


"RUCK IT UP!"


THE POST-COLD WAR
TRANSFORMATION OF V CORPS, 1990-2001



Charles E. Kirkpatrick

“RUCK IT UP!”

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"What's my mission now?" Graffiti in Kaiserslautern, 1989, summarized the Army in Europe's big question at the end of the Cold War.

“RUCK IT UP!”

THE POST-COLD WAR TRANSFORMATION OF V CORPS, 1990–2001

by
Charles E. Kirkpatrick

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Foreword

In the years following the end of the Cold War, substantial debates about the proper size, organization, composition, and techniques of command of the United States Army spurred the service to reorganize. During this time, such discussions and alterations also affected the Army's forward-deployed units in Germany—the United States Army, Europe, and its principal tactical formation, V Corps. In *"Ruck It Up!" The Post-Cold War Transformation of V Corps, 1990–2001*, Charles E. Kirkpatrick outlines a decade of change for V Corps, and the physical and intellectual tools it evolved to accomplish its changing missions.

The transformation was impressive. It began with reorienting V Corps from its traditional mission of the defense of Western Europe to becoming a force readily deployable within the U.S. European Command area of operations. Organizational, technical, and tactical developments influenced by lessons V Corps learned during missions to Africa and the Balkans spanned the decade between 1990 and 2000. Among the many and occasionally surprising lessons of the V Corps experience between 1998 and 2001 was how flexible, durable, and functional conventional general-purpose forces were in coping with a range of missions from humanitarian relief to combat operations. The author lays the essential groundwork to understand the successes of V Corps when the corps rapidly deployed to Southwest Asia, and then conducted U.S. Central Command's main attack during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

For those who continue to refine the U.S. Army's organization, roles, and missions, a careful review of this microcosm of change within the service offers useful counsel. I recommend this volume not only to those engaged in such demanding and important tasks on behalf of the Army, but also to the general reader who wishes to gain some understanding of the complexity of U.S. Army, Europe, operations after the end of the Cold War.

30 September 2005

JOHN S. BROWN
Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)
Chief of Military History

The Author

Charles E. Kirkpatrick received the B.A. *cum laude* and with honors in history from Wake Forest University in 1969 and the M.A. in European history the following year. He was a Ford Fellow at Emory University, which conferred the Ph.D. in modern European history in 1988. A retired Army officer, his military experience included a tour as assistant professor in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy and duty at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of *Archie in the A.E.F.: The Creation of the Antiaircraft Service of the United States Army, 1917–1918* (1984) and *An Unknown Future and A Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (1990). Kirkpatrick had served as the V Corps historian since 1992 and in 1994 was detailed as the historian for the U.S. Army's observances of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II in Europe. He passed away in October 2005.

Preface

In the decade following the end of the Cold War, the United States Army underwent a difficult and disruptive process of change to match itself to the conditions of the New World Order, as political pundits dubbed the highly unstable situation that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Naturally, the Army in Europe, having for more than four decades stood as the bulwark against the Warsaw Pact forces and suddenly finding itself without its defining enemy, was most directly and immediately affected. There consequently followed what often appeared to be a somewhat chaotic process of drawing down those forces that seemed no longer to be required. There also followed an extended process of redefining the mission of the forces remaining in Germany, and particularly of V Corps, the principal tactical formation in the theater. Such change—"transformation," in the argot of the day—was neither unusual nor unprecedented in the course of military history. Unfortunately, as the most cursory survey of such efforts readily demonstrated, such transformations were not always successful. More troubling, where they failed, the failures generally stemmed from causes unforeseen at the time the army began to implement change.

Parables drawn from the experiences of past armies are powerful teachers in that regard. Standing alongside a secondary road on the Franco-Belgian frontier in the shadows of the forest of the Ardennes, a scant five miles from Sedan, is a *maison fort* from the Battle of France in May 1940. One of a line of fortified houses that was intended to give advance warning of German attack, its present-day ruin remains as the physical manifestation of the intellectual and conceptual failure of the French Army to match its organization, doctrine, and capabilities properly against the military context of its day. More plainly, the isolated fortification is a mute testimony to the French Army's failed transformation after its victory of World War I, but also to the much more successful transformation that busied the German Army during those same two decades. The contrast between the two is pointed.

The French Army, evaluating its victory of 1918 and the circumstances of the peace, systematically and logically built a doctrine for war and an army based upon that doctrine. The war taught the French that fire killed, and the economic circumstances of the day impelled the nation to rely upon an army built on short-service conscription. The French Army in 1939 was therefore a force that

relied upon firepower, that did not emphasize maneuver, and the operations of which were tightly controlled at senior levels of command. More specifically, it could mobilize quickly, but required training time to be ready to give battle; had great firepower, but could not maneuver with any facility; and was thoroughly commanded, but could not react quickly to changes on the battlefield.¹

By contrast, the German Army of the 1920s and 1930s was, until the expansion that began under Hitler in 1934, a tiny professional force based on long-service enlistments. It sought a way to avoid a future war of position and, over the twenty years between the two World Wars, evolved a doctrine, a military force, and a style of command that relied heavily on traditional military virtues as understood in Germany, but one that was enhanced by exploiting the fruits of the most recent technological improvements in weapons and communications.² Although the equipment to do so was lacking except for a very small armored and mechanized spearhead, the German Army of 1940 sought to be mobile and agile and to exploit battlefield opportunities through a system of decentralized tactical command. While much of the army still walked into battle and had its impedimenta drawn by horses, the German Army's physical limitations were more than compensated for by its intellectual grasp of battle. Its leaders had already attained those goals in their style of command and concept for operating on the battlefield. In sum, as historian Robert Doughty remarked, the transformed German Army "outfought the French tactically and outsmarted them strategically."³ Lacking the precious time that the ocean barriers gave the United States Army, the French Army, created to wage only one type of war, did not have the chance to develop the flexibility it needed to respond to the German Army's faster pace of operations.

Expanding the focus allows a comparison with the United States Army, which also transformed itself periodically over the course of its history. Such changes were not necessarily matters of choice, but were inevitable and continuous. Evolving political, economic, and diplomatic contexts and the steady march of technological progress impelled the Army to evolve its capabilities, organization, equipment, and the ways it prepared to wage war. The pace of such transformation was typically gradual, and changes were normally incremental, rather than radical. Yet a perception of military requirements that was

¹ On the development of French doctrine and the evolution of the French Army between the two World Wars, see Robert A. Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1985). For an apt analysis of that Army's failure when put to the test of battle, see the same author's *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1990).

² To consider the myth of the Blitzkrieg, the single best study is Karl-Heinz Frieser, *Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug, 1940* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996). For an analysis that demonstrates that the so-called Blitzkrieg was hardly a revolution in military affairs, but was really an evolutionary development in the military art, see James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992). One of the best short expositions of the way the Germans used that force in 1940 is Florian K. Rothbrust, *Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps and the Battle of France* (New York: Praeger, 1990).

³ Doughty, *The Breaking Point*, p. 5.

based upon the needs of the day and immediately perceived urgencies, especially after great shifts in the political and diplomatic landscapes, occasionally wrought much more rapid transformation. Where quick and radical changes were made, those changes proved not always, and perhaps not even usually, to have worked out well.

The First World War was a case in point. The problem at the end of World War I was that the "obvious" defense requirements as the nation's political and military leaders understood them did not turn out to serve the longer-term needs of the nation. In 1918, after the defeat of Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, no one foresaw the need for a large American land force because no enemy existed to justify such expenditures. Focusing on the hemisphere, the Army built a smaller professional force with equipment and mobility suited to the only war it could imagine, some continuation of the insurgencies in the Pacific possessions or some small war in the difficult terrain in parts of the Americas remote from the United States. Horses properly figured largely in such an army, as did pack animals and weapons that could be transported and sustained in action by muscle power. In little more than two decades, an entirely different and far more sophisticated and powerful kind of army became necessary. Fortunately, the nation had the time to build the force needed to win World War II.⁴

An intangible had much to do with the transformation of the U.S. Army once the nature of the war became evident. During the 1920s and 1930s the Army had invested much of its limited budget in the education of its officer corps through a systematically applied school system.⁵ The consequence of that educational system was frankly fortuitous; the generation of officers that built and led the Army during World War II was prepared to recognize the changes in the nature of war and what those changes required of the formations it was building and leading. That is to say, the Army was conceptually prepared for change, even if its organization and equipment in the middle years of the 1930s were ill-suited for the battles that lay before it. The U.S. Army certainly had its "Colonel Blimps" who were determined even in 1940 to argue for the horse

⁴ Among the studies that address this very large question are the relevant volumes of the United States Army's official history series, *U.S. Army in World War II*. The issues are delineated in Mark Skinner Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, United States Army, 1950), particularly chapter 2; and Kent Roberts Greenfield et al., *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, United States Army, 1947). On the planning process to build the wartime force, see Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1992).

⁵ Particularly illuminating in this regard is General Douglas MacArthur's "Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1935," in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1935* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935). Also see Charles E. Kirkpatrick, "Orthodox Soldiers: U.S. Army Formal Schools and Junior Officers Between the Wars," in Elliott V. Converse III (ed.), *Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World*, Military History Symposium Series of the United States Air Force Academy, Vol. 5 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998).

cavalry, but such men were steadily marginalized by officers who were able to change their assumptions about warfare and military organization quickly enough to match the changes that were even then taking place in Europe.

A more successful transformation characterized the decade after the end of the war in Vietnam. During those years the Army quietly went about a systematic process of reforming itself, first of all dealing with the widespread indiscipline that characterized the service by 1972 and that lingered throughout much of that decade. Careful study of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and thoughtful consideration of the directions new technology was taking were even then helping the Army's leaders to make a series of inspired decisions that skillfully melded the capabilities of new technology to build some of the best weapon systems in the world and then to devise doctrine that wielded the new weapons in a way that exploited their capabilities. Thus the Army fielded the famous "big five" weapon systems: the M1 Abrams tank, the M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicle, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the Patriot missile system, and the UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopter, as well as making giant strides in many other systems and subsystems. Thus, also, the Army devised AirLand Battle doctrine to wield the weapons effectively. The end result was the superbly capable force that won the Persian Gulf War in 1991.⁶

And then, almost immediately, a new set of circumstances arose. Culminating events—the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War—generated demands in the United States first for a smaller military establishment and then for one restructured to accommodate the imperfectly understood circumstances of the New World Order. Accordingly, the Army once again undertook a process of transformation, a process driven by high-level studies and analyses and directed at the departmental level. The Army focused this transformation on the portion of the force that was based in the United States, designating the Army in Europe a "legacy" force that would be among the last to benefit from the modernization process.

At the same time, however, the Army in Europe, the part of the Army that was most directly and immediately affected by the end of the Cold War, began its own process of transformation. The operational demands of the post-Cold War world left no other choice, and U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), engaged in what leaders by 2002 were calling "small 't' transformation," the theater-based process of evolving USAREUR's capabilities within the constraints of its very limited funding. The process was forward-looking but also conscious of the lessons of the military past. Both at the Army level and within the Army in Europe, leaders sought to avoid the pitfalls that gave both the United States and the French the wrong types of Army in 1939. It was important for the service, to borrow Robert Doughty's perceptive description of French military policy in the interwar years, not to choose too narrow an edge on which to balance its

⁶ On that transformation, see Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *Building the Army for Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Paper No. 9, November 1991).

military policy, thus restricting the nation's alternatives when responding to a future crisis.

With those cautions in mind, the Army at large, and more particularly the Army in Europe and its premier tactical organization, V Corps, underwent a lengthy process of evolutionary change that took them away from the mind-set of the Cold War and the great heavy force battle both had long been prepared to fight along the inter-German border.⁷ By the end of the decade of the 1990s it was time to evaluate the changes that had taken place.

In November 1999 General Montgomery C. Meigs, who had been the chief of staff of V Corps at the height of the drawdown of forces and was by 1999 the commanding general of United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, conferred with the senior USAREUR leaders about the future of the command, discussing with them the characteristics of successful and enduring organizations and enlisting their views to chart the future course of the Army in Europe. Meigs was concerned that there were those, in both public and private life, who considered the Army in Europe to be too heavy and too slow to deploy, and who regarded USAREUR as a command that was still holding on to the Cold War past with its principal focus still the Fulda Gap. Such a perception was particularly frustrating in view of the fact that USAREUR had actually "moved light years beyond the old Cold War paradigm," in Meigs' words.⁸

Unfortunately, few except those who had taken part in the process knew of, or appreciated, the impressive scope of the transformation that had taken place in Germany. Nowhere were the changes of which Meigs spoke more evident than in V Corps, the headquarters that had shouldered the greater part of the load in the numerous military operations that USAREUR launched in the course of the decade. The following work is an attempt to cast light on those changes from the perspective of V Corps and to document some of the most important aspects of the process that V Corps undertook between 1990 and 2001 to accommodate it to a new political and military reality.

The topic is a large one. This history is therefore in no way comprehensive and seeks only to outline the major elements of change. Indeed, the process was both complex and convoluted, and many, many actions of V Corps, its divisions, and its separate brigades could not be recounted in the space available. The reader must also be aware that the "information age" has imposed its own limitations upon historians. Paradoxically, as the ability to communicate speeded through various technical means, and the use of microcomputers became pervasive, the production of permanent records in the traditional sense declined precipitously. As the pace of V Corps operations accelerated, much of

⁷ Inter-German Border was an American military term, rather than a political one, deriving from the description of operations to defend central Europe from Warsaw Pact attack. The IGB, as it was customarily called, was defined in Cold War-era publications such as Field Manual 34-35, *Armored Cavalry Regiment and Separate Brigade Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*.

⁸ Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs Briefing at Senior Leaders Conference, Leading Change in USAREUR, 17 November 1999.

the decision-making became oral, either in meetings or, increasingly, in video-conferences, and never entered the documentary record. Hence, the rationale for some key decisions remains only imperfectly understood and, to the extent that it is understood, has been revealed only through the medium of oral history interviews, which have their own imperfections.

The scope of the study is further circumscribed. Inasmuch as the documentary evidence from which the author had to work was almost entirely V Corps records, this monograph considers the process of change and the actions of the Army in Europe entirely from the corps' point of view, leaving to others the task of setting forth the perspectives of higher headquarters and political authorities. Moreover, the reader should bear in mind that this is also, in a sense, a personal narrative, because the author was assigned as a V Corps staff officer throughout most of the period under discussion, and his views and opinions, shaped by the perspective of the headquarters in which he served, occasionally and inevitably encroach upon the historian's ideal of perfect objectivity. Finally, it is important to consider that this study has been written at a point in time close to that of the events that it describes and attempts to analyze a time when the path of the Army's post-Cold War evolution is by no means firmly and finally chosen.

Even with all those limitations, the story is an important one and the tentative conclusions worthy of consideration. Indeed, the transformation of V Corps from a traditional tank-heavy corps committed to a high intensity battle in central Europe to a lighter, more deployable reaction force simply based in central Europe is an exemplar of the changes that confronted the Army at large during the same period. The actions of the corps speak for themselves in explaining the difficulties the service encountered during a period in which major changes were being made at the same time that a high pace of operations had to be sustained. The narrative that follows outlines the major shifts in the operational context in which V Corps found itself after 1990 and discusses the major military operations in which the corps took part. Those operations gave the headquarters the essential "feedback" to adjust its organization and training to be more in synch with the requirements it faced. Finally, the study offers some tentative conclusions about the process of transformation of the Army in Europe, as seen from the perspective of one heavy, mechanized corps.

So while the task of V Corps is to carry out military operations, the task of its historian is to follow at a discreet distance and record what the corps and its units have done. In the nature of things, busy commanders and staffs are more immediately concerned about the doing than about the recording. Despite that, commanders, staffs, and soldiers across the corps have been unusually forthcoming and helpful and have given freely of their limited time to help document the many operations of a busy headquarters over a decade that offered few opportunities to pause for reflection.

Thanks are therefore due the commanders, staffs, and soldiers of V Corps who made their records available for this study, and likewise for those who made available the time for thoughtful interviews about operations and the key developments that occurred during their assignments in the corps. Those interviews

were especially important because of the dearth of written records about some of the process of transformation. I am particularly indebted to General David M. Maddox, General Montgomery C. Meigs, General John W. Hendrix, General B. B. Bell, Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, Maj. Gen. Julian Burns, Maj. Gen. Richard Cody, Maj. Gen. Robert T. Dail, Maj. Gen. William L. Nash, Maj. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, Maj. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes, Maj. Gen. Walter H. Yates, Maj. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Brig. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, Jr., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Bruner, Brig. Gen. James S. Dickey, Brig. Gen. Lloyd Waterman, and Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Swain; to the many principal staff officers, plans and operations officers, and other members of the V Corps staff; and to unit commanders and staffs and soldiers within the corps for their invaluable contributions.

Some years ago, a wise old cavalry colonel observed to me that "majors run the Army," a deceptively profound statement. Majors, who do not normally command, spend their years in grade as staff officers at various echelons. Once past brigade level, they are rarely staff principals, but are the second and third tier staff deputies upon whom falls the greater part of what the Army calls "nug work." They are the action officers, normally and necessarily given vast discretion and often astonishing independence, who keep the Army functioning. They rarely receive credit for their work, thereby breathing modern life into General Hans von Seeckt's nineteenth century dictum about staff officers.⁹ Throughout the decade of the 1990s, V Corps was exceedingly fortunate to have had the services of a remarkably talented and dedicated group of such officers in its staff sections. While the story of the transformation of the corps has generally been recounted in the words of the generals and staff principals, it was the vast quantity of excellent staff papers, briefings, plans, orders, and other documents the majors and other staff planners produced that lay at the heart of the story. Their individual contributions to the changes in V Corps generally went unremarked, but the cumulative effect was profound. Accordingly, they merit special mention and thanks, even if I have not cited them individually.

Other debts must be acknowledged. I am grateful to Mr. Bruce Siemon, the historian of United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, and his superb staff of historians, particularly Mr. Warner Stark and the late Mr. Steven P. Gehring, for their assistance throughout this study. They generously gave me unrestricted access to their files and draft manuscripts and helped me to locate important records. I am particularly grateful for their encouragement, advice, and critical reviews of the developing manuscript. At various steps in the research and writing process, several deputy chiefs of staff of V Corps guided my work, and I owe much to the advice and tenders of experience particularly from Col. William W. Alexander and Col. Daniel M. Ferezan, both of whom had

⁹ Chief of the Army command of the tiny German *Reichswehr* from 1920 to 1926, von Seeckt was fond of saying that "General Staff officers have no names." Quoted in Hermann Foertsch *The Art of Modern Warfare* (New York: Veritas, 1940), p. 46.

crucially important and generally little-recognized influence in a series of key events while they were assigned to V Corps. I also owe thanks to some of the long-serving members of the corps staff whose collective memory allowed them to function as a sounding board for ideas about the evolution of this manuscript and whose advice was important in the development of the project. These especially include Mr. Raymond D. Nolen, Lt. Col. Dan Sulka, Lt. Col. Mike Lehto, and Lt. Col. Peter Schifferle. I also appreciate the encouragement and support of the successive Chiefs of Military History who have long sustained an interest in this project and whose staff stood ready to assist at every turn: Brig. Gen. Hal Nelson, Brig. Gen. John Mountcastle, and Brig. Gen. John S. Brown. In that regard, I also owe special thanks to Mr. William Epley, an old soldier and good friend who was my point of contact at the Center of Military History.

Those who write are often inclined to be weak on self-criticism, and it is to peers that the historian turns for help. In that connection, I must particularly thank Army Chief Historian Dr. Jeffrey Clarke for his detailed consideration of the manuscript and recommendations for improvement. I have also been fortunate to have had a number of friends and old colleagues, all of whom are gifted historians, who have been willing to supply any deficiency in self-criticism I may have displayed. Through discussions of the issues with which I have been working, they have also helped me to clarify ideas and establish the frame of reference for various parts of the manuscript. It is impossible for me to overstress the importance of their candor and critical reviews of my work. I am particularly indebted to Maj. Gen. (U.S.A., Ret.) William A. Stofft, formerly Chief of Military History and Commandant of the Army War College, who has an intimate understanding of the changes in the Army in Europe and with whom I have often discussed the manuscript. For more than fifteen years he has been my guide and mentor, both as a historian and as a soldier, and this present study bears the stamp of his influence at many points. A number of colleagues from my days in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy offered equally valuable criticism and helped in various ways, including helping me maintain a seemly modesty. I especially value the advice of Dr. (Col., Ret.) Richard Swain, Dr. (Col., Ret.) W. Scott Wheeler, and Col. (Ret.) Gregory Fontenot. Their perspectives on the Cold War and post-Cold War experience of the Army, embodied in remarks and observations they have probably long since forgotten, were extremely helpful to me. In a separate category, I must thank Dr. (Col., Ret.) Henry Gole and Dr. (Lt. Col., Ret.) Martin Andresen, also old colleagues from the History Department, for their very similar assistance and especially for their work in developing the after action report on Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, upon which those chapters of this study have in large part been based.

Then-Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs chartered this study in 1994, while he was V Corps chief of staff, pointing out that the Victory Corps was involved in a unique change of mission that had many implications, not only for the corps, but also for the Army at large. Although he soon moved on to greater responsibilities, he remained in touch with what I have been doing and has of-

ferred constant encouragement. His original project directive was my guidance from start to finish: chronicle the post-Cold War transformation of a heavy corps committed to the German Defense Plan battle.

General Meigs unintentionally influenced the study in another way. After he became Commanding General, U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, General Meigs began for his senior staff and commanders a series of staff rides that continued throughout his tenure of command. I am fortunate to have participated in many of those staff rides as part of the historical staff. History was, of course, not the point of the staff ride. Instead, Meigs used the battles we studied as vehicles to consider the nature of modern military operations and the complex tasks that devolve upon senior officers in carrying them out. I thus had occasion to hear candid and thoughtful discussions of a wide range of subjects, including many of those considered in this present study, by the generals who had been charged with executing the tasks U.S. Army, Europe, undertook in the post-Cold War era. Those invaluable discussions deepened my understanding of the issues with which I was dealing as I wrote the study.

This project could not have been carried to completion without the assistance of all these persons, as well as the editor, Susan Carroll; the cartographer, S. L. Dowdy; and the book layout and cover designer, Henrietta M. Snowden, and I am grateful for all that they have done to help. The unit designations and organization in the charts and tables are the author's reconstruction of what existed at the time. I alone am responsible, however, for the interpretation of the records and interviews, and at my door must be laid any of the infelicities that may turn up, including all errors of fact, of interpretation, and of omission. One somewhat delicate issue remains to be mentioned. If my affection for the Victory Corps and organizational loyalty occasionally show through in what I have written, I ask the reader's understanding indulgence. A retired soldier, I confess I have retained a soldier's affection and admiration for the professionalism of the American soldiers I know best.

Heidelberg, Germany
April 2003

CHARLES E. KIRKPATRICK

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“RUCK IT UP!”

THE POST-COLD WAR
TRANSFORMATION OF V CORPS, 1990–2001

The Beginnings of Transformation

"... we have certainly lost out on the barbed wire and iron curtain piece of the action."

Col. William W. Alexander
V Corps Deputy Chief of Staff, 1992

"If you haven't been in Europe in the last year, all you knew before doesn't count. All that was written about Europe is no longer valid, and that which is valid about Europe is yet to be written."

Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Commanding General,
V Corps Support Command, 1995

"It's a case of 'vuja de.' You go out and don't recognize anything at all."

Dr. R. S. Garnett
V Corps Government Relations Adviser, 1995

To prepare soldiers for the risks they were likely to encounter in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1995 General William Crouch, Commander in Chief of United States Army, Europe, prescribed a course of individual training that each trooper had to complete before leaving Germany for duty with Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The course of situational training exercises was conducted at Hohenfels Training Area under field conditions—which began with living in tents, regardless of the weather. Naturally, word of the mildly unpleasant training circumstances quickly got around. M. Sgt. John T. Butt, the senior noncommissioned officer in G-3 Operations in the 1st Infantry Division, was responsible for mustering division soldiers requiring that training and seeing them off to Hohenfels. Through 1996, as V Corps units were augmented by both Regular Army soldiers and soldiers called to active duty from the reserve components, there was a steady demand for the training course, so Sergeant Butt found himself fulfilling his task every few days.

On each occasion, some percentage of the group presented what it regarded as irrefutable arguments in favor of delaying the trip to Hohenfels. Butt's response was conditioned by his instinctive economy with words and by a long-service soldier's equally instinctive impatience with anyone lacking what he saw as a proper concept of duty, especially given the pervasive use of the

phrase "Duty First!" throughout the Big Red One: "Shut up," he replied, "and get on the bus."

Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford's command of V Corps ended well before the Bosnia mission began. However, involved in a number of other missions outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) European confines, he had a similar response that he favored when his subordinate commanders or staff expressed reservations about one of the new "out of sector" missions that fell to V Corps after the end of the Persian Gulf War. After listening to their litany of objections, he, too, had a professional soldier's response: "Ruck it up!"

As understood in V Corps, "ruck it up!" had much the same import as "shut up and get on the bus." The expression meant that discussion was over; that the mission, whether desirable or not, was clear; that the corps had been allotted the task; and that it was time to pick up the rucksack and move out. The aphorism could easily be overdrawn, but it is fair to take "ruck it up!" as the working philosophy of V Corps between 1990 and 2001 as the headquarters went through the complicated and interrelated series of changes it experienced in that decade.

Stability and Change

Change was the unifying theme for the United States Army in Europe after the end of the Cold War. Within V Corps that change was profound, not just in terms of the drawdown that slashed the numbers of soldiers and tactical units, but also in terms of the missions that the corps was given to accomplish. Once the Warsaw Pact threat in Europe was gone, V Corps began to look to a series of new tasks, wholly different from the Cold War duties that had long served as its reason for being. Those new tasks naturally imposed new training and operational requirements that conditioned the way a heavy corps had to evolve to meet all of those demands, changing the focus of its operations from the traditional heavy force battle to the diverse military requirements that arose after 1989. The changes were significant, ending decades of stability in operations, training, and the general philosophy of how the corps should be employed.

The V Corps mission hardly changed from 1951, when growing East-West tensions dictated its return to Europe, through 1989, when the Warsaw Pact collapsed and the Cold War confrontation in a divided Germany came to an end. Assigned to what came to be known as NATO's Central Region, V Corps had responsibility for slightly more than a fifty-mile sector of the inter-German border, with particular attention to the Fulda Gap, which was one of the principal avenues of approach from the east and a corridor allowing access to the city of Frankfurt am Main, the financial capital of the Federal Republic of Germany. For almost half a century, the pattern for operations of the "Imperial Army of the Rhein," as soldiers called it, remained a familiar one. The V Corps stationed its armored cavalry regiment well forward, based on Fulda, to screen and observe the border. Two heavy divisions, one armored and one mechanized, and a number of separate brigades or groups of supporting arms and services were based



The 14th Armored Cavalry screened the inter-German border in the V Corps sector. The "Border Belle" was one of the first American tanks across the Rhine River at Remagen in 1945.

at casernes that lay chiefly, but not entirely, in the state of Hessen and remained poised to deploy forward rapidly to carefully selected defensive positions along the border, there to fight a delaying battle until reinforcements arrived from the United States and elsewhere in the NATO alliance.¹

The anticipated battle itself would be fought according to the thoroughly understood and well-rehearsed General Defense Plan. Frequent exercises ensured that U.S. Army units had an intimate and detailed knowledge—a knowledge probably unrivaled in the history of the United States Army—of the terrain on which they expected to fight.² At division, brigade combat team, and battalion task force levels, planners elaborated the provisions of the General Defense Plan in great detail and prepared "battle books" that included maps, checklists, and photographs of battle positions and other significant pieces of terrain. Commanders at every level from USAREUR down through battalion conducted regular terrain walks with their subordinates to discuss potential operations. Naturally, every unit paid meticulous attention to the disposition of Warsaw Pact forces across the border and kept its intelligence staff busy updating the presumptive readiness and organization of those units. Of course, the entire plan was frequently reviewed and updated.

Throughout the Cold War, the attention of V Corps units remained fastened upon readiness and gunnery, and periodic tests and exercises made certain that both met exacting standards. Generations of soldiers shared the same experience—the eternal round of gunnery and field training exercises. Battalions moved from garrison to the training areas at Grafenwöhr, Vilseck, Baumholder, and Hohenfels and back to garrison with the regularity and inevitability of the changing of the seasons. Corps commanders demanded skilled



Tank gunnery was a crucial element of V Corps Cold War training. This is a tank of the 3d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, at Grafenwöhr in 1967.

maneuver, but for the individual soldier, platoon leader, company commander, and battalion commander, gunnery lay at the heart of all training. The overwhelming numerical strength of Warsaw Pact forces confronting V Corps demanded proficiency in gunnery above all else. Hence, tank crew qualification in the armored battalions and Expert Infantry Badge qualification in the mechanized infantry battalions held first place as the most important measures of success. Thus, the experiences of a V Corps soldier who manned an M41 tank in 1952, or an M48 tank in 1959, or an M60 tank in 1975, or an M1 tank in 1989 were similar, and the same held true for soldiers of all the other arms and services. Technical and tactical proficiency properly dominated the thoughts of leaders at all levels.

Exercises of all sorts filled the time that battalions were not involved in gunnery and maintenance. Winter maneuvers had long been an annual event, but became the premier exercise in October 1963, when Operation BIG LIFT brought the 2d Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas, to participate. The V Corps, then under command of Lt. Gen. Creighton Abrams, was responsible for running BIG LIFT, which had a political purpose as well as a military one. President John F. Kennedy wished to demonstrate, in the aftermath of the 1961 Berlin confrontation, that the United States was determined to defend Europe. BIG LIFT was also a rigorous test of the concept of pre-positioning equipment in Europe that arriving troops would use. In 1967 the United States announced



Winter maneuvers of 2d Armored Division in January 1956

Lt. Gen. Creighton Abrams at a brigade change of command ceremony in the 3d Brigade, 8th Infantry Division. Lt. Col. George Casey is at Abrams' rear.



plans to withdraw 28,000 soldiers, roughly two divisions, from Europe in 1968. To demonstrate its continuing commitment to NATO, the United States concurrently agreed to a large-scale force deployment of not less than three brigades of a single division to Europe in an annual exercise, for which BIG LIFT became the model.

Thus was born the annual Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercise, which supplemented the General Defense Plan by reinforcement and, through continuous refinement, became a plan that was tightly integrated with U.S. and NATO naval and air force plans. REFORGER tested the ability of conventional forces to reinforce Europe and fight in a conventional war. The first REFORGER, which the Soviets denounced as a major military provocation, began on 6 January 1969. Starting in that year, V Corps took part in REFORGER as the culmination of an annual training cycle that became increasingly structured as time went on.

In WINTEX exercises, the corps evaluated general defense, administrative, and certain other war plans. Other exercises helped resolve questions about how best to cooperate with NATO allies, and V Corps troops regularly went to the field with French, British, and German units to become familiar with the other nations' equipment, organization, communications, and tactical doctrine. Still other exercises tested U.S. Army, Europe, operation plans and served as USAREUR and V Corps preliminaries to REFORGER. For most Cold War veterans, however, one of the dominant impressions was the periodic and unannounced readiness test, when all soldiers were recalled to their units, generally in the middle of the night, and moved out to their general defense positions in accordance with a strict timetable that permitted no variance and admitted no excuses for failure. The sound of a telephone ringing in the middle of the night was, for many, the most enduring emblem of service in Europe during those tension-laden years.


All other corps operations were aimed at supporting the deployment of the divisions forward to the Fulda Gap, which General Abrams once called "a playground for tanks."³ Indeed, the battlefield on which V Corps expected to fight was organized in a way that bore curious and striking resemblance to battlefields on which it had previously fought: St.-Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Normandy, and the Ardennes. The corps deployed itself from back to front along a linear battlefield with well-defined flanks, which in the years after 1957 included the III Korps of the new Federal German *Bundeswehr* to the north and U.S. VII Corps to the south.⁴ Logistical arrangements were clearly defined, pushing supplies and materiel forward along carefully controlled supply routes. Indeed, the General Defense Plan defined a linear logistics battlefield with a firm, fixed theater structure, a definitive corps rear boundary, all the ports and airports substantial distances to the rear, and a big, robust theater army that fed the corps a specified tonnage of supplies every day. Traffic flow was carefully controlled to support a battle with a clearly defined forward area. Allowing for modern weapons and increased engagement ranges, the V Corps battlefield and the control measures intended to manage the fight were familiar ones.

The foe was substantial and formidable. The *Group of Soviet Forces in Germany*, eventually augmented by the *Volksarmee* of the German Democratic Republic and the other Eastern European nations of the Warsaw Pact, was a powerful army that Americans assumed remained constantly poised for war. Large Soviet tactical air forces maintained bases all across Germany and the other central European states to support the land battle, and equally large elements of the Soviet fleet secured the theater's flanks in the Baltic Sea. The Soviet preparations for war were as thorough as those of NATO, large and frequent exercises being held on a regular and recurring schedule throughout the calendar year. Within the Soviet Union itself were stationed many more divisions that could quickly be brought into a major European battle. One other element of Soviet military power continued to worry NATO planners as well. Highly trained commando forces, the much-vaunted Spetznatz troops, formed an integral part of all Soviet battle plans. Such forces would certainly be deployed in great numbers and across the depth of the battlefield to attack all of those rear area installations that sustained the NATO land battle, but particularly command and control headquarters, logistics bases, airfields, and lines of communication. Plans had to be laid, and forces allocated, for what eventually came to be known in the United States Army as the "rear battle" against commando units.

The Victory Corps confronted only a small part of that larger armed force, but in a place NATO planners considered critical: the so-called "Fulda Gap." Opposite V Corps in the Fulda Gap was the Soviet *Eighth Guards Army*, one of the major formations of the *Group of Soviet Forces in Germany*. Given the honorific "Guards" in July 1943, the army had previously been located at Berlin, and then at Weimar and Nohra. In August 1951, about the time that V Corps was returning to Germany with the heightening of Cold War tensions, the *Eighth Guards Army* moved its headquarters entirely to Nohra, a town just southwest of Weimar. The forces assigned to the army varied over the years, but in general were maintained at a level of two mechanized divisions and two rifle divisions with supporting organizations. With the Soviet division being slightly smaller than an American division, the *Eighth Guards Army* was roughly equivalent to an American corps, and therefore any battle along the inter-German border would, at least in the opening stages of a war, be a parity fight.

In 1957, and typically for the Cold War period, the *Eighth Guards Army's* divisions were dispersed throughout the army sector, with the *21st Guards Mechanized Division* at Halle, the *20th Guards Mechanized Division* at Jena, the *57th Guards Rifle Division* at Naumburg, the *39th Guards Rifle Division* forward at Ohrdruf, and the *13th Antiaircraft Artillery Division* at Weimar. (Map 1) The major training area for the army was at Ohrdruf, with smaller supplementary areas at Eisenach and Lossa. Typically for the Soviet Army, the *Eighth Guards* was heavy in artillery.⁵

The *Eighth Guards Army*, a "conventional" army, was designed as a major force that could sustain attacks against strong defensive positions or,



MAP 1

alternatively, defend organized positions. The corps echelon of command did not exist. While the *Eighth Guards Army* had four divisions, it had the potential for far greater strength, because according to Soviet doctrine the independent brigades were really cadre divisions that could quickly expand when additional men and equipment were provided. The Soviet Army had in fact often done that during World War II.

The *Eighth Guards Army* attained a cumulative peacetime strength of 60,195 soldiers. Facing the Soviet divisions at Fulda, V Corps looked across the border wire at rifle divisions that had 9,721 men and mechanized divisions that had 11,523. The rifle division owned 77 medium tanks and 5 amphibious tanks, whereas the mechanized division could field 46 heavy tanks, 229 medium tanks, and 30 amphibious tanks. Thus, without reinforcement, the *Eighth Guards Army* could muster 92 heavy tanks, 612 medium tanks, and up to 70 amphibious tanks. In addition, the army had 42 assault guns with 152-mm. guns, 110 assault guns armed with 100-mm. or 122-mm. guns, 36 assault guns armed with either a 76-mm. or 85-mm. gun, and 734 armored infantry personnel carriers. The artillery support was substantial.

At first glance, V Corps and *Eighth Guards Army* appeared to be evenly matched forces. It was the forward placement of the additional Soviet forces that made the difference, since divisions from elsewhere in Germany or from European Russia could reach the inter-German border very swiftly—much more swiftly than REFORGER could reinforce the NATO armies. In the opening phases of any European war, NATO forces in general were confronted with the possibility of being overwhelmed by far more Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions equipped with far more tanks and other armored vehicles than NATO forces had. With these powerful Soviet forces in mind, it is easy to understand why force modernization in the United States Army was for decades both dictated by and focused on the United States Army, Europe.

As the case of the *Eighth Guards Army* illustrates, the Warsaw Pact and *Group of Soviet Forces in Germany* were either actually or potentially far larger in manpower and possessed greater quantities of all sorts of weaponry than the NATO land forces. For the General Defense Plan to succeed, soldiers in Europe had to “fight outnumbered and win,” as the 1982 version of the Army’s operations manual phrased it.⁶ Lacking the quantitative edge in artillery and numbers of tanks and other fighting vehicles, the U.S. Army sought a qualitative advantage, with the goal of allowing smaller American units to be able to take on far larger attacking formations with some hope of success.

The result was a steady upgrading of the equipment assigned to the soldiers in Europe. The various models of the M4 Sherman tank were replaced after World War II by the M26 Pershing, designed to cope with the German PzKw V (“Panther”) and PzKw VI (“Tiger”) tanks and therefore comparable to the then-current Soviet armor. The M41 light and M47 medium tanks of the early 1950s were soon entirely supplanted by heavier equipment. The M48 Patton tank with its 90-mm. cannon, for years the mainstay of the American tank battalions, was in its turn replaced by the M60 series, with a 105-mm. gun and other

armaments in various modifications. Ultimately, V Corps tank battalions were equipped with the M1 Abrams tank (105-mm. cannon) and M1A1 Abrams tank (120-mm. cannon). Comparable upgrades occurred in every major category of weapon, with infantry fighting vehicles culminating in the M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle; helicopters, in the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter; artillery, in the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the Army Tactical Missile System; and air defense, in the Patriot Missile System.⁷ Whenever modernization occurred in the United States Army, the new equipment went first in quantity to the Army in Europe, where the nation was prepared to fight the war that might be least probable, but that was nonetheless the one offering the highest risk to national interests.

Tactical evolution also aimed at dealing with the much more numerous Soviet enemy and finding ways to use the more capable weapons most efficiently. Tactically, the Army at the start of the 1970s was a deeply divided institution. The Army in Vietnam, an army through which most of the rest of the service passed in one-year rotations, emphasized infantry-airmobile warfare suitable for that conflict. Meanwhile, the Army in Europe, confronting the much less probable—but infinitely more serious—Warsaw Pact threat, remained a heavy mechanized and armored force. There was no unifying doctrine that satisfied the needs of both armies, and Army doctrinal manuals reflected that ambiva-

The M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank





The AH-64A Apache attack helicopter

lence. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 threw the Army's quandary into high relief, pointing up the lethality of the modern battlefield: in only one month of fighting, the Israeli, Syrian, and Egyptian armies lost more tanks and artillery than then existed in the entire U.S. Army, Europe.⁸ New and deadly weapons, especially antitank missiles, rendered existing "pure" tank forces dangerously obsolete. A future armored war, it was clear, would consume enormous quantities of materiel and manpower, and the Army needed to devise a way to win any such war quickly.

Beginning with the promotion of a concept known as the Active Defense in 1976,⁹ the Army systematically reconsidered its doctrine for battle. The next edition of the operations manual, appearing in 1982, focused on winning "the first battle of the next war" and demanded a trained and ready peacetime force, a reversal of traditional American military practice. The 1982 doctrine envisioned the armored force as the centerpiece of battle, and the tank as the single most important weapon available to the commander. The manual stressed, however, that it was the deft manipulation of all of the arms, together with air power, that would give the maneuver forces the means to win battles. The new doctrine required commanders to seize the initiative from the enemy; to act faster than the enemy could react; to exploit depth of battle through operations extending in space, time, and resources to keep the enemy off balance; and to synchronize the combat power of ground and air forces at the decisive point of battle.

Commanders were not to devote their whole attention to the fight along the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA)—a familiar term replaced by “forward line of own troops (FLOT).” Instead, the 1982 operations doctrine required commanders simultaneously to manage three battles. In close operations, large tactical formations—preeminently the corps—fought the current battle through maneuver, close combat, and indirect fire support. Close operations bore the immediate burden of victory or defeat. Deep operations, on the other hand, helped to win the battle by engaging enemy formations not in contact, chiefly through deception, deep surveillance, and ground and air interdiction of enemy reserves. Objectives of deep operations were to isolate the current battlefield and to influence when, where, and against whom future battles would be fought. Rear operations proceeded simultaneously with the other two and focused on assembling and moving reserves, redeploying fire support, continuing logistical efforts to sustain the battle, and providing continuity of command and control. Security operations, traffic control, and maintenance of lines of communication were critical to rear operations.¹⁰

From the point of view of soldiers serving in Europe, the battle they were prepared to fight was the most sophisticated in the history of warfare, and maintaining readiness to fight it was a professionally absorbing task. Technical and tactical proficiency, in view of technologically complex weapons and even more complex operational requirements, had never before been so stringently defined. Soldiers’ and leaders’ attentions remained fixed on maintaining that proficiency, and the theater itself built an elaborate logistical structure aimed at supporting the style of battle for which the two European-based corps trained.

End of the Cold War

At the end of the 1980s the United States Army in Europe was a formidable military organization. Equipped with the most modern weapons and hardware, trained to demanding standards according to a rigorous and well-considered program, organized efficiently for a high intensity war, and exquisitely rehearsed in its battle plans, the army had, in the words of one thoughtful officer, finally reached the standard of organization, equipment, doctrine, and training that its leaders of 1941 had envisioned for the forthcoming war against the Axis.¹¹ However overdrawn that observation might have been, it pointed up the truth that V Corps and VII Corps were well prepared for the long-feared battle with the Warsaw Pact. For four decades and more, V Corps soldiers had fastened their collective attention upon one exquisitely difficult and exacting mission, and the Army in Europe had organized, equipped, trained, and planned only for that mission. The end of the Cold War and the consequent removal of the countervailing military threat in central Europe inevitably brought with it a demand for a reduction of American forces in Germany and a reconsideration of the missions the residual forces would have.

In 1989 V Corps assessed its position and the prospects for the next several years. Of principal concern to Lt. Gen. George Joulwan, the corps com-

mander, was retaining an emphasis on battle training, while also modernizing and maintaining the subordinate units. To do that, he intended to stabilize training calendars and prioritize the training tasks and other missions for the corps and its divisions and brigades. To ease the impact of force modernization on training schedules, he decided to integrate introduction of the new equipment and new organizations as part of scheduled training, insofar as possible. The other major concern was allotting enough time to monitor and maintain combat systems at an acceptable state of readiness. Looking forward two years, Joulwan also directed his staff to consider the impacts of events that he thought might occur, including a possible Army decision to make the European tour of duty unaccompanied or to reduce the number of families overseas. Of equal concern were the potential impacts of further budget reductions on readiness and maintenance of standards. Looming on the horizon were overseas force reductions that the corps estimated at 10 to 20 percent, and Joulwan adjudged it overwhelmingly important to evaluate how much such a reduction would affect the corps' ability to carry out its wartime contingency plans.¹²

By October 1990 the situation had been clarified somewhat. German unification was a reality and the Warsaw Pact was in disarray. The Cold War appeared to be over, although 350,000 Soviet soldiers remained in eastern Germany. The threat to Western Europe had markedly diminished. Nevertheless, uncertainty and instability in Eastern Europe were higher than ever. Against that background, the United States announced a reduction of U.S. forces in Germany and identified the first units to go, establishing a date of 1 March 1991 for the departure of the first increment. Joulwan already knew that V Corps had to decrease in size by 15,000 soldiers in Fiscal Year 1991, a task his successor, Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox, had to implement after assuming command in November 1990. It was in the course of planning for those draw-downs that V Corps sent substantial forces to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD at the end of 1990 and foresaw possible future rotational requirements for more troop units and a continuing support requirement for units already in Southwest Asia. Complicating training was an increasing domestic German sensitivity to maneuver damage and noise and to the dislocations that training inevitably caused. Considering the Cold War over, Germans began to question seriously why the Americans needed to maintain the same high training tempo.¹³

Setting the corps priorities in the midst of continuing and evidently unpredictable change, General Maddox stressed continuing support for Operation DESERT SHIELD, maintenance of readiness to ensure stability in Europe, and the "build down" of forces in Germany. The political complexities of German unification and the continuing fall of the dollar against the Deutsche mark affected the affordability of training and on-going work to improve V Corps installations. The General Defense Plan for Europe, on the other hand, was literally put on the shelf in the G-3 Plans office. Periodic updates were made to the plan on the basis of directives from USAREUR, but the Cold War, the Iron Curtain, and the Fulda Gap were—as far as V Corps was concerned—things of

the past. Looking ahead to how the corps would train, Maddox also pointed out that the annual REFORGER exercise was no longer in synch with the political and operational realities with which V Corps had to contend. Obviously, major changes to the training philosophy were in the offing as well.¹⁴

Replacing the General Defense Plan as the guiding principle in training and organization for combat was a set of plans that addressed the needs of what V Corps referred to as “out of sector missions.” During the Cold War years V Corps had been part of NATO’s Central Army Group and had been aligned with the other NATO corps along the inter-German border in what looked like a linear defense of the style last fought during World War II. (*Map 2*) Just arriving at the fight was a central issue by 1990, though, since the future battlefield would presumably not be on the inter-German border. Maddox assumed that the corps would evolve into a multinational formation that had to assemble, move 200 kilometers or more into a forward assembly area, and then conduct a movement to contact with the enemy. His plans for corps training reflected that assumption, calling for the corps to assemble at Baumholder, Friedberg, Mannheim, Frankfurt, and Fulda; move about two hundred kilometers to the Grafenwöhr Training Area; then move tactically about one hundred kilometers to the Hohenfels Training Area, where the training “fight” would be conducted.¹⁵ New technology, including the recently developed Maneuver Control System, became critical tools for controlling the battle that Maddox believed would characterize future V Corps operations.

The V Corps showing new soldiers and their families the Iron Curtain in the corps sector during border tours





MAP 2

Tests of the new operational principle took place in the extensive V Corps exercise series in 1990–91, including the Corps Caravan Guard exercise of July 1991 and the REFORGER exercise of September 1991, preparations for which began more than a year earlier. Starting in June 1990, the corps and its subordinate commands conducted a series of field and map exercises to work out details of the new training concept. In December 1990 Exercise Cactus Juggler was combined with the fielding of the new Maneuver Control System. In February 1991 V Corps used the Mobile Subscriber Equipment Capability Evaluation as another chance to test the maneuver concept, further refining it in a series of division and cavalry regiment exercises into the spring of 1991. Exercise Central Fortress of May–June 1991 was the first full test, leading to Exercise Caravan Guard in July and the REFORGER in September.¹⁶

In each of those field problems, Maddox emphasized, the principles of combat were unchanging. What had changed were the conditions. Large unit exercises with full troop unit participation, and particularly with armored vehicles, were things of the past. The corps could expect training in maneuver rights areas to become more limited.¹⁷ Likewise, local training areas would continue to be available, but their use would increasingly be restricted by local demands to decrease noise and military activity. To compensate, simulations would have to increase and improve in quality. They, Maddox thought, were the key to success, since simulations could stress and develop battle staffs and commanders by offering varying tactical situations of differing degrees of intensity. In his opinion, every exercise, staff ride, terrain walk, staff procedure drill, and map exercise should use a corps tactical problem as the scenario and reflect the current corps mission essential task list—those unit tasks deemed vital for success.

The “graduation exercise,” replacing the traditional REFORGER, was the Army’s Battle Command Training Program Warfighter Exercise, an external evaluation of command post functions of units of brigade size and larger, conducted by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth in cooperation with the unit being tested. The Warfighter had the flexibility to build scenarios to emphasize problems or tactical situations of concern to the tested unit commander. Broadly speaking, the forward-deployed corps needed to train all of its units to fight according to then-current operational realities. The Warfighter exercises and corps evolutions at major training areas provided opportunities to integrate into the tests the corps “slice” of combat service support (the logistical support from the 3d Corps Support Command allocated to each division) and to conduct large unit operations.¹⁸

NATO generally shared the V Corps view of the future operational context, and its planners reacted to the changed political situation in Europe by considering what the future NATO strategy should be. The NATO goals of collective defense, protected peace, and democratic stability in an uncertain world remained constants.¹⁹ The immediate problem was for NATO to decide how to respond to threats to collective security when the location and nature of such threats were unpredictable. NATO found common ground with American

assessments that instability in the former Warsaw Pact area was likely to be a continuing concern, and concluded that crisis management planning was therefore essential to sound NATO strategy. A second and political wrinkle demanding some consideration was that nations other than the United States intended to decrease the size of their active forces after the end of the Cold War, so that the traditional missions of assuring stability and deterring aggression, whether in central Europe or outside of Europe, had to be accomplished through means that stressed economy in the use of military force. Ultimately, the basic operational concept that NATO adopted was virtually identical to the one U.S. Army, Europe, had already begun to apply in exercises. NATO also had to develop a deployable force capable of moving to places outside of its normal Cold War operational area. That implied availability of air—and sealift—flexible command arrangements, a highly trained staff, units configured for short-notice movement, and the ability to assess accurately the amount of force needed for a given situation. The NATO maneuver concept was identical to the one V Corps and other U.S. forces had begun to exercise, stressing movement to contact and maneuver on a fluid and open battlefield.²⁰

All of that indicated that NATO and USAREUR were marching down the same path, sharing an important coincidence of view. Of more interest, however, was NATO's determination that the old division of Allied Forces, Central Europe, into Northern, Central, and Southern Army Groups was outmoded and that future NATO operations should involve true multinational forces.²¹ According to that concept, each member nation would provide an appropriate force contribution and the NATO structure would provide for realistic control of logistics, administration, and training by the contributing nations while itself maintaining centralized operational control. NATO leaders then envisioned forces from more than one nation serving under a nominated NATO commander who had an internationally integrated headquarters. The model for such integrated forces from different nations was the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land), a quick-reaction NATO strike force that had operated in that way for many years. The concept contrasted with the more historically common model of assigning various national forces to a single national headquarters—an American corps, for example—augmented by an appropriate international staff.²² Both types of organization lay in V Corps' future.

In the NATO view, multinational forces had several advantages. They naturally demonstrated the solidarity of the alliance, but NATO planners anticipated that they were also likely to be more efficient. Forces contributed by several nations might permit reduced national force structures overall. Allied interoperability and standardization could also be expected to improve in such organizations. That optimism was tempered by NATO's realistic investigation into the enduring problems of multinational forces and the impact of those problems on the proposed organizational model. National differences in language, doctrine, training, leadership styles, logistics, equipment, weapons, communications, force structures, readiness and mobilization techniques, and time tables were considerable. While, therefore, multinational forces were


politically desirable and desirable from the point of view of the efficient use of smaller national armies, NATO conceded that they were prone to be militarily less effective as a consequence of the disadvantages imposed by those national differences.²³ The working out of such problems proved to be a large component of the negotiations that soon began to create the U.S.-German and German-U.S. bi-national corps.

The Extended Obbligato of Drawdown

Thinking through the requirements for a new mission was an unremarkable process for the Army, though unusual for the Army in Europe because its mission had been virtually unchanged for the better part of half a century. Complicating the new mission analysis, however, was the fact that the end of the Cold War had brought with it powerful outside demands to reduce the size of the armed forces in general and to reduce the costly forward deployed forces in particular, and those largely American domestic political demands set the pace. The drawdown of forces was never a consistent process, inasmuch as it extended through several presidential administrations and was routinely influenced by diverse perceptions of national security requirements and by pragmatic, and changing, political demands. The impact on commanders and staffs in V Corps was that the planning basis was never certain. As the staff looked to the future, the process was very much like working a large jigsaw puzzle where someone occasionally either seemingly randomly removed key pieces or else periodically shook the table so as to disorder them.

The drawdown was a rapid and uneven process. The Army in Europe went from 213,000 soldiers in 1990, the equivalent of 69 brigades, to less than 65,000 soldiers in 1995, with much of the decrease taking place right at the end of the Persian Gulf War, when units that had been assigned to VII Corps in the Southwest Asian desert returned to Germany and were placed under V Corps control. (*Map 3*) At many points in the process planners thought that the much-hoped-for "final" number had been reached, but the demands to cut force structure continued, seemingly as unabated as the pleuvial excesses of a German spring, with additional decreases announced at irregular and inconvenient intervals. The crucially important fact was that the real decisions about the size of the Army in Europe were made not in Europe, but at the Department of Defense, and that, while USAREUR certainly represented its interests to the decision-makers, other than traditional military calculations determined the final outcome.

On the other hand, the *pace* of the drawdown was often influenced by USAREUR pressure to complete the process as quickly as possible so that the theater could reach a balance among the requirements of mission, physical resources, and troop strength within the constraints of anticipated severe budget restrictions. The V Corps staff was not a party to those on-going discussions of larger issues among USAREUR, U.S. European Command, and the Department of the Army. Instead, V Corps planning chiefly concerned itself



MAP 3


with implementation of the decisions reached at those higher echelons of command.²⁴

The Persian Gulf War slowed, but did not halt, the drawdown. The plan had been to reduce USAREUR by 30,000 soldiers in 1991, but that process halted at around 14,500 because of the deployments to the Persian Gulf. Another 30,000 soldiers were scheduled to leave in 1992. The V Corps completed the part of the process that had started before the war began, finishing the inactivation of six battalions or battalion equivalents in March 1991. With the return of some of the deployed forces to Germany after the end of the war, there was a rush to return to the drawdown schedule to reach the established 92,200-soldier end state. After the war USAREUR therefore had the task of reducing its force structure by around 45,000 soldiers in the course of one year. The process was complicated by the fact that V Corps assumed command of VII Corps units returning to Germany, briefly raising corps strength to around 112,000.

The corps staff worked hard to maintain the pace, inactivating or moving sixteen battalions by October 1991 and sustaining a pace of roughly six battalions inactivated each month thereafter. By June 1992 V Corps had moved fifty-six battalions and thirty-seven company-sized units out of the corps. (*Map 4*) Maddox chose not to use conventional staff processes, so as to avoid creating undue anxiety among the soldiers and civilians assigned to the corps. He believed that many of the decisions would be changed before they were implemented, and that the result could easily be despair and despondency among soldiers and families whose futures were uncertain. Maddox therefore determined to limit the number of people involved in the staffing process and to withhold information about drawdown decisions until they had become certain. He himself made most of the decisions regarding V Corps units in consultation with Mr. Robert Marston, the Conventional Force, Europe, staff officer, and the deputy chief of staff, Col. William W. Alexander, using a personal staff group, which he dubbed the "Law Firm," to do the detailed work.²⁵ At the same time, Marston and the Law Firm worked in concert with Mr. Darryl Pflaster in the USAREUR operations staff, so that corps and USAREUR planning remained aligned.

The drawdown was governed not by mission but by the desired personnel end strength.²⁶ As time went on, many on the corps staff frequently criticized that method, believing that it would have been better to have conducted a methodical mission analysis to determine what functions needed to be performed and then to have lined up units against those functions. Where requirements exceeded personnel authorizations, the corps would then enter discussions with USAREUR and the Department of the Army about which functions would have to be cut. Particularly in the later stages of the drawdown process, however, planning usually resolved itself into simple demands for the corps to give up specified numbers of military and civilian positions. As events transpired, the pace of the force reduction quickly outstripped the staff's ability to do methodical planning.

According to Colonel Alexander, the staff attempted to do a threat-based analysis to shape the end state corps force. Time worked against orderly staff



MAP 4

planning, though, because the process became, as he put it, "a bowling ball falling down an elevator shaft," a "free fall operation." Even at the beginning of the process, moving fifty-six battalions out of the corps in under a year really didn't offer a lot of opportunity for analyzing which battalion should go, given a changing threat array. "Reality," Alexander said, "was as we knew it, and truth had a date-time group."²⁷ The situation became worse in July 1992, when Maddox assumed command of USAREUR and Seventh Army. Although the plan at that time was to cut the Army in Europe force structure to just under 100,000 soldiers, it quickly became clear that a further reduction to 65,000 was in the offing, a decision that was indeed finalized by the late fall.²⁸

Earlier decisions about unit inactivations had included considerations about preserving the best quality installations and the best facilities among those in the corps area. By 1993, however, corps planning turned almost entirely on how to maintain two divisions within the 65,000 soldier force limitation and establishing the proper balance among maneuver units, supporting units, and headquarters elements, the latter decisions complicated by a constantly changing political and security situation in Europe and on NATO's periphery. Ultimately, the planning resolved itself into two key decisions: the corps had to surrender one maneuver brigade from each division and eliminate the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). The first decision was made with little fanfare. The 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, stationed at Erlangen, was inactivated between October 1993 and January 1995. The 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, stationed at Mannheim, was returned to the United States between May and August 1994.²⁹ Political difficulties at both locations helped secure the decision to cut those two brigades, particularly in Mannheim, where there had always been controversy about the use of the Lampertheim Local Training Area.

The decision to return the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to the United States was much more emotional, since few senior leaders in Europe favored eliminating the unit. The armored cavalry organization was considered ideal for the kinds of missions that many planners foresaw. In the end, keeping the regiment was impossible, although, as Colonel Alexander said, cutting it from the order of battle

was not first on our list of good ideas. In fact, taking the cavalry regiment out of Europe was probably the single most argued piece of the drawdown decision-making. The 2d ACR was already gone, for all practical purposes. The original plan was not to take the 11th ACR out of Europe, but to retain two divisions and a cavalry regiment. But the issue then became affordable force structure, both from a dollar point of view—base ops and training—and from a force structure point of view. As the dollars kept falling, . . . the force structure kept falling.³⁰

Additional decreases in the force structure through the rest of 1992 were necessary to attain the specified force limits, resulting in what the corps staff began to call the "death of a thousand cuts." The V Corps Artillery had already lost one of its field artillery brigades. The remaining brigade was reduced to two rocket artillery battalions, a fact compensated for by the assignment of a full Multiple Launch Rocket System battalion to each division, unique in the



Maj. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs receives the colors of the 1st Infantry Division from Lt. Gen. John Abrams, the V Corps commander. The 1st Infantry Division replaced the 3d Infantry Division in the V Corps order of battle in February 1996, although the reflagging ceremony was not conducted until 10 April.

Army. Corps aviation lost one of its three attack helicopter battalions. The corps air defense artillery brigade inactivated its Hawk missile battalion, an easy decision inasmuch as the Department of the Army had already announced its decision to remove Hawk from the active force. The engineer brigade's bridge battalion headquarters and two of its four bridge companies likewise cased their colors. USAREUR eliminated one Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) battalion from the signal brigade. Two of nine military police companies went away. The corps support command lost two transportation companies, a quartermaster company, a heavy equipment transporter company, a fuel transportation company, an aviation intermediate maintenance company, and one of its two chemical companies.

The cuts became deeper in 1993. The corps inactivated one of its two CH-47 Chinook helicopter companies and reduced the level of organization of the air traffic control battalion. One company of combat heavy engineers was eliminated, and the engineer topographic battalion was reduced to company size. The interrogation company of the military intelligence brigade was eliminated, with the intention that USAREUR's 66th Military Group would provide interrogation support to the corps. The corps support command lost one of two

medium truck companies, one of three ordnance companies, and the medical group headquarters. That left one ordnance company in support of each division with a promise that 21st Theater Army Area Command could provide backup support as needed and a conclusion that the corps could contract for transportation when required. While the corps gained a medical brigade headquarters in 1994, the force structure for that brigade eliminated one of two mobile army surgical hospitals while adding a combat support hospital. Finally, the deputy commander in chief of USAREUR decided to cut both the 5th Personnel Group and the 5th Finance Group from the corps force structure.

At the start of 1994 USAREUR still had to eliminate 1,500 spaces to reach its 65,000 soldier ceiling. By that time the process of selecting units for inactivation involved much more intense and searching analyses. USAREUR Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Richard F. Keller was evidently willing to wield a fairly indiscriminate axe. When he issued guidance to V Corps about how to shape a U.S. Army force of not more than 65,000 soldiers, he stressed the guidance he had received from the U.S. European Command. The army should be able simultaneously to conduct NATO peace operations, particularly in Bosnia, as seemed likely; ad hoc multinational operations such as peace enforcement on the Golan Heights, then in prospect; humanitarian and disaster relief operations; and evacuation of noncombatants from any threatened area in the theater. Redundant capabilities, Keller stressed, "are not an affordable luxury in a force of 65K. Consolidation of functions and locations is one way to gain some savings."³¹

To help reach that goal, V Corps sustained a number of smaller unit and personnel reductions, but there were serious caveats. The corps commander, Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, thinking of maintaining the combat power of the corps, remarked in a session with his plans officers, as Maj. Cornell T. McGhee recorded in a memorandum of the meeting, "Don't want to give up tank [battalions]—but don't get hung up on a central region scenario as their justification."³² The G-3 plans staff also reviewed all of its existing operations plans to be sure that they could still be executed, given the proposed force cuts.³³ With those limitations in mind, the corps staff worked out compromises that were at least acceptable.

Within both divisions, the cavalry wheeled vehicle scout platoon, a signal company, an air defense battery, and the rocket artillery battalion were eliminated. The scout platoon was a nonstandard formation, and the Department of the Army had been urging elimination of that unit for some time. The artillery battalion was replaced by one Multiple Launch Rocket System battery, bringing each division to the Department of the Army standard. There was, however, no corresponding increase to the V Corps Artillery force structure in compensation. The corps artillery winnowed out forty-nine personnel spaces, and discussion began about eliminating that headquarters entirely. The corps artillery also gave up one of its two remaining rocket artillery battalions. The corps support command continued to decrease in size, seeing the departure of its remaining chemical company, an ordnance battalion headquarters, and

one ordnance company, leaving one ordnance company for all corps missions. The corps band was inactivated and replaced by the 21st Theater Army Area Command band. A proposal to draw down the corps' mechanized engineer battalion, in which USAREUR concurred, was finally disapproved by the Department of the Army, which determined that battalion was needed to support any major regional conflict.

Various force structure studies continued without producing viable alternatives. USAREUR had since 1993 wished to add a light infantry battalion to the theater reserve, attempting but failing to retain the battalion previously assigned to the Berlin Brigade for that purpose. The corps opposed the idea of adding such a battalion if that also meant cutting out a mechanized unit, since it was dedicated at that time to the concept described by a popular phrase justifying continued stationing of heavy units in Germany: an Army "one ocean closer" to potential emergency missions. The corps counterproposal was to create one division of three brigades and one division forward, the latter with a heavy organization of around 6,000 soldiers and including an attack helicopter battalion. Such an organization would save around 5,000 personnel spaces and allow USAREUR to pay outstanding force structure bills and still create a light infantry battalion. That idea never left the starting blocks and was probably, according to Colonel Alexander, never even seriously considered for interservice political reasons that had to do with maintaining the number of active division flags in more or less fully manned divisions. The V Corps and USAREUR studied the possibility of replacing the V Corps Artillery with a reserve component corps artillery, but finally concluded that the reserve unit could not be trained to standard to perform the deep operations mission in the specialized environment in Europe.

In 1994 USAREUR operations staff began a study of the theater logistical structure and proposed eliminating the 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). According to that plan, the pure base operations missions would be given to the area support groups, which operated under USAREUR control, while all tactical logistical missions and units would be given to V Corps' 3d Corps Support Command. The USAREUR plan estimated a personnel savings of around 600 positions. The countervailing proposal was elimination of 3d Corps Support Command and giving to 21st TAACOM the mission of supporting V Corps, a notion that was unpopular at the corps, particularly considering the fact that the TAACOM was already staffed at very low levels in military personnel.

The entire logistical picture was worrisome, since the 3d Corps Support Command (COSCOM) and its 19th Corps Materiel Management Center had been stripped of staff officers and soldiers in the drive to meet USAREUR personnel ceilings, transferring many positions to the Army Reserve. By the end of the process the organization was really able only to maintain peacetime missions, and those occasionally with difficulty. Transportation was a particular concern, since the 181st Transportation Battalion, the only one remaining in the corps, had no company organized at full strength. Consequently, early in 1995 V Corps proposed cutting out one nondivisional maintenance company in order to "buy back" one of the medium truck companies that had previously been

eliminated. The Department of the Army disapproved the action on the basis that the maintenance company was required for any major regional contingency. As Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR began in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of 1995, V Corps maintained a prioritized list of force structure buy backs, in the eventuality—or in the faint hope—that additional spaces under the 65,000 USAREUR force structure might become available.³⁴

Finally, in 1997, the continuing demand to eliminate the V Corps Artillery headquarters came to resolution. Various corps artillery commanders, but particularly Brig. Gen. Thomas Swain, had argued vigorously that the corps artillery was essential to manage the many artillery tasks that lay beyond the capabilities of a field artillery brigade.³⁵ For a while USAREUR and V Corps considered the possibility that the 41st Field Artillery Brigade and an augmented fire support coordination section in the corps headquarters could substitute for the corps artillery, but they finally dropped the idea as infeasible. At length, USAREUR concluded that the “range of competencies and depth of leadership” needed to integrate lethal and nonlethal fires, employment of long range artillery fires, synchronization of attack helicopters in deep operations, and integration of fires for special operations forces only existed in corps artillery. Consequently, USAREUR obtained Department of the Army approval to inactivate Battery A, 25th Field Artillery (Target Acquisition), then assigned to the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, as a “bill-payer” to retain the V Corps Artillery in the corps force structure. In justification, USAREUR noted that assignment of a target acquisition battery to a corps field artillery brigade was in any case nondoctrinal and that the experience of using target acquisition batteries from the reserve components during operations in the Balkans in 1996 and 1997 had been positive.³⁶

New Missions

An army needs an enemy the way an evangelist needs sin. Without a credible and virulent foe, the service has always had difficulty justifying itself. Surprisingly enough, however, the precipitous end of the Cold War did not result in an immediate change to the V Corps mission statement. Until well into 1994 the corps mission remained the one that had governed it throughout the years of confrontation along the inter-German border:

On order, V (US) Corps initiates transition to war actions, deploys to and occupies assigned sector; will defeat enemy attack well forward in sector; will receive support and employ reinforcements, and execute contingency operations as directed by NATO.³⁷

Obviously unsuitable for the changed circumstances in which the corps found itself, the mission statement remained in effect until the draft post-Cold War mission statement was developed in 1994 and formalized in 1996:

V Corps rapidly deploys as a combined Joint Task Force in support of European Command and Central Command regional military objectives or in support of NATO

and United Nations military operations. The Corps also provides trained and ready forces in support of CINCUSAREUR-validated operational requirements.³⁸

In support of that mission, the corps developed a detailed mission essential task list that reflected the reality that corps planners knew in the course of that year and that remained in effect through the end of the decade. The V Corps missions were encapsulated in four major tasks: rapidly deploy from Central Region; conduct joint operations; conduct multinational stability operations; and conduct conventional corps operations.

It was noteworthy that two of the four major tasks were new to V Corps after 1990 and that a third, "Conduct Joint Operations," had long been assumed but little exercised. The bulk of the corps mission until 1990—"conduct conventional corps operations"—was reduced in the 1996 mission statement to one quarter of the mission essential tasks. Although conducting conventional corps operations did remain a defining task for the heavy, mechanized V Corps, the corps and its subordinate commands had already begun to spend most of their time elsewhere, preeminently in stability and support operations. For the future then, the corps soldiers would have to "ruck it up" as its focus moved progressively away from the central European heartland.

NOTES

¹ The 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment was replaced in Fulda by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment after the end of the war in Vietnam, although for a time in the 1960s V Corps commanded two cavalry regiments—the 14th and the 3d. Throughout most of the Cold War V Corps commanded the 3d Armored Division, with headquarters in Frankfurt am Main and brigades stationed at Kirch Göns, Gelnhausen, and Friedberg, and the 8th Infantry Division, with headquarters at Bad Kreuznach and brigades stationed at Mainz, Baumholder, and Mannheim. Although an infantry division in name, the 8th was effectively an armored division in organization, having six mechanized infantry battalions and five tank battalions. Soldiers in the 1960s and 1970s in fact often called it the “8th Armored Division” for just that reason. By comparison, the 3d Armored Division had six tank and five mechanized battalions. The ancillary brigades (earlier, groups) included the V Corps Artillery, with up to three field artillery brigades or groups; a corps support command; a military police brigade; a signal brigade; an engineer brigade; an aviation brigade; a military intelligence brigade; and, at various times, a finance group, a personnel group, and an air defense artillery brigade. The corps organization varied over time, and for specifics on the corps order of battle in any particular year, refer to the series of V Corps Annual Historical Reports deposited in the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and to this author’s *V Corps Order of Battle 1918–2003* (Heidelberg: Headquarters, V Corps History Office, 2003).

² The General Defense Plan, USAREUR OPLAN 4102, with the supporting V Corps OPLAN 33001, was supplemented at every echelon of command.

³ Quoted in Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 152.

⁴ The Federal Republic of Germany organized the first units of its new *Bundesheer* in January 1956, and between 1960 and 1965 organized, trained, fielded, and committed a dozen divisions to serve in NATO. For a summary of the process, refer to [Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt], *30 Jahre Bundeswehr: 1955–1985, Friedenssicherung im Bündnis* (Mainz: W. Hase & Koehler Verlag, 1985). On the early functioning of NATO and the consequent context within which German forces operated, see Winfried Heinemann, *Vom Zusammenwachsen des Bündnisses: Die Funktionsweise der NATO in ausgewählten Krisenfällen, 1951–1956* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), the first volume of the German Military History Office official history series of the Cold War period, *Entstehung und Probleme des Atlantischen Bündnisses bis 1956* (in progress).

⁵ The entire discussion of the Soviet *Eighth Guards Army* is based on [United States Army, Europe], *Soviet Order of Battle Handbook GSFG and Installations List Soviet Zone Germany*, 1 January 1957.

⁶ U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5, *Operations* (1982). The situation was slightly ironic. In 1944 and 1945 the U.S. Army relied upon simple, mass-produced tanks sustained by operator

maintenance, on the whole, to fight technically superior German tanks that existed in far smaller quantities, but that had superior firepower.

⁷ For a fuller discussion of this and other aspects of the "renaissance" of the U.S. Army between the end of the Vietnam War and the deployment for the Persian Gulf War, refer to C. E. Kirkpatrick, *Building the Army for Desert Storm*, Land Warfare Paper No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, November 1991).

⁸ Specifically relevant to the lessons that the U.S. Army drew from its analysis of the fighting are: Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, *Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1985), and Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, "Operations,"* Leavenworth Paper No. 16 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988).

⁹ U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (1976).

¹⁰ Kirkpatrick, *Building the Army for Desert Storm*, pp. 2-3.

¹¹ Author's notes from unofficial "Greenspeak" Seminar of officers assigned to the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy, November 1981. The comment was made by then-Captain Gregory Fontenot.

¹² V Corps G-3 Briefing for Staff, Battle Tasks, 1989-1991, dated 1989. Also see Ltr, Lt. Gen. George Joulwan, CG, V Corps, for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1 Nov 1990, sub: End of Tour Report.

¹³ V Corps Briefing for Staff, Where We Are—November 1990. For General Maddox's early assessments of the situation in 1990, see Ltr, Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox, CG, V Corps, for CofS, U.S. Army, 15 Jun 1992, sub: End of Tour Report.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ By the end of the Cold War U.S. Army units were routinely negotiating with local German officials and German state officials, as well as federal German offices, about the training units intended to conduct even in those areas that had long been designated for maneuver. Among the principal considerations were noise, especially on weekends and at night; helicopter operations; and disruptions of local traffic. Town case files of Government Relations Advisor, V Corps ACofS, G-5.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, states, in part, "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

²⁰ AFCENT Briefing, The Future of NATO Strategy, December 1990.

²¹ Within USAREUR the terms were customarily used in the form of acronyms: AFCENT, NORTHAG, CENTAG, SOUTHAG.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid. The V Corps critiques of the NATO intention held that multinational forces were certainly more efficient from the administrative point of view of the nations providing the forces. Many on the staff expressed grave doubts that such formations could ever be *tactically* effective, or even efficiently administered at the tactical level. Subsequent events demonstrated that those reservations had some merit.

²⁴ Much of the decision-making and staffing process of the drawdown in Europe was conducted on a close hold basis, and V Corps documents that delineate the rationale are few. Unless otherwise cited, this discussion is based on the following interviews with commanders and staff officers who played a large part in the process as seen from the V Corps perspective:

author with Col. William W. Alexander, Deputy DCSPER, USAREUR & Seventh Army, 12 Sep 1995, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany; author with Col. Daniel M. Ferezan, Deputy CofS, V Corps, 15 Mar and 13–14 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks; and author with Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox, Commanding General, V Corps, 5 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²⁵ The “Law Firm” was manned by four officers, usually majors who were graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies, drawn from the corps staff. The Law Firm was so named because the last names of its first four members sounded to the staff like the name of a Washington, D.C., law firm. At least for the new members of the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff, the name was an unending source of confusion as they attempted to route documents—particularly documents from the staff judge advocate—around the staff.

²⁶ Much of this section is drawn from the excellent and detailed discussion of the drawdown in *Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army Command History 1 January 1993–31 December 1995* (Heidelberg, Germany: HQ USAREUR & 7th Army History Office, 2000), particularly ch. 1.

²⁷ Alexander interv, 12 Sep 1995.

²⁸ See a detailed discussion of this in *Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army Command History 1 January 1993–31 December 1995*.

²⁹ For an illustration of the complexity of the move, see Headquarters, 1st Armored Division, 1AD OPLAN 4352–93, Operation HOMEWARD BOUND, 4 Nov 1993, which specified tasks and responsibilities for the move of the 3d Brigade Combat Team to the continental United States as part of the CFE drawdown.

³⁰ Alexander interv, 12 Sep 1995.

³¹ Memo, Lt. Gen. Richard F. Keller, USAREUR CofS, 15 Feb 1994, sub: Sizing the Army in Europe Force Structure, citing a 29 Dec 1993 meeting at SHAPE; and USAREUR ODCSOPS Briefing for CINCUSAREUR Commanders’ Forum, 18 Feb 1994, which discussed drawdown issues.

³² Planner’s handwritten notes on corps commander’s guidance: 65K /Force Requirements 22 February 1994, contained in V Corps G–3 Plans 65K Force Structure Book 1 (V Corps ACofS, G–3 Plans Action Officer notebook).

³³ Annex A to V Corps OPLAN 4228, Deploying Force Organization, 17 Sep 1993; 1AD structure for possible Bosnia mission; V Corps Briefing, 23 Sep 1993, sub: 1AD Force Structure, Prospective Force Cuts Implementation of GPP; Memo, V Corps ACofS, G–3, for Commander, U.S. Army Europe, n.d., but Sep 1993, sub: Drawdown Impacts on OPLAN 4228.

³⁴ Memo, John Ramsaur (Conventional Forces, Europe, Chief), for CG, V Corps, 30 Aug 1995, sub: Building the Current V Corps Structure.

³⁵ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Swain, CG, V Corps Artillery, 31 May 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

³⁶ Msg, CINCUSAREUR DCSOPS to HQDA, 202243Z May 1997, sub: Force Structure Adjustment.

³⁷ Mission Statement Files, V Corps History Office.

³⁸ Ibid.

Evolving Training and Exercises

"I can't imagine that our future exercises won't be affected by our current contingency operations. We are in a contingency Army; that's what we are now doing, so it shouldn't be a surprise to anybody that we are tending to focus in that direction."

Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs
Chief of Staff, V Corps, August 1994

"With the 'new world order,' simply to be in the starting blocks and ready to do what you have to do is going to take a good deal more review and thought."

Dr. R. S. Garnett
V Corps Government Relations Advisor
August 1994

"This is all new business. We've got to use the exercises to kick over the rocks and see what's underneath them."

Comment from V Corps Exercise
Design Briefing, 1993

As V Corps and former VII Corps units returned from Southwest Asia to Germany and fell under V Corps control, they resumed the draw-down process that the Persian Gulf War had interrupted. Simultaneously, V Corps commenced an uncomfortable process of determining what shape its future training ought to have and the equally delicate and obviously interrelated process of reconsidering its mission. Sensitive to allegations that no valid corps mission remained in Europe after the end of the Cold War, members of the staff freely expressed their concerns privately to each other. Mr. Doug Nolen, chief of the Exercises Division of the corps G-3, later recalled:

I would say we kind of floundered around a while after the Wall came down about what the Corps was going to do—what our mission was. DA had not changed the JSCP [Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan] at that time, and we were kind of looking for work, really. We were still trained to the old GDP standards, because that's all we had. During that interim period between when the Wall came down and . . . well, as I recall, out to about 1993 or 1994 . . . we had no other mission for the Corps. We just kind of maintained doing what we had been doing.¹

Such a philosophy, as all realized, could not be a recipe for success.

REFORGER

Until the Persian Gulf War, all corps exercises were focused on the General Defense Plan of Europe and on preparing for the annual Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) Exercise. The two went hand in hand, because REFORGER was used as a means of testing and refining various aspects of V Corps Operation Plan (OPLAN) 33001, which was its part of the much larger NATO general defense plan. The plan itself did not undergo significant change from year to year. The force structure changed little; the equipment had been modernized but remained appropriate for heavy mechanized forces; the missions incident to the plan did not change in any major way; and the ground certainly had not changed in more than forty years, although urban development on the western side of the iron curtain had its effects on freedom of maneuver. Hence, the

In Exercise Certain Thrust, October 1970, UH-1D helicopters conducting an air assault across the Main River between Dippach and Rossstadt under cover of a simulated artillery barrage



consequent analysis of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time—or METT-T, in the useful military short-hand expression—produced few major alterations to the operation plan. Nonetheless, V Corps rewrote OPLAN 33001 every two years, essentially every time a new corps commander arrived with a slightly different vision for executing the big future war in central Europe.²

As rehearsals of the general defense plan battle along the inter-German border, the REFORGER exercises involved major troop units engaged in wide-ranging maneuver across the German countryside from 1969 to 1988. Most involved ever larger numbers of soldiers and masses of equipment. The 1989 REFORGER was much scaled down from the 1988 exercise, which incidentally involved a maneuver damage bill of more than \$50 million. In fact, 1989 became the test for a new exercise model that relied more heavily on simulations and that was essentially a very large command post exercise, in effect a large map exercise rather than a physical test of maneuvering units.³

A series of division and corps exercises normally built up toward REFORGER each year. An excellent example was Caravan I, a V Corps field problem that preceded the 1971 REFORGER. Typical of such maneuvers and the succeeding REFORGERs, Caravan I was a thoroughly scripted exercise conceived as a force-on-force battle within the V Corps area of operation, involving large units maneuvering against each other in the style the Army had used since World War II. The V Corps, acting as both control headquarters and higher headquarters

The V Corps Tactical Command Post during Exercise Caravan I



for the two opposing forces, established phase lines but allowed units a degree of free play within those controls to permit individual training, with the intent of achieving the maximum individual soldier training possible while still testing and polishing headquarters functioning. More than 40,000 German and American soldiers and more than 9,000 wheeled and tracked vehicles took part in the simulated combat. Not since Exercise Winter Shield II of 1961 had V Corps conducted a maneuver of such magnitude.⁴

The scenario was straight out of the General Defense Plan. The action started on 5 December, the Blue Forces defending with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment forward as a covering force for the 3d Armored Division, reinforced by the 3d Brigade of the 8th Infantry Division. The remainder of the 8th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 6. Panzerbrigade from the Bundeswehr's III Korps, constituted the attacking Orange Forces. Orange units attacked westward at 0700 of the first day from the area of Fulda-Bad Hersfeld against the Blue 11th Cavalry, which fought a traditional delaying action.⁵ By dark on that day the Blue Force had withdrawn its cavalry through the main Blue Force combat outposts, with the main force then taking over the battle. Orange continued the attack that night throughout the sector, and the Blue covering force then reverted to rear area security missions. Battle losses, coupled with resupply problems, hampered and slowed the Orange Force attack.

The next day Blue Forces began their counterattack, supported by simulated tactical nuclear fires. A vigorous attack, coupled with the accumulated attrition of Orange Forces, caused a general withdrawal of Orange Forces to the line of the inter-German border.⁶ Caravan I illustrated the mind-set under which V Corps operated throughout the Cold War. Commanders had to move their units out of their casernes in a specified amount of time, along routes that were thoroughly reconnoitered, to terrain that they had studied and to battle positions that they understood, to confront a thoroughly familiar enemy that they expected, on terms that were likewise understood.

The sequence was much the same year after year. The preparation for and conduct of REFORGERS was a long process that extended through as much as eighteen months. Division exercises were followed by a NATO Central Army Group exercise, a WINTEX/SIMEX, in January or February. Those were all command post exercises, and most of them were driven by a carefully composed script that planners knew as a master events list. Every other year the corps did a winter REFORGER, holding a late summer REFORGER in the alternate years—after most of the crops had been harvested, usually in late September. The precursor to REFORGER was the Corps Caravan Guard exercise series, which succeeded Caravan I, or Central Fortress exercises, in which the corps set its own scenarios, always testing various parts of the General Defense Plan.⁷

Regular, frequent field training exercises enabled both the corps headquarters and its major subordinate units to maintain proficiency in the mechanics of going to the field and operating there. Until well into 1994 V Corps conducted such corps-level maneuvers once a quarter. That exercise might be part of a larger exercise within NATO Central Army Group or, later, Land Forces, Cen-



In REFORGER '81, Exercise Certain Encounter, M60A3 tanks of the 3d Armored Division laying down a smoke screen as they are attacked by Opposing Force AH-1 Cobra helicopters while en route to the town of Zell

tral Europe, but the Corps Special Troops Battalion had plenty of opportunities to practice taking the corps main command post and corps tactical command post to the field, operating them, and displacing them on order. The point was that every one of those exercises was related to the Cold War plan for general war, working over whatever part of that plan the corps commander thought needed emphasis, and starting at various points in the course of the predicted general defense plan battle.

Sometimes the exercise began "at the fence" (the border astride Fulda), and sometimes it began after the first series of combat actions. Sometimes it paid closest attention to the deep battle, or the close battle, or the rear battle, or focused on logistics, reconstitution of brigades, or some other aspect of the plan. Normally, there was no USAREUR preliminary for REFORGER. Instead, members of the USAREUR staff simply observed the corps preparations. USAREUR generally used Caravan Guard or Central Fortress to validate the exercise parameters for the forthcoming REFORGER, and the ideas of the current commander-in-chief naturally had an impact on shaping the scenario.⁸

When V Corps conducted the 1989 REFORGER at the Truppenübungssplatz in Daaden as chiefly a command post exercise, it set the model for future exercises. The 1990 REFORGER, though a force-on-force battle between V Corps and VII Corps, was really carried out in a combined field training exer-

cise and command post exercise format. Thereafter, the large corps exercises increasingly involved more simulations and less actual maneuver. The 1992 REFORGER, which V Corps considered the last legitimate REFORGER, was entirely a command post exercise. Throughout that brief period at the end of the Cold War, V Corps was at the cutting edge of the Army in the use of simulations, staying, as General George Joulwan liked to put it, "out on the edge of the envelope."

The corps also began to use computerized simulation systems to train division and corps staffs. Multiple computers gave real time play in movement, combat, and logistics for units of any size. Controllers represented echelons above corps in the battle simulation center. Players, division or corps staff members, performed actual duties in planning, allocating, directing, and managing operations, at first using game maps that strongly resembled the hex maps used in commercial board war games to show combat power distribution, capability of maneuver, and so forth. The system could simulate direct ground engagements, direct and general support artillery fire, Army aviation operations, logistical support including medical and maintenance, engineering operations, Air Force close air support and battlefield air interdiction, and air-to-air engagements.⁹ After 1990 the number of simulations increased dra-

Armored maneuver across the German countryside came to an end as the 1980s drew to a close and V Corps increasingly relied upon computer-assisted battle simulations to train commanders and staffs.



matically. In 1991 V Corps scheduled twenty-five major simulation exercises for the headquarters and subordinate units.¹⁰

The corps operated its own simulation center until the headquarters moved to Heidelberg in 1994–95, and was developing simulation software that had applications across the Army.¹¹ That uniqueness was swiftly lost as the Army, through the agency of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), instituted a far-ranging battle simulation system. Continuing refinements resulted in a comprehensive simulations system run by the Seventh Army Training Center to replicate the battlefield environment from the Battle Focused Trainer, a company- through battalion-level tactical training simulation; to the Brigade Battle Simulation, used primarily as a command post exercise driver to develop staff decision-making skills in multi-threat combat environments; to the Corps Battle Simulation.¹² All were developed by TRADOC. The entire process, although designed with the heavy force battle in mind, did much to prepare the corps for the subsequent evolution of its exercise program under the pressure of preparing for contingency operations in a wide range of possible situations.

Early Changes

Although the General Defense Plan remained the principal operation plan for V Corps, it no longer governed the design of exercises after August 1990, when Operation DESERT SHIELD started in Saudi Arabia. At that point the corps G-3 determined that V Corps would no longer brief the General War Plan because it was obsolete. Instead, he substituted the "How the Corps Fights" briefing, which was based on the lessons learned from REFORGER 90. That briefing began to consider more fluid operations and looked for suitable examples drawn from exercises and current doctrine that helped shift the corps away from the general defense plan mentality.¹³ The corps received Change 4 to the General Defense Plan in October 1990, along with instructions from USAREUR to "put the GDP on the shelf" and stop maintaining the plan. Thereafter, corps planning and corps exercises began to reflect the slow changes in operational concepts for the Army in Europe.

The first major exercise after Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox assumed command of V Corps was Cactus Juggler 90, conducted in December 1990 while VII Corps was deploying to the Persian Gulf and substantial portions of V Corps were assisting its movement to the ports. Cactus Juggler was a NATO Central Army Group exercise that still focused on the traditional Fulda Gap defense, but it also departed somewhat from that scenario because it began with the second battle of the notional general war, rather than the first, and considered many of the reorganization and reconstitution problems that could be expected after the first series of battles. It was by far the most sophisticated of all the general defense plan exercises that had been staged in recent years.¹⁴ The corps was in the midst of modernization, chiefly in completing the process of swapping out M60 tanks for the M1 Abrams, M113 armored personnel carriers for the



Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox

M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Lance and other field artillery rockets for the Multiple Launch Rocket System, and AH-1 Cobra helicopters for the far more capable AH-64 Apache. General Maddox experimented during Cactus Juggler with a new organization to exploit the enhanced capabilities that the new weapons gave the corps.

One noteworthy innovation was the concept of the "Deep Division," a V Corps concept that placed all the deep strike systems under command of the V Corps Artillery commander, who then coordinated artillery, assault helicopter, and, eventually, Air Force close air support and interdiction missions, in synchronization with the two maneuver divisions.¹⁵ Maddox intended the Deep Division to concentrate battlefield air interdiction, the Army Tactical Missile System, electronic warfare, and attack helicopters against enemy forces up to 100 kilometers beyond the line of contact to establish the conditions in the forward area for the success of the corps close fight. The concept, as the V Corps Artillery developed it between June and August 1991, centered on delivering fires from the division fire support coordination line, about thirty kilometers in front of the corps' lead elements, and out to a theater-established "reconnaissance and interdiction phase line," a box the width of the corps area and forty to seventy kilometers deep.¹⁶ The exercise revealed coordination of

deep fires to be difficult, and it remained an area of attention, as more urgent missions permitted, through the end of the decade.¹⁷

Secondly, Cactus Juggler marked General Maddox's first major use of a "synchronization matrix" to outline the general flow of events, determine the key tactical decision points, and organize the combat power of the corps and its various supporting units in accordance with the operation plan. After Cactus Juggler 90, a synchronization matrix became a standard part of all corps plans.¹⁸ With those minor innovations, Cactus Juggler set the stage for continuing changes in corps exercises. Maddox began the habit of exercising the corps quarterly with an emphasis on keeping it "trained to standard"—by which he meant the heavy force mission standard as expressed in USAREUR Regulation 350-1, because, as he put it,

While the future threat may not be Iraq, I would suggest that there are very few places now where the enemy throws spears. Everybody has heavy equipment. So I continue to believe, both for the longevity of soldiers, but also because of the lack of definition right now about where we might be called on to serve, that we need to continue our emphasis on the Corps' ability to fight the large-scale, heavy force maneuver battle.¹⁹

Underscoring that intention was Maddox's training policy for units returning to V Corps control after the end of the Persian Gulf War. He wished to achieve a smooth, rapid integration of all those soldiers and units back into the corps "to facilitate a transition back to our CENTAG [Central Army Group] mission focus as quickly as possible."²⁰

General Maddox determined that the many training tasks confronting the corps made it essential to design every exercise to achieve multiple objectives. Of special significance was his decision that the corps would conduct what he called a synchronization drill, which the staff later termed a "sticker drill," before every major exercise. The sticker drill was in essence a movement exercise conducted on a very large map that used accurately scaled unit tokens to work out details of tactical and administrative movement on the battlefield. A very slow and laborious process, the sticker drill considered every element of every operation, discussing events in sequence and evaluating both how well the plan could unfold and what its shortcomings might be. Major productions from the corps commander's point of view, sticker drills involved all senior commanders, their key staff officers, and the corps principal staff officers. Normally, General Maddox ran those drills himself. The big point was that the sticker drills did not just consider maneuver, but also how logistically to support the whole corps, especially over long distances. Maddox gave as much attention to combat service support as to maneuver, and in the process, the corps came to regard sticker drills as painful experiences.

During a sticker drill, normally conducted in the ballroom of the Terrace Club adjacent to the corps headquarters or some other very large venue, Maddox began by reciting his intent in great detail. He then explained where the corps was at a given moment in the operation and then asked each participant what he was going to do, and when, to support the commander's intent. The

process established chronologically what was going to unfold and underscored the complex interrelationships among events, but was painfully slow. The drill proved enormously useful, however, in managing the complex process of arranging the combat units and combat support units in proper order and deploying the corps in proper sequence to carry out the intended operation. For one major exercise in 1993, the sticker drill considered the movement of more than 2,600 vehicles and uncovered a number of fallacious assumptions in the process. Using large maps and accurately scaled tokens for serials of vehicles revealed the fact, for example, that the roads could not carry the traffic density that the plan called for in the amount of time allowed. Obviously, such exercises could not be used in actual operations, but they were useful to Maddox in schooling his staff and the staffs of the subordinate commands to think in detail about the myriad of issues involved in maneuvering very large tactical formations.²¹ Indeed, it was during sticker drills that the staff began to refer to

Detail of the sticker drill map showing scaled unit tokens



General Maddox as "the schoolmaster," the man teaching them a new concept of corps operations.

After Cactus Juggler, Maddox followed through on his intention to pursue multiple objectives. In February 1991 V Corps ran a capability exercise for fielding the new Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) in the signal battalions. The corps commander treated the exercise as a training opportunity and used the Corps Battle Simulation system to drive a scenario in which he moved the command posts of the major subordinate commands from Frankfurt north past Kassel and Göttingen in correct relation to the MSE computer icons that denoted unit locations.²² The capability exercise was an important step in the development of a new corps exercise philosophy because it was the first exercise where the scenario called for an open (opposing forces not initially in contact), nonlinear (no continuous lines and forces maneuvering with vulnerable flanks), maneuver-oriented battle. The corps axis of attack was about 100 to 120 kilometers wide, with two divisions abreast. That was based on physical constraints, because roads were limited in the corps sector. The intention was to maneuver with about four roads per division. In order to locate eight good roads on which to move tanks and mechanized infantry on parallel routes, the plans staff had to find an axis some 120 kilometers in width. The corps regarded that selection of a route of advance as an important learning point, one that had not arisen in the days of the General Defense Plan because routes to and from the intra-German border were well-known and thoroughly understood. A second point that was to emerge as V Corps began casting its planning eye outside of Germany was that, while 120 kilometers of frontage should yield enough roads for a two-division maneuver in central Europe, the same was not true of less developed areas.

Significant tactical matters were also evaluated during the capability exercise. Since the exercise was essentially a movement to contact, the corps had to begin from a designated assembly area and then march toward battle, task organizing for combat while moving toward the enemy and trying to determine his dispositions and exact direction of march. Deception also became a crucial part of planning and therefore of exercises. Previously, the concept had been less important, since in the general defense plan battle "it was pretty difficult to deceive the enemy about your intentions," according to Lt. Col. Herbert Frandsen, war plans chief in 1991. There was emerging a complete change of outlook from the days of the General Defense Plan, which had always defined the conditions of battle.²³

Evolving its maneuver techniques as a result of a growing understanding of the changing conditions of future battle, the corps developed the "advanced support echelon" concept, which it exercised in May 1991 in a movement exercise.²⁴ The command and control exercise tested the ability of the corps to move along seven different routes from Grafenwöhr, the corps staging area, to Hohenfels, which served as the line of contact. The key leaders took part and each vehicle on the ground represented 24 others, simulating some 5,000 vehicles of all kinds. General Maddox also used the movement exercise to test the

ability to use mobile subscriber equipment on the move, and found that it was unsuitable for such demands, although the system could be emplaced and made operational faster than the corps had been told to expect. To control movement, the corps used the innovation of a movements operations center in the corps tactical operations center, working through military police traffic control points for positive control. The exercise convinced Maddox that the advanced support echelon (ASE) concept worked.²⁵

Exercise Caravan Guard 91 was General Maddox's second major exercise, and with the experience of Cactus Juggler and the capability exercise behind him, he was, as Colonel Frandsen remarked, "ready to do something at the graduate level of the operational art with a corps." Caravan Guard 91 used the standard corps staging area envisioned by the ASE and introduced the ASE concept to the corps at large. The advanced support echelon, the organizational concept that Maddox planned to use to move the entire corps forward from that staging area and into battle, involved constructing the communications and traffic control systems, field artillery and air defense coverage, and logistical support for an entire corps on the march. The echelon had proved difficult to conceptualize and organize.

The ASE likewise proved difficult to use on the first occasion that the division commanders and the cavalry regiment commander tried it. At that time, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was in Kuwait for Operation POSITIVE FORCE, so the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, formerly a VII Corps unit, took part in the exercise. The other maneuver units involved were the 3d Infantry Division, the 8th Infantry Division, and the Bundeswehr's 5. Panzerdivision. The exercise was also the first for V Corps with two aviation brigades, which allowed the corps further to refine the deep division and deep operations concept.²⁶ Thereafter, and until the end of General Maddox's tenure of command, the remaining exercises were relatively small, allowing little scope for any further refinement of his operational concepts.

The significant impacts of the exercises Maddox conducted were numerous. First, they allowed V Corps to begin to understand how to conduct a fight farther and farther away from garrison, under uncertain terms of engagement, not knowing exactly what the enemy forces were going to be, and not knowing what the conditions of battle were going to be. In pursuit of those objectives, however, Maddox found that TRADOC's Battle Command Training Program and the various combat training center methodologies were not realistic. All required parity fights with divisions engaging each other one on one. Maddox, by contrast, sought ways to mass the entire combat power of the corps against enemy divisions one at a time. Ideally, he wanted to devise a standard play that would allow V Corps to meet the enemy with greater than a 2:1 force ratio, having first set the conditions for that fight by using the deep division to manage violent and productive deep operations. Therefore, one of his chief concerns was how best to make the transition from a movement to contact to a hasty attack. The corps staff, including the Operation DESERT STORM veterans, spent a lot of time working on that problem.²⁷ Exercises under succeeding

corps commanders continued to seek solutions to the questions Maddox had raised.

The principal contribution of General Maddox, at least in the opinion of his plans staff, was the series of exercises that he designed and conducted, and particularly those during the first six months of his tenure of command. Together, they proved crucial in changing the mind-set of V Corps away from the General Defense Plan and toward what Colonel Frandsen described as an open battlefield, where the corps had to establish contact with an enemy under varying and unpredictable circumstances and in geographical locations that could not necessarily be anticipated. It was in the course of those exercises that V Corps laid the groundwork for the missions that lay in its future by working out difficult problems of assembly, approach march, and movement to contact—issues that were thoroughly exercised parts of the war plan when the corps was dedicated to the General Defense Plan but that could no longer be exercised in the same way after the end of the Cold War.²⁸

Exercise Dragon Hammer '92

Exercise Dragon Hammer foreshadowed the shape of future corps exercises in many ways and was an important part of the corps' process of feeling its way toward a new mission. In that exercise, V Corps truly began to train itself for out-of-sector operations. It was the first time that V Corps had taken a hard look at the problems involved in moving a large tactical organization out of Germany. Dragon Hammer was a command post exercise for which V Corps deployed a

Tanks of V Corps during Exercise Dragon Hammer '92



joint task force headquarters, a brigade headquarters, a battalion headquarters, several companies, and a slice of combat service support, all to serve as the opposing force for a NATO Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) exercise on Sardinia. The participating corps elements deployed to Sardinia through Livorno, with the 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry, arriving via airdrop from Vicenza. Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, the corps commander and joint task force commander for the exercise, used Dragon Hammer and the opposing force mission as a way to practice deployments. "I would say that this was the first time that we got a feel for how we would deploy from Central Region to another location by air and sea and then pull off an operation," he later remarked.²⁹

One of the most interesting parts of Dragon Hammer was the sudden realization that operations outside of Germany were simply different and that the old civil-military arrangements that supported the general defense plan mission, and with which the corps was so comfortable, were obsolete. Dragon Hammer showed the corps "how luxurious our long-established support arrangements with the Germans" really had been, as Col. Stuart Watkins, the corps G-5, later evaluated it.³⁰ The corps carried a lot of mental baggage with it to Sardinia, most of it amounting simply to a series of invalid assumptions about host nation support. The corps was accustomed to long-standing relationships with the German Territorial Army for route control, with the German police and other authorities for convoy clearances, and for the kinds of assistance from the German Army and government that NATO had grown to expect as normal. Those relationships simply did not exist outside Germany, and the corps host nations relations adviser in the G-5 remarked that the change wasn't easy for the staff to assimilate: "Simple things, we found out rather quickly, became more complicated than we were used to, especially requesting any kind of unprogrammed support."³¹ The planning basis did not exist for sophisticated host nation support anywhere except in Germany, as the G-5 staff commented after the exercise, describing the situation in Germany:

Very elaborate plans were drawn up for host nation support, mutual support in operations, who would be where on the front lines—very, very detailed. And we had a long time to do this, essentially starting in the 1950s and 1960s, so they could be refined to the nth degree.³²

The essential point was that the Dragon Hammer exercise provided a glimpse of the real-world operation the corps might eventually be called upon to carry out. When operating outside of NATO's Central Region, corps planners suddenly grasped, V Corps was more likely to be *giving* support to the host nation than it was to be *receiving* it from that nation. Logically, that was even more probable the farther away from Europe that V Corps units operated. For the future, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and "those guys with the briefcases full of money," the indispensable contracting agents, were clearly going to be critical elements of a successful deploy-

ment outside of Europe.³³ One additional, and very important, point was that the German Army was also changing its focus as a result of the end of the Cold War and was placing far less emphasis on supporting NATO operations in Central Europe.³⁴

More Simulations

The many virtues of simulations notwithstanding, their increasing use throughout the early 1990s engendered some concerns. Montgomery Meigs, then a brigadier general and corps chief of staff, raised the issue on 31 August 1993, when he directed the G-3 chief of current operations and the corps historian to study one important aspect of the increasing dependence on simulations. It appeared to him that actual battalion-level readiness in maneuver skills had declined steadily since the widespread use of such methods had begun in 1989. Reductions in personnel and cuts in resources devoted to field training exercises further exacerbated the situation, in his opinion. Yet steadily climbing gunnery scores across the corps testified to the value of gunnery simulators. Simulations also certainly had improved the problem-solving abilities of staffs at all levels. General Meigs thought, however, that simulations could not hone—or even preserve—the highly perishable multi-echelon soldier and leader skills that collectively underpinned competent tactical maneuver. In short, the corps' emphasis on simulations in training and exercises neglected battalion task force maneuver, to the detriment of overall corps readiness.³⁵

As it began its deliberations, the study group noted that some Mission Essential Task List tasks were always left unaddressed because of limited time or resources, while assuming that all battalion and brigade commanders used Combat Maneuver Training Center rotations to hone only the most critical of the mission essential tasks. They further assumed that soldier skills associated with maneuver decayed quickly in the absence of reinforcement training. This decay included such prosaic but basic tasks as driving combat vehicles for extended periods of time and over extended distances; managing full-scale motor marches; unit tactical maneuver across terrain; actual displacement of tactical operations centers; fueling and rearming systems during combat operations; extended casualty evacuations; vehicle recovery and repair part direct support unit operations. There was no full testing of administrative and logistical systems under the stress of tactical operations and under the limitations imposed by dispersion, fatigue, the effects of weather and temperature, and the operation of chance. Simulations, it seemed, could never duplicate the conditions the Army knew as "friction." In making the study, the staff assumed that there were no unmanned infantry squads in 1989—that is, that all platoons had enough soldiers to field all of the squads authorized by their tables of organization—although there certainly were many such units in 1993, prompting a subsequent comment from Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford that he did not believe that V Corps had ever been at 100 percent manning in infantry squads, even at the height of the Cold War.³⁶

The study group also looked at the mass of readiness reports on file in the G-3, and particularly at the commander's remarks section. From that data it drew an obvious first conclusion: resource constraints had a definite impact on tactical competence. Although funding for maneuver training remained relatively constant between 1989 and 1992, the figures, once adjusted to constant dollars,³⁷ showed a decrease of 48 percent. (Table 1) One of the key facts was that force modernization paradoxically played a part in reducing readiness, since the costs per system of maneuver training increased steadily from 1989 to 1993. The M1 tank and M2/M3 infantry combat vehicle cost more to operate per mile than their predecessors. In terms of fuel and repair parts alone, the M1 tank was 250 percent more expensive per mile to operate than the older M60 tank, while the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle was 370 percent more expensive than the M113 armored personnel carrier.³⁸ The study group concluded that the combined effects of inflation, adverse changes in the dollar conversion rate, and the impacts of force modernization significantly reduced the overall training value of available funds.

The matter of operational tempo was obviously directly related, and the study group found that training miles per system decreased because of budgetary limitations and the increased operating costs of the Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle. The study group presented figures based on the

The problem with technological improvement: the M60 tank, shown here, was far more economical to operate than the superior M1 Abrams tank and therefore allowed more operational training.



TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF V CORPS RESOURCES VERSUS TRAINING IN 1989, 1992, AND 1993

<i>Item of Comparison</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>
Cost of Training for three Armor and three Infantry Battalions (<i>constant \$ in millions</i>)	\$25.08	\$14.81	\$7.72
Odometer Miles per Vehicle (M1/M113-M2)	1,067/1,575	775/518	406/418
Number of Major Training Events (Field Training Exercise, Combat Maneuver Training Center [Hohenfels], Gunnery, External Evaluation)	52	36	31
Percent Units Attaining Authorized Level of Organization (ALO)	92	79	76
Percent Maneuver Battalions Attaining ALO.	90	63	52
Percent Units Reporting No Funding Impact	100	100	75
Percent Manned Infantry Squads	100	97	66
Percent Personnel Fill	99.7	99	94
Percent Units Reporting No Personnel Impact	99	92	88

Training Management Control Data reported by battalions of the 8th Infantry Division, redesignated the 1st Armored Division by the end of the study period. Part of the reduction in available miles, the study group found, was caused by the budgeted miles in the operational tempo allocation, which USAREUR decreased every year in order to satisfy the administrative requirements of the command. That figure was a given. In general, the lack of real buying power of training funds was a major contributor to a decreasing competence in tactical maneuver in the battalions.

The Cold War imperative to "fight outnumbered and win" had caused unit commanders to focus their attention on gunnery to counter the Warsaw Pact's advantage in numbers. Despite the demise of the Warsaw Pact, V Corps generally adhered to the older standards for gunnery training, although not all armor battalions went through the usual two Grafenwöhr gunnery rotations in the years under analysis because they were involved in new equipment training after being issued the M1 Abrams tank. Corps units also met and often exceeded the USAREUR requirement to conduct maneuver training every fourteen months, although several battalions serving as opposing force units at the training center were not formally evaluated during actual training rotations. However, the corps did not meet the USAREUR standards for formal external evaluations of all units by outside agencies in 1992 or in 1993. The crux of the issue was that

the USAREUR standard for maneuver and gunnery training was always beyond the reach of most combat battalions from 1989 through 1993. Although most units in 1989 had managed battalion task force maneuver twice a year, in addition to company team maneuver exercises, by 1993 no battalion in the corps even approached that standard.³⁹

The manning standards of units, as summarized in the unit readiness reports, showed a steady downward trend after 1989, and that had the effect of intensifying the difficulty in attaining the level of unit maneuver proficiency the corps commander sought. The number of units reporting that personnel shortages affected training standards increased throughout the period. Most significant, however, the percentage of manned infantry squads decreased by 30 percent over a period of four years ending in 1993. In 1993 there were sixty-six unmanned infantry squads across the corps—squads that had *no* soldiers. While manning Bradley fighting vehicles was seen as the most critical factor, the problem extended to infantry dismounts as well. To backfill that critical shortage, twelve engineer squads were deployed during one operation in 1993 to perform mechanized infantry security missions in place of infantry squads. While that substitution eased the infantry manning problem, it did nothing at all to help engineer units accomplish their equally demanding jobs. The study group concluded its evaluation of manning trends by noting that the impact of resource reductions on unit fill was disproportionate, having by far the greatest impact on maneuver units, as opposed to fire support and combat service support units.⁴⁰

Contributing to training problems was the availability of training areas after the end of the Cold War. Throughout the period after the Persian Gulf War, V Corps assumed the responsibility for maneuver rights coordination for USAREUR. During the period of the study, the German authorities never turned down a corps request for maneuver, and German state authorities were all supportive of maneuver rights requests and willing to allow limited tracked vehicle movement across terrain, assuming reasonable American controls. Maneuver inside USAREUR maneuver training areas remained relatively unrestricted. Despite the return of some training areas to German jurisdiction, there was no substantial decrease in the land area available for maneuver training. Any actual decreases in training area availability were counterbalanced by the continuing drawdown of maneuver battalions in Europe, which meant that training site availability to units actually increased.

In response to German concerns about the noise and disruptions that attended maneuver training, USAREUR imposed an exclusion zone around Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels that prevented massing of forces outside those areas and subsequent maneuver into them, though during Combat Maneuver Training Center rotations, support units and helicopter forward area refueling and rearming points were allowed to move on and off the posts. Maneuver outside those training areas, however, was restricted by corps policies that limited off-post deployment of heavy equipment except for those special tactical vehicles needed in command post exercises.⁴¹ German sensitivity to noise, and particu-

larly artillery and helicopters, and to troop unit maneuver outside of the training area arose from a popular perception that the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact removed any justification for those disturbances. In essence, the limitations imposed on maneuver training were entirely self-imposed by V Corps, but they were the product of the corps' desire to sustain good community relations after the end of the Cold War.

In the end, the study produced a wealth of figures that demonstrated that General Meigs' perception was essentially correct. The available data showed a substantial reduction in training fund expenditures after 1989; a substantial decrease in the value of training funds after 1989 because of increased training costs incident to force modernization; a major reduction in battalion field training exercises; a reduction in personnel fill within units that sharply affected maneuver unit training; and a perception by battalion commanders that their units were less well trained in maneuver than they ought to have been, in part because of inadequate funding. (*See Table I.*)

The study group concluded that simulations, trainers, and computer-driven exercises produced positive training effects. Because of the availability of conduct of fire trainers for tanks and Bradleys, armored and infantry crews shot better in 1993 than ever in the past. The V Corps battle staffs probably functioned much more effectively together, and were better trained in the intellectual aspects of synchronization, in 1993 than in the past. In large part, the staff attributed those improvements to simulations. Simulations clearly helped maintain a combat edge in staff tasks. They did not, however, reinforce the multi-echelon, collective, supporting tasks on which battlefield movement and maneuver depend.

Competent maneuver, the study group affirmed, required what common sense would dictate—adequate training time, resources, and practice in a field environment. A very basic comparison suggested itself. Just as the only way to teach a light infantry battalion to conduct long marches was simply to do long marches, so too did mechanized task forces need to conduct live maneuver training to sustain maneuver proficiency. The downward trends in funding and personnel after 1989 contributed significantly to corresponding decreases in field training time and therefore in combat readiness. Battalions conducted significantly fewer field training exercises in 1993 than in 1989. Commanders and staffs focused instead on high-payoff training opportunities such as the Combat Maneuver Training Center, gunnery, and simulators. A nearly 100 percent reduction in the number of field training exercises at the battalion task force level had an obvious effect by 1993 on task force ability satisfactorily to perform many of the basic tasks associated with maneuver. That lack of maneuver training became painfully evident at training centers, where maneuver battalions in 1993 began rotations at much lower entry levels than ever before.

To General Meigs, simulations clearly had, at lower echelons of command across the corps, a down side. The difficulty lay in trying to figure out how to turn that trend around, particularly in view of the fact that funding remained constrained and that it appeared dollars would be in even shorter supply in the

uncertain future. The corps was still grappling with that problem when the Balkan crisis became acute in 1995 and V Corps units turned to a different type of exercise to prepare them for duty in southeastern Europe.

Exercises in 1994

Exercise REFORGER 93 had been intended to move beyond the traditional exercise scenario by taking the command posts of a couple of divisions, a corps command post, the separate brigades, and the necessary support elements to Livorno, Italy, to run a computer-assisted command post exercise with the Italians. That would have been the first time that V Corps would have been multinational in an exercise at that level, because the German 5. Panzerdivision was to participate under V Corps operational control. Then-current operational requirements, however, led to the cancellation of REFORGER 93 before it even began.⁴² Atlantic Resolve 94 was the first exercise to follow the REFORGER series. Conducted in October and November of 1994, it largely fulfilled the expectations of the canceled REFORGER 93. A multinational, joint exercise, it began in April, when the corps led a United States European Command effort, Exercise 48 Hours, as a preparatory phase. In 48 Hours, European Command created an ad hoc joint task force headquarters that began advanced planning for the implementation of Atlantic Resolve. The joint task force commander for the exercise was Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, V Corps commander.

The end result was a joint, U.S.-only operation plan and troop deployment data that would be used in the forthcoming Atlantic Resolve exercise. Planners assumed that V Corps would be the heart of both the multinational joint task force and the combined land component, and would also be the corps-level combat headquarters. At the end of the exercise, the plan the task force developed was briefed to the USAREUR commander and the deputy commander of European Command.⁴³ A series of meetings and in-progress reviews continued through April and into October. Later a multinational staff that involved officers from the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, and France visited Frankfurt to brief the corps deputy commanding general on a more refined version of the land component. There were many meetings at the action officer level, including joint working groups and multinational work groups, throughout the summer.⁴⁴

Although it was an excellent concept, Exercise 48 Hours failed to allow for the normal rhythms of personnel reassignments. Many of the key staff that worked through 48 Hours were no longer in the corps during Atlantic Resolve, which began months later. Unfortunately, there was not an adequate hand-off of information to their successors. For example, when Exercise Atlantic Resolve started, the new staff was under the impression that the boundaries on the map represented the situation when the joint task force deployed into the mythical area of Atlantis for operations. This was not so, and other misunderstandings followed. In the end, a quick series of briefings was necessary to bring everyone to the same level of understanding of the development of exercise play.⁴⁵ As

Brig. Gen. Larry Lust, commanding 3d Corps Support Command during Atlantic Resolve, later pointed out,

... there was a tremendous amount of connectivity between the two exercises, but the important thing for the future is that whoever plays the first exercise needs to stay in position for the follow-on exercise. You need these guys who saw the burning bush and got religion to come up and share it with us heathens who weren't there.⁴⁶

Exercise Atlantic Resolve proved crucial in the evolution of USAREUR exercise philosophy and in pegging on-going exercises to suit the needs of on-going contingency operations, because it was explicitly not a "Fulda Gap scenario" targeted against the Warsaw Pact, as the REFORGER series had been. Atlantic Resolve required force deployments across water and by air to a notional area of operations enmeshed in a civil war. The forces there did not resemble Soviet forces. They were heavy forces, but with a different mix than those against which corps units had been accustomed to exercising. Further, the political situation in the area of operations was totally different from the old Warsaw Pact versus NATO problem.

The exercise plan retained a heavy force opponent because, as General Meigs, corps chief of staff at the time of the exercise, pointed out, "there are a lot of places in the Third World today that have hybrid versions of heavy forces." The friendly force mix the exercise plan called for was appropriate to combat such an enemy. It contained slightly more than three heavy division equivalents, including large American and large German conventional divisions, a somewhat smaller French division, and two separate brigades. The forces were spread across a wide frontage and not engaged in contiguous operations. Exercise play placed more emphasis on rear area security operations and force protection than in the REFORGER series. Possibly more important, and to affirm the fact that the corps was not just dealing with friendly Germans as it had done for forty years, the exercise also stressed civil-military affairs, including host nation activities in a "non-robust" environment.⁴⁷

Thus by the end of 1994 the Victory Corps had changed its exercise program completely from the schema in use during the Cold War years. In the course of five years of evolutionary development, the corps no longer looked toward the intra-German border or focused its exercises on missions within Germany, but instead looked outward, into the entire European Command mission area. Planning for tasks anywhere in a large geographical region, the headquarters had begun to develop standard means of moving from its home stations via strategic and tactical airlift and sealift to distant battlefields, and had likewise begun to include in its exercises the logistical programs necessary to sustain forces far from their German barracks.

World events almost immediately wrought further change in both training and exercises. Consequently, the V Corps staff began to react to those changes in the conditions under which soldiers had to operate by altering the design of the training exercises. Thus the following year brought a new look to V Corps exercise design as the corps prepared its units for their new missions in the Balkans.

NOTES

¹ Interv, author with Mr. Raymond D. Nolen, Chief, Exercise Division, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 12 May 2000, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.; Interv, author with Dr. Robert S. Garnett, Jr., Government Relations Advisor, HQ, V Corps, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁴ HQ, V Corps Field Information Office, Caravan Release #3, 30 Nov 1971.

⁵ V Corps Exercise Handbook, Exercise Caravan I, 1971; HQ, V Corps Field Information Office (FIO), Caravan I Release #6, 4 Dec 1971; HQ, V Corps FIO, Caravan I Release #10, 5 Dec 1971.

⁶ V Corps Exercise Handbook, Exercise Caravan I, 1971.

⁷ Nolen interview. The Caravan Guard exercise series began in 1972, originally designed to alternate with REFORGER. See V Corps History Office file, Exercise Caravan Guard (72).

⁸ Nolen interview.

⁹ V Corps Battle Simulation Overview Briefing, 1994; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command BBS (Brigade/Battle Simulation) Overview, BBS-OVW-2.1, 1 Oct 1991.

¹⁰ V Corps ACofS, G-3, Exercise Division, 1991 Simulation Exercises Schedule, January 1991.

¹¹ Nolen interview.

¹² Seventh Army Training Center, Battle Simulations Support Branch, USAREUR Simulations Primer, May 1995.

¹³ V Corps How the Corps Fights Briefing, October 1990.

¹⁴ V Corps Cactus Juggler 90 After Action Report, 11 Dec 1990.

¹⁵ V Corps Artillery, Deep Battle SOP (Draft), 1995, illustrates the initial development of corps concepts for waging deep strike operations.

¹⁶ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Joel A. Buck, an artilleryman and member of Lt. Gen. David Maddox's personal staff group (the "Law Firm"), 1 Dec 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

¹⁷ Memo, V Corps Artillery for Commander (CDR), V Corps, 5 Feb 1993, sub: V Corps Artillery After Action Report for Cactus Juggler 92, shows deep fires to be a continuing issue. Also see Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Swain, Commanding General (CG), V Corps Artillery, 31 May 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany, for the views of the V Corps Artillery commander who developed the concept. In Exercise Caravan Guard 91, when the corps had two aviation brigades, General Maddox explored the possibility of defeating an enemy division deep in sector by the use of attack aviation alone. See Exercise Caravan Guard 91 After Action Review, May 1991.

¹⁸ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Herberg Frandsen, Chief of War Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 5-6 Jan 1993, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

¹⁹ Interv, author with Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox, CG, V Corps, 5 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²⁰ Msg, CG V Corps for multiple addresses, 121200Z Mar 1991, sub: V Corps Training Guidance for Soldiers and Units Returning from Operation DESERT STORM.

²¹ For discussions of the sticker drill, refer to Nolen interview; Frandsen interview; Interv, author with Lt. Col. James A. Cope, Chief, Training Div, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 29 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²² The Corps IG also conducted a MSE User Evaluation in conjunction with the CAPEX. See Memo, V Corps IG for CG, V Corps, 21 Dec 1990, sub: MSE User Evaluation.

²³ Frandsen interview; MSE CAPEX After Action Report (AAR), March 1991.

²⁴ For details of the Advanced Support Echelon concept, refer to Chapter 4.

²⁵ V Corps ASE MOVEX AAR, May 1991; Frandsen interview.

²⁶ V Corps Caravan Guard 91 Exercise Directive, 31 May 1991; Frandsen interview.

²⁷ Frandsen interview.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Interv, author with Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, CG, V Corps, 19 Jan 1995, Campbell Barracks, Germany.

³⁰ Interv, author with Col. Stuart H. Watkins, ACofS, G-5, V Corps, 13 Jan 1993, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

³¹ MFR, V Corps ACofS, G-5, 25 May 1992, sub: G-5 Cell After Action Review, Exercise Dragon Hammer 92; Garnett interview.

³² Garnett interview.

³³ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Daniel V. Sulka, Plans Chief, ACofS, G-4, V Corps, 9 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks, Germany. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) was an Army effort to decrease its support infrastructure by contracting many of those support missions that did not require specifically military operations. In subsequent V Corps operations in the Balkans, for example, LOGCAP found extensive use, with companies such as Brown & Root building base camp areas and doing extensive engineering work, both construction and base support.

³⁴ Memo, Lt. Col. Michael Dietz, III (GE) Korps Liaison Officer, for V Corps Command Group, 14 Aug 1992, sub: (GE) CSA Guidance on the Enhancement of Responsiveness and Combat Readiness of the (GE) Army, transmitting a translated document, "Guidance No. 1" for the German Army from Lt. Gen. Helge Hansen. The German armed forces retained the mission of German territorial defense, but were beginning a transition to an organization of crisis reaction forces, particularly for humanitarian aid, civilian evacuation, and peacekeeping missions outside of the alliance.

³⁵ Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on staff paper, V Corps Readiness Working Group Briefing for Chief of Staff: Readiness, A Comparison, 1989 vs. 1993, 30 Sep 1993.

³⁶ Comment during 29 Sep 1993 pre-brief to Corps Commander, recorded as historian's marginal note on briefing slide set, V Corps Readiness Working Group Briefing for Chief of Staff: Readiness, A Comparison, 1989 vs. 1993, 30 Sep 1993.

³⁷ That adjustment allowed a valid comparison between 1989 dollars and 1993 dollars by adjusting for inflation and changes in the dollar-Deutsche mark conversion rate.

³⁸ All figures were adjusted to 1993 dollars using data from USAREUR Cir 37-11 (1993), from which cost per mile for Class III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) and Class IX (repair parts) were also drawn. Cost figures for operating the M1 and M113 vehicles were similarly adjusted for increased system operating costs.

³⁹ The standards expressed in the USAREUR Regulation 350-1 (edition of 1989 with Change 1, 1990) did not differ significantly from the standards in the edition of that regulation current in 1993. Data for 1989 summarized the experience of armored and mechanized infantry battalions in the 8th Infantry Division. The 8th Infantry Division Annual Historical

Report, CY 1989, contained an enumeration by battalion of all field training conducted within that year. Data for 1992 and 1993 were obtained from 1st Armored Division G-3 Training Division.

⁴⁰ The staff drew readiness data for 1989 from DA-SORTS. Data current in 1993 were drawn from V Corps Unit Status Report (USR) Historical File 1992-1993. All readiness data were based on 4th quarter figures for each year.

⁴¹ Data from V Corps ACofS, G-5, Maneuver Rights Div, files and briefings, 1989-93.

⁴² Rutherford interview.

⁴³ HQ, United States European Command, Exercise 48 Hours 95 AAR, October 1994.

⁴⁴ V Corps ACofS, G-3, Plans, Action Officer File, Exercise 48 Hours 94; Intervs, author with Col. Daniel M. Ferezan, V Corps Deputy Chief of Staff (DCofS), 15 Mar 1995 and 13-14 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks, Germany.

⁴⁵ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, CG, 3d Corps Support Command, 24 Jun 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, CINCUSAREUR Atlantic Resolve Exercise Initial Planning Guidance (4075S), January 1994; Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-3, for distribution, 6 Jan 1994, sub: V Corps Reforger 94 Training Objectives; Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, CofS, V Corps, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

Training and Exercises After 1995

"... if the idea was to cause leaders to be adaptable, innovative, aggressive, willing to act in the absence of orders, willing to take risks on the battlefield, then you've got to start at home station to develop those kinds of things. They don't happen on the first day of the next war. If you don't have them in your unit when you cross the LD, they are not going to emerge automatically because you are at war."

Lt. Gen. James C. Riley
V Corps Commander
June 2001

"You can't be flexible if your major divisional capstone training event is inflexible and isn't attached to leadership or training."

Maj. Charles Eassa
V Corps G-3 Deliberate Plans Chief
June 2001

The tanks of C Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, marched across the Sava River bridge on New Year's Eve 1995, leading Task Force (TF) Eagle into Bosnia in what was, at that time, a new mission for an armored division. Five years later, peace enforcement could no longer be called a new mission, and the American soldiers from the various units that comprised TF Eagle could point to a new understanding of stability and support operations on the basis of their accumulated experience with the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and Sustainment Force (SFOR). Effective in their new role, American forces earned considerable respect not only from the NATO and other national forces taking part in IFOR and SFOR, but also from the former warring factions. They operated safely and with few casualties. None of that happened by accident.

The Mission Rehearsal Exercise

The V Corps played a large part throughout operations in the Balkans, largely laying the foundations for their success. During the first three years of the mission, Task Force Eagle was made up largely of V Corps units and soldiers, while the USAREUR (Forward) and 21st Theater Army Area Command (Forward) headquarters in Hungary and Task Force Victory, which sustained the

operation from Germany, were either heavily or entirely made up of V Corps troops. During that time one of the critical missions the corps carried out was the training of Army units sent to Bosnia. The vehicle for running that training was the Mountain Eagle series of exercises.

The V Corps needed quite literally to invent the doctrine on which it based the exercises. Only a few years earlier—during the Cold War and Persian Gulf War days—no one assigned to a heavy, armored corps would have expected to have to train for any mission other than high intensity combat operations. For that task, the training program was well understood and had a clearly defined and thoroughly validated set of tasks, conditions, and standards. Mission training plans existed in profusion, and field manuals and training materials were readily available to support them. Peace enforcement was another matter entirely. The first problem V Corps had to overcome in designing a training program for such new missions was the shortage of documentation for peace enforcement operations, unlike the usual military tasks for which Department of the Army published guidance existed. The corps at first sought the experience of those officers from foreign armies who had served with the United Nations in Bosnia, such as General Sir Michael Rose.¹ As time went on, the G-3 turned to international documents such as the *Joint Military Commission Handbook* as primary references, and later still used the lessons the American soldiers then in Bosnia were learning, as well as the growing corpus of TF Eagle standing procedures, plans, and after action reviews, as a solid basis for articulating the tasks, conditions, and standards of subsequent exercises.²

Because the situation in Bosnia could, and often did, change with bewildering rapidity, documentary information alone was not a sufficient basis for realistic exercises. Therefore, fundamental to the V Corps approach to running Mountain Eagle exercises—the name applied to the exercise series—was the use of soldiers from Task Force Eagle with current experience in Bosnia as observer-controllers, charged with validating the proposed training and executing other tasks associated with running the exercises. Those young officers' and noncommissioned officers' first-hand knowledge and current experience gave the observer-controllers enormous credibility with the soldiers being trained. At the same time, exercise design demanded that the corps planners make frequent staff visits to Bosnia to learn at first hand the current and projected tasks there by talking to commanders and soldiers engaged in the mission. As one exercise succeeded another, most of the corps staff wound up serving in Hungary or Bosnia, or both; however, they always needed to update their experience in the light of current events. In essence, TF Eagle was writing Army doctrine for peace enforcement operations and V Corps was writing Army training plans for peace enforcement.

The V Corps did not start entirely from zero when it designed the Mountain Eagle exercises, because it had the experience of two previous exercises upon which to draw.³ In the months before the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord,⁴ the deteriorating situation in Bosnia offered the prospect that American forces might be called upon to help extract the peacekeeping troops of the United Na-

tions Protection Force that were under increasing threat throughout the country. USAREUR directed the Southern European Task Force in Vicenza to make itself ready for such a mission and ordered V Corps to help with the training.⁵ Suddenly, V Corps had a new, real life mission, and attitudes in the headquarters reflected that fact. When one member of the staff commented about how filling personnel shortages for the task force would work a hardship on Central Region airfield operations, Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams, the corps commander, curtly replied that "we are of a mind to support the commander who is going to war" and "not just sourcing for training while we are waiting for something else to happen."⁶

The airborne rescue group from Vicenza was soon dubbed Task Force Lion. In June and September 1995 V Corps ran the two Mountain Shield exercises to help Task Force Lion develop and refine its plan. In what one V Corps staff officer called "scratching a plan out in the dirt," corps and Southern European Task Force (SETAF) cooperated to define the political and military situation that existed in Bosnia, to lay out the range of possible missions, and to develop a series of operations to accomplish those missions. By the fall of 1995, therefore, the corps staff had thoroughly familiarized itself with the operational environment in Bosnia and examined the major issues involved in a deployment there. Fortunately, many of the staff officers involved in the subsequent Mountain Shield exercises that trained the later Task Force Eagle were unaffected by the 1995 summer personnel rotation and were still available to V Corps when the NATO mission was announced.⁷

The Mountain Eagle Exercises

In 1995 V Corps became USAREUR's executive agent to conduct the Mountain Eagle exercises for units destined to serve with NATO in the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The corps received a lot of assistance. The USAREUR staff helped, the Seventh Army Training Center being instrumental in providing observer-controllers, helping to design the situational training exercises, organizing the exercise area, and providing the physical resources. The contributions of officers and noncommissioned officers from TF Eagle were indispensable to the eventual success of the exercises, since their knowledge of the situation and operations in Bosnia ensured that the training was relevant and realistic.

The V Corps ran a total of five Mountain Eagle exercises. Mountain Eagle I trained the original TF Eagle for about five weeks at the Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels Training Areas. Exercise Mountain Eagle II, intended for further TF Eagle training, was canceled because the 1st Armored Division began its deployment to Bosnia before the exercise could begin. Exercise Mountain Eagle III trained the 1st Infantry Division for its mission in Bosnia, which included providing a covering force for the armored division's redeployment and then assuming the TF Eagle mission. A brigade from the Big Red One (1st Infantry Division) participated in Mountain Eagle IV in preparation for its rotation

in Bosnia. Mountain Eagle V was a division training exercise for 1st Armored Division, which returned to Bosnia for its second one-year rotation following 1st Infantry Division. Mountain Eagle VI trained the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, the V Corps unit that remained in Bosnia until transfer of authority to 1st Cavalry Division on 7 October 1998.

While the Mountain Shield exercises trained Task Force Lion for a mission it was never ultimately called upon to carry out, the training process the corps developed in Mountain Shield was useful when the staff built the succeeding Mountain Eagle exercise series to train Task Force Eagle for its peace enforcement mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As time went on, division after division assumed the Task Force Eagle mission. Although the focus for Mountain Eagle exercises varied, depending upon the training audience and the current situation in Bosnia, they generally followed a common structure: a training seminar for commanders; a command post exercise driven by a master events list; a fire coordination exercise to certify air mission commanders working with the Air Force, attack helicopters, and artillery; situational training exercise (STX) "lanes" for platoons and companies; and a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) for the entire force.⁸

While the exercises all followed the same model, the training philosophy changed over time. In the beginning the intent was to send a force to Bosnia prepared for the worst possible contingency—actual combat. Task Force Eagle entered Bosnia as a combat force fully capable of responding to any situation, thereby sending a clear signal to all factions that the Implementation Force meant business. As the political and military tensions in Bosnia stabilized, NATO's operational philosophy became less confrontational. Mountain Eagle V and VI therefore trained purely for peace support operations, rather than also for conventional battle. In a similar manner, the focus during Mountain Eagle IV on training commanders to conduct joint military commission talks changed by Mountain Eagle VI to center on bilateral talks between American commanders and faction officials, because lessons from TF Eagle experience showed that bilateral talks were more difficult and required more training time.

One of the unique features of V Corps Mountain Eagle exercises was their cadre, since the officers running them were not necessarily the staff proponents for training. The command divided the exercise into three basic areas of responsibility and assigned a colonel or lieutenant colonel from the staff to be in charge of each: exercise architecture and support; platoon and company situational training exercises; and battalion and brigade mission rehearsal exercises. The corps commander sought out staff expertise and used it without regard to normal staff organization. Consequently, for example, the resource manager was deeply involved in exercise control; the chemical officer was responsible for replication of higher headquarters; and the G-5 and special operations coordination cell supervised role players. As customary, the G-2 wrote the scenario and master events list, or exercise script, and the G-3 training division and exercises division generally superintended the administration of the exercise and its execution.

Two factors determined the exercise design. The first was a set of training objectives that emerged from comprehensive discussions between the corps and the units to be trained. Training objectives reflected the corps commander's assessment of the unit's training level and needs, on the one hand, and the expectation of each unit commander concerning the training his unit would require, on the other.⁹ Conducted during the design phase of the exercise, that essential coordination eliminated the possibility that the two echelons of command would come to the exercise with divergent aims and differing expectations. The second factor affecting exercise design was a continuing series of corps staff visits to TF Eagle to determine "ground truth" in Bosnia in order accurately to replicate what units there were actually doing.

From pre-exercise planning discussions there emerged three or four major themes, or missions, that the corps thought most important for the mission rehearsal exercise. Those themes allowed the G-3 to develop a series of events to test unit ability to carry out peace enforcement tasks in a variety of situations at task force, brigade, company, and platoon levels. Laid out in a matrix showing which situations would be covered, and at what level of organization, those scripted encounters became the basic guideline for the authors of the exercise scenario and master events list.

The exercise scenario provided the framework within which the unit would be trained and provided the background for the specific training situations the unit would encounter. Once the major themes had been decided, the next step was to determine when each situation should occur during the exercise. The writer then worked backwards from those points, adding subsidiary events as needed to build toward each desired major event. Once the events list had been compiled, the planners could compute the resources required for each training event. A comprehensive list of equipment, physical facilities, and role players was one of the early staff products.

In addition to specifying a series of events to keep the exercise moving, it was critical for the writers of the master events list to analyze what a given scenario or event required of the training unit. At the platoon level, the goal was to have the unit doing only one thing at a time. At company level, on the other hand, the intent was to force the company commander simultaneously to manage several platoons engaged in different missions. Battalion, brigade, and division staffs required situations that caused them to manage several actions concurrently, while also planning for future operations. Scripting the exercise to facilitate such a flow of events was an important consideration.

Careful surveys of the situation in Bosnia and use of subject matter experts from TF Eagle guaranteed that the training situations would be both valid and realistic. The V Corps made the exercise even more realistic by configuring the maneuver area to correspond as much as possible to the unit's assigned area of responsibility in Bosnia. The training area contained simulated villages and base camps that represented specific villages and base camps in Bosnia, located in the proper relationship to one another and to an Intra-Entity Boundary Line and Zone of Separation that mimicked those in the unit's area of responsibility.

Village “populations” in the training area were designed to replicate the actual ethnic mixtures of those specific villages in Bosnia, and the scenario built in situations, personalities, and events that were typical of those factions. Where minefields existed, exercise minefields were marked out. If de-mining exercises were part of the scenario, then the corps engineer laid exercise mines and provided a minefield map that closely simulated the practice of the former warring factions in Bosnia.

Assuring realistic confrontations between American soldiers, factional civil and military authorities, and the populations of the villages required an additional step that turned out to be the single most important of the exercise series. In Bosnia, all negotiations and relations with the civilian population were carried out with the help of Serbo-Croatian interpreters. Working through an interpreter was difficult. It required a degree of trust between the negotiator and interpreter. Such trust took time to develop, as did the confidence that the interpreter was conveying to the other party not just what the negotiator *said*, but also what was *meant*. Learning how much to say before pausing to allow the interpreter to translate also required practice. Finally, the American soldiers needed to understand that a negotiation involving an interpreter simply took more time than they expected.

The solution to that problem was to make use of role players who spoke a foreign language. German speakers, however, would not do. Too many American soldiers spoke or understood enough German that they could follow the course of a conversation. To obtain the maximum training effect, the corps wanted reliance on the interpreter to be total. Thus V Corps contracted for role players who spoke languages few Americans would understand. In Exercise Mountain Eagle VI, Hungarians filled that requirement, and it was the universal judgment of both the trainers and the trained that the innovation was one of the most successful aspects of the exercise.

Managing the role players called for a degree of finesse, since not all could be expected to have the same abilities as actors. Some role players did not have speaking parts, and those generally were American soldiers drawn from units stationed at the training area. As much as possible, foreign language role players were cast in specific parts representing specific characters with specific personalities that they maintained throughout the exercise. American soldiers dealt with them over the course of the exercise, and the history of that relationship became an important part of the role during negotiations. Role players were trained during the set-up phase by going through the complete scenario. Subject matter experts from TF Eagle stood in during those preparations to play the parts the soldiers under training would later occupy, so that the role players could understand both exercise goals and the details of the scenario.

Another group of role players provided the higher headquarters of the training units, headquarters with which that unit had to interact, to which it had to submit reports, and from which it received orders. Depending on the size of the unit being trained, the notional higher headquarters was either Multi-National Division North or the senior NATO headquarters. Replicating a high-

er headquarters was a generic process that did not depend upon the specific training objectives of a particular mission rehearsal. On the other hand, realism demanded that the cell performing that task understand the current and near-term battle rhythm of the headquarters being replicated and know the formats of orders and reports characteristic of that headquarters. The unit being trained also needed a physical forum in which to meet the higher staff, because everything could not be done over the telephone or via videoconferencing. Thus the corps set up a simulated higher headquarters complex that resembled the headquarters with which brigades and TF Eagle had to deal, including a replication of the physical relationship between staff sections, signs, and means of communication—exactly as they actually were in Bosnia.

The exercise control cell made certain that the exercise maintained its focus. To do this, the cell synchronized the master events list with the training objectives, made certain that the role players were aware of their parts at each step, and ensured that the resources were available to support each exercise event. Exercise control was the focus of coordination for the exercise, ensuring that the programmed events made sense in the context of the scenario, that information flow was correct, and that observer-controllers provided feedback after each event. Exercise control monitored each action, counter-action, and reaction stimulated by exercise events to make sure that the training audience made appropriate responses to every event. If the unit did not react, exercise control either re-sent the initiating message for the event or found some other way to re-energize the exercise, such as inserting additional events, known as “strings” or “sequels.”

The essential component in making the exercise run properly was the synchronization meeting that exercise control held each morning and evening. Key players came together to discuss events of the preceding twelve hours and to plan those of the next day. The meetings laid out upcoming events in great detail, verifying and emphasizing responsibility, resource allocations, and the plan for collecting information needed for unit feedback and the after action review. They also allowed exercise control to decide whether the unit had reacted appropriately to events and, if not, how to bring the exercise back on track.

The first phase of the Mountain Eagle exercise was the leader seminar. It was designed in two parts. The first was a series of classroom lectures and discussions for the leaders of the unit. The second consisted of a series of practical exercises reflecting the current situation in Bosnia and involving both role players and observer-controllers who gave the participants immediate feedback. The leader seminar was normally scheduled for a day and a half and had to be kept to a fairly rigorous time schedule, with the corps facilitator keeping the seminar on schedule. In later exercises the corps divided the leader seminar into two groups for practical exercises, in order to address the different concerns of field grade and company grade officers.

Platoon and company situational training exercises were core elements of each Mountain Eagle exercise. TF Eagle provided junior officers and sergeants to assist with the exercises. They proofed the exercise “lanes” and exercise jargon for the individual training events and helped to conduct the training. Be-

cause those soldiers had important and, for the moment, unique leadership experience in Bosnia and knew the situation there in detail, their participation immediately improved training. Units being trained for real world missions always accorded special credence to the experience and advice of those who were actually carrying out those missions at the time.

The corps was not overly concerned with the problem of situational training exercise lanes being compromised—that is, a unit being aware of what situation it would face next. Because of the way the training was developed, with full participation of the unit to be trained in setting the objectives, there was a kind of full disclosure of the mission essential task list and training objectives right from the start of the exercise. Thus it was not possible, and not even desirable, to conceal from the training audience the contents of any given situational training exercise. Since the doctrinal basis for peace enforcement operations was then a small one, the specific processes a unit followed to reach its objective were less important than whether the end-state was positive and consistent with the Dayton Accords and other governing documents. The unit would already be aware of the major training objectives, and it would be aware that it had to react to one of a number of possible situations defined by those objectives. The only concern with respect to compromise of exercise lanes was that units not know *exactly* which situation would be presented to them, or when, or what the details of that situation might be.

The public affairs portion of the Mountain Eagle exercises merits special comment. From the beginning soldiers worried about an aggressive media, a concern that was in part a legacy of the war in Vietnam. Further, it was clear that a junior officer could conceivably find himself in a situation in which what he said could have an impact on public opinion or even on government policy, not to mention on his own career as well. Thus, learning to deal with the press and other media remained one of the major training objectives of the exercises.

As with other aspects of mission rehearsals, feedback from TF Eagle changed the public affairs content of the exercises. By the time V Corps ran Mountain Eagle IV and Mountain Eagle V, it had become clear that reporters were not hostile, as the existing scenario initially portrayed them. Still, Col. Gregory Fontenot's experience while commanding 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in Task Force Eagle remained in the minds of commanders and prejudiced their attitudes toward media. Colonel Fontenot's cautions to his soldiers to be careful when engaged in operations, as well as his forthright responses to questions following a visit by the Secretary of Defense, were reported in the *Wall Street Journal* by a reporter "embedded" in his brigade and occasioned a minor political furor.¹⁰ The public affairs officer used that experience as a way to explain that, while the Army continued to use embedded media, it was unwise to become too close or too intimate with those reporters. As time went on, the public affairs office changed the focus of its part of the exercise to depict media as less challenging and confrontational. During Mountain Eagle V and Mountain Eagle VI, public affairs training concentrated on how to give interviews and how to be comfortable on camera. Typically, media training for commanders

involved three events: a press conference following a meeting, a stand-up television interview, and participation in a call-in radio show.

The objective was to build commanders' confidence. Thus, the observer-controller watched the progress of the public affairs event. If the subject was doing well and was comfortable with the interview, then the controller gave the role player a signal to "turn up the heat," asking more difficult and challenging questions. If, on the other hand, the subject of the interview was less than satisfactory, then the controller could direct the role player to fall back to easier questions with which the subject would be more comfortable. A menu of questions gave the observer-controller and the role player that flexibility. The overall critique, naturally, came later.

In preparing for the exercises, the corps routinely asked various reporters and other media figures to participate, a process that had to be planned well in advance but that also had to be flexible enough to take advantage of an unexpected arrival or departure from Bosnia of a reporter willing to visit the training. Using commercial media was beneficial because it was useful for commanders at least to recognize faces they were likely to see again in Bosnia during their deployment. The bulk of media role playing, however, was done by the USAR-EUR and V Corps public affairs officers and by the audio-visual technicians in the corps G-3 section.

The Mountain Eagle exercises were distinctly not "training as usual." Instead, each was unique, nonstandard, and not to be repeated. No Army training plan existed on which to base the exercises. The tactics, techniques, and procedures used in the situational training exercise had little in common with the kinds of training that went on at the Joint Readiness Training Center, for instance, or at the National Training Center. Every Mountain Eagle exercise was different from every other, and all of them were different from the training customary in a unit's annual training cycle. In fact, the Mountain Eagle exercises were not simply training, but were actually *mission rehearsals*, and the structure of each exercise reflected the mission anticipated for the unit being trained.

The V Corps commander and staff developed the concept of the mission rehearsal exercise when training SETAF during the Mountain Shield exercises and refined the concept in the first Mountain Eagle exercise. The mission rehearsal took mission essential task list training to a more sophisticated level by incorporating the actual mission and operational environment into the training. When the corps staff determined the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the mission rehearsal, it based them on the situation then current in Bosnia and on the current and projected mission requirements of TF Eagle. Dealing with a riot was an illustrative case in point. The tactics, techniques, and procedures would include the intelligence indicators for a riot; staff battle drill for dealing with a riot; and unit procedures, based on the rules of engagement, for dealing with a riot.

The techniques for handling a riot might well vary from one Mountain Eagle exercise to the next because the political and military situation in Bosnia had changed over that period of time. Therefore, the unit battle rhythm for that

situation would change. Similarly, replicating the non-U.S. higher headquarters involved in the exercises—SFOR and Multi-National Division North—was a nonstandard task, at least in part because the organization and nature of their operations also changed over time.

The essential fact was that the Mountain Eagle exercises did not train doctrine, because no coherent doctrine for peace enforcement missions existed. Nor did the exercises provide a generic training for peace enforcement, based on a fixed set of requirements. Instead, the Mountain Eagle exercises sought to prepare each task force for the specific circumstances and situations that it would encounter when it arrived in Bosnia. The engagement of V Corps in the task was a key to success because the corps had accumulated a massive amount of experience in all aspects of TF Eagle operations and had remained deeply involved with the peace enforcement operation at the operational level from the beginning of such operations. Drawing on the deep reservoirs of knowledge and experience of its staff and the subordinate units that had remained heavily engaged in the mission in Bosnia, V Corps was able to articulate the specific requirements for each mission rehearsal.

Each Mountain Eagle exercise built upon and improved upon the one that preceded it. Successful training techniques were retained, while ineffective ones were discarded. In that process of refinement, a number of important lessons emerged from the Mountain Eagle exercises. Training objectives had to be agreed to by the headquarters conducting the training and the headquarters being trained. A process of consultation early in the exercise design phase best accomplished that. Expertise in the area of operation was crucial. There was no substitute for subject matter experts, and their credibility had to be unchallenged. Particularly for soldiers returning to Bosnia for a second or third tour of duty, there was a tendency to say: "I've been there; I've done that; I've got the T-shirt; and there's nothing you can teach me about it." That attitude could only be overcome by showing the soldiers being trained that things had changed and new circumstances existed. Only real experts could do that. Everyone participating in the exercise, but preeminently those running exercise control, writing the scenario, writing the master events list, serving as observer-controllers, and validating the training needed current, accurate, and thorough knowledge of the operational context and the requirements of the task force engaged in the mission.

Daily synchronization meetings conducted by exercise control constituted the single most important way of making sure that the training objectives were met. Adequate lead time was required for exercise preparation. The unit conducting training had to arrange cost-effective contracts for those resources that it did not own, and the G-3 had to issue taskings to subordinate units far enough in advance that the unit could plan to meet its requirements properly. Scenario and master events list writers had to develop branch lines and sequels to give exercise control the flexibility it needed to keep the exercise moving properly. Other lessons were just as important. Foreign language role players and the training in using interpreters were essential parts of the success of the

exercise series. Finally, the mission rehearsal, keyed to the specific circumstances units would confront in Bosnia, distinguished the Mountain Eagle exercises from normal unit training.

Exercise Victory Strike

Exercise Victory Strike was another new concept for V Corps. It was developed both as a response to some of the aviation issues that the corps and USAREUR observed during the 1999 mission into Albania¹¹ and as a response to the corps commander's ideas about battalion capstone training events for aviation units. The study of aviation needs and requirements that the USAREUR commander, General Montgomery C. Meigs, convened in early 2000 and the resulting action plan to address the major issues afforded Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, corps commander by that time, the opportunity to implement his own ideas about aviation training and exercises.

Largely overdrawn media commentary during the Task Force Hawk deployment to Albania about problems in Army attack aviation had already caused a public debate about the effectiveness of the AH-64 Apache helicopter and the efficacy of Apache aircrew training. An evidently unintentional public release of the contents of a message that Brig. Gen. Richard Cody, TF Hawk deputy commander for air and special operations, had sent to the chief of staff of the Army about aviation training and equipment deficiencies only served to intensify public interest in the question.¹² By the time Cody's remarks had been widely distributed, however, General Meigs had already drawn together a group

Lt. Gen. James C. Riley



of senior USAREUR officers to look into Army aviation with a view to making the USAREUR aviation force a more effective weapon.

Meigs hosted a conference at the USAREUR conference center at Garmisch to discuss Army aviation requirements. Among the participants, besides key members of the USAREUR staff, were the V Corps commander, the commanders of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions, commanders of V Corps brigades, and key aviation leaders, including the commander of the 11th Aviation Brigade. The eventual result of their deliberations was a white paper for the vice chief of staff of the Army that identified a host of matters to be addressed and those organizations within the Army that should deal with them. The point of the white paper was not so much *deficiencies* in Army aviation, however, as it was ways in which Army aviation needed to *evolve* to meet the demands of the kinds of missions USAREUR leaders foresaw for the twenty-first century. Flexibility for missions across the spectrum of conflict was a common underlying assumption. That flexibility implied capability for rapid tactical and strategic deployment and equally rapid action to meet the political imperatives of swiftly evolving international situations and a broad range of capabilities to meet the challenges of unconventional or asymmetrical threats. It was clear to everyone at the conference that rapid deployment also required a sustained high state of readiness and training and the ability to go into action when necessary without any kind of additional training or mission rehearsal exercise. Equally, recent experience made it almost certain that Army aviation needed to be capable of functioning smoothly under joint or combined command and in organizations that might bring together elements of other services.¹³

USAREUR and V Corps each accepted ownership of a variety of the points under discussion. One of the questions V Corps agreed to handle was how attack aviation exercises should be conducted to be both more realistic and more challenging. General Riley perceived the need for attack helicopter battalions to have an annual capstone training event similar to the exercises that since 1983 had rounded out the annual training of maneuver battalions, either a National Training Center rotation or, on alternate years, an external evaluation at task force level. He believed that aviation battalions lacked exercises that had the rigor, the battlefield realism, and the high fidelity feedback that combat training centers provided to maneuver battalions, and that they had not experienced the pressure that time and an energetic opposing force imposed upon those training evolutions. Army aviators needed a training event that could provide a more realistic environment.¹⁴

Task Force Hawk operations dramatically illustrated some of the issues with which the envisioned training event needed to deal. The first major issue was staging equipment and then deployment, both tactical and strategic, with consideration to movement by road, by rail, and by intra-theater airlift with C-130 aircraft. Aviation gunnery and low-level flying would be crucial elements of the exercise design, with live fire of Hellfire missiles,¹⁵ the GAU-30 gun,¹⁶ 2.75-mm. rockets,¹⁷ and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)¹⁸ for suppression of enemy air defense. Mission planning was to be done through the deep opera-

tions coordination cell that had been used by Task Force Hawk. Responding to General Meigs' challenge to develop a "world-class aviation training exercise," and realizing that extensive low-level flying and live fire gunnery would be difficult at training areas in Germany, V Corps planners looked abroad to Poland, where there were fewer restrictions.¹⁹

After permission to conduct the exercise in Poland had been coordinated, G-3 planners looked at the Drasco Pomorske training area and discovered that, although much more could be done than in Germany, there were some limitations that could not be overcome. Drasco Pomorske was not large enough to do a full regimental aviation attack, and exercise designers therefore had to insert the squadrons by echelon. Funding limitations and restrictions on firing the Army Tactical Missile System²⁰ from the MLRS limited the scope of the joint suppression of enemy air defense training.

The eventual exercise, which V Corps called Victory Strike, took place in September 2000. In the end, the exercise was less joint than Meigs and Riley wished, Air Force participation being limited to C-130 airlift to deploy some of the units and the usual operations of the Corps Air Support Operations Group. There was a combined aspect to the exercise, since Polish artillery and air defense units took part. The air defense was a particular success, with the Polish air defense integrating with the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and other units from 69th ADA Brigade. Various aircraft, including C-130s, flew live against the integrated air defense system. Exercise control changed the integrated air defense array daily, giving the Army aviators a look at a different opposing force every time they flew a mission.²¹

The corps learned other lessons during the exercise as well, particularly about having sufficient aviation fuel on site for extended, large-scale operations. One of the successes of Victory Strike turned out to be the logistical support that the 71st Corps Support Battalion provided to the task force. The deployment, on the other hand, did not go as well as hoped, in part because there was some trouble with the Two Plus Four Agreement,²² specifically in arranging movement of forces through what had been the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The mechanics of deployment continued to be troublesome, and the corps had to work through problems of coordination with the Deutsche Bahn and the Polish rail system. USAREUR did not activate its movement operations center for Victory Strike, and thus the link between V Corps and the 21st Theater Support Command was not as good as it could have been.²³

Despite the limitations, Exercise Victory Strike was generally adjudged to have been exceptionally successful and to have been the most rigorous and realistic battalion-level aviation training USAREUR had ever conducted. The training did not reach the level of realism and fidelity that Riley envisioned because there was no engagement simulation system for attack helicopters. One of the outgrowths of the exercise was a vision that Meigs and Riley shared that corps aviation battalions ought to be optimized for deep attack missions and that divisional battalions ought to be optimized for close in, over-the-shoulder support of division operations, suggesting that the capstone training event for the corps

aviation battalion should be quite different from the exercise for a divisional aviation battalion.²⁴

The corps designated Victory Strike an annual training event, and G-3 exercise planners used the results of the 2000 exercise to plan Victory Strike II, to be conducted in October 2001. Major changes for the next year included force-on-force exercises, ideally including U.S. Air Force participation. Design changes also called for some kind of maneuver force along the line of contact and an operation plan that included a ground attack supported by attack aviation and joint suppression of enemy air defense artillery missions. Meigs arranged for British participation in the next exercise, as well, to enhance the joint nature of the training.

Training Considerations

Throughout this discussion the focus has been on exercises, rather than on specific training, since the nature of training itself for most missions remained much the same. Meigs explained in 1994, while assigned as V Corps chief of staff, that "it's hard to draw a line between peacemaking and low level combat operations as I understand the definition."²⁵ If the distinction was difficult for a general officer to draw, it was a safe conclusion that it was equally hard for the rifleman, to whom the difference was likely to be irrelevant in any case, if the experience of Somalia was in any way typical. Meigs further commented that levels of training in things that were not particularly affected by the availability of training dollars—tank gunnery and Bradley gunnery chief among them—remained high across the board, thanks in part to the conduct-of-fire simulators available to the battalions.²⁶ Resources did, however, pose a constant threat to training readiness in many other areas.

Meigs cited money as the most difficult problem he had to manage as corps chief of staff, pointing out that, while the Army insisted that training was the glue that held the force together and that it had first priority, training still did not receive priority when money was allocated. Through 1993 and 1994 finding resources to support V Corps training was further complicated by periodic budget cuts in the middle of the fiscal year. In fiscal year 1993, for example, there was a severe money cut in the fourth quarter, following which the corps was given an unanticipated \$126 million in year-end funds. The fiscal year 1994 budget kept the operational tempo at fiscal year '93 levels, but was then subjected to swings that took it up in January and down in mid-year by more than 100 miles per vehicle. "In terms of programming training and readiness," Meigs later remarked, "we have been following a jagged sinesoidal curve that goes up and down with the vagaries of the budget cycle. This pattern drives trainers nuts; they never know what resources to count on."²⁷

As time went on, there were also additions to training that demanded both more money and more training time, and that made it increasingly difficult for units to maintain a fully trained status. The process began soon after the Persian Gulf War, when every battalion-size unit going through the Combat Maneu-

ver Training Center at Hohenfels began spending a portion of its time there training what was then called "operations other than war." There, unit focus was upon developing unit competency for humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations and on gaining proficiency in small unit techniques for setting up checkpoints, running convoys, dealing with civilian authorities at the local level, and handling operations involving rules of engagement that varied in intensity. At the same time, the unit had to train to the standards required for high intensity war at battalion and company level. Units thus began having to learn to operate over the entire spectrum of combat, but with no real expansion of training time or funds.²⁸

Considering the issues that deployments to Croatia, Somalia, and Rwanda had raised, General Jerry Rutherford, corps commander from June 1992 through April 1995, concluded that the modern operational environment required more flexibility and more competencies of leaders. He did point out, however, that Meigs' remark about the nature of operations as seen by the rifleman was correct. He insisted that operations other than war missions

involve many of the same basics that you have to master to conduct any military operation. Making sure that the platoon leaders and other small unit leaders have an exposure to some of the events that we never trained during the Cold War days is the key to all of this—and you have to build in the time to allow this additional training to happen. But it is true that the company commander today has to be more flexible than he was five years ago.²⁹

The real tension came later, when individual training for peace enforcement missions became much more sophisticated and complex, and particularly when the standard practices of the United Nations for military forces involved in peacekeeping operations became part of the training. Peace enforcement and combat operations, particularly as practiced by task forces later assigned to places like Macedonia, involved completely different sets of reactions to stimuli. Commanders noted that, once trained for a UN mission, a soldier required time and retraining to take on a combat mission.³⁰

Exercise Urgent Victory '01

In the course of the year 2000, Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, who had assumed command of V Corps in November 1999, became convinced that certain aspects of corps operations or, more accurately, "elements of our life," as he phrased it, needed attention and improvement.³¹ Reviewing the pace of corps operations over the preceding several years, as well as day-to-day corps operations, Riley decided to focus on several interrelated aspects of corps-level military operations: leader development; stability and predictability of the corps environment, which roughly translated into training management; and home station training, which determined how subordinate units could enter their principal training event or, indeed, war, at a higher level of proficiency. For the latter, the agreed shorthand term for developing highly capable combat organizations of all types

became "creating killer companies." Seeing leadership linkages at every point in those concerns, Riley wanted to address leadership first. Indeed, his command group believed that the new generation of company grade leaders was being conditioned simply to avoid failure, rather than to achieve success. In addition, the forthcoming publication of a new assessment of Army leadership by Fort Leavenworth made the issue a timely one.³²

In order to define the problem better and to propose viable solutions, Riley convened a seminar at the end of February 2001 to consult all of the senior leaders in V Corps. Participants included the general officers across the corps, the corps principal staff, brigade commanders and division chiefs of staff, and command sergeants major. Prior to meeting, each reread Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, and a number of articles about leadership drawn chiefly from *Parameters* and *Military Review*. Riley invited retired General Wayne A. Downing, the former commander of Special Operations Command, as keynote speaker, specifically asking him to be provocative in his presentation. To facilitate the conference, he obtained the help of retired Maj. Gen. William A. Stofft, a former commandant of the Army War College and former chief of military history, and the principal experts on leadership from the Army's training base.³³ The conference organizers assumed that the evolving "information age" and what had come to be known as the "new world order" would produce battlefields in the twenty-first century across the entire operational continuum from low-intensity conflict and covert threats to high-intensity war. Army officers charged with leading units on such a wide range of battlefields needed leadership skills that could both galvanize and embolden their subordinates. Junior officers would have to take on increased responsibilities. To achieve that, the corps had to create a professional environment of agility and flexibility, readiness to take calculated risks, and tactical innovation. The issue was whether such an atmosphere did exist, and if not, how to create it.³⁴

The operational environment the seminar posited was certainly a daunting one. The sum of participants' expectations was that operations of the future could take place anywhere along the spectrum of conflict, but that the most probable context was at the lower end. Battle would be complex and dirty, and probably urban, but in a place that had little infrastructure to support military operations. Fighting would be close-in or, as the commanders described it, "in the mud," and against ill-defined enemy forces motivated by little-understood goals and values. That problem would certainly also extend to differing values and expectations between the United States and any allies the nation might have in future battle.

Warfare would probably have an economic aspect as well, and could easily incorporate both blackmail and extortion as issues with which the Army would have to deal. Certainly future enemies would directly target both military and commercial information systems, and the Army should also expect attacks on commercial and military targets in space. Both lethal and nonlethal weapons would certainly be in use. The use of biological and chemical toxins could not be ruled out, particularly inasmuch as they had become relatively easy to produce even in third world countries.

Whatever the nature of battle, any future combat would probably be extended, and both the military and the civilian establishment could not expect brief "in and out" operations. Rapid information exchange would characterize future operations, with one aspect of that being a pervasive presence of the media on the battlefield to inform and affect both domestic and world opinion, thus guaranteeing an immediate and probably dramatic political feedback to military operations. Those were challenging circumstances, for which far more would be required of leaders than understanding "two up, one back, and a hot meal once a day," as the conference organizer expressed the traditional requirement that an officer have "technical and tactical proficiency."³⁵

More than just lip service would have to be paid to the many well-understood attributes of good leaders if they were to succeed in the kinds of battle the corps' leaders had described, and some of those attributes demanded more attention than others. The first requirement was a strong chain of command through which a clear understanding of the commander's intent could be passed via the medium of open, candid, and effective communications among leaders. Such communication was based in the first instance on the reciprocal trust, respect, and confidence that had always been the basis of good unit cohesion and on simple, rather than elaborate, concepts, orders, and instructions.

Such simplicity was part and parcel of the maximum delegation of authority that participants in the conference saw as essential for success, since it allowed, given clear understanding of command intent, the maximum in operational flexibility and innovation to deal with circumstances that changed rapidly and that presented fleeting and challenging opportunities. Command at every level had to reward innovation and disciplined initiative, even when an instance of such freedom of action might result in failure, because such failures were the substance of learning. The keys to creating such subordinates were providing them with adequate resources, and especially discretionary time to do the training and preparation those leaders saw as necessary, and a command atmosphere characterized by abundant personal accountability and an absence of fear and abuse.

After resolution of those issues, the conference could easily and briefly define the attributes of a good leader. Such an officer embodied the values traditionally enunciated by the Army, but he most particularly possessed strong character, a quality surprisingly not emphasized by the most recent leadership assessment made at Fort Leavenworth. Of course, he was technically and tactically competent and physically fit, but he also required a keen intellect, adaptability, and patience. The ideal leader was compassionate in his relationships with subordinates and always displayed confidence not only in his own abilities, but also in the abilities of his subordinates and in the cumulative capabilities of the unit. Finally, the ideal leader was tenacious in pursuit of his mission.

More interesting were the specific elements of a leader's behavior that the conference enumerated. The corps' leaders needed to develop and sustain strong chains of command; generate trust, confidence, and cohesion; and establish and maintain a positive command climate. The exercise of authority demanded more

than just good leadership, though. Seniors needed to coach, counsel, develop, and respect subordinates, all the while understanding that authority was earned from the led as "a gift of trust." The essential factor was open, frank, and honest two-way communications concerning a clearly articulated commander's intent. Within that context, subordinates should be free to take calculated risks. Looking ahead, all leaders should provide for the future success of the organization and its members, in part by being unafraid to decentralize and to underwrite honest mistakes through delegation of real authority. The measure of success depended upon continual assessments by leaders of themselves, of their subordinates, and of their units. To achieve that, leaders had to get out of the office, be visible, and be approachable. All of those things required an environment of clearly expressed high standards and consistent standards of discipline. In sum, as Riley concluded when briefing Meigs on the way the leadership seminar described ideal officers,

V Corps officers are insightful and confident leaders who are fit, caring, and disciplined team players. These exemplary men and women of character aggressively seize initiative; are unafraid to take calculated risks; and are focused on warfighting, developing and empowering effective leaders, and attaining excellence. They enthusiastically seek challenging responsibilities, enhancing their technical competence, intellect, and operational adaptability through diverse experiences, introspective assessment, and diligent professional study.³⁶

The conference went beyond the theoretical, however, and amounted to much more than a structured rehash of the Army's leadership doctrine. Riley wanted to give Meigs concrete recommendations about how to improve leadership in the Army in Europe. To do that, he divided the conference participants into three groups, each facilitated by one of the leadership experts brought in from the United States. Each group considered the ways in which certain things in Europe needed to be changed to bring about the desired changes in leadership style. One group discussed V Corps and USAREUR policies and procedures. The second considered the requirements and basic philosophy embodied in USAREUR Regulation 350-1, which outlined USAREUR training procedures. The third discussed the conduct of collective training in USAREUR, not only at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, but also at home station and at the Grafenwöhr training area.

The groups' conclusions challenged the way the Army in Europe routinely conducted business and made specific recommendations for improvement. One of the most important conclusions was that risk aversion, the so-called "zero defects" mentality, while not prevalent in Europe, did still exist. Command guidance at all levels was viewed as far too prescriptive and too directive, and the participants emphasized that subordinates needed instead to have a clear understanding of the commander's intent and operational flexibility within that intent. Short-term command objectives, they concluded, were often inconsistent with the organization's long-term health and the general goal of empowering subordinates to act more independently and innovatively.

Along those lines, there remained the issue of combating the old Army tendency for any expression of contrarian ideas to be viewed as disloyalty. In general, the conference concluded, the entire command needed to change policies, procedures, and regulations to promote both leader development and leader empowerment.

The specific recommendations of the conference were concrete and limited to those things that the command could really affect. The corps should implement "empowering authorities" to battalion and brigade commanders, giving them time to assess their units and determine for themselves what mandatory training could and ought to be accomplished. The corps should modify or eliminate policies and procedures that did not directly support officer leadership development and empowerment. Increased training scenario flexibility for units at the Combat Maneuver Training Center would allow more advanced units to execute more challenging events. At the training centers, the headquarters should reduce after action review frequency, promoting attainment of near continuous operations. Simultaneously, evaluators should incorporate into after action reviews those leadership behaviors the conference thought most desirable. Stress should be on tactical initiative, actions without orders, and commander's intent in all training scenarios. Finally, the corps had to find ways to cause leaders to become accustomed to complex leadership situations that required initiative and innovative solutions. In the process, the staff had to institute less routine and predictable training evolutions at combat training centers, giving unexpected "flex" missions and attaining the desired end state via "actions without orders" and creating situations in which the exercise eliminated a leader and allowed a subordinate to take over in the midst of the action.

Riley discussed the conference results with Meigs and simultaneously began to implement such recommendations as lay within his area of responsibility. The first was a major rewrite of V Corps policy letters to eliminate those the conference characterized as having an "egg-sucking level of detail." The rewrite specifically focused on telling subordinate commanders much more about command intent—what things needed to be done—and far less about how to accomplish those things. In the course of that process, V Corps decreased its policy letters from thirty-eight to sixteen in which the instructions were empowering, rather than limiting.

One of the best examples, and one that addressed a glaring problem, dealt with the issue of mandatory training. In 1999 the United States Army, Europe, had an annual training requirement for 392 days of mandated training, a phenomenon that General Meigs once criticized as a "war on white space" on the training schedule. Not only was it obviously impossible to carry out that much mandatory training, but the very act of enunciating it constrained commanders' initiative, suggesting to them that all they really needed to do was execute, because the higher headquarters was going to take care of telling them what to execute, and how frequently. USAREUR approval was required to make such a change, and Riley discussed a rewrite of USAREUR Regulation 350-1³⁷ to

achieve the goal by giving the chain of command the power to make exceptions to mandatory training policy. By the middle of 2001 the redrafting of the regulation was well under way, with Meigs' blessing.³⁸

One of Riley's particular concerns, and one that the leadership conference specifically endorsed, was finding ways to use corps exercises at all levels to enhance leader development. The next major exercise was the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Exercise 2001 for the 1st Armored Division. The corps commander saw the forthcoming BCTP exercise, which V Corps titled Urgent Victory '01, as a beckoning opportunity and discussed with the operations staff ideas that they believed he had been developing for some time.

Basically, the forthcoming exercise was more or less the same as every Warfighter since 1988. The defect of the Warfighter in terms of leader development, as Riley saw it, was that the exercise was predictable and followed a scripted scenario that everyone knew. It began with a Blue Force attack against a defending Red Force, followed by a continuation of the attack against succeeding Red Force echelons, if Blue Force still had enough combat power. The next step was preparation to defend against a Red Force follow-on echelon.

Useful in many ways, such an exercise scenario did not necessarily help develop the innovative solutions that Riley sought or produce the "comfort" in dealing with battlefield unknowns that allowed adaptive leaders to develop. In his view, it really implied a set-piece approach to training and therefore a set-piece approach to leadership. The reasoning behind his challenge to the traditional exercise design was unassailable. If, as Riley later commented, the idea was to cause leaders to be adaptable, innovative, aggressive, willing to act in the absence of orders, and willing to take risks on the battlefield, then the corps had to start that development process at home station. Such characteristics, as he pointed out, did not just *happen* on the first day of the next war. If they did not exist when the unit crossed the line of departure, they were not going to emerge automatically just because a war had started. The battlefield, he insisted, was not nearly as set-piece as some would like it to be. Therefore, the degree of comfort that leaders needed to have in dynamic, foggy, muddled environments, and the ability to think quickly and intuitively and to adapt to uncertainty and cause the organization to adapt, was critical.³⁹

Meeting with the planners from the G-3 Exercise Division, the corps commander discussed his concerns about *pro forma* exercise scenarios during a corps command post exercise, Victory Focus, that preceded the Warfighter maneuvers. He quickly decided to change the scenario of the forthcoming Warfighter exercise to provide more uncertainty and a more fluid operational and tactical situation offering more scope for subordinate commanders to exercise their initiative. The specific scenario he envisioned was a meeting engagement with both Blue and Red forces in motion as the operation began. At the same time, he decided that he wanted to involve both the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division simultaneously in the exercise, a radical proposal inasmuch as the Army had never before conducted a multiple division BCTP. When Riley

discussed the idea with one of the Battle Command Training Program's senior mentors, retired General Fred Franks⁴⁰ was immediately enthusiastic and only wondered how the mechanics of changing the scenario could be worked out.⁴¹

The mechanics of change were indeed daunting because of the development process that lay behind every BCTP exercise, a process involving consultation and cooperation between the staff at Fort Leavenworth, the exercise director—in this case, the V Corps commander—and the unit to be exercised. By the time Riley made his decision to change the exercise scenario, the planning process was well advanced and the exercise itself was only about ninety days away. Any major change in scenario meant a short notice and massive change in exercise planning, to include changes in the contracting support that the program customarily used to run the exercises. By the time Exercise Victory Focus was in progress, however, Riley had concluded that the training objectives originally enunciated for the forthcoming Warfighter were inappropriate. The Battle Command Training Program had structured an exercise that frankly limited the freedom of the divisions, which had to attack down "bowling alleys." That is, the scenario placed the divisions between conventional, parallel divisional boundaries in accordance with orthodox control measures of division sectors within the context of a corps operation in a way that had been unchanged since the days of the Cold War.

Moreover, the divisions faced specified and predictable kinds of enemies. Another thread of continuity running through all of the Warfighter exercises was what V Corps exercise planners called a "heavy metal OPFOR," by which they meant that the opposing force that contractors designed for the Battle Command Training Program was a heavy, mechanized force drawn from the Combined Arms Center threat book and strongly resembling the old Warsaw Pact Soviet force configuration. That "world class OPFOR" was a very strong and capable force, although not really of the type V Corps planners expected to encounter when operating in third world environments. While they anticipated that Warsaw Pact equipment would be prevalent, they did not expect to see anything like the Warsaw Pact in size and capabilities of opposing forces. At the time the 2000 Warfighter Exercise was being planned, Fort Leavenworth had not yet developed its new conventional operating environment, which offered a menu of opposing force sizes and capabilities, much more in line with the then-current threats.⁴² Therefore, regardless of the exercise scenario chosen for the Warfighter 2000, it was destined to be a heavy force battle.

In short, the maneuver inherent in the original Warfighter design offered no reward for being an agile and aggressive leader and there were few opportunities to do that in any case. "So," as Maj. Charles Eassa of G-3 plans described Riley's decision, "he turned us on a dime."⁴³ The exercise that was then in formulation was based upon a Southwest Asia scenario and was, in his opinion, routine. Riley wanted the divisions, instead of attacking and then defending or defending and then attacking, as had been traditional, to conduct a movement to contact that led to a meeting engagement. To add ambiguity, and therefore opportunity for creative tactical thinking, and in part to compensate for the

heavy force structure used, he decided that the units would have only about 30 percent of the intelligence information to which they were accustomed on a major exercise. Finally, he decided that, when the exercise began, all of the units would already be in motion. Taking a final ground-breaking step, he confirmed that the exercise design would involve both the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division.⁴⁴

Limiting the intelligence inputs to the exercise was an important way to inject flexibility and, in the V Corps planners' view, realism. For exercise purposes, units had long been accustomed to receiving a great deal of information on enemy order of battle and intentions, one outgrowth of the much more capable technical intelligence-gathering systems and the integration of information operations into war planning that had been characteristic of the preceding five years. Indeed, many believed that there was very little that could be hidden on the modern battlefield, given the wide range of intelligence-gathering capabilities into which the corps could tap in central Europe.

But experience in Balkan peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, as well as in low intensity combat operations in the third world, had recently moderated such enthusiasms. The very real Serb success in hiding armored vehicles from allied air attacks in Kosovo in 1999 argued that, particularly in such conditions and in such terrain, the army could not expect the 100 percent "read" on enemy dispositions that prior exercises conditioned many to expect. Limiting intelligence inputs to the exercise would help teach commanders and staff to operate effectively in the face of that "vague, nebulous information you don't have," as Lt. Col. Peter Schifferle, previously the V Corps G-3 plans chief and by then teaching at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, phrased the dilemma.⁴⁵ Riley agreed with that assessment, later soliloquizing that

we will never see the battlefield as clearly as we need to see it. We are talking about the ability to have an intuitive and instinctive feel for the battlefield, the ability to cut through the fog, the ability rapidly to assess and adapt, the willingness to be aggressive, to be innovative, to take risks when called for—these are imperatives, in my opinion, for the military leader. Technology will never, ever dampen the need for those imperatives.⁴⁶

Enlisting the assistance of General Franks, Riley turned to Lt. Gen. W. M. Steele,⁴⁷ the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center, to discuss how such a major—and very last-minute—change to the Battle Command Training Program scenario could be developed. At the same time, Mr. Doug Nolen, Chief of the Exercise Branch in the V Corps G-3, entered discussions with Col. Michael Thompson, chief of the Battle Command Training Program, and found him ready to talk about ways to make the major changes that Riley wanted.⁴⁸ Through extended discussions between V Corps and the staff at Fort Leavenworth, often using the medium of video-conferencing, the many difficult problems were finally resolved and briefed to generals Steele, Riley, and Meigs. With their approval in hand, the concept for a revised Warfighter Exercise was presented to the chief of staff of the Army, who also gave his agreement.⁴⁹

The corps had to accept one modification to its preferred organization for the exercise. Instead of placing the two divisions side by side, the Battle Command Training Program staff inserted a third, notional division between them. The idea was that the Warfighter was a major exercise for the division, and that a failure by one division would affect the outcome for the other division. In exercise terms, the position was a reasonable one, although the Corps G-3 made the point that the relative success of adjacent units, and care for units on the flank, were part and parcel of real operations and therefore ought to be exercised in the Warfighter as well. In any case, the exercise designers placed a notional 3d Infantry Division into the exercise order of battle between the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division.⁵⁰

A maneuver control cell headed by Col. J. D. Johnson represented the 3d Infantry Division during the exercise.⁵¹ While that artifice kept the two participating divisions isolated at the start of the exercise, Riley succeeded in placing them side by side toward the end of the Warfighter so that he could look at the issue of mutual support across the division boundary. The mechanism for repositioning the divisions was a right hook by the 3d Infantry Division that required the other two divisions to adjust boundaries and that placed them beside each other.⁵²

The corps' assessment of the exercise was favorable, concluding that the movement to contact was good; the corps had successfully deployed into battle and quickly went back on offensive operations. Maneuver of the two divisions was adjudged satisfactory, and both divisions ended the Warfighter with the conclusion that they had been well and fairly tested. Nolen summarized the majority opinion when he said that "the exercise was executed very, very well, and it kind of set a mark on the wall, I think, for the rest of the Army and for the CTCs."⁵³

From the corps commander's point of view, the exercise also began to put flesh on the bones of the decisions reached at the leadership conference. By maintaining the corps in offensive operations, he gave its leaders a chance to demonstrate some of those traits that the conference had earlier described as most desirable.⁵⁴ When he assessed the results of Exercise Urgent Victory '01, Riley noted that

interesting things happened inside the divisions as reversals happened at division and brigade. There was an awful lot of dynamic thinking going on about how to shape the battlefield, how to cause the enemy to do what you want him to do, and how you might respond when he didn't. Wonderful, wonderful efforts going on down at the brigade and division levels. Very, very creative. Gen. Franks' observation was that there was a lot of development going on among those that were participating.⁵⁵

Leader development was not just an issue for brigade and division commanders and the general staffs across the corps. Instead, improvement had to percolate down to the lowest links in the chain of command. Nolen commented that the Warfighter was an important exercise that consumed a great deal of time and attention, but that there were nine other months of the year in which

to inculcate that kind of leadership, and other echelons of command in which to do it.⁵⁶

Success in the Warfighter allowed Riley to take that essential next step by changing the scenarios for all corps training events to accord with the recommendations of the leadership seminar. Unpredictability in exercise events was a conscious goal, and for a model, Riley reached back to his early experiences as a battalion commander at the National Training Center from 1984 through 1986. At that time there was "no predictable battle rhythm for battalion commanders who were in the box," he emphasized, adding that "you were going to fight, and you were going to get missions [but] you didn't know what your next mission was going to be or when your next mission was going to be. You just got what you got, and you fought." An essential element of that experience, in his view, was that "you fought at night and you tried to shape the battlefield in ways that were advantageous to you and to your organization to accomplish your mission."⁵⁷

Unfortunately, he thought, over the years the combat training centers had evolved into predictable experiences in which it was very well known that a Blue unit was going to receive a mission, two days to plan and prepare it, one day to execute it, receive an after action review, and then have days to plan and prepare the next mission. Riley saw the process as "set-piece from start to finish" and therefore very predictable. A major flaw was that there were no continuous operations, no flex missions, and no real unknowns about the exercise battlefield. Such an exercise was an excellent battle drill but did not, in his view, contribute to the leader development model that the corps had just espoused. Not only for Warfighter, but also for exercises at lower levels, Riley thus sought a more realistic battlefield where the leaders could experience the unknowns and frictions of combat. Fatigue was of real value in such exercises, because he wanted commanders to become as fatigued in exercise as they would during war, and he sought a way to obtain the continuous operations that gave that result, but without sacrificing the benefits of the after action review.⁵⁸

To implement those ideas, the corps issued instructions to break the old two-day planning, one-day execution paradigm and brought units to the combat training center without telling them what their battle rhythm would be. Under the revised exercise scheme a battalion task force could not unreasonably expect at least four days of continuous operations before receiving its first fully instrumented after action review, receiving only brief, informal after action reviews to that point. Until then, the continuous operations, day and night, involving all types of tactical operation, would impress upon the battalion commander that he could not run the unit entirely by himself and that the success of his task force was to a large measure determined by how well he developed his subordinate organizations and especially his subordinate leaders. Within his own headquarters it would become evident that success also depended upon how much he trusted his immediate subordinates and staff. Such an experience was important, in Riley's view, to counteract the tendency among battalion commanders "to continue to do what they always did as company commanders,

where there is more potential to do it all yourself." As everyone understood, battalion command was both more sophisticated and more demanding than company command, which explained the fact that battalion commanders had staffs to assist them. Learning to use the staff effectively vastly enhanced the commander's own effectiveness and invariably produced a unit that performed more efficiently. Too, there was a need to combat the Army-wide attitude that battalion command was an opportunity that had to be maximized, and that a commander had, in essence, a two-year sprint in which he had the opportunity to make his mark.⁵⁹

The third step in the process was to recast home station training to improve the combat training of the company-size units. In essence, the proposition was that about 15 percent of combat units were responsible for 80 percent of the combat effects on any battlefield. Increasing unit effectiveness would magnify the combat value of any organization and increase the combat capability of the larger organization without increasing its numbers. Convincing small unit leaders to adopt the set of behaviors that Riley was working to inculcate at higher echelons lay at the heart of success. He believed that battalion and brigade commanders had deliberately to focus on creating the right environment, or climate, to encourage small unit commanders to seek success, rather than avoid failure, and that such innovation was the first step in creating more powerful combat organizations. It would, in his view, be a rare individual "who steps up to the plate and demonstrates these aggressive, innovative, risk-taking behaviors" without encouragement from higher commanders.⁶⁰

By implication, other things in the Army would also need to change to encourage innovation at the lowest levels of command, particularly the existing officer efficiency report system that emphasized success and an Army culture that, some insisted, still did not tolerate error. Eliminating that mind-set would be, according to Riley, a "hard kill," and he thought it significant that 85 percent of the captains in the corps believed that they lived in a zero-defect, micro-managed environment. "Now, whether they *do* or not is open to argument," he pointed out, but recognized the significance of the fact that "85 percent of them *believe* that they *do*." Changing that perception would be difficult, he thought, commenting that

my own observation is that it takes a lot of courage, not as a Corps commander, but as a company or battalion commander, to be willing to allow your subordinates to do some trial and error, to be *encouraged* to try new things—which is another form of risk-taking. It takes courage, and it takes more courage the further down the tape you go. Quite honestly, the first sergeant is out there looking for perfection all the time. Our PLDC teaches perfection. The perfect really *is* the enemy of the good.⁶¹

Successful small units, he recognized, had a habit of success, and the aim of the corps needed to be replicating that experience over and over again, causing all of the companies to be capable of independent, autonomous operation where the commander was comfortable with himself and his organization and with the confidence that he had earned from his next-higher commander, so that he

did not spend all of his time looking over his shoulder and second-guessing his higher headquarters. In June 2001, however, tackling that task still lay in the future.

Changing Roles of the Corps

Mountain Eagle and Exercise Victory Strike were exercises focused at opposite ends of the spectrum of conflict, but both related directly to on-going V Corps missions and possible contingencies. Together they pointed out that reality in the Army was changing very rapidly. At the end of the Cold War a heavy, armored corps was a tactical formation commanding its assigned units in executing missions assigned by senior operational headquarters. In 2001 a corps headquarters frequently was a force provider rather than a tactical headquarters for its deployed units. The corps at the end of the decade was much more like a World War II field army, both in organization and in mission, than a World War II corps. While the corps retained the capability to command and control its organic or attached forces during operational missions, it frequently had to prepare, deploy, and sustain its units for missions under separate command.

Preparing and launching task forces on missions directed by European Command required more of V Corps than was required during the Cold War years. Then, the corps maintained a single operation plan. By the year 2001, it maintained many. Then, the corps trained exclusively for high intensity conflict within NATO's Central Region. In 2001, the corps trained for operations spanning the entire spectrum of conflict from high intensity operations to peace enforcement, and at locations in Europe, Africa, and Southwest Asia. Operations outside of the central European environment became commonplace for V Corps after 1990. Although not always in command of those operations, V Corps nonetheless found it necessary to remain closely involved with its deployed units in order to sustain them. One important part of that sustainment was providing the realistic, high-quality training that made the operations successful. For Bosnia, to cite the best example, Mountain Eagle exercises were the essential component in that training.

Virtually every senior officer assigned to V Corps had a part in changing the nature of corps exercises over the course of a decade. Although their points of view did not always agree, all saw change as necessary. Brig. Gen. Larry Lust, commanding the 3d Corps Support Command in 1995, voiced one of the more prescient observations about exercises when he worried that there was a tendency for the corps to train only for expected operations and to ignore the really difficult one of actual deployment: moving from home station to port, from the port of embarkation to the port of debarkation, and then to the tactical assembly area. "We have a tendency," he said, "to talk about this part and then jump the exercise off at the TAA. The hard part is all in getting to the TAA."⁶² Consequently, he thought that the corps exercise schedule should regularly include emergency deployment readiness exercises and deployment exercises, and recommended that an occasional command post exercise be scheduled devoted solely to the problems

of movement and deployment. No such change was made to the corps exercise schedule, however, largely because the continued pressure and pace of contingency missions made a deliberate and measured look at the deployment process impossible. That such a series of exercises was a good idea was amply demonstrated, however, by the fact that the corps tended to repeat many of the same mistakes and experience many of the same problems in successive deployments.⁶³

Many changes were evident between the time of the REFORGER exercises that were customary in 1990 and the mission rehearsal exercises that were typical in 2001. Scripted, generic exercises gave way to exercises designed to prepare units as small as battalion task forces for specific missions that ranged in intensity from one end of the spectrum of conflict to the other. Expertise was as often drawn from corps units as from Army training doctrine, as in the case of the Mountain Eagle exercises where soldiers then serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina validated the training ongoing for the next units to deploy. As during the REFORGER days, the exercises were keyed to missions the corps had to perform, but by 2001 there were far more of those missions and of considerable type and diversity, which required corresponding flexibility in exercise design.

The most notable differences in V Corps exercises between 1990 and 2001, however, were caused by the lack of predictability and lack of stability that characterized the "new world order." The exercise cycle during the Cold War was predictable. Exercises by 2001 were anything but predictable, since many were generated by the often short-notice missions given the corps. The other complication lay in the fact that although most of the operations for which V Corps designed exercises after 1990 were peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or stability support missions, the corps retained the requirement in its mission statement to be prepared for high intensity conflict. The deployment of Task Force Hawk⁶⁴ to Albania and the later Victory Strike exercise demonstrated that fact. Not one type of exercise, therefore, but at least two distinctly different ones occupied the attention of the exercise planners and required a careful and judicious allocation of time, money, and resources.

The headquarters explicitly recognized that important change in the training environment. Briefing the corps staff following a discussion with Riley about staff priorities, Brig. Gen. Stephen Speakes, the V Corps chief of staff in 1999 and 2000, pointed out that the entire philosophy of training had changed in V Corps since the end of the Cold War. Then, training was an orderly, sequential process that began with the mission statement. From the mission statement, the corps developed its mission essential task list (METL) and then, through analysis of that METL, determined specific training tasks and strategies. The culmination of the process was the two-year training plan, a highly specific, thoroughly structured plan for unit training that included a standard hierarchy of unit, division, and corps exercises each year.

By the time the corps was preparing units for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Speakes told the new members of the staff, the changes had already become apparent. The operational tempo was such that Exercise Atlantic Resolve 94, the capstone exercise for that year, had to be canceled. While the annual Battle

Command Training Program evolutions continued as before, the traditional European theater exercises seemed increasingly to be things of the past, with more than a hint of irrelevance about them. It was a fact, as Speakes subsequently explained to the staff, that corps exercises and training were no longer driven by the mission essential task list. By 2001 they were based increasingly on changing contingency operations, and the corps had consequently already introduced the mission rehearsal exercise as its principal training concept vehicle. The point that Speakes addressed, and one that V Corps had only gradually come to realize imposed a very real constraint on traditional training, was that operations and training increasingly proceeded *concurrently*, rather than *sequentially*. Moreover, several different units might be involved in contingency operations at the same time, or engaged in other training for varying and different missions.⁶⁵

The evolution of exercises mirrored the slow evolution of mission types the corps undertook. If the process seemed halting and at times uncertain, that was because the direction the corps was to take was at any given moment unclear. By 2001, however, V Corps exercises had definitely turned away from the events that had been typical during the Cold War and toward rehearsals for the variety of missions the headquarters and the major subordinate units had to carry out.

NOTES

¹ General Sir Michael Rose commanded the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina from January 1994 to January 1995. He authored *Fighting for Peace, Bosnia 1994* (London: Harvill Press, 1998).

² Except for documents otherwise cited, this section is based on a series of interviews with members of the V Corps staff charged with developing and conducting the Mountain Eagle series of exercises. See Intervs, author with Lt. Col. David R. Bissell, Chief, SOCOORD Element, ACofS, G-3; Maj. David K. Cox, Plans Officer, Plans Division, ACofS, G-3; Maj. Brian D. Earl, Deputy Chief, SOCOORD Element, ACofS, G-3; Capt. Erik O. Gunhus, Deputy Public Affairs Officer; Col. Henry J. Hughes, III, Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management; Col. Edward G. Murdock, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5; Col. Edward Newing, Chemical Officer; and Mr. Raymond D. Nolen, Chief, Exercise Division, ACofS, G-3. All conducted 2-7 Jun 1996 at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

³ For further details on the Mountain Eagle exercises and commentary on the Mountain Shield exercises, refer to Interv, author with Mr. Raymond D. Nolen, 16 Jul 1998, Campbell Barracks, Germany.

⁴ The proximity talks in Dayton, Ohio, resulted in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initialing a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 21 November 1995. The agreement stipulated that a sovereign state to be known as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be created and that it would consist of two entities, the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia. The agreement further stipulated military provisions that included a cease-fire and supervision of compliance by a NATO-led Implementation Force; political stabilization within the region; an Inter-Entity Boundary between the Federation of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic; elections to be conducted within six to nine months; the adoption of a constitution of the republic; agreement to submit to binding arbitration to resolve disputes; specified provisions for observance of human rights; terms for repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; creation of a commission to preserve national monuments; creation of public corporations to operate joint facilities; establishment of a high representative to help resolve civilian aspects of the agreement; and establishment of a UN International Police Task Force to train and advise local law enforcement agencies. Initialing of the Dayton Peace Agreement committed the parties to the subsequent signing of the General Framework Agreement in Paris.

⁵ Much of this section is based on V Corps After Action Report, "Tribal Knowledge: The Conduct of Exercise Mountain Eagle VI by Headquarters, V Corps," V Corps History Office, August 1998.

⁶ General Abrams' comments from Memo, V Corps Historian (AETV-CSH), 3 Jun 1995, sub: Notes to Accompany Briefing Slide Set, Commander's Guidance Brief.

⁷ Memo, AETV-CSH, 2 Jun 1995, sub: Notes to Accompany Chief of Staff O & I Slide Set; Memo, AETV-CSH, 2 Jun 1995, sub: Notes to Accompany Briefing Set, Commander's Guidance Brief; Memo, AETV-CSH, 3 Jun 1995, sub: Notes to Accompany Briefing Slide Set, Commander's Guidance Brief.

⁸ V Corps Briefing, Mountain Eagle Mission Rehearsal, October 1995.

⁹ V Corps ACofS, G-3, Summary Document, Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, n.d., but 1996, with appended scripting for exercises in 1998.

¹⁰ See "U.S. Military Commander 'Disappointed' by Colonel's Reported Remarks," *New York Times*, 28 Dec 1995, for a summary.

¹¹ See Chapters 15 and 16 for a detailed discussion of Operation VICTORY HAWK.

¹² On 20 June 1999 *Stars and Stripes* published excerpts from an internal e-mail memorandum from General Cody to General Erik Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff. Entitled "Lessons Learned in Albania" and dated 16 June, Cody's memorandum said in part that the Apache pilots were undertrained and underequipped for their mission and that Army aviation training and the sequence of assignments in units were not appropriate to develop aviation leaders properly in their first three years of service. "The results," Cody wrote, "are young captains emerging from the Advanced Course with little experience and little aviation savvy on what right looks like." General Cody's observations were in large part repeated in his congressional testimony. See Statement by Brigadier General Richard A. Cody, Director, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Before the Readiness Sub-Committee, House Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, 1st Sess., 106th Cong., 1 Jul 1999 (Record Version).

¹³ USAREUR White Paper, "USAREUR Army Aviation in the 21st Century—A Vision for Training Excellence," 5 Jan 2001.

¹⁴ End of Tour Interv, author with Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, Commanding General, V Corps, 22 and 27 Jun 2001, Campbell Barracks, Germany.

¹⁵ The AGM-114 Hellfire air to ground missile is the primary armament of U.S. attack helicopters. It is guided by laser, by imaging infrared seekers, a radio frequency seeker, or millimeter-wave seeker. The name comes from the original designation "helicopter-launched fire and forget." It entered U.S. service in 1986. The high explosive shaped charge weapon has a range of eight kilometers at approximately Mach 1.1 and enjoyed great success in the Persian Gulf War, destroying an estimated 500 tanks. The AH-64 can carry up to sixteen Hellfires, though a load of eight is more typical.

¹⁶ McDonnell Douglas helicopters' M230 30-mm. chain gun, fitted in a turret below the AH-64 cockpit and was fed from a 1,200-round pallet.

¹⁷ The Hydra 2.75-mm. rockets (70-mm.) are fired from pods mounted on the AH-64 helicopter, which can load up to four nineteen-rocket pods.

¹⁸ The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is a 227-mm. system on a tracked, self-propelled, launcher loader, which carries two six-cell rocket launch pods/containers. The system has a nominal range of twenty miles and a salvo of twelve rockets will saturate a sixty-acre area with 7,728 antipersonnel bomblets in less than one minute. Other warheads include an antitank mine dispenser and a terminally guided warhead. The MLRS was used in the Persian Gulf War, and its horrific effects prompted the Iraqi soldiers to refer to it as "steel rain."

¹⁹ Interv, author with Nolen, 16 Jul 1998.

²⁰ Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), a long-ranged tactical missile (150 kilometers) fired from the MLRS system and using a warhead that dispenses 950 antipersonnel/antimateriel submunitions over a 600-square-foot area. Eighteen ATACMS produce the equivalent effect of 792 155-mm. artillery rounds.

²¹ Nolen interview, 16 Jul 1998.

²² The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, generally known as the Two Plus Four Treaty, was signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990. Signatories were the four World War II Allies—Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France—and the two Germanies, both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The treaty ended the quadripartite authority in Germany and the occupation of Berlin and defined the sovereignty of a united Germany. Article 5 of the treaty specified that, during an interim period, only those German military units not integrated into NATO could be stationed in east Germany and Berlin as armed forces of the united state. The armed forces of other states, specifically including the NATO allies, could not be stationed in the eastern part of Germany, nor could they carry out military activity of any kind in the eastern part of Germany until the withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces from the zone was complete. After that time, various other legal and diplomatic restrictions remained to be observed.

²³ Nolen interview, 16 Jul 1998.

²⁴ Riley interview.

²⁵ V Corps Historian Staff Call Notes, 9 Aug 1994.

²⁶ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ See USAREUR Regulation 350–1, editions for 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994; Interv, author with Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, 19 Jan 1995, Campbell Barracks.

²⁹ Rutherford interview.

³⁰ For a more thorough discussion of this issue, refer to Chapter 9, which considers Task Force Able Sentry operations.

³¹ Riley interview.

³² Ibid.

³³ The subject matter experts were Col. Joseph LeBoeuf from the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy; Col. Edward Filiberti from the Command, Leadership, and Management Department of the U.S. Army War College; and Lt. Col. Bruce Peebles from the Leadership Branch and Center for Army Leadership, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

³⁴ Unless otherwise cited, details of the V Corps leadership seminar have been drawn from a briefing entitled V Corps Officer Leadership Seminar, 28 Feb through 1 Mar 2001. "Hot Wash" briefing to General Montgomery Meigs, USAREUR CG, March 2001.

³⁵ Comments by Maj. Tony Abati, assigned to the SOCOORD in V Corps G–3 and organizer of the leadership conference. Historian's notes, Leadership Conference Planning meeting, 17 Jan 2001.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ USAREUR Regulation 350–1, *Training in USAREUR*, 17 Nov 2000.

³⁸ Riley interview.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. (U.S.A., Retired), was Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, prior to his retirement from the Army. Before that, he commanded VII U.S. Corps in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91. A senior observer was a retired senior general officer appointed personally by the Chief of Staff of the Army to coach and mentor the senior leaders, staff, and major subordinate commanders of units undergoing BCTP. Senior observers also overwatched doctrinal standardization and provided feedback to the Army's senior leadership. As of 2001, the senior observers were: General (Ret.) Edwin H. Burba, Jr.; General (Ret.) Richard E. Cavazos; General (Ret.) William W. Crouch; General (Ret.)

Frederick M. Franks, Jr.; Lt. Gen. (Ret.) David E. Grange, Jr.; General (Ret.) Ronald H. Griffith; and General (Ret.) James J. Lindsay.

⁴¹ Riley interview.

⁴² Nolen interview, 6 Jun 2001.

⁴³ Interv, author with Maj. Charles Eassa, Chief, Deliberate Plans, ACoS, G-3, V Corps, 1 Jun 2001, Campbell Barracks, Germany.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Lt. Col. Peter Schifferle, plans officer and chief of war plans in the V Corps ACoS, G-3, in 1994-96, including during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the deployment of 1st Armored Division as Task Force Hawk into Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the NATO Implementation Force for the Paris Peace Accords, was subsequently assigned to Fort Leavenworth to teach at the School of Advanced Military Studies, and specifically to manage the Fellows Program.

⁴⁶ Riley interview.

⁴⁷ Lt. Gen. William M. Steele was Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, as of 23 October 1998.

⁴⁸ Nolen interview, 6 Jun 2001.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Eassa interview.

⁵¹ Col. J. D. Johnson had been the V Corps ACoS, G-3, and had just given up that assignment to take brigade command in the 1st Armored Division. He fulfilled the role in Warfighter in the interval before assuming brigade command and after leaving the corps headquarters. Johnson had previously been G-3 of the 3d Infantry Division when then-Maj. Gen. James C. Riley commanded the division. That division's Warfighter had achieved unusual success, essentially destroying the entire OPFOR organization.

⁵² For details of the conduct of Exercise Urgent Victory '01, see HQ, V (US) Corps OPLAN 01-19 (Operation URGENT VICTORY), 141430A Mar 2001; HQ, V Corps FRAGO 1 to V Corps Exercise Urgent Victory 01 Tasking Order (V Corps Tasking Order #01-23), 231500 Feb 2001; and HQ, V Corps FRAGO 2 to V Corps Exercise Urgent Victory 01 Tasking Order (V Corps Tasking Order #01-23), 151200 Mar 2001.

⁵³ Combat Training Centers: National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany. See Nolen interview, 6 Jun 2001.

⁵⁴ Nolen interview, 6 Jun 2001.

⁵⁵ Riley interview.

⁵⁶ Nolen interview, 6 Jun 2001.

⁵⁷ Riley interview.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

⁶² Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, CG, 3d COSCOM, 24 Jun 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

⁶³ See V Corps History Office Information Paper, 29 Jul 1999, sub: Observations on Continuing Issues in V Corps Deployments, 1989-1999.

⁶⁴ See Chapters 15 and 16 for discussion of Operation VICTORY HAWK and Task Force Hawk.

⁶⁵ Staff Update Briefing, Briefing Notes, Historian File, 2 Feb 2000.

Some New Operational Concepts

"There's going to be a lot of 'oh, by the way, we have a crash and burn and have to get on with it; we don't know exactly where we'll be going, or when we'll be going, but we have to get a plan together.'"

Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Commanding General
3d Corps Support Command
June 1995

"... you will never get everything you need out of the U.S. Army force structure."

Lt. Col. Daniel V. Sulka, Plans Chief
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, V Corps
June 1995

"... moves now are a much more difficult problem. For the combat arms guys, it's a function of navigation. But it places a big strain on logisticians because they have to change the way they look at operations."

Lt. Col. James A. Cope, Chief, Training Division
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, V Corps
June 1992

One of the hackneyed criticisms of the Army in Europe by the end of the Cold War was that it and its remaining tactical corps were "immovable," both literally and figuratively. Indeed, one of the most persistent canards against which the USAREUR commander, General Montgomery Meigs, had to struggle in 1999 was that his command remained prepared to fight an anachronistic battle against a Soviet foe that had long since disappeared. The criticisms of the Army in Europe that ensued from that notion were that it was heavy, slow to move, lethargic in response to contingency requirements, and tied to a decades-old concept of operations that was no longer relevant. Meigs knew that just the opposite was true and that his command had "moved light years beyond the old Cold War paradigm" it was charged with perpetuating.¹ The best evidence for the truth of his contention was the development by V Corps of a series of disparate, but related, operational concepts between 1990 and 2001, all aimed at preparing USAREUR's principal

tactical organization for battle in the changed strategic environment. The major parts of that evolution in operational technique involved shelving the Cold War battle plans, devising new organizations to suit new conditions, creating an ability to move large units out of central Europe to give battle elsewhere, finding ways to support far-flung task forces, and building a rapid reaction force that could lead the way for a major deployment wherever needed. As with most other developments in V Corps over the decade, changes to operational technique were piecemeal and guided by the steadily changing operational environment. To that extent, the path at any given moment was not always clear and direct, though the general direction of change was unwavering.

Forget About the Fight at the Inter-German Border

By 1993 some of the principal members of the V Corps staff had begun to view the NATO mission as "almost a distracter" that kept the attention of the staff focused on the wrong things and in the wrong places.² The mission essential task list for NATO operations was naturally based on the General Defense Plan, which assumed a very short time for units to reach their battle positions—units left their casernes within two hours of alert and deployed the contents of their supply rooms to the field within another six hours. Changes in the operational context after the end of the Cold War presumably left the corps with a much wider and longer window of notification, and consequently of preparation, for a NATO mission. By 1993 the corps was planning operational moves of at least 200 kilometers before arriving at the battlefield, leaving little need to have units on such a short recall notice. Counterbalancing that, the movement to battle had become a much more difficult problem, especially for combat support units such as artillery, aviation, and air defense, as well as for those organizations delivering logistical support to the divisions.³

By 1992 the corps staff regarded the General Defense Plan (GDP) as a useful tool that had taught them how to concentrate staff attention on difficult tactical problems and produce coherent plans. But even as early as 1990 it had been clear that the GDP was really no longer a valid concept. Most fundamentally, the old plan postulated military operations that would be conducted within what was by then a single sovereign state, whereas such operations had once been conceived as occurring on the border between two sovereign states—the two German republics. The corps had to move away from the traditional NATO mission and the mind-set that went along with it, because the corps itself occupied a different position after the end of the Cold War. When the task was the GDP, V Corps was a purely tactical instrument. In the post-Cold War environment, the corps slowly became something more, an operational organization, designed to fight decisive combat to defeat an enemy center of gravity. Some thought the corps really occupied the boundary between the operational and the strategic, at least in the way it came to be used through the decade of the 1990s.⁴

The NATO mission itself was certainly no longer as conventional as it had been, and principal members of the alliance had already begun to restructure

their armed forces for a multiplicity of future missions. The Bundeswehr retained the task of German territorial defense, but had commenced a transition to an organization of crisis reaction forces, particularly for humanitarian aid, civilian evacuation, and peacekeeping missions outside of the alliance.⁵ Despite such evolution, however, the United States Army understood that most of the NATO allies would continue to prefer to work within the NATO structure or to use something similar to the standing, mutually agreed upon NATO procedures. When faced with a nebulous situation requiring a quick reaction, it was obvious that familiar relationships and long-established procedures would leave members of the alliance in a far better position to act efficiently and effectively.⁶

The Bi-National Corps

Following the end of the Persian Gulf War, the Army in Europe began to restructure its relationship with its NATO partners to provide appropriate organizations to fulfill military missions within central Europe as well as to react to military and nonmilitary missions in nations outside the boundaries of the alliance. Fundamental to that restructuring was an agreement between the United States and Germany to create a pair of bi-national corps for operations in Europe. The United States also agreed to provide a division to NATO's rapid reaction corps for operations outside of Europe. Both actions affected V Corps directly and raised questions about command and sustainment of military operations that demanded careful and immediate consideration.

In years past V Corps had been accustomed to operating side-by-side with German III Korps, the adjacent allied corps to its left flank in the Cold War alignment, and to making use of the German Territorial Army for rear area security missions in the V Corps sector.⁷ As both the United States Army and the Bundeswehr began drawdowns from their peak Cold War strength, the two armies sought ways to meet their NATO commitments with fewer resources. Since any conventional military threat to Central Region in the foreseeable future was unquestionably both small and of low probability, the NATO security could likewise be smaller. Bilateral discussions at the national level aiming at German-American cooperation for such new missions culminated in the signing of an agreement to establish a pair of German-American, bi-national corps.⁸ German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe signed for Germany on 15 December 1992 in Bonn, and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney signed for the United States on 4 January 1993 in Washington. In a real sense, the agreement was a political affirmation of the military decision to retire the General Defense Plan, which was thereafter no longer a concern for either the United States Army or the Bundeswehr.

The agreement was general in nature and simply specified that Germany and the United States would contribute a division to each corps, one German-led and the other under American command. On 10 February 1993 in Heidelberg, military officials from the German Army and the Commander in Chief,

United States Army, Europe, signed an agreement that contained more detail about the bi-national corps organization. Each participating division would come to its respective corps with organic support and logistical elements to sustain it in action. The agreement also discussed command and control in a general way and provided that the two corps would exchange staff officers. Training would remain a national responsibility, and each corps and its divisions would continue to conduct training and operations according to national standards. As an aid to maintaining a clear understanding of the capabilities of the forces, the two corps commanders had the prerogative to visit and observe training events of the other nation's divisions in peacetime. Each nation remained responsible for its own medical and logistical support, but unnecessary redundancies and duplications were to be avoided. For logistical support, agreements concluded under the NATO Mutual Support Act applied.⁹

The nuts and bolts of how the two corps were to function were agreed upon in June 1994 in a technical arrangement between V Corps and II Korps that assigned 1st U.S. Armored Division to German II Korps and 5. Panzerdivision to U.S. V Corps. Prior to signing that agreement, the staffs of the two corps spent much time in consultation to make the process as simple as possible. The staffs assumed that the two corps would remain part of NATO's main defense force to be employed primarily in central Europe. That is, the primary mission of both corps lay in Europe, although the agreement did not exclude the possibility of operations out of the region. The two corps exchanged staff officers who became regular, full-time members of the respective corps headquarters, not liaison officers. The commanders agreed that both corps would use NATO procedures where they existed and where they satisfied perceived requirements. No one wanted to come up with new and separate procedures if they were unnecessary. If it was more sensible to use a national procedure for a given action, that was done.¹⁰

The heart of the common operational technique for both corps was the set of Standardized NATO Agreements, the STANAGS, that had existed for many years and that covered many situations. The problem from the American perspective was that V Corps had really operated purely as an American organization even during the Cold War, even while under NATO's Central Army Group. Whenever a NATO exercise came along, Americans always had to "crack the books" to relearn the STANAGS. There was therefore, at least in V Corps, the consideration that staff training would be necessary.¹¹

Joint talks between II Korps and V Corps outlined a procedure for dealing with many of the open questions, and particularly those of STANAGS and other operating procedures, chiefly through the use of exercises. The two headquarters arranged to agree upon a schedule each April, with the goal of one corps bi-national exercise each year, in addition to any other regularly scheduled NATO exercises, which were thereafter to be conducted by the bi-national corps instead of by the national corps. An ambitious training strategy proposed language training, combined schools, and mobile training teams to inculcate common terminology, supervise individual technical

training, teach equipment characteristics and limitations, and build mutual confidence. Collective training in the form of command post exercises, gunnery, competitions, and joint Combat Maneuver Training Center rotations would then serve to integrate the bi-national staffs, refine doctrine, synchronize battlefield operating systems, train the agreed-upon mission essential task lists, integrate capabilities, and build unity of effort. Leaders and staffs would conduct seminars, tactical exercises without troops, map exercises, staff exchanges, and officer and noncommissioned officer professional development sessions to set command standards, processes, and procedures; build teamwork; and agree upon common order formats and operational graphics. Each corps commander had the responsibility to review and approve the mission essential task list of the exchanged division.¹²

Such an elaborate training plan was clearly demanding of time, and the V Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, predicted that there would be still more issues to resolve because of the differing capabilities of the German and American divisions. Furthermore, German Army wartime procedures differed considerably from peacetime procedures, whereas the American Army made no particular distinction between the two. Fire support for deep operations was far more limited in a German division, and logistical arrangements differed significantly, since the German corps had no equivalent to the American corps support command. From the start, Rutherford anticipated that the 3d Corps Support Command would have to become more multinational in nature for bi-national corps missions and that important questions about logistics doctrine would continue to arise when the two corps began to function. He was certain that his staff would have to do extensive planning to provide the German division in V Corps with adequate deep fires and associated intelligence gathering for combined operations.¹³

The logistical questions turned out to be among the most vexing. They were thrown into sharp relief by the V Corps experience throughout the decade with deploying combat service support soldiers and units for humanitarian aid and peace enforcement tasks outside of Germany, and by the way the German and American forces restructured themselves in the course of their respective drawdowns. Corps G-4 planners were concerned about what they referred to as the "hidden card" of logistical capability. In the NATO alliance, only the U.S. forces retained traditional supply and maintenance capabilities on a substantial scale. But if the U.S. Army found itself committing more and more of its small combat service support force structure to coalition or United Nations missions, then there would inevitably be some U.S. Army units that could not be properly supported for a major regional conflict. There were only so many truck companies, quartermaster companies, ammunition companies, water purification platoons, and other support units to be had. Within Europe, virtually all of those units came from V Corps. Many of the combat service support skills were also low density ones, so even a small deployment could make it hard for the corps to sustain its own units.¹⁴ Medical support was a highly emotional and very parochial issue, tied not to an inanimate

piece of equipment or repair part, but to a living, breathing soldier. Consequently, it was subject to intense public scrutiny that was not necessarily logical or rational, but that was always political. Previous exercises had demonstrated that differing national capabilities again complicated the matter. For example, while the Germans had a ground ambulance capacity equal to the American one, if not better, they were critically short of air ambulances. More important, many of the German medical capabilities, along with other types of support, came from their civilian sector and were not readily deployable elsewhere.

Managing bi-national and multinational logistics was also complicated by differing management systems and by different logistical requirements. The Americans handled logistical reporting by data automation systems, while the other armies were still making do with paper reports. Bringing the two together so that critical supplies and equipment could be tracked accurately and reported was a particular concern to the commander of the 3d Corps Support Command.¹⁵ Differing requirements also posed a problem for the bi-national corps, with fuels offering an excellent case in point. Even though NATO was officially a single fuel alliance, the United States used JP-8 fuel, while the British and Germans used diesel. If, therefore, the United States had the responsibility to provide fuel in a bi-national corps, then the corps support command would need a larger force structure. There were not enough fuel tankers to divide them up to carry JP-8, diesel, and a little gasoline around the battlefield. "So do we go to the Germans and tell them they have to burn JP-8," General Larry Lust mused, "or do Americans go back and burn diesel fuel?"¹⁶ The latter was not a viable alternative in any case, because the corps support command had to fuel helicopters, which required JP-8.

Other classes of supply raised similar issues, some of them merely cultural, as with the case of foodstuffs. The German and American forces provided significantly different breakfasts that accorded with national habits and tastes. In terms of food, the only thing that was really standardized between the two armies was water. More important was ammunition since, despite years of attempts at standardization within NATO, there was still little commonality in the two armies. The 7.62-mm. machine gun ammunition was the same in both armies, but the different machine guns required different ammunition linkage, and therefore differing ammunition stockage. The 5.56-mm. ammunition Americans used in the M16 series rifles was of course useless to the Germans, whose individual small arms chambered 7.62-mm. ammunition. Ammunition for tank main guns was not the same, particularly after the Abrams tank was upgraded to the M1A1 standard, changing the ammunition requirement from 105-mm. to 120-mm. Even discussing the problem was difficult, since the United States had nine classes of supply, while NATO used five. In deciding what to do, both armies had the option of training to use both supply systems, the supply system of the other army, or devising a third system for the bi-national corps. Considering the difficulties, not every member of the staff was sanguine about the new organization, one officer remarking that

When you fight as a coalition for political reasons, at some point you accept less military capability as a whole because you have the frictions of the differences in doctrine and capability, and it takes more effort and time to get everybody working together.¹⁷

Pondering the problem, Lust, who commanded the 3d Corps Support Command, simply concluded that "when you are working with allies, it is not very easy to draw the wiring diagram and put the boxes in."¹⁸ Much work remained after 1994 to turn the concept of the bi-national corps into a functioning reality, work that the NATO mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina interrupted in mid-1995. Serious consideration of the remaining issues, and the process of testing solutions in exercises, did not come until the end of the decade. Even then, changes intruded into the process.

The United States Army was not alone in instituting organizational change; developments were also in progress in the German Ministry of Defense. As part of a process of adaptation to the new political and military situation in Europe, by 1995 the German Army inactivated III Korps as a tactical formation and used that staff to create German Army Forces Command, or "GARFCOM," in the new parlance. As part of the same process, the Bundeswehr was becoming smaller and more focused on contingency missions out of the old Central Region of NATO. One of the first casualties in that process was the 5.Panzerdivision, the unit paired with 1st Infantry Division in the V (US/GE) Bi-National Corps. In 1999 the German Ministry of Defense replaced it with the 13.Panzer-grenadierdivision, a unit stationed in Leipzig.¹⁹

When in the late 1990s V Corps returned to the task of working out arrangements of the bi-national corps, it had behind it four years of experience in operations in the Balkans, often under NATO command, and had validated some of the early concerns but discovered others that could safely be discounted. Those lessons proved invaluable to fleshing out the procedures by means of which the paired corps operated. To prevent the erosion of bi-national capability through the losses caused by normal personnel rotations, the staffs of the two corps created a computer compact disk containing a guide to unit structures and capabilities, doctrinal employment principles, and even vehicle specifications and measurements.²⁰

Applying those lessons within V Corps, the G-3 revised the Victory Corps Tactical SOP (standard operating procedures) specifically to allow bi-national functioning. Permanent exchange officers and liaison staffs ensured continuity of planning and operations. The staff also arranged to exchange intelligence and integrated communications, supplying deployable intelligence capabilities not organic to 5.Panzerdivision, including direct feeds from the Hunter unmanned aerial surveillance vehicle and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System. Those innovations gave the bi-national corps a sound tactical foundation, which was tested in the year 2000 Battle Command Training Program Warfighter Exercise, Urgent Victory, in which 5.Panzerdivision participated.

The Battle Command Training Program Warfighter 2000 exercise scenario considered a future of coalition engagements involving a traditional response to

an attack on a NATO member as well as elements of existing Balkan scenarios. Fighting an out-of-region battle as a bi-national corps and employing an allied division was a unique employment of the U.S. Army's notoriously difficult capstone divisional exercise. But the exercise vindicated the work that had begun years earlier, involving integrated communications and a synchronized attack by U.S. and German armored divisions side-by-side and controlled by bi-national videoconferencing. The corps further used the Warfighter Exercise to introduce the deep operations coordination cell and the rear operations center into the bi-national operation.²¹

Commitment to the ARRC

The second major force commitment of the Army in Europe was also related to NATO. The Allied Command, Central Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps, or "ARRC" for short, was intended to be NATO's quick response corps for contingency missions outside of Europe. Though either national corps or the pair of bi-national corps could potentially be ordered to undertake missions outside of Europe, the ARRC was the standing force, presumed ready to move on short notice, that NATO maintained for emerging contingencies. The issue was not discussed within the V Corps staff, beyond making the presumption that such deployment of the bi-national corps would not take place in any situation short of a major war involving the coalition. In any case, using both the ARRC and a bi-national corps would be difficult, since both Germany and the United States committed the same divisions to both organizations. The ARRC was based at Rhein-Dahlen and was a British-framework headquarters to which the U.S. Army agreed to commit one division. As early as 1994 it was already clear that the ARRC was the headquarters that would undertake any possible future NATO-led expedition into the Balkans, and the American commitment to that corps, the 1st Armored Division, consequently had the additional requirement to be trained for employment with the ARRC.

Early in the decade the 1st Armored Division began including operations other than war exercises in its battalion rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center as a way of preparing for the kinds of operations it envisioned might be required in Bosnia. The division also established and maintained liaison with the ARRC.²² Assisting with the effort, Seventh Army Training Center created a special training program for the division. The emerging Balkan crisis spoiled any orderly training plan, however, and in the twenty months leading up to the early spring of 1995, when both NATO and V Corps planning for a Bosnian operation began in earnest, the division was repeatedly "whipsawed" by the lulls and peaks and valleys of the political situation. General Rutherford commented in early 1995 that "depending on whether we think peace is at hand or something else, the division has had to lean forward again and again. That alone, to the leadership, causes a lot of turbulence."²³ Every fluctuation of the international situation resulted in a ripple of "getting ready to go," a process that included returning to specialized training and, depending on how serious the

ripple appeared to be, tweaking the plan.²⁴ Leaving the 1st Armored Division on the edge of deployment, however unavoidable that might have been, was destabilizing for the unit and, ultimately, demoralizing for its soldiers and leaders.

Preparing the division for an ARRC mission involved more than just an increased training tempo for operations other than war. It also demanded serious thought about tailoring the division for that mission. Noting that the ARRC was in no way analogous to an American corps, Rutherford determined that he would have to reinforce the 1st Armored Division with support that it normally did not require, mainly because the ARRC lacked an analogue to the American corps support command. When the division went to the ARRC, he commented, it had to

go with a much more robust capability in many areas than do divisions from other countries that fall under the ARRC for deployment. Thus the division can expect more to give support to the ARRC than to receive it, and there are some doctrinal and organizational questions to be solved that make it possible for differently configured military units to function easily together in the same corps.²⁵


Ultimately, a number of additional units had to be added to the 1st Armored Division for the ARRC mission, as depicted in *Chart 1*. Note that the third maneuver brigade, stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, was not assigned to the ARRC mission, nor were its habitual supporting engineer, artillery, and support battalions, signal company, or air defense battery.

One matter that was not a concern was command. What had come to be referred to as "the NATO consensus" made V Corps units comfortable with the idea of serving under ARRC command. Long years of integrated military command in NATO's Central Region, coupled with equally long years of integrated planning in the NATO alliance, gave Americans the assurance that the ARRC would be commanded by a highly capable military establishment on which V Corps and its division could rely. In short, there was no hesitation about serving under non-American command and staffs. As Dr. R. S. Garnett, the staff officer who had labored to resolve many of those issues, explained it in a V Corps staff meeting,

Until we come up with another system, NATO is really all that we have. Through all of these years . . . among the senior NATO commanders and even the junior ones moving up through the ranks, you are talking about known quantities. To be under command of a general from another NATO nation, with whom you have long experience, is something that no one finds terribly outlandish. This is the sense behind the way the ARRC is set up.²⁶

Working within the context of the ARRC required that the division staff be familiar not only with all the NATO standardized procedures, but also with the internal operation of the ARRC staff. Since the ARRC functioned according to British staff procedures, learning those forms and routines became necessary at all staff echelons in the division. By the time of the mission rehearsal exercises for deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina in late 1995, V Corps had incorporated

CHART 1—1ST ARMORED DIVISION AUGMENTED FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE ALLIED COMMAND, CENTRAL
EUROPE, RAPID REACTION CORPS



Note: As Task Force Eagle (Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, 1995–96), this shows the attachments and augmentations for the NATO mission. The augmentations are shown in the chart under "attached elements."

that process into its training plan. The staff studied ARRC orders, reports, and staff papers and used those formats in the mission rehearsal so that they would be "more ARRC-like" and so that the division would be familiar with them once it reached the area of operations.²⁷

Another major concern about ARRC operations arose only later, during the planning for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in the fall of 1995. At that time the corps discovered that the ARRC simply planned at a far slower pace than the U.S. Army standard, and considerably slower than most members of the staff believed prudent, given the rapidly developing diplomatic and political situation in the Balkans that might make deployment of military forces a sudden and urgent necessity. The frank opinion of many V Corps staff officers was that the NATO planning system that prohibited the rapid reaction corps from formulating plans in the absence of approved planning guidance from the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body, was archaic and hobbled that NATO headquarters. Obtaining such planning guidance, the Americans learned, was a deliberate political process that traditionally was painfully slow.²⁸ The matter—unresolved and in fact insoluble—continued to worry the corps battle staff.

Logistics for an Expeditionary Corps

The many familiar characteristics of the general defense plan battle no longer applied to V Corps planning after 1990. Logistics, especially logistical support of the bi-national corps and the NATO rapid reaction corps, changed out of all recognition. During the Cold War, V Corps paid close attention to a logistical system that could keep forward combat elements in action as they carried out the general war plan. The result was a highly structured theater logistical organization that was organized back to front and that relied on a system of depots and push logistics. It was, as Lt. Col. Dan Sulka, the G-4 plans chief, put it, "war . . . and logistics . . . to four decimal places."²⁹ In 1990 V Corps had already begun thinking of itself in terms of being a more flexible power projection force. That emphasis drove the staff to more detailed consideration of operational logistics to sustain a deployed corps, and the intimate interrelationship between operations and logistics.

No longer working from known point to known point, corps logisticians began to consider the new questions about how to store equipment, how to load equipment, how to get to a rail head, how to barge equipment down the Rhein River to Antwerp, how to load equipment on a ship, how to prepare and dispatch various force packages by air, and how to support such operations far away from home bases. Soldier direct support requirements did not change much, regardless of theater. They always required food, ammunition, and fuel. But after 1990 USAREUR had a smaller logistics structure to support all those tasks, just at the time planning began to shift away from the concept of a fixed, linear logistics battlefield.³⁰

In a power projection Army, the operational decision about what unit deployed first was clearly tied to the requirement for transportation planning,

both sea and air lift, and then to the sustainment of those forces. The Cold War model of structuring the logistics system to support a single major operation plan was clearly impracticable. Indeed, for some contingencies the corps would face, the first or only units to deploy might well be combat service support units. Consequently, the G-3 and G-4 emphasized the impossibility of delinking operational and logistical planning. The mission set the priorities and answered a series of otherwise contentious questions. Who determined how a ship should be loaded, the operator or the logistician? Who determined what unit loaded on a ship first?

The solution was to use the corps battle staff collectively to work out such issues, having the operators more involved in logistical issues and logisticians more involved in otherwise purely operational questions to devise a plan that gave the commander well-thought-out capabilities, as opposed to giving him merely units. Days of supply, as one example, were still based on Cold War concepts in 1990, but underwent a thorough review in the course of the next three years. It was impossible, the battle staff finally concluded, to determine in the abstract how many days of supply were necessary for a contingency situation before the national logistics supply line could be plugged into the deployed force. Instead, the number of days of supply—that is, the amount of supplies a unit carried with it in a deployment—would change according to the mission and circumstances, and that computation had to become a regular part of the mission analysis process.³¹

Various options presented themselves, with the staff tending toward augmenting the corps support command to save logistics capacity, and particularly the theater logistics capacity, so that it could be used elsewhere. Ports, planners understood, could well be in the corps area, but the lines of communication to the deployed force might well start in the hold of a ship or the cargo bay of an aircraft. The logistics system for deployed forces could easily become a distribution system, rather than a depot or stockpile system, as the G-4 concluded after analyzing the requirements. In such a situation, nontraditional techniques were preferable, such as putting the same officer in charge of the lines of communication from corps through to the brigade support area, with authority to manage both the transportation and the stocks, and to make the required tie-in to the European base or even the base in the continental United States.

Fundamentally, the corps G-4 planners concluded that the Army was unlikely to be able to afford multiple echelons of logistics for a corps-size contingency and needed to find ways to keep from building up a massive sixty days of supply in such operations. Instead, the battle staff began to seek ways to operate deployed forces with five to ten days of supply on hand and with the rest of it in the distribution pipeline. Similarly, the world of contingency missions demanded great flexibility from the corps support command, which needed to be able to take charge of a whole theater of war or area of operations within a theater of war, if necessary.³²

Numerous technical aids were available to help the corps with all those tasks, starting with the automated logistical system that the Army continued to

upgrade over time. The experiences of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM had led to the development of an electronic tagging system so that the logistics managers could keep track of supplies and equipment in transit from base areas to the active theater. Streamlining the logistics deployment process led to preparation of pre-stocked containers that could be loaded quickly and dispatched with good security and good identification of contents. One of the most important steps in that process was the procurement of ISU-90 containers as the corps standard while Lt. Gen. John Hendrix was corps commander. The ISU-90, a commercial container designed to be loaded efficiently into a wide range of aircraft, reduced deployment timelines significantly.³³

Finally, there were some needed changes in attitude. The Army logistics system contemplated supporting units until they deployed, then cutting the link with the home base, at which point the overseas command assumed the logistical responsibility. The reality, as V Corps understood from sending a hospital to Croatia, an aviation task force to Somalia, and a long series of battalion task forces to Macedonia, was that the deployed unit had to maintain ties to the home base, because the theater to which the units were sent was never a "mature" one that could adequately manage sustainment, or else was under command of an international agency that could not fill the needs of the U.S. Army units. Consequently, V Corps became accustomed to structuring logistical support entirely on the basis of the needs generated by the situation, rather than on the basis of standing procedure.³⁴

Brig. Gen. Larry Lust remained concerned that exercises did not prepare the logisticians properly for the missions that the corps was beginning to receive. Training scenarios, he complained, rarely considered the problems involved in deployment.³⁵ To deal with the issue, the 3d Corps Support Command in early 1995 began doing a series of quarterly deployment terrain walks to help make all those mental adjustments. General Lust wanted his staff and all of his units to understand "what right looks like" when handling a complex deployment. The last of that series of terrain walks before Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR began in Bosnia-Herzegovina was particularly fortuitous. In it, the corps support command considered the creation of a battalion marshaling area and how it was supposed to operate, developing clear instructions for what each station had to do. Less than seventy-two hours after that exercise ended, the logisticians received the order to support Southern European Task Force's (SETAF's) Task Force Daring Lion as it prepared for a possible mission to evacuate United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.³⁶

The Advanced Support Echelon

Emerging logistical concepts to support out of sector operations were matched by the evolution of maneuver techniques to fight something other than the general war. Exercises that V Corps conducted during 1991 and 1992 focused on assembling the corps, conducting a movement to contact against an enemy that was also maneuvering, then developing that movement into a hasty

attack in which the corps concentrated its combat power to attain a favorable force ratio. At that point, V Corps was beginning to change its operational concept from the general defense plan battle, essentially a defensive battle, to mobile corps operations with a variety of tactical options and a range of missions that were based on enemy strength, location, and dispositions.

To help think through those new issues, questions that V Corps had never been required to confront in all the years it trained to defend Western Europe from an attack by the Warsaw Pact, Lt. Gen. David Maddox, commanding the corps in 1990, instituted a detailed synchronization exercise³⁷ that his staff normally called a "sticker drill." The drills had great utility simply as coordination exercises, but two important conclusions also emerged from them. The first was that the corps needed a "standard play" to develop a concept for logistically supporting the maneuver units in their movement to contact. The second was that the entire logistical support effort required the supervision of a general officer. Thus originated the "advanced support echelon," a movement technique under the control of the deputy corps commander.³⁸

Obviously, marching the entire corps into an assembly area and then marching it toward an enemy was an enormous movement control problem. The old fully planned move with carefully worked-out routes and timings to established local battle positions in Germany was no longer viable. For the operations that planners envisioned in V Corps' future, the corps would have to develop march tables and coordinate a complex tactical road march in a very short time, placing all of the combat support and combat service support organizations in optimum positions to support and sustain the movement. Planning was necessary, for instance, for refueling operations, during which tanks were particularly vulnerable. Members of the corps staff who had served in Operation DESERT STORM verified some planning assumptions about that crucial process. From desert operations, they concluded that a tank formation could move about seven hours, at an assumed speed of about 20 kilometers per hour, about 140 kilometers, before it needed to refuel. The most efficient way to refuel was to move the refuelers forward of the tanks, set up refuel points, and then pass the armored units through those refueling points as they continued their advance. Of course, a miscalculation that timed a refueling operation just at the moment when contact was made with the enemy would be catastrophic.

Taking fueling as an example, the obvious first problem was positioning the supply units to the front. The process was far more complex than that, though. The corps also needed to have air defense positioned to protect the routes of advance; military police to regulate the march and control routes; engineers to prepare the routes, to emplace needed bridging (particularly armored vehicle launched bridges), and to construct alternate routes; signal units to put in the communications so the whole operation could be controlled; forward area refueling points established for the attack helicopters to support deep operations; general support and long range artillery far enough forward to fire suppression of enemy air defense missions in support of deep

operations; and tactical command posts so that the cavalry regiment had someone to whom to hand off the battle at the appropriate moment. Managing all those bits and pieces in a coherent way was a complex process.

As the concept developed, General Maddox's first notion was to attach all of that support to the cavalry screen and to have it maintain a forward movement behind the armored cavalry regiment. Then, the divisions could road march behind that formation and remain properly supplied to execute orders that could—and probably would—change as the commander gained a clearer view of the enemy dispositions through the unfolding of the tactical situation. Consequently, a well thought-out communications structure was also essential to allow the corps to adjust the plan and tactically reconfigure as necessary while on the move. The G-3 plans staff did a lot of work on how to make that crucial transition from a movement to contact to a hasty attack and steadily revised its views on the best techniques. While the basics of the problem had not changed that much since Lee's army bumped into Meade's forces at Gettysburg in 1864, the great increase in military technology had meanwhile made the process infinitely more complex.

More mature planning demonstrated that the original idea of attaching all of the support infrastructure to the cavalry regiment did not work. First of all, the large support structure was far too much for the regiment to control. More important, the cavalry had its own mission and its own problems. Maddox swiftly concluded that he wanted the forward tactical commander to focus his attention strictly on what was ahead of him, not on what was behind him; on finding the enemy, not on controlling the corps' combat support and combat service support operation, which had twice as many vehicles as the regiment operated. Eventually, he decided that the corps would lead with the armored cavalry regiment. Behind it, the various supporting units, including the tactical command posts, would move as part of the advanced support echelon (ASE), under the command of the deputy commanding general. Behind the support, the two divisions would march abreast. Upon contact, he envisioned the divisions passing through the advanced support echelon, with the armored cavalry regiment still forward to protect it.³⁹

To test the advanced support echelon concept, the corps ran a movement exercise (MOVEX) in May 1991 between Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels, with Grafenwöhr simulating the corps staging area and Hohenfels representing the line of contact. Across the ninety kilometers that separated them, the plans staff found seven routes for the advanced support echelon to move along in a 100- to 150-kilometer-wide zone, reinforcing what it had learned in the earlier Mobile Subscriber Equipment Capability Exercise about the width of a corps zone in Germany. All the key leaders took part in the exercise. In some cases they were brigade commanders; in others they were battalion and company commanders, depending on the size of the organization that needed to be in the advanced support echelon. The plan called for emplacing the advanced support echelon along the routes and testing the command and control links. Each vehicle in the exercise generally represented a march unit of twenty-

four, simulating a movement of about five thousand vehicles in all. There were no big vehicles; most of those used were light tactical trucks.

Each light truck represented a march unit, although some of the units, especially those that were part of the command and control system being tested (i.e., the military police and the signal troops), had to have a lower ratio. Because a substantial number of military policemen were employed elsewhere on force protection missions around USAREUR, especially in the VII Corps area, and others were assigned to Southwest Asia, it was difficult to find enough military police to test that part of the command and control. The mission of the corps signal brigade was laying down the communications from the corps staging area to the line of departure. Since the exercise was initiated on short notice, Maddox did not want to send the entire signal brigade to the field and thereby throw its whole planned training calendar into disarray. Consequently, the brigade only provided signal coverage along two routes. In sum, the signal units and the military police actually did the jobs they were supposed to do, though not at every point across the exercise. The artillery, though, as an example of the practice other type units followed, adhered to the formula of using one vehicle to represent a 24-vehicle march unit. That was especially realistic for a Lance missile unit, since a Lance battery actually had about twenty-four vehicles.

One of the interesting situations on the movement exercise was reacting to the friction of war. After a notional Lance battalion passed through on route A, Brig. Gen. Leonard Miller,⁴⁰ the ASE commander, ordered it to move to a firing position on the opposite side of the corps sector to react to a change in the enemy situation. The question was whether the command element could contact the battalion through the ASE communications net and order the move. One method was to call the battalion through Mobile Subscriber Equipment, but that effort failed because MSE wasn't operational at that point. In any case, the purpose of moving signal forward was not to control the advanced support echelon, but instead to serve the larger purpose of controlling the divisions.

Miller's test was an important one, because the advanced support echelon was there to support the attack, and if the corps could not find a good way to control the myriad of support units operating forward of the divisions, it would have significant problems with congestion in the corps zone, not to mention the uncertainty of war that required the ability to make rapid changes. Conceptually, primary control of the advanced support echelon was through FM radio, using retransmission units wherever necessary. That became a problem because the corps had lost retransmission equipment in the changes of tables of organization and equipment in its signal brigade units triggered by Mobile Subscriber Equipment fielding. Therefore the corps tasked the various separate brigades for the equipment to create the needed retransmission net. During the test, that net also failed. However, there was another means of command and control—the military police, among the first units of the advanced support echelon to deploy. In the end, the ASE command post was able to contact the Lance battalion through the traffic control points along the route. A military policeman flagged down the march unit, put the commander on the military police radio

net, and allowed the advanced support echelon headquarters to talk to him and give him his new orders.

The ASE command post, dubbed the "movement operations center," consisted of an expando van that had a liaison officer from each of the units that was moving. The liaison officer's job was to coordinate with his unit and do "force tracking," the corps jargon for keeping up with the locations of all the units. In the movement operations center, the liaison officer figured out what routes his battalion had to take. Part of the plan was to make sure that lateral routes were available if needed. In the case of the movement exercise, there happened to be an *Autobahn* that cut right across the sector, which meant that the movement operations center did not have to stop traffic anywhere. Once the Lance battalion commander had his new orders and shifted to the lateral road, the movement officer promptly lost contact with him, because communications were still not running properly and because there were no military police control points on the lateral routes. Thus, among the many lessons the corps took away from the movement exercise was that when units were diverted from a planned route of march, a military police escort should accompany them. With military police all over the various routes, the movement operations center retained a means of positive control, even without normal signal communications.

The movement exercise looked into a series of other problems as well. General Miller purposely selected a bridge at a place where the engineers did not have bridging material immediately available and declared that bridge destroyed. Then the movement operations center had to figure out how to bring the appropriate unit and equipment to the right place to repair the damage and cause the movement to proceed. Successfully working through a number of such problems convinced Maddox and his staff, but more important, his subordinate commanders, that the advanced support echelon concept worked.⁴¹

While the corps was completing the movement exercise, preparations for the 1991 Caravan Guard exercise continued and were influenced by developments noted during the movement exercise. Thus Caravan Guard 91 became a little more demanding for the staff, inasmuch as it used the advanced support echelon concept for the first time in a major exercise. In fact, Maddox used Caravan Guard to try out a variation on the advanced support echelon to determine how flexible the concept could be. The battlefield was not open, as it had been during the earlier Mobile Subscriber Equipment Capability Exercise. There was a friendly force to the corps front, so the approach march was also modified and moved the advanced support echelon to the front. In that variation, the advanced support echelon deployed short of the line of contact, then the cavalry regiment and the divisions marched through the support echelon and conducted a passage of lines through a defending friendly corps. In later discussions with his staff, Maddox concluded that the exercise had further validated the advanced support echelon, although more work obviously remained to be done.⁴²

The corps continued to work on the concept after Maddox left command. In the summer and fall of 1993, V Corps developed a series of "standard plays"



Rapid bridging of rivers remained as important for the Advance Support Echelon as it had ever been during V Corps Cold War operations.

for a wide range of tactical scenarios. Working at the behest of the USAREUR commander, the G-3 devised and distributed to the divisions and separate brigades a series of nineteen standard maneuvers that ascended from task force, through brigade and division, to corps-level maneuvers. As the G-3 said in his cover letter to one of the divisions, the document contained “very little original thought” and was intended simply to lay out the basic concepts as a starting point from which commanders could begin their own planning process and apply the factors of mission, enemy, troops, time, and terrain.⁴³ All of the standard plays were based on the heavy force mission and emphasized the hasty attack in a variety of tactical settings. In what was obviously a continuation of the concept of the advanced support echelon, Tab P of the playbook outlined a covered approach march from a corps staging area, and Tab Q discussed an uncovered approach march from a corps staging area.⁴⁴

When he assumed command of V Corps, Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford inherited a relatively mature advanced support echelon that seemed capable of accomplishing the tasks set for it. The concept gave the corps the ability to move smoothly from one point to another and conduct a major heavy force operation within Germany. It offered the same capability once the corps completed a deployment to any point outside of Germany and needed to strike out from a lodgment area. The advanced support echelon was of no use, however, in the process of deploying the corps out of central Europe. In that situation, the issue became one of marshaling the logistical support at the port of debarkation to receive the combat elements when they arrived. However, Rutherford believed that the advanced support echelon was a useful experience in planning for deployments,

particularly since it caused the whole corps to think in terms of mobile, open warfare, rather than static, linear battle.⁴⁵

Emphasis on Personnel Readiness

When VII Corps went to Saudi Arabia for Operation DESERT SHIELD in 1990, it consisted of 75,000 soldiers drawn from across USAREUR. As that corps prepared to leave Germany, personnel officers found that 3 percent of all soldiers were not qualified for deployment, a figure slightly lower than the Army-wide rate at the time. That figure meant that VII Corps had to find approximately another two thousand soldiers in Europe to fill the unexpected vacancies.⁴⁶ Analyzing the situation after the fact, the USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, cited a number of medical causes for nondeployability, although his staff could not attach numbers of soldiers to each cause.

Those causes included previously undisclosed injuries and previously undiagnosed illnesses, asthma, and allergies. A major problem turned out to be the inability of soldiers suffering from asthma to wear protective masks, though there was no explanation as to why that difficulty had not already been reported in the course of normal training. Pregnancies among female soldiers were not, according to the personnel analysts, the main cause of medically related failures to deploy, though the number of pregnancies was significant, amounting to 7.4 percent of women assigned to VII Corps, as opposed to an Army-wide rate of 7 percent.

Other causes of nondeployability were chiefly administrative and disciplinary, with 637 soldiers debarred from assignment to Southwest Asia because of pending administrative actions or actions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Only fifty-one soldiers missed movement with their units. The total 3 percent figure for nondeployables included soldiers who had inadequate family care plans. More than a thousand had to revise their family care plans hastily before deployment. At that time placing family care plans on file was a standard requirement of the noncombatant evacuation order process. In the end, some soldiers chose voluntarily to leave the Army rather than consign their children to the care of a third party. A total of forty or fifty soldiers could not, or would not, implement adequate family care plans. Those soldiers were discharged from the service. General Crosbie Saint, the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, raised the crucial question when he demanded to know why permanently nondeployable soldiers had ever been assigned to a forward-deployed unit in the first place.⁴⁷

Personnel qualification⁴⁸ became a major issue for V Corps when the headquarters began to deploy soldiers to northern Iraq in November 1990 for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT at the end of the Persian Gulf War. The Special Troops Battalion organized a records check in the rotunda of the C. W. Abrams Building, the first personnel qualification review that V Corps had run. The lack of experience was immediately apparent. The battalion commander and the corps adjutant general pulled the major pieces together: medical records screening, dental



Personnel readiness processing became routine in the V Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Company, as it did throughout the Corps after 1991. Records checks included everything from insurance and wills to powers of attorney.

technicians, medical personnel for immunizations, finance clerks, the staff judge advocate, and the Red Cross, among others. Formalizing the process with a battalion SOP, the headquarters conducted such reviews periodically throughout 1991 and six times in 1992, finally setting a regular schedule of a records review once a quarter.⁴⁹

The early reviews turned up many nondeployable soldiers, mostly because they failed to meet requirements to have current dental or medical examinations on record, or simply had no dental or medical records. The battalion modeled its process on the one used during the deployment of V Corps soldiers to Southwest Asia for the Persian Gulf War, where the processing was conducted at Rhein-Main Air Force Base and administrative deficiencies were made up on the spot. The battalion personnel review brought in dentists to check soldiers' teeth for serious dental problems and clerks to create dental records then and there, if necessary—at a minimum, a panoramic tooth x-ray. The minimum requirement for medical records could also be met by bringing immunizations up to date or, if necessary, creating a new shot record. The battalion discovered that part of the problem lay in coordination with the hospital, which needed a certain amount of time to pull all of the medical records together for the soldiers being checked. Thus the thrust of the early personnel processings was to identify administrative and record-keeping problems.



Personnel readiness processing also certified soldiers as medically ready to deploy, offering immunizations and minor dental work on the spot.

Lt. Col. Gary Heuser, the battalion commander in 1992, emphasized to his staff that it had to distinguish between simple administrative irregularities and real deployability problems. The battalion found that one of the persistent shortfalls was protective mask inserts for soldiers who wore glasses, and the first issue was to decide whether the inserts were really necessary. Research into the records finally uncovered a firm standard to help make such a decision. Finally, the battalion determined that inserts were unnecessary for soldiers with 20/40 vision or better, unless those soldiers were drivers or aviators. The battalion then considered the missions each of its soldiers might have to carry out and assumed that most soldiers were indeed required to be drivers. Obtaining prescription protective mask inserts for all the soldiers needing them temporarily overloaded the medical system.

Other qualification requirements were harder to meet. Soldiers, and very often their supervisors on the corps staff, always seemed to think that carrying out day-to-day duties was more important than doing the things that prepared them for overseas movement—such as scheduling an eye exam and ordering mask inserts. More fundamentally, though, the pressure of daily operations complicated the process of keeping soldiers up to date on other individual requirements such as the semi-annual Army Physical Fitness Test, weapons qualification, protective mask fitting, and changing protective mask filters. None of those simple things

required a lot of time and effort, but they all detracted from the urgency of the moment, and staff supervisors were frequently loath to release their soldiers for the half-day necessary to do them. The problem was more acute for busy staff officers.

Soldiers leaving the continental United States for Germany theoretically met the personnel qualification standards for that movement, but the Special Troops Battalion discovered that many of the criteria had been waived or deferred until soldiers reached their units in Germany. Many soldiers thus had arrived at the corps without medical or dental records in hand, and repairing those deficiencies took time and effort. Similarly, all of the qualification criteria could easily degrade over time, and the battalion continuously stressed the soldier's individual responsibility to keep up with those things. Another difficulty the battalion faced was the lack of a standard battle roster for the corps advance party or for other deployment packages, a tool that would have been useful in managing personnel readiness. For the deployment to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, some 80 to 90 percent of the soldiers were fully qualified. Throughout 1992 and 1993, about half of all soldiers reporting for the review qualified without corrective action having to be taken.

Personnel readiness remained an issue for the Special Troops Battalion commander throughout the decade. The battalion settled on a regular quarterly schedule for the processing review and maintained a qualification roster for every officer and soldier assigned to the battalion. That roster became part of the battalion quarterly training management review and the battalion command sergeant major issued copies of it to the staff sergeants major in each of the corps staff sections.

The issue of single parents, by contrast, never posed much of a problem within the battalion. The headquarters and headquarters company commander handled the family care plans for single parents and noted no significant problems during any of the V Corps deployments throughout the 1990s. By December 1995, when V Corps began deploying units and individual soldiers to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the personnel qualification process had become a routine part of the corps' personnel readiness mission. In 1998 and 1999 the Special Troops Battalion reported that about 90 percent of all soldiers remained qualified for deployment, but causing soldiers to sustain those qualifications remained a constant problem.⁵⁰

The Partnership for Peace

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched the Partnership for Peace program at its Brussels Summit in January 1994 in order to enhance the stability and security of Europe by strengthening the relations between NATO and the countries of central and eastern Europe that had formerly been part of the Warsaw Pact, as well as other nations participating in the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Through the partnership, NATO encouraged those countries to intensify their ties with the alliance through practical cooperation,

much of it involving military interaction. NATO's chosen vehicle to accomplish that goal was military operations in support of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Naturally, the program had the political dimension of promoting democracy, which NATO believed would increase regional stability.⁵¹

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, formed in December 1991 and comprising sixteen NATO nations and the countries of central and eastern Europe, produced an annual work plan to raise the general level of cooperation and understanding among the member nations through a broad and diverse range of activities, including security related matters and extensive military contacts. The Partnership for Peace was one of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council programs, and the 1994 Brussels Summit outlined an ambitious series of objectives for it. Generally, participants in the summit wanted to make national defense planning more "transparent," and likewise the defense budgeting processes of the member nations. Overall, they sought more democratic control of defense forces. Within the constraints of individual national goals and constitutional limitations, the summit hoped participating nations would contribute to operations under authority of the United Nations or the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Cooperative military relations with NATO were particularly desired, leading to joint planning, training, and exercises that could strengthen the various nations' abilities to undertake peacekeeping missions, search and rescue during emergencies, and humanitarian operations in particular. Finally, the Brussels summit hoped over the longer term to develop forces that were better able to operate alongside those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.⁵²

As nations joined the Partnership for Peace program, NATO necessarily became involved in geographic areas that were new to the alliance, including the nations that arose from the former Yugoslav state, the Baltic states that had gained independence after the fall of the Soviet regime, and previously non-aligned states such as Finland and Sweden. The first partnership exercises were scheduled in 1994, including Exercise Cooperative Bridge, the first hosted by a non-NATO nation—in that case, Poland.

American leaders enthusiastically supported the Partnership for Peace, together with the related Joint Contact Team Program, the Program for Confidence and Security Building Measures, and security assistance programs, all of which became collectively known as the National Strategy of Peacetime Engagement. The American intention was to use its military forces to foster democratic values and ethics with the peoples of eastern Europe, which should in turn ease their transition from centralized to free market economies, cause the standards of living and quality of life to rise, and produce a stable and thriving eastern Europe. While the partnership became the cornerstone of the National Strategy of Peacetime Engagement, American military forces also took part in hundreds of the much smaller Joint Contact Team activities, more than 650 of them in 1996 alone.

The United States Army, Europe, was from the start heavily involved in the Partnership for Peace and related programs. Most of its engagement activities

were relatively small in terms of the numbers of soldiers involved, but they were numerous, and all required considerable time for planning and preparation. Within USAREUR, V Corps was either the lead agent or a major participant in many of the partnership exercises. The program occupied a central place in USAREUR's hierarchy of tasks. Speaking to Col. Gregory Fontenot before he assumed command of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, General William W. Crouch, the USAREUR commanding general, said that he considered Partnership for Peace exercises a primary mission of his command.⁵³

Partnership for Peace demanded time and energy from units that were already heavily engaged in other tasks. The heavy exercise load⁵⁴ also consumed a great deal of attention from staffs at all levels within V Corps and the personal attention of commanders, particularly in view of the considerable international import of the exercises. Exercise Cooperative Challenge 95, conducted by 1st Armored Division just before its deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, was an excellent example of a mature Partnership for Peace exercise.

Proposed in 1994 by the Czech land forces and whole-heartedly supported by the government of the Czech Republic, in 1995 Cooperative Challenge was the largest exercise in the series in terms of scope and scale, if not in the numbers of soldiers involved. Cooperative Challenge featured a brigade headquarters commanding thirteen battalions from various nations and from various arms and services, including a Czech motorized rifle battalion, a Czech engineer battalion, a Baltic Battalion composed of Estonians and Lithuanians, an American tank battalion, a Dutch tank battalion, a Polish motor rifle battalion, a Slovak motor rifle battalion, and a Swedish mechanized battalion. In support were a logistics battalion from the Austrian Army, a second logistics battalion from the French Army, and a Mistral air defense artillery battery from the Belgian Army.⁵⁵

Commanding the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, Col. Greg Fontenot led the exercise with a multinational unit composed of a staff drawn from his headquarters and an almost equal number of Czechs, augmented by an air-space control element provided by Allied Forces, Central Europe, and led by a British wing commander. It was a truly multinational headquarters. Every American on the staff had a Czech counterpart, while the primary civil-military relations staff officer was Czech and the brigade air defense officer was Belgian. The deputy commander was a Czech, Col. Juri Sedivy, who had commanded a tank regiment in the former Warsaw Pact army of Czechoslovakia, and at the time commanded a Czech rapid deployment force. The brigade chief of staff, Lt. Col. Olivier de Bavinchove, was a planner in the French 2d Armored Division and had extensive experience in Bosnia.⁵⁶ The directing staff was largely Czech, but filled out by personnel from the 1st Armored Division.

The exercise was a peacekeeping mission that had a zone of operations of 140 kilometers, including a buffer zone separating two opposing sides. The exercise area in the Czech Republic was a zone that ran southwest to northeast, from Brno to about forty kilometers northeast of Olumouc, just north of Aus-



The international command team in the Partnership for Peace Exercise Cooperative Challenge '95 in the Czech Republic. From left to right, French Lt. Col. Olivier de Bavinchove, the chief of staff; Col. Gregory Fontenot, commanding; and Czech Col. Juri Sedivy.

terlitz. The exercise headquarters was at Vyskov, at the Czech military academy. The principal group to be trained was the brigade headquarters, all other exercise headquarters consisting of seven- to ten-man response cells, representing a total of thirteen units.

One outcome of the exercise that USAREUR explicitly desired was a standard operating procedure (SOP) that NATO's Land Forces, Central Europe, could use as a model for an actual deployment.⁵⁷ The further objective was to accustom NATO and former Warsaw Pact units with one another. To lay out the preliminaries, in August 1995 the 1st Brigade hosted a study conference so that all of the participants could meet and jointly write draft procedures. Among the participants, only the Swedish contingent had any experience with peacekeeping operations, and the study group learned much from the Swedes' experience and from study of the documents they brought along, especially their SOPs. The group also assimilated the lessons that the 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, drew while serving with the United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia. Naturally, each group also drew from its own basic military experience. In the study period, discussion of the draft SOP was followed by some basic instruction on how NATO and the U.S. Army operated, with particular emphasis on the military decision-making process. Other components of the discussion included the little peacekeeping doctrine that existed in the U.S. Army and the NATO

standard agreements that appeared appropriate for the exercise. The session concluded with a basic mission analysis to develop the brigade order. Fontenot made time to take the visitors to look at key pieces of American equipment and for social events so that all the participants could begin to understand and know each other, breaking down the basic reserve that naturally existed.

Having the SOP in draft and a basic mission analysis completed, the next step was a study session in early September that included the brigade staff, the directing staff, and the response cells, conducted at Vyskov in the Czech Republic. That session determined how the exercises would be run and included some rehearsals on how to use what the exercise called the military event sequence list, the chronological list of exercise situations. The group then decided on the communications hardware necessary to conduct the exercise and concluded the week-long session by producing a third draft of the SOP. After writing an operation plan for each response cell, the directing staff rehearsed the exercise plan.

The exercise itself was run during the last week of September and the first week of October. During the first week the brigade staff tested the communications links and then revised the SOP one more time, producing the fourth draft that was used during Cooperative Challenge. The exercise used a 12-hour day, rather than a 24-hour day, normally running from eight in the morning until eight in the evening, and had, by design, a lot of simultaneous events so that the brigade staff was placed under stress. Play was geared more for current operations than detailed planning, particularly since the scenario called for the exercise to start at a point ninety days into the operational scenario. The first day of the exercise, during what was referred to as a mini-ex, seven events were going on simultaneously, six of which required specific orders for the subordinate units. Stress was immediate, since the three plans officers in S-3 were German, Czech, and American, and some use of interpreters was essential. The pace of the operation dictated that the procedures used were those customary in a current operations staff element, and the S-3 only used the deliberate planning process once, instead relying upon a hasty plans process informed by a continuously updated estimate of the situation.

Cultural differences somewhat complicated the exercise. The eastern European armies, for example, were rank-heavy, with the result that the multinational brigade staff had more lieutenant colonels in it than were specified for a U.S. Army division. Most of the eastern European armies were still following the Soviet model, in which all real responsibility was vested in officers. The other interesting phenomenon was that no one ever questioned anything that an American said. The Americans on the staff worked throughout the exercise to find ways to bring the foreign officers into the discussions in a substantive way, to create the atmosphere for free exchange of ideas that was typical of an American orders group. But eliciting questions and concerns from former Warsaw Pact officers was particularly difficult during the back brief and rehearsal process, so Fontenot provided an example by having the U.S. battalion lead that process. His purpose was to allow the other nations to witness the common

interaction between an American commander and his staff, including those occasions when staff officers disagreed with the commander. The point was that disagreement did not necessarily mean disrespect, a concept that took some time to convey.

A major lesson for the Americans was that, when forming any organization that was brought together in an extemporaneous fashion, developing cohesion was based in very large part on understanding each other culturally. The difficulties in managing different service cultures that Americans experienced when putting joint staffs together were clearly magnified when creating a multinational organization. That was not true merely because Cooperative Challenge dealt chiefly with eastern European armies. One of the major learning experiences for the Americans was the different ways western European armies functioned. Col. Olivier de Bavinchove was, as Fontenot phrased it, "by God the chief of staff of that organization, and what he said, went!" The Americans were not accustomed to serving in a brigade-level organization that had a chief of staff, let alone a deputy commander, and at first resented the authoritative way that de Bavinchove saw his position. In the end, they came to understand that organizational model and learned its virtues.

The exercise stretched the brigade staff because it obviously had far too many battalions to work with. In reality, it was managing a division-size organization, since the headquarters and staffs of the response cells represented a 10,000-man force. The missions were also broader than normal brigade tasks. In a large peacekeeping operation, the S-5 had to be very large and include a civil-military operations center. The movement control cell had to be fairly large as well. Information operations were of the first importance and demanded a substantial public affairs organization. The smallest organization in the U.S. Army competent to employ forces of that nature across the wide functional areas that the exercise encompassed was actually a division headquarters. Thus, the first major lesson was that, when using brigades for such missions, they had to be organized functionally to have the capabilities of divisions. The logic of having a deputy commander revealed itself as the wide range of functions became obvious. Someone had to run the unit and do the deep planning, while someone had to be "Johnny-on-the-spot" at the critical point. Using the deputy commander in the latter role allowed Fontenot to maintain command and control across the sector.

Another lesson was the preparation time necessary to make such a headquarters work. Organized on the fly, it could still function effectively with only three or four weeks of training. Even though English was the common language, every national group spoke its own language when that was appropriate. Fontenot found it necessary to speak to his staff in French, German, and English at various times to make himself understood, but English was the common language for operations. But such a brigade still required a robust linguist section. The early decision that the SOP would direct operations down to battalion level, showing units how to go about their business in a fairly detailed way, proved effective. Such an SOP turned out to be essential for an organization that had no

agreed-upon procedures in common and that traditionally went about things in different ways, with the major difference being the eastern European military adherence to the old Soviet concept of operational norms. The SOP was not intended to limit units, but to give them at least a common basis of tactics, techniques, and procedures in great detail for various types of operations.

If nothing else, the Partnership for Peace showed that the U.S. Army did not begin to have enough linguists to operate effectively in eastern Europe, or in the kind of context typical of the National Strategy of Engagement. In Cooperative Challenge, the 1st Brigade used counterintelligence soldiers as interpreters, which meant that they were not doing the force protection jobs for which they were intended. In almost every case, the Army had to contract interpreters for its eastern European exercises. Translators were in equally short supply, and that proved equally limiting, because key documents, such as peace treaties and various agreements, needed to exist in every language that would be encountered in the operational area. Moreover, that document had to be reliably translated by skilled professionals who were fluent in both English and the other language.

Other concerns also arose from Cooperative Challenge 95. Such exercises, in Fontenot's opinion, had a tendency to cause the host nation to believe that the United States was committing itself to that nation's defense, or at the least to suggest a level of support that did not exist. Fontenot was aware of that risk and worked hard to send no such message. Preeminently, he did not wish to generate the idea that the Partnership for Peace represented a commitment on the part of the United States to extend NATO to the east. He later commented, however, that such a point of view was "not universally understood on the other side." Clearly, when the corps was to be used as an instrument of national policy at the political and diplomatic level, more was demanded of its soldiers. The old rubric of "technical and tactical" proficiency no longer described all of the skills necessary to be an Army officer.

Development of the Immediate Ready Force

Although virtually every out of sector mission to that point had involved humanitarian assistance or peace enforcement in one form or another, the corps staff in 1994 began devoting some thought to how heavy armored forces could be quickly deployed if necessary. Officers with experience in XVIII Airborne Corps and well familiar with its "green ramp," immediate deployment, mentality suggested the idea of setting up an alert roster for a heavy company, an idea that dovetailed well with the notion of pre-positioned stocks already well-understood in USAREUR. One concept was to set aside the full set of equipment for a heavy company team in pre-configured air loads, and then have a designated alert company fall in on that equipment for rapid deployment. Desultory work continued through 1994 and 1995, but serious thought about a rapidly deployable heavy company was suspended in December 1995 when V Corps turned its attention to operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The experience of deploying Task Force Hawk to Albania in the spring of 1999 reenergized the development of the immediate ready force. The Army was criticized for the slow pace at which all the combat elements of TF Hawk were delivered to Albania. In fact, the Army could do little to speed the deployment, because many of the C-17 aircraft essential to moving the task force were already committed to helping in refugee relief operations and were unavailable to move the tanks, rocket artillery, headquarters equipment, and other materiel the task force needed.⁵⁸ Obviously, however, the Army needed to find a way to give European Command a more rapidly deployable force, and General Meigs began to discuss the issue with Lt. Gen. John Hendrix, the V Corps commander. Hendrix suggested using the model of the 3d Infantry Division, which had created an immediate ready company for similar missions.⁵⁹

Thus, V Corps continued to work through September 1999 on the development of a deployable unit that it knew as the Immediate Ready Company (IRC), using the 3d Infantry Division's "ready company" as a model and basing its concept on the use of pre-positioned equipment. As constituted, the Immediate Ready Company was a balanced mechanized company team that could be augmented as required by Force Enhancement Modules that included command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; aviation; multiple launch rocket system; logistics; and engineers.

The corps hoped to have the company operational by 15 December 1999, at first using organic equipment until separate pre-positioned stocks could be obtained. The concept assumed that the designated ready company would have normal standards of proficiency, so that the unit would require only familiarization gunnery, not the entire gunnery qualification process. The corps intended to publish an order establishing the immediate ready company on 15 October and set other key dates that included bringing all of that unit's equipment to operational standards by the middle of November and completing unit rehearsals by 10 December. The company was to be fully mission capable by 15 December, and the 1st Armored Division would be given the IRC mission from that date through 1 July 2000.

Total equipment included 4 tanks, 5 Bradley fighting vehicles, 1 M113 armored personnel carrier, 3 heavy tactical trucks, 1 light tactical truck, 1 M88 recovery vehicle, and other associated heavy equipment. The personnel strength amounted to 7 officers and 83 other ranks, among which were the personnel of 1 infantry platoon (1 officer and 40 soldiers) and 1 armored platoon (1 officer and 15 soldiers). The entire package, chiefly because of the size of the tanks and the Bradleys, required eight C-5B or C-17 aircraft for aerial deployment.⁶⁰

When Meigs returned to Heidelberg in October 1999 from his position as Commander, NATO Stabilization Force, in Sarajevo, the USAREUR commanding general conducted a thorough command review. One conclusion drawn from that review was that the concept of a quickly deployable heavy force, with which both USAREUR and V Corps had been working for several

years, was both necessary and needed some reconsideration. He immediately incorporated the V Corps concept of the immediate ready company into the evolving USAREUR plan.

Concerned that the unit required strategic airlift, he issued new guidance to base the organization on equipment that could be deployed quickly by the C-130 aircraft daily available in theater, which meant in effect that the force had to be mounted in M113 armored personnel carriers and light tactical trucks. Meigs' concept was broader than the one on which V Corps had been working, and specified a task organization that could provide an appropriate emergency response in a wider range of contingencies. Under his concept, the highest alert force was the theater reserve, the Southern European Task Force's (SETAF's) 173d Airborne Brigade, which could deploy its 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Infantry task force, including a field artillery battery and an air defense battery, within twelve hours. He intended the heavy force from Central Region to link up with the SETAF force on order to give USAREUR a quick strike capability. In the evolution of the concept, the original V Corps ready company became the USAREUR Medium Ready Company that could quickly be airlifted to support the 173d Airborne Brigade. To follow the medium company, Meigs specified a heavy punch capability, an Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle platoon under a company command and capable of deploying on a minimal number of C-17 aircraft. A series of force enhancement modules ensured maximum flexibility by providing rapidly deployable packages separate from the medium and heavy ready companies that could be tailored to the mission at hand. All force enhancement modules were C-130 deployable by utilizing existing theater airlift, rather than awaiting strategic lift from CONUS (the continental United States). As a consequence, heavy lift aircraft could be reserved for use elsewhere.

The most combat-capable module was the Medium Ready Company, which was composed of two M113 platoons designed for use as an early entry force to augment initial entry forces. The other modules included engineers for reconnaissance, mobility, and route clearance; military police for security; scouts for reconnaissance or security; and a tactical command and control force enhancement module designed to provide mobile command and control for task force or battalion tactical command posts.⁶¹

USAREUR tasked V Corps to be the executive agent for implementation of the immediate ready force concept,⁶² and the corps further assigned the mission initially to the 1st Armored Division. By the summer of 2000 the Immediate Ready Force (IRF) design had been finalized and a concept of echeloned support worked out. Once the original deployment had been made and the decision to follow on with the Heavy Immediate Ready Company or Force Enhancement Modules, those units would go with three days of supply on hand, followed by a Combat Service Support Force Enhancement Module with a further seven days of support. The support module provided a maintenance support team with modular maintenance packages and the required repair parts, in addition to the additional days of supply. The Combat Service Support Module was capable

of deploying prior to the departure of the heavy company to establish base support or could deploy within seventy-two hours after the heavy company left Germany. Long-term logistical support was based on push packages from Germany, initial push packages combined with support from forward theater assets, integration of the Immediate Ready Force into a larger deployed unit, and follow-on parent unit support.⁶³

Looking ahead, V Corps began to frame a transition process so that the two maneuver brigades of the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions could establish an orderly rotation of the IRF mission and began planning a series of emergency deployment readiness exercises in conjunction with SETAF to test and hone the deployment concept. The first test came in June 2000, when Meigs directed an evaluation of the IRF. Soldiers from the Southern European Task Force's 173d Airborne Brigade and 1st Armored Division deployed as an IRF in C-130s and UH-60s to Hungary as part of Exercise Lariat Response. Two months later USAREUR deployed 120 soldiers from 1st Infantry Division's 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, and 1st Military Police Company when it sent the Medium Ready Company to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, to augment Task Force Falcon units involved in the peacekeeping operation there.⁶⁴ The company remained in Kosovo just over a month before returning to Germany, but was obliged to leave its M113s at Camp Bondsteel for a further period until aircraft became available to return them to Germany as well.⁶⁵

An Ocean Closer

The European drawdown of forces did not end discussion about why the United States needed to maintain substantial Army units in Germany, but rather intensified it. The USAREUR contribution to the discussion was the modest suggestion that stationing in Europe put V Corps "an ocean closer" to the crisis of the moment. Such proximity was only valuable if the corps was able to move units quickly, however. Making the changes to organization and tactical technique that would allow it to fulfill a role as a "fire brigade" in Europe accordingly became the focus of V Corps' tactical development for almost ten years. Hence, as the millenium neared, the United States Army, Europe, and V Corps had found ways to make the forces that did remain in Europe better prepared for the new conditions in which they might be called upon to fight. The V Corps put away the great war plan against the Warsaw Pact that it had spent some forty years elaborating. In its place, the corps began to maintain a set of contingency plans for military operations throughout the European Command area of responsibility, a huge geographic region in which were to be found not only many types of military forces and many differing political situations, but also a wide range of climatic and topographical conditions.

Beginning with the evolution of the Advanced Support Echelon, which was the first real step away from the General Defense Plan of Western Europe, V Corps devised administrative and tactical techniques for waging war elsewhere than Germany. The corps also created new tactical organizations, both within

NATO and unilaterally, that accorded with the new political situation and, stepping up from pure military operations to the realm of the political and diplomatic, became deeply involved in the military-political process of the National Policy of Peacetime Engagement. At the heart of the set of changing techniques that V Corps developed, however, remained the ability of its units to move quickly and incrementally to the scene of the action, and on short notice. The remaining task, and a daunting one, was to reconsider the way the headquarters commanded its troops under those changed circumstances.

NOTES

¹ General Montgomery C. Meigs, Briefing at Senior Leaders Conference, Leading Change in USAREUR, 17 Nov 1999.

² Interv, author with Col. William W. Alexander, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 24 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

³ For a more detailed discussion of changes to the operational environment, see subsequent sections of this chapter; for a discussion of changes to corps exercises in reaction to the new operational environment, see Chapters 2 and 3.

⁴ Analysis by Lt. Col. James A. Cope. See Interv, author with Lt. Col. James A. Cope, Chief, Training Division, ACoFS, G-3, V Corps, 29 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁵ Memo, Lt. Col. Michael Dietz, III (GE) Korps Liaison Officer, for V Corps Command Group, 14 Aug 1992, sub: (GE) CSA Guidance on the Enhancement of Responsiveness and Combat Readiness of the (GE) Army, transmitting a translated document, "Guidance No. 1" for the German Army from Lt. Gen. Helge Hansen.

⁶ Interv, author with Dr. R. S. Garnett, Government Relations Advisor, ACoFS, G-5, V Corps, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁷ The German unit that had the security mission for V Corps was Verteidigungskreiskommando (Regional Defense Command) 431, which trained with the corps every second year. The VKK 431 was a unit subordinate to the Verteidigungsbezirkskommando (Area Defense Command) 43, in Darmstadt. For details on organization of the German reserve units in Hessen, see Tilman Lombard, ed., *Chronik des VBK 43 1958-1988* (Frankfurt am Main: Edition Chimaira, 1998).

⁸ Agreement Between the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America and the Federal Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Establishment of Two Bi-National Corps, 15 Dec 1992 and 4 Jan 1993.

⁹ Bi-National Corps Implementing Agreement, 10 Feb 1993. In 1980 Congress passed the NATO Mutual Support Act, which stipulated that support provided another nation would be reimbursed or paid back in kind.

¹⁰ The United States provided officers and NCOs of the same grade to serve in II German Korps. See MFR Between the Commander, 7th Army Reserve Command, and the Commander, V Corps, n.d., sub: Operation and Support of the V (US/GE) Corps Reserve Staff Augmentation Element to II (GE/US) Korps; Memo, USAREUR DCSOPS for Commander, V Corps, 30 Mar 1998, sub: Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)/Memorandum for Record (MFR) for AC/RC Exchange Personnel to II German Korps. The Bundeswehr provided a uniformly high quality of staff officer to V Corps. Between 1993 and 2000 the German Army stationed fifteen different officers in V Corps general staff sections (not including FSCCOORD), all but one of whom was a graduate of the Führungsakademie (Command and General Staff College) and a member of the General Staff Corps, a prestigious appointment.

¹¹ Bi-National Corps Technical Arrangement Between V US Corps and II GE Corps, 14 Jun 1994. Also refer to Garnett interview. Both as Government Relations Adviser and as an officer of the Army Reserve, Garnett was intimately involved in discussions and staff work leading to the signing of the Technical Arrangement. Also see Interv, author with Lt. Col. Daniel V. Sulka, Plans Chief, ACofS, G-4, V Corps, 9 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

¹² V Corps Command Briefing, 4 Nov 1993.

¹³ Interv, author with Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, CG, V Corps, 19 Jan 1995, Campbell Barracks.

¹⁴ That concern is best expressed in the Sulka interview.

¹⁵ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, CG, 3d COSCOM, 24 Jun 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ MFR, V Corps History Office, 10 Aug 1994, sub: Notes from Bi-National Corps Working Group Meeting.

¹⁸ Lust interview.

¹⁹ Briefing for V Corps Staff, 1998, V Corps/II Korps description; V Corps German Staff Section Organization Grenadier 13th Panzer Division.

²⁰ V/II Bi-National Corps/Korps, "Interoperability CD-ROM."

²¹ V Corps Historian Conference Note Files, 2000.

²² See remarks in 1st Armored Division Annual Histories, particularly G-3 Training, for 1993, 1994, and 1995.

²³ Rutherford interview.

²⁴ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, CofS, V Corps, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²⁵ Rutherford interview.

²⁶ MFR, V Corps History Office, 28 Aug 1994, sub: Notes to Accompany V Corps ARRC Briefing. Also see Garnett interview.

²⁷ For further detail on this, refer to the section on mission rehearsal exercises in Chapter 3.

²⁸ This issue is addressed in more detail in the context of V Corps preparations for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Chapter 13.

²⁹ Sulka interview.

³⁰ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Norris S. Jordan, Chief Army Materiel Command Logistics Assistance Officer to 3d Corps Support Command, 14 May 1993, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany; Sulka interview.

³¹ Sulka interview; Lust interview.

³² Sulka interview.

³³ Jordan interview; Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Col. Robert M. Leon, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 2, 13, and 27 May 1999, Tirana, Albania.

³⁴ Jordan interview; Sulka interview. For a discussion of the logistical difficulties inherent in corps deployments through 1995, see Chapter 7 (212th MASH deployment to Croatia), Chapter 8 (TF 5-158 Aviation deployment to Somalia), Chapter 9 (the mission to Rwanda), and Chapter 10 (Task Force Able Sentry in Macedonia).

³⁵ Lust interview.

³⁶ Ibid.; 3d Corps Support Command Annual Historical Report, 1995.

³⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the Synchronization Drill, refer to Chapter 2.

³⁸ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Herbert Frandsen, Chief of War Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 5-6 Jan 1993, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

³⁹ V Corps Briefing, The Advanced Support Echelon, n.d., but April 1991.

⁴⁰ Brig. Gen. Leonard D. Miller commanded V Corps Artillery from August 1990 through June 1991. When the V Corps deputy commander, Maj. Gen. Jay Garner, deployed with Task Force Alfa to northern Iraq for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991, General Miller assumed the task of further developing and commanding the Advanced Support Echelon.

⁴¹ V Corps ASE MOVEX After Action Review (AAR), May 1991.

⁴² Exercise Caravan Guard 91 AAR, May 1991; also see Frandsen interview.

⁴³ Ltr, Col. Clayton E. Melton, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, to Lt. Col. Robert L. Westholm, Jr., ACofS, G-3, 1st Armored Division, 16 Sep 1993, sub: V Corps Play Book. Melton commented that the document was based on the then-current edition of Field Manual 100-15-1, Field Manual 71-1/2/3, the III Corps Maneuver Booklet, and the CINC's *Large Unit Maneuver Book*.

⁴⁴ V Corps Standard Play Book, September 1993.

⁴⁵ Rutherford interview.

⁴⁶ 5th Personnel Group Message Files, Operation DESERT SHIELD, 1990, and V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Operations) Message File, Operation DESERT SHIELD, 1990, detail the cross-leveling process.

⁴⁷ HQ, V Corps, History Office, Information Paper, 19 Apr 1999, sub: Deployability—The USAREUR Experience in the Persian Gulf War. The paper was based on statistics prepared by the USAREUR DCSPER and USAREUR historian.

⁴⁸ Within V Corps, several terms relating to personnel readiness were used interchangeably over the decade: POM (Preparation for Overseas Movement), POR (Preparation of Replacements for Overseas Movement), and PDP (Predeployment Processing).

⁴⁹ This section is based heavily on Interv, author with Lt. Col. Gary Heuser, Commander, Special Troops Battalion, V Corps, 2 Jul 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; also, V Corps Special Troops Battalion POM SOP, June 1992; and Army Regulation 600-8-1 (1992).

⁵⁰ Interv, author with Lt. Col. John Knie, Commander, Special Troops Battalion (Provisional), HQ, V Corps, 13 Jul 2000, Patton Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

⁵¹ This section is based on Maj. A. R. Koenig, "Partnership for Peace Exercises Summary," V Corps, History Office, draft Ms, July 1997. Koenig based his work on V Corps ACofS, G-3, Partnership for Peace (PfP) files and PfP files in USAREUR ODCSOPS.

⁵² *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 Jan 1994.

⁵³ Interv, author with Col. Gregory Fontenot, Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 22 Nov 1995, Ayers Kaserne, Kirch Gons, Germany.

⁵⁴ See Appendix F for a summary of Partnership for Peace exercises run by V Corps or in which V Corps had significant participation.

⁵⁵ Memo of Instruction, HQ, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 1 Aug 1995, sub: Exercise Cooperative Challenge 95; HQ, 1st Multi-National Brigade, OPORD 96-1 (Cooperative Challenge Multinational Brigade OPORD), 272000 Sep 1995; HQ, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCEN), Exercise Cooperative Challenge, Exercise Operation Order, August 1995.

⁵⁶ Discussion of this exercise not otherwise derived from the documents cited above has been drawn from: Fontenot interview; Intervs, author with Lt. Col. Christian de Graff, Operations Officer, 1st Brigade (Bde), 1st Armored Division (AD); with Capt. Mark S. Vara, Plans Officer, S-3, 1st Bde, 1st AD; and with Lt. Col. Michael D. Jones, Commander, 2d Battalion, 67th Armor, 1st AD, all 22 Nov 1995, Ayers Kaserne, Kirch Gons, Germany; and HQ, 1st Bde, 1st AD, After Action Review, Exercise Cooperative Challenge 95, October 1995.

⁵⁷ Memo, HQ, 1st Brigade, 1st AD, for Peacekeeping Forces assigned to RFCT (Ready First Combat Team), 7 Sep 1995, sub: Peacekeeping Operations Standing Operating Procedures.

⁵⁸ For a fuller discussion of Task Force Hawk and the deployment issue, see Chapters 15 and 16.

⁵⁹ See Sean Naylor, "Ready—And Waiting. USAREUR's Immediate Ready Force Specialty: Quick to React," *Army Times*, 6 Nov 2000.

⁶⁰ V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans), Briefing for CG, V Corps, Immediate Ready Company (IRC), 22 Sep 1999.

⁶¹ V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans), Briefing, V Corps IRF Briefing, 16 Nov 1999.

⁶² Msg, CG, USAREUR, for CG, V Corps, 9804124, 12 Oct 1999, sub: USAREUR Implementation Message, IRC; USAREUR FRAGO 12 Oct 1999 directed V Corps to establish the IRC.

⁶³ V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans), Briefing, V Corps IRF Briefing, 16 Nov 1999.

⁶⁴ HQ, USAREUR & 7th Army News Release No. 00-08-08, 16 Aug 2000.

⁶⁵ Naylor, "Ready—And Waiting."

Command and Control

"We've got to get away from the acetate and grease pencil mentality."

Lt. Col. Joel A. Buck
Corps Commander's Personal Staff Group
1992

"What we have right now with our CP structure is the Den of the Cave Dwellers, with everybody's buffalo hide tacked up outside. We need to surrender our territoriality in the interests of better staff coordination."

Brig. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes
V Corps Chief of Staff
2 December 1999

While V Corps was busy finding ways to move its units more quickly in response to crises outside of Germany, the headquarters was also engaged in a long process of re-thinking the way it commanded those units. The Cold War techniques of command post organization and stationing were appropriate for major heavy force operations in general war, but perhaps were not so appropriate for peace support operations or humanitarian relief missions. Thus, the headquarters launched itself on a search for a better way to organize its command posts, for better equipment to speed their functioning, for the flexibility to tailor the command post to the mission, and above all for ways to move those command posts quickly to the scene of the action.

In the ten years after the end of the Cold War, V Corps command posts steadily developed in the direction of greater flexibility and greater deployability, though the European drawdown naturally complicated that process. As the perceived threat to NATO's Central Region continued to diminish after 1989, so grew political demands to decrease the American commitment in Europe. The resulting drawdown left the Army with around 62,000 troops on the continent by 1994. Thus, the corps had to make do with ever fewer soldiers, a reduction that was driven not by a careful analysis of missions and the resources those missions required, but instead by politics and a public imperative to decrease the military budget. One correlative trend that resulted from the continuing

reductions was an increasing use of data automation. Another was a search for ever more sophisticated and swifter means of communications. In prospect was a technical means of obtaining a more efficient use of a smaller force.

As generations of headquarters commandants all over the Army have tirelessly pointed out, however, there was more to a command post than providing a place and means for the commander to exercise control of his units. Soldiers had to eat, sleep, and have a secure environment in which to work, and meeting those needs imposed an irreducible minimum administrative structure, equipment load, and "overhead" of supporting troops. More sophisticated equipment began to increase headquarters efficiency as the 1990s progressed, but also required more skilled operators and more logistical support. Consequently, the ability to decrease the size of a staff section by enhancing its communications and data automation often meant an undesirable increase in the logistical tail required to transport and maintain that hardware. The power requirements for command posts also grew in parallel with the fielding of new command and control systems, imposing additional equipment and troop demands.

Within that context, successive V Corps commanders saw the need to move beyond the Cold War parameters of the cataclysmic heavy force engagement that the General Defense Plan of Western Europe had envisioned. Instead, they would have to deploy command posts and elements of the major subordinate commands to satisfy the requirements of other and theretofore nontraditional missions outside of the European continent. In the decade after 1989 the V Corps staff thus laid what turned out to be constantly evolving plans to structure a command post (CP) to meet the needs that successive corps commanders articulated and the changing world and regional security situations demanded.

World War II

During World War II V Corps headquarters was both smaller and more agile than its counterpart at the end of the Cold War. Moving it had been a correspondingly smaller task. Corps command in 1944 and 1945 was exercised by a major general, with a brigadier general serving as corps artillery commander. The chief of staff and deputy chief of staff were colonels and there was no deputy commanding general. A headquarters company of around two hundred soldiers, including staff principals, was augmented by a military police platoon, a finance section, the 91st Quartermaster Car Platoon, the 26th Machine Records Unit (platoon-size), and the 16th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad. By the end of the war the corps operations staff amounted to only twenty-six soldiers, of which fourteen were officers. Other staff sections were of proportionate size. There was no equivalent to the Cold War-era corps support command, though the World War II corps had some analogues to the separate brigades that existed in 1989.

Throughout World War II army corps, however small the headquarters, normally controlled a large number of assigned units. They never controlled less than two divisions, and generally commanded three or more. Artillery was



"Acetate and grease pencil mentality"

assigned in proportion to the divisions, and although the V Corps Artillery normally consisted of three artillery groups and eleven field artillery battalions, it commanded more than thirty battalions during the Battle of the Bulge. Typically, the corps had a number of units habitually attached for offensive operations, facilitating attachment of specific types of combat power to the divisions. Those units were not necessarily stationed with the corps headquarters, nor did they normally move when or where the headquarters moved. In the case of V Corps, serving as part of First U.S. Army in northwestern Europe, the headquarters controlled some forty-four battalions, which included support units of various types as well as combat units that could both operate independently and be attached to the divisions for specific missions. In 1944–45 these supporting units

were as follows: 3d Tank Destroyer Group (5 battalions), 3d Armored Group (5 battalions), 102d Cavalry Group (Mechanized) (2 squadrons), 81st Chemical Battalion (Motorized), 97th Quartermaster Battalion (including 1 gasoline supply company, 1 graves registration company, 2 service companies, and 2 truck companies), 177th Ordnance Battalion (maintenance), 100th Ordnance Ammunition Battalion, 49th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (2 groups), 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (6 battalions), 207th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (7 battalions), 1121st Engineer Construction Group (3 battalions), 1171st Engineer Construction Group (3 battalions), V Corps Provisional Engineer Group (3 battalions), 56th Signal Battalion, 53d Medical Battalion (also 2 field hospitals), Air Force Liaison Squadron (including weather detachment), Finance and Postal units, and Band. This list grew or diminished according to tactical and operational requirements.¹

The World War II V Corps exercised command in the field through two headquarters: a corps main command post, known as "Victor Main," and a corps tactical command post, known as "Victor Forward." Victor Main carried out most of the administrative and logistical functions of the corps, although that generally amounted to the G-1 (personnel) and the G-4 (logistics) managing coordination with army and army group personnel and logistical organizations, rather than conducting those operations themselves. Victor Forward was a small and mobile tactical command post from which the commanding general, the chief of staff, the G-3 (operations), the G-2 (intelligence), and the corps artillery commander ran the battle. Only portions of each staff section moved with Victor Forward; the remaining elements worked from Victor Main. Displacement of the command posts was relatively quick and simple, given the small number of soldiers involved and the relatively unsophisticated communications networks that existed throughout the war. The principal means of communication with the divisions was tactical wire, augmented by radio. Communication with higher headquarters was more often by teleprinter than by radio, augmented by daily courier runs. Generally speaking, V Corps headquarters was very adept at the tasks subsumed under the present term Reconnaissance, Selection, and Occupation of Position, and the headquarters quartering party usually sought to find buildings in which to house the staff during the advance across France and into Germany.

From time to time V Corps set up smaller, ad hoc command posts for special purposes. Those command posts were almost invariably a result of the limitations inherent in the communications systems of the period or a consequence of the requirements of special tactical circumstances. The best example was the small element organized under command of the deputy chief of staff for plans, Col. Benjamin B. Talley, during the Normandy landings of 6 June 1944.² The V Corps assault on Omaha Beach was conducted by the 1st and 29th Infantry Division Teams, landing in column, with regimental combat teams abreast and battalion combat teams of the regiments in column. No one anticipated good communications between the assault troops and the divisions, with the consequence that the corps commander, Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, expected that

the information available to him on which to base decisions would be slender. Therefore, he organized a small command element to solve the problem. Talley commanded a group of about twenty officers and men with adequate and redundant radios to talk directly with Gerow.³

While Gerow remained afloat in the U.S.S. *Ancon*, his command ship, Colonel Talley and his party boarded amphibious trucks at six in the morning and followed the assault regiments of the reinforced 1st Infantry Division to Omaha Beach. Talley touched down at various points along the beach while the first and second waves landed and rendered continuous reports to Gerow on the progress of the fighting. The fact that the 1st Infantry Division's tactical communications failed, in large part, due to the immersion of the radios in salt water made Talley's work more important. It was his report made at 1046, local time, that convinced General Gerow that the landings could succeed, despite initial impressions that seemed to show that the Germans had repulsed the assault. "Things seem to be better," Talley reported to his commander, later remarking that he was otherwise careful to state only facts, and not opinions. At length, Talley reported to the corps that the beach condition permitted landing of wheeled and tracked vehicles. He then debarked with the remainder of his information detachment, as his element was known, and joined up with the V Corps Headquarters advance section when it established its CP at le Ruquet (Exit E-1, right in the center of the corps sector) at one o'clock in the afternoon of D-Day. However useful it was during the Normandy landings, such a command post element was the exception, rather than the rule, throughout World War II.⁴

Throughout the years after World War II, and particularly after V Corps returned to Germany in 1951, the size of the corps headquarters itself tended to grow. Stabilized at one mechanized infantry division, one armored division, and one armored cavalry regiment, the corps also activated supporting brigades of the various arms and services, culminating in the following organization that existed in 1998:⁵ 3d Corps Support Command (10 groups and battalions); V Corps Artillery, 41st Field Artillery Brigade (1 battalion); 11th Aviation Group (2 squadrons); 12th Aviation Brigade (2 battalions); 18th Military Police Brigade (2 battalions); 22d Signal Brigade (3 battalions); 30th Medical Brigade (9 battalions, hospitals, and detachments); 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (2 battalions); 130th Engineer Brigade (2 battalions and 1 battalion equivalent); and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (3 battalions). From 1952 through the mid-1980s, the organization and mission remained stable and focused on the general defense plan battle. Both began a process of dramatic change in 1989.

Evolution of Corps Organization

The one factor that most conditioned the organization of V Corps at the end of the Cold War and the composition of corps command posts in 1990 was the concept of the "capable corps." As articulated by General Crosbie Saint when he took over as commander-in-chief of the Army in Europe, the capable corps

envisioned huge areas of operations, long and fast marches, superior maneuver skills, meeting engagements, and massed firepower. In essence, the capable corps called for the two Europe-based corps to be able to fight other battles than those of the General War Plan on which they had been focused for forty years.⁶

When Lt. Gen. George Joulwan assumed command of V Corps on 7 August 1989, his watchword was a faithful echo of the Cold War mission. "The only reason this Corps exists," he exhorted his staff, "is to fight and win. Look east!"⁷ Still, while maintaining the standards of training and readiness to fight that battle, Joulwan implemented further training programs intended to prepare the corps to fight according to Saint's capable corps concept. By the time Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox took command on 9 November 1990, the international political situation had completely changed, prompting his deputy chief of staff, Col. Bill Alexander, to remark that "we have certainly lost out on the barbed wire and iron curtain piece of the action."⁸ Changes in corps training and operational philosophy, growing from the capable corps concept, soon overtook in importance preparation for battle according to the General Defense Plan.

As soon as he assumed command, Maddox began to think in terms of organizing the corps to fight some battle other than the one along the intra-German border, gradually bending exercises toward new scenarios and using fielding and capability exercises for new signal equipment such as the mobile subscriber equipment and the maneuver control system as a way to try out new operational concepts. That process also implied changes in the way the corps deployed its command posts. During the Cold War years the corps main command post had been located at various places in the corps sector: the Kransberg-Ziegelberg complex, centered on the old Kransberg Castle south of Butzbach; in other hard shelter areas such as old factories at various points in central Hessen; at Ray Barracks in Giessen; at a meat-packing center in Bad Kreuznach; at a hangar at a German Air Force base near Ingolstadt; at an old bus factory near Usingen; at a school near Kelkheim; and in a warehouse at the Giessen Army Depot. Occasionally, the main command post was entirely contained under canvas and in expando vans. The corps rear command post was also most often in hard, sheltered areas or in fest tents.⁹ Locations included the Fulda airfield in fest tents; a school in Fulda; the Wildflecken training area in fest tents; a warehouse near Hoechst; a warehouse near Wiesbaden on the Rhein River; and on Wiesbaden Air Base itself. Only once in recent memory was the corps main command post displaced in the course of an exercise, and that was during REFORGER 89. That was, according to participants, a painful experience that required a full twenty-four hours. As far as institutional memory could recall, the corps never attempted to displace the rear command post during any exercise.

Originally, the corps headquarters and headquarters company ran the command post, but by the decade of the 1990s that organization had been expanded into a provisional battalion because the job had become so much larger during the Cold War. Commanders of the V Corps Special Troops Battalion (STB) noted that the principal limitations at the main command post were always manpower

and electricity.¹⁰ The battalion never had enough drivers to displace the main CP in one march, and moving the command post required at least two marches and consequently became a more lengthy process than desired. The main command post was also, in the words of one former STB commander, "a power-hungry beast," using 2.2 megawatts of power during one major 1992 exercise. Complicating the problem, the demands for power varied. The main command post used 110/220 volt, 50 Hz power, while V Corps Artillery required 308/208 volt, 50 Hz power, and the military intelligence operation demanded 110/220 volt, 60 Hz. To meet the varied demands, as well as provide a back-up capability, the Special Troops Battalion resorted to renting commercial generators for each exercise. The generators actually supplied cleaner power, with fewer spikes, than commercial power. The complication was that the commercially supplied generators were maintained by civilian contractors, and the possibility of taking them along when deploying outside of Germany was questionable at best and raised a long-term issue. Use of nonmilitary personnel, particularly contractors, was a question that continued to be explored through the remainder of the decade. Practical as well as tactical considerations led to the decision to use commercial power. To provide the 300 kilowatts of power the command post needed required either one commercial generator or twenty Army 15-kW generators, equipment notorious for high fuel consumption. The many tactical generators created a lot of noise but, more significant, had a far larger thermal signature than one commercial generator. It was also noteworthy that tactical generators had to operate at 100 percent capacity to produce the required power, while the commercial generators provided the same power while operating at around 75 percent capacity, an important consideration given the tendency of the main command post to grow and for additional units to operate there, temporarily drawing power from the main's generators.¹¹

Personnel problems aside from a lack of vehicle drivers also characterized the operation of the main command post. The V Corps Special Troops Battalion was a provisional organization allocated nominal resources.¹² Among other things, the battalion had no authorization for an executive officer, an S-4 (supply officer), a property book officer, a personnel administration center in the S-1 (administration) section, or a sergeant major. Yet the entire corps headquarters had an authorization of 342 soldiers at that time, not counting the military police and military intelligence troops customarily attached for combat operations. Thus, merely manning and operating the corps main command post remained difficult for the battalion commander, and the possibility of having to deploy command elements to more than one mission at a time left open the question of where the soldiers would be found to do all the jobs that would be required.¹³

During the Cold War years the corps ran its rear command post more or less in accordance with the Army's doctrinal basis for such organizations, though with an eye toward how to use it in other missions as well. In conventional operations, the rear command post was located in the corps rear area, where reasonable security was available, and so situated that it could perform its extensive

major functions, the first of which was sustainment. The rear command post orchestrated the combat service support units that maintained and armed the divisions, handled all the required transportation within the sector, delivered fuel to forward units, and operated repair facilities. The corps rear was in charge of all lines of communication and main supply routes in the sector. All rear area combat operations were commanded from the rear, including base defense and protection of lines of communication. The corps rear also coordinated and monitored all G-5, civil-military, and host nation support activities.


The rear command post was, in short, responsible for all rear operations, while providing an alternate for the corps main command post. The rear monitored both close and deep operations to maintain "situational qualification" for the staff. To accomplish all of that, the organization was tailored to facilitate the flow of information and management of combat service support to the divisions and structured for round-the-clock operations. Additional functional areas could be added to the command post in special situations.

The corps commander normally designated the deputy corps commander as the rear operations commander, and the deputy CG used the corps rear headquarters to exercise those responsibilities, locating his command post near the corps support command. His command post included a rear area operations cell that handled local security and liaison cells to the 21st Theater Army Area Command, the 3d Corps Support Command, and other agencies. Operationally, the command post was divided into functional cells: a command post headquarters cell, an operations cell, and a combat service support cell.¹⁴

According to the corps manning documents, the officer who served as corps deputy chief of staff in garrison was in fact the chief of staff for the corps rear command post, while each of the major staff elements shown in *Chart 2* drew their personnel from the parent corps staff element. In some cases, such as the G-1, the principal staff officer was normally located in the corps rear. In others, such as the G-3, the principal staff officer was normally located in the corps main command post or even in the tactical or forward command post. Obviously designed for the conventional, high intensity battlefield, the corps rear command post was a very large headquarters. Despite that, when other types of missions had become common, the V Corps staff in 1996 still drew the conclusion that, while the rear was structured for conventional operations, it was still adaptable for contingency missions.¹⁵

The organization was not particularly flexible, though there were various attempts to use it for purposes other than commanding a high intensity battle. At one point, for example, corps leaders discussed the possibility of having the corps main command post assume command and control of the National Support Element for Operation JOINT FORGE in Tászár, Hungary, to be followed three months later by the corps rear command post.¹⁶ Considering both command posts, the staff concluded that the structure would have to be made significantly smaller, though they would have to maintain force protection levels; that external augmentation had to be minimized; that host nation support relationships would have to be maintained; and that the command posts would

CHART 2—DOCTRINAL CORPS REAR COMMAND POST STRUCTURE



have to be restructured to give them the ability to adapt their organization to changing circumstances. In other words, an "echeloned-down" staff would man the forward headquarters in Taszar with the flexibility to expand to meet surge requirements, while the full corps staff continued to operate in Germany and offer augmentation and other support as required.¹⁷

In practice, the V Corps rear command post was collocated with the headquarters of the 3d Corps Support Command and was run by that headquarters' special troops battalion. But the rear command post's immobility was a continuing concern to successive corps commanders, especially Generals Maddox and Rutherford. During one of the weekly Ops-Intel briefings in early 1990, Maddox openly worried about how to save the assets located in the corps rear command post in the event of an attack across the intra-German border that required V Corps to fall back toward the Rhine. Rutherford, relieved of those concerns after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, still pondered the survivability of the rear command post in mobile or contingency operations, later referring to the rear as a "lucrative target."¹⁸ By 1993 the corps rear, exclusive of the 3d Corps Support Command, usually numbered around 150 to 200 soldiers when operating. The support command contingent more than doubled the size of the command post.

Physical security of the command posts was another difficult issue, because neither the V Corps Special Troops Battalion nor the 3d Corps Support Command Special Troops Battalion had enough soldiers to fulfill all of the requirements. Units of the 7th Army Reserve Command, with headquarters in Schwetzingen, near Heidelberg, filled that gap during wartime operations by organizing security companies for that purpose. The 280th Rear Area Support Command, a security unit organized along infantry lines, habitually deployed with the corps headquarters to handle force protection operations for the corps rear command post. The 317th Rear Area Support Command did the same, normally for the 3d Corps Support Command. Likewise, the 309th Rear Area Support Command normally deployed with the 16th Corps Support Group; the 345th Rear Area Support Command normally deployed with the 7th Corps Support Group; and the 316th Rear Area Support Command, which had no habitual relationship, usually deployed to support a corps support group from the Army Reserve, when one was assigned to the 3d Corps Support Command.¹⁹ Those soldiers naturally added to the housekeeping and life support requirements of the headquarters elements they protected.

A consequence of the corps commanders' concerns about the rear command post was that successive deputy chiefs of staff began to investigate the possibility of making the rear either smaller, or more mobile, or both. That effort was spurred on by the development of the concept of the advanced support echelon (ASE).²⁰ In such a scheme, both the main and rear command posts needed to be able to displace forward behind the advance. The advanced support echelon concept called for the corps deputy commanding general to supervise that advance, which naturally left the rear command post without its senior officer, an issue that the corps never satisfactorily resolved before progressing beyond



The "lucrative target": the V Corps rear command post

the ASE concept.²¹ Once the corps began to receive contingency missions and to think in terms of out of sector operations, considerations of how to get the corps to the place where it would have to fight, and how to emplace the command posts to run such fights, received additional stress.²²

The corps enjoyed little success, however, either in enhancing the mobility of the rear command post or in decreasing its size.²³ One consequence of the European drawdown was a deliberate effort to turn in vehicles that were excess to authorization documents, as well as to bring about decreases to those same authorizations as the overall size of the corps decreased. At the same time, headquarters strength decreased, reflecting the decrease in overall manning levels after the end of the Cold War. Already lacking enough soldiers to operate and displace corps command posts during the days of peak manning, the corps' capability to do both things did not improve during the precipitous decrease in European troop levels between 1992 and 1995.²⁴

Maddox and the "Four Horsemen"

Upon assuming corps command in 1990, General Maddox preferred to run the corps fight from as far forward as possible and generally split his time between a forward, mobile command post, which came to be known as the

"command operating element," and the corps tactical command post. Maddox's view was that the tactical command post ran the current, close battle, while the main command post monitored all corps operations and planned for operations seventy-two to ninety-six hours ahead. The very mobile command operating element did not duplicate or replace any of those functions, but served as a platform from which Maddox could receive information and issue instructions.²⁵ His style of command emerged from a series of command post developments and from his concept of placing experts in each battlefield operating system at each of the several corps command posts.

Maddox entertained a deep interest in the organization and operation of command posts. Early in his command he tested the Army's Standardized, Integrated Command Post System (SICPS) in the 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry.²⁶ That concept aimed at standardizing the command post structure and equipment of combat battalions, which at that time varied widely, and particularly as they existed in various theaters. He drew the conclusion that, while a good concept, SICPS needed more modern equipment to function efficiently. The old 4.2-kW generator, for example, didn't produce enough power to run the computer-driven maneuver control system and other new equipment. Maddox continued to work on the organization of maneuver battalion command posts, though he did not pursue the problem of how to organize combat support or combat service support command posts. In general, he believed that the corps tactical command post ought to be identical in appearance, function, and equipment to a division main command post, while the division tactical command post ought to be identical to a brigade main command post. He wanted to make certain that a stair-stepping of command posts existed so that the transition from one level of command to another by staff personnel would be easy to accomplish.²⁷

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Functional Command Post study of 1991 identified the functions a corps needed to accomplish, and at what level of detail, in each of its command posts and in the division and brigade command posts.²⁸ Maddox took the process one step further during his evaluation of SICPS, identifying not just the functions, but also exactly what equipment was to be used and how it was to be arranged within all command posts. Further to develop the enormous, and obvious, advantages of such a concept, Maddox directed his staff to work out in detail the duties and job descriptions of every member of command post staffs, so that they would be the same from battalion to battalion. By the time the corps staff had implemented Maddox's instructions, V Corps had not just standardized command post functions, but also had a standardized command post layout.²⁹

Despite Maddox's focus on maneuver units, the divisions carried the standardization process still further, occasionally in the face of rooted objections from their staffs. Brig. Gen. Larry Lust, commander of 3d Corps Support Command, remarked that he had been obliged to apply the standardized command post concept to his tactical operations center when he was commanding the 3d Infantry Division Support Command. He recalled that his reaction at the time was "I can't believe we have to do this." After the first command post exercise,

and after having experienced the much improved staff efficiency and coordination that attended the reorganization, Lust had a different reaction: "I can't believe we haven't done this before."³⁰

Maddox concluded that some new equipment was needed to enable him to command the corps as effectively as he wished, and that conclusion led to the development of the corps operations element, at first known as the corps command group vehicle. When Maddox briefed the USAREUR commander, General Crosbie Saint, on the outcome of the functional command post test in January 1991, he outlined the requirement for the additional mobile command post. Doubtless seeing in the idea a way to enhance his concept of the capable corps, Saint readily agreed. Future Battle Labs at Fort Leavenworth, asked to produce a suitable piece of equipment, estimated ten months' production lead time. Maddox, predictably, rejected such delays and decided to build an in-house version from equipment already belonging to the corps. Considering the amount of money that was to be put into the effort, he thought it might be better to test the concept quickly and use the corps-constructed vehicle as a prototype for the contractor-produced version.³¹

The concept naturally became better articulated in the process of deciding what equipment would be needed and how it should be arranged in the vehicle. Originally conceived as a vehicle from which the corps commander could issue orders, other functions began to emerge. It could also house small planning sessions involving division commanders, the cavalry regiment commander, and commanders of other major subordinate units or become the corps commander's principal means of visiting subordinate headquarters forward of the corps main command post. Sensitive to the disruption that could be caused in subordinate tactical operations centers by the arrival of the corps commander, or by using that unit's tactical operations center as a venue for the corps commander and his subordinate commanders to discuss the current battle, Maddox sought alternatives. Bringing those commanders back to the corps main command post for discussions or briefings was equally undesirable, particularly in a fast-evolving tactical situation. Using the corps command group vehicle, the corps commander could instead go to them. The communications equipment in the truck-mounted command post enabled him not to burden the division main command post with his signal requirements and to stay in touch with the corps tactical and corps main command posts.

Maddox considered that the new mobile command post would also be an excellent place to hold briefings. Anticipating the requirement for rapid regional response operations, where the corps might have to put an air-transportable command post in a crisis area very quickly, he believed that his mobile command post could solve many of the deployability problems that might arise. Finally, he thought that the vehicle would be useful in a multinational corps setting as a place to meet with German and other national staffs to coordinate operational and tactical issues with an adjacent corps of a different nationality.³²

Another unique characteristic of V Corps command post organization under Maddox was the "Deep Division," a concept that evolved between June and

August 1991. The deep division, led by the commanding general of V Corps Artillery, encompassed all operations in the area from the division fire support coordination line, notionally about thirty kilometers in front of the corps' lead elements, out to the theater-established Reconnaissance and Interdiction Phase Line. In all, the area of operations encompassed a box on the map the width of the corps area and from forty to seventy kilometers deep. The V Corps Artillery commander managed the deep battle within that area, coordinating the fires of the artillery, army aviation, and U.S. Air Force tactical air support.³³

As V Corps went through its Battle Command Training Program evaluations in 1991, it became clear that the command post concepts used in Germany were unique in the Army. The V Corps main command post was significantly different from the main command post as configured in XVIII Airborne Corps, I Corps, and III Corps back in the United States. None of the other corps headquarters, furthermore, had a mobile command post resembling the corps command group vehicle. One consequence was that the corps commander's mobile command post as used in V Corps became institutionalized in Army doctrinal publications as the Command Operations Element (COE). A new field manual on corps operations defined the COE not in terms of a specific piece of equipment, but in terms of functions best expressed by Maddox's concept of the "Four Horsemen."³⁴

Maddox preferred to manage the battle in terms of battlefield operating systems, rather than in terms of traditional "G" functional staff responsibilities. Dividing the responsibilities among members of the corps principal staff, Maddox selected the G-3 to serve as the maneuver horseman, the G-2 for the intelligence horseman, the V Corps Artillery commander to be the fire support horseman, and the commander of the 3d Corps Support Command as the logistics horseman. Those staff officers and commanders, among them, controlled the seven battlefield operating systems and interacted with each other and with the corps commander to direct operations.

When the corps commander was in the corps main command post and all four horsemen were there, they could together do whatever needed to be done to manage the battle. Maddox recognized, however, that he was often not in the main CP, and that it was also extremely rare for all four of the officers designated as horsemen to be there at the same time. Some, in fact, were rarely there at all. Therefore, he concluded that each horseman needed a hand-selected representative to look after those functional responsibilities in the absence of the principal. In fact, three sets of second-tier horsemen were needed: one in the CG's mobile command post and a day shift and a night shift team for the corps main command post.

In the mobile command post, the command operating element, Maddox used his "Law Firm" as the representatives of his four horsemen. The so-called "Law Firm," a special staff group of majors who were graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies,³⁵ had originally worked in the corps main command post, and thus replacements for them had to be found. In any case, the "Law Firm" was not an authorized part of the corps staff, but an ad hoc grouping that

the corps commander also used in garrison to work out close-hold issues such as the European drawdown of forces. Detailing them from the staff sections left gaps in the general staff that could not be filled under the officer distribution plan current at the time. Complicating the problem was the fact that the two teams of second-tier horsemen needed on a 24-hour basis in the corps main CP had also to be drawn from the staff and necessarily were the best staff officers available.

Exceptional qualifications were essential for officers detailed as horsemen, because they had to know everything about the status of their respective functions and be able to provide direct information to the corps commander or chief of staff about those functions, make sound recommendations for decisions, and then implement those decisions, directing instructions to the appropriate staff and commanders for execution. Maddox saw the horsemen as the nerve cell of the command post, where all of the functions and operating systems came together. The knowledge base required of the four second-tier horsemen was extensive, necessitating the use of his "first team" of younger officers. They needed continually to be war gaming the various crisis possibilities and making certain that the G-2, G-3, deep battle cell, and corps rear command post were working on the proper time lines to make possible the execution of a decision when it was ordered.

In essence, the concept of the Four Horsemen was yet another way to enhance communications within the staff so that the corps commander could be properly informed, regardless of whether the staff principal was available or not, and so that the right members of the staff and proper commanders would receive direction and orders when they needed them. Since the close battle was, in Maddox's view, the responsibility of the corps tactical command post, the horsemen dealing with close battle issues in the corps main command post would be talking principally to the tactical command post or the G-3 operations cell, not to units. The intelligence function, principally managed from the main command post anyway, would normally remain under the direct control of the intelligence horseman, rather than his surrogate, since the G-2 was most often in the main command post. Similarly, the corps support command (COSCOM) commander was stationed at the rear command post, where all combat service support horseman functions were supervised. The fire support horseman, the V Corps Artillery commander, remained in the deep battle cell and had to rely on his second-tier horseman for up-to-date information from the main command post. Simply, Maddox saw the concept as a way to synchronize the corps battle and keep the corps main command post occupied with its proper task of synchronizing the deep and rear battles, while planning for future operations.

Practically speaking, the second-tier horsemen worked together under the direction of the corps chief of staff in a synchronization cell in the corps main command post. The principal tool the cell used was the synchronization matrix, a carefully thought-out time line that showed the actions of the various battlefield operating systems with respect to the mission. Maddox did

not believe that any operations plan was complete without a synchronization matrix, which the staff developed during the process of war gaming the forthcoming fight. He did not consider that the time lines would ever be absolutely right, but believed the synchronization matrix would have considered the important contingencies and developed the sequence of events necessary to handle them. The synchronization matrix was an important aid for the chief of staff and second-tier horsemen in understanding the corps commander's intent and enabled them to make appropriate decisions in his absence.

Two things bedeviled Maddox's concept of the Four Horsemen. The first was that there were not enough highly qualified field grade officers assigned to the corps to make the concept work properly. The second was adequate communication among the Four Horsemen. If Maddox and his four principal horsemen could have communicated directly, some of those unfillable personnel requirements would have vanished. The only way to do that at the time, however, was by using telephones. "I am not opposed to conference telephone calls," he said, "but I haven't seen them work yet, under stress, at a time of crisis." That was a technical issue that the corps would not resolve for a number of years, until reliable videoconferencing equipment became available.³⁶

Dragon Hammer

Shortly after Maddox relinquished command to General Rutherford, the corps had an opportunity to test some of its new command post concepts. In the early spring of 1992 USAREUR determined that V Corps would provide the opposing force for a NATO exercise to be known as Dragon Hammer '92, scheduled to be held in Sardinia in the course of the summer. The opposing force headquarters was a joint task force, with Rutherford in command. The V Corps had to organize and field the headquarters and then organize the Army component of that task force, deploy it, and command it during Dragon Hammer. The Army component consisted of a brigade headquarters, a battalion headquarters with several line companies, and an appropriate combat service support slice. Not all of those elements came from V Corps, but the corps participation was nonetheless substantial.

The background to Dragon Hammer reached back to October 1990, when USAREUR directed V Corps to provide, on order, the personnel and equipment for a United States joint task force headquarters.³⁷ In August 1992 USAREUR further directed the corps to be prepared to provide the commander for a United States joint task force and the commander and staff for a United States Army Force operating under joint task force control.³⁸ As first response, V Corps began to develop a forward command post to serve as the initial element of an Army-led joint task force. The process of developing General Maddox's command operating element played a part, but the requirement to command other than Army forces and incorporate other services into the staff made the corps forward command post a larger and more complex organization of which the command operating element formed a useful part.


The forward command post developed between 1990 and 1993 was intended for contingency operations that required deployment outside of NATO's Central Region. The command post was initially to be the advance element that could pull the rest of the corps into a theater and could serve either as part of a joint task force or as the corps headquarters. It was structured to have a planning capability and a limited capability to conduct combat operations. To put all of that together, the corps used a building block approach, with the initial elements being deployable by means of C-130 aircraft. The corps developed a battle roster for the command post to ensure quick mobilization and packaged sufficient supplies and equipment for independent operations for up to fourteen days. When serving as an advance party, the forward command post deployed by air in advance of the joint task force headquarters, where the corps was to serve as the heart of the joint task force. (*Chart 3*) When used as an assault command post, the forward command post was to command all arriving forces until the V Corps tactical and main command posts arrived. (*Chart 4*) In both cases, the forward command post was supported by a rear command post that did not deploy.³⁹

In either capacity, the forward command post "pulled" the rest of the joint task force or the corps headquarters into the theater of operations. Upon arrival, the staff set up command and control linkages and conducted reconnaissance for other needed command and control sites. The corps political advisor became a key player during that process, establishing the initial liaison with the host nation and working with the U.S. Embassy country team. The command post began by supervising port opening operations and airfield operations, as needed, and then controlled the deployment and handled the reception of follow-on forces. The staff was sufficiently large to deal with any contracting with local authorities that was necessary and had a legal team to help establish a status of forces agreement and set appropriate rules of engagement. The plans staff was relatively large, giving the command post an excellent planning capability, but it had only a limited ability to command combat operations.

Conceptually, the forward command post arrived in the theater of operations at D+3 when deploying as a joint task force headquarters, with the intention of accepting a joint task force forward headquarters on D+8 and a joint task force main headquarters on D+20. When deploying as a corps "assault command post," the forward command post arrived in theater on D+5 and accepted the arrival of the corps main command post on D+14. At that point, the forward command post would temporarily act as the corps tactical command post. On D+30 the corps tactical and rear command posts would arrive in theater, and the forward command post would be reabsorbed into the corps command post organization.


The forward command post was small to fulfill either function, 117 soldiers when designated a joint task force headquarters and 120 soldiers when used as a corps assault command post. The equipment list, with the exception of the radios, tactical satellite equipment, and other communications gear, was similarly small. Ten military policemen with three light tactical trucks provided

CHART 3—V CORPS FORWARD COMMAND POST EMPLOYED AS A JOINT TASK FORCE, 1995



Note: This command post consisted of 78 staff personnel and 39 support personnel, totaling 117 people.

CHART 4—V Corps Forward Command Post Employed as a Corps Assault Command Post



Note: This command post consisted of 84 staff personnel and 36 support personnel, totaling 120 people.

local security, while eleven other soldiers provided billeting, food, and administrative support using two five-ton trucks, a fuel pod, and a water trailer. Living quarters consisted of five tents, and the staff needed only six general purpose medium tents from which to operate. The total airlift liability was eleven C-130 loads, which could be reduced to seven loads if the theater could already provide basic amenities and physical security for the command post. Aside from the intended test in Exercise Dragon Hammer in Sardinia, the corps planned to update the forward command post battle rosters quarterly, to set up the command post twice a year to check equipment and keep soldiers trained, and to exercise the concept annually.

During Exercise Dragon Hammer '92 the corps took a hard look at the problems involved in deploying the corps outside of Germany, as well as the difficulty in erecting the framework of a joint task force headquarters. Rutherford seized the opportunity presented by his opposing force mission to practice the kinds of deployment that he believed would characterize V Corps operations in the future. The Sardinia site obviously meant a long-distance deployment, port and arrival airfield operations, creation of a logistical sustainment base, and delivery of logistical support from the corps rear, but it was also, in the operational jargon of 1994, an "asymmetrical mission" in terms of the forces committed. That is, the joint task force commanded both heavy mechanized and light infantry forces, the mix determined by the terrain on which the opposing force had to operate. Among the key problems that surfaced was the question of how much of the "first team," the staff principals and the hard core of the plans and battle staffs, could be deployed on an operation that did not involve the entire corps without diminishing the capability of the remainder of V Corps to take on other missions at the same time.⁴⁰

Atlantic Resolve

More relevant still was Exercise Atlantic Resolve '94 in October and November 1994. Exercise Atlantic Resolve was the successor to the REFORGER series and focused attention on regional operations, whereas REFORGER had focused on battle in NATO's Central Region. By May 1993 practical experience had begun to allow the headquarters to isolate the problems involved in command and control of out of sector missions. The next step was to have been REFORGER '93, an exercise that was canceled because of other commitments. REFORGER '93 was to have been the first time that V Corps would have operated as a multinational headquarters, since the Bundeswehr's 5. Panzerdivision was going to participate under V Corps operational control.

For Atlantic Resolve '94, V Corps created a joint task force headquarters involving other armed services and multinational forces and a land component command headquarters that commanded foreign military forces as well as U.S. Army units. To do all that, Rutherford had a staff of forty drawn from his own headquarters, as well as appropriate personnel from the other services. The process began in April 1994, when the V Corps staff went to Stuttgart

for a planning exercise intended to produce the orders to create a joint task force headquarters and pound out a concept plan for Exercise Atlantic Resolve. Exercise 48 Hours, as European Command called it, produced a joint, U.S.-only operations plan and the troop list that were later used in Atlantic Resolve. As planning progressed, it became clear that Rutherford could not be both joint task force commander and land component commander, so he delegated the latter task to the corps deputy commanding general.

Exercise Atlantic Resolve '94 taught the corps staff how to configure staff and command posts to run joint and combined operations, thereby validating the doctrine expressed in Field Manual 100-15 that assigned creation of a joint task force headquarters as a corps mission essential task. The forward command post could, the battle staff discovered, be both planner and executor of missions, largely because the corps general staff structure could easily be turned into a J-staff organization. The key, one of the G-4 planners concluded, was "to use a headquarters like this as a base, so that you don't have a lot of strangers coming together and trying to invent processes and procedures."⁴¹

By the time deteriorating conditions in Yugoslavia made American involvement there a possibility, the corps staff had a reasonable idea of how it would structure command posts for a variety of possible operations in the Balkans, or indeed elsewhere in the United States European Command area of responsibility. Recent exercises had suggested plausible techniques for turning the corps staff into a joint headquarters staff, as well as providing some experience in working with the other services and learning their staff techniques. The next matter was to deal with the problem of organizing and deploying such a command post quickly.

From the Forward CP to the "Tac Plus"

In 1992 V Corps was still what its special troops battalion commander, Lt. Col. Gary Heuser, called "administratively immature" for regional operations. Throughout that year Heuser tried to assemble a set of equipment for a regional command post; convince the staff sections to assign specific soldiers to the mission, thereby creating a battle roster; and then move the equipment out of the battalion motor pool and into a war reserve storage site. Limitations on the quantity of equipment the corps was permitted to own made that an impossibility, however, and other solutions to the problem had to be explored.⁴²

Having tested the idea of using the corps command post as the basis for a joint headquarters in recent exercises, the staff reflected on both the accumulated experience of the preceding three years and the decisive political changes that made it all but certain that the future corps mission lay in joint or combined deployments out of NATO's Central Region. The battle staff in 1993 thus proposed restructuring the corps tactical command post to accommodate the changed situation, thus creating yet another command post struc-

ture. The resulting "Tac Plus" command post concept sought to combine rapid deployability and limited self-sustainability with the ability to provide a sturdy and flexible command structure for joint task forces.

The mission for the Tac Plus command post was to deploy a corps command and control element that could serve as a combined joint task force headquarters somewhere other than NATO's Central Region and that was capable of controlling one division and elements of V Corps brigades in mid-intensity or low-intensity warfare. The first thought had been to use the command operations element that General Maddox had devised, augmented by security forces and additional communications, but the G-3 planners who had worked with the commander's mobile command post immediately recognized that it would be far too small for the mission that the corps commander envisioned. Nonetheless, the vehicles used in the command operating element were obvious candidates to become part of the Tac Plus command post because they incorporated much of the required command, control, and communications equipment in a highly mobile package.

Unfortunately, simply deploying the corps tactical command post was also not an adequate answer to the problem. In addition, the existing corps tactical command post was too small and too light to replicate the functions of the main command post. Furthermore, it was not logistically sustainable for more than brief periods of time. Critically, the tactical command post had insufficient staff to manage all the battlefield operating systems adequately for the size force expected to fall under command of the Tac Plus. Using the corps main command post was also out of the question. While the main command post had full battle staff representation and could therefore manage all of the battlefield operating systems adequately, and while it was logistically sustainable for long periods of time, the main CP was unfortunately also too big. It required too many aircraft for deployment and was not *rapidly* deployable in any case. Planners therefore were driven to a compromise solution.

By October 1993 the staff had developed the concept of the Tac Plus command post and made it available as an alternative for deployment. Basically an augmented corps tactical command post, it was heavier than the tactical command post, able to conduct the full range of corps operations in anything up to a mid-intensity conflict, but much lighter than the corps main command post. It could be rapidly deployed from Germany by air, sealift, or rail. Its staff was large enough to manage all of the battlefield operating systems, and the structure allowed enough equipment and supplies to be self-sustainable for 120 days. Initial planning envisioned a division (minus) deploying on C-Day,⁴³ with the Tac Plus beginning its move on C+3 and fully operational with all of its augmentations not later than C+60. Between C+60 and C+120 the corps main command post could, if required, be sent to take over the mission, along with additional deployments of corps troops and maneuver units. The entire concept involved a building block approach that deployed successive elements of corps command posts as required over time, providing the added capabilities in the interval during which the preceding command post element retained the ability to sustain itself and manage the battle.

Under the new concept, the tactical command post was the first echelon of deployment. Consisting of 16 wheeled vehicles, 4 tracked vehicles, 18 trailers, and 53 troops, the tactical command post could be airlifted quickly and with few aircraft. The intended flow into combat operations began with two command vehicles, the fire support element, and a G-3 M557 vehicle. The next priority was the engineer element (also an M557), the air liaison element, and one vehicle each from the G-2 and G-3. The third lift comprised the G-2 M557, an engineer vehicle, and one vehicle each from the G-2 and G-3. The fourth lift was the fire support element M557, the air liaison element vehicle, the fire support element vehicle, and a G-6 vehicle. The last would be two five-ton trucks carrying G-3 equipment, the aviation element vehicle, and the air defense element vehicle.

The "Plus" part of the command post began deployment immediately after the tactical command post departed and comprised an aviation platoon, consisting of three helicopters and associated equipment; a military police platoon, a signal platoon, required elements of the special troops battalion, the G-1, the adjutant general, the chemical section, and G-4 elements; remaining G-6 and fire support element vehicles; one vehicle each for the public affairs officer, the provost marshal, the surgeon, and the chaplain; and the corps command vehicle. The total Tac Plus command post consisted of 252 soldiers. (*Table 2*) Once deployed, the staff envisioned a standard layout that separated the corps tactical command post and the Tac Plus supplement. The tactical command post was an integral part of the Tac Plus design but retained the ability to operate independently, if required. The Tac Plus supplement maintained a separate enclosure for the secure, compartmented, information facility belonging to the G-2 and added multiple means of communication, including multichannel tactical satellite devices, mobile subscriber equipment, AM and FM radios, and secure telephone.⁴⁴

Part of the urgency to develop the Tac Plus command post concept came from the fact that V Corps in late 1993 began moving its headquarters from the I. G. Farben Building in Frankfurt am Main to Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg.⁴⁵ During the process much of the staff was regularly commuting from Heidelberg to Frankfurt or from Frankfurt to Heidelberg, with the headquarters split between the two cities for almost a year. The corps commander needed to have a readily deployable command post, fully battle-rostered, while the corps headquarters was disrupted by the move. Later, the Tac Plus command post concept made it very easy for the corps to respond to U.S. European Command when that headquarters in 1994 asked each of the service components in Europe to provide an outline of a joint task force headquarters organization for a forthcoming directive.⁴⁶

Reorganizing the Corps Rear

While the corps commander focused on the forward command post, Maj. Gen. Henry Kievenaar (V Corps deputy commanding general), Col. Dan Ferrezan (corps deputy chief of staff and chief of staff, corps rear),⁴⁷ and Brig. Gen. Charles Cannon (commanding general of 3d Corps Support Command) inves-

TABLE 2—THE TACTICAL PLUS COMMAND POST

<i>Section</i>	<i>Tac</i>	<i>Plus</i>	<i>Total</i>
Command Gp	6	2	8
Command Opns Element	0	7	7
G-1	0	4	4
G-2	8	11	19
G-3	15	8	23
G-4	0	14	14
G-5	0	4	4
G-6	4	4	8
Air Defense Element	2	2	4
Adjutant General (5th Personnel Gp)	0	6	6
Air Liaison	4	0	4
Aviation	2	2	4
Aviation Support Platoon (12th Aviation Bde)	0	18	18
Chaplain	0	2	2
Chemical	2	2	4
Engr	4	4	8
Fire Support Element (V Corps Arty)	6	23	29
Inspector General	0	2	2
MP Support Element (18th MP Bde)	0	30	30
Provost Marshal	0	4	4
Public Affairs	0	4	4
Safety	0	2	2
Signal Support Element (22d Signal Bde)	0	14	14
Staff Judge Advocate	0	2	2
Special Troops Bn	0	15	15
Special Opns Coordinator	0	9	9
Surgeon	0	4	4
Totals	53	199	252

tigated ways to make the corps rear function more efficiently. Corps tactical command posts were already organized in tactical units according to the Standard, Integrated Command Post System model, but that tactical model was not appropriate for support organizations such as the corps rear command post. Seeking to reduce manpower requirements and the amount of sequential paper passing that went on in the rear command post, V Corps experimented with collocating corps staff and corps support command (COSCOM) staff elements that had a common function.⁴⁸ But the proposed collocation of corps and COSCOM staffs produced no real personnel savings, in view of the fact that COSCOM was authorized a peacetime staffing of around half of its required personnel and therefore had difficulty meeting its staffing requirements. Remaining staff positions had been allocated to the Army Reserve in an attempt to decrease manning levels in Europe and to decrease costs. In an emergency, Department of the Army had the authority to order the reserve augmentation of the corps support command, stationed in the mid-west, to active duty.⁴⁹ By



The I. G. Farben Building, later renamed the C. W. Abrams Building

the time the headquarters had evaluated the accumulated experience of five years of deployments to the Balkans, it was clear that the corps rear command post needed to be reduced in size and, more important, to have much reduced transportation requirements to suit it to the short-notice, distant missions that were becoming common for the corps. Revisiting the issues considered in 1994, the corps began a restructuring of the rear command post to make it lighter and more easily deployable, putting it into tents around which the customary separate brigade command posts could be satellited.

In 1999 Brig. Gen. Lloyd Waterman, commanding 3d Corps Support Command, observed that the corps rear command post had always been run by what he characterized as “a pick-up team” composed of soldiers from the COSCOM, the corps headquarters, the supporting reserve units in Germany, and the COSCOM’s reserve augmentation from the United States. Those bits and pieces did not habitually train or operate together to provide a stronger rear command post operation, a permanent staff needed to be drawn from the corps main command post and the support command and needed to train together on a regular basis. His model was the rear command post of a division, where the assistant division commander charged with handling support located a por-

tion of the division rear command post with the division support command headquarters, an idea that had proved successful. With some resulting redundancy, personnel economies could be realized by, for example, collocating the materiel management center and the movement control battalion.

In Waterman's view, the corps support command and the corps rear command post should remain collocated but not integrated, operating from expando vans or tents. In its current configuration, the command post, with the materiel management center and movement control center incorporated into it, operated from 130 tents. Waterman characterized the corps rear as moveable, with difficulty, but not mobile. Within the organization, however, he had rehearsed and equipped his own "jump" command post cell of about fifty soldiers, under the deputy commander of the corps support command, which could move quickly—within two or three hours—and become operational. It still made use of expando vans, however, and was therefore not deployable in C-130 aircraft.⁵⁰

Further refinement of the concept ensued while Lt. Gen. James C. Riley commanded V Corps⁵¹ and Brig. Gen. Robert T. Dail commanded the 3d Corps Support Command. Dail proceeded from Waterman's jump command post to a rear assault command post to supplement the corps assault command post. Dail's version was very lean—twenty-four soldiers, seven light tactical trucks, and appropriate tents and equipment, all capable of being carried by one C-17 aircraft. He assumed that the entire command post of his organization would not be deployed except in a major theater of war, and perhaps not then, and thus sought only to provide the COSCOM's core competencies, sustainment and movement control, to the corps assault command post. The 3d Corps Support Command tried the new concept during Exercise Victory Strike II in Poland in October 2001 and found various ways to improve the organization and functioning of what became, in effect, the first slice of a corps rear command post deployment. The new COSCOM assault command post offered an incremental approach to deployment and the ability to stop with the very least footprint and while maintaining the ability to call for additional support from their home stations in Germany.

Proceeding from that concept, both the corps support command commander and the deputy corps commander investigated ways to integrate the corps rear command post with the COSCOM assault command post by adding additional functions as required by the mission. According to the initial concept, the corps deputy commander looked after such issues as force protection, general rear area security, and terrain management—allocating real estate to the various units under corps command—while the commander of the corps support command concerned himself with sustainment and movement control. The size of such an integrated corps rear command post would depend upon mission requirements and constraints, and the integrated CP would be able to handle such things as RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration of personnel),⁵² initial planning, redeployment planning, redeployment command and control, and the classic rear command post functions.⁵³

Obviously a good idea, integration of the rear command post was planned to be accomplished by the time of, or just after, the next Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercise. By late 1999, however, General Riley decided to go ahead immediately with an integration of the corps rear command post and the corps support command assault command post, closely following the ideas the two staffs had elaborated over the preceding several years. The two command posts collocated staff elements by cell, the better to pool essential expertise, while recognizing that some functions of the two headquarters needed to remain separate. The physical layout was smaller and much more mobile, though it involved fewer vehicles. The corps had already made the rear command post smaller and lighter by eliminating a number of vans, including sleeper vans. Placing the command post in modular, SICPS-based tents continued the process and helped make the command post more deployable. Keeping up with the reduced structure of the corps strike command post, the corps support command was now prepared to deploy a modular rear command post that could become a logistical base, using no more than seventy soldiers, some thirty-two from the corps rear and the remainder from the 3d Corps Support Command.⁵⁴

The Application of New Technology

By the middle of 1995 the corps had access to new technology that made it possible to realize General Maddox's concept of the Four Horsemen, but within the personnel constraints imposed on the post-Cold War army. As early as 1992 the corps had experimented with using a telefax system capable of transmitting map overlays, an important adjunct to the maneuver control system fielded in 1990 and 1991. A second innovation that vastly speeded the processing of staff actions in dispersed command posts was the installation of video teleconferencing (VTC) equipment. At first cumbersome and plagued with "bugs" that had to be worked out, VTC soon became an indispensable tool that the corps commander and his staff used to great effect both in exercises and later in actual operations.

Teleconferencing allowed all of the command post staffs to be a party to ongoing discussions in the main command post and to begin staff actions or begin to answer questions before being formally asked. The first generation VTC equipment was not very mobile, but it clearly demonstrated that, once the staff became accustomed to it, VTC could yield a vast increase in efficiency. The first hurdle to overcome was the emotional self-consciousness of the video environment. Early staff coordination using the device tended to be extremely stilted. Such reticence disappeared after the staffs used VTC for a while and the various corps command posts became thoroughly accustomed to the fact that their discussions were being broadcast over the network.

Of more consequence was a tendency in the command posts to allow everything to be reduced to oral decision-making. Action officers had already complained of the corps' tendency to "do staff work by PowerPoint slide," without

generating the associated staff studies to back up the data, the resulting decision papers to record the courses of action chosen, and the action memoranda to assign responsibilities. That process only accelerated with the advent of video-conferencing, and the staff experienced problems, particularly when the pace of actual operations quickened, in recovering the rationale for decisions or the alternative courses of action considered and discarded. Even with those limitations, however, VTC proved to be the most important single tool in enabling the various corps command posts to work smoothly and efficiently together.⁵⁵

Corps Command Posts for Joint and Combined Operations

As actual deployments showed, the corps would itself rarely command deployed troops, but instead it habitually acted as a "force provider," a task previously more characteristic of a major command or a field army. Conventional wisdom held that future corps operations would have more in common with limited, battalion-size deployments than with the long-defunct General Defense Plan, and no one in V Corps saw any reason to dispute that surmise. According to that view, the corps headquarters was in the future unlikely to command its own divisions in any traditional way, but was quite likely to dispatch task forces for operations elsewhere, perhaps under the command of an ad hoc headquarters constituted out of V Corps assets, and most likely as a joint task force headquarters.

Formation of a joint task force thus became a corps mission essential task, as exercised in Dragon Hammer '92 and Atlantic Resolve '94.⁵⁶ The joint task force organization that V Corps evolved during those exercises had already been incorporated as an annex in the relevant European Command directives, along with similar joint task force organizations from the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Forces in Europe, so that European Command could call on any service to create a task force headquarters when required. Presumably, European Command would select the V Corps joint task force when the mission would be predominately a land operation.⁵⁷ The corps staff organization offered exceptional capabilities for detailed and accurate operational planning, logistics planning, and personnel planning. In fact, the corps was better suited than USAREUR for the purpose, as Lt. Col. Dan Sulka, the V Corps G-4 plans officer in 1995, explained:

... we are the only organization outside of EUCOM that has the organization and processes to do deliberate war crisis planning, both in the Army sense and even in the joint sense. USAREUR staff has plans cells to do that, but they don't have a BCTP-type [Battle Command Training Program] program, or the battle staff system that we have here at Corps to be able to put together a really multiple-BOS [Battlefield Operating System], whole integrated plan. It takes them a lot more effort to do that than it requires from us. They are torn because they have to act in their Army Title 10 position, and yet we are at the point where we can do some execution planning at the tactical and operational levels of war.⁵⁸

The battle staff was the crucial difference that gave the corps headquarters operational vision and perspective, the depth in personnel to operate around the clock, the right talents and levels of experience to do the planning and execution at the appropriate level of sophistication, and the ability to connect the operational to the strategic level of war. Those capabilities were not found in a division headquarters, at U.S. Southern European Task Force headquarters, or in any ad hoc organization. The series of joint task force exercises, starting with Dragon Hammer '92, that General George Joulwan ran while he was Supreme Allied Commander, reinforced the concept of a battle-rostered joint task force staff in each armed service in Europe, where the same staff officers from the various services worked with each other repeatedly.

The assumption on the corps staff was that some version of the Tac Plus command post, manned chiefly by corps staff members and augmented by members of the other armed services and allied nations, when required, would at some point be called upon to deploy as a joint task force to carry out a mission directed by European Command. That had not yet happened as 1995 drew to a close, but the trend of thought in V Corps was that it was wise to maintain the capability to launch such a command and control element, based on the corps tactical command post, on short notice.

One Senior Officer's View of the Issues

Discussing the problem in 1994, then-Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, at the time serving as the V Corps chief of staff, commented on the tendency toward building ad hoc headquarters for deployed forces. Not strictly relevant to the issue of the organization of a deployed command post, his remarks did address the issue of headquarters *composition*, and specifically the tendency to create ad hoc command structures. The conventional wisdom, he felt, was that the way to put together a contingency headquarters was to piecemeal bits of the corps to build something else, and never simply to use a slice of the corps headquarters to do the job. "In other words," he said, "one doesn't ask for the corps tactical command post and a coherent part of a division with coherent parts of the division slice. Instead, they ask for a team of this and a platoon of that, and various officers to build a command and control element. It's not clear why that's the case. But that is how the thing seems to be done."⁵⁹

In that context, there seemed to be little use for the corps command group vehicle and the associated command operations element that the staff had built while Maddox commanded the corps. "The corps command vehicle without the individual whose personality demanded the Corps be run that way really stayed around as a piece of equipment, but not as a functioning entity," Meigs noted. The prevailing European Command practice of pulling together an ad hoc headquarters simply ignored all the work the corps had done to build a rapid-reacting tactical command post, based on light tactical trucks—that is, the "Tac Plus" command post—in addition to the large, conventional corps command post. That struck Meigs as unfortunate because it was possible for the

corps to "deploy the advance CP in a contingency and build up to the larger whole," depending on the emerging requirements of the mission. Thoughtful and economical use of the corps headquarters was essential because, as he pointed out, "we don't have enough people in the Corps headquarters to run three command posts—a tiny one, a fast-deploying one, and a full one." On the other hand, the corps could "establish a corps tac in the readily deployable CP if we had to, quickly, but we were never asked to do that. A lot of the planning on how to move the Corps in pieces with an advance element, the Tac, and then the full Corps headquarters, was never developed because EUCOM's way of building these things is to take individuals and teams to build a JTF, rather than letting the Corps become the basis of the JTF."⁶⁰

Meigs' preference was to build the joint task force headquarters on the basis of a slice of the corps headquarters, although he saw the matter as a question of efficiency, instead of merely one of preference:

It seems to me that the smart thing to do would be to use people who are accustomed to working with each other and who do it this way on exercises. Deploy them in times of crisis or combat the way we train. In trying to do some research on this, I found that there was a decision made some time ago at EUCOM that the best way to build a JTF was to start with a personality, rather than with a unit, and build around the capability that the personality brought to the table, from whichever service you may need, and whatever skills he might bring. You may have a crisis that requires a naval aviator as opposed to an Army grunt, because he has certain experience and background that he brings to the problem.⁶¹

Building a headquarters on such a basis would, in his opinion, obviate many of the problems in command post composition that he had observed in the past. "You get orders coming out telling you that when you deploy to Stuttgart to build the JTF, you should bring a computer with you," he said, giving one example. "It would seem to me that, if you had a standing JTF, the equipment set would already be there. Or, if you told the corps rapidly to deploy the HMMWV-based Tac, all the stuff that's there, all the people that work together, can deploy with all their gear, and it's all an integral whole, and then the people from other services fall in on it."⁶²

The Victory Vanguard Command Post

Spurred on by events, V Corps continued to refine its command posts. By the end of the 1990s short-notice force projection had become increasingly important for just about any foreseeable corps mission—conventional operations, deep operations, or stability operations. The controlling headquarters for such a force could not be based on heavy, airlift-consuming equipment. As a result, V Corps in 1999 and 2000 made significant changes in the composition of its main command post. During contemporary deployments, it became clear that the existing command post structure was not only awkward, but also required an excessive amount of airlift. Too large and with too many soldiers, the existing corps headquarters could not deploy quickly

enough to fit the requirements of current, fast-emerging missions, chiefly because the corps could never count on having the airlift priority needed to move that headquarters. Over a period of several months the corps explored ways to scale back its command post to integrate functionality and improve operational capability, while drastically reducing the number of soldiers and the amount of equipment needed to do the job. The immediate goal was to eliminate redundancy and to assign multiple roles to the staff by applying the principle of "reachback" to the Central Region sanctuary whenever possible.

"Reachback" was an essential part of the deployable command post concept. The reason it could operate with fewer soldiers and less equipment was that modern communications equipment enabled the corps to leave much of the staff behind in Germany, where they provided information, prepared plans and actions, and arranged various categories of support on the basis of up-to-the-minute information. That done, those components of the corps headquarters remaining in Germany managed the delivery of whatever the forward headquarters needed. Hence the second half of the rapidly deployable command post was a thoroughly thought-out emergency action center at the V Corps headquarters in Germany.

In November 1999 the corps G-3 plans section once again began to outline a concept for such a small, rapidly deployable corps command post, but this time with the specific intention of making it easy to move by air, and specifically without using the kind of airplanes under central control for worldwide, strategic airlift. Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, the corps commander beginning in the middle of November, outlined a series of requirements for what was initially known as the Theater Opening Command Post. (*Chart 5*) The foremost consideration was that it had to be light, in comparison to the existing corps command post configuration that used between 300 and 350 soldiers. To aid in reducing strategic airlift requirements to a minimum, Riley concluded that the command post did not have to be mobile. It did require the ability to perform most normal command post functions, however, particularly management of the close and deep battles, and it was crucial that the basic design be expandable to meet emerging mission requirements. The initial design assumed the use of some kind of tent, rather than hard shelters, for the command post, and the minimum number of vehicles.⁶³

Throughout the year the staff made great strides toward reducing C-17 airlift requirements by eliminating over-sized equipment, much of which was replaced with new light tents. Before 1999, V Corps headquarters was 90 percent reliant on C-17s for strategic lift. As restructured, it was mostly deployable by C-130 aircraft, which meant that the corps headquarters could move into the theater of operations early to control forces the European commander in chief deployed for immediate operations.

Such a light, quickly deployable headquarters had immense utility, as V Corps determined in the course of planning a series of widely differing military and stability support operations. The structure of the command post lent itself well to building the various types of headquarters demanded by the roles


CHART 5—INITIAL ORGANIZATION: V CORPS THEATER OPENING COMMAND POST

Joint Forces Land
Component Comdr
39

Special Staff
40

Special Troops
Bn

MP
30–60



Signal Support
125–170



Note: Total strength equals 333, not including security and signal support.

the corps had to fulfill. Appropriately tailored, the corps' deployable headquarters could serve as the corps main command post for the heavy force battle, the base for a joint task force or combined joint task force, the heart of a joint forces land component command headquarters, the command post for specialized operations such as Task Force Hawk, the command and control element for NATO operations, or the headquarters of a bi-national corps. Early tests of the concept, when the strike command post and deep operations coordination cell were deployed to Poland for Exercise Victory Strike in 2000, were encouraging and led to further refinement of the command post organization.

Through the years between 1990 and 1995 the headquarters followed a procedure of activating a crisis action team (CAT) whenever necessary to prepare for or to control the deployment of a task force. The CAT activated on order of the corps commander and normally included the chief of staff, the principal general staff officers, the adjutant general, the public affairs officer, the surgeon, the staff judge advocate, the safety officer, and the commander of the special troops battalion. The team was responsible for monitoring the development of the situation, assessing the crisis, developing courses of action, and planning and monitoring execution. Because crises varied widely, the specific composition of the team could be modified to suit the requirements of the situation.⁶⁴ In the course of 1996 the G-3 and chief of staff began to consider ways to make the headquarters more immediately responsive. The first approximation of a solution was creation of an emergency action center within the G-3.

The emergency action center (EAC) operated continuously to take action on all emergency messages; nonnuclear events or incident reports; Conventional Forces, Europe, notifications; Intermediate Nuclear Force Inspection notifications; the various automatic digital network messages; and weather warnings. The EAC served as the corps communications center under the direction of the G-3, who established its operation as a function of the chief of G-3 operations. The center was manned around the clock by two emergency action noncommissioned officers who monitored a variety of means of communication that included two STACC-E⁶⁵ systems, a desktop interface to the automatic digital network host (DINAH), two tactical satellite sets, five STU-III secure telephones, and two secure telefax machines. The duty shift ran from 0600 to 1800 and from 1800 until 0600, with the off-going shift giving the incoming shift a detailed briefing fifteen minutes prior to shift start. The G-3 envisioned that the corps field officer of the day would operate from the EAC.⁶⁶

The final and logical development came in 1997 and 1998, when the G-3 laid plans to convert the EAC into a corps command center. Reconstruction of the facility began in 1999, and the command center became an integral part of the staff organization in garrison, formalized by standard operating procedures (SOP) and a corps training program. As before, the field officer of the day performed his duties from the command center. Brig. Gen. Stephen

Speakes, chief of staff in 1999, modified the corps battle rhythm to establish a daily update briefing at 0830, in which the field officer of the day and other command center personnel as necessary briefed the chief of staff and staff principals on overnight developments.⁶⁷

The practical result of creating the corps command center was that the forward command post, deployed somewhere outside of Germany to control units that were dealing with the crisis of the moment, could rely on the remainder of the corps staff for whatever it needed. While it was certain that the technique of "reachback" would work during peace enforcement or humanitarian relief operations, lingering doubts remained that the essential communications systems could be relied upon during combat operations, when an enemy could be expected to attack them with various kinds of electronic warfare. The test of that problem lay in an indefinite future.

Conclusions About New Concepts

In some ways, all of the innovations in corps command post structure and operation over the decade between 1990 and 2000 were a reaction to a confining, Cold War model of command post organization. According to that argument, the formal corps command post structure of tactical, main, and rear command posts was purely a Cold War legacy and functioned well only when considered as a part of the general defense plan mission. In short, it was an archaic structure. Certainly, the traditional model did not well serve the requirements of peace enforcement missions or contingency operations on the low end of the spectrum of conflict, and none of the older types of command posts were as easily or rapidly deployable as they needed to be, given the operational context current in 2001.

The slow evolution of ideas about what the best command post structure might be mirrored the equally gradual emergence of a clearer understanding of the missions that V Corps would be called upon to carry out in the post-Cold War world. By 2001 the corps assumed that it had to carry out missions that ranged from peace enforcement to heavy force combat, and it was clear to the staff that the same command post structure was not suitable for every task. Because of the wide range of possible missions, the organization of command posts had to be as flexible and mutable as the composition of the task forces they would be called upon to command and control.

Thus, Riley's concept of command post organization rested on a careful assessment of the factors of mission, enemy, time, troops, and terrain—the same broad factors that governed any other aspect of military operations. Once the operational context for a given mission was established and the nature of operations and type of forces understood, the corps could constitute a command post appropriate to that mission and send it forth to fulfill the CINC's orders. The underlying assumption that most operations would fall on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict meant that the staff devoted most attention to the smaller and more quickly deployable command post organizations, such as the

corps assault command post, and concentrated on being able rapidly to produce modifications of that basic design to suit mission requirements. As the corps worked out the details of the kind of command post needed for rapid strategic deployment, Riley was very specific about the process:

It's so METT-T dependent that, when you say "Send me a Corps CP," we've got to sit down and talk. I don't know what a Corps CP looks like until you tell me what the mission is and what the functions are and what the METT-T looks like. Then we can structure one for you.⁶⁸

Conceptually, the strike command post could deploy to Southwest Asia, for example, and, supported by the appropriate command post element from the 3d Corps Support Command with a slice from the corps rear command post organization, be commanding anything up through multiple brigade operations in as little as two weeks from deployment notification. Additional command and control apparatus could then be added as needed for an expanding mission until, at least in concept, the full panoply of corps command posts was in place for a major heavy force battle.

An important point was that such a structuring of the corps command posts was by no means the end of the intellectual process, because that kind of thinking about command posts had to extend to the divisions and brigades as well. Early in his command tenure, General Riley had begun thinking about similar modifications to the command posts of subordinate units within the corps to make them more strategically deployable. He did not necessarily want them to become smaller—that was a METT-T issue—but he did want them to be able to function within constraints of fewer cubic feet of materiel to be moved, less weight, less throw-away, and particularly less air frames for the movement. Throughout 2001, the major subordinate commands therefore continued to work on more rapid deployment of their command posts, as well as of their units.

NOTES

¹ This was the troop list for Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Europe at Normandy, on 6 June 1944. The attached units varied over time, particularly the antiaircraft artillery and engineers, which were augmented or diminished according to the threat and perceived mission. For details, refer to *V Corps Operations in the ETO, 6 January 1942–9 May 1945* (Paris: Paul Viviers, 1945). The end of each chapter of that history contains an order of battle for the operation discussed. Also see [Office of the Theater Historian, European Theater], "Order of Battle. United States Army. World War II. European Theater of Operations. Divisions" (Paris: Office of the Theater Historian, European Theater, December 1945), typescript; and Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *V Corps Order of Battle 1918–2003* (Heidelberg: Headquarters V Corps History Office, 2003).

² In fact, Talley's position as DCS-Plans was an unusual one. An engineer officer who had some experience with amphibious operations in the Pacific Theater of Operations, he had been assigned to V Corps to help plan for the Normandy landings. The position of DCS-Plans was created specifically for Operation OVERLORD and was not normally a part of the staff organization.

³ [V Corps G-3 Historical Section], *V Corps: Operations in the ETO, 6 Jan. 1942–9 May 1945* (Paris: n.pub., 1945), summarizes the corps organization throughout World War II and offers snapshots of command post (CP) operations.

⁴ For details on Talley's Information Detachment, see *Engineer Memoirs: Brigadier General Benjamin B. Talley*, interview with Dr. Charles Hendricks (Fort Belvoir, Va.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Office of History, 1994), especially pp. 164–80. For his actions at Normandy, Talley was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross, while most of the other members of his Information Detachment received the Silver Star.

⁵ Order of Battle Files, V Corps History Office, periodic; Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *V Corps Order of Battle, 1918–2003*.

⁶ For a discussion of the capable corps concept, see Stephen P. Gehring, *From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: The U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), particularly pp. 8–10 and 31–36.

⁷ Command Philosophy Statement, Lt. Gen. George Joulwan, 1989, Annual History File, 1989.

⁸ Interv. author with Col. William W. Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 24 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁹ Fest tents were large, durable, commercially contracted German tents erected on stable metal frameworks, having wooden flooring, and designed to permit installation of power and lighting facilities as well as forced air heating systems.

¹⁰ On the structure and operation of V Corps command posts at the end of the Cold War, refer to: V Corps Field Standard Operating Procedures, 20 Apr 1992; V Corps Main CP Standard Operating Procedures, May 1993; V Corps (G-3 Operations) Standard Operating

Procedures for the Current Operations Cell, 11 Sep 1992; and Memo, V Corps Special Troops Battalion (STB), n.d. but 1993, sub: Field Standard Operating Procedures for HQ Commandant Cell (FSOP).

¹¹ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Gary E. Heuser, Commander, Special Troops Battalion, Headquarters, V Corps, 2 Jul 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

¹² V Corps activated the Special Troops Battalion (Provisional) on 1 June 1980. The L-series tables of organization and equipment gave the unit a required/authorized strength of 125/125 officers, 2/2 warrant officers, and 215/215 enlisted, for an aggregate of 342/342. Most of those positions were in the various corps staff elements. See USAREUR Permanent Orders 9-3, 15 Jan 1993, and Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 52401LE101, 4 Jan 1995.

¹³ Heuser interview.

¹⁴ Summarized from Field Manual 100-15-1 (Draft), *Corps Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (1996).

¹⁵ V Corps ACofS, G-3, Briefing for Lt. Gen. John Abrams, V Corps CG, V Corps Rear "Forward!," 5 Nov 1996.

¹⁶ For a discussion of the organization of USAREUR (Forward) Headquarters in Hungary and the V Corps role in that process, see Chapter 13.

¹⁷ V Corps ACofS, G-3, Briefing for Abrams, 5 Nov 1996. For physical layout of the rear CP, refer to V Corps Rear CP FSOP, 17 Feb 1988, and subsequent revisions.

¹⁸ Weekly Operations-Intelligence Briefing Note Files, V Corps Historian files, monthly by calendar year.

¹⁹ HQ, V Corps, ACofS, G-3 (Reserve Components Division) Information Paper, 18 Apr 1992, sub: 7th ARCOM Support to V Corps in Field Operations. Also see Interv, author with Maj. Michael P. de Groat, Reserve Component Advisor, 3d Corps Support Command, 6 Feb 1996, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

²⁰ For a detailed discussion of the Advanced Support Echelon, see Chapter 4.

²¹ V Corps G-3 Briefing, "The Advance Support Echelon," 9 May 1992, details the organization and process.

²² Interv, author with Lt. Col. Joel A. Buck, V Corps Commander's Plans Cell ("Law Firm"), 1 Dec 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²³ There was little substantive change in the corps rear CP operations. See V Corps Rear CP FSOP, 17 Feb 1988, for the mature concept as used at the end of the Cold War.

²⁴ The strength of the corps headquarters and headquarters company steadily declined from required/authorized strength of 455/362 in 1990 to 434/342 in 1991, and to 342/342 with the L-series MTOE in 1994. See USAREUR Permanent Orders 127-8, 12 Sep 1990; USAREUR Permanent Orders 62-9, 22 Apr 1991; and USAREUR Permanent Orders 9-3, 15 Jan 1993.

²⁵ The concept and purposes of the Command Operating Element are delineated in V Corps Briefing, "Corps Command Group Vehicle Update for LTG Cerjan," 27 Nov 1991.

²⁶ A mechanized infantry battalion, despite the cavalry designation.

²⁷ Buck interview.

²⁸ Victory Corps Functional Command Post Evaluation After Action Report, 3 May 1991.

²⁹ Buck interview.

³⁰ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Commanding General, 3d Corps Support Command, 24 Jun 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

³¹ Buck interview; V Corps GE, Corps Command Group Vehicle (CCGV) Concept Briefing, February 1991.

³² Buck interview; CCGV Concept Briefing to V Corps CG, March 1991.

³³ Buck interview. Also, V Corps Artillery Deep Division briefing, August 1991.

³⁴ Field Manual 100-15, *Corps Operations*, Coordinating Draft, 1991. Also see Buck interview.

³⁵ Majors selected for duty in the "Law Firm" normally had completed a tour as battalion S-3 or executive officer, or both, or similar branch qualifying duty. Using four staff college graduates of the prestigious School of Advanced Military Studies in a single cell obviously decreased the chances that the remainder of the general staff would get its fair share of those highly qualified planners, but General Maddox believed the benefits outweighed the costs. According to Lt. Col. Joel Buck, the name "Law Firm" arose from the combination of names of the first four officers assigned to the duty, which reminded everyone of the name of a Washington, D.C., law office. Confusion was inevitable, and the commanding general's personal staff group routinely received staff actions that should have been sent to the corps staff judge advocate.

³⁶ "Defining the 'Four Horsemen'," précis of remarks by Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox during a staff briefing conducted at the C. W. Abrams Building, 21 Jan 1992, transcription of videotape in V Corps History Office files. Also see Buck interview. On the synchronization matrix, see Interv, author with Lt. Col. Herbert Frandsen, Chief, G-3 Plans, V Corps, 5-6 Jan 1993, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

³⁷ USAREUR CONPLAN 4285-90, 1990, updated as USAREUR CONPLAN 4292-90 in July 1992.

³⁸ USAREUR CONPLAN 4292-93 (draft), August 1992.

³⁹ Unless otherwise cited, details of the forward CP organization and operation were drawn from V Corps ACofS, G-3 Plans Briefing, Forward Command Post, 1995.

⁴⁰ Exercise Dragon Hammer 92 AAR, July 1992. Interv, author with Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, Commanding General, V Corps, 19 Jan 1995, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

⁴¹ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Daniel V. Sulka, Plans Chief, ACofS, G-4, V Corps, 9 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks, Germany. Also see Rutherford interview. Interv, author with Col. Daniel M. Ferezan, Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 15 Mar and 13-14 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks. Also see V Corps Exercise Atlantic Resolve 94 AAR, November 1994.

⁴² Heuser interview.

⁴³ Commitment Day.

⁴⁴ The entire discussion of the Tac Plus CP was drawn from various corps briefings, staff studies, and other documents. In particular, see: Concept Briefing, Tac Plus CP, 5 Oct 1993; Tac Plus CP Briefing, 15 Oct 1993; Memo, ACofS, G-3, for V Corps Task Force Move Victory, 22 Oct 1993, sub: Tac Plus Staff Study; MFR, ACofS, G-3, 18 Oct 1993, sub: Tac Plus Staff Study (Manning).

⁴⁵ See C. E. Kirkpatrick, *Move Victory: The Headquarters, V Corps, Move from Frankfurt to Heidelberg* (Heidelberg: Headquarters V Corps History Office Monograph, 1996).

⁴⁶ The experience of Exercise Atlantic Resolve 94 provided ample information on which the corps could base its proposed joint task force organization for submission to EUCOM. See USEUCOM Directive 55-11, *Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization*, 7 Jul 1995; Sulka interview.

⁴⁷ In fact, according to various versions of the corps' MTOE, V Corps had no such position as deputy chief of staff (DCS). Instead, the position was designated chief of staff, corps rear. In other words, the officer occupying what the corps in garrison called the DCS position was the CoS for the corps deputy commanding general during wartime operations. See Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 52401LE101, 4 Jan 1995.

⁴⁸ V Corps DCS Working Paper, V Corps Rear/3d COSCOM CP, Comparison of

Functionalities, 1994. The working paper identified a series of areas in which staff redundancy existed.

⁴⁹ The 3d Corps Support Command was at Authorized Level of Organization 3. The Table of Distribution and Allowances of the 3d COSCOM (CONUS Augmentation) was derived from that of the former 103d COSCOM, a reserve unit that had been aligned with V Corps. With that as a basis, the authors of the TDA constructed the document using the "required/not authorized" positions from the active component 3d COSCOM MTOE. See MTOE 63431LE102 (960217) for 3d COSCOM and MTOE 63433LE101 (960217) for 19th CMMC, both 1996.

⁵⁰ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Lloyd T. Waterman, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, *re* End of Tour Interview as Commanding General, 3d Corps Support Command, 4 Dec 2000, Campbell Barracks, Germany.

⁵¹ General Riley commanded V Corps 16 Nov 1999 to 18 Jul 2001.

⁵² The term RSOI refers to reception, training, equipping, and moving personnel from the rear area to the engaged combat forces.

⁵³ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Robert T. Dail, Commanding General, 3d Corps Support Command, 3 Jul 2001, Wiesbaden Army Airfield, Germany.

⁵⁴ Historian Reference File, sub: Notes of Conversation with Col. James Morris, Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, and Chief of Staff, Corps Rear, *re* Organization of Corps Rear Command Post, 12 Feb 2001.

⁵⁵ Lust interview. On the issues of "staff work by PowerPoint slide," and the limitations of VTC, see Historian's Notes, V Corps Battle Staff Meeting, 17 and 24 Jul 1995.

⁵⁶ See Field Manual 100-15, *Corps Operations* (1995).

⁵⁷ USEUCOM Directive 55-11, *Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization*, 7 Jul 1995, pt. IV, Annex B.

⁵⁸ Sulka interview. The Ferezan interview makes essentially the same points, as does Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Chief of Staff, V Corps, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁵⁹ Meigs interview.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ V Corps ACofS, G-3 Plans Briefing, V Corps Theater Opening Command Post, 1 Dec 1999.

⁶⁴ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-3, for Corps Staff, Dec 1994, sub: V Corps Crisis Action Team Standard Operating Procedures (CAT SOP).

⁶⁵ Standard Theater Army Command and Control System-Europe.

⁶⁶ V Corps ACofS, G-3 Operations Briefing, Emergency Action Center Briefing, 1994.

⁶⁷ V Corps ACofS, G-3, Command Center Training Program, 1998.

⁶⁸ Interv, author with Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, Commanding General, V Corps, 22 and 27 Jun 2001, Campbell Barracks, Germany, stress in the original quotation.

Operation POSITIVE FORCE

"We got the 11th ACR to and from Saudi Arabia almost as a routine action, in my mind. It just wasn't that hard."

Brig. Gen. James S. Dickey
V Corps Chief of Staff, 1992

Throughout 1990 soldiers in Europe had carefully monitored developments in Southwest Asia, considering what actions they might ultimately be called upon to take as a result of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. At the theater level, General Crosbie Saint, the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe, discussed with his commanders the possible employment of Germany-based forces, founding their discussion on the concept of the "capable corps" that Saint had been at pains to conceptualize and develop during his tenure of command.¹ Further contingency planning went on at the corps level. Lt. Gen. George Joulwan, V Corps commander, determined that he would send the 3d Armored Division to the Persian Gulf if called upon to give up one of his units for service in Southwest Asia. The decision to deploy the 3d Armored Division, instead of the sister 8th Infantry Division, was a simple one. The Spearhead Division was further along in its modernization cycle than the Pathfinders, specifically in replacing the M113 armored personnel carrier with the new M2 Bradley fighting vehicle.²

On 8 November 1990 President George Bush announced his decision to deploy troops to Southwest Asia from Germany. One day later, on 9 November 1990, Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox assumed command of V Corps. Previously having commanded the 8th Infantry Division, Maddox was already familiar with the preliminary decisions about what forces V Corps was prepared to deploy and thoroughly understood General Joulwan's rationale for selecting the 3d Armored Division. When Maddox assumed command, the 12th Aviation Brigade of V Corps had already been sent to Saudi Arabia, the first European-based unit to deploy, and the decision had been made that VII Corps headquarters, in Stuttgart, would go to the Persian Gulf as the corps echelon of command.³ USAREUR assigned V Corps the role of "pushing" VII Corps out of Germany, as well as the responsibility for reinforcing VII Corps with additional soldiers, units, and equipment.⁴

Thus Maddox's immediate problem was how to deploy V Corps units under VII Corps command, and it was complicated by his headquarters' existing involvement in the post-Cold War drawdown process. Furthermore, the requirement to transfer some V Corps units to VII Corps command was enlarged by the need to draw on the remainder of the corps to bring deploying V and VII Corps units up to full strength. Battalions across V Corps thus gave up both soldiers and equipment, diminishing their own readiness and capabilities. The case of the deploying 3d Armored Division illustrated the cost. Division and corps personnel officers quickly computed requirements for 1,357 soldiers to fill vacancies in their battalions. Particular needs included Arabic linguists, in short supply across the Army anyway, and medical personnel. Because of the distribution of personnel shortages across all of its major subordinate commands, the corps had to ask USAREUR for help in filling an additional 975 vacancies in the 3d Armored Division. The corps then worked to supply a myriad of needs for repair parts and major end items, including such things as five-ton Expando vans, radios, generators, and fuel tankers, for which the old M131 had to be substituted, because all of the new M969 models previously destined for Europe had already been diverted to Southwest Asia. The equipment, like the soldiers, came from nondeploying V Corps battalions.⁵ In all, V Corps sent 26,878 of its soldiers to Southwest Asia, either as entire units, such as the 3d Armored Division, or as individual replacements for VII Corps battalions. (*Table 3*) In fact, Maddox had to use some entire battalions from the 8th Infantry Division to fill the 3d Armored Division table of organization.⁶

Maddox later remarked that "it was not clear, if the war had gone on, how many more units might have to go."⁷ He therefore carefully balanced the possible demand for further deployments against the need to remain ready to react to possible crises in central Europe, where the political situation continued to appear unstable. Maintaining high standards of readiness and training in the units that remained under V Corps control was consequently the order of the day, and he allowed no V Corps unit to miss its scheduled gunnery or maneuver training rotation throughout the course of the Persian Gulf War.⁸ What Maddox dubbed "follow on tasks" consumed much of the remaining time and many of the available resources. The corps accepted command of 23,482 VII Corps troops that did not deploy to Southwest Asia, including the 3d Infantry Division and one brigade of the 1st Armored Division. Almost as an aside, the corps also sent considerable amounts of supplies and equipment to Saudi Arabia, including 50,000 short tons of ammunition. Rear detachment operations for the deployed units, including the operation of an elaborate family support organization, likewise demanded constant attention.⁹

Training, not just to sustain the capability of carrying out NATO Central Region missions, but also to support anticipated VII Corps demands once the ground war in the Persian Gulf commenced, became a complex task because the two missions imposed dissimilar requirements. As the chief of G-3 Training later noted, everyone had a profound sense of urgency, and training at

12th Aviation Bde	3d Armd Div	V Corps Troops
Headquarters & Headquarters Co, 12th Aviation Bde 5th Bn, 6th Cavalry 3d Bn, 227th Aviation (attached from VII Corps) TF Warrior (Provisional) Headquarters & Headquarters Co Co B, 6th Bn, 158th (-) Aviation (CH-47) Co C, 7th Bn, 158th Aviation (UH-60) Co B, 5th Bn, 158th Aviation (-) (UH-1H)	<p>1st Bde 3d Bn, 5th Cavalry (Inf) 5th Bn, 5th Cavalry (Inf) 4th Bn, 32d Armor 4th Bn, 34th Armor (8th Inf Div)</p> <p>2d Bde 4th Bn, 18th Inf 3d Bn, 8th Cavalry (Armor) 4th Bn, 8th Cavalry (Armor)</p> <p>3d Bde 5th Bn, 18th Inf 2d Bn, 67th Armor 4th Bn, 67th Armor</p> <p>3d Div Arty 2d Bn, 3d Field Arty (155) 2d Bn, 82d Field Arty (155) 4th Bn, 82d Field Arty (155) Battery A, 40th Field Arty (Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS])</p> <p>Div Troops Headquarters & Headquarters Co, 3d Armd Div 22d Chem Co (-) 533d Military Intell Bn (Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence) 3d Armd Div Band 369th Personnel Service Co (V Corps) 5th Bn, 3d Air Defense Arty (8th Inf Div) 23d Engr Bn 143d Signal Bn Co C, 17th Signal Bn</p> <p>3d Div Support Command 122d Main Support Bn 45th Forward Support Bn 54th Forward Support Bn 503d Forward Support Bn Co I, 227th Aviation Support Bn</p> <p>4th Bde (Combat Aviation) 2d Bn, 227th Aviation (AH-64) 4th Bn, 7th Cavalry TF Viper Co G, 227th Aviation Co H, 227th Aviation</p>	42d Field Arty Bde 3d Bn, 2d Field Arty (155) 1st Bn, 27th Field Arty (MLRS) 2d Bn, 29th Field Arty (155) (8th Inf Div) 144th Ordnance Co 317th Engr Bn Headquarters & Headquarters Co, 16th Support Gp 590th Transportation Co 39th Finance Unit 201st Finance Unit 93d MP Bn (-) 92d MP Co 109th MP Co 503d Finance Unit 12th Evac Hospital

Grafenwöhr, Vilseck, and local sites proceeded on a seven days a week basis, as many hours a day as were needed.

The first wave of replacements for Southwest Asia came from V Corps units. Those were in turn replaced by new troops straight from advanced individual training in the United States and by individual ready reservists involuntarily recalled to active duty. The corps handled refresher training for those soldiers in Europe, because the training demands imposed by the Army's mobilization for operations in the Persian Gulf overloaded the capabilities of the training bases in the continental United States. Thus, for example, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment superintended cavalry scout training at Grafenwöhr.

In the second wave of training, the corps "reblued" individual ready reservists in programs conducted at the major training areas, focusing on the infantry, cavalry, and field artillery specialties. The 3d Infantry Division sent its third brigade and an artillery battalion to Vilseck to serve, in effect, as a training brigade for troops passing through adjacent Grafenwöhr. Meanwhile, at local training areas all over the corps, units retrained light infantrymen to become mechanized infantrymen. In all, V Corps deployed an additional 1,945 soldiers to Southwest Asia as crew and squad replacements, and trained many more who were prepared to go, if needed.¹⁰

Although V Corps did not itself deploy to Southwest Asia, actions surrounding the VII Corps deployment confronted the staff with problems that it had never before encountered. Col. William W. Alexander, the corps deputy chief of staff, aptly pointed out the novelty presented by the problems of strategic mobility, all of them new to V Corps, when he remarked that "If you'd asked me before we did that . . . I'd have told you 'good luck!'" Prior to that time, V Corps had focused entirely on the General Defense Plan and had never considered the complex process of moving units it undertook in the winter of 1990-91. After the fact, the staff shrugged off the difficulties. "We were prepared to fight an enemy," Alexander later ruminated, "and we just did it somewhere else than we had always assumed we would." He credited the professionalism of the soldiers and the mentality of mission first with accomplishing what he characterized as endless hard work.¹¹

Responding to USAREUR directives, Maddox issued the detailed deployment orders, then monitored the process. Within the corps staff, the chief of staff and the general staff ran the deployment, allowing Maddox to focus on the mission in Europe, and particularly on readiness standards. Only part of V Corps was gone, and Maddox had received no relief from the existing NATO mission. He and his staff had to frame plans for executing the NATO missions, if required, with fewer troops than plans called for, always bearing in mind the open question of how many more troops might be required in Southwest Asia. Readiness therefore had two entirely different components, both of which V Corps had to address in 1990 and 1991.

As the staff saw it, the deployments were well executed, probably as well as they could have been, given the conditions. Hour after hour of detailed planning by G-3, on top of daily crisis action team meetings, focused the corps

effort. "And that," Alexander pointed out, "was only what the big effendis were doing, who were monitoring the system and watching the glass balls get juggled." Logisticians, movement control specialists, and what came to be known as "pusher units" responsible to help VII Corps units depart from Germany "just worked forever," as he put it, adding that they really weren't doing anything else. Deploying more than 26,000 soldiers required huge amounts of time and coordination and emphasis. At the senior management level, after setting the priorities and detailing the plans, "we were just adjusting the knobs," as Alexander put it. At the "worker bee level," however, there wasn't much of a focus other than DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.¹²

Quickly absorbing lessons from the 12th Aviation Brigade deployment, the corps capitalized on the fact that much of the movement to port was by rail, with which units were generally experienced. Experience aside, however, the scale of the movement was daunting, and the date it had to be done—over the holiday period—brought its own complications. Moving the equipment of thirty-four battalions and sixteen separate companies required 111 equipment trains, 15 ammunition trains, and 269 barges, as well as an additional 623 MILVANS. Units used railheads near their home stations, but all barge shipments originated in Mannheim, requiring road convoys to the port from all over the corps area. The corps G-4 Transportation division and 502d Movement Control Center, working in conjunction with the 21st Theater Army Area Command, coordinated rail and barge movement of the units to sea ports of embarkation to meet port calls issued by the European Military Traffic Management Command. Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Bremerhaven were used for unit equipment, while ammunition went through Nordenham.¹³

To move the soldiers, USAREUR created a special ad hoc organization, the air movement control cell (AMCC), while V Corps created a corresponding ad hoc organization, the passenger movement control cell (PMCC). The AMCC and PMCC planned, coordinated, and executed the movement of soldiers and their baggage from home station to one of four aerial ports of embarkation—Rhein-Main Air Force Base, Ramstein Air Force Base, Stuttgart, or Nürnberg. That required 539 buses and 371 cargo trucks to move the 20,854 soldiers who deployed in units from V Corps in a total of 139 air missions. Obviously, such a deployment required considerable infrastructure, and that was where the "pusher units" focused their efforts.¹⁴ The end of the Persian Gulf War imposed a new set of problems, as units began redeploying from Saudi Arabia to Germany, and the corps was fully occupied with that, as well as with getting the drawdown process back on track, when several new operational requirements arose.¹⁵

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

The Kuwait Theater of Operations was not the only area of concern at the end of the Persian Gulf War. Iraqi attacks on its internal Kurd population created a mass of civilian refugees in the northern part of the country. President

George Bush directed the armed forces to assist in the international humanitarian relief actions for that displaced group. In April 1991 the Commander in Chief, Europe, activated Combined Task Force Provide Comfort at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, under the command of Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, Lt. Gen. John Shalikashvili. The Army in Europe was, in turn, directed to deploy forces and provide supplies to support the combined task force.¹⁶

Maddox decided not only to send the required forces, but also to establish a command post for the Army component of the operation. The staff, drawn from the corps general staff, was run by Maj. Gen. Jay Garner, the deputy corps commander, and went almost immediately to Turkey. Concurrently, the corps activated its crisis action team to track the deployment and manage the corps' commitment to the effort.¹⁷ The deployment amounted to the first real test of the corps regional command post, a personnel package that the headquarters had provisionally established for such missions.¹⁸

The movement of Joint Task Force Bravo, as the force came to be known, began on 13 April 1991 with the self-deployment of an aviation unit, Task Force (TF) Thunderhorse, drawn from the 4th Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and commanded by Maj. John Mainwaring. TF Thunderhorse established a forward operating base at Diyarbakir, an airfield in southeastern Turkey. Subsequent deployments committed troops from every element of the 4th Squadron.¹⁹ Quickly, every major command in USAREUR became involved. Since part of the mission involved delivery of medical supplies and food stuffs by air drop, TF Bravo used parachute riggers from the 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry, from Vicenza, as well as from elsewhere in theater. Two days after the cavalry deployment, the 8th Infantry Division sent one UH-60 assault helicopter company, which self-deployed to Incirlik and was attached to the cavalry task force. So as not completely to strip the Pathfinder Division of aircraft, the corps attached one UH-60 platoon from the 3d Infantry Division to the mission.²⁰


Thus began a process of distributing shortages that became typical of out of sector operations as time went on. The commanding general of the 3d Infantry Division pointed out that the attachment of his platoon to the 8th Infantry Division absorbed all of his flexibility to accept further aviation taskings. Allocating six aircraft to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and six to other out of sector missions fully committed all of the division's aircraft, and key items of equipment for those aircraft, such as night-vision goggles, were likewise in short supply.²¹ By late April the requirement had grown to the extent that V Corps had to dispatch additional forces to Turkey. The 4th (Combat Aviation) Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division provided the headquarters for a task force consisting of one attack helicopter battalion and an additional assault helicopter company from that brigade, as well as an observation helicopter platoon and an assault helicopter platoon from the 11th Cavalry, and augmentation for the brigade's aviation maintenance unit drawn from the 3d Corps Support Command.²²

It swiftly became evident that the mission in northern Iraq would be a lengthy one, and V Corps consequently began a systematic rotation of its avia-

tion units to JTF Bravo. As Operation PROVIDE COMFORT gave way to PROVIDE COMFORT II (July through December 1991), the 11th Aviation Brigade replaced the 4th Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, in Turkey.²³ Operation PROVIDE COMFORT III (December 1991 through December 1996) followed, and V Corps continued its support, albeit with steadily decreasing numbers of soldiers. (Map 5) By the time Operation PROVIDE COMFORT III was in full swing, the requirement had diminished to one aviation task force command and control element and one UH-60 helicopter company, with aviation maintenance support. The peak deployment involved 2,043 soldiers in the first phase of relief operations.²⁴ By late 1992 the number had fallen to no more than fifty-one. At a time, however, when the corps was looking for units to send on other missions, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, combined with the effects of the European drawdown of forces, complicated the task of finding the right types of units, and properly skilled soldiers, to fulfill its assigned tasks.²⁵

The Requirement for Kuwait

Ground combat units of the allied coalition completed the liberation of Kuwait and reached their final objectives on 28 February 1991, having destroyed substantial portions of the Iraqi army. During the attack itself, American commanders reported the literal destruction of entire combat brigades of the Iraqi army and the annihilation of whole divisions of the touted *Republican Guard*. In the early hours of the cease-fire that followed, direct observation of the battlefield, coupled with a preliminary accounting of the vast number of prisoners of war in the hands of coalition troops, confirmed previous impressions of the



MAP 5

degree to which the Iraqi ground forces had disintegrated. Saddam Hussein's army, like the infrastructure of his entire military establishment, had been shattered by the combined weight of allied air and ground attacks.²⁶ According to some American estimates, the fighting roughly halved the number of Iraqi tanks and, overall, effectively destroyed 50 percent of the Iraqi ground forces, thus ending Iraq's military dominance of the region.²⁷ The residual Iraqi force in May 1991 was heavily involved in merging and reconstituting its remaining units, and could muster roughly 35 percent of its wartime strength in personnel and equipment. Seven heavy and two infantry divisions were at 60 to 100 percent of their prewar strength, but the balance of the army was combat ineffective. Nineteen infantry divisions had somewhere between 20 and 60 percent of their men and equipment; twenty-four infantry and eight heavy divisions had less than 20 percent.²⁸

Cautious Kuwaiti leaders nonetheless remained apprehensive. As much concerned with the unstable political situation as with the obviously small potential for renewed Iraqi attacks, the government of Kuwait asked the United States to leave some portion of its military in the country after the redeployment of Army and Marine Corps units was complete.²⁹ After due consideration, the president agreed, ordering the Joint Chiefs of Staff to station one U.S. Army brigade in the country through the first of September 1991. In response to the presidential order, the Joint Chiefs on 17 May 1991 ordered United States Central Command to deploy one Army brigade equivalent to Kuwait as a deterrent force that would also be prepared to defend the country if necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further directed the United States Commander in Chief, Europe, to have that unit in place not later than 15 June 1991. To simplify the deployment, the brigade would not have to move its heavy equipment, but instead would take over weapons, vehicles, and other equipment that were already in the theater.³⁰

Until the U.S. Army, Europe, brigade arrived, Central Command retained the 1st Brigade of the 3d Armored Division in reserve in Kuwait. That brigade, organized as a balanced tank-infantry force and composed of various elements of the division, was redesignated the 3d Armored Division (Forward) and attached to U.S. Central Command's Army Component, ARCENT (Forward), on 12 May 1991.³¹ (Table 4) The "Ready First" brigade, as it was known, relocated to Kuwait City on the twelfth of that month to occupy assembly areas as the theater reserve, provide a continued U.S. presence in Kuwait to deter further aggression, and prepare to counterattack and destroy any Iraqi penetration of the demilitarized zone.³² Almost immediately, however, the Ready First brigade began preparations to hand off the mission, organizing its equipment for transfer to the successor unit. The majority opinion within the brigade, as within U.S. Central Command, was that no military action was likely.

When the USAREUR-based brigade arrived, it would find ample weapons and materiel left by both the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions. These included roughly 300 tanks, 120 Bradley fighting vehicles, 75 howitzers, and combat support and logistical support equipment sufficient for a three-brigade divisional

TABLE 4—ORDER OF BATTLE FOR TASK FORCE COMPOSITE 1ST BRIGADE, 3D ARMORED DIVISION, KUWAIT, MAY 1991

Headquarters & Headquarters Co, 1st Bde
3d Bn, 5th Cavalry
2d Bn, 67th Armor
4th Bn, 67th Armor
4th Bn, 18th Inf
2d Bn, 3d Field Arty
Team, Battery A, 5th Bn, 3d Air Defense Arty
Platoon, 7th Bn, 227th Aviation
369th Personnel Service Co (-)
201st Finance Support Unit (-)
23d Engr Bn
2d Platoon (Ground Surveillance Radar), Co B, 533d Military Intell Bn
Team (Combat Intelligence), 2d Platoon, Co B, 533d Military Intell Bn
15th Medium Truck Co
Team, 143d Signal Bn
Platoon, 503d MP Co
54th Forward Support Bn (+)
4th Platoon, 759th Adjutant General Co (Postal) (-)

force, not counting theater reserves of tanks, Bradleys, howitzers, and other tactical vehicles. The operational readiness rate of the combat and tactical vehicles was in the 70 to 80 percent range, with half of the balance reparable within five days. The commander, VII Corps, also reported adequate supplies of both fueler and cargo heavy tactical trucks, light tactical trucks, tents, heaters, generators, cots, and mess equipment, but shortages of signal equipment, especially for secure communications, and night-vision goggles. No Multiple Launch Rocket Systems were on hand, and air defense weapons were limited to short-range Vulcan guns and Stinger missiles.³³

The deployment to Kuwait, dubbed Operation POSITIVE FORCE, naturally fell to V Corps, inasmuch as it was the only remaining corps in the European theater. Ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact and its armed forces, and the unification of Germany on 3 October 1990, corps planners had begun to think in terms of missions other than the one traditional for the corps: general defense of its sector under NATO command. Operation POSITIVE FORCE was the first opportunity for the corps itself to exercise the "out of sector" mission, an option that many believed would only grow in importance as time went on. The deployment to Kuwait provided an opportunity for the staff to examine the readiness of Victory Corps units for contingency missions and the ability of the corps and its subordinate command staffs to configure special task forces, move them, and smoothly and equitably re-allot tasks within Europe to the units that remained on station to continue with the NATO mission.

The USAREUR Framework

European Command immediately responded to the Joint Chiefs' order by directing the United States Army component commander in Europe, General Crosbie Saint, to carry out the mission, specifying that the brigade equivalent should begin its movement out of Germany not later than 25 May 1991.³⁴ In the meanwhile, General Maddox, the V Corps commanding general, selected the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, based in Fulda, to go to Kuwait. Although all of the brigade commanders in V Corps expressed their eagerness to be given the assignment, the deciding factor was the organization of an armored cavalry regiment as a combined arms team that could easily reconfigure itself for a wide range of missions. Saint concurred in his decision.³⁵

Although the command did not officially inform the Blackhorse Regiment until the next day, both local commanders and Washington superiors were aware of the decision. Indeed, the choice of the regiment became part of a Department of Defense press release on 17 May 1991 when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced that the 11th Cavalry would send just over 3,700 soldiers to Kuwait by mid-June. There, the regiment would take over the equipment and mission of the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, the last combat unit remaining in Kuwait after Operation DESERT STORM was over. Cheney emphasized that the United States had no intention of permanently stationing ground forces in the Persian Gulf and that the deployment from Europe simply met a temporary need to provide security while the government of Kuwait reconstituted its own forces. He further informed reporters that the 11th Cavalry would take its orders from the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, which had its headquarters in Saudi Arabia at that time, and that there would be no relationship between the regiment and United Nations forces operating in the area.³⁶

Underscoring the high-level focus on the deployment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also delineated most of the support requirements, directing the U.S. Transportation Command to provide the necessary air and sealift to move the regiment, the Strategic Air Command to handle air refueling, the Space Command to arrange satellite communications support, and the Defense Logistics Agency to supervise logistical support, and coordinating national intelligence support from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.³⁷

USAREUR, the command designated to provide the troops and a general officer in overall command of the brigade force, dispatched a message to V Corps on 18 May, the next day, outlining corps responsibilities for the deployment. USAREUR continued the style of supervision that the Joint Chiefs had adopted, issuing detailed instructions that left the corps little to do but execute Heidelberg's decisions. USAREUR directed V Corps to deploy three squadrons, each with two ground troops, a support squadron, and the regimental headquarters and headquarters troop. In response, the corps supervised the regiment's preparations for deployment, and also sent a liaison and assessment team to Saudi Arabia to determine the equipment and stationing requirements

for the unit and to establish command and control relationships. The corps staff endeavored to identify any support requirements higher level planning had not foreseen and organized a departure airfield at Rhein-Main Air Force Base to be operational on C-Day (Commitment Day) minus twelve hours.³⁸ Despite the previous day's announcement in Washington, both unit movements and the operation itself continued to be treated as classified in Europe. USAREUR directed the corps public affairs office to refer all queries to the Department of Defense until the DoD released the announcement of the deployment. Thereafter, the corps could resume its normal public affairs program until operational command of the regiment passed to United States Central Command, at which point all questions were to be referred to that headquarters.

Funding was an important issue. During the Persian Gulf War, USAREUR and V Corps had been obliged to dip into their training and operational accounts to find the money for additional training, including training ammunition, for units the corps was dispatching to the Middle East. The deployment process likewise incurred considerable transportation costs, including rental of buses, payment for train and barge use, and the costs of setting up and operating rail heads and other transportation termini. Equipment and ammunition transferred to VII Corps were also considerable elements of expense. The corps resource management office worked throughout on the premise that a congressional supplementary funding package would ultimately reimburse the headquarters for all those expenditures.

Hence the corps staff carefully managed the costs of the 11th Cavalry deployment, because funding was once again not provided up front. Instead, the corps was obliged to use its existing budget for fiscal year 1991 to fund the Blackhorse deployment. Again, USAREUR intended to reimburse the corps as soon as the Department of the Army supplied additional money to the theater. In the meanwhile, the corps resource management office had to keep a close eye on the costs of the operation, reporting its budget status to Heidelberg every month.

Deployment proceeded in four phases. In the first phase, the regiment developed a movement plan for its soldiers and the equipment they would take with them. Although the regiment was to take over military hardware already in Kuwait, it was still necessary to ship a substantial amount of unit equipment to Southwest Asia. After assembling information about the characteristics of the various loads, the regiment computed requirements for cargo containers and loaded those containers and vehicles for movement. In the second phase, the corps movement control center and the 1st Theater Army Movement Control Agency directed unit movement to the sea port of embarkation. Helicopters flew to the ports, while ground equipment was moved by rail and motor convoy. During phase three, the regimental loading teams helped put the equipment on the ships. At the port, 21st Theater Army Area Command provided billeting and food for the soldiers and the 7th Medical Command managed all medical support. In the final phase, the units moved the soldiers to the aerial port of embarkation at Rhein-Main Air Force Base, where the corps operated the departure airfield.

Members of the USAREUR staff coordinated with U.S. Transportation Command for ships and aircraft and with Central Command for reception of the regiment in Southwest Asia. The regiment conducted its own checks to ensure that all soldiers and civilians deploying to Kuwait had settled their personal affairs and received the necessary immunizations.³⁹

The regiment expected to be issued its basic load of rations, camouflage nets, cots, tents, tarpaulins, barbed wire, sandbags, medical supplies, and bulk and packaged fuel after arrival in Southwest Asia. Although operational readiness float equipment would be available in theater, the regiment had the responsibility to provide for itself any equipment not available in Kuwait. Thus, the corps survey became all the more important as a way of managing cross-leveling of equipment internally to fill requirements before deployment. The regiment also had to bring its own carpentry kits, its basic load of repair parts, protective masks, decontamination kits, and individual clothing and equipment. Major assemblies, track, and tires would be available in Kuwait.⁴⁰ USAREUR authorized the corps to coordinate directly with Central Command about ammunition requirements and to pass information about shortfalls to USAREUR for resolution.⁴¹

V Corps Actions

The V Corps assessment team had been led by Brig. Gen. Robert A. Goodbary from the 3d Infantry Division. In addition to soldiers from that division, it had included eighteen troopers from the 11th Cavalry who were charged with determining specific regimental requirements and four members of the corps staff who specifically considered personnel, logistics, operations, and communications needs. The team left Rhein-Main Air Force Base on a Military Airlift Command flight to Kuwait on 19 May and returned to Germany on 23 May.⁴² Orders from USAREUR in hand, and with the report of the corps assessment team that he had already sent to Kuwait available, Maddox directed his staff to prepare the orders necessary to organize the force.

More than just military operations was involved. Supporting the combat force required a headquarters to provide the proper command and control and intelligence arrangements, administrative and logistical support requirements, and such mundane things as living quarters, mess halls, and other amenities of off-duty life for the 11th Armored Cavalry. Considering all those needs, the G-3 Plans staff decided to activate a provisional brigade headquarters to command the Blackhorse. To that headquarters would be attached units from corps troops to enable the cavalry to meet all of its security, support, and communications requirements. The 3d Infantry Division provided that headquarters element, which commanded not only the 11th Cavalry, but also corps troops that included a personnel company from the 5th Personnel Group, a military police platoon from the 18th Military Police Brigade, a detachment from the 5th Finance Group, and a detachment from the 3d Corps Support Command. Maddox intended the task force, numbering not more

than 3,999 soldiers, but prepared to accept additional forces if necessary, to deploy quickly to Kuwait. The task force command element preceded the regiment to Kuwait, coordinated with Central Command authorities there, and made ready to receive the combat unit.

Task force deployment was largely in the hands of the 3d Corps Support Command, and included operation of the departure airfield; fueling and defueling of vehicles designated for air shipment; supply of blocking, bracing, and tie-down material; and other logistical support beyond the capability of the regiment. The 18th Military Police Brigade superintended convoy escort and traffic flow at the airfields, where the 502d Movement Control Center controlled the unit deployment. Garrison personnel service companies supported the deploying units in home station preparation for the move, while forward area support teams from the 5th Personnel Group went to the aerial port of embarkation to supply limited personnel service support and assistance in preparing passenger manifests. The personnel group also arranged for courier service to and from the task force in Kuwait. The 130th Engineer Brigade made cranes available at railheads, and the 12th Aviation Brigade helped to prepare aircraft for shipment.


The corps deployment order specified that the 11th Armored Cavalry could take not more than 3,700 soldiers, thus allotting a maximum of 299 soldiers to the corps "slice" attached to the regiment. The controlling brigade headquarters also involved some additional soldiers. Elaborating on USAREUR instructions, the corps specified that the regiment would take its headquarters and headquarters troop, the combat support squadron, and three reduced maneuver squadrons, each limited to two troops. Detailed instructions for preparing soldiers administratively for the movement and for coordinating with supporting corps and theater units and agencies completed the deployment order.⁴³ (*Chart 6*)

The First Deployment: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The Blackhorse did not take part in the Persian Gulf War, although it did send more than two hundred soldiers, including air crews, mechanics, truck drivers, physicians' assistants, and intelligence analysts to serve in VII Corps units. In addition, it deployed the scout platoons of Troops E and K, the former serving with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Thereafter, and throughout the Gulf War, the regiment handled rear area security in Germany for deployed units and trained replacements. At the end of the war there were further detachments. In response to V Corps orders, the regiment had previously transferred an aviation task force to support relief operations in Turkey.

The 11th Cavalry was involved in deployment planning for the Kuwait mission from early May, when it submitted a recommendation to USAREUR headquarters that the regiment deploy to Kuwait with three squadrons (minus), rather than with two full squadrons. The rationale was that if each

CHART 6—11TH ARMORED CAVALRY ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION POSITIVE FORCE
(TASK FORCE VICTORY)



Note: The 4th Squadron (Aviation) was committed to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Troops B, F, and K, one from each squadron, were left in Germany.

squadron left a troop behind, command and control would be improved. According to the regiment's plan, each military community would have a full rear detachment to manage day-to-day operations and support the families of the deployed soldiers. If full squadrons moved to Kuwait, the communities at Bad Hersfeld and Bad Kissingen would have to be covered by units assigned from elsewhere. The eventual USAREUR deployment directive embodied the concept the regiment had recommended. Thus, Troops B, F, and K remained in Germany.⁴⁴

The rules of engagement under which the Blackhorse had to operate reflected a situation in which a direct, coordinated attack against the United States or coalition forces was highly unlikely. The degree of devastation visited upon the Iraqi military during the recently concluded war remained a subject of debate among intelligence analysts. There was no question, however, that at least part of the *Republican Guard* had never been committed to battle and that substantial portions of the army remained intact. Nonetheless, there was no evidence that the remaining intact Iraqi forces were stationed in the southern part of the country adjacent to Kuwait.

The Iraqi military establishment still had between 300,000 and half a million men under arms, spread out among approximately one hundred seventy brigades of seventy divisions of various types. But most of the divisions were at less than 20 percent strength, and none was at more than 65 percent strength. In general, each Iraqi division had about one battalion's worth of heavy equipment. The Iraqi Army was busily rebuilding and reequipping its units, but the process was expected to extend over several years. If opposing only the armed forces of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, American staffs estimated that Iraq could manage to undertake a small offensive campaign against the northern oil fields. Even so, those attacks would be terribly vulnerable to air attacks, and most American estimates held that the Iraqi Army lacked the logistics capability and, indeed, the logistics units, to sustain any such operation for more than several days. On defense, Americans anticipated that Iraq could absorb one limited, single front attack. That capability was seriously hampered by the fact that the reserve forces, the remainder of the *Republican Guard*, remained positioned to defend Baghdad.

The Iraqi forces presenting the most direct and immediate threat to the 11th Cavalry were located in southeastern Iraq. Most of those units belonged to *III Iraqi Corps* and had been engaged in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations during the recently ended war. The Corps G-2 considered that most were well below operational strength levels, the majority below 20 percent. Redistribution of arms and equipment had gone first of all to the *Republican Guard* units, with the Iraqi Army receiving second priority.⁴⁵ The only armored force in the south was the *17th Armored Division*, located near Al Basrah and considered to be at approximately 75 percent strength, and the *1st Mechanized* and *6th Armored Divisions*, both below 20 percent and located north of Al Basrah.⁴⁶ (Table 5) Based on the unlikelihood of attack, the corps specified that the 11th Cavalry would use peacetime rules of engagement, assuming that the oppos-

TABLE 5—Iraqi Army Order of Battle, May 1991, Southern Iraq

III Corps

3d Armd Div at Al Basrah
11th Inf Div at Al Tannumah
17th Armd Div at Az Zubayr
37th Inf Div at Al Basrah
49th Inf Div at Al Faw

IV Corps

1st Mech Div at Amarrak
53d Mech Div at Qurnrah

VI Corps

35th Inf Div at Al Qurnrah
40th Inf Div at Al Qurnrah

ing armed forces were not declared hostile. The policy, according to the rules of engagement, was to prevent conflict. In practice, that meant that soldiers were authorized to act in self-defense where necessary, although forbidden to use more force than was required to repel an attack on individuals or units.⁴⁷

Task Force Victory in Kuwait

The 11th Armored Cavalry's operations in Kuwait commenced on 15 June, although advanced parties had arrived at King Khalid Military City in Saudi Arabia as early as the last day of May, and the first elements of the main body reached the theater on 4 June.⁴⁸ (*Map 6*) Establishing itself in an old warehouse complex near Kuwait City, the Blackhorse set up security around its base and began to build living accommodations. Thereafter, the three line squadrons took turns performing the security mission, training, and preparing for a variety of other possible tasks, including defense of the American Embassy in Kuwait City.⁴⁹ By the summer of 1991 it had become clear that there was little risk that Iraq would attack Kuwait, and the mission of Task Force Victory evolved to deterring Iraqi behavior that might upset peace and order within Kuwait, although there remained ample force to protect American interests if deterrence failed.

Evidently content with the arrangement, the government of Kuwait asked that the United States continue to station combat troops along its border with Iraq, but USAREUR considered that a battalion task force was adequate in view of the steadily decreasing tensions in the region. Accordingly, USAREUR directed V Corps to prepare a headquarters element commanded by a colonel and a battalion task force to replace the 11th Cavalry by 15 September 1991. As was the case with the Blackhorse, V Corps was responsible to handle the deployment through its own movement control center, coordinating with 1st Theater Army Movement Control Agency.⁵⁰



MAP 6

When the corps received the USAREUR warning order, Maddox chose his assistant chief of staff, G-5, Col. Stuart H. Watkins, to command what became known as Task Force Victory II.⁵¹ Watkins, a mechanized infantry officer, had also served as an armor battalion S-3.⁵² Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. David L. Benton III, assistant division commander of the 8th Infantry Division, led a corps assessment team to Kuwait to determine support requirements for the smaller force.⁵³


Task Force Victory II in Kuwait

The 3d Battalion, 77th Armor, was assigned to the 3d Brigade of the 8th Infantry Division. During the Persian Gulf War the battalion conducted an operation known as TRANSPORT SHIELD, in which the soldiers helped to ship more than 15,000 vehicles to Saudi Arabia. At the beginning of 1991 the battalion conducted Operation MANNHEIM SHIELD, intended to protect the Mannheim military community from any terrorist attack during and immediately after the Persian Gulf War. In addition, the unit prepared four tank platoons for deployment to Southwest Asia as part of the replacement operation run by V Corps. Those platoons went to Saudi Arabia in mid-February, none of them returning to Germany until April. In the midst of preparations for the 1991 REFORGER exercise in August, 3-77 Armor received notification that it would succeed the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Camps Doha and Monterey in Kuwait, taking with it soldiers from a number of other divisional and corps units.⁵⁴

The task force arrived at King Khalid Military City in Saudi Arabia at the end of August. (Chart 7) As in the case of the 11th Cavalry, only soldiers deployed, falling in on the combat vehicles the preceding unit had left behind. After performing five days of intensive maintenance on the equipment they were to be issued, the soldiers drew tactical vehicles and loaded them on heavy equipment transporters provided by the Egyptians for the trip to Kuwait. Camps Doha and Monterey, only forty-three kilometers from the Iraqi border, were in sight of the oil well fires that had not yet been extinguished.

Task force operations continued to be similar to those undertaken by the Blackhorse.⁵⁵ Following desert certification training, the task force conducted tank and Bradley gunnery at the local Gibbs Range, then ran a combined arms live fire exercise with three companies from the 7th (Kuwaiti) Armored Battalion of the Al Traheer Brigade.⁵⁶ The Silver Knights, as the battalion referred to itself, ran the first U.S.-Kuwaiti training exercise after the end of the Persian Gulf War, with a scenario that included a passage of lines and a thirty-kilometer counterattack across a training area still littered with destroyed vehicles from the DESERT STORM fighting.⁵⁷ The task force later conducted foreign military sales demonstrations of the M1A1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley fighting vehicle for the government of Kuwait and the Gulf Cooperation Council.⁵⁸ At the end of November TF 3-77 Armor turned in its vehicles and, following an uneventful tour of duty in Kuwait, returned to Mannheim.⁵⁹ The first plane

CHART 7—TASK FORCE 3-77 ARMOR ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION POSITIVE FORCE (TASK FORCE VICTORY II)



left Kuwait on 25 November with the advance party, and by 7 December the entire unit had closed on its home stations.⁶⁰

Official estimates of a reduced threat of attack from Iraq allowed the United States to substitute an exercise program for Operation POSITIVE FORCE. At the outset, plans called for approximately four training exercises in Kuwait each year, two of which might be "light" unit rotations, including airborne and Special Forces units, and two of which would be heavy force rotations.⁶¹ Thereafter, a series of tank battalions cycled through Camps Doha and Monterey and used the adjacent maneuver areas for short-duration training, again drawing on the stocks of vehicles and equipment already in theater, rather than deploying with their own. The exercises underscored American intentions to defend Kuwait, while the Army's armored task forces were given the opportunity to train in a wide-open desert environment.

The Situation at the End of 1991

At the end of 1991 V Corps was not yet in the contingency business, but neither did it contemplate a future in which the heavy force battle would dominate its attention. Nevertheless, the task of deploying VII Corps to Southwest Asia and, in the process, sending roughly half of the corps' own combat strength to fight under VII Corps command began a process of reorientation of thinking about the problem of how the corps would move to a future battlefield. In the past, V Corps could count on the battle coming to it, in a very real sense, but by the end of 1991 corps planners began to turn their thoughts away from the traditional problem of marching from *casernes* to the intra-German border and corps exercises began to take account of the new problems that deployability posed. The experiences of the two task forces in Kuwait fed directly into the planning process that the corps commander, General Maddox, was already directing to figure out how to move V Corps to more distant battlefields in future wars.

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and POSITIVE FORCE, the first out of sector missions that the corps was called upon to conduct, suggested the outlines of the problems planners would have to overcome in the future. The central issue—projecting the force to distant, and probably unanticipated, battlefields—was clear. But however useful the experience of the missions to Turkey and Kuwait, there was an element of artificiality. In the case of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the deployment involved quite limited ground combat and security forces and proceeded with the full cooperation of many of the United Nations, of the NATO allies, and of Turkey, the host nation. In the case of Operation POSITIVE FORCE, the mission was really just an air flow problem, because the equipment was already in place in Kuwait.⁶² Brig. Gen. James Dickey, the corps chief of staff at the time, agreed, commenting that the deployment to Kuwait, at least, was "not difficult."⁶³ The corps did not have to solve the huge problem of marshaling and shipping heavy equipment. To a degree, too, the experience of Operation DESERT SHIELD was deceptive, because in that operation the entire

theater was involved in loading and shipping the deploying forces from USAREUR to Southwest Asia. As the European drawdown proceeded, many of the facilities that existed in 1990 were closed, and much of the expertise that existed in 1990 was lost. Rapid personnel turnover meant that the deployment experience of 1990 evaporated, and the urgent pace of operations thereafter meant that much of that experience was never incorporated into new procedures and plans, although the corps made major revisions to its crisis action team SOP and preserved the experience of moving large numbers of soldiers by writing another on passenger movement control.

Nonetheless, the operations associated with the Persian Gulf War were the first steps in reorienting the corps' attention, and the headquarters learned a great deal from the experience. Much of it had to do with the application of new technology, which had a lot to do with the success of V Corps deployments to Southwest Asia. By 1990 computers were in general use, and lap top computers proved especially useful in manipulating large amounts of data. Although no common agreement yet existed on what software should be used for word processing, the corps did have agreement on data base software, which allowed the different headquarters easily to share detailed tracking data about air and sea movements, as well as management of transportation requirements. At the same time, the newly acquired multiuse secure telefax proved its worth. The secure fax allowed immediate hard copy distribution of movement orders, pertinent briefing slides, and situation reports.

There were, of course, some enduring problems. One of the most persistent that the corps staff observed was the USAREUR staff's habit of communicating directly with battalions and companies in the corps, completely bypassing the corps staff. Understandably, tactical units normally replied directly to USAREUR when they received such calls, but then frequently neglected to inform corps of the conversation. Often, that led to confusion and duplication of effort, as the corps staff attempted to coordinate actions after the fact. Violation of the chain of command remained an irritant, but perhaps was the inevitable result of great improvements in communications.

The corps also had some difficulty in tracking unit deployments. On paper, units moved as a body under a single numerical unit description, while in practice, battalions and larger units customarily moved in three echelons: advance element, main body, and trail element. Brigades and divisions commonly deployed in five echelons: reconnaissance party, advance element, tactical command post, main body, and trail element. One of the major lessons the corps learned was that each element of a unit required a unit line number if the move was to be managed as closely as the corps commander desired.

The staff also noted some serious problems in maintaining unit integrity during sea movements, as the corps learned from reviewing the VII Corps deployment for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The ports tended to load equipment nontactically, configuring space arrangements for the maximum efficiency, rather than for keeping a unit's vehicles and equipment together, ready for immediate tactical employment upon arrival in the overseas theater. Gener-

ally speaking, tracked vehicles went on RORO (Roll On–Roll Off) ships, while wheeled vehicles went on conventional ships. When, for example, fifteen M1A1 tanks were needed to fill a ship, the port simply loaded the next fifteen tanks in line, regardless of the unit to which those tanks belonged. The corps G–4 Transportation division concluded that it was essential in any future deployment to put unit teams at the ports to prevent such breakdowns of unit integrity. A liaison officer was not sufficient.

Units also discovered that moving soldiers was a more complex process than it seemed to be. Throughout the deployments surrounding the Persian Gulf War, units encountered problems in accounting for their soldiers. Last minute changes to deployment rosters—occasionally a few soldiers, but just as often dozens—kept the personnel accountability system in chaos. The changes resulted from many things, ranging from late arrival of filler soldiers from other units, to emergency leaves, to changes in deployment schedules for elements of units. Whatever the reason, the roster changes not only made it difficult to keep track of where soldiers were, but also confused the aircraft requesting system, thereby tending to slow the deployment unnecessarily. Complicating the problem, some units had inexplicable difficulties in arriving at the aerial ports of embarkation on time and with no more than the allowable baggage.⁶⁴

Anticipating the need to deploy soldiers to Southwest Asia, the V Corps Special Troops Battalion had run its first battalion-wide predeployment processing in November 1990 and immediately discovered that the headquarters not only had a serious lack of experience with the process, but also confronted a series of previously unanticipated problems in individual soldier readiness. Many V Corps soldiers, the battalion found, were simply unready to be deployed. The corps had previously made the assumption that a soldier leaving the United States for Germany met all of the regulatory requirements for sending soldiers overseas. In fact, many did not. Because Germany was a mature theater with all of the military facilities that existed in the United States, a soldier could be expected to have a dental problem, for example, corrected as easily in Frankfurt am Main as at Fort Hood, Texas. Thus, the first battalion personnel checks at the corps headquarters revealed a host of deficiencies to be overcome, and the battalion commander concluded that he had to conduct such checks at least quarterly. In fact, the turnover in personnel was frequent enough to make the event a steady-state requirement in the post–Cold War period.⁶⁵

It was Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, when V Corps deployed a command post to Turkey, that instigated the requirement for the corps to establish a standing, deployable, regional command post. That led to General Maddox's initial thinking about restructuring the command post system the corps used and to serious thought about how a deployable command post ought to be manned. Among the issues to be resolved in the future were whether the corps could afford to send all of the "first team," the staff principals, with a deploying combined task force headquarters and still expect the parent organization to function as it should. The proper division of staff talent among numerous and often conflicting missions therefore became an object of serious discussion on the corps

staff.⁶⁶ Staff turnover complicated the problem, as Brig. Gen. Larry Lust, the 3d COSCOM commander, later remarked when he said that the "half life of deployment knowledge is about ninety days."⁶⁷

As V Corps entered the new year, the experience of the Persian Gulf War and subsequent operations in Southwest Asia established a new frame of reference for corps operations. A new set of planning problems existed, prompting a new series of questions to be answered. Chief among them was how the corps should organize and train for operations in the post-Cold War world. Forthcoming operations that followed hard on the heels of the missions to Southwest Asia increased the urgency of resolving those questions quickly and left the corps staff with a two-fold task. While planning and supervising missions for V Corps units, the staff continuously evaluated the experience of those deployments as it worked to solve the major questions about how it would fight in the future, how it would organize itself for battle, and how it would reach distant battlefields.

NOTES

¹ For a discussion of the Persian Gulf War from the USAREUR perspective, refer to Stephen P. Gehring, *From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: The U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998). This chapter benefited from critical reviews by Brig. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes, who took part in the events described. His comments and recommendations have, as appropriate, been incorporated into the text.

² Interv, author with Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox, 5 June 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Also see V Corps Victory Plan (Long Range Plan), FY 89–95, Vol. I, Executive Summary, 26 May 1989, which outlined the process of completing the then-current equipment modernization within the corps.

³ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, to CINCUSAREUR, 201645Z Sep 1990, sub: SITREP 201400Z Sep 1990, announced the completion of the 12th Aviation Brigade deployment to Southwest Asia.

⁴ Maddox interview.

⁵ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for Cdr, 3d AD, 271400Z Nov 1990, sub: Deployability Assistance to 3AD—Response to Daily SitRep 25 Nov 1990. Also see 5th Personnel Group Message Files, Operation DESERT SHIELD, 1990, and V Corps ACofS, G–3 (Operations) Message Files, Operation DESERT SHIELD, 1990.

⁶ Msg, CINCUSAREUR to multiple addressees, 091025Z Nov 1990, sub: USAREUR DESERT SHIELD Deployment Order 21; Msg, Cdr, V Corps, to multiple addressees, 141605Z Nov 1990, sub: V Corps Warning Order 90–01 (Deployment of 3d Armored Division and Select V Corps Units).

⁷ Maddox interview. For specific data on numbers of deployed soldiers, see Memo, Commander, 5th Personnel Group, 15 Apr 1992, sub: Verification of Deployed Numbers.

⁸ Interv, author with Col. William W. Alexander, 24 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁹ Maddox interview. Also see V Corps ACofS, G–3, summary file, V Corps Support of Operation DESERT SHIELD, which tabulates the relevant outgoing and incoming messages; key briefings for the CG, V Corps; and the V Corps liaison officer log.

¹⁰ Interv, author with Lt. Col. James A. Cope, 29 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Also see V Corps ACofS, G–3, summary file, Operation DESERT SHIELD Replacement, which tabulates requirements and funding for sustainment and replacement operations.

¹¹ Alexander interview.

¹² Ibid. For details of the planning and execution of the deployment, refer to daily V Corps Crisis Action Team files for the period of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

¹³ Memo, AETV-GCO (ACofS, G–3, Operations) for V Corps Chief of Staff, 6 Feb 1991, sub: Executive Summary of Out of Sector Deployment of 3rd Armored Division and Selected Units.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Msg, General Saint, Personal for Lt. Gen. Franks, Lt. Gen. Maddox, 020857Z May 1991, sub: Command and Control in USAREUR During and Post Redeployment from SWA; Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 121700Z Mar 1991, sub: V Corps Operation Order 91-9 (Redeployment of Forces from SWA).

¹⁶ Msg, CINCUSAREUR to multiple addressees, 081502Z Apr 1991, sub: USAREUR Deployment and Support Order for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. On the humanitarian relief operation in general, see: Stephen C. Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas: An Assessment of the Situation in Northern Iraq* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 16 Sep 1991); and Gordon W. Rudd, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: One More Tile on the Mosaic, 6 April-15 July 1991" (Unpublished Ms, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 15 Aug 1991).

¹⁷ Maddox interview.

¹⁸ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Gary E. Heuser, Commander, V Corps Special Troops Battalion, 2 Jul 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

¹⁹ *Blackhorse: The History of the 11th U.S. Cavalry 1901-1991* (Bad Kissingen, Germany: T.A. Schadenmayer, 1991), pp. 70-71.

²⁰ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 131830Z Apr 1991, sub: Warning Order #1, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

²¹ Msg, Cdr, 3d Inf Div for Cdr, V Corps, 161500Z Apr 1991, sub: Receipt of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Mission.

²² Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 211430Z Apr 1991, sub: FRAGO #6 to OPOD 91-10, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

²³ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 211000Z Sep 1991, sub: FRAGO #14 to OPOD 91-10, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II.

²⁴ Maddox interview. The numbers reflect U.S. Army deployments only.

²⁵ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-3, for Historian, n.d., sub: V Corps Historical Review for 1991. On 1 January 1997 the operation was renamed NORTHERN WATCH, and it was concluded in 2003.

²⁶ Useful summaries of the Persian Gulf War include: Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1993); Richard M. Swain, "Lucky War": *Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus (eds.), *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995); Robert H. Scales et al., *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993); Stephen P. Gehring, *From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: The U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998); and Stephen A. Bourque, *Jayhawk!: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002).

²⁷ CENTCOM Overview on Iraq, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, Department of Defense Briefing, 30 Sep 1997.

²⁸ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 171559Z May 1991, sub: V Corps OPOD 91-11, Assessment Team, Historians' files, HQ, V U.S. Corps.

²⁹ For the deployment of V Corps elements, see Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 121700Z Mar 1991, sub: V Corps Operation Order 91-9 (Redeployment of Forces from SWA).

³⁰ Msg, Chairman, JCS, to multiple addressees, 171545Z May 1991, sub: Temporary Post-DESERT STORM Ground Forces.

³¹ On the decision to leave elements of the 3d Armored Division in Kuwait, see Interv, author with Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, 19 Jan 1995, Heidelberg, Germany. ARCENT was the U.S. Army component of United States Central Command.

³² Msg, Cdr VII Corps to Cdr USAREUR, Personal for General Saint, 101246Z May 1991, sub: Composition of the Reserve Brigade Remaining in Kuwait.

³³ Memo, HQ VII Corps for Maj. Gen. Mallory, HQDA, 15 May 1991, sub: POMCUS Equipment for SWA Residual Brigade Transition.

³⁴ Msg, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 172005Z May 1991, sub: Operation DESERT CALM.

³⁵ Maddox interview.

³⁶ DoD Memo for Correspondents No. 252-M, 17 May 1991.

³⁷ Msg, Chairman, JCS, to multiple addressees, 171545Z May 1991, sub: Temporary Post-DESERT STORM Ground Forces.

³⁸ In coordinating all of those actions, V Corps could call for assistance upon the 1st Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA) in Oberursel, the 200th Theater Army Maintenance Management Center (TAMMC) in Zweibrücken, and the 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) in Kaiserslautern.

³⁹ Immune Globulin (5cc), Meningococcal (A&C) for all troops not receiving a booster vaccine within the last five years, Tetanus Diphtheria (TD) Toxoid for all troops not receiving the vaccine within the last ten years, Typhoid for all troops not receiving the vaccine within the last three years, Influenza vaccine, Oral Polio booster if the primary series was complete, Chloroquine Prophylaxis (each soldier to deploy with a six-week supply of Chloroquinephosphate tablets; treatment to begin one week prior to deployment and to continue after deployment was completed until a date to be determined). Every soldier with an HIV test older than 14 months had to be retested prior to deployment, although a soldier could deploy while awaiting the results of the HIV test. Soldiers were also to deploy with agent antidote kits and Pyridostigmine Bromide tablets.

⁴⁰ Prior to departure, each soldier was issued a pair of sunglasses, lip balm, two sets of desert battle dress uniforms, one hat, and a pair of U.S. flag patches. Central Command supplemented that issue after the soldiers arrived in theater by issuing two more sets of desert battle dress uniform (BDUs), two pairs of desert boots, a helmet cover, two sets of battle dress outer garments, and one night desert BDU.

⁴¹ Msg, CINCUSAREUR to Cdr, V Corps, 181828Z May 1991, sub: USAREUR Deployment Order, Operation POSITIVE FORCE.

⁴² Msg, Cdr, V Corps, to multiple addressees, 171559Z May 1991, sub: V Corps OPORD 91-11, Assessment Team; HQ 3d Infantry Division Orders 126-5, 5 Jun 1991.

⁴³ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, to multiple addressees, 211500Z May 1991, sub: Corps Operation Order 91-12 (Operation POSITIVE FORCE).

⁴⁴ 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) briefing slides, n.d., but May 1991.

⁴⁵ 11th ACR OPORD 91-7 (GLITTERING CATAPULT), 25 May 1991, app. 2 (Enemy Situation) to Annex B (Intelligence), and Tab A (Enemy Disposition) to app. 2. Soldiers were entitled to hostile fire pay. See Memo, HQ, Task Force Victory (Forward), for Cdr, 257th Personnel Service Company, 16 Sep 1991, sub: Officer Eligible to Wear the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia-Former Wartime Service (SSI-FWS).

⁴⁶ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 171559Z May 1991, sub: V Corps OPORD 91-11, Assessment Team.

⁴⁷ Peacetime Rules of Engagement, attached to 11th ACR OPORD 91-7 (GLITTERING CATAPULT), 25 May 1991.

⁴⁸ *Blackhorse: The History of the 11th U.S. Cavalry 1901-1991*, pp. 68-75, details regimental operations in Kuwait during Operation POSITIVE FORCE. On stationing, see HQ, ARCENT SUPCOM OPLAN 91-6, Reception, Staging, and Employment (RSE) of the 11th ACR (-), 201500Z May 1991.

⁴⁹ For day to day operations of the task force, see Interv, author with Lt. Col. David M. King, Commanding 302d Military Intelligence Battalion, *re*: Task Force Victory (Forward), Operation POSITIVE FORCE, Kuwait, 1991, 28 Jan 2000, Wiesbaden Army Air Field, Germany. The King interview also discusses the explosion in the 11th ACR motor pool at Camp Doha on 11 July 1991, in which about 13,500 pounds of high explosives blew up over a six-hour period. On that issue, also see Statement, Capt. David M. King, 19 Mar 1992, appended to Task Force Victory (Forward) G-2 Section informal Memo, "No Shit Ma, There I Was . . .," appending statements of other witnesses.

⁵⁰ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 13 Aug 1991, sub: Deployment Warning OPORD #23 (POSITIVE FORCE); Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 141800Z Aug 1991, sub: V Corps Operations Order 91-16 (Operation POSITIVE FORCE II); Memo, HQ, Army Central Command for HQ, V Corps, 13 Aug 1991, sub: Timeline for Kuwait Force Relief-in-Place.

⁵¹ Memo, V Corps for HQ, TF Victory (Fwd) II, 7 Sep 1991, sub: Assumption of Command.

⁵² Interv, author with Col. Stuart H. Watkins, 13 Jan 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁵³ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 131204Z Aug 1991, sub: V Corps OPORD 91-15, Assessment Team; Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 141805Z Aug 1991, sub: FRAGO #1 to V Corps OPORD 91-15 (POSITIVE FORCE II Request for Country Clearance); Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 141800Z Aug 1991, sub: Change 1 to Request for Country Clearance. The redeployment of the 11th Armored Cavalry proceeded concurrently with the arrival of Task Force 3-77 Armor, the last planeload of Blackhorse troopers arriving in Germany on 12 June 1991. See HQ, V Corps, Public Affairs Office, News Release No. 163-1, "Last 11 ACR Flight." Memo, Watkins for Chief of Staff, V Corps, 22 Aug 1991, sub: Trip Report—Task Force Victory II Deployment, details conferences with the 11th ACR on the relief in place and specifies the chain of command; 11th ACR OPLAN 91-25 (PRINCIPLE TWO), 7 Aug 1991, is the regimental redeployment order.

⁵⁴ 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Annual Historical Review (AHR-1991), 17 Jan 1992, p. 18-11; Input Analysis Report MTOE-Type, Task Force Victory (Fwd), August 1991. Elements of 5-77 Armor, 4-8 Infantry, 108th Military Intelligence Battalion, 202d Forward Support Battalion, and 25th Chemical Company were attached from the division. In addition, a Stinger section from Battery A, 5-3 ADA, and C/10 Engineers were attached from the 3d Infantry Division. "Camp Monterey," *Stars and Stripes*, 13 Nov 1991, offers a brief description of the facilities in Kuwait. 8th Infantry Division Public Affairs Office Announcement, 8ID Deploys to Kuwait to Relieve 11ACR, was released on the evening of 27 Aug 1991. On reception of TF 3-77 Armor, see 22d SUPCOM OPLAN 91-109, Reception, Staging, and Employment of Task Force 2X2 (TF 2X2), 171200C Aug 1991.

⁵⁵ See Memo, Commander V Corps for V Corps units, n.d., but September 1991, sub: TF Victory Commander's Intent; Briefing, Task Force Victory (Fwd), Victory Forward, September 1991, which specifies command relationships, mission and implied tasks, commander's intent, the operations cycle, area of operations, and personnel and equipment status as of the time TF 3-77 Armor arrived in Kuwait.

⁵⁶ On the exercise, refer to Task Force Victory (Forward) Operation Plan K91-2, October 1991. The task force conducted the exercise 21-23 October 1991.

⁵⁷ Task Force Victory II Briefing, "Combined US/Kuwaiti Operations, 21-23 Oct," October 1991.

⁵⁸ Task Force Victory II Briefing, "FMS Demonstration," October 1991, TF Victory Ops File.

⁵⁹ Task Force Victory (Forward) Operation Plan K91-2, October 1991. For further details on the various operations TF 3-77 Armor conducted while in Kuwait, refer to: Msg, Cdr, TF

Victory, for CINCUSAREUR, 161449Z Oct 1991, sub: TF Victory Update, 1-15 October 91; Msg, Cdr, TF Victory, for CINCUSAREUR, 021800Z Nov 1991, sub: TF Victory Update, 16-31 October 91; Msg, Cdr, TF Victory, for CINCUSAREUR, 171500Z Nov 1991, sub: TF Victory Update, 1-15 November 91. For a summary of TF Victory II operations, see [TF HQ], TF Victory II Chronology, November 1991. Also see Colonel Watkins' hand-written briefing notes on TF Victory II accomplishments, filed with TF Victory II Chronology.

⁶⁰ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 141355Z Nov 1991, sub: TF 3-77 Redeployment; Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for multiple addressees, 181700Z Nov 1991, sub: V Corps Operation Order 91-23 (Redeployment of Forces from POSITIVE FORCE II); TF Victory II Briefing, Operation "Victory Homecoming" Redeployment Plan, October 1991; Msg, USCINCCENT for multiple addressees, 071235Z Nov 1991, sub: Redeployment Order (TF 3-77).

⁶¹ V Corps ACofS, G-3, internal Memo, n.d., but September 1991, sub: "Prepositioned Equipment," discusses the need to keep more than one set of heavy equipment in Kuwait in order to support continued training rotations there without incurring serious maintenance problems.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. James S. Dickey, Chief of Staff, V Corps, June 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁶⁴ Memo, AETV-GCO for V Corps Chief of Staff, 6 Feb 1991, sub: Executive Summary of Out of Sector Deployment of 3rd Armored Division and Selected Units.

⁶⁵ Heuser interview.

⁶⁶ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Herbert Frandsen, Chief, ACofS, G-3, Plans, V Corps, 5-6 Jan 1993, Frankfurt am Main.

⁶⁷ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Commanding General, 3d COSCOM, 24 Jun 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base.

Operation PROVIDE PROMISE

"It took the combined efforts of the USAREUR and V Corps staffs, 7th Medical Command, and 3d COSCOM, with DA, EUCOM, and the Joint Chiefs looking over our shoulders and making helpful suggestions, to move a company-sized unit that had the word 'mobile' as part of its name."

Comment by V Corps staff officer after completing the deployment of the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital to Zagreb, 1993

"How can you argue about deploying medical units? I mean, they're angels of mercy. No one is going to turn down having them come and help. The medics have really been building up the frequent flyer miles."

Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Commanding General
3d Corps Support Command, 1995

Early in 1991, some ten years after the death of Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav federation of six republics and autonomous regions began to fall apart. Elections in Slovenia and Croatia produced victories for independence-minded governments that promptly asserted their sovereignty. The states then began a process of secession that came to fruition on 25 June 1991, when both declared their independence from Yugoslavia. There had already been fighting between the two republics and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Army, but September 1991 saw full-scale warfare in Croatia, including episodes of "ethnic cleansing" that the international community immediately condemned as genocidal and criminal. Also in September, Macedonia declared its independence from the Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina followed suit on 15 October. Agreements periodically and briefly interrupted the otherwise continuous fighting among the ethnically similar but culturally and religiously diverse populations of the former state. None of those cease-fires proved lasting. The European Union recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992 and of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April 1992, thereby encouraging separatist determination throughout the Balkans.

The international response to the collapse of the Yugoslav state developed slowly, but steadily, urged along by a barrage of graphic television news reports that spotlighted the growing horrors of the new Balkan civil war. In an effort to control the situation, the European Union imposed economic sanctions on

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—i.e., Serbia—in November 1991. On 21 February 1992 the United Nations, responding to a request from the Yugoslav government, enacted Security Council Resolution 743, which authorized the establishment of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as “an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.” On 7 April 1992 Security Council Resolution 749 authorized the full deployment of the UNPROFOR to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and member states quickly prepared company- and battalion-size elements, ultimately amounting to roughly 20,000 soldiers, to be stationed throughout the region. Once there, the peacekeepers were intended to separate the warring parties, secure “safe areas” for minority ethnic groups, and enforce the peace upon which any hope for future stability had to be based.

Early Planning

The United States Army, Europe, closely monitored the Balkan crisis, in the anticipation that some of its units might be ordered to take part in the UNPROFOR mission. Coordinating the V Corps staff's early preparations, Col. William W. Alexander, the deputy chief of staff, mused in 1992 that “we have all the possibility of a NATO contingency in Yugoslavia.”¹ The corps commander at that time, General Maddox, began in April 1992 to ask his staff for regular updates on the situation in Yugoslavia during the twice-weekly corps operations and intelligence briefings. The G-2 and corps historian gave the first of a long series of Balkan briefings that month, responding to a request to explain “who is killing whom, and why?”² Further briefings considered the military topography of the region and the military balance among the various warring parties. Several presentations for the entire general staff outlined the German 1941 attack on the Balkans in detail, with particular attention to the assembly areas that the Germans had selected and the way geographical conditions influenced the development of the armored advance through the country. A subsequent briefing described the Yugoslav rail network and summarized the Germans' use of the railroads to sustain military operations. The German experience with partisan warfare in Yugoslavia was of similar interest.³

Alexander's expectations to the contrary, the United Nations, rather than NATO, provided the context for American involvement in the former Yugoslavia. In the late afternoon of 22 October, the Pentagon announced that the Army would send a mobile army surgical hospital to Zagreb, Croatia, for an unspecified period of time that would begin on 15 November, a date selected to coincide with the day the UNPROFOR was to begin functioning in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The need was obvious. The civilian hospitals in Croatia were already overtaxed, and few armies had as extensive a medical organization as the United States Army. Planners considered a sixty-bed Army hospital adequate to fulfill the needs of the United Nations Protection Force, which by that time amounted to a polyglot force of division size, stationed throughout the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The United Nations had decided to base certain of its headquarters

and logistics functions, including medical support, in Croatia, where they would be buffered from the fighting but easily at hand for units operating in Bosnia. USAREUR was given the mission, for such a hospital was already stationed in Germany as part of the 3d Corps Support Command of V Corps.⁴ The hospital became part of U.S. European Command's Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, under which were organized all of the American missions, both unilateral and in support of the United Nations, in the area of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Prior to the October public announcement, Washington had alerted USAREUR and V Corps about the mission, and the European staffs covered a lot of ground in the week before the Pentagon released its press statement. The 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH), a part of 3d Corps Support Command's 68th Medical Group, was stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base, and the USAREUR commander directed V Corps to prepare the MASH immediately for movement to Croatia and to deploy the sixty-bed hospital. The V Corps was also to provide command and control for all U.S. Army, Europe, soldiers ultimately stationed in the vicinity of Zagreb and to accept attachments from the 7th Medical Command and the 21st Theater Army Area Command.

While V Corps began organizing the hospital movement, USAREUR directed the 7th Medical Command substantially to augment the MASH with additional personnel and equipment and ordered the 21st Theater Army Area Command to provide the direct support maintenance for all of the military and hospital equipment in Zagreb, as well as sending four M818 tractors with drivers and four M872 trailers to help emplace the unit. USAREUR further specified that the hospital would be assigned to the United Nations and under the operational control of the Headquarters, United Nations Protection Force, in Zagreb. Operational command, on the other hand, remained in American hands. In agreeing to make the deployment, USAREUR reserved the right to approve any operations of American soldiers outside the immediate area of Zagreb. Finally, USAREUR envisioned shipping the hospital equipment from Germany to Croatia by rail, while sending the hospital personnel by military aircraft.⁵

Early staff work ironed out a series of issues that arose from the initial order. One of the first involved the delicate question of placing American troops under foreign command, and particularly under United Nations command. Lt. Col. Guy A. Berry, the chief of operations division in the corps G-3, noted the major concerns during a late-October briefing at the corps headquarters. First, Yugoslavia offered an uncertain and rapidly changing geopolitical climate. Second, Berry viewed the mission as ill-defined and subject to various—and probably conflicting—interpretations. Finally, there was an element of risk, inasmuch as the "UN [was] not liked by anyone," as he scribbled on his copy of the briefing slides. The first two conditions implied the need for a military command that would be able to take quick and decisive action when presented with crisis, not historically a strength of United Nations commands. The palliative for Berry's concerns was a dual chain of command, thereafter to become typical of U.S. Army operations in the Balkans. While the MASH fell under the authority of the UNPROFOR medical officer, its chain of command ran through an American

military headquarters, the U.S. Contingency Command (USCONCOM), to be located in Zagreb. At that point, no one was certain which headquarters would provide the USCONCOM. The 68th Medical Group was, however, a leading and logical candidate.⁶ The briefing proceeded to outline the MASH mission:

Deploy the 60 Bed 212 MASH to Zagreb, Croatia, tailored to provide medical and surgical care in support of 20,000 UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia not later than 15 November 1992.

Discussion zeroed in on the issues of facilities and missions. Initial plans called for the MASH to be located at a former Yugoslav Air Force base that shared facilities with the Zagreb airport. While Camp Pleso, as it was known, had fairly extensive facilities, the corps was at that point uncertain about whether the buildings were in good condition and how much space the UN command would allot for the hospital's use. In any case, as Colonel Berry noted, the Croatians did not want to give up many of their fixed facilities, and housing for the MASH consequently remained an open question. More housing would be needed than was typical for a MASH, too, because of the personnel augmentation necessary to expand the hospital's capabilities. Happily, medical evacuation remained a responsibility of the participant nations. Nevertheless, although UNPROFOR promised that some 40 percent of the hospital's logistical requirements would be provided by the United Nations, briefing officers assumed that they would still need to plan for a continuous logistical flow from Germany.⁷

Because the deployment process involved the other American armed services, with some assistance from the other nations participating in the United Nations mission, there were many issues to be resolved, and messages seeking the necessary information to complete the planning flew back and forth among the American headquarters in Europe over the succeeding week. The most important early decision was that the MASH would not live in tents. The USAREUR deputy chief of staff, logistics, considered the possibility of contracting for prefabricated housing, while the U.S. European Command investigated the use of U.S. Air Force prefabricated housing units.⁸ Anticipating that it would take some time to organize a supply system to support the hospital satisfactorily, and revealing persistent doubts about UN promises regarding logistics, the corps G-4 set plans in motion to send the 212th MASH to Zagreb with thirty days of supply in all of the major classes. The only exception was messing. The corps understood that the MASH would use the French mess that supported the rest of the United Nations contingent in Zagreb.⁹ Resupply remained a matter of concern and led to a corps request that the Department of the Army upgrade the 212th MASH's supply priority.¹⁰ The distinctive United Nations insignia—the UN brassard, berets, and other headgear—had to come from United Nations sources. There were no UN-blue kevlar helmets on hand, and the corps considered the possibilities of using blue helmet covers or else simply painting standard kevlar headgear.¹¹

The corps G-3 worried about the unsettled political situation, even in comparatively stable Croatia, and the potential for fighting there, and thus asked



The V Corps soldiers for the first time wearing the blue beret of the United Nations during the mission in Zagreb

USAREUR whether normal peacetime rules of engagement would apply, or whether special rules would be devised for the soldiers stationed in Zagreb, not all of whom were medical personnel. The G-3 also raised a range of other open questions that began with whether soldiers sent to Croatia would be entitled to imminent danger pay. Another immediate question was whether soldiers' families would be allowed to remain in government quarters in Germany or instead be sent home to the United States. In the latter case, personnel officers asked whether space available travel on military air transportation would be authorized for soldiers' families. The corps also needed USAREUR to make clear its expectations about the speed of the deployment; whether resupply would be by air or by rail; what operational reporting formats USAREUR preferred the MASH to use to keep headquarters in Germany informed about operations in Zagreb; and what requests it would entertain for additional personnel to assist the hospital.¹²

Some of the G-3's concerns also resonated with the G-1, responsible for determining personnel policy for the deployment. By late October no firm policy for personnel rotation had yet been decided, although the G-1 was considering the two options of rotating the entire hospital with another MASH or another service's hospital, ideally one from the continental United States, or of setting up an individual replacement system. In either case, no soldier's tour

of duty in Zagreb could last longer than 179 days, in order to preclude the assignment becoming a permanent change of station. In the interests of stability, corps policy held that no soldier with less than ninety days remaining in Europe could be sent to Zagreb, although unit commanders were permitted to request that soldiers with approved voluntary separations from active duty have those separations deferred until the deployment ended.

Similarly, commanders could request that soldiers scheduled to move on regular change of station orders have those orders deferred or deleted, in the interests of meeting the personnel needs of the mission. Those soldiers scheduled to leave the Army at the end of their enlistments, however, were unaffected and would be separated from the service on schedule. On a case-by-case basis, the corps could decide to return soldiers from Croatia to attend professional development courses. Because security in Zagreb could not be guaranteed, the G-1 strongly recommended that soldiers' families not be permitted to visit Croatia. In the event that the USAREUR deployment commitment extended beyond six months, the corps asked that former DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM personnel policies be implemented: space-available flights to the United States for family members of deployed soldiers, and families in which both parents were soldiers allowed to return their children to the United States at government expense.¹³

For the hospital, adequate communications were critical, but civilian telephones were not going to be adequate. The corps signal officer found that there were 328 commercial telephone lines available in Zagreb, of which 248 were designated for United Nations use. Only five were capable of making international connections. Adequate military communications therefore became imperative, and the corps figured on placing its two single-channel tactical satellite devices at the 212th MASH headquarters and the 3d Corps Support Command headquarters. Military secure telephones and e-mail would be tested by the corps survey team shortly to depart for Croatia.¹⁴ Envisioning the many unforeseen requirements that might arise, the corps resource manager recommended sending a warranted contracting officer to Zagreb to assist the MASH, and further recommended that one USAREUR contracting officer be designated as the point of contact for contracting support in Germany, so as to alleviate the duplication of effort encountered during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.¹⁵ The 502d Movement Control Center (MCC) recommended that 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) equipment be shipped from a railhead in Kaiserslautern in order to avoid overcrowding at the small Wiesbaden railhead. That, the 502d MCC concluded, should reduce handling and shipping time. In any case, 21st TAACOM equipment had to be shipped by rail not later than 3 November to make sure that it arrived one day before the hospital's equipment was due to arrive, because the TAACOM's equipment was needed to handle and emplace the hospital.¹⁶

On 22 October the assistant corps engineer received a request from the USAREUR deputy chief of staff, engineer, to send an engineer on the joint EU-COM-USAREUR recon team to Zagreb to determine the requirements and

feasibility of constructing a base camp for the 212th MASH. The team, which also included Army and Air Force engineers from EUCOM and the USAREUR facilities engineer, intended to look at the existing facilities, conditions, available contractors, available engineering materials, and possible locations for the camp. The corps agreed, but in fact sent two officers, an engineer major from the 130th Engineer Brigade construction management section and an engineer from the 94th Engineer Battalion, which would handle base camp construction. The team flew to Zagreb on 26 October for a four-day inspection of the site.

Legal support for the deployed task force was also a V Corps requirement. The corps retained criminal jurisdiction, inasmuch as the U.S. forces were understood to have the same legal status as the remainder of the UNPROFOR. The V Corps staff judge advocate planned to send his deputy along with the survey team to identify legal issues, and that officer or another legal officer would deploy with the task force for one or two weeks to set up a legal section in Zagreb and to help the hospital with legal issues related to its new stationing. The corps intended to send a noncommissioned officer from the legal office along with the hospital and to rotate in a staff judge advocate once a month, or more frequently if required, for four-day stints of advising the command and performing legal assistance. The MASH would handle all of its minor disciplinary matters, but would return soldiers to Germany if courts-martial or administrative elimination from the Army became necessary. The Trial Defense Service remained prepared to send defense counsel to Zagreb whenever needed.¹⁷

Finally, while there was only miniscule interest in the MASH deployment in the American press, the subject was of considerable interest in Europe, and particularly in Germany. The V Corps public affairs officer therefore saw the opportunity for favorable publicity from the foreign press in Zagreb. Thus, on order from U.S. European Command, the corps formed a press information center led by Maj. Ken Fugett, the 3d Corps Support Command public affairs officer, and staffed by two sergeants from within the corps. The corps planned to rotate the press information center's staff every two to three months, with the first replacement package using Maj. Susan Ives and Sgt. Ken Heller from the corps public affairs office.¹⁸

Working with information from those diverse sources, the V Corps, 3d Corps Support Command, and 68th Medical Group staffs within a few days cooperated to develop the basic plan for the structure of the hospital and its deployment. Before the end of October General Maddox ordered creation of a task force headquarters based on elements of the 68th Medical Group staff to serve as USCONCOM. The MASH itself was staffed with 70 officers and 186 enlisted soldiers. Including attachments from the 7th Medical Command and the 21st TAACOM, the entire deployment involved 90 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 251 enlisted soldiers, for a total of 342. The hospital and associated maintenance organization amounted to fifty vehicles and ninety-two containers. Although the hospital was under United Nations command, both USAREUR and V Corps firmly intended to retain considerable control. For that purpose, the corps set up a variety of communication nets: e-mail to the corps;

tactical satellite to the 3d Corps Support Command emergency action center, to the V Corps emergency action center, and, if required, to 21st TAACOM; and backup nets employing commercial telephones, secure military telephones, and radio teletype rigs. By that time the housing problem had also been resolved. The hospital would use "Harvest Falcon" prefabricated housing units provided by the U.S. Air Force. The briefing also finalized the deployment time line for Task Force 212 MASH.¹⁹ (*Table 6*)

The final task organization of what the corps by then referred to as Task Force 212 was established by V Corps Operation Order 93-01. Task force directives outlined the anticipated command and control relationships. The hospital and all attached units were assigned to TF 212, which served as the U.S. Contingency Command, and USCONCOM was assigned to the United Nations and under operational control of the Headquarters, UNPROFOR, in Zagreb. Also as anticipated, the commander of the 68th Medical Group, Col. Greg Stevens, was

TABLE 6—DEPLOYMENT TIME LINE FOR TASK FORCE 212 MASH

<i>Date</i>	<i>Task</i>
November 3.	Finish equipment maintenance.
November 5.	Secure soldiers' personal gear and automobiles. Direct support maintenance train departs from Mannheim.
November 6.	First medical train departs Wiesbaden Air Base. Harvest Falcon team arrives in Zagreb. Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) advance party deploys.
November 7.	Second medical train departs Wiesbaden Air Base. Direct support maintenance train arrives in Zagreb. Harvest Falcon team begins building. Harvest Falcon electrical team arrives in Zagreb.
November 8.	First medical train arrives in Zagreb. Third medical train departs Wiesbaden Air Base.
November 9.	Second medical train arrives in Zagreb.
November 10.	Build the MASH. Third medical train arrives in Zagreb. Main body party #1 deploys by air.
November 14.	Main body party #2 deploys by air.
November 15.	MASH operational.

Source: Briefing for CG, V Corps, n.d., but late October 1992, sub: TF 68 Deployment.

on 23 October designated to command not only Task Force 212 but also the U.S. Contingency Command in Zagreb.²⁰

The various staffs, confronted with a movement deadline that was only ten days away, swiftly went to work to translate the plans into action. As a first step, the task force painted all of its vehicles and equipment UN white and completed inventories and inspections incident to preparing vehicles and shipping containers for rail loading.²¹ Concurrently, the 3d Corps Support Command certified that all of the soldiers had zeroed and qualified on their rifles or pistols and had gone through refresher training in NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) proficiency. The hospital then scheduled a full day of briefings at the theater on Wiesbaden Air Base for all of its soldiers. Topics included safety, cold weather hazards, the Geneva Convention, the Code of Conduct, stress management, the current threat, defense against land mines, and a historical briefing on how the existing situation in Yugoslavia had come about. Each soldier also received a pocket-sized deployment handbook jointly prepared by the corps G-2 and historian and printed by the G-6. The handbook recapitulated much of the information that the briefings had presented.²²

Unresolved issues continued to concern the corps and corps support command staffs. The corps, in particular, was eager to obtain a commitment that, as one G-3 planner put it, the Army intended to "share the wealth around" when finding replacements for the 212th MASH at the end of its six months in Zagreb. Seeking clarification, the corps asked USAREUR operations to specify the TF 212 "endstate," by which was meant the length of deployment, the rotation policy USAREUR meant to employ, some identification of what unit would replace the 212th MASH, and instructions on what to do with the hospital equipment when the unit returned to Germany.²³ All of those questions did not lie within USAREUR's purview, however, and the theater had its own concerns, which closely paralleled those of the corps.

The USAREUR staff was particularly worried about the hospital replacement plan, outlining for the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, and Headquarters, Department of the Army, its concerns about the quality of medical care for soldiers remaining in Germany if the deployment was to be a long one. General Saint wanted it clearly understood that "USAREUR does not have the medical resources to support a long term deployment without degrading health care in theater." Clearly fearing that the Department of the Army had an inaccurate picture of the resources available, Saint spelled it out in his message to the European Command. The "USAREUR medical structure," he pointed out, "is designed to support the corps and provide peacetime health care to eligible beneficiaries with a minimum essential number of medical personnel."²⁴

USAREUR's preferred option was for an active or reserve component medical unit from the continental United States to replace the 212th MASH. To facilitate that, the USAREUR commander was willing to leave the hospital's equipment in Zagreb, re-equipping the unit at home station with medical supplies and equipment that the on-going European drawdown had made surplus to the needs of the command. The message concluded on an unambiguous note:

"Request that USEUCOM work a replacement unit for the 212th MASH from other than USAREUR assets for any mission beyond initial deployment period of 179 days."²⁵

To that, the V Corps staff and soldiers all over the corps area, concerned whether their families would be denied routine health care in Army hospitals and clinics, echoed resounding agreement. The Frankfurt Military Community, for example, had reacted with concern when four physicians and twenty-three other soldiers were detached from the 97th General Hospital in Frankfurt and assigned to the 212th MASH. The hospital commander, Col. Richard Kirchdoerfer, told a community meeting that "timely health care" would remain available, although access to some areas, such as orthopedic care and social work services, might be delayed.²⁶ Admittedly, those concerns seemed relatively minor, given the size of the Army in Europe. However, if the deployment expanded, those types of concerns would obviously all mushroom extremely quickly.

The USAREUR staff worked quickly to give V Corps answers to other pressing questions. On 27 October the corps learned that its soldiers would definitely be "blue-hatted," enjoying the same legal status as all other UN soldiers in Zagreb. The United States Consulate in Frankfurt am Main obtained passport and visa waivers for all of the soldiers, although the civilian members of the unit still had to carry U.S. passports. The use of Department of the Army civilians in deployments raised still more questions. Civilians had long been a part of most Army units in Europe, handling many of the routine garrison tasks. Another consequence of the European drawdown of forces was that all military units were reduced in size and no longer had enough soldiers to do every job. Thus, when the hospital went to Zagreb, some of its civilians necessarily went along. In their case, the government of Croatia agreed to grant visa waivers. Inasmuch as the hospital was to be located in an area that was not involved in the fighting, normal peacetime rules of engagement were in effect. Nonetheless, TF 212 was authorized imminent danger pay. USAREUR informed the corps that it had asked European Command for authority to approve all visitors to TF 212 and did not intend to delegate that authority, once granted it. The USAREUR commander had already expressed his intention to make certain that anyone going to Zagreb had a valid reason for doing so. Housing, however, remained a problem. The V Corps survey team had already reported that there were no semi-permanent billets available in Zagreb, and that buildings previously thought to have been available at the airport had already been allocated to various agencies of the United Nations. Worse yet, it was already all but certain that the Air Force "Harvest Falcon" housing would not be ready for use by 15 November, when the main body of TF 212 was due to arrive in Zagreb.²⁷

The questions of placement of the hospital and where the troops would live were obviously urgent ones, and became immediate concerns of the joint EU-COM-USAREUR-V Corps survey team that arrived in Zagreb on 27 October. If anyone in the Stuttgart, Heidelberg, or Frankfurt headquarters had a rosy view of how easily those problems could be solved, a remarkably frank telefax from the survey team the next day rapidly dispelled it. Surprisingly, housing took sec-



Members of Task Force 212 MASH in a hospital tent in Zagreb

ond place to funding as the chief concern. The United Nations chief of staff and finance officer in Zagreb argued that the UN's agreement with the United States required the Army to pay for all of the support the United Nations provided. "This," the report pointed out, "makes our nation the only one with troops assigned to the UNPROFOR to pay its own bills." The funding problem was exacerbated by the lack of any established procedures for channeling money to the United Nations, without which the UN would do nothing to help with the TF 212 stationing, since the international agency refused to provide goods and services on a reimbursable basis. Piling woe on woe, the message further added that "if supplies and services are procured through the UN contracting center, we will work with an immense bureaucracy," where "any contract for award over \$70K must be approved in NY and it takes four weeks to receive a reply." The first step in easing the situation was to provide the task force with a Class A finance agent who could pay for goods and services in cash.²⁸

With those problems—yet to be solved—in mind, the team went on to report that the original hospital and billet assignments were "considered soft." There were three possible locations for billets and two for the hospital. Each location required the hospital to be configured differently, and until those matters were resolved, little progress could be made. The "Harvest Falcon" units were not going to be ready when the troops arrived, and the team estimated costs of some \$200,000 and twenty days of lead time to prepare the site for them. Water and sewer connections for the hospital and billeting areas required at least

seven days to set in place and involved a contract award of another \$150,000. The option of buying housing locally was really no better, since it involved an immediate cost of \$1.45 million and twenty-one days between contract award and delivery. The litany of difficulties went on as the team looked for a place to put the direct support maintenance shop, since no more maintenance bays were available at the airport and no tenants would agree to give up any space. Therefore, it might be necessary to equip the task force with maintenance tents, an unforeseen requirement that demanded revision of train load plans.

Pertinent to the location of all of the task force facilities was the fact that the amount of "hard stand," either paved or other hard-surfaced area, was limited and the ground around the airport was very wet and soft. Before such ground could be used, another contract to prepare the site was essential to keep the hospital area "from becoming a quagmire and rotting out the bottom of the tents." Conveying further unwelcome news, the team reported that the French dining facility could not accommodate the MASH, as previously assumed, and the task force therefore needed to establish a contract for catering services. There were few good solutions available for any of those problems. For the moment, the survey team intended to look for nearby hotels to rent until the "Harvest Falcon" housing was ready. The report concluded with the observation that the survey trip needed to have been done a month earlier. "I am not saying the mission cannot be done," the author concluded, but "it will be hard and getting harder each minute."²⁹

While the survey team hammered out solutions to the funding and housing questions in Zagreb, the troops in Germany continued to ready themselves for departure. The numbers to deploy had grown from the estimated 300 to 431, as augmentees arrived to perform tasks for which the MASH had not originally been configured but that a clearer perception of conditions made essential.³⁰ Bureaucratic difficulties continued to insinuate themselves into the preparations. The 3d Corps Support Command belatedly learned that American vehicles transported to Zagreb would be classified as UNPROFOR vehicles. Only drivers possessing UN driving licenses would be authorized to operate them. Happily, those licenses could be obtained ahead of time by liaison officers in Zagreb who presented copies of soldiers' driving licenses to the United Nations in-processing center.³¹ As the end of the month drew near, planners also learned they would have to allot space on the trains and on the ground in Zagreb for an Armed Forces Network detachment that USAREUR had decided to send along with the task force. The soldiers who would supply radio and television to the task force quickly painted their equipment white, went through the predeployment process, and were certified as meeting the training standards of the rest of the task force. Colonel Stevens maintained control of the detachment by attaching it to the headquarters and headquarters detachment of TF 212.³²

There had never been much time available to plan the TF 212 deployment, and time was by then about to run out. On the eve of deployment the V Corps survey team sent the headquarters the good news that the French mess had agreed to feed the TF 212 soldiers lunch through 15 November and to take over

full messing responsibility after that date. The survey team continued to work on hotel arrangements with half-pension (breakfast and dinner) for the first forty-five soldiers due to arrive, as well as bus transportation from the hotels to the air base where they would work. The team warned that it might be necessary to slip the time lines a little, lest the task force have too many soldiers in Zagreb with nothing to do, or too much equipment arriving at the rail head that could not be spotted at its final destination. The team had arranged for a piece of hard stand for the hospital, but until it had been cleared of its current occupants, the team could not even survey the site.³³ The survey team's warning came too late, however. To use staff officer jargon, the deployment had by 3 November become "a falling rock" and would proceed according to plan. Each part of the deployment had been fully articulated, including manifests that listed the names of the soldiers.³⁴

The Deployment

Task Force 212 moved to Croatia on schedule, and in a bath of pathos and publicity.³⁵ Lt. Col. (Dr.) Everett Newcomb and ten of his soldiers flew to Zagreb as the advance party on 5 November. That same day the first train with medical equipment, vehicles, and supplies pulled out of Wiesbaden Air Base. Three more trains departed according to the established schedule, and the main body of the task force left Rhein Main Air Base on 10 and 11 November. The 3d Corps Support Command arranged to have all the soldiers and their families served Thanksgiving dinner three weeks early at the Wiesbaden Air Base dining facility, days before the main body departed. Typically, that emotional event attracted considerable attention from the media as well.³⁶

When the deployments began, the V Corps G-3 established a daily situation report format for TF 212 and directed the daily situation reports to be submitted not later than 9:00 in the evening, Greenwich Mean Time, as of 6:00 in the evening. The task force was directed to transmit the report to the 3d Corps Support Command emergency action center, which would forward it to corps headquarters. Uncertain about what sorts of information might be contained in the reports, and concerned to protect potentially sensitive—and perhaps politically sensitive—information, the G-3 further ordered that the report would be classified confidential, at a minimum. The intention was that each situation report would give the chain of command a thumbnail sketch of the unit's daily status and allow the headquarters both to anticipate task force needs and to respond quickly to short notice requirements.³⁷

Considering the short notice the MASH had received, it was unsurprising that the deployment began with some important questions still awaiting adequate answers. The survey team in Zagreb had already determined that the Air Force prefabricated housing units would not be ready when the task force arrived at the Pleso Air Base. As it turned out, an adequate number of "Harvest Falcon" units was not yet even en route to Croatia. Most of the sets available to the Air Forces in Europe were already in use at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey,

supporting humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq.³⁸ The few being delivered to Zagreb exhausted European stocks and none had been held back for other possible contingencies. Although European Command asked other unified commands to help out, those discussions were still in progress when Newcomb's troops departed for Zagreb.

There remained other contentious issues to be resolved that "purple procedures" did not allow for. Chief among them was funding. European Command in Stuttgart confessed that it did not know where the money was coming from to return the borrowed "Harvest Falcon" housing at the end of the mission. The European headquarters also agreed that reconstitution of equipment at the end of Operation DESERT STORM, an unfortunate experience that European Command had shared, gave good reason for reticence. However, despite the fact that funding for PROVIDE PROMISE operations was still an unresolved question, European Command stressed that "we cannot delay this operation awaiting those answers" and promised to solve the money question as quickly as possible. Obviously joint staff procedures were not yet as maturely developed as they might have been.³⁹

The legal status of soldiers in Zagreb was one of the more pressing open issues. Characteristically, American soldiers operating in a foreign country were subject to a status of forces agreement (SOFA) worked out between the United States and that country. In the case of Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, authorities in Germany were uncertain what sort of arrangement existed, since negotiating the agreement in Croatia was a UN responsibility. The status of forces agreement would need to delineate the documentation soldiers would have to present in order to enter Croatia, as well as the status of U.S. Army soldiers who were not citizens of the United States, but permanent resident aliens. The consulate in Frankfurt am Main received reports that a United Nations Model Status of Forces Agreement was in force in Croatia, but had no idea what the provisions of that document entailed. Accordingly, the consul general asked the embassy in Zagreb to discuss the issue with the UNPROFOR legal adviser and to send a copy of the United Nations status of forces agreement "should it actually exist." There was no overconfidence about United Nations arrangements. The consul general also dryly informed the embassy in Zagreb that "nonexistence of that MODEL SOFA would also be a useful piece of information."⁴⁰

Those and other legal issues were finally resolved by the middle of November 1992. Interestingly, the rules of engagement for U.S. soldiers remained ill-defined even after they began arriving in Zagreb, in part because of differences within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A message from the Joint Chiefs on 13 October 1992 told the Army that normal U.S. peacetime rules of engagement applied. Later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff legal adviser specified that the task force had to adhere to United Nations rules of engagement. On 19 November European Command finally determined that the UN rules of engagement applied.

The State Department's discussions about the status of American soldiers finally bore fruit as well. The Frankfurt consul general's suspicions about the status of forces agreement proved correct. While the United Nations was in-

deed negotiating with Croatia for an agreement, none actually existed at that moment. Croatia had, in the interim, agreed to be bound by the UN Model Status of Forces Agreement and the United Nations Immunities Convention. That convention generally gave UNPROFOR personnel immunity from Croatian criminal and civil jurisdiction and other legal processes in duty-related matters and allowed the national contingent commander to exercise legal jurisdiction in criminal cases. The United Nations was given the right to adjudicate financial claims for duty-related damage and injury to Croatian nationals incident to its operations. Finally, members of the United Nations force were exempt from passport and visa regulations, immigration inspection and restrictions on entry and departure from Croatia, regulations governing residence of aliens there, taxation on pay and benefits from their national governments or the United Nations, and duty and customs on their goods upon arrival.⁴¹

Not all staff discussions were so fruitful. While Army staffs were quick to criticize the bureaucratic nature of the United Nations staffs and the slow pace of joint staff work, they were themselves still prone to internal, and occasionally unproductive, disagreements. Evidently concerned that the similarity of designation between "Task Force 212," the headquarters element of the American deployment, and "212th MASH," the hospital itself, might cause confusion, someone in the USAREUR staff proposed changing the name of the task force. That provoked a sharp response from the corps over the signature of Brig. Gen. Henry A. Kievenaar, the corps chief of staff. "Until last week," he wrote, "this was not an issue." Couching his protest in the form of a question, Kievenaar stressed that "this headquarters has no difficulty . . . understanding that TF 212 is the headquarters element with 212 MASH as a subordinate unit. Are you now directing us to re-designate the headquarters element in Zagreb?"

Kievenaar then asked USAREUR to understand the problems such a change would involve, problems that would begin with reissuing all 342 sets of deployment orders for individuals assigned and attached to the task force to reflect the new headquarters designation. Further, he argued, all public announcements had referred to "Task Force 212," and a change could cause the press to believe that another force or additional forces were being sent to Croatia. Considering the American sensitivity about deployment of troops in the first place, and the probability that some, if not many, journalists would not have the military background to understand what the redesignation really meant, that would be an undesirable outcome. The corps staff, already frustrated by its dealings with the UNPROFOR staff, provided what many must have considered the clinching argument: Since UNPROFOR had been talking to, and answering message traffic about, TF 212 for more than a month, redesignation of the task force could cause misunderstanding or confusion in that headquarters and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. The arguments evidently convinced the USAREUR staff, which decided to make no change in the task force designation.⁴²

In a parallel action, 21st Theater Army Area Command had been alerted to a possible mission to supply drivers to deliver relief supplies throughout the for-

mer Yugoslavia for the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. European Command was already forming a transportation cell to be stationed in Belgrade to coordinate the delivery of supplies, and directed USAREUR to supply some of the soldiers to man that office. Some of those troops naturally came from V Corps.⁴³ The idea of setting up a driver dispatch office in Belgrade was ultimately scrapped, but 21st TAACOM still needed to prepare its soldiers for Balkan driving conditions in case the contingency was decided upon, and asked V Corps to direct TF 212 to support a sixty-man driver training mission in Zagreb.

The phenomenon was known as "mission creep" and was already well understood in Frankfurt and worried the corps staff. Of similar concern was the possibility that a large body of soldiers, over which Colonel Stevens, in his persona as commander of the U.S. Contingency Command, would have no authority and which would drain the resources of the task force, would be assigned to Zagreb. Therefore, the corps hedged its reply to the 21st TAACOM request with qualifications. The task force, the corps agreed, could provide command and control for the driver training mission, but only if the size of that force did not increase and if it did not become any more diverse. Further, the existing 21st TAACOM augmentation to the task force, the 66th Maintenance Team, could not be diverted from its primary MASH-support mission to support the driver training mission, and the transport and maintenance sections of the driver training mission itself had to be subordinated to the task force forward area support team. Finally, V Corps specified that the task force could provide support only in the immediate vicinity of Zagreb.

In justifying such limitations, the corps pointed out that the task force did not have a large staff and could not function as a stand-alone brigade headquarters. Moreover, the task force could not be diverted from its mission to provide the interface between the 212th MASH and the UNPROFOR headquarters.⁴⁴ The importance of such understanding became immediately apparent when Stevens, the task force commander, got wind of the TAACOM deployment about a week later and complained that no one had discussed the action with him. He pointed out that if, as he had heard, 60 soldiers and 240 trucks and trailers were headed to Zagreb, USEUCOM should realize that there was absolutely no space at Pleso Air Base either to billet the soldiers or to base the training mission's vehicles. Stevens recommended that the TAACOM send its training mission to Split, instead.

Meanwhile, Stevens wanted standing area clearance for couriers to fly routinely between German bases and Zagreb. It turned out that certain personnel actions, including routine distribution, finance, personnel administration, and unit supply, were better managed by carrying paper copies of the documents than by using telefax or radio teletype. The couriers also served as back-up means of communication that Stevens and the COSCOM commander wanted in their hip pockets and as a secure way to send private, and much more frank, notes back and forth among commanders.⁴⁵

In the midst of those discussions, the main body of TF 212 arrived in Zagreb and began to set up the hospital and temporary living quarters. The trip was

uneventful, the diplomatic arrangements having successfully paved the way for international border crossings that aroused no comment and a reception in Croatia that was evidently without incident.⁴⁶ The soldiers erected the hospital tents on 13 November and declared themselves ready for operation the next day.

The MASH treated its first casualty the day before the official opening ceremony, however. On 14 November a bulldozer helping to clear a parking lot to emplace the MASH struck an antitank land mine, and the hospital gave emergency treatment to the injured civilian operator. The event dramatically emphasized the importance of the land mine awareness training the soldiers had received in Wiesbaden and ensured that soldiers paid strict attention to the signs marking off areas at the air base that had not yet been cleared of mines. On Sunday, 15 November, the hospital officially opened the doors of its eleven tents and five mobile containers. The first United Nations soldiers had arrived in Yugoslavia in April. Since that time, twenty had been killed and twenty-seven wounded. As the ribbon-cutting—attended by two members of the U.S. Congress—took place against the backdrop of a bullet-riddled hangar about two and one-half kilometers from the airport's main passenger terminal, no one was certain how busy the hospital would become. At that moment, however, nineteen UN peacekeepers were in nearby Croatian hospitals, and the task force knew that they would immediately be transferred to the MASH.⁴⁷

The hospital established, work proceeded on more permanent living facilities in Zagreb. Once the prefabricated Harvest Falcon units had been erected, unit operations could settle down to a routine, since that housing would be adjacent to the hospital and the daily bus ride to and from hotels could be eliminated. Whenever the bus was unavailable, the only option was a twenty-dollar taxi ride for the eighteen-mile trip between the air base and the hotel. Work on the housing was not moving as fast as the task force commander wished, however, and there appear to have been differences of opinion between Stevens and the Air Force engineers on how best to proceed. As a result, the corps forwarded a request to have the Harvest Falcon work crew placed under operational control of Task Force 212 as a way to solve the question of responsiveness. The construction problem was symptomatic of a more general problem, and the corps simultaneously asked USAREUR's help in encouraging European Command to transmit a message emphasizing that all U.S. Army troops in Zagreb were attached to the task force, while all other U.S. forces in the area were under task force operational control. Members of the corps staff determined to prevent mission creep were equally determined to prevent fragmentation of authority in Zagreb, and the corps staff was willing to bring all of those issues to the attention of the corps commander, if necessary. "Expect increased interest," Col. Guy Berry, the corps chief of current operations, ominously warned his USAREUR counterparts, "if no resolution soon."⁴⁸

The task force, although under United Nations command since arriving in Zagreb, remained subject to direction from Germany, with instructions typically issuing from corps in response to items in the daily TF 212 situation report. At the end of November, for instance, the corps G-3 cautioned the task force commander that he had to adhere to the original USAREUR and European

Command orders limiting his patient load to members of UNPROFOR. Stevens had earlier voiced his concern about the medical needs of the civilian population around Zagreb, but corps reminded him that he was not permitted to treat civilians, other than in emergency situations to save life, limb, or eyesight. The rationale was that, regardless of the need, there was a chance that treatment of civilians would create a perception that the United States favored one ethnic group in the region more than another.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, other missions, by then routinely passing through the normal chain of command, continued to arrive in Zagreb. Still preparing for the chance that the mission to haul civilian relief supplies would materialize, corps passed to Stevens a requirement to conduct a route reconnaissance from the port facilities in the vicinity of Rijeka through Zagreb to Belgrade to determine the route's suitability for use by a medium truck company.⁵⁰

At the end of November the hospital was in full operation, although the prefabricated housing was still not in place. The corps staff remained worried that the mission might last longer than the planned 180 days.⁵¹ What unit would replace the 212th MASH was a question that remained up in the air as well, since the 7th Medical Command would not even brief the USAREUR commander on the options until 22 December. Meanwhile, USAREUR was having little success in dealing with the problem of controlling the members of the other U.S. Armed Services in Zagreb. "Having a hell of a time with EUCOM getting the OPCON of the . . . USAF guys straightened out," the USAREUR operations chief told his corps counterpart.⁵²

In order to keep track of how those and other issues were progressing, Brig. Gen. Charles C. Cannon, the 3d COSCOM commander, directed his inspector general to visit the task force at the 60- and 120-day points.⁵³ One object of obvious inspector general interest was supply, since the Department of the Army had declined to upgrade the hospital's force activity designator, with the comment that the MASH had been given a special project code that would expedite delivery of all classes of supply, ranking the hospital's requests above all others that had the same priority.⁵⁴ As events turned out, the Army's decisions about how supply should be handled were appropriate, since the task force never reported any particular logistical problems.

Personnel issues demanded attention as the deployment proceeded. Although the MASH had been forbidden to take to Croatia any soldiers with less than ninety days remaining in Europe, the unit had been forced to do exactly that. One consequence of the European drawdown was that the pool of soldiers in the various military occupational specialties was much smaller than it had been during the Cold War days, and there were correspondingly fewer candidates to fill critical positions in a deploying unit. That was particularly true in some of the senior enlisted grades in key medical skills. The MASH looked forward to the first week in February as the deadline to fill the positions of those noncommissioned officers and urgently asked the corps for help. For its part, the corps found that no suitable replacements were available in corps support command and that the 7th Medical Command might have one soldier avail-

able, and therefore asked the corps adjutant general to requisition replacements from the Department of the Army. The problem there, as Berry noted, was that half of all projected personnel gains never showed up in Germany.⁵⁵

When, at last, the Harvest Falcon housing sets were installed at Camp Pleso, an extended discussion of property accountability ensued. Authorities in Stuttgart, presumably motivated by their promises to U.S. Central Command to return the housing sets after the operation was over, directed USAREUR to specify the Army commander in Zagreb who would assume custodial control—and accountability—for the housing. The discussion that followed resembled the bidding in a game of bridge. USAREUR countered with the suggestion that the simplest method of keeping track of the housing was simply to attach to TF 212 the current hand receipt holder, an Air Force major. That would make sense, USAREUR suggested, because Air Force engineers were remaining in Zagreb to provide engineering support to the U.S. forces. European Command rejected that idea and instructed V Corps to assume control of the property, recommending that the TF 212 property book officer was the right person to take over accountability. In the process, however, corps received explicit instructions to make a careful inventory of the housing, because various pieces of Army equipment had been incorporated into the Harvest Falcon units, and that property would have to be separated from the housing and returned to Army control when the operation was over. If, on the other hand, the Zagreb mission continued beyond 179 days, then all equipment would be returned to the service that owned it, later to be signed for by the next hospital to take over the MASH mission.⁵⁶

By March the 212th MASH had treated more than 3,070 patients from thirty countries, of which the UN casualties, as distinct from illnesses and injuries, amounted to 382 injured and 32 dead. The American presence in Yugoslavia had grown as well. European Command decided to expand the former U.S. Contingency Command headquarters in Zagreb into Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Forward), with another element in Kiseljak. Americans also served on the staff of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees in Belgrade and maintained a movement control center in Zagreb and a mobile aerial port in Split. The total patient load was somewhat less than what the MASH had anticipated, so the hospital commander, Colonel Newcomb, decided to send forty-six members of the hospital back to Wiesbaden some two months early. "They will help out with the medical care in Germany," he commented, noting that the hospital was "left a little short with our deployment here." In case of emergency, Newcomb made provisions to recall those forty-six soldiers on 48-hours' notice. The medical mission had enlarged while in Zagreb to include functions that mobile surgical hospitals normally did not provide. Furthermore, the hospital was prepared to care for patients for up to thirty days, whereas a MASH normally evacuated patients within twenty-four hours of treatment.⁵⁷

About a month before the end of the 212th MASH tour of duty in Zagreb, USAREUR, in consultation with the joint chiefs, finally reached a decision about a replacement hospital. Despite well-founded concerns about over-stressing the

somewhat austere medical structure that remained in Europe, USAREUR acquiesced in sending another Germany-based hospital to Zagreb in April. The 502d Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, drawing much of its medical staff from the 3d Combat Support Hospital in Nürnberg, received the assignment. Nürnberg was a community slated for drawdown, but there were still many soldiers and family members who obtained medical services from the hospital there. Since about two hundred soldiers from the 3d Combat Support Hospital would be involved in the deployment, and because they had to begin training for their mission, hospital services had to be reduced from 28 March through 4 April, a preview of the reduced services that would be available once the soldiers went to Zagreb. Col. (Dr.) Charles F. Miller didn't pull any punches when he told the community about the impact of the orders. "What you're seeing," he said, "are finally the effects of the drawdown in Europe coming home to roost in the medical area. There's no more wiggle room to take care of retirees. There may not be enough wiggle room in the next year to take care of dependents if the drawdown continues."⁵⁸ The eventual closure of the military communities in Nürnberg and Erlangen eliminated the problem.

The handover from the 212th MASH to the 502d MASH proceeded smoothly. As planned, the 212th MASH left its equipment in place, and the 502d MASH took over the hospital in a two-day mission transfer on 26–28 April. As events turned out, the 502d MASH drew only 165 soldiers from the 3d Combat Support Hospital, allowing medical services to continue in Nürnberg, although somewhat slower and reduced in scale. The aircraft that brought in the main body of the 502d MASH took the main body of the 212th MASH back to Wiesbaden. The staff planning that established the MASH operation in Zagreb proved sufficient to allow an uneventful assumption of the mission by the 502d MASH, which was able to maintain the hospital with fewer soldiers—a total of 205—than the 212th MASH had initially deployed. The remainder of the 179-day tour of duty was uneventful, and the 502d MASH was, in its turn, replaced in Zagreb by an Air Force hospital.⁵⁹

Some Conclusions

Although involving a much smaller unit, the Task Force 212 deployment to Zagreb was considerably more complicated than the movement of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to Kuwait. Fundamentally, that was because the MASH moved not just people, but also its equipment. Troop cantonments, maintenance areas, and theater command structure already existed when the Blackhorse went to Kuwait. All the soldiers really had to do was step off the airplane and sign for the equipment they needed to use. In the case of the MASH, the unit had to go through the whole process of readying equipment for shipment and sending it by rail across international borders, then building its entire base area upon arrival.

Working under UN control further complicated matters, and the frustrations many staff officers recorded reflected not just the bureaucratic nature of



Wry sentiment expressed in Wiesbaden when the 212th MASH returned to home station at the end of its mission in Croatia.

the United Nations, as many preferred to think, but also the American soldiers' lack of training in working with nongovernmental organizations. The deployment to Zagreb began a series of operations in which the corps staff and the soldiers of its subordinate commands would be required to learn about the various agencies of the United Nations and other nongovernmental agencies and to develop procedures for dealing effectively with them. Not the least of those problems was one of bureaucratic language, since military services and civilian agencies did not necessarily mean the same things when they used the same words. Nor, V Corps staffs learned, somewhat to their surprise, did civilian agencies work on army schedules.

The mission in Croatia further taught the corps staff something about the world of joint operations and revealed that procedures did not yet exist for many things that had to be done as a matter of routine. Some corps staff officers considered the various organizations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be simply unresponsive. More accurately, however, actions worked through the Joint Staff required more time because the JCS had to deal with the various armed services and the various unified commands, and such staffing through multiple levels of command could not be completed as quickly as staff work within a single service. Even within the Army, and within the Army in Europe, everyone found sufficient room for disagreements. One of the complicating factors in future

operations was clearly going to be long staffing lead times for short-notice missions, an impossible situation that promised a good deal of future anguish for the staffs and units involved.

The deployment to Zagreb also gave V Corps a foretaste of the problems of multiple chains of command. At least in theory, a unit committed to a United Nations operation fell under United Nations command and was no longer a part of the parent command. To draw a comparison, the headquarters of Army Ground Forces in the United States no longer had any ties whatsoever with V Corps after the corps was shipped to Ireland at the start of 1942. Both USAREUR and V Corps, however, maintained daily contact with, and supervision over, TF 212, in part because they knew the unit would eventually revert to corps control. The task force commander thus had to answer to at least two commanders: the V Corps commanding general and the commanding general of the UNPROFOR in Zagreb. Future missions would involve even more complicated chains of command.

As the first phase of the MASH deployment drew to a close, the staff could congratulate itself on a successful piece of work. The deployment involved a burst of intense, concentrated effort on the part of the staffs and similarly intense, concentrated preparations by the unit. Some of the problems were new and unanticipated; others were expected. What was clear to all concerned was that such problems needed to be worked out in detail before the next out of sector mission. The best vehicle for doing that remained the corps exercise program.

NOTES

¹ Interv, author with Col. William W. Alexander, 24 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

² Briefings were scheduled on V Corps Master Events Calendar, maintained by the secretary of the general staff. See calendars for March through June 1992 for the first series of briefings. Thereafter, the calendar indicates that a "Balkan Update" was a regular feature of the Operations and Intelligence ("Op-Intel," or "O&I") briefings through 1995. The corps chief of staff, recognizing what was occasionally the character of those briefings, referred to the briefings as "our little Tuesday and Thursday showdowns."

³ Particularly on this subject, briefings sought to cut through the accumulated mythology that the Germans were unable to control Yugoslavia, even though they committed many divisions to the effort. In fact, as briefings pointed out, the Germans rarely attempted to do more than control the lines of communication.

⁴ The announcement appeared in both American and German newspapers. See "300 Soldiers Tie up Loose Ends to Get Set for Croatia Mission," *Stars and Stripes*, 22 Oct 1992; and "Amerikanisches Feldlazarett ins ehemalige Jugoslawien" ["American Military Hospital in the Former Yugoslavia"], *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23 Oct 1992.

⁵ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps et al., 171616Z Oct 1992, sub: Deployment Order #9291—Hospital to Zagreb, Croatia.

⁶ V Corps Briefing slides, "MASH Mission," n.d., but late October 1992, with marginal notes by Lt. Col. Guy A. Berry, Chief, Operations, ACofS, G-3, HQ, V Corps.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Memo, ACofS, G-4, Plans V Corps (AETV-GDP) for Chief of Staff (CofS), V Corps, 22 Oct 1992, sub: 212th MASH Deployment—Living Quarters for MASH Personnel.

⁹ Memo, AETV-GDP for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: 212th MASH Deployment—Days of Supply Guidance. Initial supply plans called for: unit basic load of MREs (Meals, Ready to Eat), plus six MREs per soldier for movement contingencies, and Medical B rations for the hospital on order; 30 days of supply for Class II and IV, plus direct exchange/emergency issue for selected Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE); 30 days package Class III products, with bulk POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) provided by UNPROFOR; a tailored basic load of Class V; sundry packs on the normal basis of issue (one per 100 males, one per 25 females per five days); all major end items of equipment; Class VIII (medical resupply) as determined by the 68th Medical Group; and all unit PLL/MPL (Prescribed Load List/Mandatory Parts List).

¹⁰ Memo, ACofS, G-4, Supply, V Corps (AETV-GDS) for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) Deployment—Force Activity Designator (FAD). CINCUSAREUR requested the FAD change on 2 November. See Msg, CINCUSAREUR for HQ DA (DAMO-ODR), 021431Z Nov 1992, sub: Request for Force Activity Designator (FAD) upgrade. The V Corps asked DA to increase the force activity designator from II to I.

¹¹ Memo, AETV-GDP for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) Deployment—UN Headgear/Brassards/Kevlars/Berets.

¹² Msg, Cdr V Corps for CINCUSAREUR, 221748Z Oct 1992, sub: V Corps OPOD 93-01, Operation PROVIDE PROMISE Coordination.

¹³ Memo, ACoS, G-1, Plans, V Corps (AETV-GAP) for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: Personnel Service Support Issues for Operation PROVIDE PROMISE.

¹⁴ Memo, AETV-IM (22d Signal Brigade) for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: Communications.

¹⁵ Memo, AETV-GFS (ACSRM, V Corps) for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: 212th MASH Deployment.

¹⁶ Memo, AETV-GDP for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: 212th MASH Deployment—Consolidation of Equipment for Shipment to Zagreb.

¹⁷ Memo, V Corps Staff Judge Advocate for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: Legal Support for 212 MASH.

¹⁸ Memo, V Corps Public Affairs Officer (PAO) for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: PAO Resourcing for 212 MASH Deployment. For final developments in manning, see Msg, CINCUSAREUR to V Corps et al., 101741Z Nov 1992, sub: Frag Order 003 to Deployment Order 9291—Hospital to Zagreb, which defined personnel requirements and also made arrangements for daily newspaper deliveries to deployed soldiers.

¹⁹ Briefing for CG, V Corps, n.d., but late October 1992, sub: TF 68 Deployment. Because it had fielded the Multiple Subscriber Equipment (MSE), V Corps no longer had radio teletype equipment and had to procure the equipment elsewhere to give the task force a backup communications system. See Msg, V Corps G-3 to 21 TAACOM, 051509Z Nov 1992, sub: Tasking Request for TF 212.

²⁰ V Corps Operation PROVIDE PROMISE Deployment Handbook (October 1992), "Command and Control Relationship." Also, E-mail Msg, Lt. Col. Janak, V Corps Staff Engineer, to Chief of Staff, V Corps; G-3, V Corps; Cdr, 130 Engr Bde, 23 Oct 1992, 7:30:39 CET, sub: Engineer Recon to Zagreb. Msg, 3d COSCOM G-3 for V Corps G-3, 232006Z Oct 1992, sub: V Corps OPOD 93-01 (Deployment of Hospital to Zagreb, Croatia, Operation PROVIDE PROMISE Support).

²¹ One of the "media events" to which the public affairs officer invited the press, the painting of the 212th MASH vehicles, seemed to fascinate German reporters. Among other articles, see "Aus Militär-Fahrzeugen werden 'Friedens-LKW'" ["Military Vehicles Become 'Trucks for Peace'"], *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, 27 Oct 1992.

²² Briefing slide set, CAT (Crisis Action Team) Update to CofS, 26 Oct 1992, with briefing notes to accompany slides; Memo, ACoS, G-3, V Corps (AETV-GC), for V Corps CofS, n.d., but late October 1992, sub: Certified Training Events.

²³ Msg, Cdr V Corps for CINCUSAREUR, 271230Z Oct 1992, sub: TF 212th MASH Deployment to Zagreb, Croatia.

²⁴ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for USCINCEUR, 271427Z Oct 1992, sub: Zagreb Hospital Replacement Plan.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "Frankfurt Soldiers to Deploy to Croatia," *Frankfurt Chronicle*, 5 Nov 1992.

²⁷ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps et al., 271211Z Oct 1992, sub: TF 212 Deployment Update. On the passport and waiver issue, see Ltr, T. L. Chittick, Chief, American Citizen Services, Consulate General of the United States of America, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, to HQ USAREUR ODCSOPS, 27 Oct 1992. The V Corps staff, assured on the question of the soldiers' status in Croatia, expressed concerns about those soldiers required to travel on the trains with the hospital equipment. Realizing the issue had probably already been addressed

by the State Department, the corps wanted to make sure that the trains, their equipment, and their accompanying soldiers would not be "quarantined" at international borders on the way to Croatia. See Msg, Cdr V Corps for CINCUSAREUR, 280930Z Oct 1992, no subject given.

²⁸ Telefax Ltr, Lt. Col. Athan, 21st TAACOM Chief, Contract Management, to 21st TAACOM, 28 Oct 1992.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Handwritten Memo, Lt. Col. Wade, 3d COSCOM, for Lt. Col. Berry, V Corps ACofS, G-3, Operations, 28 Oct 1992. Wade's memo gave the following preliminary POM figures for the 212th MASH: total of 431, of which 243 were assigned to the 212th, 43 attached from 21st TAACOM, and 145 attached from the 7th MEDCOM.

³¹ Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 281700Z Oct 1992, sub: FRAGO #3 to OPOD 93-01 (Deployment of Hospital to Zagreb, Croatia). DA Forms 23348 and 346 satisfied the UN requirements.

³² Memo, V Corps PAO for Chief, USAREUR Public Affairs, 30 Oct 1992, sub: AFRTS Support for 212th MASH Deployment.

³³ Telefax Msg, V Corps Survey Team to V Corps ACSR, 3 Nov 1992. TF 212 requested additional help in the form of a civil engineer from the 130th Engineer Brigade to help coordinate civil engineering activities between the UN Civil Engineer and the U.S. Air Force Harvest Falcon engineers, once they arrived in Zagreb. Memo, 3d COSCOM (G-3 PLEX) for V Corps G-3 (Lt. Col. Berry), 4 Nov 1992, sub: Civil Engineer Support to TF 212.

³⁴ Memo, 3d COSCOM G-3 PLEX for V Corps ACSR, 4 Nov 1992, sub: Manifest Data. Deployments began the next day.

³⁵ Public affairs officers' hopes that the German press would develop an interest in the story were realized when articles were published in the following papers: *Frankfurter Neue Presse* (6 Nov 1992), *Rhein Main Presse* (7 Nov 1992), and *Rhein Main Zeitung* (7 Nov 1992). On the later departures, see "Medical Team Taking off on Croatia Mission Today," *Stars and Stripes*, 10 Nov 1992, and *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, 10 Nov 1992.

³⁶ Memo, AETV-GDS (G-4) for V Corps CofS, 22 Oct 1992, sub: 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) Deployment—Thanksgiving Dinner. "'Tis the Season for Croatia-bound GIs," *Stars and Stripes*, 7 Nov 1992.

³⁷ Memo, ACofS, G-3, V Corps for Cdr, 3d COSCOM, 5 Nov 1992, sub: TF 212 MASH SITREP.

³⁸ Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, to which V Corps had dispatched some two thousand soldiers at the end of the Persian Gulf War, delivered humanitarian aid to the Kurds in northern Iraq, among other missions.

³⁹ "Purple procedures" was a derogatory term for the functioning of joint staffs and was routinely used in V Corps as a synonym for "slow." In the mid-1990s "purple" was used to describe the joint staff, in distinction to, for example, "green" (Army). On the Harvest Falcon sets, see Msg, USCINCEUR to USCENTCOM, 101703Z Nov 1992, sub: Harvest Falcon Assets in Support of Operation PROVIDE PROMISE.

⁴⁰ Msg, AMCONSUL Frankfurt to AMEMBASSY Zagreb, info V Corps, 101436Z Nov 1992, sub: Request for Information/Coordination.

⁴¹ Msg, USCINCEUR for CINCUSAREUR, 190638Z Nov 1992, sub: Clarification of Legal Status of Personnel Assigned to Field Hospital in Zagreb. The relevant American decision was that "Hospital personnel will be detailed immediately upon arrival to UNPROFOR under 22 U.S. Code Section 287D, Noncombatant Assistance to the United Nations." The agreement to support the UN had an important reservation: "The U.N. does understand and agree that U.S. hospital personnel will remain in Croatia and not be ordered into the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

⁴² Msg, V Corps G-3 Operations for CINCUSAREUR DCSOPS, 120854Z Nov 1992, sub: TF212 Designation.

⁴³ Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 211400Z Oct 1992, sub: Manning in Support of Belgrade Task Group.

⁴⁴ Msg, V Corps G-3 Operations for 21 TAACOM, 121129Z Nov 1992, sub: Zagreb Command and Control.

⁴⁵ Msg, 3 COSCOM G-3 Ops for V Corps G-3 Ops, 201113Z Nov 1992, sub: Trk Co Deploy Croatia. On the standing courier request, also see Msg, 3d COSCOM (G-3) to V Corps G-3 Ops, 231433Z Nov 1992, sub: Area Clearance.

⁴⁶ Msg, 3d COSCOM to V Corps, 102019 Nov 1992, sub: Task Force 68/212 Deployment SitRep 011 101600 Nov 92. The COSCOM sent a daily situation report to V Corps that provided details of the deployment, hospital construction, and then day-to-day operations. While these are not cited, they provide a means of verifying dates of important events. See V Corps Historian File, TF 212 Daily SitRep (1992).

⁴⁷ Msg, TF 212 for 3d COSCOM, 142000Z Nov 1992, sub: SitRep. Also see "MASH Unit in Croatia Sets up Hospital for U.N.," *Stars and Stripes*, 14 Nov 1992; "MASH Worker Hurt in Croatia," *Stars and Stripes*, 15 Nov 1992; "MASH Troops Go into Action," *Stars and Stripes*, 16 Nov 1992; and "A MASH with a Difference Is Set up in Croatia," *New York Times*, 16 Nov 1992. Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona) and Rep. Frank McCloskey (D-Indiana) attended the opening ceremony.

⁴⁸ Msg, V Corps G-3 Ops to USAREUR ODCSOPS, 171731 Nov 1992, sub: TF212 Command. On the travel difficulties in and around Zagreb, see "MASH Unit in Croatia Treats First Troops from U.N. Force," *Stars and Stripes*, 17 Nov 1992. By November, the deployment, including the possibility of the 21st TAACOM driver training mission, was being reported in Army publications. See "First U.S. Army Unit Arrives in War-torn Yugoslavia," *Army Times*, 23 Nov 1992.

⁴⁹ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-3 for Cdr, TF 212, Zagreb, 25 Nov 1992, sub: Treating Civilians.

⁵⁰ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-3 for Cdr, TF 212, Zagreb, 25 Nov 1992, sub: Route Reconnaissance.

⁵¹ Msg, V Corps G-3 for USAREUR DCSOPS, 301029Z Nov 1992, sub: Request for Information Update on Working Actions.

⁵² Msg, Col. E. Paul Semmens, Chief, Operations, USAREUR ODCSOPS, to Lt. Col. Berry, Chief, Operations, V Corps, 301500Z Nov 1992, sub: The Cavalry Arrives.

⁵³ Memo, 3d COSCOM Inspector General for 3d COSCOM G-3 Operations, 4 Dec 1992, sub: Travel to Croatia.

⁵⁴ Msg, HQ DA (DAMO-OD) to CINCUSAREUR, 041414Z Dec 1992, sub: Force Activity Designator Upgrade for the 212 MASH.

⁵⁵ Msg, 3d COSCOM G-3 Ops to V Corps G-3 Ops, 011221Z Dec 1992, sub: Pers Replacement 212. Berry's comment on no-shows was a penciled note on the reverse of the message.

⁵⁶ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps et al., 141338Z Jan 1993, sub: Property Accountability of Harvest Falcon Assets; Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 201500Z Jan 1993, sub: FRAGO #12 Property Accountability of Harvest Falcon Assets.

⁵⁷ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 030824Z Feb 1993, sub: Frag Order 004 to Deployment Order #9261—Hospital to Zagreb, Croatia, details the expanded American operation in Yugoslavia. Also see "Mash Members in Zagreb to Begin Return to Germany," *Stars and Stripes*, 7 Mar 1993. Soldiers assigned to the MASH were awarded the United Nations Service Medal. See "46 Members of MASH Come Home," *Stars and Stripes*, 11 Mar 1993.

⁵⁸ "Nürnberg Hospital to Curb Services: Staff Preparing for Possible Duty in Croatia," *Stars and Stripes*, 24 Mar 1993. The hospital in Nürnberg had previously been a larger operation, the 98th General Hospital. In the fall of 1992 it became somewhat smaller and was redesignated the 3d Combat Support Hospital, with the mission specifically changed to support V Corps deployments.

⁵⁹ For various comments, see "502nd MASH Leaves for U.N. Duty in Croatia," *Stars and Stripes*, 27 Apr 1993.

Operation RESTORE HOPE

"The bottom line was that the deployment of TF-158 was a 'pit stop' in the transition from the Unit Wartime Movement Plan of the GDP era to USAREUR becoming a force projection organization."

Maj. Dan Sulka, V Corps G-4 Planner, January 1993

In February 1991 rebel forces under the command of Muhammed Farah Aided finally crushed the government of the Marxist Muhammed Siyad Barrah, ending a civil war that had persisted in Somalia since 1981. Typically for African wars, the fighting had been marked by seemingly endless bloodshed. Thousands of Somalis, many of them civilians, had died and roughly a million more had become refugees. Aided's victory did not bring peace, however. The rebel forces were a loose alliance of clan-based movements, and once Siyad Barrah was gone, clan interests prevailed. The consequence was that all effective government in Somalia simply disappeared in a continuing, evidently endless *bellum omnium contra omnes* (war of all against all). Already poor, Somalia was thoroughly impoverished by the fighting. Agriculture and industry, such as they were, came to a halt. Drought made a bad situation worse, and more than 300,000 Somalis had starved to death by the time summer came. "The only things available in bulk," as one observer aptly put it, "appeared to be guns and bad attitudes."¹

Various civilian relief organizations tried to help, but the conditions in Somalia defeated the best intentions of even the most persistent agencies, such as CARE, Save the Children, Medicines sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), and UNICEF. Eventually, the United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 751. Passed on 27 April 1992, it authorized United Nations military operations, under the title of UNSOCOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia), and the Secretary General asked member nations for military assistance. Initial UN efforts proved equally fruitless, however, and President George Bush decided to help by airlifting relief supplies into Somalia from bases in Kenya. That operation, PROVIDE RELIEF, began in August 1992 and was actually quite small. At the end of 1992 the operation could claim to have delivered substantial amounts of supplies to Somalia, but the fact was that the Somali clan chieftains managed to loot al-

most all of the deliveries once the supplies passed into the hands of the agencies charged with their distribution. Meanwhile, the famine worsened.

President Bush then opted for more forceful action, and on 21 November alerted U.S. military commands to prepare for intervention in east Africa. On 25 November United States Central Command was given the mission of securing humanitarian relief in Somalia, using a large-scale military operation to subdue the warring factions so that delivery of relief supplies could be carried out effectively. The United Nations supported the American decision by enacting Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December, authorizing action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to "restore peace, stability, and law and order" to Somalia as well. President Bush, not necessarily agreeing that the United States either could or would fulfill such a broad charter, still was determined to ameliorate the suffering in Somalia. Even so, he promised that United States forces would "not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary" to accomplish their humanitarian missions.

Central Command named the operation RESTORE HOPE and chose Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, commanding the I Marine Expeditionary Force, to be the joint task force commander. Johnston had previously run Operation PROVIDE RELIEF and was consequently familiar with conditions in Somalia. The Army component of the joint task force was the 10th Mountain Division (Light), from Fort Drum, New York. Constituted as Task Force Mountain, the 10th Mountain was commanded by Maj. Gen. Steve Arnold. Because the division only maintained two active infantry brigades, it required augmentation in various ways. Obviously Army aviation would be important for operations in Somalia, considering the poor road network and the great distances to be covered in establishing control of the countryside and then sustaining humanitarian relief operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly decided that the 10th Aviation Brigade of Task Force Mountain needed additional aircraft and directed the U.S. European Command to provide an aviation task force from units assigned to Europe.² European Command, in turn, passed the mission to the U.S. Army, Europe.³

Early Plans and Preparations

There was no question to whom USAREUR would assign its new mission. The European drawdown had progressed to the point that Hobson's Choice was the usual decision-making mechanism in unit taskings. By the end of 1992 V Corps was not only the sole remaining corps in the European theater, but it was also the only headquarters that commanded aviation units of any size. Therefore, as soon as corps planners heard that a requirement to send an aviation task force to Somalia existed, they knew that the majority of the soldiers and equipment would come from corps subordinate units, most likely the 12th Aviation Brigade, to which was assigned the general aviation battalion.

As Operation RESTORE HOPE began, V Corps was still deeply involved in Operation PROVIDE PROMISE. Task Force 212, based on the 212th Mobile Army

Surgical Hospital, had been up and running in Zagreb for under a month, and the staff was still working its way toward the solution of a number of troublesome problems, including providing adequate housing for the soldiers already serving in Croatia. In a foretaste of things to come, the battle staff had to divide its efforts between the two operations, while simultaneously doing contingency planning for other possible requirements that loomed on the operational horizon. One result of the European drawdown was that the corps headquarters had become somewhat smaller. The decreased headquarters size was only part of the equation, however, because the end of the Cold War also brought with it an end to USAREUR receiving priority of personnel fill in the Army, particularly in the crucial officer distribution plan and, within that, the annual allocation of the graduates of the Command and General Staff College. It was thus a smaller staff and one apt to be suffering through vacancies in important posts that now no longer focused on one mission, as it had done during the Cold War, but instead found itself running two major operations and developing contingency plans for many other possibilities. Worse yet, the staff also tended to be more junior in rank, at least among the plans and actions officers, than had been typical through 1989, and therefore had less accumulated military experience upon which to draw.⁴ For the staff, 1992 accordingly ushered in an interesting new set of conditions.⁵

In at least one respect, however, the overlap of Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and RESTORE HOPE was beneficial. The staff did not find it necessary to work the deployment of the aviation task force to Somalia in such grinding detail as it had the TF 212 deployment to Croatia. The lessons learned in the process of preparing the medical task force for UN duty and then dispatching it to Croatia were fresh in everyone's mind, and the list of points of contact at USAREUR, at 21st Theater Army Area Command, and at 1st Theater Movement Control Agency were current. Thus, the staff work proceeded smoothly after the corps received the USAREUR deployment order requiring creation of an aviation task force from corps assets and units attached from 7th Medical Command and preparing it for movement.⁶

The deployment to Croatia had also imbued the corps staff with a sense of immediacy. The one certain thing the "iron majors" on the battle staff had learned about out-of-sector operations was that they were apt to be short-fused and that time was a precious commodity. Young staff officers naturally soon found informal ways to obtain the greatest possible warning of new missions. The corps therefore had its own sources of information about the impending USAREUR order, probably through personal staff officer contacts with counterparts on the USAREUR operations staff. Therefore, the same day that it received the formal USAREUR order, corps was able to issue a warning order that gave a tentative task force organization, an outline concept of operations, and suppositions about deployment dates.


The V Corps concluded that deploying units could anticipate an earliest arrival date in Somalia of 13 December—already obviously impossible—and a latest arrival date of 27 December. Because corps had not awaited instructions from

USAREUR before sending a warning order out to the units concerned, the telefax cover sheet from the corps G-3 aviation section included a note alerting subordinate staffs that the warning order was already completed at the time the USAREUR order arrived at corps. Retransmitting the USAREUR order to the brigades was the simplest way of guaranteeing that no mistakes were made, and the corps instructed all addressees to take the USAREUR order as authoritative, wherever it conflicted with the corps warning order. In the meanwhile, the 12th Aviation Brigade, as well as the other brigades that might expect to be asked to contribute individual soldiers or additional small units to the operation, could expect a corps operation order the next morning.⁷

Early consultations between the corps and USAREUR staffs established that helicopters would be required to fly considerable distances in Somalia. Further, securing the operational environment implied the probability of at least limited combat actions that included air assaults, while the logistical requirements, both to sustain U.S. forces and to assist in the humanitarian relief process, suggested the need for cargo-carrying capability. The task force therefore needed UH-60 Blackhawks for general utility purposes, including air assaults, and those aircraft all needed to be equipped with external fuel tanks for greater range.⁸ The cargo requirement could be met by sending a company of CH-47 Chinooks. The USAREUR staff supplied the requisites for medical evacuation by attaching to the task force an air ambulance company belonging to 7th Medical Command. Finally, keeping the helicopters flying demanded deployment of an aviation intermediate maintenance company. Discussions between corps and the 12th Aviation Brigade resulted in a decision to base the task force on the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, stationed at Giebelstadt. By 13 December, a day after receiving the mission, the staffs had settled on a task force organization that satisfied the mission requirements, insofar as those requirements were understood at the time.⁹ (*Chart 8*)

The rationale behind the task force organization reflected the mission requirements. The 159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) belonged to the 421st Medical Battalion (Evacuation), then a 7th Medical Command unit stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base.¹⁰ It was attached to the task force for purposes of deployment, although the staff anticipated that Task Force Mountain might reattach the company to the 10th Mountain Division's medical organization once that company arrived in Somalia. In any case, the 159th Medical Company satisfied the requirement for aeromedical evacuation. Company D, 502d Aviation, stationed at Coleman Barracks in Mannheim, operated the CH-47 Chinook, a medium-lift cargo helicopter, and could easily fulfill any cargo delivery requirements. Aviation intermediate maintenance support came from a mixed company-size element drawn from the 7th Battalion, 159th Aviation, and loosely designated a task force within TF 5-158. Finally, because only one platoon of UH-60s in 5-158 Aviation had external fuel stores, and thus the necessary extended range capability to operate in Somalia, the utility helicopter company had to be assembled from the one suitably equipped platoon in Company C, 5-158 Aviation, and two similarly equipped platoons from another battalion. The

CHART 8—ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE 5-158 AVIATION



choice fell on Company A, 7th Battalion, 227th Aviation, located in Hanau and part of the 1st Armored Division's 4th (Combat Aviation) Brigade.

The corps order repeated the mission enunciated in USAREUR's message of the preceding day, thus giving brigade and task force planners a specific set of tasks on which to base their own orders:

USAREUR units will participate in joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organizations and to assist United Nations/Non-Governmental Organizations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.¹¹

In a procedure that was to become common in V Corps, much of the information flow to the units affected by the order was purely verbal. Not until planning was well advanced did the task force commander actually receive a formal copy of the V Corps operation order. Instead, his staff worked individually with brigade and corps counterparts, using telefax and e-mail as means of communicating plans and requirements.¹²

A few preliminary bits of information conditioned the planning environment. Personnel policy for the deployment was governed by the same criteria as that obtained during Operation PROVIDE PROMISE. Soldiers with movement orders effective within the succeeding sixty days would not be taken to Somalia, with the exception of key and critical personnel, for which the unit could request a deletion from orders or a deferment of orders. The task force could not take with it any soldier who was within ninety days of separation from the Army, and those soldiers scheduled to attend various Army schools would comply with their existing orders—again, with the exception of key individuals.

The Army was at that time going through one of its periodic personnel adjustments, and a number of officers had been selected by Department of the Army board action for early retirement. The department contemplated further actions, however, because the selective early retirement board had not reduced officer strength sufficiently to meet the Army's targets for the year. As a consequence, formal reduction in force boards were then meeting, and the task force commander had to employ some discretion in selecting captains to go to Somalia. Those who had previously failed in the selection for field grade rank were at risk. Since the board results were not due to be announced for several months, presumably while the task force was still in Africa, it was prudent not to take along any officer who might be liable to involuntary separation from the Army.¹³

Headquarters of the United States Forces Command (FORSCOM), located in Atlanta, Georgia, likewise sent some guidance. Acknowledging that there were no American bases in the immediate area and that a logistical system would have to be created while the deployment was in progress, FORSCOM directed deploying units to go to Somalia with sufficient supplies to meet their en route needs for initial operations in Africa. Forces Command

helpfully specified that desert pattern organizational clothing and individual equipment would be used.¹⁴ Planners in Europe received little more guidance from Atlanta before the deployment began, so fast was the pace of the operation.

The V Corps and USAREUR planners together worked out the key issues and made the decisions necessary to deal with the "show-stoppers," as Col. Will Densberger, the V Corps G-3, phrased it. Among the early questions that had to be resolved were the distribution of communications and intelligence responsibilities, plans to prepare aircraft for movement by sea from the port of Livorno, in Italy, and the concept for task force employment once in Somalia. One question loomed large. Aviation units owned some pieces of oversized equipment that had to be shipped, but low bed train cars to transport those pieces of equipment to the port were in short supply. Careful scheduling of shipments would thus be a major consideration.¹⁵

Going to Somalia in an Overcoat

Concern about available time proved well founded. The first helicopter unit began its movement to the port less than twenty-four hours after 12th Aviation Brigade began to form the task force, an action possible only because both the corps and the aviation brigade had begun their staff work before receiving formal notification of the mission. The aviation companies that eventually formed the task force also tried to anticipate their eventual orders. Across the corps, detailed planning continued, even as units began to execute the mission. Formal, written operation orders actually were published well after the deployment began. Although the first aircraft began flying out to the port in Livorno on 13 December, the V Corps operation order was not published until 12 December, the 1st Armored Division operation order was issued on 14 December, and the 12th Aviation Brigade operation order did not appear until 15 December.¹⁶ The fact that the orders had been published did not, of course, mean that they reached the affected units on those dates. Until those documents appeared, telephones, telefax, e-mail, and short-notice meetings kept commanders apprised of the planning requirements and were even used to issue early execution instructions.

In December 1992 Lt. Col. Gary S. Coleman had only recently assumed command of the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, stationed at Giebelstadt, not far from Würzburg, Germany. He first learned of the mission on 5 December, when the 12th Aviation Brigade involved him and his staff in a series of planning exercises to deploy an aviation task force to an unknown location. Given a notional task force organization, his staff developed a suitable deployment plan. Immediately after finishing that exercise, he received additional, and different, task force organizations for which to plan. Those "what if" drills continued until about 9 December, and throughout that period, Coleman was convinced that he and his battalion were bound for Yugoslavia. "That kind of tainted how we were thinking about the operation," he later said, adding that

"even after the Somalia operation commenced on the ninth of December, we still didn't realize that it was our eventual operations area."¹⁷

Coleman forwarded his command estimates and the plans his staff had formulated to brigade headquarters and awaited further guidance. Finally, on 12 December, the 12th Aviation Brigade gave him a formal warning order for a deployment to Somalia. He announced the impending mission at a battalion Christmas party that same evening, and his staff and companies immediately began a period of hectic preparations. Two days later Coleman attended a meeting at 12th Aviation Brigade headquarters in Wiesbaden, at which he discovered he was going to receive a lot of high-level help, whether he wanted it or not. "I walked into the room," he recalled, "and found myself to be pretty much the junior guy." The corps commander and his principal staff, the 12th Aviation Brigade commander and his principal staff, and the commanders of the other V Corps major subordinate commands¹⁸ were all in the conference room. The meeting, intended to work out important issues relating to the deployment, began with the corps commander, Lt. Gen. Jerry Rutherford, setting the tone by issuing some specific guidance to all of the attendees.

The deployment was, Rutherford began by explaining, to be a corps effort, a point the general emphasized when he pointed out that he had 70,000 soldiers available to push the 500-man aviation task force out of Germany. In saying that, he clearly identified the deployment as a V Corps effort, and not as a 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, or 12th Aviation Brigade mission, and it was obvious to all the other commanders in the room that their principal task for the next few weeks was to support the deployment. The second important point that Coleman took away from the meeting was that his task force was to travel to Somalia "heavy." That is, the corps commander wanted him to take with him everything that he thought there was any possibility that he might need, since conditions in Somalia gave new meaning to the now slightly worn term "austere environment." As Coleman recalled it, Rutherford told him that he would "rather have you go to Somalia with an overcoat, and when you get there, take the overcoat off, than to show up down there and find out that you need it."¹⁹

Coleman soon discovered that the corps could provide more help than his small battalion staff could easily accept, and his first problem was "the sheer physics of absorbing all of this assistance from the corps." Provided with the text of the warning order and information drawn from the USAREUR deployment order, he organized his task force around a detachment drawn from the headquarters and headquarters company and Company C of his battalion. The attached units were located too far away from Giebelstadt for the commanders to waste the travel time needed for face-to-face meetings, so Coleman communicated with the 159th Medical Company and the 7-159 Aviation (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance) in Wiesbaden and Company A, 7-227 Aviation in Hanau by telephone and telefax.

While he was busy organizing the task force, support began pouring in to Giebelstadt as a consequence of Rutherford's injunctions that the rest of the corps should help. The first arrivals were soldiers from all over the corps area



Lt. Gen. Jerry Rutherford visiting a mechanized infantry battalion

who were attached to the task force to fill specific shortages in the battalion's table of organization or to supplement the task force with skills an aviation battalion did not normally require. Among those were finance clerks, additional personnel clerks, medical technicians, and signal troops to operate the satellite communication links that the task force would be issued. Coleman's headquarters company, which had a strength of around 70, immediately ballooned to more than 120 soldiers, and he was forced to commandeer the post gymnasium to house the additional troops. Considering all the attached individual soldiers, as well as attached units, the task force grew to a planning figure of 700 soldiers, of which only about 250 came directly from Coleman's battalion.²⁰ Similar difficulties arose as the additional supplies and maintenance equipment began to arrive in Giebelstadt. The corps G-4 helped by immediately delivering storage containers, and the battalion finally coped with the influx by stowing everything in the MILVANs and CONEX containers eventually used for the deployment.²¹

While all that was going on at the task force headquarters, the units to be attached began their own preparations, based in large part on Coleman's mission analysis. He refined his task force mission statement from the one handed him in the USAREUR deployment order and V Corps warning order:

Conduct strategic deployment of Task Force 5-158 to Somalia, East Africa. Establish a forward operating base. Conduct combat, combat support, and combat service support aviation missions in the humanitarian relief sectors of Somalia as directed by Headquarters, ARFOR.

The mission demanded a number of specified tasks for which Coleman directed task force units to prepare. Combat tasks included conducting air assault missions, command aviation operations, convoy security, and route security reconnaissance for ground forces. Combat support tasks amounted to establishing forward area refuel and rearm points and maintaining the ability to conduct search and recovery operations for downed aircraft. The combat service support tasks, largely logistical in nature, called for the task force to conduct air movement of troops and supplies, carry out logistical resupply, conduct aeromedical evacuation of injured and wounded soldiers, maintain all of their aircraft and equipment, and provide their own air traffic control at task force airfields. Finally, Coleman told his commanders that he wanted the task force to arrive in Somalia with the ability to sustain itself for approximately thirty days, as a hedge against theater logistical problems. He intended to begin operations within forty-eight hours of arrival and wanted to be able to conduct independent aviation operations, if necessary, for short periods of time.

To facilitate the deployment and subsequent operations, the battalion commander intended to send a fact-finding and coordination team to Somalia ahead of the task force, and to follow it with an advance party that could assume command of the leading elements of the task force when they arrived at Mogadishu. As the companies prepared for deployment, Coleman once again emphasized maintenance, setting a goal of an operational readiness rate of 80 percent or better, sustaining operations twenty-four hours a day, and having a minimum of deferred maintenance on aircraft.²² USAREUR obliged Coleman's request to send a coordination team to Somalia early, agreeing to provide an aircraft to fly his liaison team of a captain and a sergeant to Mogadishu on 14 December.²³ The rest of the task force focused its attention on assembling everything it would need to carry out the commander's intent and on leaving Germany.

Capt. Peter Newell, commanding Company A, 7th Battalion, 227th Aviation, received early notice of the deployment. He was at the Grafenwöhr exercise area during the first week of December, leading his company in a battalion field training problem. The 1st Armored Division was involved in contingency planning for a deployment to Somalia even then, because Newell reported that he responded to questions relayed from the 4th (Combat Aviation) Brigade S-3, through his battalion commander, for pieces of information the division needed.²⁴ Newell discussed the mission in some detail with his battalion commander on 7 December and learned that he would receive an additional gunner for each of his aircraft. The captain asked to return to Fliegerhorst Kaserne, in Hanau, to begin preparing his unit for movement, but was instead directed to remain at Grafenwöhr and go through additional gunnery training so that his new gunners, supplied by units throughout the 4th Brigade, could qualify.

Division trainers reconfigured the range times so that Newell's company could qualify on 10 December instead of 13 December, as scheduled, and the company went back to garrison the next day. On 11 December Newell was told that ten of his aircraft—two full platoons—would deploy to Somalia for at least two months. His soldiers had already begun work on 10 December to prepare the unit for movement, a process they continued for the two nominated platoons through the eighteenth, working, according to Newell, eighteen to twenty hours a day. Only on 15 December did the company learn that it would take its aircraft to Ramstein Air Base, where they would be loaded on U.S. Air Force transports for delivery to Mogadishu.²⁵

The 159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) belonged to the 421st Medical Evacuation Battalion, which was not a V Corps unit but was assigned to USAREUR's 7th Medical Command. The USAREUR deployment order attached the company to the Somalia-bound task force, just as it had attached the 1st Armored Division's two platoons. Perhaps because it had been operating in a different chain of command, the 159th did not appear to have had as much early notice as the other elements of the task force.²⁶ Capt. Dale A. Goldsberry, the company's operations officer, reported that the unit learned only in the middle of December about the deployment, which he later clarified to mean that the unit was formally alerted on 11 December. Planning was not quite as smooth for the 159th, either. Goldsberry complained that he and his small operations section were required to spend too much time in "what if" drills because no one seemed able to decide how the unit would be deployed. Thus, the company developed plans for various combinations of rail and aerial movement, to include self-deployment as far as Livorno. As he pointed out, it was not enough to say that the unit would move by strategic airlift; he also needed to know what types and numbers of Air Force aircraft would be used, because the C-5A Galaxy and C-141 Starlifter required different air load configurations for his equipment. He felt that working out load plans for various types and combinations of aircraft pointlessly ate into valuable time.²⁷

Other home station preparations consumed the time of junior officers and noncommissioned officers. One of the first steps was appointment of a rear detachment commander, among whose many responsibilities was the operation of a family support group to keep the families of deployed married soldiers informed about what was going on and to forestall a wide range of possible domestic problems. Single soldiers inventoried and stored their personal belongings and automobiles. All of the soldiers involved in the deployment had to verify their weapons and particularly their chemical and biological protection qualifications and complete all the steps in the personnel readiness process so that they were eligible for overseas movement.²⁸ Soldiers received briefings on the area of operations and warnings about the diseases they were likely to encounter. Because disease and nonbattle injuries were expected to be the prevalent type of casualty, the task force took every possible prophylactic measure at home stations, especially yellow fever vaccination and treatment against malaria. The soldiers also had clearly to understand the rules of engagement under which they would operate.²⁹

With the companies heavily engaged in organizing themselves to move, the corps staff occupied itself with organizing the out-of-theater movement of the task force. The operations officer of 5-158 Aviation gathered together a summary of the equipment that the subordinate companies needed to ship and computed railcar requirements, which he then sent to the 502d Movement Control Center, which ordered the trains from the German Bundesbahn. In the end, the task force figured on four trains from the Kitzingen Bahnhof, serving Giebelstadt; two trains from Mannheim, to be loaded at Coleman Barracks; and two trains from Wiesbaden, to be loaded on the air base itself.³⁰ All were bound for the port at Livorno, Italy. As the trains and aircraft began to leave Germany for Livorno, the USAREUR staff arranged for a ship, coordinating with the Military Traffic Movement Command in Europe for a port call at Livorno.³¹

Because some aircraft needed to be sent to Somalia right away to assist the arriving 10th Mountain Division, the corps planned to move the utility helicopter company using strategic airlift from Ramstein Air Base. The remainder of the helicopters were flown to Livorno, where they met the trains delivering the task force's vehicles and other equipment and were loaded on board a ship for the trip to Mogadishu. The first task was to launch the CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopters of D Company, 502d Aviation Regiment, from Mannheim toward Italy. The 12th Aviation Brigade planned two possible routes for the Chinooks and a later movement of thirty UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to Pisa airfield, near Livorno. The first option was a one-day route through the Brenner Pass that included two stops for refueling and that was obviously dependent on weather. The second was a two-day route with a number of refueling stops via Marseilles and Nice, and thence to Pisa airport, with a planned arrival not later than 15 December.³²

The sixteen Chinooks lifted off from Coleman Barracks in four flights on 13 December. While they were on their way south, the 12th Aviation Brigade sought clearances to fly in Italian air space, alerting the U.S. defense attaché office at the Embassy in Rome for assistance. The defense attaché responded the same day with verbal clearances from the Italian government, with the proviso that the helicopters could land only at military airfields.³³ In the meanwhile, in the midst of preparing to fly the aircraft either to Ramstein or to Livorno, the task force prepared most of its vehicles and other equipment for shipment by rail in accordance with a detailed plan that manifested soldiers on various aircraft or as supercargoes on trains or on the ship. Careful pallet loading plans for all the aircraft allowed the task force to take three days' supply of field rations on the aircraft and another twelve days' supply on the ship. Coleman's staff also procured fifteen days' supply of bottled drinking water, at five gallons per man per day, for delivery to Mogadishu by ship.³⁴

USAREUR and corps staffs turned their attentions to port operations in Livorno, where the U.S. Army's Southern European Task Force (SETAF) and SETAF's 8th Area Support Group were on hand to help. To prepare helicopters for sea transport normally called for removing the rotor blades and then covering the fuselage in shrink-wrap plastic to protect against the effects of salt

air and saltwater, tasks that required both maintenance space and manpower. USAREUR directed the SETAF soldiers to prepare the aircraft for ship transport and determined that they would do so in temporary maintenance facilities, known as clamshell tents, that USAREUR troops would help to erect. USAREUR provided a C-12 transport to send seventeen soldiers from the 94th Engineer Battalion of V Corps to Livorno, where they worked for two days to erect the promised shelters. Other V Corps soldiers from the 70th Transportation Battalion went to Italy by C-130 to help load the ship.³⁵

The corps also sent soldiers to Ramstein to help the task force prepare its aircraft for strategic airlift at the aerial port of embarkation.³⁶ For the task force itself, however, the real deadlines were those imposed by the rail loading times specified in order to meet the ship loading time in Livorno for a vessel that was already en route from the United States. The date that rail loading had to begin, 15 December, in turn set a number of other deadlines: obtaining supplies and packing them, loading them into shipping containers, transporting them to the three railheads, and then loading the railcars. Loading began early on the morning of 15 December, as planned, and lasted well into the night at Kitzingen, Mannheim, and Wiesbaden, with one railhead, Kitzingen, requiring more than thirty hours of continuous work to finish loading. The local base support battalions and area support groups, none of which were under V Corps command, supported the task force, but Coleman's soldiers handled the actual loading.³⁷ It was a big task, Coleman later commenting that his soldiers loaded trains with more equipment than their units had ever owned before. More equipment yet was provided in Italy. USAREUR determined that it would be more efficient to issue war reserve stocks from a depot in Italy than to transport the equipment from Germany, so the task force planned to pick up some forty vehicles and trailers from those stocks and deliver them to the port for shipment.³⁸

At that point, the major pieces of the operation were more or less positioned for deployment. From 15 through 21 December the trains traveled between Germany and Livorno, the first arriving at the port on 19 December.³⁹ The Chinook helicopters landed in Italy on 15 December, while the UH-60 aircraft of the 159th Medical Company flew in two days later.⁴⁰ The balance of the task force aircraft began to move from home stations to Ramstein Air Force Base on 15 December, the last of the three platoons arriving there the next day.⁴¹ With all of the aircraft spotted at the departure airfield and port, USAREUR then arranged for Air Force flights to return the aircrew and the engineer teams to Germany.⁴² Airfield operations were the responsibility of the 21st Theater Army Area Command, which devised the plan and supervised aircraft preparation and loading.⁴³

While those unit movements were under way, the 12th Aviation Brigade delivered its completed operation order to the task force. The order consisted of six phases. In Phase 1, the units prepared for movement. Phase 2 involved movement of aircraft and equipment to the sea port of embarkation. In Phase 3, the UH-60 company deployed from Ramstein on six C-5 and four C-141 aircraft. Phase 4 provided for movement of the main body from Rhein-Main Air Base to



Loading CH-47 Chinook helicopters on board the M.V. American Falcon in Livorno for missions in support of the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia

Mogadishu. When the order was issued, the task force was obviously already in the midst of Phase 3. The remaining two phases had no dates attached to them, since they dealt with conduct of the mission and eventual redeployment, and no one yet knew how long TF 5-158 would be in Somalia. The order did, however, attach additional elements to the task force: an air traffic control element consisting of one platoon of the 3d Battalion, 58th Aviation Regiment, and Detachment 26, 7th Weather Squadron (U.S. Air Force).⁴⁴

Last minute planning continued while the task force made its final preparations. Various intelligence estimates suggested that the warring factions in Somalia might possess herbicides and tear gas or other riot control agents, and were likely to use them if they did have such chemicals, but were unlikely to be armed with any more substantial or virulent chemical agents. As a consequence, no chemical units were assigned to the task force, but elements of the task force were directed to take basic NBC equipment with them and to put all deploying soldiers through NBC requalification at home stations.⁴⁵

By that time all of the planning staffs knew that the ship they were awaiting at Livorno was the *American Falcon*, a roll-on, roll-off vessel that was under government contract and that normally transported service members' automobiles to and from Europe. USAREUR units working at Livorno reported that large quantities of bulk supplies were appearing on the docks, and that they heard these supplies were going to be loaded on the *American Falcon* for onward shipment to Somalia. The corps staff, having received such reports from its own soldiers, anxiously asked its USAREUR counterparts to make certain that TF 5-158 had first priority for loading and that none of the aviation task force equipment would be "bumped" and left on the pier.⁴⁶ Somewhat ominously, the Department of the Army, conscious that Somalia was a dangerous place, chose that moment to detail casualty reporting procedures for the task force.⁴⁷

The shipment of equipment to Livorno did not proceed without incident. Despite previous experience with international rail movements, neither USAREUR nor V Corps recognized that some of the oversized equipment that required the special low-bed train cars would be too large to pass through some of the tunnels in Italy.⁴⁸ The first inkling of the difficulty came when the first train arrived at Rosenheim, on the German-Austrian border. An Italian train inspector met the train there to inspect it and grant clearance. Anticipating that there might be corrections to be made, V Corps had already dispatched a team to the border crossing point with instructions to make the loads comply with Italian requirements. Discussions with the Italian inspector revealed that the oversized equipment, forty-seven pieces in all, would not pass through some of the tunnels.

Because the 502d Movement Control Center could not immediately locate a line haul carrier to truck the oversized equipment to Livorno, USAREUR decided to ship the equipment as far as possible into Italy by rail, then offload it and arrange with the 8th Area Support Group for drivers to take it by road the rest of the way to Livorno. The process somewhat delayed the loading of the ship, though some of the lost time was easily made up when soldiers at the port discovered it was unnecessary to cover the helicopters in shrink wrap, since the aircraft would all fit in the hold of the *American Falcon* and thus be protected from the elements.⁴⁹

Departures from Germany and Livorno, with those minor exceptions, flowed according to plan, with all of the elements of Task Force 5-158 Aviation converging on the airfield and port in Mogadishu by 3 January 1993. (Map 7) The actual deployment time line made it clear why there was never any chance that USAREUR or V Corps could use the deliberate planning process: There simply was not enough lead time to do the formal staff estimate and issue the orders, all of which were published after unit movement began.

The task force delivered thirty-one helicopters, the Chinooks of Company D, 502d Aviation, and the air ambulances of the 159th Medical Company, by ship. The remaining fifteen UH-60 helicopters were delivered by air. A total of 478 pieces of equipment, including 113 containers, and 9 passengers sailed



MAP 7

with the *American Falcon*. Another 91 pieces of equipment and the majority of the task force, 681 soldiers, traveled by air to Somalia.⁵⁰

Duty in Somalia

The deployment of Task Force 212 to Croatia had been based on a set of existing facilities, the use of which was negotiated through the United Nations with a sovereign government. When Task Force 5-158 arrived in Mogadishu, by comparison, it found no such arrangements had been made. No functioning national government existed, and the different clans that controlled various portions of the defunct government had little claim to legitimacy and even less ability to accomplish anything constructive. The port of Mogadishu had little capacity and had been abandoned for some time. The remaining port facilities and the airport had been stripped of anything of value, including electrical wiring, and were in ruins. "Anything here worth a nickel was taken," one Navy officer commented. Few civilian companies remained with which the United Nations forces could contract support. According to the Navy's port officers, "there was no infrastructure, no government, no people to deal with or hire, [and] you didn't know who to trust . . . it was worse than starting at ground zero."⁵¹

Colonel Coleman left Ramstein Air Force Base with his advance party on 21 December, taking with him seven soldiers, two ten-ton fuel haulers, a five-ton truck, and a light tactical truck.⁵² Capt. Joey Mehr, who had flown to Mogadishu on 15 December, met the advance party when it arrived in Somalia early on 22 December. The general dilapidation of the port and the shortage of facilities were obviously problems, but Coleman found to his delight that Mehr and his sergeant had gone a long way toward finding solutions. They had arranged a place for the task force to be billeted and had made initial coordination and contact with the 10th Mountain Division headquarters, which had itself only just arrived. The remainder of the advance party arrived over the succeeding three days, with the entire company being in place by 26 December, giving the task force the nucleus of aircraft and personnel to begin operations. "Murphy, of course, struck," as Coleman later related. The task force had combat loaded the transport aircraft so that the tools and equipment to reassemble their helicopters would be on the first plane to arrive. As it turned out, the tools came on the last airplane, a problem Coleman solved by arranging to use tools belonging to a Marine flight detachment already at the port to make his aircraft ready to assume the mission.⁵³

The main body of the task force left Rhein-Main Air Base on chartered aircraft on 30 and 31 December.⁵⁴ After test flying its helicopters, the task force immediately relocated to Baledogle, where the 10th Aviation Brigade made its headquarters on a Soviet-built airfield formerly used to train pilots of the Somali Air Force. From Baledogle, the task force launched immediately into a series of air assaults as Task Force Mountain began trying to stabilize the political situation in the countryside.⁵⁵ While that was in progress, the remainder of the task force met the *American Falcon* at the port, prepared its aircraft for op-



Air assault in Somalia

erations, and joined the UH-60 company at Baledogle. Upon arrival, the 159th Medical Company was, as planners had anticipated, detached from task force control and assigned to the 10th Mountain Division's medical group. Thereafter, the company operated as the theater aeromedical evacuation unit.⁵⁶

One other decision reduced the size of the task force. Company D, 502d Aviation Regiment, the Chinook heavy-lift helicopter unit, was still in Mogadishu on 5 January when Col. Michael Dallas, commander of the 10th Aviation Brigade, informed them that the company was not needed in Somalia. The joint task force had determined that other helicopter units in Somalia, notably Marine and Navy heavy lift squadrons, and a greater than expected deployment of helicopters by other member nations of the United Nations, made it unnecessary to retain D-502 in the country. Asked to comment about the decision, the V Corps public affairs officer could only repeat the information that had already been released, but conceded that the cost to the government to send the company as far as Livorno ran to \$44,768 for the sixteen Chinooks, while handling costs at the port of Livorno amounted to an additional \$25,213. Sensitivity about wastage of resources prompted the European Command public affairs officer to issue guidance to USAREUR and V Corps to the effect that the U.S. Central Command public affairs office would make the official statement.⁵⁷

The 166 soldiers of Company D, although irritated at the turn of events, prepared their aircraft and put them back on the ship. In response to a V Corps request, the *American Falcon* returned the company's equipment to Bremerhaven.⁵⁸ The soldiers returned by chartered airliner, arriving at Rhein-Main Air

Base on 9 January. The *American Falcon* docked at Bremerhaven on 21 January and offloaded all of Company D's equipment the same day. The last of the aircraft returned to Coleman Barracks on 30 January, while a train carrying the balance of the unit's equipment arrived in Mannheim on 10 February.⁵⁹

The events associated with making the task force operational in Somalia proved that the corps had been wise to send Coleman's unit "heavy." Food, water, and shelter were immediate problems. Because the task force had taken water and provisions sufficient for a month, Coleman was able to give his soldiers substantially more water than the standard issue—a major health concern. With few buildings left intact, the MILVANS, CONEX containers, and trailers became invaluable places to store repair parts and test equipment away from the pervasive dry, red, dusty sand. Extra tentage solved the billeting problem.

The medical company had taken tractors and trailers, which turned out to be a wise decision because there were simply no civilian vehicles to be leased in Mogadishu. The 159th Medical Company's tractors ended up being used by the rest of the task force and other U.S. forces around the port. One other piece of equipment that the 159th decided to ship to Somalia was a ten-ton forklift, an item not provided on the company's authorization documents. Captain Goldsberry, the company operations officer, later remarked that he had no idea how they would have managed without the loader because materiel handling equipment, like trucks and trailers, was utterly unavailable in Somalia no matter what rental price the Army was willing to pay. "We about wore the tires off of the ten-ton forklift," he remarked.

The 159th also decided to take along with it a substantial amount of sports equipment and other gear provided by the morale, welfare, and recreation office. That, too, was a wise decision. Coleman later ruefully commented that there were absolutely no facilities at Baledogle. There was also no American radio, since no decision was ever made to deploy an Armed Forces Radio and Television Service detachment to support the troops in Somalia. Mail was slow—about a ten-day round trip to Germany—and newspapers were therefore far out of date. Soldiers were starved for news and for something to do other than "watch the dust blow," as Goldsberry put it, when they were not on operations. To combat the boredom, the 159th had a wide range of sports equipment available. That proved to be an important piece of foresight in terms of maintaining morale.⁶⁰

Redeployment

Beginning in February 1993 redeployment of the task force proceeded in stages. With Company D, 502d Aviation, already back in Germany, Coleman's force declined to around 550 soldiers. Army strength in Somalia was drawing down as the political situation there appeared to stabilize. The joint task force headquarters decided to leave an infantry battalion behind as a ready reaction force and to create a small aviation task force to support that battalion. Early in February Col. Mike Dallas, the 10th Aviation Brigade commander, recom-

mended to General Steven Arnold, the division commander, that the aviation task force be centered on TF 5-158. Arnold forwarded that recommendation to the joint task force, but the final decision was that the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, a unit belonging to the 10th Mountain Division, would provide the aviation support.

As a consequence, on 10 February Coleman learned from Dallas that his unit would go back to Germany and that he should begin planning for redeployment. Released from its mission, most of TF 5-158 returned to Mogadishu from Baledogle. The 159th Medical Company, no longer under task force control, was to remain in Somalia until it could be replaced with a like unit. About fifty soldiers from Company B, 7th Battalion, 159th Aviation, the aviation intermediate maintenance unit, also stayed in Somalia to support the 3-17 Cavalry, as did a ten-man team from the 3d Battalion, 58th Aviation, which had handled air traffic control for the task force.⁶¹

Coleman placed the remainder of the task force in a compound at the port in Mogadishu, where civil disorder caused him serious concerns about his soldiers' safety. The task force prepared its aircraft for shipment and washed down its vehicles in a processing facility that Task Force Mountain had built at the port. Because the task force equipment would make up only a part of the load of the ship that would carry it, and because the balance of the cargo was going to the United States, TF 5-158 presented its equipment to military and Department of Agriculture inspectors according to standards for entry into the United States. After the ship sailed, the soldiers went to the airport, where they departed by chartered aircraft on 1 March, arriving back in Germany around two o'clock in the morning of 2 March. Replaced by another unit, the fifty men from the aviation intermediate maintenance company returned to Germany at the end of March. Later still the joint task force released the air traffic control team, which returned to Germany by 5 April.⁶²

The 159th Medical Company sent a few people back to Germany early in the deployment, as the requirements for aeromedical evacuation decreased. By the time the bulk of TF 5-158 redeployed, the 159th Medical Company had around forty-five soldiers left in Somalia, and they stayed there until the end of May, redeploying on 24-25 May. Original discussions had envisioned replacing the 159th with a unit from the continental United States and using UH-1 Iroquois aircraft, which many of the pilots thought better suited to the mission in Somalia. In the end, however, the 45th Medical Company (Air Ambulance), a UH-60 company from the 7th Medical Group in Germany, replaced the 159th.⁶³

The task force planned its return to Germany carefully. Quickly processing through the passenger terminal at Rhein-Main Air Base, the soldiers returned to home station and to the usual welcoming ceremonies. In order to ensure that he had all the loose ends tied up, Coleman maintained control of all task force soldiers for one month after their return to Germany. Every soldier had to complete his course of malaria prophylaxis, which ran for thirty days after return to Germany; turn in all weapons and critical items of equipment; and

then take either a four-day pass or, if desired, a fourteen-day leave. After clearing all hand receipts, the soldiers returned to control of their parent units. Ten days after TF 5-158 returned, the ship with its aircraft and equipment docked at Bremerhaven. When the equipment arrived at local railheads, task force soldiers unloaded the cars and took the equipment back to motor pools. Simultaneously, aircrews went to Bremerhaven and picked up the helicopters. The task force officially disbanded on 5 April 1993.⁶⁴

One problem remained. As the soldiers of 7-159 Aviation, the task force maintenance unit, were preparing to return to Germany, they received instructions from the joint task force headquarters to leave their equipment behind for the next aviation maintenance unit to use. The V Corps commander reacted sharply, insisting that he could not leave the maintenance equipment in Somalia without undercutting his maintenance capability in Germany. General Rutherford further pointed out that Europe no longer had "float," or excess, equipment of that type, since the equipment made surplus by the drawdown of VII Corps units had already been turned in. He therefore demanded that 7-159 Aviation return to Germany with its equipment.⁶⁵ Brig. Gen. Charles C. Cannon, Jr., commanding the 3d Corps Support Command, which was the headquarters to which 7-159 Aviation belonged, agreed with Rutherford. He stressed that the AVIM equipment under discussion amounted to about 40 percent of his aviation maintenance capacity. Were it not returned, he would have difficulty supporting normal peacetime operations, let alone any further contingency missions.⁶⁶

The corps formally directed 3d Corps Support Command to bring the equipment back to Germany.⁶⁷ By including the CINCUSAREUR, the commanding general of Third U.S. Army, and the commanding general of the Army element of U.S. Central Command as information addressees, Rutherford brought the matter to a level of command that could rectify the problem. While that was going on, the corps G-4 tried to deal with the issue by talking to the deputy chief of staff, logistics, at Forces Command.⁶⁸ Delicate negotiations at the senior level were not matched by what was going on in Somalia, however. The day that V Corps dispatched its message, the 7-159 Aviation commander in Somalia received a document control number for the transfer of his AVIM equipment to Central Command, along with "a direct order not to touch 'his equipment,'" as the conversation was reported to the corps G-4. "I don't think the CG knows this!" the deputy G-4 warned his boss.⁶⁹

The corps ultimately lost the fight. On 3 May the corps G-4 received instructions to transfer the aviation maintenance equipment to the 24th Infantry Division, which would hand receipt it to Company K, 159th Aviation Regiment, which assumed the maintenance mission for the units remaining in Somalia.⁷⁰ Concerned about the level of maintenance support he was able to provide units in Germany, the corps commander continued to explore ways to have the equipment formerly belonging to 7-159 returned. By mid-July, USAREUR was supporting the corps position and had arranged for the helicopter maintenance equipment to be brought back for V Corps use.⁷¹

At length, USAREUR determined that there were only six pieces of equipment still in Somalia that were critical; others could be replaced from within theater. USAREUR and Forces Command agreed that, as soon as those items were identified as being on hand in Somalia, they would be sent back to Germany. In the end, the continuing European drawdown process made pursuing the issue a pointless exercise. USAREUR had just announced that Company D, 7th Battalion, 159th Aviation, would be inactivated. Since that unit's equipment would be available for transfer to Company B, no critical shortage remained.⁷²

Reflections

From the point of view of V Corps, it was important to analyze the experience of sending TF 5-158 Aviation to Somalia, particularly because several of the problems that arose—among them the width of Italian railroad tunnels—were hardly new. Nevertheless, in a V Corps review conducted in January 1993 to evaluate persistent problems, the staff admitted in an internal report that the "Command does not have the capabilities . . . to review lessons learned from last deployment exercise." Considering Exercise Dragon Hammer '92, when the corps deployed to Sardinia, the deployment of TF 212 to Croatia, and the deployment of TF 5-158 to Somalia, the review found the corps "unable to retrieve lessons learned from previous three deployments."⁷³

Discussions among corps staff officers attributed that shortcoming to several circumstances. Chief among them was the lack of time. Busy planners, faced with a short-notice deployment, were unable to spend the time needed to look at after action reviews and other documents pertaining to previous deployments. A wealth of such documentation existed, as did staff analyses based upon those documents. Complicating the matter, the normal turnover in personnel swiftly destroyed accumulated staff expertise. Some staff officers thought that the staff did not even keep adequate records of previous operations from which to draw the needed lessons, had the time to do so been available. Finally, corps deployments were increasingly characterized by verbal decision-making, normally in the course of battle staff meetings or high level briefings for which no transcripts were ever taken.⁷⁴ The after action reviews published by the various elements of Task Force 5-158 were thus of considerable interest as the staff began thinking about how to do the job better the next time.

Reading over the unit evaluations of what had happened did not provide much comfort. Basically, as might be expected from small units such as aviation companies, such materials offered narrowly perceived problem areas, rather than larger summaries and analyses of the entire experience. Still, the corps staff felt the sting of disgruntled comments, such as one from Company D, 502d Aviation, that complained that the

Unit was kept out of the information net until the last minute. Only had 24 hours' notice to deploy the unit by air. Main body departure changed only minutes after the advance party departed.⁷⁵

In a particularly wounding jibe, D/502 alleged that AFN Radio, notorious for facile and superficial reporting, was among the best sources of information for its soldiers.

The 12th Aviation Brigade commented upon problems in filling personnel shortages and on a process of issuing orders that wasted time. Corps staff members recognized both as having occurred on previous deployments. The brigade further commented about the problem with oversized train loads, and the inability of both the 502d Movement Control Center and the German train master to recognize that the vehicles would not clear the Italian tunnels. Other transportation issues were equally relevant, and the brigade noted that qualified movement personnel—rail and air load planners—were in short supply throughout the organization.⁷⁶ The 159th Medical Company remarked with some asperity on an extreme shortage of planning lead time, time lost to pointless “what if” drills, a unit table of organization and equipment that had inadequate transportation to move the entire company, and the fact that “no mission statement was issued during predeployment or deployment phases.”⁷⁷ The last point appeared to suggest communications problems, since the headquarters of TF 5-158 issued its mission statement not later than 15 December.

The USAREUR and V Corps staffs conducted their own after action review in the first week of January 1993, which revealed most of the issues the task force later complained about. The attendees recognized that any short-notice deployment would be rife with problems, and that the issuance of plans and orders could not possibly follow normal procedures. Nonetheless, they agreed that “we made this much harder than it had to be,” and emphasized that the superior headquarters needed to keep deployments as simple as possible. The crux of the matter, both headquarters concluded, was to “decide what will be deployed and ruthlessly eliminate the tendency to create changes” and to “reduce the tendency to engage staffs and, subsequently, units, in ‘jousting with windmill’ type planning drills.” Significantly, the report emphasized that USAREUR had to develop the same “Green Ramp” mentality that existed in the XVIII Airborne Corps, and that the entire command needed to institute a systematic program for training movement planners. All agreed that USAREUR Regulation 55-3, which detailed the USAREUR movement control system, needed to be revised and republished to account for contemporary circumstances. The communications system needed to be harshly disciplined, as well. Gently alluding to commanders’ and principal staff officers’ voracious demands for information—demands that often caused the deploying units to stop what they were doing and formulate multiple reports—the attendees stressed that staffs had to learn to “control the ‘info-monsters.’”⁷⁸

The after action review concluded with an assessment of the major things the two headquarters had done right, and those they had done wrong. Largely because of the short deployment time line, sending vehicles to Livorno by rail, rather than road marching them, was a correct decision. Most of the rail planning procedure went well, too, with trains ordered and spotted so that they were available when the units were ready to load. Good coordination with the

Bundesbahn created a situation in which the German federal railway expedited the movement of trains, when asked. For the most part, diplomatic clearances were obtained in a timely manner. Granting the planning error about oversized loads and tunnel widths, the backup plan to road march that equipment from Bologna to Livorno was well conceived and satisfactorily carried out. Moreover, the staffs produced the plan swiftly, so that the equipment continued toward the port with minimum delay. Using the 8th Area Support Group (ASG) to coordinate all of the various players in Livorno was likewise a good decision, and the 8th ASG was also praised for dealing with last minute problems, such as a customs clearance issue, that did arise.⁷⁹

The list of things the headquarters did wrong began with the failure to issue a timely deployment order. Noting that the mission came on short notice, participants in the after action analysis still believed that, had the staffs adhered to the principles of keeping everything simple and sticking to initial deployment decisions, they could still have gotten an order to the units affected in good time.⁸⁰ While task force formation and deployment by means of telephonic coordination worked, that was not the ideal way to do business. Both staffs were embarrassed by their failure to recognize the recurring problem with Italian tunnel restrictions, and they noted poor coordination to obtain technical clearances for movement. For a short-notice deployment, quick coordination with various officials such as the liaison officer at the embassy in Bonn and various Deutsche Bundesbahn officials was obviously necessary, yet the staffs failed to arrange for odd-hour contacts with those offices. In general, there was a failure to station liaison officers at key points to smooth the deployment process. Units at every level across V Corps had already complained about higher headquarters' nagging telephone calls to find out what was going on at any given moment. Their persistent complaints, with which the corps staff was completely sympathetic, reinforced demands that senior staffs had to control the urge to "live in the unit commander's hip pocket." The upshot was that conference participants concluded that they had neither defined nor enforced realistic reporting requirements for the various players. Finally, there was a problem with customs clearance forms, since some of the equipment showed up in Livorno without the required documents.⁸¹

Many of these problems would reappear, some in different guises, in subsequent operations. For the moment, the corps staff was satisfied that it had defined those areas that most needed attention. Throughout the corps there was a growing familiarity with the tasks involved in deploying a unit out of Germany and a growing acceptance that such a deployment would probably come without much warning and with little lead time for preparation. For its part, V Corps was growing comfortable with its new role as a force provider rather than a combat headquarters itself.

Several aspects of the corps' experience in Somalia seemed particularly important for future operations. The corps could assume that any mission would be a short-notice mission. The staff presumed—incorrectly, as it turned out—that future missions would involve working with, or as a part of, a United Nations contingent. In sharp contrast to the logistical support that corps units were ac-

customed to receiving in NATO's Central Region, deploying task forces should in the future assume that they would get no help at all in their area of operations, and should therefore plan to be self-sufficient at the start of a mission. Finally, no deploying task force should assume that it was going into anything other than a hostile environment, and its organization and equipment should reflect that assumption.

NOTES

¹ Daniel P. Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995), p. 273.

² Msg, CJCS for USCINCEUR et al., 112350Z Dec 1992, sub: Operation RESTORE HOPE Deployment Order.

³ Msg, USCINCEUR for CINCUSAREUR et al., 112355Z Dec 1992, sub: Deployment of Aviation Forces to Somalia in Support of Restore Hope.

⁴ Officer strength in the headquarters and headquarters company at first declined and then rose somewhat as the corps progressed from the H-series MTOE to the L-series MTOE. The required/authorized officer strength of the headquarters was 144/104 in 1990; 138/99 in 1991; and 125/125 in 1994. See USAREUR Permanent Orders 127-8, 12 Sep 1990; USAREUR Permanent Orders 62-9, 22 Apr 1991; and USAREUR Permanent Orders 9-3, 15 Jan 1993. The numbers were deceptive, because the essential fact was that having authorization for an officer or soldier did not guarantee that the Army personnel system would produce someone to fill a vacancy.

⁵ For the major command point of view, see: Waldo D. Freeman et al., "Operation RESTORE HOPE: A USCENCOM Perspective," *Military Review* (September 1993). For other views on the mission in Somalia, see: Steven L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review* (December 1993); Walter S. Clarke, *Somalia: Background Information for Operation RESTORE HOPE* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, December 1992); and Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," *Parameters* (Winter 1993-94).

⁶ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps et al., 122047Z Dec 1992, sub: Deployment Order #2346, USAREUR Aviation Support to Operation RESTORE HOPE.

⁷ Msg, V Corps for multiple addressees, 122058Z Dec 1992, sub: V Corps Warning Order for Operation RESTORE HOPE, with Telefax cover sheet including handwritten note to recipients concerning conflicts between the USAREUR deployment order and the corps warning order.

⁸ With the use of external fuel stores, the UH-60 aircraft's range expanded from 320 to 600 nautical miles.

⁹ Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 130559Z Dec 1992, sub: V Corps OPORD 93-5, Operation RESTORE HOPE Support (Part I).

¹⁰ In subsequent restructuring of Army forces in Europe, 7th Medical Command was inactivated and 30th Medical Brigade was activated and assigned to V Corps. The 421st Medical Battalion was then reassigned to 30th Medical Brigade.

¹¹ Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 130559Z Dec 1992, sub: V Corps OPORD 93-5, Operation RESTORE HOPE Support (Part I). The 5-158 Aviation had at that time a curious battalion organization. As a consequence of the European drawdown, it actually consisted of companies drawn from both the 5th and 7th Battalions, 158th Aviation. The situation was

confusing to outsiders, since there were, for example, two Companies C: C/5-158 and C/7-158. Within the battalion, soldiers simply referred to "C/5" and "C/7." The battalion was not realigned to the usual structure until 1995.

¹² Interv, Maj. Donald F. Schardt (Commander, 49th Military History Detachment) with Lt. Col. Gary S. Coleman, Commander, Task Force 5-158 Aviation, 26 Aug 1993, Grafenwöhr Training Area, Germany.

¹³ Msg, HQ DA (DAPE-HR) for multiple addressees, 091839Z Dec 1992, sub: Personnel Management Policy and Guidance for Deployment: Operation RESTORE HOPE. The policy announced in this message was repeated in the V Corps OPORD and 12th Aviation Brigade order. Particularly see Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 131743Z Dec 1992, sub: FRAGO 1 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 (Operation RESTORE HOPE), Personnel Policy.

¹⁴ Msg, FORSCOM for multiple addressees, 110821Z Dec 1992, sub: Operation RESTORE HOPE Logistics Policy Message Number 1.

¹⁵ E-mail Msg, Col. Densberger for USAREUR ODCSOPS, 120218Z Dec 1992, sub: RFI [Request for Information] in support of TF 5-158 Deployment.

¹⁶ The first aircraft left Germany on 12 December. See Headquarters, V Corps, Public Affairs Office, News Release, 13 Dec 1992.

¹⁷ Coleman interview.

¹⁸ In V Corps at that time and sending senior-ranking representatives to the meeting: 1st Armored Division, 3d Infantry Division, V Corps Artillery, 3d Corps Support Command, 18th Military Police Brigade, 22d Signal Brigade, 130th Engineer Brigade, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 11th Aviation Brigade (later Regiment), 12th Aviation Brigade, 5th Personnel Group, 5th Finance Group, and V Corps Special Troops Battalion.

¹⁹ Coleman interview.

²⁰ Locations and units providing soldiers to TF 5-158: 2-1 Aviation, 3-1 Aviation, 3-58 Aviation, and 7-1 Aviation in Ansbach; 914th Medical Detachment in Augsburg; SETAF in Aviano, Italy; 4-27 Field Artillery, 77th Maintenance Company (of 85th Maintenance Battalion) from Babenhausen; Berlin Medical Department Activity; 596th Maintenance Company (85th Maintenance Battalion) and 4th Medical Detachment in Darmstadt; Headquarters, V Corps, 5th Personnel Group, 22d Signal Brigade, and 97th General Hospital in Frankfurt am Main; 4th Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, in Fulda; HHB, 69th ADA Brigade, 2-3 Aviation, 5-158 Aviation, 6-52 ADA, 7-158 Aviation, and 7-159 Aviation in Giebelstadt; 503d Finance Support Unit and 2-32 Field Artillery in Giessen; 7-227 Aviation, 8-158 Aviation, 39th Finance Support Unit, and 127th Aviation Support Battalion in Hanau; Headquarters, USAREUR, and 130th Station Hospital in Heidelberg; 5-229 Aviation, 2-6 Cavalry, and 6-6 Cavalry in Illesheim; 17th Signal Battalion in Kitzingen; 2d General Hospital in Landstuhl; 6-158 Aviation in Mainz; D-502d Aviation in Mannheim; 55th Personnel Service Company and 240th Quartermaster Supply Company in Nürnberg; 3-58 Aviation and 5-159 Aviation in Schwäbisch Hall; 3-64 Armor in Schweinfurt; 94th Engineer Battalion and 95th Chemical Company in Vilseck; HHC, 12th Aviation Brigade, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion, 29th Supply and Services Company (8th Maintenance Battalion), 8-158 Aviation, 159th Medical Company (AA), and H-3 Aviation in Wiesbaden; and 67th Evacuation Hospital in Würzburg. See Headquarters, V Corps, Public Affairs Office, News Release #2358-2, 23 Dec 1992.

²¹ Coleman interview.

²² Command Briefing, Task Force 5-158, Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia, East Africa, n.d., but 1993.

²³ Memo, AETV-ABC (12th Aviation Brigade) for Cdr, V Corps, ATTN: G-3, 14 Dec 1992, sub: Request for Aircraft Support, with handwritten notes summarizing actions taken.

²⁴ OPOD 93-002RH, RESTORE HOPE, HQ, IAD, 140700 Dec 1992, directed the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade to prepare two platoons for attachment to TF 5-158 Aviation effective 130800Z Dec 1992. That is to say, the order was dated one day after the action it directed. Obviously, the date of the operation order did not reflect the actual progress of events, since the company commander involved knew as early as 7 December what his mission would be. That was yet another case in which the formal orders followed well behind the course of events and, in effect, provided a record of what happened, rather than actually directing those actions.

²⁵ MFR, Company A, 7th Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, 14 Jun 1993, sub: Operation RESTORE HOPE After Action Review. For details of the attachment of two platoons of A/7-227 Aviation to Task Force 5-158 Aviation, see 1st Armored Division OPOD 93-002RH, RESTORE HOPE, 140700 Dec 1992.

²⁶ 159th Medical Company (AA) After Action Report for Operation RESTORE HOPE—Somalia, 23 Aug 1993.

²⁷ Interv, Maj. Donald F. Schardt, Commander, 49th Military History Detachment, with Capt. Dale A. Goldsberry, Operations Officer, 159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance), 25 Aug 1993, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

²⁸ Preparation for Overseas Movement included preparation of wills and powers of attorney and checks on other important documents in soldiers' personnel files, including government insurance. In addition, there were various medical and dental checks and immunizations.

²⁹ See Msg, Cdr, V Corps for multiple addressees, 130600Z Dec 1992, sub: V Corps OPOD 93-5, Operation RESTORE HOPE (Part 2), which includes the medical annex. For the record, the expected diseases were: acute diarrheal diseases, enteric protozoal diseases, typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, malaria, arboviral fevers, chikungunya and west Nile fevers, Rift Valley fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, O'Nyong-Nyong fever, viral hepatitis, schistosomiasis, leishmaniasis, meningococcal meningitis, acute respiratory disease, and cholera. In addition, sexually transmitted diseases, including a high incidence of HIV, were prevalent. The specified preventive medicine requirements were: current standard immunizations; yellow fever vaccination, initial vaccination or booster every 10 years; TB tine test prior to deployment and following redeployment; typhoid booster given every 3 years or oral live attenuated TY21A series every 5 years; meningococcal vaccine, quadrivalent, booster every 5 years; ISG-2cc. for up to 90 days, 5cc. for 5 months; malaria chemoprophylaxis—Mefloquine, one tablet per week beginning one week prior to departure (chloroquine resistance present); Doxycycline, 100mg. daily, beginning 1-2 days prior to departure, in individuals who could not take Mefloquine (e.g., aviators, and individuals taking beta blockers and certain other medications). The order recommended Doxycycline rather than Mefloquine for female soldiers, because Mefloquine causes fetal damage during pregnancy.

³⁰ From Kitzingen, 108 railcars; 42 from Mannheim; and 37 from Wiesbaden. Telefax, S-3, 5-158 Aviation for 502d Trans Center, 16 Dec 1992, sub: 12th Aviation Train Worksheet.

³¹ Msg, Cdr MTMC Europe, Rotterdam, for CINCUSAREUR, V Corps, et al., 15 Dec 1992, sub: RESTORE HOPE Port Call No. 1 (OPLAN 193RH).

³² Annex C (Air Movement) to HQ, 12th Aviation Brigade, OPOD 92-12, 151745Z Dec 1992.

³³ Msg, Cdr 5-158 Avn Regt for USDAO, Rome, Italy, 141230Z Dec 1992, sub: Aircraft Landing Advisory (CH47 missions); Msg, Cdr 5-158 Avn Regt for USDAO, Rome, Italy, 141400Z Dec 1992, sub: Aircraft Landing Advisory (UH-60 missions); Telefax, Capt. McMahon, 12th Aviation Brigade Flight Operations, for TF 5-158 (Maj. Young), 14 Dec 1992, advised of the verbal clearances from the DAO in Rome.

³⁴ Task Force 5-158th Deployment Plan "Operation RESTORE HOPE," 14 Dec 1992.

³⁵ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps, SETAF, et al., 140755Z Dec 1992, sub: FRAGO #1

to Deployment Order #2346—Clamshell Maintenance Tent Support; Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 142024Z Dec 1992, sub: Change 1 to FRAGO 2 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 (Operation RESTORE HOPE).

³⁶ Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 140107Z Dec 1992, sub: FRAGO 3 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 (Operation RESTORE HOPE) tasked both the 12th Aviation Brigade and the 1st Armored Division to supply soldiers to help TF 5-158 at the APOE. For a summary of taskings to support the deployment, see Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 142216Z Dec 1992, sub: RESTORE HOPE Summary Personnel Taskings. Also see File 870-5d, Operation RESTORE HOPE—V Corps, G03—Personnel and Equipment Data (Taskings), in V Corps History Office.

³⁷ Coleman interview.

³⁸ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-4, Plans (AETV-GDP), for Chief POM, USAREUR DCSLOG, 151900Z Dec 1992, sub: TF 5-158 LOG Open Issues/Information; Memo, AETV-GDP for Chief POM, USAREUR DCSLOG, 151000Z Dec 1992, sub: AR2/TRU ARPS CL VII for TF 5-158, Additions.

³⁹ Memo, AETV-GDP for CofS, V Corps, n.d., but 7 Jan 1993, sub: RESTORE HOPE Transportation AAR.

⁴⁰ HQ, V Corps, Public Affairs Office, News Release, 13 Dec 1992, and News Release #2351-1, 16 Dec 1992.

⁴¹ HQ, V Corps, Public Affairs Office, News Release, 15 Dec 1992, and News Release #2351-2, 16 Dec 1992.

⁴² Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-3, for Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAREUR, 15 Dec 1992, sub: Transportation Request for Aircraft Aircrews and External Support Personnel, with attached handwritten memorandum detailing the missions USAREUR coordinated: C-130 to return 60 CH-47 crewmembers, 161300Z Dec 1992; C-130 to return 50 aircrew from the 159th Medical Company, 161900Z Dec 1992; and one C-130 to return 45 support personnel after ship loading operations were completed on 23 Dec 1992.

⁴³ Telefax documents, 21st TAACOM CONOPS for V Corps ACofS, G-3, APOE/APOD Operations. This plan includes the "architecture" of the teams and the units from which they were drawn, as well as a diagram illustrating unit flow through the APOE.

⁴⁴ HQ, 12th Aviation Brigade, OPORD 92-12, 151745Z Dec 1992. The 21st Replacement Battalion, stationed at Rhein-Main Air Base, provided billeting, messing, arms room, and passenger manifesting for the TF 5-158 main body once it arrived at the air base. See OPORD 2, 21st Replacement Battalion, Rhein-Main Air Base, 151400A Dec 1992. Memo, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, for DCSOPS, USAREUR, 17 Dec 1992, sub: TF 5-158 Air Port of Embarkation (APOE), formally requested Rhein-Main as the APOE and specified 28-30 December as the expected date of deployment.

⁴⁵ Annex G (NBC Defense) to V Corps OPORD 93-5 (Operation RESTORE HOPE), promulgated on 16 Dec 1992.

⁴⁶ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-4, Plans, for Chief, POM USAREUR DCSLOG, 160900Z Dec 1992, sub: Priority of Loading for TF 5-158.

⁴⁷ Msg, Cdr, PERSCOM for multiple addressees, 171840Z Dec 1992, sub: Casualty Operating Procedures for Operation RESTORE HOPE.

⁴⁸ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-4, Plans, for CofS, V Corps, n.d., but 7 Jan 1993, sub: RESTORE HOPE Transportation AAR.

⁴⁹ Memo, Operations Division, USAREUR ODCSOPS, for the DCSOPS, 18 Dec 1992, sub: Sitrep on Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) as of 181600L Dec 92; Memo, V Corps CAT [Crisis Action Team], 181650A Dec 1992, sub: Rail Status.

⁵⁰ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-4, Plans, for CofS, V Corps, n.d., but 7 Jan 1993, sub: RESTORE HOPE Transportation AAR.

⁵¹ Quotations from U.S. Navy officers drawn from "Small Port Has Big Problems," *Stars and Stripes*, 14 Jan 1993.

⁵² High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle, or HMMWV.

⁵³ Coleman interview. Coleman was paraphrasing the popular "Murphy's Law," according to which anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.

⁵⁴ HQ, V Corps, Public Affairs Office, News Release #2365-1, 30 Dec 1992, and News Release #2364-1, 29 Dec 1992. Many human interest stories appeared in the press. Articles appeared in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 31 Dec 1992; the *Frankfurter Neue Presse* on 31 Dec 1992; the *Mannheimer Morgen* on 31 Dec 1992/1 Jan 1993; and the *Main Post* on 1/2 Jan 1993; see also "Somalia-bound Troops Bid Families, Germany So Long," *Stars and Stripes*, 31 Dec 1992.

⁵⁵ The air assaults were as follows: 28 December 1992, 0900 local, on Belet Uen; 31 December 1992, 0700 local, on Marka; 9 January 1993, 0845 local, on Buurhakaba; 10 January 1993, 0800 local, on Jilib; 17 January 1993, 0900 local, on Qoryooley; and 30 January 1993, 1730 local, on Afgooye. See Task Force 5-158 Aviation Briefing, Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia, n.d., but February 1993.

⁵⁶ Operations in Somalia do not form a part of this story, except insofar as they had an impact on subsequent USAREUR and V Corps planning procedures. Each unit of the task force submitted a daily situation report to V Corps, and task force operations in Somalia may be studied by reviewing: File 8780-5d, Operation RESTORE HOPE-V Corps, 12th Aviation Brigade-Somalia Situation Reports and Miscellaneous Messages; File 870-5d, Operation RESTORE HOPE-V Corps, 159th Medical Company-Situation Reports (monthly); and File 870-5d, Operation RESTORE HOPE-V Corps, G-3-421st Medical Battalion Situation Reports. All are on file in the V Corps History Office. Also see Coleman and Goldsberry interviews. Also see: Memo, AETV-ABA (12th Aviation Brigade S-1), for Commander, 12th Aviation Brigade, Operation RESTORE HOPE After Action Review (AAR), 15 Jan 1993; MFR, Company A, 7th Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, 14 Jun 1993, sub: Operation RESTORE HOPE After Action Review; 159th Medical Company (AA) After Action Report for Operation RESTORE HOPE-Somalia, 23 Aug 1993.

⁵⁷ MFR, Company D, 502d Aviation Regiment, 9 Mar 1993, sub: Operation RESTORE HOPE After Action Review; "Mannheim Unit's Somalia Duty Cut Short," *Stars and Stripes*, 5 Jan 1993; "Copters Leave Somalia Days after Arrival," *Stars and Stripes*, 6 Jan 1993; Memo, Chief, Public Affairs, USEUCOM, for Chief, Public Affairs, USAREUR, 7 Jan 1993, sub: Public Affairs Guidance for Redeployment of CH47 Helicopters.

⁵⁸ E-mail Msg, Lt. Col. Berry, V Corps Chief, Ops, ACofS, G-3, for Col. Semmens, Chief, Ops, DCSOPS, USAREUR, 050833Z Jan 1993, sub: Sea Port of Debarkation, CH47s.

⁵⁹ MFR, Company D, 502d Aviation Regiment, 9 Mar 1993, sub: Operation RESTORE HOPE After Action Review; HQ, U.S. Central Command Public Affairs Office, MacDill AFB, Florida, News Release, 7 Jan 1992; HQ, V Corps, Public Affairs Office, News Release #3008-1, 8 Jan 1993.

⁶⁰ Coleman interview; Goldsberry interview.

⁶¹ Coleman interview.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Goldsberry interview.

⁶⁴ Coleman interview. Also see Memo, AETV-AB (12th Aviation Brigade) for multiple addressees, 22 Feb 1993, sub: TF 5-158 Redeployment Procedures; 12th Aviation Brigade OPOD 93-3, app. 2 to an. E (Deprocessing Site).

⁶⁵ Msg, Cdr V Corps for CINCUSAREUR et al., 161545Z Apr 1993, sub: Equipment Remaining in Somalia.

⁶⁶ E-mail Msg, Brig. Gen. Charles C. Cannon, Jr., 3d COSCOM CG, for CG, V Corps, 300937A April 1993, sub: AVIM Equipment in Somalia.

⁶⁷ Msg, Cdr V Corps for Cdr 3d COSCOM, 301200Z Apr 1993, sub: Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) Equipment in Support of Operation RESTORE HOPE.

⁶⁸ E-mail Msg, Maj. McMiller, V Corps Deputy G-4, for V Corps ACofS, G-4, 301849A April 1993, sub: Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) Equipment in Somalia.

⁶⁹ E-mail Msg, Maj. McMiller for V Corps ACofS, G-4, 301655A Apr 1993, sub: 7-159 AVIM Equipment in Somalia.

⁷⁰ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-4, for Commanding General, V Corps, 3 May 1993, sub: Somalia Equipment.

⁷¹ Information Paper, V Corps G-3, 21 Jul 1993, sub: B/7-159 Avn (AVIM) Equipment in Somalia, summarized the joint USAREUR ODCSOPS and ODCSLOG effort to get the equipment back.

⁷² HQ, AETV Form 10R (V Corps Staff Summary), from G-3 Aviation Officer to G-3, 30 Jul 1993, sub: AVIM Equipment in Somalia.

⁷³ JULLS [Joint Universal Lessons Learned System] Long Report, 25 Jan 1993, sub: Exercise TF 5-158, conducted by V Corps on 12/21/92.

⁷⁴ MFR, V Corps Historian, 15 Aug 1993, sub: Discussions with G-3 and G-4 Plans Officers, August 1993, on Corps Planning Procedures.

⁷⁵ MFR, Company D, 502d Aviation Regiment, 9 Mar 1993, sub: Operation RESTORE HOPE After Action Review.

⁷⁶ Memo, AETV-ABA (12th Aviation Brigade S-1) for Commander, 12th Aviation Brigade, 15 Jan 1993, sub: Operation RESTORE HOPE After Action Review (AAR). Enclosure 4 (Se to 12th Aviation Brigade Internal AAR for TF 5-158 Deployment to Somalia, 15 Jan 1993, contains the observations related to transportation and unit movements.

⁷⁷ 159th Medical Company (AA) After Action Report for Operation RESTORE HOPE—Somalia, 23 Aug 1993.

⁷⁸ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-4, Plans, for V Corps Chief of Staff, n.d., but 7 Jan 1993, sub: RESTORE HOPE Transportation AAR, reporting on the meeting conducted by USAREUR, that date, including Col. Paul Semmens (Chief, Operations, ODCSOPS), Brig. Gen. Mahan (21st TAACOM), Col. Simmins (Commander, 1st TMCA), Lt. Col. Laferriere (Commander, 502d MMC), Lt. Col. Sanders (Deputy G-4, V Corps), and action and plans officers from the USAREUR and V Corps staffs.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ The actual orders sequence was:

112350Z Dec 1992, CJCS Operation RESTORE HOPE Deployment Order.

112355Z Dec 1992, USCINCEUR Order, Deployment of Aviation Forces to Somalia.

122047Z Dec 1992, CINCUSAREUR Deployment Order #2346.

122058Z Dec 1992, V Corps Warning Order for Operation RESTORE HOPE Support.

122346Z Dec 1992, V Corps Message, Operational Support for Operation RESTORE HOPE.

130559Z Dec 1992, V Corps OPORD 93-5, Operation RESTORE HOPE Support (Part 1).

130600Z Dec 1992, V Corps OPORD 93-5, Operation RESTORE HOPE Support (Part 2).

131743Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 1 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [Personnel Policy].

132302Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 2 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [o/o, deploy Engineer Squad to SPOD, Livorno].

140755Z Dec 1992, CINCUSAREUR FRAGO #1 to Deployment Order #2346—Clamshell Maintenance Tent.

170700A Dec 1992, 1st Armored Division, OPORD 93-002RH [Attach two UH-60 platoons to TF 5-158].

141017Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 3 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [Taskings to support APOE].

142024Z Dec 1992, Change 1 to FRAGO 2 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [Engineer squad deployment to Livorno].

141925Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 4 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [Taskings, night-vision goggles for TF 5-158].

151029Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 5 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [Pregnancy test not required for female soldiers].

151745Z Dec 1992, 12th Aviation Brigade, Operation Order 92-12 [Formation and mission of TF 5-158].

161647Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 6 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [NBC Cell Operations].

211000Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 7 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [Guidance for property accountability].

230830Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 8 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [Helicopter Aerial Delivery Slings requirements].

301100Z Dec 1992, FRAGO 9 to V Corps OPORD 93-5 [Personnel taskings].

⁸¹ Memo, V Corps ACofS, G-4, Plans, for V Corps Chief of Staff, n.d., but 7 Jan 1993, sub: RESTORE HOPE Transportation AAR. The documentation was the AE Form 302.

Operation SUPPORT HOPE

"... we had to interpret the taskings so that they made military sense. . . . And we have to do a lot more with a lot less. Look at this corps. When I got here, we had a cavalry regiment and two divisions of three maneuver brigades—that was sixteen months ago. Today, we have two divisions with two maneuver brigades and no cavalry regiment. And we are doing more now than we were when I got here."

Col. Clayton E. Melton, ACoS, G-3, V Corps
August 1994

"You get a lot of disruptive help. . . ."

Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs
Chief of Staff, V Corps, August 1994

Deep in the heart of the African continent, Rwanda in 1994 was both densely populated and politically unstable. The Rwandan government had been struggling against an internal rebellion, largely based on tribal differences, since October 1990. Primarily enlisting its army from the Hutu tribe, it found itself fighting the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel organization composed chiefly of members of the Tutsi tribe. Promising negotiations to end the war came to an abrupt halt on 6 April 1994, when an airplane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down, killing both heads of state. Responsibility for the shoot-down was unclear. Nonetheless, Hutu tribesmen immediately began killing the Tutsis in retaliation. Their conduct in turn triggered massive Patriotic Front operations against government forces. Out of a population of 7.7 million in April 1994, approximately a half million were killed and another three million driven from their homes by fighting that began that month.


Several weeks of heavy fighting defeated the Rwandan Army, and government forces began withdrawing to the west in the face of constant pressure from the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Hutus, fearing reprisals for their massacres of the Tutsis, fled from the advancing irregular troops. The French government intervened at the end of June, beginning a humanitarian mission to supply food and water to the refugees fleeing the Patriotic Front. Although the French set up a safe zone in southwestern Rwanda as a refuge for the Hutus, the number

of refugees quickly outstripped their ability to provide relief and international organizations began to assist in the middle of July. The situation reached crisis level by the time at least three million Rwandans had fled to adjoining countries. In the refugee camps near Goma, Zaire, cholera and other diseases soon appeared, striking refugees already weakened by exhaustion, malnutrition, and fear. Others were dying of dysentery, measles, and other contagious diseases. In July the deaths reached a total of around one thousand each day, in part as a consequence of a shortage of food and potable water.

Preliminary Planning

As early as 8 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the United States Commander in Chief, Europe, that President Bill Clinton was likely to decide to assist the French in caring for the refugees in the eastern part of Zaire. The Joint Chiefs directed European Command to prepare an operation order that would organize American military assistance to the French and to the humanitarian agencies already in Zaire and to compute the requirements for numbers and types of units to fulfill the obligations that the services would incur. Due to the immediacy of the crisis, the Joint Chiefs authorized European Command to send units to Zaire incrementally, as they became ready, but cautioned that operations within Rwanda itself, while not precluded, required very strong justification.¹ Eleven days later the Joint Chiefs asked the U.S. European Command to send an assessment team to Goma, Zaire, to determine what sort of help the United States could and should provide. (*Map 8*) Closely monitoring developments in Washington, the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon sent a copy of the joint directive to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army Europe, as a "heads up," or warning. Thus, by 19 July Army leaders in Germany had adequate information to begin their own contingency planning, working on the assumption that European Command would ultimately order the Army to handle American operations in Africa.² The next day European Command gave the order for the assessment team to fly to Africa.³

On 20 July the USAREUR crisis action team convened a meeting to brainstorm the requirements the Army was likely to be given, so that the operations staff could brief the commander in chief (CinC) later that day on what to expect. The CinC, General David M. Maddox, needed to know what types of units would be required to render the types of support necessary in Zaire; whether any of those units existed in Europe; and which headquarters should provide the commander and staff of the joint task force to run the relief operation. The chief of USAREUR operations expected that all of the attendees would make suggestions based on their own previous experiences with deployments, and specifically with Operation PROVIDE PROMISE. Throughout, there was one important factor that constrained the planners. Maddox had already specified that no units earmarked for existing operation plans was to be designated for the African mission. If use of such units was unavoidable, then the planning group needed precisely to identify the effects on those existing plans. He asked that



MAP 8

the recommended joint task force composition be listed in terms of units available in Europe, units in Europe currently earmarked for other possible operations, and units not currently in Europe. He preferred for the U.S. Southern European Task Force to provide the nucleus of the task force headquarters, with V Corps as his second choice and a unit from the continental United States as third. He also asked the crisis action team to produce a draft USAREUR operation order for humanitarian relief actions in Zaire.

Maddox knew that he had to brief the commander of European Command, General George Joulwan, the next day, and that the European Command intended to activate its own planning cell not later than 23 July. Therefore he wanted to be prepared to discuss in detail such issues as the joint task force mission statement, its organization, and the parent unit providing the force headquarters. Lt. Col. Randall Chase, the V Corps G-3 Plans chief, attended the meeting in Heidelberg to determine what requirements would devolve upon the corps and agreed that it was desirable for a corps G-2 planner to remain in the senior headquarters to work with the USAREUR deputy chief of staff, intelligence. Chase was authorized to discuss the operation, and its possible impacts on Exercise Caravan Guard, then in progress, only with the corps commander and chief of staff.⁴

Returning to Frankfurt am Main, Chase immediately briefed Brig. Gen. Montgomery Meigs, the corps chief of staff, and discussed future command of the effort, should V Corps be given the task. Meigs concluded that the best course would be for the task force headquarters to be under command of the corps deputy commanding general and to be formed from the corps principal staff. Meigs then conferred with Col. Thomas Morley, the chief of current operations at USAREUR, to discuss the personnel implications of the deployment, and in particular the impacts on the corps and contingency missions then on the books of losing control of important air traffic control, military police, and medical units for an undetermined, but probably extended, period.⁵

At about the same time Col. Clayton Melton, the V Corps G-3, who was at that moment at Giessen taking part in Exercise Caravan Guard, learned about the possibility of sending corps units to Rwanda. Noticing that some senior USAREUR staff officers had suddenly disappeared from the exercise, he convened his own crisis action team at the exercise site. Ambiguity disappeared almost immediately, when Colonel Morley telephoned with the warning that selected units and equipment might have to go to Africa on short notice. That warning in hand, Melton then discussed the evolving requirements with Meigs and with the USAREUR deputy chief of staff, operations, who happened to be in Giessen for the exercise. At that point, everyone expected that the operation would be fairly low key.⁶

The USAREUR crisis action team reconvened in the early evening of 20 July, beginning its deliberations with a review of the French forces then in Zaire. The French units, amounting to around 3,500 lightly armed soldiers, controlled the airport at Goma and had assumed the task of protecting the estimated 1.8 million refugees as their principal mission. However, they lacked the appropriate organizations to deliver medical or other humanitarian aid for any substantial period

of time. Lacking any firm information about an American area of operations, the deputy chief of staff, operations, directed the crisis action team to put what it knew into an operation order format and brief General Maddox to obtain his decision on which unit would form the joint task force headquarters.

The USAREUR planners expected to brief their progress to the commander in chief sometime in the late evening. Contributing to the process, Chase carefully outlined the V Corps preference for how the task force should be organized, if the corps were called upon to form it. Simultaneously, they learned that the European Command assessment team was then en route to Zaire. Meanwhile, back in Giessen the V Corps planners continued to plug away at the on-going Caravan Guard exercise but kept a weather eye on the steadily growing crisis. They kept the corps commander and chief of staff up to date on developments in Africa and began working on means to support the joint task force, should the corps be given that mission.⁷ Much of their work remained speculative at best, Melton concluding that his staff couldn't do any serious work, regardless of the "what if" drills the USAREUR and European Command staffs were engaged in, until it knew more about how the senior headquarters intended to form the joint task force.⁸

On 22 July European Command directed creation of a joint task force for planning at Kelley Barracks, in Stuttgart, to coordinate and command the relief operation in Rwanda, requiring USAREUR to designate a commander of the joint task force and to provide a staff to plan, coordinate, and carry out the humanitarian relief operations. On order, USAREUR would then conduct the relief operations and provide logistical support to third country forces and humanitarian organizations in Zaire, if so directed. The same day, USAREUR announced Maddox's decisions.

He directed the Southern European Task Force in Vicenza to establish the joint task force headquarters, identify mission requirements, and do the operational planning to support American operations in Zaire. Responding swiftly to the USAREUR order, the joint task force staff began to assemble in Stuttgart that same day, with most of the headquarters personnel arriving by the early evening. The V Corps staff dispatched a number of its officers to serve on the task force and awaited further USAREUR orders to provide forces to be used in the operation. Meanwhile, the corps retained responsibility for other plans, many relating to on-going operations elsewhere in the theater, and was charged to be ready to give the Rwanda-bound units any further support they needed.⁹ At that stage of the operation, as Melton recalled, "there were all kinds of predictions about where this thing was going . . . most of them wrong." In fact, even though SETAF had been designated to lead the operation, the plan at first called for Meigs to be the joint task force commander.¹⁰

Interpreting the Taskings To Make Military Sense

By the time Exercise Caravan Guard was drawing to a close, the corps staff had received the USAREUR warning order and begun to think about sending

water purification equipment, engineering equipment, and medical units to Rwanda. The process was well advanced by the time the exercise was over, and Colonel Melton further smoothed the planning path by sending selected members of the staff back to Frankfurt before the conclusion of the exercise to set up the corps crisis action team and get the operation up and running.

Almost at once the staff issued a warning order that required the 3d Corps Support Command (COSCOM) to prepare three reverse osmosis water purification units for deployment, each capable of independent, sustained production of water twenty hours a day. Working with the initial observations of the assessment team, the staff determined that each platoon needed to produce 60,000 gallons of water for storage at the purification site and then set up eight remote distribution points, each with a storage capacity of 15,000 gallons. USAREUR, they learned, would provide the forward area water purification system sets from its own war reserve stocks to facilitate local distribution of water to the refugees.¹¹ The execution order followed that evening. The COSCOM water purification platoons reported to Rhein-Ordance Barracks in Kaiserslautern, where they linked up with Task Force 51, as the SETAF operational headquarters had been designated.¹²

The USAREUR deployment order spelled out the task force composition. The SETAF commander prepared a reinforced rifle company team from his airborne battalion, although security seemed unlikely to be a problem, since there was no evident hostile threat in Zaire and the task force would be operating in what jargon termed a "permissive environment." The 5th Signal Command provided the required signal support, while the 21st Theater Army Area Command contributed the task force command and control element, including a headquarters company and a transportation platoon. As anticipated, the V Corps commander was responsible for sending water purification platoons. Units prepared for departure by air from Rhein-Main Air Force Base, with priority of movement going to the water production, storage, and distribution units. The duration of the operation remained uncertain, so the corps assumed a 179-day deployment. General Meigs further specified that V Corps units were to deploy with their full panoply of equipment, and that all units were to deploy under direction of their own chain of command, not the UN chain of command. "No blue hats, no white vehicles," he laconically informed them.¹³

Uncertainty prevailed about what came next, but USAREUR wisely counseled all subordinate commands that the situation in Rwanda and Zaire was "a fast moving crisis response operation," in which commanders should "expect mission requirements to evolve constantly." Events of the next two days proved the Heidelberg headquarters correct, as the deputy chief of staff, operations, gave the corps a rapid succession of additional missions. Early reports from Zaire informed European Command that the Rwandan refugee population was severely dehydrated and at considerable risk. In response, the headquarters in Stuttgart issued an alert order through USAREUR for V Corps to prepare a forward support medical company and medical logistics team for duty at Entebbe, Goma, and Bukavu to deliver preventive medicine, veterinarian, and public



A Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit of the 3d Corps Support Command during an exercise in Germany

health services and to operate rehydration centers planned by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.

The next day the corps learned of a further mission to send an engineer package consisting of at least three road graders, four bulldozers, three front-end loaders, and four five-ton dump trucks to Zaire to prepare sites for the water purification units and to clear roads. The same day, USAREUR directed the corps to provide six Blackhawk helicopters for duty in Zaire.¹⁴ Soon that order was expanded to encompass an entire UH-60 helicopter company and its accompanying aviation intermediate maintenance support.¹⁵ As time went on, the engineer mission was likewise broadened to include sufficient earth moving equipment to dig mass graves to inter the thousands of refugees who had already died in Zaire.¹⁶

Although the tasking process appeared in retrospect to have been orderly, it was anything but that. Despite the background of the Persian Gulf War and the several operations that followed it, the V Corps planners judged that staffs at senior headquarters still had little experience with creating and deploying joint task forces. The senior staffs' learning process was, at least from the corps point of view, a painful one. The fundamental problem, as the corps G-3 saw it, was that the European Command staff asked for pieces of equipment or types of units rather than defining a mission and allowing the corps to prepare the

appropriate type of unit to carry it out. In the first couple of days of the mission, for example, the Stuttgart staff, responding to joint task force requests, told V Corps to dispatch two bulldozers and a road grader to Zaire. Colonel Melton demurred, pointing out the problems in that approach:

If I give you two bulldozers with their crews, who is going to feed them? Where is the maintenance going to come from? Where is the logistics support for the equipment? Where is the command and control, the leadership? Well, we started challenging this, and pointing out that we had an organization that could accomplish all these things.¹⁷

In another case, European Command ordered the corps to supply a forward support medical company for the task force. Curious about why that specific type of unit had been requested, Melton asked what mission the company would have. When he learned that it was intended to give medical aid to refugees, he pointed out that a forward support medical company was a tactical unit from a forward support battalion. Intended to follow a mechanized brigade into combat, the company had six fully tracked ambulances but only four wheeled ambulances. Obviously, such a unit was not what the task force needed. Delving further into the matter, he then discovered that the medical company was really intended to take care of American soldiers in the task force, rather than give aid to the refugees. For that purpose, a tailored medical company from a main support battalion was more appropriate, because it had wheeled ambulances, a preventive medicine capability, mental hygiene staff, and so on. Eventually, despite those arguments, the corps was directed to prepare Company F, 703d Forward Support Battalion, as the medical unit selected for deployment, substituting wheeled ambulances for its M113s. Because Company F did not have all the desired capabilities, the corps had to augment it with additional soldiers, raising its total strength from 134 to around 150, and go through the convolution of supplying the necessary equipment from other units.¹⁸ Grumbling, the staff completed work that was pointless, given that an appropriately organized and equipped medical company was already available for the task. From Melton's point of view, the argument about which medical unit to use perfectly illuminated continuing problems in relationships among senior staffs and the persistent problem of staff indiscipline.

The issue, as Melton emphasized it, was that the corps needed to know what capability the task force required: the requesting headquarters needed to state the mission, the specified tasks, and the implied tasks. With that information, the corps staff could supply a properly constituted organization to do those things. Thus, as he put it, he was very much in the business of attempting to make military sense of the tasks the corps had been given. What could only be described as the Stuttgart staff's ignorance of service capabilities made the job harder than it needed to be, in his judgment. Happily, the USAREUR commander in chief, General Maddox, clearly understood the corps' frustration and supported the corps position in his own discussions with European Command.¹⁹

Unfortunately, the tendency of the joint headquarters, itself under enormous pressure to produce results quickly, remained to set its staff to flipping through service manuals and to conclude that the task force needed "one of *these*, and one of *these*, and one of *these*."²⁰ General Meigs observed the same problem in another instance involving a colonel in J3 at European Command who simply ignored the chain of command by calling directly to a medical detachment in 3d Corps Support Command. The joint task force had expressed the need for medics as a first priority, and that officer reacted by looking up what appeared to be, on his troop lists, a unit that had medics and then ordering the unit to the airfield for onward movement to Africa. In fact, the unit he chose was a ten-man medical logistical detachment that had people skilled in managing medical supplies, but that had no actual doctors or medics at all. The corps support command alerted Meigs to the problem and he quickly corrected it, noting later that the external pressure on the joint headquarters to produce results swiftly had unfortunate consequences. Of the officer in question, Meigs observed that "he ordered to the air head a unit that would have been totally inappropriate to the mission at hand and, in the process, violated four levels of the chain of command. He didn't talk to USAREUR; he didn't talk to the Corps; he didn't talk to the COSCOM."²¹

Managing the Deployment

The V Corps units selected for duty in Zaire fell under the operational control of the joint task force as soon as they were designated for duty in Africa. They were not attached to Task Force 51 until actual deployment, however, which meant that the corps retained responsibility for preparing the units for movement, for moving them to the departure airfield, and for sustaining and controlling them until the airplanes took off from Rhein-Main Air Force Base.²² The corps, well aware of the limited space at Rhein-Main, preferred the units to await an air movement order at their home stations. When advised of the flight schedule, corps could easily arrange an orderly call-forward of soldiers and their equipment to the aerial port.²³ Given the urgency of the medical crisis in Zaire, however, USAREUR orders directed the units to move to the airfield as swiftly as possible.²⁴ Again, high level urgency to place units in Africa complicated operations.

That pressure was soon felt in the corps, where commanders were trying to move soldiers to the airfield only when aircraft were available to fly them to Africa. Meigs came under pressure to move Company B, 94th Engineer Battalion, to Rhein-Main immediately, but without the assurance that any airplanes were going to be available to transport the unit to Zaire. Extremely reluctant to put soldiers in the position of sitting around waiting for an airplane that might, or might not, arrive, Meigs argued that there was no reason to inflict point-less discomfort on the troops. Informed of the urgent demands from the National Security Council and European Command to deliver engineers to Zaire, Meigs was also told that the Army could not afford not to have soldiers ready

for movement whenever the Air Force could make transport aircraft available. Eventually, the corps received orders to send the soldiers to Rhein-Main to wait, with instructions to load whatever would fit on to whatever aircraft showed up. Thus, B/94th Engineers went to the airfield before any flight was scheduled for the unit, and then fell victim to constantly shifting priorities and did not fly to Africa for almost a week. In the meanwhile, as Meigs noted, the company was subject to high-level scrutiny, as it was struggling

. . . to deploy on a TRANSCOM system, being supervised by a corps headquarters, an army headquarters, EUCOM headquarters, and the Chairman's staff, all watching the departures of individual soldiers and pieces of equipment. The level and intensity of supervision of one little company is phenomenal.²⁵

Operations at the airfield itself were, as Meigs phrased it, a "comedy of errors" in which aircraft loads were changed on the ramp. Because of those delays, aircrew exceeded crew rest limitations, or slot times to cross international borders expired, or tanker support could not be arranged, and flights were further slowed. "This," Meigs dryly concluded, "is not the way you should do business."²⁶

Other problems arose at the departure airfield, often because units did not have the appropriate training or experience to prepare themselves for air movement. The 21st Theater Army Area Command inspector general observed operations at Rhein-Main and found that units were still showing up at the air base without having been called forward. Units also arrived for movement with small arms ammunition in their possession, a violation of standard safety procedures. Furthermore, units characteristically lacked troop manifests on a computer diskette, as the USAREUR operation order directed.²⁷ Noting the reports that the air base and Transportation Command provided, the Department of the Army forwarded its own list of complaints about poor documentation and manifesting on the part of the units awaiting movement to Zaire. The crux of the issue, from the Department of the Army point of view, was that units were not using the computer-assisted procedures properly, or at all, which denied Transportation Command the ability to use its Global Transportation Network to provide in-transit visibility of the cargo the joint task force was awaiting.²⁸ In part as a result of observations by the corps staff, and in part as a consequence of problems that the corps commander, General Jerry Rutherford, and General Meigs observed on visits to Rhein-Main, the corps had already given additional, detailed instructions to all of its units so that they could properly prepare themselves for arrival at the air base.²⁹

Learning as it went along, the corps staff on 30 July created a departure and arrival command center at Rhein-Main, operated by the 3d Corps Support Command. The ad hoc headquarters controlled V Corps personnel and equipment prior to departure and maintained liaison with Air Force authorities. Well aware of the growing tendency for every headquarters to issue orders as the operation proceeded, the corps commander specified that the departure and arrival command center was under operational control of the V Corps crisis action team and reported directly, and solely, to that team.³⁰

A few days later the corps decided to send some assistance to the 21st Theater Army Area Command teams that were trying to manage the flow of units through Rhein-Main, loaning them additional certified load planners and experts in handling hazardous cargo.³¹ Since it was becoming apparent that units were going to be fragmented as elements were called forward to fill airplane loads, the staff also directed the major subordinate commands preparing the units for movement to make certain that a leader of appropriate seniority traveled with each element of a unit, and that each element took with it enough supplies to sustain itself until the entire organization arrived in Zaire. That reorganization, utterly necessary in view of the way units were being deployed, naturally complicated not only the movement process, but also the command and control and sustainment plans that units had already framed.³²

It was obvious to everyone trying to control the deployment that every headquarters involved was trying to do the right thing. Unfortunately, in the process, and presumably because of political pressure, those same headquarters consistently violated the established joint doctrine for contingencies. Therefore, as Meigs observed, the system was not disciplined enough to let the deployment process work as it was designed to work.³³ The commander of the 3d Corps Support Command, Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, agreed that the central question at the airfield was simply who was in charge. "Who says what goes on the next plane load was the issue," he pointed out. One authority clearly needed to be responsible for setting priorities. The corps discovered that it had not thought the problem through to the point of designating, ahead of time, who would run the departure airfields. The obvious solution to part of this problem was to send soldiers to the appropriate schools, formalize liaison with the Air Force, and direct each of the 3d Corps Support Command's two corps support groups to constitute two departure and arrival airfield control groups as a standing mission. "This," General Lust later commented, "falls into the category of another blinding flash of the obvious."³⁴

Conclusion of the Operation

The operation began on 19 July. By 9 August V Corps had deployed several units and prepared a number of others for assignment to the joint task force. Far more soldiers were alerted than ever deployed.³⁵ Deployments began on 2 August, when 40 V Corps soldiers flew to Zaire, with another 507 alerted for movement. The peak of deployments came on 16 August, when 118 soldiers were actually in Africa, 15 had been sent to Stuttgart to augment the joint task force, and another 33 remained alerted for deployment. On that date, twenty-six soldiers had already been returned from Zaire.³⁶ A dramatic drop in personnel commitments came on 12 August, when the requirements fell from 586 in the late morning to 169 by the evening.³⁷

In fact, the relief operation began to be scaled back by the afternoon of 4 August, when USAREUR informed its commanders that the success of humanitarian relief work in Goma had allowed the Army to turn over many of

its functions to the nongovernmental organizations in Zaire and therefore to lower the alert status of the units that had not yet been deployed from Germany. In general, all units awaiting movement were placed on eight- or twelve-hour recall notice and allowed to return to their home stations. That specifically included Company C, 6th Battalion, 159th Aviation, the alerted Blackhawk helicopter company, and Company F, 703d Forward Support Battalion, the alerted medical company. Some requirements—among them the materiel management team and property book officer—were simply rescinded because the need for those soldiers disappeared as the Army's commitment in Zaire was scaled back.³⁸ Some deployments continued, as the corps on 9 and 11 August sent two mess teams to support soldiers working at Kigali and Entebbe.³⁹ By 12 August all remaining units on alert for the mission to Zaire were instructed to stand down.⁴⁰

When V Corps troops went through predeployment processing before departing for Africa, they completed a number of medical checks, screenings, and immunizations because Zaire was, as Col. (Dr.) David Lam, the corps surgeon, told the units, a very unhealthy part of the world, particularly for "medically naive" Americans who had never been exposed to the virulent diseases endemic to the region. Africa was a medically harsh environment, and such things as malaria prophylaxis had to be initiated well before soldiers boarded airplanes.

The process of medical preparation for deployment uncovered a lack of medical readiness all across European Command, with shortages particularly of antimalarial medications and mosquito netting. As the surgeon discovered, the Army ethic of maintaining instant readiness to deploy posed its own hazards. "This concept of 'sure, we can do it, and we can leave in an hour' is fine if you're going to France. But if you're going some place where you need to be on antimalarial pills . . . you may not be able to deploy safely on a no-notice basis," Lam later remarked. That fact was not generally understood, and it required intervention by General Maddox himself to hold up the deployment of the lead units for thirty-six hours, solely in order for the soldiers to take enough antimalarial pills to get the medication to a high enough level in their blood streams to protect them.⁴¹

Despite that, a story in the *Stars and Stripes* on 6 August alleged that some soldiers assigned to the 94th Engineer Battalion might not have been properly immunized prior to their departure for Africa. The story prompted the corps to require every unit to re-verify that all of the correct predeployment steps had been taken, and particularly that all soldiers had received the appropriate medical prophylaxis. The conclusion, reached after numerous exchanges of query and response between the V Corps crisis action team and the units concerned, was that the engineers had been appropriately protected, having received their first meningitis C inoculation prior to departure and their second upon arrival in Goma.⁴² Just as important, as Dr. Lam also pointed out, was proper medical treatment of soldiers returning from the deployment. Again, the nature of the tropical diseases necessitated continued prophylaxis for a period of time after the soldiers came back to Germany.⁴³

Issues Arising from the Deployment

USAREUR, SETAF, and the 21st Theater Army Area Command had primary responsibility for the Rwandan humanitarian relief mission. The V Corps provided units and individual soldiers to the task force, and even so, only some of those troops were ever deployed to Africa. Despite the small scale of the operation, however, SUPPORT HOPE was valuable to the corps as a learning vehicle. Internal organization of the corps to manage deployments—a matter that the staff had already addressed more than once—remained an issue. Once again the corps was a force provider, rather than an operational headquarters, a situation that was becoming the norm for out of sector deployments. Three other major points demanded further attention: the degree of supervision units could expect in the course of high profile deployments; the question of how a joint task force should be formed and commanded; and problems in working with nongovernmental agencies.

High level attention, as General Meigs said, could provide a lot of “disruptive help.” By 1994 the drawdown of American forces in Europe had progressed to the point that there was a single unified command that had only one Army subordinate command, USAREUR. USAREUR, in turn, had only one major tactical command, V Corps. From the corps point of view, that meant that the span of control had been so compressed that all of the senior staffs in Europe had only one headquarters upon which to focus their collective attention during a deployment, and the corps therefore received much more detailed supervision than it had ever experienced during the Cold War years.

Meigs thought that might simply be in the nature of contingency operations, since they were all unique and necessarily “high profile.” Perceiving that uniqueness, senior officers at every headquarters were prone to become involved in all the little details, rather than leaving them to the subordinate commanders. Some of that, Meigs considered, was the natural inclination of seniors to take care of soldiers and make sure that things went right, and some of it was driven by the pervasiveness of the press and an understandable desire to be certain that national policy was not only executed well, but was also *perceived* by the general public to have been executed well.⁴⁴ Some of it, of course, was just a function of personality and a worrisome echo of the Vietnam War, where too many senior officers became involved in the details of operations that could have been, and should have been, handled in the normal course of events by the units involved.

One consequence of the high level attention has already been noted. The anecdote about a European Command staff officer issuing orders directly to a medical unit was not an isolated incident. Indeed, as the Army in Europe continued to carry out missions like the one to Rwanda, action officers at various echelons of command developed the unfortunate habit of skipping over intermediate headquarters and contacting units directly for information or to issue instructions, with obvious consequent effects on

unity of command and good order within the organizations. More insidious was the fact that every such request for information cost precious time that units trying to plan for or carry out deployments or other missions could ill afford to lose. The experience of units within the corps was that demands from superior headquarters to know exact, current unit status multiplied relentlessly, a fact the corps staff execrated, but about which it could do nothing.⁴⁵ Corps and USAREUR after action reviews of Operation SUPPORT HOPE nonetheless took care unambiguously to point out the problem.

Although Army units and headquarters had, at any one time, a considerable amount of accumulated experience about how to deploy forces out of Germany—in many cases in 1994 extending as far back as the Persian Gulf War—those same senior headquarters felt it necessary to continue to intervene in the planning and execution process. Meigs believed that corps units had a reasonable level of proficiency in handling deployments and that it was safe to assume that those units would give a very good response when called upon. Thus, the short-term changes induced by such interventions were extremely disruptive. Again, the drawdown influenced the situation, as Meigs pointed out when he remarked that “it’s very painful when you have so few people to put against the number of tasks that you have.” Two big lessons stood out at the end of Operation SUPPORT HOPE: the corps had to learn to live with what could only be described as “over control,” and it had to expect that the agreed joint doctrine for deployments would not necessarily be followed.

The formation of joint task forces became an object of somewhat greater concern. While V Corps did not have a role in forming the task force for Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the headquarters retained an active interest in how that should be done, both to make the process more efficient and to create a more capable and effective task force organization. In 1992 the U.S. European Command had published EUCOM Directive 55–11, which required each service component in the theater to constitute a joint task force headquarters for activation when required. Responding to earlier requirements, the three services provided detailed organizational information, and European Command published those headquarters tables of organization as annexes to ED 55–11.⁴⁶

When the need arose to create a joint task force for Operation SUPPORT HOPE, however, the unified command did not make use of its own directive, instead calling on the services to provide specified personnel and equipment to form an ad hoc organization. As finally organized, Joint Task Force Support Hope was under the command of Deputy Commander in Chief, USAREUR, Lt. Gen. Daniel Schroeder and maintained a headquarters at Stuttgart where most of the senior staff served. Schroeder himself took the forward element of the joint task force to Entebbe, Uganda, and from there directed the operation of Joint Task Force A at Goma, Zaire. Joint Task Force A, under command of Maj. Gen. Jack P. Nix, Jr., commanding general of SETAF, had a number of subordinate elements. Among them was Task Force

51, to which the V Corps water purification platoon was assigned, and B Company (-), 94th Engineers. Other task forces subordinate to the joint task force were projected for Kigali and Entebbe.⁴⁷

Those members of the corps staff most directly associated with the task force noted problems in how it was formed and how it operated. Chiefly, the problems stemmed, as Meigs had already commented, from the fact that European Command chose not to follow established joint doctrine. Colonel Lam, the corps surgeon, also served as the joint task force surgeon, and his observations were particularly relevant because the thrust of that particular mission was overwhelmingly medical. After noting that European Command simply ignored its own directive 55-11 when it formed the task force, he laid stress upon two points that were particularly troubling. First, the headquarters organized the task force before a clear mission statement existed, which meant that the staff was generic, rather than task organized for the job that had to be done. Second, European Command never actually let go of the mission after the task force was formed, but instead kept intervening and, at the same time, failed to prevent other headquarters from becoming involved in the nuts and bolts of the mission.⁴⁸

"You know," Lam complained, "we sent forces down before we really had a plan of operation. There were many organizations doing parallel planning, not all of them working on the same sheet of music. The decision was made to get people on the ground as fast as we could, even if we were not really sure what they were going to be doing." As a consequence, it was unclear to him who was actually in charge of Operation SUPPORT HOPE until more than two weeks into the mission.⁴⁹

The European Command concept of the operation was very different from General Schroeder's concept. For example, European Command wanted the Army to be involved in refugee health care, and set the requirement for a refugee rehydration center that generated the mission for Company F, 703d Forward Support Battalion. Schroeder, after observing conditions in Zaire, determined that the task force would not provide such support because civilian agencies were already organized for that purpose. Nonetheless, Lam reported that it still "took us two weeks to kill the rehydration center." Similarly, European Command did not deflect the attempts of staffs at all echelons, up to and including the Department of the Army, to play a direct role. Consequently, instead of merely offering their assistance and waiting for the joint task force commander to accept it, "they forced it down his throat." An example was the persistent attempt of the Army Medical Research and Development Command to use the experimental tele-medical package in Zaire, even though the Army medical infrastructure did not exist there properly to evaluate the equipment.⁵⁰

In the opinion of many officers on the corps staff, those problems were endemic to joint task forces but could easily be resolved if European Command changed its method of forming a joint task force. One of the most trenchant critiques came from General Meigs:

... the Corps is never looked at as an entity. For some reason, the conventional wisdom in a contingency is to piecemeal pieces of the Corps to build something else, and never to take a slice of the Corps to go do a job. In other words, one doesn't ask for the Corps tactical command post and a coherent part of a division with coherent parts of the division slice. Instead, they ask for a team of this and a platoon of that, and various officers to build a command and control element. It's not clear why that's the case, but that's how the thing seems to be done.⁵¹

Observing previous deployments, Meigs surmised that European Command had concluded that the best way to build a joint task force was to begin with a personality, rather than with a unit, and build the capability around the commander. It appeared to him that a standing joint task force of some kind would be far more efficient, because a unit would already have the necessary equipment and a trained staff. "It's not a question of preference," he averred, but of efficiency, because it would be "the smart thing . . . to use people who are accustomed to working with each other and who do it this way on exercises. Deploy them in times of crisis or combat the way we train."⁵²

The corps commander was of the same opinion and felt strongly that, certainly in any large operation, European Command should use the corps as the foundation of the deployment, attaching personnel and units from the other services, as required, to make the headquarters more joint and more combined. General Rutherford was emphatic about the advantages:

You would then have built around a very cohesive, tight unit that has all the C3 that it needs to pull off a major operation, bringing in only that special equipment you need to work in the joint and combined area. But you would have *all of that well-oiled Corps machinery* that's accustomed to working together on a day-to-day basis. . . .⁵³

Those staff officers who had experienced the end of the Cold War and the transition to an emphasis on regional operations took the same view, especially after participating in the series of joint task force exercises that European Command ran while General Joulwan was the theater commander in chief. Col. Dan Ferezan, corps deputy chief of staff at the time of the Rwanda operation, held that a corps headquarters had a uniquely capable staff organization. "We do extremely detailed and accurate operational planning, logistics planning, personnel planning," he asserted.⁵⁴ Lt. Col. Dan Sulka, the G-4 plans officer, supported Ferezan's conclusion and elaborated upon it. Himself experienced in planning deployments, Sulka spent some time analyzing the problem, and his conclusions were an excellent *précis* of the view many V Corps staff officers shared.

First, he insisted, all of the principal requirements of a joint task force headquarters already existed within a corps headquarters. A corps had the appropriate operational vision and perspective, by virtue of its level of organization; it had the depth in personnel to operate twenty-four hours a day; it was organized with the right levels of talent and experience for the joint task force mission; and it had the ability to connect the operational and strategic levels, both in planning and in execution of operations. Those capabilities, he noted in passing,

did not exist in a division, at SETAF headquarters, or in ad hoc organizations. Crucially, Army doctrine as expressed in FM 100-15 explicitly gave the corps headquarters the mission essential task of forming a joint task force and of being both the planner and the executor of an operation. The general staff structure of the corps facilitated that task, because it was easy to turn the G-staff into a J-staff. A unique capability of the corps that further enhanced its capability to function as a joint task force was the corps battle staff, organized under the G-3 and bringing all the trained planners together on a routine and recurring basis. In fact, Sulka noted, the corps had already functioned as a joint task force during Exercise Atlantic Resolve '94 and had provided its joint task force organization to European Command for inclusion in EUCOM Directive 55-11.⁵⁵

In Sulka's view, the corps position was not dissimilar from that of the EUCOM commander. General Joulwan had, over the preceding year, run a series of joint task force exercises that had the intent of achieving a battle-rostered staff that worked together from one exercise to the next. Because of the frequency of routine personnel reassignments in the three services, it was but a short step to conclude that it was even better to draw the nucleus of a joint task force from a single headquarters, in which case there was little doubt that the staff officers would know each other and share a body of experience. "There is a challenge in taking a small headquarters like SETAF and having a lot of people from outside coming in to fill critical jobs, versus having a core of a trained staff," he observed. Therefore, Sulka concluded, "I don't think its the 'hooah' factor" that the corps should be the base on which a joint task force should be formed. "I think it's a very deep, intellectual understanding of the fundamentals of pulling together organizations to accomplish military missions; that you can't do ad hoc things, or you want to minimize how ad hoc you are."⁵⁶

Sustained grumbling at the action officer level notwithstanding, the future direction of joint task forces seemed unlikely to change. The lessons the staff could draw from the operation were therefore all the more important in order to minimize the disruptions that subsequent deployments would cause. Chief among those lessons was the fact the G-3 had noted when the Rwanda operation began: The staff had to insist upon receiving its taskings in the form of requirements for capabilities, rather than as demands for particular equipment, skills, units, or parts of units.

The final major issue concerned relations with international, civilian, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As the corps was rapidly learning, such groups existed in a bewildering array and were invariably involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Everyone understood that such organizations did not function in familiar ways. For example, often their most senior, experienced people worked at the lowest levels of the organization, and those organizations often did not have intermediary staffs linking senior supervisors and working groups. The revelation lay in just how unfamiliar their functioning could actually be, and in the fact that such organizations rarely seemed to coordinate their actions with other agencies, or even with other parts of their own organization.

While all of the humanitarian assistance organizations, and especially those in the medical field, were dedicated and well-motivated, they were not military organizations and exhibited an entirely different culture. As Colonel Lam pointed out, however, those organizations were thoroughly experienced in the kinds of missions that soldiers knew virtually nothing about, and the corps had much to learn from them. That learning took the form not only of observing their techniques during operations, but also of attending courses, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross symposium on handling refugee affairs in large populations. Within the Army, Lam believed, staffs needed to develop systems that allowed better interface with the nongovernmental organizations, while explaining to them how the Army worked.⁵⁷

As the corps had already seen in Croatia, the Army's and nongovernmental organizations' systems could be compatible, but not without work. Some, and particularly the United Nations, were heavily bureaucratic in nature and more time had to be allowed when coordinating actions with them. Fundamentally, it remained very hard for soldiers to comprehend any organization that had no chain of command, and few international humanitarian agencies did. Nongovernmental organizations, for their part, were equally confused by the Army's command organization. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was a case in point. Soldiers in Zaire found that they received differing and often conflicting answers from the UNHCR, depending upon the official with whom they were dealing or the place in the organization that the official occupied. Equally, as Lam saw it, the UNHCR did not understand how to work with the Army:

I heard a complaint from one of the NGOs that they had asked the U.S. Army two weeks ago for some stuff and it wasn't there yet. They wanted to know if we were ignoring them. Well, our question was: "who did you ask?" It turned out that they had asked one of the sergeants down there, running one of the water plants. We told them that this isn't how the Army works, and they had a very hard time understanding that.⁵⁸

The organization's request for assistance also highlighted the fact that by 1994 the nature of corps operations had evolved considerably. In almost every mission since the end of Operation POSITIVE FORCE, the corps deployment had been led by combat service support troops or units. Rarely had there been a need for combat forces. Indeed, medical units, and the 212th MASH in particular, had been most in demand, with other combat service support units not far behind. Brig. Gen. Larry Lust characterized the post-Cold War corps neatly when he said that "if you want to go places and do things these days, you want to be a logistician."⁵⁹

In almost every case the finite number of specialized logistics and similar support units in V Corps could be contrasted to the wide and seemingly endless range of services demanded by peacekeeping and disaster relief missions. Competition for those capabilities was keen, because the maneuver brigades could not operate if their own logistics "slice" was deployed elsewhere. The issue would be a continuing one, too, as Sulka pointed out. "It comes back to that

one nation in the coalition or alliance," he said, "that has the capabilities. And that's the United States." A shrinking army needed to take care, he thought, about how much of its logistics force structure it allowed to be committed to multinational organizations or humanitarian relief operations. "It's a zero-sum game," he stressed, because only so many units were available.⁶⁰ For the future, the V Corps staff clearly understood that logistics units would remain central to their planning for out of sector missions.

NOTES

¹ Msg, CJCS for multiple addressees, 08 Jul 1994, sub: Planning order.

² Msg, CJCS for multiple addressees, 191645Z Jul 1994, sub: Joint Staff Request to Deploy USEUCOM Assessment Team to Goma, Zaire; Telefax Msg, Army AOC, Pentagon, to USAREUR ADCSOPS, 19/20 Jul 1994, "heads up on Rwanda."

³ Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 200035Z Jul 1994, sub: USCINCEUR Execute Order for Site Assessment Team to Goma, Zaire; Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 201817Z Jul 1994, sub: Site Assessment Team to Goma, Zaire, tasked V Corps to provide a field grade medical plans specialist, to assist the follow-on assessment team, ETD 21 July 1994.

⁴ MFR, V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans), 20 Jul 1994, sub: JTF.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Interv, Maj. John O'Brien with Col. Clayton E. Melton, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 23 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁷ MFR, V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans), 20 Jul 1994, sub: JTF.

⁸ Melton interview.

⁹ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 221640Z Jul 1994, sub: Warning Order #2194—USAREUR Establishment of U.S. Joint Task Force. The order specified the command relationships for the operation, naming USCINCEUR as the supported U.S. commander, and Commander, Joint Task Force Quiet Resolve, as the supported theater commander.

¹⁰ Melton interview.

¹¹ V Corps Warning Order for JTF Quiet Resolve, 222100Z Jul 1994.

¹² V Corps Execution Order #94-68 for JTF Quiet Resolve, 222100Z Jul 1994. The order was modified by Msg, Cdr, V Corps for multiple addressees, 23 Jul 1994, sub: FRAGO 1 to Execution Order 94-68 for JTF Quiet Resolve.

¹³ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 231904Z Jul 1994, sub: Deployment of IRF to Support COMJTF Operations in Zaire; Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 232121Z Jul 1994, sub: Update #1 to Deployment of IRF to Support COMJTF Operations in Zaire; and MFR, 21st TAACOM, 23 Jul 1994, sub: Initial Planning Guidance for Joint Task Force (JTF) Quiet Resolve, quoting General Meigs' instructions; Msg, Cdr, V Corps for multiple addressees, 232330Z Jul 1994, sub: FRAGO 2 to Execution Order 94-68 JTF Quiet Resolve, told units to plan for a 179-day mission.

¹⁴ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for Cdr, V Corps, 252055Z Jul 1994, sub: Alert Order for V Corps (Medical); Msg, CINCUSAREUR for Cdr, V Corps, 260230Z Jul 1994, sub: Alert Order #2 for V Corps (Engineers); and Msg, Cdr, V Corps for multiple addressees, 260800Z Jul 1994, sub: Warning Order One to Execution Order 94-68 JTF Quiet Resolve (JTFQR) (Aviation).

¹⁵ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 271718Z Jul 1994, sub: Update #4 to Deployment Order 2394, Deployment of IRF to Support COMJTF Operations in Zaire (COMJTF Support Hope).

¹⁶ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 282230Z Jul 1994, sub: Update to Execution Order to V Corps for Engineer Package.

¹⁷ Melton interview.

¹⁸ Msg, 260100Z Jul 1994, V Corps FRAGO 6 to Execution Order 94-68 JTF Quiet Resolve; Msg, 272030Z Jul 1994, V Corps FRAGO 14 to Execution Order 94-68 for JTF Quiet Resolve.

¹⁹ Msg, 272030Z Jul 1994, V Corps FRAGO 14 to Execution Order 94-68 for JTF Quiet Resolve.

²⁰ Melton interview.

²¹ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Chief of Staff, V Corps, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²² Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 262000Z Jul 1994, sub: Change 1 to Update #1 DTG 232121Z Jul 94 on Deployment of IRF to Support COMJTF Operations in Zaire.

²³ Msg, Cdr, V Corps for multiple addressees, 010800Z Aug 1994, sub: Rwanda Mvt Process.

²⁴ For example: Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps, 270248Z Jul 1994, sub: Execute Order for V Corps Medical Unit; Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 282230Z Jul 1994, sub: Update to Execution Order to V Corps for Engineer Package; Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps, 292045Z Jul 1994, sub: Change to update #4 to Deployment Order 2394, Deployment of IRF to Support COMJTF Operations in Zaire (COMJTF Support Hope).

²⁵ Meigs interview.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Msg, Cdr, V Corps for multiple addressees, 030216Z Aug 1994, sub: V Corps Msg #2, 21st TAACOM IG DACG Observations.

²⁸ Msg, HQDA for multiple addressees, 031700Z Aug 1994, sub: Documentation and Manifesting Procedures for Support Hope Cargo.

²⁹ Msg, 290300Z Jul 1994, V Corps FRAGO 22 to Execution Order 94-68 for JTF Support Hope.

³⁰ Msg, 301030Z Jul 1994, V Corps FRAGO 27 to Execution Order 94-68 for JTF Support Hope, V Corps Departure and Arrival Command Center at Rhein-Main AFB.

³¹ Msg, 030525Z Aug 1994, V Corps FRAGO 40 to Execution for JTF Support Hope, D/AACG Personnel Taskings.

³² Msg, 301207Z Jul 1994, V Corps FRAGO 28 to Execution Order 94-68 for JTF Support Hope, C2 for Deploying Units.

³³ Meigs interview.

³⁴ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Commanding General, 3d Corps Support Command, 24 Jun 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

³⁵ Operation SUPPORT HOPE Briefing Slides, V Corps Staff for CG, V Corps, 9 Aug 1994.

³⁶ Operation SUPPORT HOPE Briefing Slides, V Corps Staff for CG, V Corps, 2 and 16 Aug 1994.

³⁷ Operation SUPPORT HOPE Briefing Slides, V Corps Staff for CG, V Corps, 12 Aug 1994.

³⁸ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 041730Z Aug 1994, sub: Change 4 to CINCUSAREUR OPORD #2494 USAREUR Support to Operation SUPPORT HOPE; Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 081500Z Aug 1994, sub: Change 7 to CINCUSAREUR OPORD #2494, USAREUR Support to Operation SUPPORT HOPE.

³⁹ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 061405Z Aug 1994, sub: Change 6 to CINCUSAREUR OPORD #2494, Operation SUPPORT HOPE.

⁴⁰ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 121400Z Aug 1994, sub: Change 10 to CINCUSAREUR OPORD #2494, Support to Operation SUPPORT HOPE.

⁴¹ Interv, Maj. John O'Brien with Col. (Dr.) David M. Lam, V Corps Surgeon, 24 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁴² Msg, Cdr, V Corps for Corps MSCs, 061131Z Aug 1994, sub: V Corps FRAGO 46 to Execution Order 94-68 JTF Support Hope, Verification of Proper POM Procedures. The article was: "Some relief soldiers possibly missed shots," *Stars and Stripes*, 6 Aug 1994, and referred to Meningococcal inoculations. On the verification procedures, refer to V Corps crisis action team staff duty log (DA Forms 1594), 6 Aug 1994.

⁴³ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 122047Z Aug 1994, sub: Redeployment Criteria for Malaria Prophylaxis (Operation SUPPORT HOPE); and Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 171515Z Aug 1994, sub: Medical Screening/Evaluations of Soldiers Redeploying from Operation SUPPORT HOPE (2 parts). The latter message specified time tests and other medical screenings as well as prophylaxis.

⁴⁴ Meigs interview.

⁴⁵ MFR, AETV-CSH (Historian), 24 Aug 1994, sub: Notes from Corps Staff Wrap-Up Discussion, Operation SUPPORT HOPE; Informal Notes, Corps Historian, V Corps Staff Call, July and August 1994. These memoranda summarize points made by corps staff principals, staff deputies, and action officers, as well as comments forwarded by major subordinate commands in response to a request from the ACofS, G-3, for observations about deployments.

⁴⁶ [Headquarters, U.S. European Command], Directive 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters, Policies, Procedures, and Organization, 29 May 1992 (rev. ed. 7 Jul 1995).

⁴⁷ CINC Evening Brief, 31 Jul 1994, which gives a detailed organization diagram.

⁴⁸ Lam interview.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Meigs interview.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Interv, author with Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, Commanding General, V Corps, 19 Jan 1995, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg; emphasis in the original.

⁵⁴ Interv, author with Col. Daniel M. Ferezan, Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 15 Mar and 13-14 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks.

⁵⁵ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Daniel V. Sulka, Plans Chief, ACofS, G-4, V Corps, 9 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Lam interview.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Lust interview.

⁶⁰ Sulka interview.

Blue Helmet Duty Task Force Able Sentry

"We can't lose sight of what a difficult process this is, and how disruptive this is to a battalion."

Lt. Col. Carter Ham
Commanding TF 1-6 Infantry
18 August 1995

"The problem with this mission is that it is a peace enforcement mission. We are, by nature, and by structure, and by mission . . . not a peace enforcement-trained unit. The European part of the U.S. Army is becoming that way over time, what with IFOR and Macedonia and Somalia and so on. But I will tell you that the shift in mind set from a killer force, a fighting force, to a peacekeeping force prepared to fight is difficult."

Lt. Col. Stephen Layfield
Commanding TF 1-15 Infantry
14 June 1996

"So how long do we do this? The average UN peacekeeping operation lasts sixteen years. The Multi-National Force and Observers has been in the Sinai for twenty-five years."

Comment at V Corps Staff Call
in re Macedonia missions
August 1996

Early in 1992 the president of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ asked for assistance in securing the new nation's borders and stemming the spread of war in the Balkans. In response, the UN Secretary General dispatched a fact-finding team composed of military, police, and civilian experts to Macedonia and, upon reviewing its findings, agreed to establish the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) there.² The resolution the Security Council adopted on 11 December 1992 stipulated a force that included a military component, civil affairs organizations, United Nations Military Observers, and United Nations Civilian Police.³ President Bill Clinton declared at the time that Balkan stability and containment of the existing con-

flict within the borders of the former Yugoslavia were objectives compatible with U.S. national security interests. Therefore, in early June 1993 the United States offered to augment the UNPROFOR with a small American ground contingent, an offer the United Nations accepted in the middle of that month.⁴

The Task Force 212 medical mission to Croatia was the first V Corps operation in direct support of the United Nations, and it appeared certain that it was not to be the last. Unlike the UNPROFOR tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR in Macedonia had a mission unique in United Nations history: providing a peacekeeping force *before* hostilities erupted, with the intention of preventing fighting. Also unlike similar UN actions, that UNPROFOR mission proceeded with the approval of only one of the two states involved. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, now a combination of Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, was not a party to the agreement, and most observers anticipated that a certain degree of tension would consequently exist between the United Nations troops in Macedonia and the Serb armed forces across the border in Kosovo.

The mission was purely to observe the border and report the results of those observations to UN Command. Augmenting the efforts of the UNPROFOR was the United Nations Civilian Police, there to monitor the Macedonian border police, to work with the Macedonian military and civil authorities, and to cooperate closely with UNPROFOR in border matters. The force was not intended to be combatant because such was not its mission. In any case, it was far too light to engage in any sort of combat operations against either the minimal Macedonian armed forces or the comparatively substantial military power that Yugoslavia could array against it in the border region.

Yugoslav forces there amounted to some 65,000 soldiers, organized in twenty-two tank and infantry brigades and one parachute brigade and equipped with around 350 tanks (largely obsolete T-34 and T-55) and armored personnel carriers (chiefly M-80 and M-60). Yugoslav ground forces were backed up by an air force that operated 109 fighters, among them 12 MiG-29 Fulcrums; 121 ground attack aircraft; 54 attack helicopters; and 63 utility helicopters, all with availability rates about which the UN observers could only speculate. In effect, the cumulative Yugoslav force along the border amounted to one extremely heavy armored corps and one infantry corps, facing a newly created Macedonian armed force consisting of about 12,000 light infantry soldiers.⁵

Implementing the president's decision, the secretary of state asked the secretary of defense to provide a suitable peacekeeping unit to the United Nations. The eventual consequence was a 21 June European Command order to USAREUR to send a force "intended as an additional U.S. effort to support multinational actions to contain conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to contribute to stability in the Balkan region." At the time American troops were readying themselves for duty in the Balkans, the UNPROFOR Macedonia command consisted of a single battalion, the "Nordic Battalion." Commanded by a Danish brigadier general, the unit had Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian infantry companies with a cumulative strength of about eight hundred soldiers. The American reinforced company team and headquarters element would increase that

total by three hundred.⁶ Setting aside the heavy force combat mission for which their soldiers had been trained, American task force commanders bound for Macedonia instead absorbed the requirement to prepare their units for duties in line with the United Nations dictum that "there are no enemies; there are only parties."⁷

The European commander in chief's intent for the operation, called "Able Sentry," was explicit:


Deployment of this force into the FYRM [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] is intended to deter the expansion of current hostilities and contribute to stability in the region. Accordingly, I want our communication with the public at every level to clearly reflect that our purpose in the region is to support the UN mission as a member of the UNPROFOR MAC command. Every effort must be made to avoid signaling U.S. support for any regional ethnic faction. Establish early liaison with UNPROFOR leadership in Zagreb and conduct a leader's reconnaissance to FYRM to determine specific requirements. The U.S. force must be tailored to function as a self-sustaining administrative and logistical organization. Plan to include mechanized transportation and a force protection capability. Because of the potential media interest, a robust public affairs element should be included initially and may be scaled back over time. Commander JTF Provide Promise will coordinate all liaison with UNPROFOR commander and will exercise COCOM responsibilities for USCINCEUR. CINCUSAREUR will provide logistical and administrative support.⁸

Seven days after the alert order, European Command directed the Army to execute the mission, and USAREUR ordered the 6th Battalion, 502d Infantry, then assigned to the Berlin Brigade, to organize a reinforced company team based on its Company C for service in Macedonia. The first of the three hundred soldiers departed on 25 June to coordinate the deployment, and a full advance party arrived on 5 July. The main body reached the country on 12 July, along with the command and control element and a detachment of combat support and combat service support troops adequate to support the operation of the company team. The unit took along with it sixteen M113 armored personnel carriers.⁹

TF 6-502, under command of Lt. Col. Walter Holton, assumed its duties alongside the Nordic Battalion in July, under overall command of Brig. Gen. Finn Saemark-Thomsen of Denmark. The task force established itself in tents at Petrovec Airfield, a run-down base of the former Yugoslav air force, and built observation posts along a 25-kilometer stretch of border between Macedonia and Serbia. (*Map 9*) Technically, the nation across the border was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, specifically, the province of Kosovo. The Berlin Brigade's responsibility for the mission extended for 179 days.¹⁰

V Corps Assumes the Mission

By January 1994 the mechanics of deploying task forces from NATO's Central Region were well known and offered few surprises. Units and planning staffs had absorbed the lessons of the preceding deployments to Kuwait,



MAP 9

Croatia, and Somalia and had incorporated them into standing procedures. *How* to do it was pretty much “old hat” to the corps staff. *Who* was doing it, on the other hand, was something new, since the operation in Macedonia was the first time since the end of the Persian Gulf War that V Corps had sent ground combat troops out of Germany for a mission. The staff’s principal interest in the new Task Force Able Sentry deployments was how to organize and train the task force and then how to reconstitute the battalion upon its return to Germany. From the unit point of view, extended operations under UN control demanded some adjustments, and those likewise had to be incorporated into unit peacekeeping training.

As soon as TF 6-502 Infantry reached Macedonia, V Corps planners began to review options for assuming the mission. Since the Berlin Brigade was in the process of inactivating as the European drawdown proceeded, it was clear the corps would be called upon to do so. Other than the airborne battalion based at Vicenza, Italy, as part of the Army’s Southern European Task Force, there were no other suitably organized forces in Europe available to take over the job when the Berlin Brigade’s unit completed its rotation.

Because the Vicenza battalion remained the CINC's only reserve, its use in Macedonia was improbable.

The experience of TF 6-502 Infantry provided some useful lessons that conditioned early V Corps preparations. In September General Jerry Rutherford, the corps commander, sent the Training and Doctrine Command and Army Materiel Command a request for assistance in obtaining additional equipment for use in Macedonia, adducing in justification the issues his staff had developed in the course of its mission analysis. He pointed out that the customarily inclement weather necessitated additional survival equipment for his soldiers, including additional heaters, cold weather rations, fuels, and clothing that were not part of the standard issue in Europe. Noting the broken terrain in Macedonia and the 72-kilometer distance between the task force base and the observation posts, Rutherford also asked for additional communications equipment, and specifically for something other than FM radios, which did not perform well in such terrain. Equipment such as night-vision devices to enhance observation were also needed.¹¹

The CONUS-based commands swiftly agreed to support Rutherford's requests.¹² In the meanwhile, the corps asked USAREUR to transfer to its control the night-vision devices, navigation systems, and various installation items the Berlin Brigade had been issued from theater war reserve stocks for use in the Balkans.¹³ The battalion designated to relieve TF 6-502 Infantry was the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, of the 3d Infantry Division.¹⁴ It, too, requested additional equipment, most of which the corps readily agreed to, although without being as lavish in its support as in the case of TF 5-158 Aviation during its Somalia deployment.¹⁵

By January 1994 V Corps had sufficient experience in running battalion-size deployments that the movement of TF 1-6 Infantry, as well as of succeeding battalions committed to that mission, went smoothly and without incident. (Table 7) The orders process was also unremarkable.¹⁶ Instead, the staff and the deploying battalions focused on a number of peculiar issues relevant to the mission at hand. Once again, although V Corps was a force provider and not in direct command of its battalions, the headquarters retained a direct interest in task force operations in Macedonia. Since the corps intended to provide administrative and logistical support, it needed to be kept abreast of operational issues in order to do that efficiently. Planning for future battalion deployments also demanded that the corps remain current on the operational environment in Macedonia so that it could efficiently and effectively guide unit training and properly equip units for the situations they would encounter in Macedonia.¹⁷

Operating Under United Nations Control

The United Nations had its own institutional procedures and internal language that the Army task forces had to understand if a smooth working relationship was to exist in Macedonia. In essence, the UN Command was part of



The Task Force Able Sentry observation posts and base camp made liberal use of guard towers, barbed wire, and sandbag revetments, but they existed only to monitor and report activities along the border, not to engage in active operations.

a large bureaucracy, though not one that functioned in a way that was familiar to soldiers. Its decision making was centralized at the highest level, making quick responses nearly impossible. Every issue—not merely the most momentous ones—was routinely referred to higher echelons of the organization for decision, thereby slowing the pace of any action. The UN staff also created vast quantities of paperwork in which the key elements of information were not always obvious, but had to be searched out. That tendency was particularly evident in the UN logistics system and the centralized finance and administrative apparatus.

In terms of peacekeeping operations themselves, V Corps found, somewhat to its surprise, that the United Nations lacked any standardized model for deploying peacekeeping forces and that every such mission was handled in an ad hoc manner. Finally, task forces had to learn the distinctive terminology the UN applied to military operations, a terminology and set of abbreviations that was unfamiliar to soldiers. The UN equivalent of the S-1, for example, was the CMPAO (Chief Military Personnel Administrative Officer), the S-2 was the CMILO (Chief Military Information Liaison Officer), the S-3 was the SOO (Senior Operations Officer), while the G-3 was the COO (Chief Operations Officer), and the S-4 was the CLOGO (Chief Logistics Officer).¹⁸

TABLE 7—BATTALION TASK FORCE ROTATIONS TO TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY (TFAS) PROVIDED BY V CORPS

<i>Date</i>	<i>Rotation</i>	<i>Task Force (TF)/ Home Station</i>	<i>Commander</i>
6 Jan 1994 . . .	TFAS I	TF 1-6 Infantry/Vilseck	Lt. Col. Carter Ham
13 Jun 1994 . . .	TFAS II	TF 2-15 Infantry/ Schweinfurt	Lt. Col. John Baggott
8 Dec 1994 . . .	TFAS III	TF 3-5 Cavalry/ Kirch Göns	Lt. Col. Topper Rush
20 May 1995 . . .	TFAS IV	TF 3-12 Infantry/ Baumholder	Lt. Col. Gene Kamena
1 Nov 1995 . . .	TFAS V	TF 1-15 Infantry/ 1-18 Infantry/Schweinfurt	Lt. Col. Stephen Layfield
1 May 1996 . . .	TFAS VI	TF 2-63 Armor/ Schweinfurt	Lt. Col. John L. Barker
1 Nov 1996 . . .	TFAS VII	TF 1-63 Armor/Vilseck	Lt. Col. David Perkins
15 Mar 1997 . . .	TFAS VIII	TF 2-37 Armor/Friedberg	Lt. Col. David Niedringhaus
5 Sep 1997 . . .	TFAS IX	TF 1-6 Infantry/Baumholder	Lt. Col. Robert Pidgeon
5 Mar 1998 . . .	TFAS X	TF 1-26 Infantry/Schweinfurt	Lt. Col. Randal A. Dragon
29 Aug 1998 . . .	TFAS XI	TF 1-18 Infantry/Schweinfurt	Lt. Col. William B. Norman
26 Feb 1999 . . .	TFAS XII	TF 1-4 Cavalry/Schweinfurt	Lt. Col. James L. Shufelt

Note: TF 1-15 Infantry was reflagged as 1-18 Infantry while deployed for the TFAS mission.

Source: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS, Operations Division, Action Officer Files, TFAS.

A complex chain of command was a fact of life in Macedonia. Throughout the existence of UNPROFOR, American task forces reported through three distinct chains of command. The first was the United Nations chain. The Army provided the reinforced company team to European Command, the supported American commander in chief. European Command, in turn, provided the forces to the United Nations Protection Force commander in Zagreb, who exercised control through the UN Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Command in Skopje. The American contingent was under the operational control of FYROM Command, but remained under operational command of European Command. Americans drew strict distinctions between operational control—direction of day-to-day operations—and operational command, which always took priority in case of conflict.

There was then the U.S. unified chain of command, exercised through a joint task force based in Naples. The Able Sentry task force reported through Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Forward) in Zagreb, to Joint Task Force Provide Promise in Naples, and ultimately to European Command headquarters in Stuttgart. Very early in the TF 1-6 Infantry rotation, the Zagreb headquarters was removed from the reporting chain, and the Able Sentry commander reported directly to Naples. Finally, the parent units retained a direct interest in the task forces, since the original execution message had directed those units to provide all administrative and logistical support required. Thus the support chain of command originated at European Command and extended from USAREUR and the Berlin Brigade to the task force headquarters. After the Berlin Brigade was inactivated and V Corps assumed the Able Sentry mission, the support chain became somewhat longer: European Command, through USAREUR, through V Corps, through the parent division, through the parent brigade, to the task force headquarters.¹⁹

Task force commanders naturally discovered the need for subtlety and tact in balancing the occasionally conflicting demands and requirements of three chains of command. As the first of the V Corps commanders involved, Lt. Col. Carter Ham, who commanded TF 1-6 Infantry (the task force that replaced the battalion from the Berlin Brigade), exercised some finesse in handling the diverse requirements of his three reporting chains. His rater, the chief of staff of Joint Task Force Provide Promise, was a Marine Corps brigadier general. His senior rater, the joint task force commander, was also Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.²⁰ "When in doubt," he said, theirs "were the instructions that I followed." Once the UN understood that he was under United Nations operational *control*, but remained under American joint task force operational *command*, he found there to be few difficulties. Whenever the UN command asked the task force commander to do something about which he had doubts, Ham simply queried the U.S. chain of command for approval.

In one case, for example, the FYROM Command asked Ham to accompany its commanding general on a trip into Serbia. Knowing that entering Serbia was contrary to U.S. policy, he asked the joint task force commander for direction. In that case, the task force agreed that Ham should accompany his UN commander to the other side of the border to meet with the Serbian corps commander. Every chain of command was genuinely interested in helping the task force accomplish its mission but, as Ham saw it, "they were not always in sync." Personalities, furthermore, were important. The flag officers at each echelon of command quickly came to an understanding on how Task Force Able Sentry would be controlled. In the end, however, the American chain of command prevailed whenever there was doubt. "The pecking order was that the task force did what the [American] JTF says first, always," Ham concluded. "They are the real, no kidding, headquarters and issue orders you have to obey. Once that was clear, there were no problems."²¹

Succeeding task force commanders discovered much the same situation. But Lt. Col. Gene Kamena, commanding Task Force 3-12 Infantry, also noted that the United Nations did not always give him enough time to clear some missions

with JTF Provide Promise headquarters. For example, he recalled, "the UN would give me a day's notice," with the order that "tomorrow, you're going to a meeting in Belgrade." Then he had to spend the rest of the night talking through American channels, trying to secure permission to do that mission. Kamena also noticed that the United Nations Command was not as stringent about force protection as was his American chain of command. UN commanders gave their soldiers considerably more freedom to visit local towns and the city of Skopje and allowed them to patrol closer to the border on a routine basis than he was permitted to authorize. "The UN people thought we were too hard on our soldiers," he said, in a preview of comments later to arise about American force protection measures in Bosnia.²²

By the time TF 1-15 Infantry, under command of Lt. Col. Stephen Layfield, reached Macedonia, the command structure provided no surprises. Layfield still found the need to clear certain United Nations missions and requirements with his American chain of command, but encountered no unusual difficulties in the process. The only point of contention during his battalion's duty in Macedonia was the UN commander's desire to have the task force patrol inside a 300-meter zone along the border from which U.S. orders excluded American troops. Aware that the American task force was restricted from entering the zone because the exact location of the border was a matter of dispute, the UN commander nonetheless thought patrols there were essential, and that became a point of some contention that required intervention by JTF Provide Promise.

That aside, no UN order violated any parameters that Layfield had been given. He found the joint task force chain of command, under Admiral Leighton Smith, Jr., and Col. Paul F. Pugh (USMC), the J3, to work extremely well:

It was a very decentralized operation. I would touch base telephonically with the JTF Provide Promise daily, and provide them with the daily SitRep. If they wanted me to change something that was really quick and easy, they'd call me. That's how it worked, either on TacSat or land line. I had a direct line to Col[onel] Pugh, the J3, and he had enough resources up there to provide me with an instant response to any questions I had. So I didn't have to wait in order to get an answer to something.²³

"You must find the right line to walk," Layfield concluded, "always keeping in the back of your mind that you are, in fact, working for all of these guys, in different capacities. But the U.S. chain of command clearly has the final say in this UN deployment."

He stressed the essential point that the Americans were not UN soldiers, but American soldiers working in a UN environment; working *with* the UN. In summary, he found the three chains of command to be complementary:

The USAREUR chain of command, my home station chain of command, was the resourcer, primarily, for my unit. They were used for obtaining resources and keeping my shuttle runs of supplies and replacement personnel coming in. Actually, under that command structure, they were the logistics provider. The operational directives came strictly from JTF Provide Promise. Day to day operations came from the UNPREDEP [United Nations Preventive Deployment] commander.²⁴

During the December 1994 to May 1995 rotation, the character of the operation changed. The United Nations perceived that a measurable degree of stability had been achieved and, suiting the force designation to that perception, renamed the unit the somewhat less bellicose UNPREDEP, or United Nations Preventive Deployment. At roughly the same time, European Command judged that Joint Task Force Provide Promise had accomplished most of the missions specified for it and therefore directed that the task force be deactivated as a complement to the activation of the NATO Implementation Force created to supervise the provisions of the Dayton and Paris Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁵ At the end of December European Command further directed that its Provide Promise liaison team remain as the point of contact between European Command and the commander of the Implementation Force, generally known as IFOR. On 25 January 1996 European Command directed deactivation of Joint Task Force Provide Promise. At that point the liaison team remained in Sarajevo to account for all non-IFOR U.S. Department of Defense personnel throughout the Balkans. Simultaneously, Joint Task Force Provide Promise dropped out of the Task Force Able Sentry chain of command, and the task force began reporting directly to Headquarters, USAREUR and Seventh Army, making the U.S. chain of command much simpler.²⁶

Layfield's task force was therefore the last American contribution to UNPROFOR and the first to UNPREDEP, officially dropping Joint Task Force Provide Promise from its chain of command on 15 February 1996. Transfer of authority for the ABLE SENTRY operation was well prepared and well rehearsed at the highest levels. General William Crouch, the USAREUR commander, visited Macedonia to determine how to make the transition "clean." He then sent his operations chief, Maj. Gen. Daniel J. Petrosky, along with Petrosky's deputy, Col. Paul Tiberi, for a series of coordination meetings among the task force, UN command staff, and his own staff, each of which contributed views on how the relationship should be structured. They also selected the implementation date. In Layfield's view, the transition was a smooth one that streamlined both the operational and logistical support for the task force, as well as "cleaning up the wiring diagram some." Every headquarters established a TFAS cell, and USAREUR clearly established how the command would handle any serious incident that might occur, specifying a reporting system to accommodate swift information flow directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when required.²⁷

United Nations Logistics

"There is no secret about it," Colonel Layfield observed. "The United Nations logistical system is cumbersome, slow, and ineffective. No matter how much you know about it—and we trained hard on it, and we know how it works—it is not responsive. It will never be responsive because of the many layers of bureaucracy in their own approval system."²⁸ Logistics indeed pre-

sented both problems and, occasionally, surprises, for task forces in Macedonia.

The first problem was the UN administrative procedures that managed physical property and accounted for costs. The United Nations signed for all U.S. Army equipment deployed to Macedonia, although not in the sense that the Army understood, since the task force did not physically transfer possession of the equipment. Instead, referring to the process as an "in survey" and to the equipment as "contingent owned equipment," the United Nations assessed the actual value of the equipment at the time of movement, assumed monetary responsibility for it, and reimbursed the supporting nation at the end of operations for the net diminished value of the equipment, as well as for all usage and maintenance costs during the period of the peacekeeping operation. Only the equipment that the United Nations requested, or equipment that the supporting nation asked to bring and that the United Nations had previously approved, was so supported. Any other equipment the supporting nation brought, it brought without any UN reimbursement. The only exception was weapons, for which the United Nations accepted no responsibility. Equipment never left U.S. hands, but it became clear that careful cost assessments and cost accounting would be essential as long as the task force was under UN control.²⁹ It was, according to Colonel Kamena, "a strange property accountability system" that took some getting used to and that required keeping four sets of property books to reconcile all the categories of property.³⁰

The American task forces used a considerable amount of equipment that was no longer standard in U.S. Army units. The M113 armored personnel carriers left behind by TF 6-502 Infantry were a case in point, since the Army had since modernized its mechanized infantry battalions with the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle.³¹ Obsolete five-ton trucks equipped the task force support platoon to handle line haul of supplies and equipment to the observation posts. Task force fire support was provided by 81-mm. mortars, likewise already replaced in American mechanized units by the 107-mm. mortar. Other equipment, such as water purification sets and water storage equipment, were not part of an infantry battalion's standard equipment. Commercial design generators of several types powered the observation posts. Supplementing the M113 at each observation post was an articulated "Snow Cat" manufactured by Volvo and equipped with a Mercedes engine and transmission, extremely useful in snow and mud and on steep inclines. The task forces referred to it as the SUSV, or Small Unit Support Vehicle.³²

Obtaining repair parts for obsolete or nonstandard equipment was a continuing issue, with parts for the SUSV representing a special problem. Fortunately, the Finns in the Nordic Battalion had a similar piece of equipment, although produced by another manufacturer. The task force maintenance section discovered that the two vehicles had a lot of parts in common and that it could obtain parts through the sister unit.³³ For the other odd pieces of equipment, the task force routinely turned to the joint task force headquarters in Zagreb for help, and later to JTF Provide Promise in Naples. For nonstandard items, the

task force made maximum use of local purchase and standing contracts. For such purposes it was adjudged necessary for the unit to have its own contracting officer and its own purchasing authority. Repair parts for U.S. equipment, even the obsolete equipment, generally came through the U.S. chain of command, and it was fortunate that the European drawdown had generated so much surplus equipment and spare parts, particularly for the obsolescent M113. In any case, however supplies and parts were obtained, they had to be reported to the UN command for accounting purposes. In general, as Layfield put it, "when you're out there, deployed by yourself, you do what you have to do." Nevertheless, the task force ended up relying heavily on logistical support from its USAREUR chain of command.³⁴

The United Nations provided food and medical supplies. The latter turned out to be an occasional problem. Medics found that they were unable to use some of the UN medical supplies, principally because those items were not in the American medical formulary or because the packaging was in languages other than English.³⁵ Food was another matter, and although the soldiers occasionally complained about the food, alleging that the "mystery meat" came from kangaroos, koalas, "mad cows," or some other exotic mammal,³⁶ the task force commanders saw the UN food issue as a success. American cooks were unfamiliar with the bulk food supply procedures they found in Macedonia and had to make adjustments. The food itself was of good quality and was delivered in considerable variety. The only real problem was that the delivered quantity at times reduced variety. When a whole side of beef was issued, it all had to be used because the observation posts had only small cold storage containers. "You got food from all over the world," Colonel Kamena commented, adding that, "at times, troops didn't know what it was, but they cooked it."³⁷

Headquarters Involvement in Able Sentry Operations

The V Corps involvement with units in Macedonia was officially circumscribed, the corps being limited to providing forces for Able Sentry and delivering various types of support for the task forces while they were deployed under operational command of Joint Task Force Provide Promise and operational control of the United Nations FYROM Command. Nonetheless, the corps freely intervened to state its position with respect to various operational details throughout the operation, particularly when the safety of the American soldiers was involved. Probably the best case to illustrate that was the issue of the NLAOO, the Northern Limit, Area of Observation, which was a buffer zone behind the international border into which American troops were not to venture. The NLAOO was not a boundary, but instead a control measure created by the UN Command to prevent UNPROFOR troops from accidentally wandering into Serbia. American commanders increased the original 300-meter interval to 1,000 meters from the disputed border, a buffer subsequently reduced again to 300 meters.³⁸

Despite the fact that V Corps made certain that the task force had global positioning system (GPS) devices, and despite task force commanders' continuing

drive to procure better maps, incidents still occasionally occurred. While soldiers invariably patrolled behind the offset, some of the observation posts were literally on the border, so that patrols first marched south, and then laterally along their patrol routes. With time, every squad came to know its sector intimately, so that a border crossing incident was unlikely.³⁹ When TF 1-6 Infantry first took over the observation posts formerly manned by the Swedish Company of the Nordic Battalion, however, the soldiers were completely unfamiliar with the terrain, and the first of several incidents took place. On 10 May 1994 a patrol from one of the new observation posts was detained by a Serb patrol that became very agitated when it discovered the UN troops were Americans. Level-headed reactions by the American patrol leader and the TFAS chain of command, coupled with the fact that the United Nations Command subsequently determined that the patrol was well within Macedonia and that it was the Serb patrol that was on the wrong side of the border, defused the situation.⁴⁰

After that incident the NLAOO became a topic of discussion in the V Corps commanding general's weekly operations and intelligence briefings, and instructions soon issued from the G-3 to emphasize both land navigation and careful observance of the NLAOO in task force predeployment training.⁴¹ The corps reacted favorably when TF 2-15 Infantry asked for seven more GPS receivers

The Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV)



and for replacement of the twenty then in use by the new modified version.⁴² The corps commander, General Rutherford, took an even closer interest in the problem when the V Corps science adviser informed him that the accuracy of the GPS equipment was questionable and that the systems in use in Macedonia could produce a reading with a guaranteed accuracy of only 100 meters, not ten meters, as previously thought.⁴³

Problems continued, even with the distribution of new equipment and despite the task force commander's decision unilaterally to expand the offset to 500 meters. On 26 July 1994 a Serb patrol attempted to detain an American patrol again. In that case, investigation later revealed that the patrol had not used a GPS device to determine its location and had unintentionally entered Serbia. The task force commander concluded that the incident validated his decision to expand the offset and his requirement that every patrol use the GPS.⁴⁴ The incident was duly reported to V Corps in the task force weekly situation report, and Rutherford concurred in the commander's decisions about the NLAOO. In the meanwhile, task forces began once again to observe a 1,000-meter buffer zone.⁴⁵

The United Nations FYROM Command had always preferred that patrols walk closer to the border than Americans were willing to do. On 22 March 1995 the Joint Task Force Provide Promise chief of staff received a telefax message from UN FYROM Command to the effect that the UN commander believed the 1,000-meter buffer to the border that the U.S. battalion observed was too restrictive. The United Nations' preference, he emphasized, was for the interval not to exceed 300 meters. Admiral Leighton W. Smith, commanding JTF Provide Promise, eventually acceded to the UN request, directing TFAS to observe a 300-meter offset.⁴⁶ Even so, the FYROM commander later asked Col. Steven Layfield to patrol inside the 300-meter limit, although aware that U.S. orders prohibited the task force from doing so.⁴⁷ By the time TF 2-37 Armor assumed the mission in March 1997, the U.S. offset from the designated UN patrol line was again 300 meters. The task force S-3 regarded that as an unrealistic restriction, since the patrol line ran along the high ground, generally with excellent observation of the border. By contrast, the 300-meter offset placed U.S. patrols on the reverse slope of the hills, usually in terrain with poor footing and virtually no observation of the Serb side of the border, which made using the offset offensive to tactically adept American soldiers.⁴⁸ Political and diplomatic sensitivity seemed more important than tactical effectiveness, yet another of the curious lessons American soldiers were beginning to absorb from peace enforcement duties. Throughout all of those discussions, the V Corps commanding general retained an active interest in the control measures to be employed and periodically directed the task force commander to observe differing offsets, depending on the situation that existed at the time.⁴⁹

Engineering Improvements

By the time TF 2-15 Infantry was preparing to deploy to Macedonia, V Corps had accumulated a lot of additional experience with operations there and had,

with considerable input from Colonel Ham, begun planning a steady program of improving the living conditions of the task force soldiers. The experience of one winter in Macedonia had forcibly drawn attention to the marginal conditions of the road network over which the supply platoon had to drive in order to resupply the observation posts. The narrow and winding roads were "made for Yugos," not for Army trucks, as one sergeant observed.⁵⁰ With force protection remaining one of the corps commander's principal concerns, the ability of the task force to operate its vehicles over such roads, particularly in the winter, became a matter of some importance.

Consequently, Maj. Gen. Leonard D. Holder, commander of the 3d Infantry Division, sent the commander of the divisional engineer brigade to Macedonia to survey the state of roads, determine what work needed to be done, and establish some priority for repair. The principal concern was the degree to which they might deteriorate during the forthcoming winter, since the roads, not built to carry the heavy loads required to support the observation posts in the first place, were being severely damaged. Road drainage, furthermore, was in a poor state of repair in most areas and simply did not exist in others. Any work to improve road surfaces would be further hampered by shortages of equipment and materials. The United Nations FYROM Command had already surveyed the roads, and the UNPROFOR engineer estimated that more than \$2.3 million would be needed to fund the work that needed to be done. He cautioned, however, that while he had requested that amount from the United Nations headquarters in Zagreb, he expected to receive no more than one million dollars. Working from that smaller allocation, the lion's share—around \$700,000—would go to work in the Nordic Battalion sector, which had the higher priority.

Evidently, the United States would have to apply its own resources to the problem, although the existing agreements specified that the United Nations was responsible for all such work. American engineers proposed a combination of contracted and in-house repair work and submitted a prioritized plan. As an aside, the engineers noted that water pressure and water flow problems at Camp Able Sentry in Skopje had been largely resolved, although the sewer system continued to be a problem and the buildings were all in generally poor structural condition.⁵¹ Conditions in the camp, slowly improving as a result of work by the task force engineering section, had to take second place to safety concerns about the roads.

In the middle of July 1994 TF 2-15 Infantry asked the FYROM Command to make the needed improvements. As expected, the UN placed its engineering priorities in other areas. The only alternative was for the Americans to do the work, although the engineering requirements far exceeded the capabilities of the small engineering section assigned to the task force. Thus, the task force commander asked that a detachment from a combat heavy engineering company be temporarily deployed to help. He estimated that about twenty soldiers, two bulldozers, two five-ton dump trucks, a road grader, and a few other pieces of equipment should suffice.⁵²

Once again, the effects of the drawdown of Army strength in Europe made themselves apparent. Construction engineers were not assigned at division level, and the 3d Infantry Division had to ask V Corps, which did have a combat heavy engineer battalion, to detail troops for the job. The corps, however, had only one such unit, the 94th Engineer Battalion, assigned to its 130th Engineer Brigade, and that battalion was already engaged in a mission in Rwanda as part of Operation SUPPORT HOPE. The consequences of finite, and diminished, resources at a time of multiple missions were beginning to make themselves felt, and V Corps was unable to honor the request for assistance.⁵³

The corps commander, General Rutherford, thus asked USAREUR to forward the request to European Command for resolution. Summarizing the division's requirements, the corps engineer concluded that it would require most of a combat heavy equipment platoon to satisfy the demands of the work in prospect. The corps had only four such platoons, and while it could supply the needed troops and equipment by degrading other missions and readiness to execute other contingency plans, there was another, and equally compelling, reason to demur. The major problem V Corps adduced was simply a lack of money. Deployment of the platoon had a real cost, and the corps had already scaled back training that it considered essential to readiness, just in order to help USAREUR minimize its budget risk during the fiscal year. The obvious solution, from the corps point of view, was to lob the ball back into European Command's court and demand that the United Nations meet its commitments. If the international organization were truly unable to do the job, then the corps could and would do the work, but only if someone provided the money required to accomplish the mission.⁵⁴

The V Corps plea fell on receptive ears, for the USAREUR commander at that time, General David Maddox, fully agreed with Rutherford's argument. After being briefed on the problem, he wrote, "I do not agree with doing the road work unless funded by non-USAREUR sources. I will help the OP construction if necessary, but this is a UN responsibility." Maddox then alluded to the commitment of the scarce engineering units elsewhere when he remarked, "With Rwanda, don't know if we can help."⁵⁵ As far as the USAREUR engineers could see, the bottom line was that the observation posts might occasionally have to be resupplied by air through the winter, since it was too late in the year to begin road repairs, given the lengthy United Nations staffing procedures. No non-USAREUR funding appeared to be available, and USAREUR did not wish to require V Corps to absorb the cost, either.⁵⁶

The European Command staff in Stuttgart evidently agreed with the logic of Maddox's position, because it sent a similar message to the Joint Chiefs a few days later, pointing out that the American mission to the United Nations had asked the Department of Defense to define its position on funding road improvements. The secretary of defense agreed with the idea of sending an engineering squad—not a platoon—to do the work on a reimbursable basis, a position with which European Command agreed, although pointing out that it did not have the money to fund those improvements. The solution, it appeared to

European Command, was for the Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly to task European Command to do the road upgrade and assist Stuttgart in finding interim funding for USAREUR so some of the work could be done before the worst of the winter weather set in.⁵⁷

Acknowledging that the Able Sentry force itself could do nothing about the roads, the task force commander focused the attention of his engineers on the base camp and observation post upgrades that he believed necessary before winter. Improvements to troop billets at Camp Able Sentry included major work to replumb and rewire the buildings, as well as extensive construction to stabilize the buildings and make them tight against the weather. At the observation posts, requirements included construction of additional ammunition and personnel bunkers and winterization of the eleven observation posts. Accomplishment of all of that was beyond the abilities of the task force engineer section, and the commander asked that one or two carpenters, plumbers, and electricians be sent to Macedonia on each of the bimonthly sustainment flights from Germany to continue the work and return home two weeks later. The corps agreed and began sending a few soldiers at a time to help with the base camp reconstruction.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, USAREUR had taken a few steps toward having the roads repaired, while continuing to argue for external funding. By early October USAREUR had sent eight pieces of heavy equipment and twenty-three engineer soldiers to Macedonia, where they had repaired and upgraded nineteen kilometers of road and built seventeen culverts, in addition to helping upgrade the base camp and observation posts. USAREUR's unreimbursed cost to that point was \$88,000, which included transportation, painting, and repair parts, but not equipment depreciation. USAREUR estimated that it needed more than \$490,000 to complete the essential repairs,⁵⁹ but pointed out that the rainy season had started and that further work had to be deferred until the following May or June. USAREUR then proposed an alternative solution to the problem, suggesting that the work should be done by reserve component engineers called to active duty for the purpose, as had already been done in other regions. The bottom line was that USAREUR would not accept additional engineer taskings without reimbursement because, in the tight funding environment that existed, that would cause a deleterious impact on both current operations and training. "The UN," Lt. Gen. Dan Schroeder, the deputy USAREUR commander, argued, "must find another alternative."⁶⁰

Operational requirements eventually demanded action, whether the funding issue had been resolved or not. In November 1994 USAREUR directed V Corps to send fifteen more construction engineers on temporary duty to Macedonia for two months, specifically to carry out road repairs. In the interests of leaving V Corps with the ability to carry out its other contingency missions, 21st Theater Army Area Command withdrew most of the engineer equipment itself from theater war reserve stocks and shipped it to Camp Able Sentry, as the task force base camp at Skopje had come to be known. In December V Corps sent another engineer section and six more pieces of equipment, including a



Resupply of observation posts from Camp Able Sentry was comparatively easy in summer, despite roads constantly in need of repair, but extraordinarily difficult in the winter snows.

vibratory compactor, to speed the road repairs. At the end of that two-month period the most essential repairs had been made, and V Corps left five of the engineers in Macedonia to reinforce the task force engineer section.⁶¹

Task Force Reorganization for Peace Enforcement Operations

The ideal force for the mission in Macedonia was a light infantry battalion, of which V Corps had none. The only available solution was to reconfigure mechanized infantry battalions. When Colonel Ham went to Macedonia and visited TF 6-502 Infantry to see how that battalion had reorganized itself, he concluded that it made sense to follow the model the first task force had established. That process, however, proved difficult. First and most obvious, a mechanized infantry battalion did not have the same number of soldiers as a light infantry battalion. The relevant numbers were to be found in squad organization. Whereas a Bradley battalion had only two dismounted squads of nine soldiers each in a platoon, a light battalion had three squads of eleven, plus a weapons squad of seven. In sum, counting platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and radio-telephone operators, a mechanized platoon mustered nineteen dismounts, as opposed to forty-four in a light infantry platoon. The infantry strength of the task force was generally set at twenty-four squads reorganized to a total of

178 Bradley-qualified soldiers. Deploying a full dismounted infantry company to Macedonia therefore required the mechanized battalion to reorganize and cross-assign infantrymen from one company to another to create a full-strength unit organized according to the light infantry tables of organization and equipment.⁶²

Battalion reorganization after returning from Macedonia was equally difficult. As Colonel Kamena explained it after his task force returned from Skopje, "the Able Sentry deployment destroyed a mechanized battalion, and I am still paying the price for it."⁶³ The first consequence was that the heart of the fighting organization, the well-established small unit teams, had to be broken up and small unit loyalties sundered. At the same time, the leader-led relationships, the forging of which required time and was founded in the development of mutual trust and respect between leaders and the led, were also generally disrupted. To an extent, the new squads of the infantry company constituted for Macedonia were composed of men only cursorily acquainted with each other, and an important part of the training process during the first weeks of the mission was the rebuilding of those crucial relationships and loyalties that characterized a good unit.

CSM Dwight Anderson of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, explained that his battalion had a similar experience. "We essentially raped Company C and tried to fence Company D, as much as we could," he noted, in order to bring Companies A and B up to strength for the mission. "I took all of the first sergeants into the conference room and we stayed there about five hours," he later said. "We didn't come out until the battalion was completely reorganized. We did all the horse-trading and . . . arm-twisting in private." In the end, TF 1-15 Infantry moved about two hundred soldiers from one unit to another to restructure before going to Macedonia.⁶⁴

The armor battalions assigned to the TFAS mission had an easier reorganization task, despite the obvious skills mismatch. To create the infantry squads that manned the observation posts, armor battalions melded two four-man tank crews and added a medic. Typically, a platoon leader filled the role of squad leader for one observation post, while the platoon sergeant served as squad leader of the other. Thus, in tank battalions, there was far less disruption of long-constituted teams when the battalion reorganized for Able Sentry. The trade-off was that the junior noncommissioned officers in armor battalions never had the opportunities for sustained, independent leadership and personal leadership growth that their peers in mechanized infantry battalions enjoyed.⁶⁵

As Kamena rightly pointed out, however, only about half of the task force was made up of infantrymen. The remainder had to perform the myriad of tasks required to keep the task force operating smoothly in a location far removed from the normal kinds of support an infantry battalion could expect. Colonel Ham's visit to Petrovec Airfield, for example, convinced him that he needed to take a sizable engineering section with him—not combat engineers, but construction engineers—to continue the upgrading of the base camp facilities that TF 6-502 Infantry had begun.

The Berlin Brigade troops had lived under canvas throughout much of their tour of duty, and plumbers, electricians, and carpenters were essential if Ham's troops were to have permanent shelters. At the same time, the buildings allotted to the task force base area were vermin-infested, with an open-air trash dump less than a quarter of a mile from the compound. Thus, a preventive medicine detachment and veterinary inspectors were necessary. All that was in addition to the other skills that the task force needed to operate. A transportation platoon was needed to maintain resupply of the observation posts, and a maintenance section to keep all the task force equipment running. In addition, Ham determined he required military police, a postal team, a finance team, a public affairs office, a mess section, linguists, and civil affairs troops.⁶⁶

Many of the task force soldiers were not normally assigned to an infantry battalion, and V Corps issued tasking orders to its major subordinate commands to fill the requirements.⁶⁷ Concerned about medical care for the deployed soldiers, and considering that medics alone were probably not sufficient, the 3d Infantry Division asked 7th Medical Command to assign a field surgeon to the task force, a request that V Corps endorsed after sending the corps surgeon to make a study of the medical care available in and around the city of Skopje.⁶⁸ There was a clear limit to the capabilities that task force commanders could take to Macedonia, though, because of the force cap of 315 soldiers the Joint Chiefs of Staff imposed on the operation.⁶⁹

That cap rose almost immediately when the Swedish infantry company of the Nordic Battalion was recalled to be refitted and reassigned to duty in Bosnia. In March 1994, halfway through the TF 1-6 Infantry tour of duty, the Joint Chiefs directed European Command to augment UNPROFOR with approximately two hundred soldiers to replace the departing Nordic Battalion element. The 3d Infantry Division, reacting to V Corps orders, prepared Company D, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, to join its parent unit in Macedonia. By the middle of April the additional soldiers had arrived, along with fourteen more M113 armored personnel carriers and twelve other vehicles, enabling the task force to expand its operations to take over the observation posts formerly manned by the Swedish troops.⁷⁰ In the meanwhile, V Corps and 3d Infantry Division conducted surveys of the new observation posts and stipulated the additional construction and force protection measures that would be required when American troops took them over.⁷¹

The experience of every task force rotation in Macedonia was similar, in terms of personnel employment, and the final organization for the mission became fairly standardized, although modifications to suit current requirements continued. The consensus among task force officers and noncommissioned officers was that there were always just enough soldiers to do the job, and that the unit could ill-afford to give away any personnel slots to disciplinary problems. Occasionally, and particularly in low-density skills, the temporary absence of a soldier due to pass, leave, or illness made full mission manning difficult.

In May 1994 another major organizational change occurred when the secretary of defense authorized deployment, not later than 4 May, of three UH-60



Junior noncommissioned officers, in command of their squads for weeks at a time at isolated observation posts, swiftly matured as independent leaders.

aircraft to improve force protection.⁷² Under operational control of the task force commander, the flight detachment was intended to be used for routine troop transport, training, resupply when inclement weather made it impossible for ground vehicles to reach the observation posts, and medical evacuation of casualties. It was also intended to be used for swift reinforcement of observation posts or extraction of task force soldiers from dangerous situations. The V Corps, given the mission, further directed 3d Infantry Division to send the aircraft to Macedonia. The division, in turn, selected the 7th Battalion, 1st Aviation Regiment, from its 4th (Aviation) Brigade to provide the three helicopters and a flight detachment of thirty-five soldiers.⁷³ As an immediate consequence of that decision, the personnel ceiling for TFAS was raised to 549.⁷⁴ The 3d Infantry Division sent the required flight detachment to Macedonia on 23–24 April 1994. Accompanying the three UH–60s were sixteen pilots and crew chiefs and a maintenance team of seventeen. The parent aviation battalion commander, his S–3, and his S–4 went temporarily to Macedonia to establish procedures for Blackhawk operations there.⁷⁵

Nicknamed “Whitehawks,” since they were painted UN white, the aircraft were stationed at Petrovec airfield. The problem with cats, of course, is that they tend to have kittens, and various administrative problems arose almost immediately. The smallest of those was a division requirement periodically to rotate air-

crew through the TFAS flight detachment, rather than retain the same soldiers there throughout the task force tour of duty.⁷⁶ The major problems were what to do about the helicopters when the 3d Infantry Division handed off the TFAS mission to 1st Armored Division, since the Marne Division would naturally not wish permanently to lose three aircraft from its general aviation battalion, and how to manage the periodic maintenance that the UH-60 required.

General Rutherford had already been considering the first issue and had decided in the course of an update briefing on 23 May at 3d Infantry Division headquarters that he did not want to have a lot of aircraft in the corps painted white. Working on the basis of Rutherford's decision, the 3d Infantry Division G-4 recommended to his commander in July that the three helicopters be laterally transferred to the 1st Armored Division and become the permanent property of the deployed force, much like the majority of the rolling stock then in Macedonia. To transfer the aircraft would, however, adversely affect the division's readiness rates, and the G-4 further recommended that no transfer take place until the three aircraft had been replaced by UH-60s drawn from excess stocks in V Corps, USAREUR, or elsewhere.⁷⁷ The 1st Armored Division, eventually having heard about that proposal, stiffly told V Corps that it could not afford to backfill 3d Infantry Division, since transferring three of its helicopters would have the same adverse readiness effects on its own aviation unit.⁷⁸

A V Corps G-3 staff study proposed a solution: the corps would issue to the 3d Infantry Division three operational readiness float UH-60s from the total of seven available to USAREUR, then assign the three UH-60s then stationed in Macedonia into the float account. Thus, when the 1st Armored Division took over the mission in December 1994, the 3d Infantry Division would simply leave the three helicopters there. As far as Rutherford was concerned, such a course of action was more cost effective than constantly replacing the helicopters at Skopje and reduced the number that had to be repainted, at further cost. He believed that it made more sense to resource Operation ABLE SENTRY from reserve stocks and to keep the divisions at full authorized aircraft strength. The USAREUR Aviation Division agreed, noting that the TFAS flight detachment duty appeared to have become semi-permanent. The V Corps plan would reduce turbulence in the divisional aviation brigades that shared the mission. Once again, the European drawdown provided some flexibility, since 7-1 Aviation could replace the test and maintenance equipment it would be leaving in Macedonia with equivalent equipment made excess in Germany by the forthcoming inactivation of the 2d Battalion, 1st Aviation, in December 1994. General Maddox approved the plan.⁷⁹

The second problem became acute at the end of 1994, when all of the helicopters in Macedonia were nearing the point of having accumulated 400 hours of operation. Phase maintenance for the UH-60 was performed at 500 hours and was a major undertaking. The 1st Armored Division's 4th (Aviation) Brigade notified the division commander that the flight detachment in Macedonia did not have adequate personnel, tools, or parts to perform that maintenance and recommended that the division paint a fourth helicopter white and use it



Observation Post 34, a typical isolated, hilltop site

as a float, enabling the flight detachment to send the other aircraft in rotation to Germany for phase maintenance at one of the aviation intermediate maintenance battalions. At the time, the helicopters in Macedonia were accumulating flying time at the rate of 28.7 hours per aircraft per month, while the USAR-EUR operational tempo average, by comparison, was 14.4 hours per aircraft per month.⁸⁰

Concerned about the problem, Maj. Gen. William G. Carter III, the Old Ironsides commander, wrote to General Rutherford to propose the plan the 1st Armored Division G-4 had suggested. In the same letter, Carter wrote that he considered it imperative that the Able Sentry flight detachment reduce the flying hours since such a high operational tempo would inevitably take its toll on the helicopters and work a hardship on the maintenance program both in Macedonia and in Germany.⁸¹ The corps G-4 concurred in the recommendations, adding that self-deploying aircraft from Macedonia for phase maintenance cost twenty flying hours per leg of the trip, while shipping the helicopters via Air Force C-141 or C-5 cost up to \$88,000 per aircraft.⁸² Rutherford approved the division's plan, with the proviso that the fourth aircraft in the rotation had to come from 1st Armored Division assets, and that only three helicopters could be stationed in Macedonia at any one time.⁸³

Those decisions made and those plans implemented, future rotations of the mission between the two divisions proceeded without further discussion of how to manage the aircraft. The maintenance decision likewise proved a sound



The UH-60 in its "Whitehawk" configuration

one, although the aviation operational tempo in Macedonia, despite attempts carefully to screen mission requests, remained higher than units in Germany experienced.

Mission Training

Speaking to Task Force 1-6 Infantry on the eve of its departure from Rhein-Main Air Force Base, General Maddox reminded the troops that the "military professionalism and competence of the individual soldier" were the foundation of success in Macedonia.⁸⁴ Because the essence of the mission was the daily patrols the isolated squads conducted from their observation posts along the border, individual skills were far more important than the collective tasks that defined normal operations for a mechanized battalion task force and its subordinate company teams. The mission training for Macedonia-bound troops reflected that priority.

Obviously, however, there was more to the Able Sentry mission than individual soldier skills, and many of the individual and collective tasks that experience showed were necessary were not included in the Army's training publications or in guidance issued by higher headquarters. Many of those manuals included bits and pieces of the mission, but in 1994 there was no U.S. Army publication that told a battalion how to train for a peace enforcement mission.⁸⁵ Bearing in mind the paucity of guidance from Army training manuals,

USAREUR complained in June 1994 that no one—not European Command, UNPROFOR headquarters, the United Nations FYROM Command, or even Joint Task Force Provide Promise—provided any help in determining what training was required for a task force prior to assuming the TFAS mission.⁸⁶

To fill the gap, USAREUR headquarters and its Combat Maneuver Training Center documented the critical tasks for training. The most important step in that process was to solicit lessons learned from TF 6–502 Infantry and study that battalion's after action reports. The issues the battalion from the Berlin Brigade considered most important therefore became the framework for future training. To add essential detail, the training center sent officers to attend the United Nations Staff Officer Course in Sweden, the United Nations Military Observer Course in Switzerland, and the United Nations Military Observer and Staff Officer Course in Austria. Officers from the training center also visited the Austrian Peacekeeping School and the recently formed peacekeeping schools in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, USAREUR studied past and current United Nations operations, and especially those in which USAREUR units took part, for other lessons.⁸⁷

Army units were accustomed to working from an approved mission training plan, but no such plan existed that provided comparable detail for peace operations under UN mandates. Therefore, the Combat Maneuver Training Center used the information that it had gathered to develop a peacekeeping operations mission training plan to assist units in their home station training and to provide a training readiness standard for assessment of the mission essential task list. Furthermore, by March 1993 USAREUR had already revised the annual 21-day training center rotation that each maneuver battalion underwent to add peace operations training. That portion of the training incorporated lessons learned from preceding UN operations, lasted between two and five days, and involved both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. By October 1994 twenty battalions had gone through the revised training, some of them twice. Among those so trained were 1–6 Infantry in August 1993 and 2–15 Infantry in March 1993. Thus, the first two V Corps battalion task forces assigned to Able Sentry built their mission training on the foundation of the introduction to peacekeeping operations provided by the Combat Maneuver Training Center.⁸⁸

To assist the battalions in home station training, USAREUR designated a number of critical tasks: conducting patrols, establishing and operating an observation post, establishing and operating a checkpoint, planning for interaction with media, conducting liaison and negotiating, escorting a convoy, reacting to ambush, reacting to indirect fire, establishing a lodgment, providing command and control, conducting mine clearance, and securing a route. The training center added several tasks to the baseline missions: separate belligerents, secure a facility, secure an urban area, and secure a border.⁸⁹

Elaborating on the information and plans USAREUR provided, as augmented by its own analysis of the mission, V Corps G–3 helped the battalions develop a highly specialized training plan that accommodated the demands the mission

would place on soldiers in Macedonia. The United Nations FYROM Command specified tasks that included establishing a temporary checkpoint, conducting mounted and dismounted patrols, establishing a temporary observation post, and reinforcing an observation post. The implied task list was somewhat longer and included force protection operations; command, control, and communications operations; sustainment operations, including logistics and training squad cooks; observation post turnover; conducting company command post operations; performing the reserve force mission for the task force; and operating under the established rules of engagement. Detailed analysis of training requirements produced the following mission essential task list:

- Exercising the base camp reaction force,
- Actions upon encountering a Serbian Army patrol,
- Reacting to Macedonian checkpoints,
- Actions upon encountering civilian smugglers,
- Responding to civilian requests for food,
- Responding to Macedonian police requests for medical attention,
- Responding to media queries, both approved and unapproved,
- Protecting European Union Sanctions Enforcement Personnel,
- Conducting VIP briefings,
- Reinforcing a temporary observation post,
- Responding to encounters at observation posts, and
- Responding to hostile Macedonian civilians.

The V Corps plan called for training certification to occur at battalion level for individual tasks, with brigade evaluating collective tasks and the UNPROFOR commander validating the overall training.⁹⁰ General Rutherford stressed the importance of the training period because of what he saw as a very high tension level with which soldiers assigned to observation posts in Macedonia had to cope. As a consequence, he wanted to make certain that the troops had an opportunity to understand every aspect of the mission and "acclimatize to the theater" before being assigned to the observation posts, even in a training status.⁹¹

Training the unit for operations in Macedonia, despite the help from USAREUR and from V Corps G-3 Training, was thus principally a battalion responsibility. Moreover, it was one that required three or four months of concentrated effort during which the battalion was no longer organized to carry out its normal missions. In the fifty-six days prior to its departure for Macedonia, TF 2-15 Infantry devoted 61 percent of its training time to peace operations. During that period the battalion trained for its traditional combat mission only five days. Eleven days were devoted to training on specialized equipment, including the 81-mm. mortars, the M113 armored personnel carrier, and the snow cat vehicle. The TF 1-6 Infantry experience was entirely similar, with significant amounts of time devoted to training the rules of engagement, operations in cold weather, combat lifesaver techniques, and small arms qualification. In addition, all task forces spent time learning about Macedonia and its culture and made certain that all deploying soldiers had requalified on their rifles.⁹² Kamena computed

that four months were required to prepare TF 3-12 Infantry to an adequate standard for peacekeeping, rather than the two months allotted.⁹³

Given the limited preparation time, commanders had to prioritize their training. Col. Carter Ham believed that training his soldiers to respond properly to the UN's very restrictive rules of engagement was the most important single task.⁹⁴ Colonel Kamena isolated the central issue on the rules of engagement. "Our first option in Macedonia," he said, "was to try to negotiate our way out of situations instead of trying to shoot our way out of situations."⁹⁵ Ham underscored the fact that attaining such an attitude took time and training, since at the start "all of us were overly aggressive and too quick to use force to solve a problem; that's what we had been trained to do. But everybody adapted to that. That's not to say that everybody liked it."⁹⁶ Making shooting—that is, recourse to the essence of the training the Army had been at such pains to instill in infantry soldiers—the last resort was, in the judgment of just about every leader, a difficult transition for soldiers, and that explained the enormous emphasis every task force placed on teaching the rules of engagement. Ham set up a series of situational training exercises that required his soldiers to apply the rules of engagement in a variety of situations. To help, TF 6-502 Infantry loaned Ham a number of its experienced noncommissioned officers, who then spent nine days with 1-6 Infantry at Vilseck in mid-November 1993. That sharing of experience helped Ham's soldiers understand what they should expect while operating as United Nations troops and was a key part of the training.⁹⁷

Assistance from the incumbent task force proved such an invaluable part of preparing a unit for duty in Macedonia that Ham sent a similar team from his battalion to help TF 2-15 Infantry train in April 1994, a practice that each unit thereafter followed in order to assist the relieving battalion. Mission demands meant, however, that it was not always possible to send teams from Macedonia back to Germany, and the form that assistance took evolved over time into a week-long leaders' reconnaissance in Macedonia, during which the TFAS unit thoroughly briefed and oriented the relieving unit's commanders, staff, and squad leaders on operations and the operational environment. When Kamena's battalion visited TF 3-5 Cavalry, for example, his leaders accompanied patrols from the observation posts, inspected the specialized equipment, and generally learned the kinds of things that training in Germany could not tell them. Upon return to home station, the sergeants, in particular, were able to fine-tune the training upon which their squads concentrated in the time remaining. Kamena summarized the importance of the trip when he said,

You know, you can talk about a country and its terrain, but until you're on the ground and walk the mountains and you see how tired you get and feel how much the ammunition and radio and everything else weighs, it's just talk! I thought that was probably the most valuable thing we did during train-up, just go up there and live for a week, and then come back and finish training.⁹⁸

By the time Col. Stephen Layfield was training his battalion for Macedonia, the recon had developed into a program units referred to as the "right seat

ride,"⁹⁹ a thorough reconnaissance visit that involved all the unit's leaders and primary staff undergoing a week-long tutelage with their opposite numbers from the unit then conducting the mission. The only real drawback was the fact that Layfield ran his right seat ride during the summer, but would be responsible for the mission chiefly during winter, which meant that he had to look at all of the problems through what he called "winter eyes," making assumptions about how weather would affect his soldiers. When Layfield's battalion left, he ran a similar program for Lt. Col. John Barker, whose TF 2-63 Armor was due to take over from his soldiers.¹⁰⁰

Task Force 1-6 Infantry used situational training exercises, a procedure that succeeding battalions emulated. The training context was an increasingly sophisticated simulation of the operational environment, constructed in a training area in Germany. Task Force 3-12 Infantry built a replica of the entire Able Sentry operation at Baumholder, constructing ten observation posts on the northern edge of the reservation boundary and using a German military compound in the town of Allenbach to replicate the Able Sentry base. Realism was enhanced by extending patrols into the German community where soldiers met Germans who represented Serbs and Macedonians. The TF 1-15 Infantry training was similar. The battalion used Camp Robertson, an old Hawk missile site near Schweinfurt, to emulate Camp Able Sentry and replicated the placement and dispersion of the observation posts as much as possible. By that time increasingly elaborate training involved using the V Corps G-3's audiovisual documentation teams to act as CNN reporters. The idea, as Maj. David Osborne, the task force S-3, pointed out, was to show soldiers "all the weird and challenging situations that can happen on Operation ABLE SENTRY."¹⁰¹

Given the unusual tasks that the soldiers had to learn, the training process itself was normal, following the Army standard that began with individual training and proceeded to collective training. The focus was naturally on dismounted operations, or light infantry operations. "You'd like to be able to say 'we're infantrymen; we can do that any time, any day,'" Layfield remarked, although he concluded that "well, that's really not true." Some toughening was required, and training accordingly stressed physical fitness. Units did a lot of road marches to prepare themselves for their forthcoming encounter with mountains, particularly in winter conditions. The mountains and snow available in Germany did not resemble conditions in Macedonia, however, and both still came as something of a shock after soldiers arrived in the Balkans. "We had to spin ourselves up on how to operate in the deep snow—up to eight feet at times, and especially in the eastern sector, where the snow was never less than five feet," Layfield said. Physical endurance and physical conditioning were important, since "walking in snowshoes takes it out of you."¹⁰²

Patrols in Macedonia were about seven kilometers each way, for which soldiers trained by doing twenty-kilometer road marches in Germany. But in Macedonia the hills were steeper and soldiers carried rucksacks and equipment weighing from sixty to seventy pounds. In view of that, Sgt. Aric Gray, a squad leader in TF 3-5 Cavalry, commented that "the training just didn't prepare the

troops for the conditions they found."¹⁰³ One interesting spin-off of Operation ABLE SENTRY was that units found the Army physical training program, and particularly the run, not to be predictive of a soldier's ability to walk long distances under a heavy load.

Occasionally, there were misunderstandings about patrolling, as when the United Nations force commander took TF 2-37 Armor to task because, although it was a larger unit than the Nordic Battalion, it reported significantly fewer patrols. The battalion pointed out that it met the United Nations standard of one patrol per day from each observation post. By contrast, further discussion revealed that any Nordic Battalion task that took soldiers out of an observation post was classed, and reported, as a patrol. The American task force therefore took pains to explain to the UNPREDEP staff that American patrols were considerably more rigorous. To be classed as a patrol, they explained, the mission had to begin with issuance of an operation order and include a thorough pre-combat inspection and rehearsal. Afterward, there had to be a patrol debriefing. Mere administrative movements did not meet that standard.¹⁰⁴

The "bread and butter" of operations in Macedonia, as Layfield put it, was patrolling. While most of the techniques and tactics of infantry patrols that everybody understood still applied, some of the execution had to be different in Macedonia, and that demanded a different mind-set on the part of the soldiers. A patrol was normally a stealthy operation, and infantrymen were accustomed to "snooping and pooping" around, as the younger sergeants phrased it. In contrast, the Macedonia patrols were meant to be heard and seen, and the peacekeeping aspect of the operation required soldiers not to appear aggressive. As a consequence, weapons were normally at the "UN carry"—slung with muzzles down—rather than held at the ready. In a normal deployment a task force performed over 2,000 dismounted patrols along the border, simply observing, monitoring, and reporting what was seen. Becoming comfortable with an overt patrolling technique required of soldiers a process of intensive training to overcome ingrained tactical habits.¹⁰⁵

The other essential element of patrolling was a standard of precision in land navigation that infantrymen did not normally have to achieve. The border between the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was ill-defined, extremely poorly marked, and a political question open to continuing debate by all parties concerned.¹⁰⁶ It was extremely important, given the characteristically tense relations that existed along the border, for American soldiers not to become involved in border-crossing incidents. "The UN line that we patrol is so sensitive," Layfield said, "there is simply no room for error." What resulted was the UN-established Northern Limit, Area of Observation, or NLAOO, mentioned earlier, into which patrols did not venture. It was still easy to make errors in the rugged terrain, however, and the task force used global positioning system devices to help the patrols navigate accurately. Task forces trained

hard before deployment on using the GPS and likewise drilled conventional land navigation skills at home station.¹⁰⁷

Other units in Germany assisted with task force preparations. The 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, hosted TF 1-6 Infantry training at Garmisch, where the Special Forces soldiers taught the infantrymen how to operate in mountainous terrain and, most important, cold weather operations skills. Knowing that Macedonia was mountainous and that his task force would be there during winter, Ham anticipated that patrols could be caught in severe weather for extended periods. Consequently, he gladly accepted the timely Special Forces offer to train his soldiers and small unit leaders how to function at peak efficiency in such conditions. A two-day training exercise where the soldiers ran patrols, manned observation posts, and had to react to various situations—again facilitated by the noncommissioned officers and officers of the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group—completed the training. At the same time, Ham found an area near Garmisch that was remarkably like the border in Macedonia—steep hills with narrow roads that were only one vehicle wide. Fortuitously, the weather cooperated at that point, providing icy and snowy driving conditions.

A typical Task Force Able Sentry patrol. Note that two members of the patrol are making use of Global Positioning System devices, essential to accurate navigation along the disputed border area, and that the third soldier is equipped with a radio that allowed the patrol to communicate with its observation post.



He took the opportunity of integrating driver training in adverse weather conditions into the exercise, so that his support platoon could get a taste of what it would be like to supply observation posts in Macedonia during winter.¹⁰⁸

Other individual predeployment training tasks were common to all task forces. Every unit had to learn to use the improved 81-mm. mortar that was issued to Able Sentry companies for force protection in place of the 107-mm. mortar the units were accustomed to using. Task forces trained and licensed almost every soldier to operate light trucks, especially the HMMWV, the five-ton truck, the M113 armored personnel carrier, and the Snow Cat that was provided for every observation post.¹⁰⁹ Task Force 1-15 Infantry found some Snow Cats in Italy belonging to the NATO Allied Mobile Force and brought two of them back to the unit motor pool so soldiers could do cross-country training in the local training area.¹¹⁰ Soldiers also had to be able to operate and maintain the nonstandard commercial generators that powered the observation posts. Likewise, training was required to use the AM radios given the observation posts. Once helicopters were assigned to the task force, soldiers presumably not proficient in airmobile assaults and sling-loading equipment had to master techniques they would need when using aircraft while on quick reaction force duty or when resupplying observation posts by air.¹¹¹

Each observation post had a medic, each of whom required specialized training because the distance from any observation post to professional medical treatment involved a delay of several hours, even when using aeromedical evacuation. The problem was even more acute for soldiers on dismounted patrols along the border or those in the temporary observation posts that patrols set up at random intervals. Additional predeployment training enhanced the ability of the squad medics to make them more independent and able to deal with many injuries that might otherwise require a doctor's care. They received advanced trauma and advanced life-saving training in far more depth than the average medic received. In particular, they learned to handle minor emergency surgeries. Of course, the battalion surgeon accompanied task forces to Macedonia as well, though he remained at the task force base camp.¹¹² Young medics, serving in rotation at task force headquarters, worked with the surgeon on a daily basis, thereby receiving continuous and extremely valuable professional development.

The heart of the emergency medical plan was a new piece of equipment, the Telemed, a suitcase-sized system that could even be carried on dismounted patrols. Still experimental in the Army at that time, Telemed was basically a videoconferencing system that had several medical devices attached to it.¹¹³ Using it, the medic could confer about a casualty with medical doctors at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, or at Landstuhl Hospital in Germany and receive advice and assistance. It would have been unwise to have relied entirely on medics, however, considering the remoteness of the operation, and each task force trained its soldiers as com-

bat lifesavers, some units attaining a rate of up to 60 percent of its soldiers so qualified.¹¹⁴ All of that required significant training time prior to deployment.¹¹⁵

Reconstitution, Retraining, and Recertification

As every commander acknowledged, Able Sentry was basically a light infantry mission, proficiency for which required three to four months of concentrated training. During that time the participating unit's Bradley fighting vehicles simply sat in the motor pool, and the highly perishable skills soldiers had to master to be good mechanized infantrymen—particularly gunnery—degraded on a predictable curve. "A lot of people lost a lot of valuable skills while preparing for the mission, and then while carrying it out in Macedonia," Col. Gene Kamena observed. Returning to the level of training required of a mechanized infantry battalion would obviously involve at least as much effort as had been invested in preparing for the Able Sentry mission.

Col. Carter Ham was, as in so many other aspects of the mission, the trailblazer. The chief of staff of the Army visited his task force in January 1994, and during that visit General Gordon Sullivan casually asked Ham how long he thought it would take to "put his battalion back together."¹¹⁶ The colonel knew that his battalion would be going through its combat training cycle at the Combat Maneuver Training Center three months after returning to Germany, and he answered that he expected to be back at the same level of training and readiness that the battalion had enjoyed before the Able Sentry mission by the time the training center rotation was over. "He laughed at me," Ham later recalled, "and told me it would take six months." Sullivan remarked that it had taken that amount of time to rebuild battalions returning from duty with the Multinational Force and Observer mission in the Sinai, and he thought that the same time line would apply to 1-6 Infantry as well. "As it turns out," Ham admitted, "he was almost exactly right. I underestimated how difficult the process is to put the battalion back together structurally, and then to train and bring it back to a level of combat proficiency. Six months was about right."¹¹⁷

The first task was to restructure the battalion to its original organization. Again, that process destroyed teams that had been built through months of shared effort and broke up leader-led relationships. With the four line companies reconstituted and personnel strength balanced across the battalion, the focus shifted to restoring the crew drill and Bradley gunnery skills that had atrophied over the preceding three quarters of a year. Ham expected those skills to recover relatively quickly, but found that his soldiers needed six weeks to attain even a marginal level of proficiency. Obviously, his time estimate for retraining was too low.

The battalion also encountered some mind-set changes. Soldiers who for six months had lived under restrictive rules of engagement were once again in what might be described as a wartime setting. The battalion discovered during its first days at the Combat Maneuver Training Center that some soldiers were reluctant to "shoot when shooting was appropriate," and it took some time to change their

automatic responses to various tactical situations. "There is not some switch that you can hit and say 'now you're a peacekeeper,' or 'now you're a warfighter,'" Ham explained. "It's not that simple. It would be nice if it was, but it's not." The battalion had trained for three months before a six-month deployment that shooting was a last resort. Upon redeployment, soldiers were in a situation in which the first step in the reaction to contact was to return fire. The retraining simply took time. The 1-6 Infantry was the first Bradley battalion to go through that kind of retraining model in Germany, and the unit's experience illuminated the pitfalls for the battalions that followed.

As time went on the process of reconstituting and retraining battalions returning from Macedonia became as sophisticated and structured as the training that prepared them for the light infantry mission. In a program supervised by the parent brigade and V Corps G-3, battalions normally began the process with a block leave of several weeks for the returning soldiers, during which time the commanders and staff reorganized the battalion to its table of organization structure.

The case of 2-15 Infantry illustrated the process. Returning to Germany on 12 December 1994, the necessary reorganization was finished by New Year's Day. The unit was on leave from 19 December 1994 through 3 January 1995. At that point, the battalion moved directly into platoon situational training exercises from 10 to 26 January, followed by platoon training tests from 21 January through 2 February. Soldiers began recovering gunnery skills by using the Bradley conduct of fire trainer¹¹⁸ throughout January and February, building up through a series of unit exercises to gunnery qualification from 19 February through 21 March. The battalion staged a major field exercise from 19 to 21 March and another, 28 to 31 March. Finally, 2-15 Infantry underwent its training rotation through Combat Maneuver Training Center from 6 through 26 April, at which time the battalion was adjudged mission ready. Other battalions followed a similar "road map" to heavy force readiness after returning from Macedonia.¹¹⁹

By the time TFAS VII, the seventh V Corps battalion assigned to Able Sentry, had deployed, V Corps had taken steps to help mechanized infantrymen and tankers maintain their highly specialized skills while they were serving in Macedonia. The corps obtained both a Bradley and an Abrams mobile conduct of fire trainer from the National Guard and placed one with Task Force Eagle units in Bosnia and the other at Camp Able Sentry. Periodically, the corps swapped out the trainers so that, when a tank battalion was assigned to Macedonia, it had access to an Abrams trainer. The armor battalions attempted to keep track commander and gunner combinations together, so that when the platoons rotated back to Camp Able Sentry for a period of weeks those teams could use the conduct of fire trainer to maintain proficiency. Still, driver skills deteriorated, and tank battalions found it necessary to allocate enough time and enough operational tempo equipment miles upon return to Germany to retrain and recertify all their tank drivers.¹²⁰

The other interesting aspect of Able Sentry duty from the point of view of training involved physical fitness. When soldiers returned from Macedonia,

they were extremely fit, having for six months marched up and down hills “that would make a mule smile,” as Maj. David Osborne phrased it. While on duty at the observation posts, bored soldiers spent a lot of time in physical training (PT), but the limited space available meant that they overwhelmingly concentrated on weight lifting, riding stationary bicycles, and similar activities, rather than running, which they could really do only during their rotations through Camp Able Sentry every twenty-one days. Most soldiers improved push-up and sit-up scores, but their running generally got worse. Osborne noted the paradox that the battalion was probably more fit after the rotation than before, but that average PT test scores across the battalion dropped fifteen to twenty points, primarily because of the run.¹²¹

Soldiers uniformly agreed that they became much more physically fit while in Macedonia. There had been little else to do in their spare time, and many of them concentrated on exercise both as recreation and as a way to relieve stress. The problem was that weight lifting and long-distance patrols replaced fat with heavier muscle. Sgt. Aric Gray recalled that some soldiers had never lifted a weight in their lives before going to Macedonia and ended up being able to press 250 pounds by the time they left the country. He commented that he gained about twenty pounds, all from weight lifting.¹²² Cpl. Brian Kibiloski and his fellow troopers had the same experience. “Most people gained weight,” he said, “because all you did was PT.” Even with all the exercise, Kibiloski’s weight went from 160 pounds at the time of deployment to 183 by the time the battalion re-

Entrance of Camp Able Sentry in Skopje



deployed. "We put on weight on our thighs," he explained, because of endless patrols up and down hills that developed those muscles. "Makes it hard to get into those 501 jeans," Kibiloski concluded.¹²³ Thus, a common observation of task forces returning from Macedonia was that soldiers were both heavier and more physically fit, but still scored lower on PT tests than before the deployment.

The overall impact of the TFAS mission on a battalion was harder to judge. Layfield spoke for most of the commanders who took task forces to Macedonia when he evaluated it as an exceptional way to build the leadership skills of junior officers and noncommissioned officers, particularly the latter. Once in Macedonia, operations were highly decentralized and relied on mid-level sergeants to run squads on their own, on a foreign border, in a sensitive political environment, implementing command policy and enforcing the rules of engagement while running a complicated patrol matrix for extended periods of time. The ten soldiers at each observation post were under the command of a staff sergeant or sergeant who made daily decisions about what his squad should do, and how, and when. The sergeant performed pre-combat inspections on patrols before they left the observation post, monitored and adjusted the continuing training of his soldiers, and in general regulated their lives on a daily basis. "You could not ask for a more fertile junior leader training environment than that," according to Layfield. Summing up, he concluded that,

We gave the responsibility to the sergeants out there, and it paid immeasurable dividends to this battalion, even now. We are still feeling the effects of very professional, mature, junior noncommissioned officers. Whatever unit gets the Able Sentry mission will reap that benefit. For the entire Army, I don't believe that benefit can go understated. Some of my E5s [sergeants] and E6s [staff sergeants] out there have grown so much, they are now performing at the next higher grade level, across the board.¹²⁴

Other battalions had the same experience, and the final comment about Task Force Able Sentry might well be that conducting the operation was itself an unexpectedly fine training vehicle for the Army in Europe in a generic sense. "It's a six month Ranger school for soldiers of a mechanized battalion," Major Osborne concluded, adding that "every day is an ARTEP."¹²⁵

End of the TFAS Mission, 1996-98

At the end of 1995 the end of the Able Sentry mission was nowhere in sight. When V Corps dispatched the 1st Armored Division to Bosnia-Herzegovina as the American contribution to the NATO Implementation Force, that deployment made it increasingly difficult for the corps to sustain the mission in Macedonia. The demand for mechanized infantry battalions in Bosnia led to a decision to send an armored battalion to Macedonia in order to gain a little more flexibility in meeting the requirements of the two missions. Naturally, using an armored battalion imposed a more demanding predeployment training regimen, since tankers did not have all the small unit skills of infantrymen. Similarly, the soldiers from the tank battalion were faced with a demanding re-

training problem upon the unit's return to Germany, tank gunnery and tank company-team maneuver skills being at least as perishable as those of Bradley crewmen. Once in Macedonia, the performance of those armor soldiers in the TFAS mission was not noticeably different from the way infantrymen carried out the observation post and patrolling tasks.

High level discussions in early 1997 considered the possibility of using reserve component soldiers for the mission in Macedonia,¹²⁶ particularly since UN plans were under way to decrease the UNPREDEP size from 1,050 to 750 soldiers, and correlative American plans envisioned scaling back the American commitment from 500 soldiers to around 300. In April 1997, however, USAREUR informed V Corps that it should expect to maintain current force levels at least until October of that year. Although the long-term future of the Able Sentry mission remained in doubt, USAREUR did not expect a final decision from the United Nations any time soon, and expected the UNPREDEP mandate to be extended at least for the balance of the year.¹²⁷ A few days later the United Nations voted to delay any force reduction in Macedonia.¹²⁸ The intensifying crisis in the province of Kosovo that unfolded in 1997 and 1998 sharpened United Nations concern to prevent a spill-over of violence into Macedonia, and the UNPREDEP mission continued with full American support. For its part, V Corps continued preparing and deploying battalion task forces on six-month cycles, as it had been doing since 1994.

The Task Force Able Sentry mission ended suddenly and unexpectedly in the spring of 1999, just as the 350-man task force from the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was in the process of taking over from 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry. Lt. Col. James Shufelt's soldiers were conducting final inventories and assuming control of Camp Able Sentry in Skopje and the observation posts along the border on 27 February. Simultaneously, in New York, the Peoples' Republic of China vetoed the United Nations Security Council resolution to extend the mission in Macedonia another six months. Behind the surprising action lay Chinese irritation at the government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which had recently granted diplomatic recognition to the Chinese government in Taiwan.¹²⁹

Reacting to the decision, the United Nations Mission to Macedonia announced that the UNPREDEP operations would cease as of midnight on Sunday, 28 February. For the moment, both the Scandinavian battalion to the west and the American task force remained in place to secure both the facilities and the equipment along the border and in Skopje. Over the following week there was a mild increase in tensions as the cavalrymen of TF 1-4 Cavalry, still wearing UN blue berets, observed Serbian Army units reinforcing the border with an estimated 2,800 soldiers and a number of T-55 tanks and mining bridges in the border region.¹³⁰ The Scandinavian battalion immediately began its withdrawal from Macedonia, and discussion continued about what the next steps should be. NATO and American officials considered reflagging the peacekeeping mission under NATO control, or perhaps making it a unilateral American operation.¹³¹

In the end, the American task force stayed in Macedonia and retained possession of Camp Able Sentry in Skopje. Shortly thereafter, NATO's Allied Forces, Central Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps—universally known in Europe as the "ARRC"—arrived in Macedonia to command any possible future peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Jackson and the ARRC staff set up headquarters in Skopje, and Camp Able Sentry became the hub of United States national support for U.S. Army forces that would be part of the ARRC if deployed to Kosovo. The NATO forces themselves would be aligned under NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe, commanded by Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., of the United States Navy.¹³²

Able Sentry and a Changing V Corps

The missions V Corps units carried out in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia differed from other out of sector missions in two ways. First was that they involved combat arms battalions. With the exception of the aviation task force deployment to Somalia, every other V Corps mission after the end of the Persian Gulf War had required combat service support soldiers, since they were either humanitarian relief operations or related to peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions for which other organizations were chiefly responsible. The second was that Task Force Able Sentry was an open-ended mission. The first V Corps rotation was in January 1994, and the twelfth battalion task force was to begin its duty with the United Nations in Macedonia in March 1999. The consequence for the corps was the permanent loss of one maneuver battalion, a loss felt most acutely when 1st Armored Division deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR at the end of 1995.

One of the principal, and least understood, facts about duty in Macedonia was the actual duration of a unit's commitment. Battalion task forces served in Macedonia for six months. But adding the time devoted to training before leaving Germany and the time required to retrain the battalion after its return to home station, Able Sentry actually consumed a battalion for an average of fifteen to eighteen months. Since another battalion was serving in Macedonia while one was training for duty, and a third was simultaneously retraining after redeployment, there were periods when a full brigade equivalent was actually unavailable for any other mission, particularly for heavy force, high-intensity combat. The corps had only four maneuver brigades stationed in Germany. When one division was committed for duty in Bosnia with both of its brigades and one of the remaining brigades was consumed with the mission in Macedonia, that left only one brigade available for any other possible duty.

Another major consequence of the Able Sentry mission lay in training, where the inclusion of peace enforcement tasks as part of the V Corps mission essential task list devised in 1996 only reflected reality, and the correlative requirement for all maneuver battalions to maintain an agreed minimum level of proficiency in peace enforcement operations was reasonable.¹³³ But the added training requirement complicated the tasks of unit commanders and, given the limited time

available to any battalion at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, required adjustments in their perceptions of the degree of training that could be accomplished and sustained in any unit.

Hard lessons learned while dealing with the United Nations bureaucracy in Macedonia, combined with the equally hard lessons in trying to work with the United Nations and other nongovernmental organizations in Croatia and Somalia, had a major impact on the training programs instituted both at USAREUR's Seventh Army Training Center and within V Corps troop units to prepare soldiers for peace enforcement operations. No soldier found the military tasks associated with peace enforcement particularly difficult, but many of those tasks required mental adjustments. Instead, it was the problems in dealing with civilians that soldiers found difficult. SFC Michael Dalton, a platoon sergeant in Company D, TF 3-5 Cavalry, reflected on the fact that soldiers in Macedonia were dealing with civil-military tasks, rather than purely military missions, concluding that

... you spend 99.9 percent of your time dealing with civilians. I had exposure to maybe two or three Macedonian soldiers the whole time I was there—actually to talk to them. The majority of my time, I was dealing with civilians. That's not something we were taught before we deployed. We learned a lot tactically before we left Germany. We spent a whole lot of time—three months, actually—learning the tactics of peacekeeping. But we didn't spend one hour learning the tactics of how to deal with a civilian population.¹³⁴

Thus, task force after action reports were replete with recommendations that units bound for Macedonia should exploit every available opportunity not only to enhance such skills, but also to master how the United Nations functioned.

The corps headquarters retained a standing interest in the task forces sent to Macedonia, where the situation was utterly unlike that prevailing during the Persian Gulf War. When V Corps dispatched more than 25,000 of its soldiers to serve under VII Corps command in Saudi Arabia, the connection between those deployed units and the V Corps headquarters was completely severed. That was not true during any subsequent deployment of V Corps units to serve under the command of other headquarters, and it was especially not true in the case of Task Force Able Sentry. The corps knew that it would retain responsibility for the Able Sentry mission for the foreseeable future and that it had to maintain close relationships with the deployed task forces in order to gather the knowledge it needed to program adequate training for replacement battalions. Furthermore, USAREUR explicitly gave V Corps the task of managing administrative and logistical support for the deployed units. The corps commander consequently exercised unusual control of a unit ostensibly under control of European Command and the United Nations and justifiably required daily situation reports from the task force commander. The chain of command was never "clean," as one task force commander put it.

Finally, managing training for battalions designated to serve in Macedonia consumed a lot of attention. The unique mission demanded creative approaches to training, and much of the task force preparation for United Nations duty involved situational training and role playing that very much prefigured the innovative exercises that V Corps later devised for its units assigned to duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

NOTES

¹ The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as it was properly known, often abbreviated to "FYROM" by American soldiers, is occasionally referred to in this discussion simply as "Macedonia."

² The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), created in February 1992, operated until March 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Created to secure protected areas in Croatia, UNPROFOR's mandate was enlarged several times to include monitoring implementation of periodic cease-fire agreements and, in September 1992, to support UNHCR activities. UNPROFOR extended its activities to include monitoring the stability of the Macedonian-Yugoslav border in December 1992. For a summary of this and other peacekeeping operations, see Barbara Benton, ed., *Soldiers for Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: Facts on File, 1996).

³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 795, 11 Dec 1992. This chapter benefited from critical reviews by participants in the events described: Col. Carter Ham, Col. Stephen Layfield, and Maj. Dwayne Edwards. Their comments and recommendations have, as appropriate, been incorporated into the text.

⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 842, 18 Jun 1993.

⁵ See V Corps ACofS, G-3, Plans, Briefing Book, Intelligence Overview of Kosovo and Macedonia, 1999. The balance of forces along the border remained relatively stable, at least through 1995, when V Corps still noted the stationing of the Pristina Corps and Nis Corps of the Serbian Army and essentially the same Macedonian light infantry forces. See V Corps CG OPOD Brief, Task Force Able Sentry (OPOD 05-94), 24 Feb 1995. The Pristina (52d) Corps reportedly consisted of the following units: 243d Motorized Infantry Brigade; 15th Infantry Brigade; 549th and 125th Motorized Infantry Brigades; 52d Mixed Artillery Brigade; 53d, 55th, and 57th Border Battalions; 52d MP Battalion; 52d Engineer Regiment; 52d Signal Regiment; 52d AA Regiment; 311th Air Defense Regiment; and the 83d Aviation Regiment. The Nis (21st) reportedly included the 78th, 89th, 4th, and 7th Motorized Brigades; the 150th Artillery Brigade; and the 211th Armored Brigade.

⁶ Msg, USCINCEUR for CINCUSAREUR, 211733Z Jun 1993, sub: OPOD for Deployment of U.S. Forces to Join UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (USCINCEUR OPOD 001 for Deployment).

⁷ Interv, Maj. Kim R. Daniel with Lt. Col. Carter Ham, Commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, 18 Aug 1995, Hohenfels Training Center, Germany.

⁸ Msg, USCINCEUR for CINCUSAREUR, 211733Z Jun 1993.

⁹ Msg, USCINCEUR for CINCUSAREUR, 281233Z Jun 1993, sub: EXORD for Deployment of U.S. Forces to be Assigned to the UN for Duty with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Macedonia.

¹⁰ According to Daniel P. Bolger, General Saemark-Thomsen was at first somewhat skeptical about commanding "trigger-happy" Americans, but soon found them to be excellent soldiers for the UN peacekeeping mission. See Daniel P. Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995), p. 356.

¹¹ Msg, Cdr, V Corps (Lt. Gen. Rutherford) personal for General Franks, General Ross, Info General Maddox, 140912Z Sep 1993, sub: Support for Operation ABLE SENTRY.

¹² Msg, Cdr, AMC (General Ross), personal for Cdr V Corps, info Maddox, 241400Z Sep 1993, sub: Support for Operation ABLE SENTRY.

¹³ Memo, AET-BGD-PO (V-G-4) for ACofS, G-4, V Corps, 18 Oct 1993, sub: ABLE SENTRY Property Transfer.

¹⁴ V Corps OPLAN 94-3 Operation ABLE SENTRY, 29 Sep 1993, was the OPORD for TF 1-6 deployment.

¹⁵ AETV Form 10 (Staff Summary Sheet), ACofS, G-4, V Corps, through CofS, DCG, for CG, 21 Jan 1994, sub: Late Tasking, Able Sentry Equipment, Kevlar Blankets.

¹⁶ MFR, V Corps Historian, 19 Jun 1994, sub: Corps Battle Staff "Hot Wash" on Deployment Procedures. Copies of deployment plans and orders relating to the deployment of TF 1-6 Infantry, TF 2-15 Infantry, TF 3-5 Cavalry, TF 3-12 Infantry, and TF 1-15 Infantry are on file in the corps historian's office and reflect the routine of making the deployment. Copies of similar documents pertaining to battalion rotations after April 1996 are retained by the deploying units.

¹⁷ HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS, Operations Division, Action Officer Files, TFAS. TF 1-15 Infantry was reflagged as 1-18 Infantry while deployed for the TFAS mission. This study uses the designation 1-15 Infantry throughout to avoid confusion.

¹⁸ File, V Corps ACofS, G-3, Operations Division, Task Force Able Sentry, Miscellaneous Data, 1993-1994; Memo, TF 1-6 Infantry, n.d., UN Terminology and Operating Procedures. This information was also collected and published in [U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned], *From the Front! "Heavy Infantry Battalion in Peace Operations"* (May 1994). The UN eschewed the term "intelligence," invariably using "information" in its place. The presumption or, more properly, orthographic fiction, was that a peacekeeping organization had no requirement for intelligence data, the term itself bearing pejorative implications.

¹⁹ The command relationships evolved over time. For details, refer to Msg, USCINCEUR for CINCUSAREUR, 211733Z Jun 1993; V Corps Command Briefing, Task Force Able Sentry, n.d., but February 1995; and Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 151000Z Jun 1994, sub: PROVIDE PROMISE Revision and Mission Clarification.

²⁰ Initially, Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, followed by Admiral Leighton Smith, Jr.

²¹ Ham interview.

²² Interv, Maj. Richard Thurston with Lt. Col. Gene C. Kamena, Cdr, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, 30 May 1996, Baumholder, Germany.

²³ Interv, Maj. Richard Thurston with Lt. Col. Steven Layfield, Cdr, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, Operation ABLE SENTRY, Macedonia, 14 Jun 1996, Schweinfurt, Germany.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Commander, Implementation Force. NATO assigned the Allied Forces, Central Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the mission of commanding the IFOR.

²⁶ Personal Msg, Admiral Leighton Smith for General George Joulwan, 150900Z Dec 1995, sub: Deactivation of JTFPP; Msg, USCINCEUR, 181335Z Dec 1995, sub: U.S. National Rep to COMIFOR; and USEUCOM ECJ3 Internal Memos, 25/26 Jan 1996, sub: JTFPP.

²⁷ Layfield interview. Naturally, USAREUR also kept European Command informed whenever an emergency required the headquarters directly to inform the Joint Chiefs about developments in Macedonia.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Memo, JTFPP-14 for CofS, USCINCEUR, 23 Jun 1993, sub: United Nations Signing for Equipment.

³⁰ Kamena interview.

³¹ Obsolescent, but not yet obsolete, the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier continued to be used in U.S. heavy divisions in more limited numbers outside of mechanized infantry battalions. Therefore, spare parts and the expertise to maintain the equipment were both available.

³² Layfield interview; Ham interview; Kamena interview.

³³ Interv, S. Sgt. Roger Ruth with CWO3 Robert Erzen, Battalion Maintenance Technician, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 18 Aug 1995, Kirch Gons, Germany.

³⁴ Ham interview; Kamena interview; Layfield interview.

³⁵ Ham interview.

³⁶ For examples of such comments, see Interv, Maj. Richard Thurston with CSM Dwight E. Anderson, Command Sergeant Major, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, Task Force Able Sentry, 4 Jun 1996, Schweinfurt, Germany. Also, Interv, Thurston with 1st Lt. Bryan Womack, Battalion S-4 and Support Platoon Leader, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, Operation ABLE SENTRY, 30 May 1996, Baumholder, Germany. Also see Interv, S. Sgt. Roger Ruth with Cpl. Brian Kibiloski, B Team Leader, 2d Squad, 1st Platoon, Company D, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, Operation ABLE SENTRY, 21 Aug 1995, Kirch Gons, Germany.

³⁷ Kamena interview.

³⁸ Interv, Maj. Kim R. Daniel with Maj. Brian P. Stapleton, S-3, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 16 Aug 1995, Kirch Gons. Also see comments in Interv, Maj. Kim R. Daniel with Capt. Joseph F. Forlenza, S-2, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 22 Aug 1995, Kirch Gons. For the soldier's perspective on the NLAOO, see, among others: Interviews, S. Sgt. Roger Ruth with Sgt. Aric Gray, Squad Leader, 1st Platoon, Company D, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 21 Aug 1995, and with Sgt. Michael Scott Lyons, Fire Team Leader, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, both 21 Aug 1995, Kirch Gons, Germany.

³⁹ Stapleton interview.

⁴⁰ Notes attached to V Corps CAT Shift Report: Attached Message Received from HQ JTF Naples, 10 May 1994, sub: 10 May Border Incident, Task Force Able Sentry; Msg, HQ JTF PP Naples to NMCC, DC et al., 10 May 1994, sub: Incident Identification and Details; Msg, HQ JTF PP Naples IT to USCINCEUR et al., 111800Z May 1994, sub: 10 May Border Incident, Task Force Able Sentry.

⁴¹ MFR, V Corps Historian, 17 May 1994, sub: Notes from O&I TFAS Discussion.

⁴² Msg, CINCUSAREUR to HQDA, 21 Jun 1994, sub: Request for Seven (7) additional Precision Lightweight GPS Receivers (PLGR) for Macedonia Mission.

⁴³ E-mail Msg, V Corps Science Advisor for CG and CS, V Corps, 12 Jul 1994, sub: Position location.

⁴⁴ Memo, XO, TFAS (Maj. Steven R. Corbett), for COMJTF-PP, Brig. Gen. Hanlon, thru Commander, TFAS, 30 Jul 1994, sub: Summary of Events and Reports, RE: 26 Jul 94 attempted detention of USBAT Patrol #C1-087. Ref: Operation Able Sentry Commander's SITREP, 26 Jul 94 (Extract); Debrief of Patrol C1-087, 26 Jul 1994; Command Msg UNPROFO FYROM COS-140/94 dated 26 Jul 1994; FYROM UNMO Report, 27 Jul 1994.

⁴⁵ TFAS SitRep, 29 Jul 1994; MFR, V Corps Historian, 2 Aug 1994, sub: Notes from O&I TFAS Discussion.

⁴⁶ MFR, Cdr, JTFPP, 23 Mar 1995, sub: Northern Limit of the Area of Operations (NLAOO) FYROM Command. For the UN position on the NLAOO, see UNPREDEP Force Command Briefing (Draft), 20 Jun 1995, "Northern Limit of the Area of Operations (NLAOO)."

⁴⁷ Layfield interview.

⁴⁸ Interv, author with Maj. Dwayne Edwards, S-3, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, Task Force Able Sentry, 2 Dec 1998, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

⁴⁹ See daily SitReps from TFAS commanders, which contain discussions of the NLAOO and other control measures and refer to V Corps CG directives on that and other subjects in File G-3, TFAS SitRep (Monthly).

⁵⁰ Interv, S. Sgt. Roger Ruth with S. Sgt. Johnny Castillo, Support Platoon Sergeant, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, Task Force Able Sentry, 18 Aug 1995, Kirch Gõns, Germany.

⁵¹ Memo, AETV-BG-EN-CDR (HQ, Engr Bde, 3ID) for Maj. Gen. Holder, 9 Jun 1994, sub: Trip Report—Able Sentry.

⁵² Memo, AETV-BG-CS (G-3, 3ID) for Commander, V Corps, 18 Jul 1994, sub: Request for Engineer Equipment to Support TF 2-15 IN.

⁵³ Memo, AETV-GC (G-3, V Corps) thru Cdr V Corps, to DCSOPS, USAREUR, 30 Jul 1994, sub: Request for Engineer Equipment to Support TF 2-15 IN.

⁵⁴ Msg, Cdr V Corps for CINCUSAREUR, 091430Z Aug 1994, sub: Engineer Support to TF Able Sentry.

⁵⁵ Memo, AEAEN-MET for DCINC, 27 Jul 1994, sub: Observation Posts Move Status, with CINC handwritten marginalia. Also see Memo, USAREUR SGS, for DCSENG, 1 Aug 1994, sub: OP Move Status, which gives same quotation.

⁵⁶ E-mail Msg, Charles Rust (ADCSENG) to CS, USAREUR, 12 Aug 1994, sub: Engr Spt to TF Able Sentry (SGS Tasker), CINC's reply to the 3ID request for additional work.

⁵⁷ Msg, USCINCEUR for JCS, 030643Z Sep 1994, sub: Engineer Support for Task Force Able Sentry.

⁵⁸ Memo, USBAT, FYROM COMMAND, for 1st Bde, 3ID, 6 Sep 1994, sub: Engineer Support, detailed the work that needed to be done. Operation ABLE SENTRY—Commander's SitRep, 4 Sep 1994, TF 2-15 Infantry, requested the assistance. Typically, each SitRep commented on the progress of construction work. Also see Memo, AETV-BG-CS (GC 3ID) for Cdr, V Corps, ATTN: G-3, 14 Sep 1994, sub: Request for Engineer Personnel to Support TF 2-15 IN, which asked V Corps for help; and Msg, Cdr V Corps to Cdr 130 Engr Bde, 161630Z Sep 1994, sub: Engineer Support for Task Force Able Sentry (TFAS) FRAGO 12 to OPORD 94-02, which directed the 130th Engineer Brigade to send soldiers to TFAS for short periods of duty.

⁵⁹ For the cost estimates, see draft Msg, USCINCEUR ECJ3 for JCS, 2731054 Oct 1994, sub: Macedonia Road Repairs.

⁶⁰ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for USCINCEUR, 071510Z Oct 1994, sub: Deployment Order for Macedonia Road Repairs.

⁶¹ Draft V Corps OPORD 95-55, Task Force Able Sentry, May 1995, which summarized all deployments to that date. The records do not show whether USAREUR and V Corps were ever reimbursed for the costs involved.

⁶² Ham interview. Because it was issued prior to the use of a mechanized battalion in Macedonia, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Draft Operation Able Sentry Initial Impressions Report: A Peacekeeping Mission in Macedonia (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 21 Oct 1993), while including extensive discussion of training and peacekeeping observations, is silent on the issue of organization for the TFAS mission. Also see 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry Able Sentry II Briefing (March 1994), which specifies the number of dismounted infantrymen available.

⁶³ Kamena interview.

⁶⁴ Interv, Thurston with Anderson, 14 Jun 1996.

⁶⁵ Edwards interview.

⁶⁶ Ham interview; Kamena interview; also see HQ, 3ID Briefing to V Corps Commander, Reinforce TF 1-6, March 1994, which includes the headquarters detachment force structure.

⁶⁷ For example, Msg, Cdr V Corps to Cdr Special Troops Battalion, V Corps, et al., 101800Z Nov 1993, sub: Warning Order, V Corps Mission Order 94-08, Personnel Support to UNPROFOR Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command (FYROM CMD); Msg, Cdr V Corps for Corps MSCs, 241800 Nov 1993, sub: Warning Order, V Corps Mission Order 94-10, Personnel Support to UNPROFOR FYROM CMD; Msg, Cdr V Corps for Corps MSCs, 151800Z Nov 1993, sub: Warning Order, V Corps Mission Order 94-10, Personnel Support to UNPROFOR FYROM CMD.

⁶⁸ Memo, Cdr, 3ID, for Cdr 7 MEDCOM, 7 Oct 1993, sub: Mobilization Augmentee Request (ABLE SENTRY); Information Paper, V Corps Surgeon (Col. [Dr.] David Lam), 7 Nov 1993, sub: Trip Report—Medical Survey, Macedonia, 2-5 Nov 1993, which recommended the University Hospital in Skopje for American use in emergencies, but saw a need to improve aeromedical evacuation from Macedonia and agreed that a medical officer, although not a field surgical team, were required; and Msg, Cdr V Corps for CINCUSAREUR, 151500Z Oct 1993, sub: Field Surgeon Support for Able Sentry Macedonia.

⁶⁹ Msg, CINCUSAREUR, AEAGC-O-CAT, 171142Z Jun 1993, sub: USAREUR Personnel Deployment Policies and Criteria for Contingency Operations—Macedonia. Also see Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps, 220900Z Jun 1994, sub: Able Sentry Personnel Ceiling.

⁷⁰ Msg, EUCOM for CINCUSAREUR, 072033Z Apr 1994, [Modification 001 to USCINCEUR Execution Order for the Deployment of a Reinforced Company Team (RCT) to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) for duty with the UNPROFOR Macedonia Command]. HQ, 3d Infantry Division Briefing to V Corps Commander, Reinforce TF 1-6, March 1994; Msg, Cdr V Corps for Cdr, 3ID et al., 011011Z Apr 1994, sub: Able Sentry Reinforcement Deployment, FRAGO #2 to V Corps Operations Order 94-30; Msg, Cdr V Corps for Cdr 3ID, 020800Z Apr 1994, sub: Able Sentry Reinforcement Deployment, FRAGO #3; Msg, Cdr V Corps for Cdr 3ID, 061500Z Apr 1994, sub: Able Sentry Reinforcement Deployment, FRAGO #4; Msg, Cdr V Corps for Cdr 3ID, 081500Z Apr 1994, sub: Able Sentry Reinforcement Deployment, FRAGO #5; Msg, Cdr V Corps for Cdr 3ID, 270900Z Apr 1994, sub: Able Sentry Personnel Requirements, FRAGO 9 to V Corps Operations Order 94-03, additional augmentation from various MSCs. Also, Ltr, HQ, USAREUR (ODCSOPS) for United States Embassy, Sofia, 8 Apr 1994. Articles in the *Stars and Stripes* reported the deployment: "More 3rd Inf Div Troops Heading to Macedonia for Peacekeeping" (17 Apr 1994), and "Vilseck GIs Begin Macedonia Mission: They Join Comrades to Beef up Patrols on Serbian Border" (20 Apr 1994).

⁷¹ Memo, Col. Thomas V. Morley, Jr., for Maj. Gen. Holder, CG, 3d Infantry Division, 18 Mar 1994, sub: Trip to Macedonia (14-16 March 1994).

⁷² Msg, EUCOM for USCINCEUR, 291535Z Apr 1994, sub: UH60 Aircraft for Duty with TFAS; Msg, CINCUSAREUR for V Corps, 291716Z Apr 1994, sub: CINCUSAREUR Deployment Order #9313, UH-60 Deployment to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; "37 Katterbach GIs Going to Macedonia," *Stars and Stripes*, 4 May 1994; "Macedonia Missions for Copters Just Ahead," *Stars and Stripes*, 8 May 1994.

⁷³ Msg, Cdr, V Corps for Cdr, 3 ID, 291730Z Apr 1994, sub: Able Sentry Aircraft Requirements, Frago 18 to V Corps Operations Order 94-83.

⁷⁴ Msg, CINCUSAREUR, AEAGC-O-CAT, for multiple addressees, 011625Z Apr 1994, sub: Able Sentry Reinforcement Deployment Order, raised the ceiling to 515 after the additional infantry company was added to the task force. Msg, CINCUSAREUR, AEAGC-O, for multiple addressees, 291716Z Apr 1994, sub: UH-60 Deployment to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, authorized deployment of UH-60 aircraft and associated crew and maintenance personnel, thus increasing the personnel ceiling on station to 549. Also see Memo, AETV-BGR-C for 3ID Marne Museum, 28 Feb 1995, sub: 1/6 IN 1994 Annual Historical Review, Operation ABLE SENTRY.

⁷⁵ 3d Infantry Division Briefing, UH 60s to Able Sentry, 23 Apr 1994. The unit providing the helicopters was the 7th Battalion, 1st Aviation.

⁷⁶ Memo, 7-1 Aviation Regiment for Commander, 3ID, 17 Jun 1994, sub: ABLE SENTRY Flight Detachment Rotation Plan.

⁷⁷ Memo, 3ID G-4 for CG, 3ID, 20 Jul 1994, sub: UH-60 Transition for ABLE SENTRY. Also, E-mail, Col. Tom Morley (CS, 3ID) to Col. Clay Melton (ACofS, G-3, V Corps), 23 Aug 1994, sub: Transfer of Helos when 3ID and 1AD swap TFAS mission.

⁷⁸ Memo, 1AD G-3 for V Corps G-3, 22 Sep 1994, sub: Transfer of UH-60 "Whitehawks" in Support of ABLE SENTRY.

⁷⁹ Memo, G-3 V Corps for CG V Corps, 20 Sep 1994, sub: Able Sentry UH-60s—Information, proposed the plan. USAREUR Staff Action Summary, USAREUR Aviation, 24 Oct 1994, sub: Aircraft and Aviation Equipment for Operation ABLE SENTRY, contains the USAREUR Aviation Division's recommendation. Memo, Cdr, V Corps, for CINCUSAREUR, 24 Oct 1994, sub: Operation ABLE SENTRY UH-60 Support, was General Rutherford's formal proposal to General Maddox. General Maddox's approval is indicated in his handwritten marginal note on the V Corps record copy of the document. Anticipating such a course of action, 3d Infantry Division made preparations in late September to carry out the orders it expected to receive. See HQ, 3 ID, FRAGO 2 to OPORD 94-11 (ABLE SENTRY II), 23 Sept 1994, which directed those steps be taken "on order."

⁸⁰ Memo, HQ, 4th Brigade (Avn), 1st Armored Division (1AD), for Commander, 1AD, 17 Jan 1995, sub: ABLE SENTRY UH-60 Phase Plan—Staff Study.

⁸¹ Memo, CG, 1AD, for Commander, V Corps, 20 Jan 1995, sub: ABLE SENTRY UH-60 "Whitehawk" Phase Inspections.

⁸² Staff Summary, V Corps G-4 to CG, 28 Feb 1995, sub: ABLE SENTRY UH-60 Whitehawk Phase Inspections.

⁸³ Memo, CS, V Corps, for CG, 1AD, 3 Mar 1995, sub: ABLE SENTRY UH-60 Whitehawk Phase Inspections.

⁸⁴ "Task Force 1-6 observes and reports actions along Macedonian border," *Frontline* (3ID newspaper), 75 (February 1994), reporting Maddox's speech of 4 January.

⁸⁵ The following U.S. Army Field Manuals current in 1994 addressed aspects of peace operations or included tasks relevant to peace operations: 6-20, 7-8, 7-10, 7-20, 7-98, 8-42, 8-55, 19-10, 19-15, 19-40, 20-22, 20-32, 33-1, 34-2-1, 34-130, 41-10, 43-5, 44-3, 44-53, 46-1, 55-10, 63-6, 90-8, 90-10-1, 90-14, and 100-20. Other relevant manuals included: TRADOC Pamphlet 525-56, *Planner's Guide for Military Operations Other Than War*; USAIS Draft: *The Application of Peace Enforcement at Brigade and Battalion*, an undated White Paper; undated TRADOC draft *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*; FM 7-98, *Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict*; TRADOC Newsletter No. 93-8 (Dec 1993), *Operations Other Than War Vol. IV, Peace Operations*; Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, *Strawman Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Enforcement, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, Joint/Combined/ Interagency Operations*; and NATO undated draft *Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*.

⁸⁶ Memo, AEAGC-O, ODCSOPS, USAREUR, for CINCUSAREUR, n.d., but end of June 1994, sub: Analysis of TF Able Sentry Mission (TFAS).

⁸⁷ Ltr, Inez M. Azeona, U.S. General Accounting Office, to HQ, 3d Infantry Division, n.d., but 1995, transmitting copy of GAO report on peacekeeping operations for division comment, with enclosure: "Training for Peace Operations: USAREUR Perspective," Rotations 6-502 (12 July-31 Dec 93); 1-6 Inf 27 Dec 93-23 Jun 1994; 2-15 Inf 24 June-10 December 1994.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Memo, Cdr V Corps for DCSOPS, USAREUR, 29 Jun 1994, sub: Analysis of Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) and TF Able Sentry (TFAS) Missions.

⁹¹ Memo, AETV-BGD-PO for staff, 23 May 1994, sub: Able Sentry II IPR to Commanding General, V Corps. This was a major IPR that involved briefings by both division staffs and the V Corps staff.

⁹² Ltr, Azeona to HQ, 3d Infantry Division, with enclosure: "Training for Peace Operations: USAREUR Perspective."

⁹³ Kamena interview.

⁹⁴ UN Force Commander's Policy Directive Number (13) Rules of Engagement, 24 Mar 1992. The rules were modified slightly by the United States and then approved by the UN General Officer Commanding in Macedonia, by the V Corps and division commanders, and by the operational headquarters, Joint Task Force Provide Promise, in Naples. The version issued to U.S. troops was Annex B of United Nations Force Commander Directive No. 01, Rules of Engagement (HQ, UNPROFOR, Sarajevo, 23 Mar 1992). The basic policy statement allowing UNPROFOR soldiers to carry weapons is contained in the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), 11 Dec 1991, Annex III, par. 4.

⁹⁵ Kamena interview.

⁹⁶ Ham interview.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Kamena interview.

⁹⁹ The term referred to the right front seat of the experienced commander's vehicle.

¹⁰⁰ Layfield interview.

¹⁰¹ Interv, Maj. Richard Thurston with Maj. David C. Osborne, S-3, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, and Senior Operations Officer for Task Force Able Sentry, 14 Jun 1996, Schweinfurt, Germany.

¹⁰² Layfield interview.

¹⁰³ Gray interview.

¹⁰⁴ Edwards interview.

¹⁰⁵ Layfield interview.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations maps used by TF Able Sentry specified that the borders indicated on the map were for reference purposes only and did not constitute a recognition by the United Nations of that line as the official border between the two states.

¹⁰⁷ Ham interview; Layfield interview.

¹⁰⁸ Ham interview.

¹⁰⁹ Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 171800Z Nov 1993, sub: V Corps Mission Order 94-09, SUSV Training in Support of Deployment to FYROM Command, arranged SUSV training in Mannheim.

¹¹⁰ Layfield interview.

¹¹¹ The V Corps specified those and other individual training items, and the list became more sophisticated and comprehensive over time. See, for example, V Corps CG OPOD Brief, Task Force Able Sentry (OPOD 05-94), 24 Feb 1995. For commanders' comments on the required individual training, see Ham, Kamena, and Layfield interviews.

¹¹² The battalion surgeon was a physician's assistant, a warrant officer (later a commissioned officer) with training and skills roughly equivalent to those of a nurse practitioner.

¹¹³ In October 1994 TF 2-15 conducted the first live Telemed conference with an international audience from Camp Able Sentry II Medical Station to Walter Reed Army Hospital in the United States. See Operations Report, 1st Brigade, 3ID, 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, n.d., but 1994.

¹¹⁴ Ham interview; Layfield interview; Osborne interview.

¹¹⁵ For further comments on medical operations, see Interv, S. Sgt. Roger Ruth with Capt. Willie Sallis (battalion physician's assistant) and Sgt. Kenneth Langstaff (battalion aid station), 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 18 Aug 1995, Kirch Göns, Germany.

¹¹⁶ Memo, AETV-BGR-C for 3ID Marne Museum, 28 Feb 1995, sub: 1/6 IN 1994 Annual Historical Review, Operation ABLE SENTRY.

¹¹⁷ Ham interview; Kamena interview; Layfield interview. Col. Gene Kamena agreed with that estimate, but noted that he would not consider his battalion fully trained until a point almost eight months after its return to Germany. Layfield's experience was different, inasmuch as Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams, V Corps commander at that time, allotted his battalion only ninety days to recover and retrain. External evaluations of the process by the Government Accounting Office validated the four- to six-month standard for recovery after a TFAS rotation. See Ltr, Azeona to HQ, 3d Infantry Division, with enclosure: "Training for Peace Operations: USAREUR Perspective."

¹¹⁸ Conduct of fire trainers, both Bradley COFTs and Abrams COFTs, were devices used in garrison training that simulated the turret of the armored fighting vehicles and presented gunnery problems so that crews could maintain and indeed improve their skills without using actual vehicles or firing live ammunition.

¹¹⁹ 1st Bde, 3ID, Able Sentry II, Mission Handover and Redeployment Briefing, October 1994. Also see TF 2-15 Transition with 1AD and Redeployment, IPR to CG, V Corps, 14 Oct 1994. Also see TF 2-15 After Action Review, Task Force Able Sentry, n.d., but December 1994.

¹²⁰ Edwards interview.

¹²¹ Osborne interview.

¹²² Gray interview.

¹²³ Kibiloski interview.

¹²⁴ Layfield interview.

¹²⁵ Osborne interview. The ARTEP, or Army Training and Evaluation Program, was a standard test used to validate success in unit training.

¹²⁶ Msg, Joint Staff for HQ DA et al., 171720Z Mar 1997, sub: Reserve Component Integration in Task Force Able Sentry; Msg, USCINCEUR for Joint Staff, 071233Z Feb 1997, sub: Request for Army National Guard Integration in TFAS; Msg, USCINCEUR for HQ DA, 070833Z Apr 1997, sub: EUCOM Request for Reserve Component Integration in TFAS; Msg, USCINCEUR for Joint Staff, 051433Z May 1997, sub: Reserve Component Integration in TFAS.

¹²⁷ Msg, CINCUSAREUR to V Corps, 081501Z Apr 1997, sub: TFAS Force Level.

¹²⁸ Msg, CINCUSAREUR to V Corps, 101401Z Apr 1997, sub: UN Votes to Delay Force Reduction at UNPREDEP; Msg, USMISSION USUN to Sec State DC et al., 092332Z Apr 1997, sub: UNPREDEP: Security Council adopts Resolution to Suspend Drawdown.

¹²⁹ "U.N. Seeking Way to Save Macedonia," *Stars and Stripes*, 27 Feb 1999.

¹³⁰ "Mission Fades Away," *Stars and Stripes*, 2 Mar 1999; "Peacekeepers Left High and Dry," *Stars and Stripes*, 2 Mar 1999.

¹³¹ "Forces Unsure of What Will Come Next," *Stars and Stripes*, 3 Mar 1999.

¹³² "NATO Open for Business in Skopje," *Stars and Stripes*, 8 Mar 1999; "Sentries' Mission Not Over," *Stars and Stripes*, 11 Mar 1999.

¹³³ See Ltr, Azeona to HQ, 3d Infantry Division, with enclosure: "Training for Peace Operations: USAREUR Perspective." Also: V Corps METL, January 1996, copy in Historian Reference File—Corps Mission Statements.

¹³⁴ Interv, S. Sgt. Roger Ruth with SFC Michael Dalton, Platoon Sergeant, 1st Platoon, Company D, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 21 Aug 1995, Kirch Göns, Germany.

Aviation Missions

"Conserve combat power and take care of your people. You'll get many opportunities to stand on your head. Don't go looking for them."

Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix
TF Apache Briefing
5 October 1999

"It might be more interesting than we can stand."

Maj. Gen. George Casey, CG, 1st Armored Division
Remark about TF Apache, 5 October 1999

"Damn! We're doing about ten plans for every one we execute. I'm having a little too much fun, these days. The whole corps aviation staff is getting sorta worn down. Both of us."

Frustrated V Corps Staff Officer
October 1999

On 20 September 1984 terrorists bombed the United States Embassy annex in East Beirut, Lebanon. In the ensuing days, the Department of State concluded that it could no longer safely use the Beirut International Airport for its normal traffic to support the embassy, and it turned to the Department of Defense for assistance. With the agreement of the Department of Defense, the State Department outlined a plan for aerial resupply of the embassy and transportation of embassy staff via military helicopters operated from Cyprus. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Sixth U.S. Fleet to prepare the operation. For some twenty months, starting in the fall of 1984, the United States Navy satisfied the Department of State requirement, using three H-53 aircraft stationed at Larnaca International Airport, Cyprus, for what was dubbed the "Beirut Air Bridge."

The Beirut Air Bridge

Cyprus was not an entirely congenial base for such a mission. The island hosted a large Palestinian refugee community that, in the judgment of analysts, supported terrorist operations elsewhere. The Democratic Front for the Libera-

tion of Palestine maintained a support organization in Cyprus, and both Nicosia and Larnaca were known arms storage locations for the Al-Fatah organization. Moreover, Cyprus had the reputation as a more or less neutral ground in the Middle East that all of the various factions used for rest and rehabilitation. The embassy in Nicosia also pointed out that Iran Air operated two flights per week from Larnaca and maintained an office in Nicosia. All of those factors suggested a substantial terrorist threat level in and around Larnaca by 1986, and the United States reacted by reaching agreement with the British government to relocate the American aviators to the Royal Air Force Akrotiri Station, a wholly British enclave. Nonetheless, the U.S. Embassy directed those assigned to the detachment to keep a low profile, both on and off duty. By the late 1980s the Department of State assessed the risk as more a hazard of incidental injury than deliberate harm, since the Irish Republican Army had made attacks on RAF Akrotiri on several occasions, and U.S. personnel could easily be caught in the line of fire of any such assault.¹

On 19 May 1986 the United States Army, Europe, assumed the Beirut Air Bridge mission, using UH-60 Blackhawk aircraft of the 48th Aviation Company ("Blue Stars"), of the 12th Aviation Group. Other units took over the duty in succession to the Blue Stars. From 1988 through 1990 Company C, 6th Battalion, 159th Aviation, the general aviation company of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade of VII Corps, carried out the mission. As Operation DESERT SHIELD started and the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade deployed to Saudi Arabia with the rest of VII Corps, C/6-159 Aviation handed off the mission to Company H, 3d Aviation Regiment, of the 4th (Aviation) Brigade, 3d Infantry Division. Company H retained the responsibility until the 12th Aviation Brigade resumed the operation in 1992.²

From the beginning the detachment scheduled fifteen missions per month, of which some or all might actually be flown, based on Department of State mission requests. European Command had the authority to approve mission requests, and emphasized that missions would be flown only under "permissive conditions" and on a random flight schedule for security reasons. That understood, the unit would always respond to no-notice, non-routine, emergency mission requests. The commander of the aviation detachment in Cyprus properly retained authority for all operational decisions.

The detachment received operational support from the American embassies in Nicosia and Beirut and always obtained positive clearance for flights into Beirut. Aircrews had a series of special training requirements that included qualification for U.S. Navy ship deck landings, with quarterly recertification. Each mission was flown by two helicopters, both of which had secure communications equipment and were specially equipped for search and rescue.³ Command and control was uncomplicated. The flight detachment was under the operational command of European Command, but was under USAREUR's operational control throughout its existence for mission planning and execution. The European commander in chief had the authority to approve or cancel air missions.⁴

The original European Command directive specified that the Beirut Air Bridge would use three aircraft, with one designated an alternate mission aircraft. The order also specified that peacetime rules of engagement were in effect, and that missions would automatically be aborted any time safety was in question. Aircrews were not authorized to carry weapons.⁵ USAREUR decided, however, to increase the safety margin by providing a fourth aircraft, and in August 1986 the British government agreed to allow the flight detachment accordingly to expand the size of its operation at Akrotiri.

In April 1987 the Department of State reimbursed European Command for some of the operational costs associated with the mission, opening an extended discussion about mission costs that led to the signing of a funding memorandum of agreement on 31 July 1988 in which the Department of State agreed to reimburse the Department of Defense, but specifically limiting annual costs to \$1.7 million, plus 5 percent for unanticipated expenses. Meanwhile, European Command had laid plans for a rotation of the mission from Army to Air Force, and enlisted the Department of State's assistance to obtain British approval to replace the Army UH-60 detachment at Akrotiri with a U.S. Air Force flight detachment of CH-53E helicopters and forty-six airmen. However, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided a month later that the mission would remain with the Army because of the high costs of the proposed turnover to the Air Force. Operationally, the major development was a presidential order on 5 September 1989 to evacuate the embassy in Beirut because of increased threat. The three flight detachment UH-60s accomplished that mission on the morning of 6 September.⁶

With the realization that the mission would remain an Army task, the 12th Aviation Group began to develop a set of permanent routines to carry it out. After Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, when VII Corps returned to Germany only to be inactivated, USAREUR designated V Corps its executive agent to supervise mission execution.⁷ The 12th Aviation Brigade, as the unit had by then been redesignated, was the only general aviation unit available to carry out the mission and thus had responsibility for the Beirut Air Bridge from the end of the Persian Gulf War until the Department of Defense gave up the mission.⁸

The brigade determined that an aviation platoon was adequate to fly the Beirut Air Bridge missions, and that it had to dedicate one aviation company to the task of maintaining that platoon in Cyprus through an orderly crew rotation process. The ultimate flight detachment organization called for a total of twenty-seven soldiers. The detachment commander was a major and served a two-year tour of duty on Cyprus, as did the first sergeant and a captain who was assigned as liaison officer to the embassy at Nicosia, as well as being a reserve pilot. The remaining twenty-four soldiers of the detachment came from Company C, 6th Battalion, 159th Aviation,⁹ in platoon packages on sixty-day tours of temporary duty.¹⁰

Finding an adequate number of pilots and crew chiefs was not always easy. The brigade commander was confronted with two missions, each of which fully

occupied one fifteen-ship Blackhawk company—Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq¹¹ and the Beirut Air Bridge. Aviation battalions did not have excess flight crews, crew chiefs, or helicopter mechanics. Therefore, to sustain both full-time missions, the brigade was often forced to deploy certain low density, key personnel either on consecutive rotations or else too frequently. Some of his soldiers, he complained to the corps commander, were spending in excess of eighteen months deployed away from home station in the course of a three-year tour of duty in Germany.

To compensate and to give enough personnel slack to grant adequate leave, time on home station, training time to maintain proficiency in Central Region missions, and simple rest, the brigade asked the corps to provide one additional aviation repair parts clerk and one additional complete, battle-rostered crew current on night-vision goggle operations for each of the two standing missions.¹² However, the only general aviation unit in USAREUR, except for the flight detachment that supported USAREUR headquarters, was the 12th Aviation Brigade. As a consequence, the only place from which to draw the aircrew and other soldiers needed for the deployment missions was from the general aviation company of each of the two divisions assigned to the corps. That was the eventual solution, with the 1st Armored Division and the 3d Infantry Division each required to provide one crew and one repair parts clerk to the aviation brigade on a rotating basis. Quite naturally, the respective division commanders complained about the tasking, since it diminished the ability of their own aviation brigades to accomplish all of the division missions.¹³ The 12th Aviation Brigade consequently began looking for another way to solve the personnel shortfall.

While it appeared that the Beirut Air Bridge would continue indefinitely, there was also no end in sight for the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT deployment in northern Iraq with which the 12th Aviation Brigade was simultaneously charged. The logical solution was to request a change to the unit authorization documents to assign additional aviators. A request for a modification to the Table of Distribution and Allowances to provide the needed personnel was flatly refused in 1994, with USAREUR responding that it was impossible to build such an authorization document. Because of the drawdown of the Army in Europe, so many aviator positions had been cut from the force structure that there were no authorizations available to give the unit.¹⁴

The 12th Aviation Brigade then explored an alternative solution by asking the corps in 1995 to increase by three the number of warrant officer aviators assigned under the officer distribution plan. That solution would relieve the pressure on the brigade and let the divisions off the hook.¹⁵ But the corps staff responded that they could not increase the officer distribution plan that year, although the G-3, working through the USAREUR deputy chief of staff, personnel, managed to find three aviators in USAREUR that could be assigned to the brigade as a short-term solution.¹⁶ The brigade acknowledged the help, but pointed out that the officer distribution plan for fiscal year 1996 still needed to be modified, since the brigade required an absolute minimum of sixty-nine war-

rant officer aviators to sustain its then-current missions, a number not habitually assured under the existing officer distribution plan.¹⁷

Mission training began twenty-one days before aircrews traveled to Cyprus and continued throughout the temporary duty period. Aircrews first had to meet the predeployment requirements outlined by USAREUR and be at Readiness Level 1, which meant that aviators were fully qualified on night-vision goggles before beginning training. Crews used the two mission-configured aircraft stationed in Germany to qualify on the storm scope radar, all of the aircraft survivability equipment, the Omega navigation system and global positioning system, the auxiliary Robertson internal fuel system, and the various radio sets. Further time was demanded to allow aircrew certification in water survival techniques, including initial helicopter emergency egress and use of the egress device. Part of that training involved travel to a Navy base in the Mediterranean to go through the "dunker" training and other water survival techniques the Navy included in its program of instruction for aviators.

Operationally, pilots and crew chiefs had to be certified in over-water, multi-ship operations and obtain a naval deck landing qualification, the latter because landing on a U.S. Navy ship at sea was one of a range of possible emergency options in the Beirut Air Bridge operational checklist. The 12th Aviation Brigade commander, as executive agent for the corps, certified crews in all those tasks before they could assume the mission in Cyprus. Once the crews arrived in Cyprus, phase two of the training began under the direction of the flight detachment commander. This phase focused on tasks specific to the operational environment and mission, but with particular emphasis on over-water and multi-ship operations. Phase three was the sustainment training, which the detachment commander structured to keep all crews current in their required skills.¹⁸

Deck landing certification was a particularly strenuous requirement based on the Navy's program of instruction. It began with being certified on precise landings on a fixed spot. Early on, the flight detachment found a good location on a sheer cliff on Cyprus that aircrews could use to replicate the fantail of a frigate. Marking it to emulate a ship deck, the crews then made a number of landings under the supervision of a Navy instructor pilot by day, and then by night. That qualified them to go on to make actual shipboard landings, both day and night, under supervision of a Navy instructor pilot. Once certified as qualified and current, the Army aviators could land on any of the Sixth Fleet's ships. The training focus was on smaller ships, because they presented by far the most difficult piloting challenge, but flight detachment crews landed on all kinds of Navy vessels, including ammunition supply ships, general supply ships, amphibious assault ships, and aircraft carriers, including the U.S.S. *Coral Sea*.¹⁹

The mission involved over-water flight from Cyprus to Beirut, a total of 120 nautical miles. Aircrews noted that flying over open water was a specialized skill that most Army aviators never had the opportunity to acquire. Even in visual flying conditions, they considered it more closely akin to instrument flying, because there was no good visual reference for altitude over the water

or aircraft attitude. Given the mission profile, particularly in the approach to Beirut, flying over water was, in the words of one pilot, "sporting," since it was done "in formation, at night, at fifty feet, under goggles, and even in the dark without goggles, unaided."²⁰ The 12th Aviation Brigade equipped four UH-60A helicopters for the special requirements, in the process creating a nonstandard aircraft type.

Each Blackhawk had a sophisticated Omega navigation system, augmented by global positioning system equipment and a radar system to monitor stormy weather. As an adjunct, a voice-activated altitude warning device was also installed. Because the mission might be aborted as late as the last few minutes before landing in Beirut, the aircraft had not only a high frequency radio, but also a secure satellite communication system and a secure ultra high frequency radio (HAVEQUICK II). Armor plating was installed on the floor of each aircraft, increasing its all-up weight somewhat, and an internal Robertson Range Extension Fuel System that carried 185 gallons gave a mission duration of three hours and forty minutes. For further security, each Blackhawk had the AN/ALQ-144 (V1) infrared jammer, the AN/APR-39 (V2) radar detector, and the M-130 chaff dispenser. The brigade also had to maintain two identically equipped back-up aircraft in Germany, a further permanent commitment of a limited number of airframes.²¹ Obtaining more tools, test equipment, and ancillary aviation hardware was easier than obtaining more people for the mission, and the brigade in the fall of 1994 obtained approval from the corps deputy commander for a modification to the unit table of distribution and allowances to obtain the equipment needed not only in Cyprus, but also in northern Iraq.²²

The standard mission profile was a demanding one and, as events later demonstrated, dangerous as well. The detachment flew two helicopters for every operation as the standard. Missions originated at RAF Akrotiri and allowed two and one-half hours to preflight the aircraft, key the secure communications equipment, go through a satellite communications conference that included the embassy in Beirut and European Command headquarters for a mission "go," and receive the air mission commander's briefing. The aircraft then landed at Larnaca International Airport to pick up passengers and cargo. That stop was the consequence of an agreement between the United States and the Cypriot government that the flight detachment aircraft would clear customs both entering and leaving the island. One of the functions of the detachment's liaison officer at the embassy in Nicosia was to handle the customs paperwork at the airport. After leaving Larnaca, the two helicopters climbed to 500 feet and, once twenty nautical miles from the airport in daytime, climbed to 1,000 feet, weather permitting, for the remainder of the flight across the eastern Mediterranean. An on-time radio check notified the embassy that the aircraft were following the established mission schedule.

About twenty nautical miles from Beirut the aircraft descended to 100 feet or less for the remainder of the flight until landing at the embassy. The aircrew had been briefed that the SA-7 Grail²³ antiaircraft missile, many of which were in the hands of terrorist groups in the region, could not effectively acquire an

aircraft at altitudes of less than 100 feet, with the consequence that the detachment flew at that low level not only into Beirut, but also when approaching Cyprus on the return leg. Because the landing zone at the embassy compound was small, the missions used a point initial, over the water, where one aircraft flew a holding pattern while the other landed and discharged passengers and cargo.

After a maximum allowable three minutes on the ground in Beirut to unload passengers and cargo and pick up manifested passengers returning to Cyprus, the aircraft returned to Larnaca along the same route, cleared customs again, and finally flew back to Akrotiri. (*Map 10*) Before landing at Akrotiri, the aircraft performed a visual sweep of the cliffs, waterfront, and fences of the air station as a courtesy to the RAF. The normal flight time between Cyprus and Beirut was just over an hour, and the total mission time averaged seven hours, including all briefings and inspections. There were various numbers of mission



MAP 10

types, over time, including deception missions that were flown for operational security reasons. In 1997 the brigade changed the mission profile to allow the helicopter to fly overland from Akrotiri to Larnaca at 1,500 feet, as an alternative to the usual coastal route of 500 feet altitude over the water.²⁴

The flight detachment retained the ability and authority to abort the mission at any time for safety considerations or because of last minute intelligence assessments that might indicate a threat to the aircraft. Other abort criteria that could be exercised at any point in the mission included missing the weather minimums of the 1,000-foot ceiling and five-mile visibility and failure of any key piece of equipment. Envisioning the worst circumstances, the operations orders specified that gunfire in or around the landing zone was an immediate abort criterion, but the orders were also sufficiently conservative to list failure of communications with the landing zone as an adequate reason to abort. The embassy in Beirut also had the ability to abort the mission right up to landing time, either through use of the various radios with which the helicopters were equipped or during final approach with red star clusters that the Army delivered to the defense attaché for that purpose. Further testifying to the caution that characterized all of the missions, pilots were instructed to abort if they observed *any* flares around the landing zone, not just the ones prescribed for embassy use.²⁵

One such mission abort illustrates the conservative approach V Corps insisted upon, as well as the speed with which threat warnings were disseminated. On 19 January 1998 the defense attaché in Beirut informed the State Department that he had learned a Hezbollah team had allegedly been organized to use a Soviet-designed SAM-7 anti-aircraft missile for an attack on a Beirut Air Bridge mission.²⁶ As the message was being sent out, a flight was en route to Beirut. At a point eighteen minutes from the Lebanese coast, the embassy directed the helicopters to abort the mission and return to Cyprus. Even though there was by that time no direct evidence of any Hezbollah intention to attack the aircraft, the possibility that the faction had the missiles was sufficient cause to turn the helicopters around. As soon as USAREUR received word of the threat, Brig. Gen. B. B. Bell, the deputy chief of staff, operations, ordered the flight detachment to fly no further missions until the entire situation had been evaluated.²⁷ Both USAREUR and European Command had previously suspended operations because of threats, and the warning in January 1998 was not unique. In every case, higher command adopted the policy that it would allow the aircrew to run no avoidable risks.²⁸

The normal mission was considered routine but nonetheless exciting by many of the aircrews. CWO Michael Ferguson, who flew from Cyprus on three rotations between 1988 and 1990, remarked that

... it was my first assignment after flight school and it was an experience. Coming right off the street, right out of flight school, where everything is so very, very sterile and extremely controlled. The very first time I went to Beirut, the senior warrant officer in our company, an old CW4, was the pilot—he had like 45 Air Medals from Vietnam. We were going into Beirut, flying fifty feet above the water, and there was

smoke everywhere across the city, and you could see buildings all blown up, and a building on fire, here and there. Screaming in! Our sliding armor was forward, and I had my "chicken plate" over my nose. This guy was flying *so* fast, and *so* low . . . my eyes were *this* big, looking out at burned out buildings. It was amazing for a new guy like myself . . . it was one of those religious experiences.²⁹

Still, Ferguson never reported being deliberately fired upon, commenting that the closest he came to hostile fire was when someone was firing artillery at the Beirut-Cyprus ferry, and they happened to be in the way. The flight detachment reported no instances of being taken under fire. Aside from the several times the embassy was evacuated and reinstated, probably the most interesting missions were flown just as Operation DESERT SHIELD began in Southwest Asia. Ferguson reported that his detachment was used in an experiment to determine whether helicopters could self-deploy from Europe to the Middle East. His aircraft, being equipped with long-range navigation equipment and search and rescue equipment, escorted a medical evacuation helicopter unit from Brindisi, Italy, past the Greek islands, across the eastern Mediterranean, and into Egypt.³⁰

Normal operational risks naturally could not be avoided when the flight detachment programmed an average 1,400 flying hours per year, many of those hours at night.³¹ In fiscal year 1992, for example, the detachment flew a total of 1,181.6 hours, of which 658.8 were under night-vision goggles.³² Between 1984 and the start of 1996 the detachment flew more than 1,280 missions in all. In 1995 statistics caught up with the flight detachment. On 15 August a pair of UH-60s left Akrotiri en route to Larnaca International Airport to fly a mission to Beirut. The helicopters took off at 2116, with pilots using night-vision goggles and flying at 500 feet above the ocean. Just before 2129, the pilot of one aircraft noticed a flash on the engine of the other. Almost immediately, the damaged aircraft struck the water in a dive at an estimated 140 knots, striking nose high and inverted and sinking immediately, killing the entire crew.

After the fact, accident investigators assessed two causes of the crash. The first was engine failure, and specifically the failure of a gas generator rotor blade. The UH-60 was capable of flying on one engine, however, if speed were reduced. Pilot error was assessed as the second cause of the accident, since post crash investigation showed that the pilots failed to reduce speed, accidentally went to full power on the damaged engine, and shut down the good engine.³³ Correcting an identified engine design defect was part of the solution; additional mission training also played its part. The accident underscored the fact, however, that the Beirut Air Bridge, for all of its air of routine, was an inherently dangerous undertaking.

Pressure to bring the Beirut Air Bridge to a close began to mount in early 1995 when both the V Corps commander and key members of the USAREUR staff evaluated the unreimbursed costs of the operation and concluded that the command could not sustain them. The Department of State had never budged from its 1988 funding agreement of \$1.7 million a year, and occasion-

ally paid less, despite periodic requests to increase the allowance. Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, the V Corps commander in 1995, brought the issue to a head when he tabulated the cumulative costs to his organization over four fiscal years. "The Department of State," he wrote, "should be required to reimburse the Department of Defense for the full cost of mission performance or consider converting the mission to a contract operation." Expensive upgrades of UH-60 aircraft in Germany to meet mission standards for training remained uncompensated. Funding shortfalls, "projected to be \$6.52 million in FY95, cannot continue unaddressed," Rutherford concluded.³⁴

USAREUR seconded the recommendation to European Command, which asked the Department of Defense to help obtain State Department approval for a revision to the funding memorandum that European Command proposed on 15 May to raise the annual reimbursement to \$4.2 million. The State Department was noncommittal about an increase for fiscal year 1996, and the Defense Department promised to try for an increase for the succeeding fiscal year, though defense officials professed no optimism.³⁵ Shortfalls in funding remained an issue throughout 1997 and were a matter of concern particularly at a time when USAREUR was working hard for the funding to cover its normal operational costs.³⁶

Money problems constituted only one of a number of reasons that USAREUR wanted to halt embassy flight operations, however. General Bell enumerated several more practical reasons after he visited Cyprus to evaluate the operation. Although the detachment had absorbed the lessons of the 1995 crash, he emphasized that the Beirut Air Bridge was a high risk mission involving more than 240 day and night over-water missions and training sorties each year. Consequently, he wrote, "USAREUR must push for DoD and inter-agency measure to contract or terminate it as soon as possible."³⁷

He cited other reasons as well, including the fact that there was no status of forces agreement in effect with Cyprus, presenting some legal hazards for the Americans stationed there. Security was also an issue. Although in the thirteen years of missions no attack on any of the aircraft had ever taken place, Bell was uncomfortable with the fact that both friendly naval vessels and Lebanese air defense units knew details of each embassy flight mission, without giving assurances that the air defense would be in "weapons tight" while American aircraft were in range. Bell felt a positive response from the air defense was a necessary part of the pre-mission checklist, because "it is not beyond the realm of possibility to have a repeat of the shoot down in Northern Iraq."³⁸ In fact, he wrote, he was "more worried about the threat of a friendly shoot down than a terrorist act."

While search and rescue had performed well in the case of the 1995 crash, he noted that European Command had made very little investment in that task, being content to leave search and rescue in the hands of the Royal Air Force. The RAF 84th Search and Rescue Squadron was highly proficient, but its aircraft did not have the range to search the radius of action of a UH-60. Finally, he pointed to a certain amount of complacency on the part of the flight detachment, in that

deception missions were not run so as actually to emulate real missions, and particularly that the flight detachment had fallen into a pattern of using particular mission times during both day and night cycles that could be exploited by a terrorist organization. He noted that the detachment commander was working to correct that flaw, but that was only one of many worries. Bell concluded his report to the CINCUSAREUR by saying that "we have assumed a high level of risk for too many years."³⁹

Fortunately for V Corps, growing concerns about the risks inherent in the mission coincided with an improving political and security situation in Lebanon in 1997 that encouraged further discussions between the Department of State and the Department of Defense about terminating the Beirut Air Bridge. European Command hosted an interagency conference in October 1997 to discuss what the various parties were referring to as the "BAB endstate," in which the American Embassy in Beirut would have obtained a nonmilitary, secure means of transportation that fully supported the ambassador's administrative and logistical requirements.⁴⁰ Within months the embassy had selected a commercial aviation company to provide helicopter transportation to and from Cyprus, and the Department of Defense began planning a hand-over date. On 24 April 1998 the State Department informed J5 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs had approved replacement of the Beirut Air Bridge with a commercially contracted helicopter service to begin on 26 June. Accordingly, acting on joint staff instructions in April, European Command ordered the Army to begin planning to shut down the embassy flight detachment.⁴¹

USAREUR directed V Corps to end the operation not earlier than 15 June 1998, nor later than 30 July, and to complete redeployment of soldiers, aircraft, and equipment not more than fifteen days after receiving the execution order.⁴² Reacting to embassy concerns that the civilian contractor would not be ready to assume the mission on those time lines, the Department of Defense instructed USAREUR to allow some flexibility in the mission transfer.⁴³ The 12th Aviation Brigade immediately planned the redeployment and coordinated transportation requirements with the Air Force and commercial shippers. The flight detachment flew its aircraft back to Germany, while the remainder of the equipment was shipped by commercial contract. The soldiers returned by air. The 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, conducted a transfer of authority with the civilian company on 13 July 1998. The detachment sent two of its aircraft back to Germany two days later, as well as shipping some of its equipment. The remainder stayed until the detachment was formally relieved of the mission on 24 July, ending a thirteen-year stint.⁴⁴

The Beirut Air Bridge was not in itself an all-consuming mission, although it did occupy the undivided attention of the one UH-60 company that maintained a platoon there, kept one platoon in a process of preparing for the mission, and a third platoon in a process of recovering from the task. However, the 12th Aviation Brigade for much of the period also dedicated Company C, 6th Battalion, 159th Aviation, to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq and

a platoon rotation from Company A, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, to support NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land). Thus the total commitment of general aviation units to standing missions amounted essentially to one battalion, thereby significantly decreasing the airlift available to V Corps for all other administrative and tactical tasks.⁴⁵ The long stationing of the aviation detachment in Cyprus illustrated how a very small unit, employed on a very sensitive mission, could consume inordinate amounts of attention from all echelons of the chain of command, and further illustrated the diversity of nonmilitary tasks that fell to the Army in Europe after the end of the Cold War.

Austrian Avalanche Support

The Victory Corps' excursions into disaster relief included emergencies within Europe, as occurred in the winter of 1999, which saw the heaviest European snowfall in half a century. In the late afternoon of 22 February an avalanche described as one of the largest in decades engulfed the Austrian village of Galtür, forty kilometers southwest of Innsbruck, and blocked all the roads to the site of the disaster. As snow continued to fall, initial indications were that several people had been killed, more than fifty were missing, and about twelve thousand were trapped in Galtür and nearby villages. In a matter of hours the Austrian government asked Switzerland, Germany, and the United States to help airlift the stranded vacationers from the avalanche area.⁴⁶

European Command passed the mission to USAREUR, which responded to the Austrian minister of the interior's request at 0130 in the morning of 23 February by tasking V Corps to provide a relief package, which the corps constituted out of the 12th Aviation Brigade.⁴⁷ Literally a minute later, the corps command center alerted the 12th Aviation Brigade, which began an abbreviated planning process. Unfortunately, detailed planning guidance about the number of passengers and the amount of cargo to be moved, or about the probable mission duration, was unavailable. The lack of information made it difficult to determine what size task force to assemble. Working on the basis of telephonic and e-mail guidance, the brigade finally alerted an aviation task force of sixty-five soldiers, seven UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopters from the 5-158 Aviation, and three UH-60 Blackhawk aerial ambulances from the 30th Medical Brigade, all under command of Lt. Col. Mark McKearn, commander of the 5-158 Aviation.

After the task force was readied, there was a brief delay because USAREUR had not yet received the European Command execution order authorizing its movement. Finally, the V Corps commander decided to authorize its dispatch without the execute order in hand. As events turned out, some questions raised at the European Command morning staff shift change on 24 February delayed issuing the order, which was finally released at 1133 that day, but did not reach the 12th Aviation Brigade by telefax until 1333. By that time all three movement serials had already left home station. Shortly thereafter, the USAREUR execute order reached V Corps and 12th Aviation Brigade, directing the corps to be the executive agent for USAREUR and detailing the mission:

When directed, CG, USAREUR and 7th Army provides, as required, aircraft support with C2, MEDEVAC, BASOPS/common logistics support and force protection for assigned/OPCON USAREUR elements in support of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior's request for rescue lift assets.⁴⁸

USAREUR also directed V Corps to expect a mission duration of less than thirty days and to use 1000Z on 24 February as D-Day/H-Hour.

The three task force packages therefore left Germany starting at 1100 on 24 February. The first, consisting of three helicopters and the three aerial ambulances, arrived at Innsbruck in the mid-afternoon of 24 February. The second, with four more helicopters, remained overnight at the Marshall Center at Garmish because of poor flying weather. The ground support package left Giebelstadt mid-afternoon on 24 February to drive to Innsbruck. While the task force was deploying, a second avalanche occurred at the village of Valzur, five kilometers east of Galtür, increasing everyone's sense of urgency.

Six of the aircraft were available on 24 February to commence relief operations, while the remainder arrived the following morning. The task force commander based his operations on what he had learned the preceding evening in a meeting with the Austrian minister of the interior. The task force ground support elements arrived in the evening of 24 February. Colonel McKearn positioned the necessary administrative and maintenance support areas at Landeck, near Innsbruck. Initially, he planned to have the task force function for about a week, and he developed a recovery and logistical network between Giebelstadt and Innsbruck.⁴⁹ The Austrian Army provided billeting for the soldiers in Innsbruck.

Operations began on 25 February, when the task force instructor pilots left Innsbruck at 0830, led by a German UH-1 helicopter for an orientation tour of the area. The instructor pilots then briefed the other crews and the task force placed liaison teams at all the landing zones, with the task force commander stationing himself at Galtür. Nine helicopters flew throughout the day to shuttle the civilians out of the avalanche area, including the villages of Galtür, Valzur, and Ischgl, and the supporting personnel performed scheduled inspections and maintenance on the aircraft through the night. In case heavy lift turned out to be needed, the 12th Aviation Brigade made two CH-47 helicopters ready at Giebelstadt, as well as additional logistical support for the task force.⁵⁰

The task force used a landing zone on a section of Autobahn that the Austrian government had closed near the town of Imst, some fifty kilometers west of Innsbruck. The flying time between the landing zone and the affected villages was about twenty minutes. Aircraft flew in pairs, each aircraft evacuating between eight and twelve people per mission. The flying weather was much improved since 24 February, but the risk assessment noted that the aircraft were operating over rugged, high altitude terrain, with numerous power lines and ski lift cables throughout the area. The helicopters all had extended range fuel systems that allowed five hours of flying time without refueling, and two of the medical evacuation aircraft were stripped down to make more seating available.

The mission continued over the next two days, with the helicopters flying in groups of five to facilitate refueling and a normal mission day of eight o'clock in

the morning through sunset. Through the end of the day on 26 February, the task force had carried a total of 3,109 passengers away from the area of Galtür, with 1,832 carried during a single flying day.⁵¹ The mission ended late on 26 February, and European Command directed the task force to redeploy to Germany on 27 February. By the middle of the afternoon on 28 February all of the aircraft and the ground support element had returned to home stations in Germany. The entire mission involved a total of 211 flying hours on 186 missions.

Task Force Apache

The corps did not carry out every aviation mission that came its way. Whether a mission was executed or not, however, it remained a cost that had to be paid in terms of staff attention and energy and soldier time and energy in the unit assigned the task. One of the many such "spin drills" the staff worked through was the possibility of deploying an attack helicopter task force to Macedonia, and specifically to Skopje, in the fall of 1999. USAREUR issued a planning order at the end of September based on directives from European Command, giving the corps the mission rapidly to deploy to Camp Able Sentry an Apache task force prepared to conduct potential close combat operations in support of either Kosovo Force (KFOR) or Task Force Falcon.⁵² The task force was to be in place at Skopje not later than 8 October 1999, according to the original mission concept.⁵³ The corps immediately transmitted a mission order to the 1st Infantry Division to prepare a task force from its 4th (Aviation) Brigade and deploy it on order from Central Region to the Multi-National Brigade (East) area of operation in support of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN and KFOR or Task Force Falcon, depending upon the situation when the aircraft arrived in Macedonia.⁵⁴

The deployment concept called for Task Force 1-1 Aviation to self-deploy from Katterbach to Petrovec Airfield at Camp Able Sentry in Skopje, Macedonia. The Apaches would, depending upon weather and diplomatic clearances, follow one of two routes. The primary one was from Katterbach across Austria and northern Italy via the Brenner Pass to Vicenza, down Italy east of the Apennines to Falconara, to the heel at Brindisi, and across the Adriatic. The alternate route was into eastern France at Amberleau and south via Le Connet to the Riviera, into northern Italy, and by one of two possible routes from Pisa, one east and one west of the Apennines, then across the Adriatic. Meanwhile, the aviation support package was to move to the deployment processing center in Kaiserslautern and then to Ramstein Air Force Base, where it would be sent to Macedonia by means of strategic airlift some seventy-two hours later. The total airlift requirement amounted to eleven C-130s, of which one was for passengers and ten were for cargo, or two C-17 and one C-130 missions. The support package included not only maintenance units and the requisite equipment and repair parts from Company C, 501st Aviation, but also a medical package from the 236th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) and a battalion tactical command post. Subsequent buildup of forces, if called for, were allowed for in

a follow-on flow of forces in four force packages over a number of days, constituting a total airlift requirement of thirty-two aircraft.⁵⁵

The initial force package was planned to be austere and had the capability only of demonstrating a show of force or "force presence" and conducting aerial reconnaissance. The battalion command post was only a tactical headquarters that had no planning or sustainment capability. The task force had no unit or intermediate aviation maintenance support and had to rely on Camp Bondsteel for maintenance of its eight Apaches. No unit ground vehicles were to accompany the task force. With additional force package arrival, the task force added the capability of armed reconnaissance and security missions, a hasty attack with armored or cavalry units, and the ability to constitute a company-size reserve. It could carry out one battalion attack or three company-size attacks, operating one separate company for twenty-four to thirty-six hours. To support that, Camp Able Sentry had twenty-five aircraft combat loads of ammunition on hand. With further enhancement, the task force headquarters could be expanded for aviation planning and liaison. Arrival of additional maintenance in a third force package would increase the task force sustainment capability. Ammunition supply would then become an imperative, however, demanding further airlift if operations exceeded one battalion-level attack.

Decision on whether or not to issue an operation order had to be made on 30 September; the call-forward decision point for additional force packages loomed on 3 October.⁵⁶ Six days later, the corps and 1st Infantry Division were still hard at work on the plans, but the mission was on hold. The aircraft had originally been intended to depart from Germany on 2 October. Bad weather and what the corps staff assumed to be political uncertainties prevented the Apaches from launching on that date, and USAREUR had already cautiously put the mission on a 48-hour hold. Staffs and crews had to remain close to home station and ready to go, in case the order should suddenly be given.⁵⁷ In the intervening period, the mission had undergone some evolution as well. European Command asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve the deployment of 16 Apaches, 4 supporting Blackhawks, and 2 aerial ambulances to Macedonia for a period of seven days. Once there, the task force would reorganize for follow-on operations in support of Task Force Falcon or the commander of the Kosovo Force.⁵⁸

However, when European Command issued its orders to USAREUR, it specified that the task force was to exercise procedures to reinforce KFOR and Task Force Falcon, conduct a familiarization with the area of operations, and demonstrate a credible deterrent capability within USAREUR.⁵⁹ The corps and 1st Infantry Division missions remained unchanged, but V Corps asked USAREUR to remove from its directive the clause stating that "if necessary these elements must be capable of transitioning to a force capable of conducting potential close combat ops ISO [in support of] either KFOR or TF Falcon." Considering the very limited maintenance support and command and control that would be available in Macedonia for the task force, not to mention the extremely limited supplies of ammunition, the V Corps battle staff reasoned that the combat role

was beyond task force capabilities, given that the mission was intended merely as a demonstration of force.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, the staff continued to work on all the issues involved in the deployment, a planning process that grew in magnitude as time went on. As far as the staff could determine, it was still certain that the task force would deploy. The only question was when. The 1st Infantry Division's 4th Brigade remained busy, elaborating the design of the force packages to follow the initial Apache deployment and developing complete load plans for strategic airlift for each of three possible mission options: a simple force demonstration package, a light operations package, and a full combat operations package. (Table 8) The brigade assumed the mission of dispatching what everyone understood was the theater attack helicopter reserve from Katterbach to Task Force Falcon or KFOR within ninety-six hours of notification. The 1st Infantry Division cautioned that, when considering the three options, V Corps should remember that the task force would have no capacity for deep operations. Cross-border capabilities were greatly reduced without the planning and targeting resources of a deep operations coordination cell, and particularly without the availability of rocket artillery to fire suppression of enemy air defense missions.⁶¹

Working together, the brigade staff and V Corps G-3 Aviation staff went on to consider what would happen if, as had happened in the past, a presumably short mission turned into a long-term requirement. In that case, some rotation of attack helicopter units would be necessary. There were four AH-64 battalions in V Corps: one in each of the divisions and two in the 11th Aviation Brigade. Putting together a force package that was fully trained and equipped and qualified for night operations was a large task that would entail the complete attention of the battalion that had the tasking. If the mission were scheduled on a thirty-day basis, that would mean that a second battalion would have to begin deliberate preparations at least two weeks before deployment, and at least forty-eight hours would be required for mission hand-off and area orientation once the relieving task force arrived in Macedonia. In fact, something more like three weeks would be needed for gunnery, and that assumed good flying weather. Worse yet, the 4th Brigade staff was certain that any battalion that assumed the mission would need to have its aircrews augmented by the other battalions, since the corps had a persistent aviator manning shortfall. Consequently, the corps had to figure that fully half of USAREUR's attack helicopters would be committed at any one time. Devising a monthly rotation plan would clearly not be an easy process.

Descending from the general to the particular, the 4th Brigade also needed to know how soon 1-1 Aviation would be released from the Task Force Apache mission, since it was scheduled to go to Kosovo with the 1st Infantry Division brigade that was next in the KFOR rotation series. That deployment would begin with rail loading on or about 1 November, and the battalion would have to be reconfigured from air load packages to rail load packages before that time. More to the point was the problem of aircrew qualification. The 48-hour alert and, later, 96-hour alert had seriously interrupted battalion training, which had

TABLE 8—4TH (AVIATION) BRIGADE TASK ORGANIZATION FOR TASK FORCE APACHE OPTIONS

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Force Package</i>
Option 1: Demonstration of Force	Battalion tactical command post 16 AH-64 Apache helicopters 4 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters 2 UH-60V Medical Evacuation helicopters
Option 2: Light Operations	Forces in Option 1 Remainder of AH-64 Battalion
Option 3: Full Operations	Forces in Option 1 and Option 2 Aviation Brigade headquarters Divisional Aviation Support Battalion

quickly fallen two weeks behind schedule, particularly in night-vision goggle training and mountain flying. Collective training had come to a complete halt in 1-1 Aviation, and only selective individual training had continued through the alert period. Expected inclement weather in October and November would impede make-up training.⁶²

The corps G-3 Plans staff, working with the two divisions and the 11th Aviation Regiment, tried hard to figure out a feasible force rotation scheme, and units remained at least nominally detailed for the mission for some months. Finally, however, the Task Force Apache mission simply faded away, ceasing to be mentioned by European Command and receiving less and less mention in the V Corps daily update briefings. By the end of October the corps staff decided that the mission would probably not be executed, particularly in view of the staff weather officer's warning that conditions along the deployment route would certainly result in mission delays, typically from seven to ten days, starting by mid-November.⁶³ At that time the staff simply put the whole package of planning on the shelf and continued with other tasks.

None of the three aviation missions—two of which were actually carried out—appeared at first to involve a particularly large slice of the corps' strength. In fact, however, those missions had much in common with the Task Force Able Sentry rotations, which turned out to encumber the equivalent strength of a maneuver brigade on a standing basis. In every case, crew rotations, aircraft maintenance, the support requirement for deployed aviation units, the lower manning priority accorded European-based units, and the scarcity of certain key skills after the European drawdown combined to produce a much larger force structure requirement. From the perspective of the units involved, from company through corps staff, planning each of the missions also demanded a

great amount of energy and time. Moreover, as the case of Task Force Apache showed, there was no difference, in terms of application of staff talent and time, between a mission that never was carried out and the several missions that were.

NOTES

¹ 12th Aviation Brigade, Beirut Air Bridge Briefing, Summer 1990.

² Eagle Flight Detachment, 3d Infantry Division, Briefing, ca. 1991. Interv, author with CWO3 Michael W. Ferguson, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion, *re* Assignment to Beirut Air Bridge, Company C, 6th Battalion, 159th Aviation, 8 Dec 2000, Wiesbaden Army Airfield, Germany.

³ 12th Aviation Group OPLAN 1-86, 241200 Feb 1986. Operations were based on USAREUR OPORD 4373 of 1984, updated in draft in 1990 and formally on 15 Jan 1995 as USAREUR OPORD 4373-94.

⁴ USAREUR OPORD 4373-94 (Draft), 5 Aug 1994; 5-158th Aviation Regiment Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) Eagle Flight Information Briefing, January 1995; V Corps CG OPORD Brief, Beirut Air Bridge, 28 Feb 1995.

⁵ CINCUSAREUR Briefing, Beirut Air Bridge Original Mission, 12 Jan 1986; CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4287-86, 12 Jan 1986.

⁶ USEUCOM ECJ33 Information Paper, Beirut Air Bridge, 16 Apr 1996.

⁷ CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4287-86, 12 Jan 1986, assigned the mission to V Corps; subsequently confirmed as a V Corps mission in revisions and updates of that order. See V Corps CG OPORD Brief, Beirut Air Bridge, 28 Feb 1995, *re* USAREUR OPLAN 4373-94.

⁸ Before the Persian Gulf War, the two corps in Germany each had what was designated a combat aviation brigade, a composite unit composed of UH-60 Blackhawk, CH-47D Chinook, OH-58 Kiowa, and AH-64 Apache helicopter companies that fulfilled the general aviation, heavy lift, scouting, and attack missions for the corps. Company C/5-158th Aviation was the UH-60 company in the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade of V Corps, while C/6-159 was its mirror image in the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade of VII Corps. After the Persian Gulf War, both brigades came under V Corps command and were restructured so that the 11th Aviation Brigade became the attack aviation unit, while all general aviation units were placed in the 12th Aviation Brigade. Therefore the general aviation company from the 11th Brigade was assigned to the 12th Brigade and put under the 5-158 headquarters, producing an odd battalion organization that included companies of three aviation regiments. The companies were much later realigned as organic units of 5-158 Aviation.

⁹ Until the organization was regularized late in the decade, the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, was the battalion headquarters that commanded companies of the 6-159 Aviation, as well as its organic companies, and that had responsibility to assign one company each to the full-time mission for operations in northern Iraq and in Cyprus.

¹⁰ Eagle Detachment Commander's Brief, January 1994.

¹¹ For discussion of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, refer to Chapter 6.

¹² Memo, Cdr, 12th Aviation Brigade for CG, V Corps, 2 Mar 1994, sub: External Support Requirements for Deployments.

¹³ Msg, Cdr, V Corps for Cdr, 1AD and Cdr, 3ID, 111800Z Oct 1995, sub: Mission Order 9601, Personnel Augmentation to 12AB in Support of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) and Beirut Air Bridge (BAB), directed the divisions to provide crews and set a rotation schedule. For the continuing mission and rebuttals from the divisions, see V Corps ACofS, G-3 Operations Tasking Files, 1994-95. Company H, 3d Aviation Regiment, 4th (Aviation) Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, augmented the BAB detachment.

¹⁴ Memo, 12th Aviation Brigade to Commander, 5-158th Aviation Regiment, 9 Aug 1994, sub: Status of Unit's Letter Request for BAB TDA and OPC TDA; MFR, AETV-ABD-RM (V Resource Management), 9 Aug 1994.

¹⁵ Memo, Cdr, 12th AB for Cdr, V Corps, 7 Apr 1995, sub: Request for Additional UH-60 Pilot (153DO) Officer Distribution Plan (OD) Supported Positions.

¹⁶ Memo, G-3, V Corps, for Cdr, 12th Aviation Brigade, 1 May 1995, sub: Request for Additional UH-60 Pilot (153DO) Officer Distribution Plan (OD) Supported Positions.

¹⁷ Memo, Cdr, 12th Aviation Brigade, for Cdr, V Corps, 5 May 1995, sub: Request for Additional UH-60 Pilot Officer Distribution Plan (ODP) Supported Positions.

¹⁸ USAREUR Regulation 350-1, 1994, with changes and subsequent revisions; V Corps CG OPOD Brief, Beirut Air Bridge, 28 Feb 1995; CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4373-94. All aircrews were required to have not less than twenty days of night-vision goggles operations capability before required recertification upon arrival in Cyprus.

¹⁹ Ferguson interview.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Eagle Detachment Commander's Brief, January 1994; 5-158th Aviation Regiment Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) Eagle Flight Information Briefing, January 1995; USAREUR OPOD 4373-94 (Draft), 5 Aug 1994.

²² Memo, Cdr, 12th AB, for Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 18 Aug 1994, sub: Augmentation of Table of Distribution and Allowances. The equipment was for C/6-159 (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT) C/7-158 (BAB). On the memorandum is the handwritten note "Approved. Kievenaar. 8 Sep 94."

²³ SA-7 was a Soviet-designed, man-portable air defense missile, which NATO designated the Grail and which the Soviets designated the 9M32 Strela 2. It was introduced in 1966 for use in tactical units and was widely proliferated after that, manufactured in China and Egypt, among other nations. It had an infrared seeker with a 1.8 kilogram high explosive warhead that was generally lethal to helicopters. It had a low speed and relatively short range and an engagement envelope of 150 to 3,000 meters altitude and at ranges out to 2.3 miles.

²⁴ 12th Aviation Brigade, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) Embassy Flight Information Briefing, 1 Jul 1996; 12th Aviation Brigade BAB Mini Conference, February 1997. Also see Ferguson interview.

²⁵ The issue was discussed at virtually every USEUCOM Beirut Air Bridge conference, as well as in briefings and orders. See, among others, CINCUSAREUR Briefing, Beirut Air Bridge Original Mission, 12 Jan 1986; CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4287-86, 12 Jan 1986; and U.S. European Command Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) Conference, 6-7 May 1997.

²⁶ Msg, USDAO Beirut to SCSTATE, 101351Z Jan 1998, sub: Hizballah SAM-7 Team Alleged to be Organizing for an Attack on the Beirut Air Bridge.

²⁷ E-mail, Maj. Gen. B.B. Bell to Cdr, 12th Aviation Brigade, 10 Jan 1998, sub: BAB Flight Abort; Msg, CGUSAREUR to Cdr, V Corps, 101319Z Jan 1998, sub: Suspension of Beirut Air Bridge Operations.

²⁸ In September 1989 President Bush directed the Beirut Embassy evacuated, and missions halted until November 1990. In January 1991 the start of the Persian Gulf War prompted another evacuation of the embassy, which was not reestablished until April 1991.

See USEUCOM ECJ33 Information Paper, Beirut Air Bridge, 16 Apr 1996. Mission aborts in the first half of 1997 were evaluated at length in United States European Command Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) Conference, 6–7 May 1997. Embassy Flight Detachment (BAB) Mission Status Briefing, 20 Jun 1997, details a mission suspension on 21 November 1997 for similar causes, with operations commencing again on 25 November 1997, as outlined by Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 1 Dec 1997, sub: Resumption of Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) Operations; Memo, Brig. Gen. B. B. Bell for Commanding General, USAREUR, 28 Nov 1997, sub: Beirut Air Bridge Force Protection Assessment.

²⁹ Ferguson interview, emphasis in the original.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, BAB and OPC In-Progress Review, 19 May 1993.

³² Eagle Detachment Commander's Brief, January 1994.

³³ Extensive discussion of the crash is in United States European Command FY96 Beirut Air Bridge Conference, 22–25 April 1996; and Memo, 12th Aviation Brigade for Cdr, V Corps, 1 May 1996, sub: Synopsis of the EUCOM BAB Conference (22–25 April 1996); Memo, Maj. Gen. Walter H. Yates, Deputy Corps Commander, for Commanding General, V Corps, 29 Aug 1995, sub: Trip Report on Activities Relating to Loss of Embassy flight UH–60–16 to 29 August 1995; Memo, Cdr, 5–158 Aviation for Cdr, 12th Aviation Brigade, 17 Aug 1995, sub: Proposed Program In Order to Resume the BAB Mission. Also see Interv, author with Maj. Gen. Walter H. Yates, Jr., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 5 Sep 1995, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

³⁴ Memo, CG, V Corps, for CINCUSAREUR, 21 Mar 1995, sub: Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) Reimbursement Shortfall.

³⁵ USEUCOM ECJ33 Information Paper, Beirut Air Bridge, 16 Apr 1996.

³⁶ 12th Aviation Brigade BAB Mini Conference, February 1997.

³⁷ Memo, Brig. Gen. B. B. Bell, USAREUR DCSOPS, for CINCUSAREUR, 27 Jun 1997, sub: Brigadier General Bell's Assessment Visit to the Beirut Air Bridge (BAB).

³⁸ Ibid. Two Blackhawks of the 12th Aviation Brigade were accidentally shot down by a U.S. Air Force F–15 fighter aircraft on 14 April 1994 while engaged in operations in northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish population (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT). The aircraft were transporting Turkish and U.S. co-commanders of the Military Coordination Center, a component of the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Combined Task Force, and other staff officers scheduled to meet with UN representatives and officials of the Kurdish Democratic Party. The helicopters were en route from MCC (Forward) headquarters in Zakhu to Irbil and Salah ad Din, Iraq, when shot down by the F–15C fighter patrolling the no-fly zone. All twenty-six occupants of the two aircraft were killed. V Corps History Office file, Class A Aircraft Accidents and Losses, 1988–2002.

³⁹ Memo, Brig. Gen. B. B. Bell for CINCUSAREUR, 27 Jun 1997, sub: Bell's Assessment Visit to the BAB.

⁴⁰ HQ, USEUCOM, Beirut Air Bridge BAB Interagency Conference, 23 Oct 1997.

⁴¹ Msg, USCINCEUR to multiple addressees, 061133Z Apr 1998, sub: Beirut Air Bridge Redeployment Planning.

⁴² Msg, CDRUSAREUR ODCSOPS for multiple addressees, 980412Z, 061811Z May 1998, sub: Beirut Air Bridge Redeployment Planning Order.

⁴³ Msg, American Embassy Nicosia to Sec of State, 071410Z May 1998, sub: DOD Commitment to Carry out BAB Mission; Joint Staff Msg, 151557Z May 1998, sub: Beirut Air Bridge Transition.

⁴⁴ HQ, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, Movement Order 98–01, 091700Z Apr 1998; 5–158th

Aviation Regiment, BAB Redeployment Movement Order Brief, April 1998; Memo, XO, 5-158 Aviation, for Cdr, 12th Aviation Brigade, 1 May 1998, sub: Trip Report—Beirut Air Bridge (BAB) Drawdown Site Visit, 27-30 Apr 1998; Msg, DCSOPS, 251016Z Feb 1998; V Corps Warning Order 098-047, 271200Z May 1998; E-mail, Maj. Donald L. Hackle to Cpt. David King, USAREUR ODCSOPS, 2 Jul 1998, sub: Beirut Air Bridge Transition Update; Msg, CJCS for multiple addressees, 061630Z Jul 1998, sub: Termination of DOD Support to Beirut Air Bridge; HQ, 12th Aviation Brigade, FRAGO 001 to OPOD 96-96-01 (BAB Embassy Flight Detachment Redeployment), April 1998.

⁴⁵ 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, External Deployments IPR, 3 Mar 1994; V Corps ACOFS, G-3, Operations, Action Officer files—Deployments, 1992-98.

⁴⁶ Except as otherwise cited, discussion of the Austrian Avalanche mission is based on [USAREUR Lessons Learned Office], Austrian Avalanche Relief Operation 24-28 February 1999 After Action Report, April 1999.

⁴⁷ Msg, USAREUR for V Corps, 99007 22 Feb 1999, sub: Austrian Avalanche Relief.

⁴⁸ Cited in USAREUR Austrian Avalanche Relief Operation AAR.

⁴⁹ HQ, 12th Aviation Brigade OPOD 99-02-02 (Austrian Avalanche Relief); Closure Report, TF 5-158 Aviation, 241600Z Feb 1999.

⁵⁰ TF 5-158 Aviation Austrian Avalanche Support SITREP #1 for Period 251600Z Feb 1999 through 261600Z Feb 1999, 251521Z Feb 1999.

⁵¹ TF 5-158 Aviation Austrian Avalanche Support SITREP #2 for Period 261600Z Feb 1999 through 271600Z Feb 1999, 261600Z Feb 1999.

⁵² For discussion of the mission in Kosovo, see Chapters 15 and 16.

⁵³ Msg, USCINCEUR to USAREUR, 251641A Sep 1999, sub: Planning Order; Msg, USCINCEUR to USAREUR, 27 Sep 1999, sub: Combined WARNO and Deployment Preparation Order; Msg, USCINCEUR to USAREUR, 25 Sep 1999, sub: Bullets from CINC's JWICS VTC; Msg, USAREUR to USEUCOM, 281000A Sep 1999, sub: Deployment Timelines for KFOR Reinforcement Exercise.

⁵⁴ Msg, V Corps to multiple addressees, 252230Z Sep 1999, sub: V Corps Planning Order for Apache Task Force Deployment; Msg, V Corps to multiple addressees, 261630A Sep 1999, sub: FRAGO 01 to V Corps Planning Order for Apache Task Force Deployment; Msg, V Corps to multiple addressees, 26 Sep 1999, sub: V Corps Readiness Status of AH-64s and Crews; Msg, V Corps to multiple addressees, 292059Z Sep 1999, sub: V Corps Operations Order 99-09-D4 Task Force Apache; Msg, V Corps to USAREUR ODCSOPS, 26 Sep 1999, sub: Required Support for V Corps Mission Planning; Msg, Corps G-2 to multiple addressees, 27 Sep 1999, sub: Threat and Counter-Intelligence Assessments for Areas of Operation.

⁵⁵ V Corps Command Center Update Briefing, 011300(L) Oct 1999.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 271735Z Sep 1999, sub: EUCOM PLANORD; Msg, USAREUR for multiple addressees, 271500Z Sep 1999, sub: USAREUR PLANORD ISO CONPLAN and Exercises; Msg, USAREUR for V Corps, 041830Z Oct 1999, sub: USAREUR FRAGO 001 to PLANORD ISO CINCEUR CONPLANS and Exercises (Montenegro); Msg, USAREUR for V Corps, 260749Z Sep 1999, sub: EDRO of one LT INF CO to MNB(E); Msg, USAREUR for USEUCOM, 281000A Sep 1999, sub: Deployment Timelines for KFOR Reinforcement Exercise; Msg, USAREUR for multiple addressees, 011112Z Oct 1999, sub: USAREUR Nomination for JFLEC ISO Montenegro Ops; Msg, V Corps for multiple addressees, 252230Z Sep 1999, sub: V Corps Planning Order for Apache Task Force Deployment; Msg, USAREUR for multiple addressees, 261630A Sep 1999, sub: FRAGO 01 to V Corps Planning Order for Apache Task Force Deployment; Msg, V Corps for multiple addressees, 040700Z Oct 1999, sub: V Corps Tasking #99-389, LNO Support for TF Apache

Deployment.

⁵⁸ Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, DRAFTKPGZ Oct 1999, sub: Request Approval for Deployment of TF Apache to Conduct Operational Exercise ISO KFOR.

⁵⁹ Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, DRAFT35Z [Oct 1999], sub: Combined WARNO and DEPORD Directs USAREUR to prepare to deploy Apache Task Force to CAS.

⁶⁰ V Corps Command Center Update Briefing 07300(L) Oct 1999.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.; and V Corps Command Center Update Briefing 061300(L) Oct 1999.

⁶³ V Corps Command Center Update Briefing 061300(L) Oct 1999.

Air Defense Artillery Deployments

"... our operating environment has fundamentally changed. Now, we have to think in terms of stand-alone units. We have to put people in charge of those units... that are capable of fighting that battery or MEP on their own, with only commander's intent to guide them."

Maj. Harry L. Cohen
Executive Officer, 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
January 2000

"We moved a great tonnage of equipment in less than 48 hours. We never did that before, in the old day..."

1st Sgt. Leander Benjamin
Battery A, 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery
Operation DETERMINED RESOLVE
December 1999

Throughout most of the Cold War, air defense artillery (ADA) battalions in Europe were assigned to one of the artillery groups, later redesignated brigades, of the 32d Army Air Defense Command (AADCOM).¹ With the European drawdown of forces, the Army began to reassign or inactivate 32d AADCOM's brigades, and the Air Defense Command itself was reassigned from USAREUR to Fort Bliss, Texas, where it became a contingency deployment headquarters. Those brigades remaining on active duty were reassigned either to Army major commands or to the Army's active corps headquarters.² The 32d AADCOM had commanded a mix of Nike Hercules high altitude missile battalions, Hawk missile battalions, and Chaparral-Vulcan battalions in an integrated air defense of West Germany. After the end of the Cold War, the missile battalions remaining in Germany were reequipped with the Patriot system, which covered the entire engagement envelope previously defended by Hawk and Nike Hercules units. The mission of the battalions remaining in Germany was no longer just theater air defense, however, but swiftly became twofold. They retained the NATO task of defending central Europe against air attack, but by the end of the Persian Gulf War they also turned their attention to deployments anywhere within United States European Command's area of responsibility.³

As part of that process, the 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade was reassigned from 32d AADCOR to V Corps, where it became a corps air defense artillery brigade charged with providing air defense coverage for heavy mechanized corps operations.⁴ To do that, the brigade had two dissimilar battalions: the 6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery (Patriot), and the 5th Battalion, 2d Air Defense Artillery (Avenger). The Patriot battalion provided high and medium altitude air defense over the corps area, while the Avenger battalion provided low altitude air defense for key communications centers, the corps support command, or other corps critical assets, or else reinforced the divisional air defense artillery battalions. Meanwhile, the 94th Air Defense Artillery Brigade was assigned with its two Patriot missile battalions, the 1st and 5th Battalions, 7th Air Defense Artillery, to USAREUR, where it performed the theater emergency deployment mission. By 1999 reorganizations of the air defense structure in Europe had eliminated the 94th ADA Brigade, inactivated the 69th ADA Brigade's Avenger battalion, and reassigned the 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, to Fort Bliss, Texas. The 69th ADA Brigade was left with two Patriot battalions, and therefore no longer had the doctrinal structure of a corps ADA brigade. The two battalions were the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, located at Hanau and reassigned from the 94th ADA Brigade, and the 6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery, stationed at Ansbach.

The Demand for Patriots

The Patriot missile system itself had become widely known to the public because of its dramatic and considerably touted antimissile engagements during the Persian Gulf War. Although designed to counter manned aircraft, including helicopters, system capabilities early suggested that it could also be used to shoot down tactical ballistic missiles. That threat emerged early in the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein's forces began firing the Al-Hussein missile, a Scud-B variant with a range of around four hundred miles, at Saudi Arabia and Israel. The United States estimated that Iraq possessed around five hundred to one thousand such missiles that could be fired from an estimated thirty-two fixed and thirty-six mobile launchers.

The much-publicized successes of the Patriot missile intercepts of Scuds was somewhat diminished by postwar analyses that argued the kill ratio was far lower than it had appeared to be during the war. The principal explanation had to do with the fact that the PAC II improved Patriot missile was still in development when the war started and the batteries were firing rounds delivered directly from the manufacturer, as well as by the teething troubles of the recent software upgrades that allowed fire to be directed at missiles. The merits of the varying sides of that debate notwithstanding, it was still clear that the Patriot had made successful intercepts of ballistic missiles.⁵ More to the point was the fact that subsequent system improvements greatly enhanced the antitactical ballistic missile capabilities of the Patriot in years after the war.

Army air defense analysts credited the Patriot with contributing to the Persian Gulf War at every level of conflict. At the tactical level, it intercepted Iraqi ballistic missiles. At the operational level, it protected key ports and airfields, contributing to the rapid and smooth buildup of forces in the region. At the strategic level, it had much to do with keeping Israel out of the war. It was that last contribution, with the Patriots dispatched to defend Israel and Saudi Arabia credited with preventing a widening of the war and preserving the coalition against Saddam Hussein, that accounted for the fact that, in a very real sense, the Patriot thereafter rapidly became as much a diplomatic and political tool as a military weapon.⁶ Thus, the real significance of the Patriot after 1991 was its credibility in the eyes of the nations it had defended and the willingness of the United States to extend an antitactical ballistic missile umbrella over Middle Eastern states whenever there seemed to be a possibility that Iraq might launch Scuds at them. The Patriot units assigned to USAREUR consequently began a series of deployments in which the stakes were often higher than the size of the forces employed might have indicated. USAREUR's 94th ADA Brigade and V Corps' 69th ADA Brigade shared the burden with Patriot battalions in the United States for some of those missions, although the short-notice deployments fell entirely to the European-based units.

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

At the end of the Persian Gulf War there was a residual threat that Iraq might again decide to launch Scud missiles at the Gulf states that had taken part in the Allied coalition. To deal with that possibility, the United States government in 1991 directed the Army to send Patriot missile units to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At the time the operation that came to be known as SOUTHERN WATCH began, the Army had fourteen Patriot battalions. One of those was stationed in Korea and was exempted from the projected battalion rotations in Southwest Asia. In the drawdown of forces that followed the end of the war, four more battalions were inactivated, leaving nine in the active force. After the Army's reorganization of Patriot battalions, seven were stationed in the United States and two remained in Germany. The 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, made the first deployment, from September 1991 through February 1992, and was followed by the 2d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery, from February through June 1992.

In June 1992, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH officially began, under the aegis of United States Central Command. Joint Task Force Southwest Asia performed the Operation SOUTHERN WATCH mission of monitoring and controlling airspace south of the 33d parallel in Iraq. The role of the coalition forces—including the armed forces of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Saudi Arabia—taking part in the task force was to monitor compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.⁷ The 2d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery, deployed from the United States to assume the air defense portion of that mission. Thereafter, battalions from the United States and Europe followed each other in rotation in Saudi Arabia. (*Table 9*)

TABLE 9—BATTALIONS ASSIGNED TO OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH, 1992–2000


<i>Unit</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Parent Command</i>	<i>Duration</i>
2d Bn, 43d Air Defense Arty (ADA)	108th ADA	FORSCOM	Feb–Jun 1992
3d Bn, 43d ADA	11th ADA	FORSCOM	Jun–Oct 1992
2d Bn, 43d ADA	108th ADA	FORSCOM	Dec 1993–Apr 1994
3d Bn, 43d ADA	11th ADA	FORSCOM	Apr–Sep 1994
1st Bn, 7th ADA	94th ADA	USAREUR	Feb–Jun 1995
5th Bn, 7th ADA	94th ADA	USAREUR	Feb–Jun 1995
3d Bn, 43d ADA	11th ADA	FORSCOM	Nov 1995–Mar 1996
6th Bn, 52d ADA	69th ADA	USAREUR	Mar–Jul 1996
2d Bn, 1st ADA	35th ADA	FORSCOM	Aug–Dec 1996
2d Bn, 43d ADA	108th ADA	FORSCOM	Jan–Apr 1997
1st Bn, 7th ADA	94th ADA	USAREUR	Apr–Sep 1997
5th Bn, 7th ADA	94th ADA	USAREUR	Apr–Sep 1997
5th Bn, 52d ADA	11th ADA	FORSCOM	Sep 1997–Jan 1998
3d Bn, 43d ADA	11th ADA	FORSCOM	Jan–Jun 1998
1st Bn, 1st ADA	31st ADA	FORSCOM	Jan–Jun 1998
6th Bn, 52d ADA	69th ADA	USAREUR	Jun–Nov 1998
2d Bn, 43d ADA	108th ADA	FORSCOM	Nov 1998–Mar 1999
3d Bn, 2d ADA	31st ADA	FORSCOM	Mar–Aug 1999
3d Bn, 43d ADA	11th ADA	FORSCOM	Aug–Dec 1999
5th Bn, 7th ADA	69th ADA	USAREUR	Dec 1999–May 2000

Until January 1999 the requirement for Patriot units deployed to Operation SOUTHERN WATCH was two active batteries and two reduced readiness batteries. In January 1999, in response to Iraqi defiance of the northern and southern no-fly zones, the secretary of defense authorized the deployment of two additional active batteries to Kuwait. The deployment was further expanded in March 1999, and again in November 1999, when the secretary of defense approved a change in standard Patriot configuration for the mission to three active and two reduced readiness batteries.⁸

The SOUTHERN WATCH mission was a predictable one for which battalions received ample notification and for which they could plan. Moreover, the Army retained full battery sets of Patriot equipment in Saudi Arabia, as well as the requisite ancillary vehicles and equipment necessary to unit operations, so the deployment was largely a personnel flow, thereby vastly simplifying the operation. The stationing and tactical employment of the batteries in Southwest Asia likewise rapidly became fixed, which also relieved units of the necessity of performing the tactical reconnaissance that was the usual preliminary to establish-

ing a Patriot defense. Finally, the unit assuming the mission had a brief overlap with the unit being relieved, so that any changes to operations, the tactical situation, or the administrative arrangements could be efficiently passed on and quickly assimilated. One Operation SOUTHERN WATCH deployment therefore looked much like another. (*Map 11*)

From the point of view of the 69th ADA Brigade, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH was technically and tactically undemanding. Preparing units to serve in Saudi Arabia was a matter of allowing them the training time to master the tactics, techniques, and procedures peculiar to that mission area and maintaining personnel deployment readiness. The six months a battalion spent in Southwest Asia were usefully employed for training, and batteries characteristically



MAP 11

returned to Germany exceptionally well schooled in Patriot system operation and tactical employment. The drawback was the limited number of Patriot fire units available for the many potential missions to which they could be called on short notice.

While one battalion was in Saudi Arabia there was only one battalion in Germany available for all other missions. Until the Patriot reorganization plan, that second battalion might well also have been called upon to augment the unit deployed to Southwest Asia, further decreasing the number of fire units available for use. There was also the consideration that the battalion sent to Operation SOUTHERN WATCH was sequestered from other assignments for a period prior to deployment so that it could perfect its training, and that the same battalion would enter a period of block leave and recovery after its return to Germany, so that the time during which a battalion was unavailable for V Corps use was actually considerably longer than the specified six months the mission demanded. In no sense, however, did the brigade find Operation SOUTHERN WATCH to be difficult in a tactical or technical sense. The opportunity to deal with more complex challenges came later, toward the end of the decade.

The Patriot Reorganization Plan of 1998

In 1998 the Department of the Army began reorganizing the Air Defense Artillery force structure to create a tenth active force Patriot missile battalion that could be assigned to the Southwest Asia rotation. The reorganization plan had several objectives that simultaneously served both operational and administrative goals. Since the SOUTHERN WATCH deployment was a standing mission with no clear ending date, the Army wanted to reduce the operational tempo for Southwest Asia deployments for any given Patriot battalion. Administratively, the reorganization standardized Patriot battalion organization across the Army at one headquarters and headquarters battery, five firing batteries, and a maintenance company. Crucially, establishment of the tenth battalion allowed the Army to increase time on station for soldiers assigned to battalions in the continental United States, an important factor not only in allowing those battalions to maintain high standards of tactical proficiency, but also for soldier morale.⁹

In Germany, the effects of the reorganization plan were to inactivate the 94th ADA Brigade, at that time assigned to USAREUR, and to temporarily transfer the 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, to the 69th ADA Brigade. There, the intention was to use the 1-7 ADA to reorganize the 69th ADA Brigade to the new standard. Typifying the problem for which the Patriot reorganization plan was the solution, the 69th ADA Brigade's units were at that time organized differently. The 6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery, had six firing batteries, while the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, had only three. The V Corps plan was to reorganize those battalions according to the five firing battery and one maintenance company standard and return 1-7 ADA to Fort Bliss with two batteries not later than 16 July 1999.¹⁰

The reorganization began with the public announcement on 28 December 1998 of the restationing. A total of 190 days later, the action was complete. The headquarters and headquarters battery and two firing batteries of 1-7 ADA had reached their new station at Fort Bliss, and both of the 69th ADA Brigade's remaining battalions had the same organization, which besides five firing batteries was composed of twelve Stinger teams and 703 soldiers. From the point of view of the battalions concerned, the reorganization made life much simpler. At the beginning of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, battalions had been able to handle the mission out of their own resources. Prior to the terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, Patriot battalions had to send four fire units to Southwest Asia in each rotation: two full batteries and two reduced readiness batteries, the latter as contingency units. Most battalions were capable of handling that without assistance.

After the bombing, the Department of the Army set the requirement for the SOUTHERN WATCH mission at five Patriot batteries. Coming up with the men and equipment to make up the difference meant that battalions had to be reinforced by fire units attached from other Patriot battalions. But obviously, attaching batteries from another battalion meant that two battalions, instead of one, were committed to the mission, thereby reducing the parent command's ability to deal with another mission elsewhere. Equally, cross-attaching batteries from one battalion to another destroyed unit integrity and magnified the reintegration and retraining problem when the mission was over.

One case in point was the 1997 Operation SOUTHERN WATCH rotation that 1-7 ADA conducted with the assistance of 5-7 ADA. The 94th ADA Brigade was the controlling headquarters, and its almost superfluous troops-to-task analysis immediately revealed the need to reinforce 1-7 ADA for the mission.¹¹ Since V Corps commanded the only remaining Patriot battalions in Europe, the reinforcement mission fell to its 69th ADA Brigade, which passed the task to the 5-7 ADA.¹² The two battalion commanders immediately began to work together to sort out the mission requirements, each delicately avoiding potential areas of conflict.

For his part, Lt. Col. Dan Kirby of 5-7 ADA punctiliously acknowledged the fact that his counterpart in 1-7 ADA was the task force commander and that all operational decisions fell to him. Kirby was determined to provide thoroughly trained batteries, but still wanted to express preferences about how his units were to be handled. Lt. Col. Mike Locke of 1-7 ADA was equally careful to handle the sister battalion's units with what might almost be described as undue care. Reserving to his own battalion one of the worst of the sites in Saudi Arabia in terms of living conditions, he noted to Kirby that he wanted "my guys to go to Al Kharj because it is the 'Tent City,' . . . [in order] . . . to avoid even the possibility of the perception that I am treating 5-7 less well by sending them to a poorly developed area."¹³

In subsequent meetings and e-mail exchanges, the two commanders amicably worked out all of the details of the attachment and various arrangements for the forthcoming mission. The eventual operation order spelled out those deci-

sions, and the mission was conducted with little incident. Over the succeeding months preceding the deployment, the two battalions participated in a series of tactical exercises and common training to suit them for their forthcoming mission.¹⁴ The battalions laid plans for rear detachment operations and briefed the deputy commander in chief, USAREUR, on how the mission, designated Operation ARABIAN FURY, was to be conducted and on how the task force organization varied from that specified in ARCENT OPLAN 10-93.¹⁵ Meanwhile, however, 5-7 ADA was unavailable for any other assignment, because even those soldiers not already serving in Southwest Asia might be sent there if the tactical situation required it. However successfully the task force functioned, it was clear to everyone involved that it would have been both better and much simpler to have drawn the entire organization from a single battalion. The Patriot reorganization plan allowed just that for future SOUTHERN WATCH rotations.

Smaller and More Deployable: The Minimum Engagement Package Concept

Speed was of the essence in deployments, and the missions V Corps units had carried out since the end of the Persian Gulf War had all taught their lessons about how to move soldiers and equipment at an ever faster rate to meet the demands of often urgent military and political crises. Speed of deployment was inevitably linked to the availability of strategic airlift, however, and Army units characteristically required numerous air missions to deliver a capable and sustainable force to any location outside of Germany. Consequently, reducing the "tail" in favor of the "tooth" component of deploying forces became an imperative across the corps. Nowhere was the problem more intensively studied than in the 94th and 69th ADA Brigades, where the high density of Patriot battery and battalion equipment constituted a particular problem for aerial deployment.

The Minimum Engagement Package (MEP) concept took on a life of its own in February and March 1998, when the possibility loomed that USAREUR might have to send one of its Patriot battalions on a short-notice mission to the Middle East. The 94th ADA Brigade recognized that such an order could come with little notice, that its reaction would have to be swift, and that it could not rely on any priority for strategic airlift from Air Force units in the United States. The concept was implicit in the Patriot minimum engagement capability, toward which a fire unit worked to be designated "mission capable." The doctrinal minimum requirement was for the fire control system to be in place and "initialized," or ready to engage targets, and two launchers to be ready to fire.¹⁶ More fundamentally, the roots of the minimum engagement concept lay in the NATO tactical evaluation requirements and the related doctrine common to all air defense units in Europe.

In February 94th ADA Brigade took that idea one step further. Having defined the minimum engagement capability, the brigade then tailored it accord-

ing to the specific mission circumstances, using the standard evaluation tool of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time (METT-T). In that particular case, the key elements of the situation were enemy and time. The MEP was the natural extension of all that discussion, and it evolved from normal staff work at the brigade level, principally under the guidance of Col. David Casmus, the brigade commander, and Lt. Col. Tim Glaeser, who commanded 5-7 ADA.

The actual practical application of the MEP occurred later that year, in November and December. By that time further development of the concept lay with the 5-7 ADA, which was the battalion having the most current and extensive deployment knowledge and experience. Consequently, that battalion was the logical choice to receive any Patriot deployment mission in the near future. The 69th ADA Brigade headquarters, by contrast, having previously served entirely as a corps air defense brigade and therefore having never been involved with such tasks, lacked the crucial recent Patriot experience. The brigade therefore drew on the accumulated experience and knowledge of its new battalion.¹⁷

The brigade defined the minimum engagement package, which entered the soldiers' vocabulary simply as "MEP," as the absolute minimum number of pieces of equipment and number of soldiers needed to constitute an initial, effective air defense. As the concept matured, the MEP consisted of 1 radar station with heavy tactical truck, 1 radar station without heavy truck, 1 engagement control station, 3 launcher stations with heavy trucks, 1 battery command post, 12 Patriot missiles, and 1 sustainment package. The MEP needed just fifty-five soldiers and could be moved in four C-5 Galaxy air missions. All that developmental staff work was critical when the MEP made its debut in an actual operation in December 1998. Certainly others in the air defense community had considered the concept of putting together a Patriot deployment package, but the process of standardizing the minimum engagement package as it existed in 1998—literally looking at all the nuts and bolts and determining which 147 lines of repair parts were critical and therefore stored in three standard airline ISU-90 containers—took place in 69th ADA Brigade. In fact, much of that process became formalized only after Thanksgiving, during a pause in an actual deployment.

Proceeding from discussions that had been going on for some time within the brigade and battalion staffs, the 69th ADA Brigade used the brief interval between Thanksgiving and the Christmas holidays to establish the 55-soldier manifest, including the maintenance detachment; select the critical pieces of equipment that had to be taken; prepare the ISU-90 containers with the critical repair parts; and figure out the type and number of aircraft that would be needed for the deployment, doing all of that in the context of the November mission analysis. The brigade also bore in mind that deployment missions would be unique, much different from the NATO mission, and vastly different from a V Corps, high-intensity conflict mission. Thus, in using the MEP for some other mission in a different geographical area, the brigade again applied the mission analysis process to the existing organization and adjusted it as necessary for the differing circumstances.

Administratively, the MEP departed considerably from normal practice, since it did not make use of the familiar NATO procedure, as tested in tactical evaluations—TacEvals, in the air defense jargon—of deploying as a full-up unit, able to sustain itself for seven days, and operating within the context of a theater air defense architecture. There were also significant departures from the tables of organization. Although a Patriot battery was designed to function with eighty-seven authorized soldiers, many were associated with sustainment, which was not an immediate concern for the MEP. Consequently, the battery was set up on a battle roster of deployable and nondeployable soldiers, and battalions developed the “prioritized manifest” to place soldiers on airplanes according to the sequence of jobs that had to be done to ready a battery to fire. In garrison, maintenance was affected by the need to identify critical repair parts and store them permanently in the ISU-90s. Ultimately, the brigade took the logical step of putting the entire repair parts stockage in ISU-90s, not just the critical parts, to facilitate deployment of the follow-on packages. In terms of training, the brigade no longer spent as much time doing brigade field training exercises, although integrating two Patriot battalions under brigade tactical control was certainly a perishable skill. Instead, the focus was on the emergency deployment readiness exercise.

The 69th ADA Brigade adopted the MEP as its basic deployment package and devised load plans and movement tables to suit. Unit training plans were likewise devised to prepare fire units to organize and operate according to the MEP concept, and brigade rehearsals continued to refine both the concept and the deployment plan. By the time the 69th ADA Brigade was called upon to make its first actual strategic deployment of Patriot systems, the MEP was a viable concept that was ready to use.¹⁸

The initial planning at 69th ADA focused on establishing a minimum engagement capability within the first ninety-six hours after alert and on carrying the critical repair parts to sustain that capability for seventy-two to ninety-six hours. Thereafter, the concept presupposed supply flights to deliver spare parts or additional equipment. The philosophy that underlay the MEP was that the minimum engagement package could establish an air defense of a critical point or area and maintain that defense until additional forces could be brought in to supplement or replace it. For the world of short-notice, strategic deployments, the MEP was ideal.¹⁹

Toward Patriot Strategic Deployment: Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD

Periodic operations by the United States and its coalition partners to enforce United Nations sanctions against Iraq occasioned the threat that Saddam Hussein might respond by using his intermediate range ballistic missiles, the same Scud-B variants that he had fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Persian Gulf War, against Israel or other nations in the region. Such was the case three times in 1998, centering particularly on Iraq's persistent refusal to allow United Nations weapons inspectors unhindered access to Iraqi facilities. That

culminated in December 1998 in the British and American punitive bombing of Iraq, an event that resulted in Israeli population centers, in particular, coming under the threat of Iraqi missile attack. The American response was to dispatch a Patriot missile task force from the 69th ADA Brigade to Israel, the first strategic deployment of a heavy air defense unit from Europe since the end of the Gulf War. The Army in Europe had also begun preparing task forces during the two preceding crises in 1998, although neither reached the point of outloading air defense missile batteries from Europe before tensions abated. The consequence of each, however, was to build the basis of experience and planning upon which 69th ADA Brigade was able to draw when the December crisis arose.

A crisis in February 1998 impelled the government of Israel to ask the United States for assistance in bolstering its defenses. Reacting to European Command orders as delivered through USAREUR, V Corps in February and March created a joint task force headquarters under Maj. Gen. Gregory A. Rountree, the corps deputy commanding general, to command a joint task force that included elements of the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, that were to be sent to Israel in what was known as Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD. The task force mission was to form, train, and deploy forces to enhance theater missile defense of Israel.²⁰ European Command had already sent an assessment team to Israel to survey possible locations for missile units and the task force headquarters and also promptly delivered instructions to Rountree about what the task force priorities were to be.²¹

Responding to the European Command alert order of 16 February, Rountree brought his staff together at the headquarters of the 94th ADA Brigade in Darmstadt. Following preliminary planning at corps and in Darmstadt, the joint task force was activated on 20 February, with the joint task force (rear), which was to perform the functions of a national support element, activated at Darmstadt on 22 February. The principal Army unit involved was 5-7 ADA, and the controlling air defense headquarters was 94th ADA Brigade, a unit under USAREUR control. Accordingly, V Corps involvement remained at the joint task force level, with Col. David Casmus, who became simultaneously Army Force (ARFOR) commander and chief of staff of the task force, and his 94th ADA Brigade staff handling the air defense aspects of the mission.

Time was a particular problem, given that the planning burden was considerable. The joint task force staff worked against the clock to forge arrangements for technical and tactical interoperability with the Israelis and to develop agreements for Israeli support for the air defense task force. Parallel work went on to write the necessary operations plans, joint procedures, and battle books, meanwhile developing the necessary joint manning documents and deployment and redeployment plans. While all of that was going on, General Rountree pondered the problem of continuity of command, bearing in mind the impending inactivation of the 94th ADA Brigade. Should the operation continue for very long, he would also need to allow for an orderly transfer of responsibility to another air defense brigade, since the Department of the Army orders to case the colors of Casmus' brigade would not be changed.²²

Rountree flew to Israel with his aide and a few staff officers on 23 February, followed over the next two days by the balance of the advance party. He established the forward joint task force headquarters at a hotel in Tel Aviv, subsequently moving the operation to Sirkin Air Base by 9 March. The remainder of the task force headquarters arrived in Israel on 15 March, and the staff occupied itself with planning for potential future operations, as well as with refining the plans and associated documents they had already produced. The 94th ADA Brigade sent one Integrated Command and Control (ICC), the key piece of equipment the Patriot battalion used to control air defense engagements, to Israel on 27 March for the first combined ICC test with the Israeli Defense Forces, an important exercise in combined operating techniques that concluded on 1 April. Although no Patriots were taken to Israel on that occasion, various reconnaissances were made, and a considerable body of information about potential battery locations, routes, and deployment procedures was amassed.

The most important document to come out of the operation was entitled "Combined Procedures for Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD" (CPONS), jointly signed by Rountree and Maj. Gen. Shlomo Yanai, Chief of the Planning Branch of the Israeli Defense Forces. Although that arrangement fell far short of being a combined SOP for American-Israeli air defense operations, the CPONS was the crucial beginning that outlined the areas of agreement and areas requiring further discussion and coordination. The document specified a basic battle management architecture, the structure of a combined theater missile defense center, early warning techniques, and Patriot battery locations. It also at least opened the discussion on air defense rules of engagement—a matter about which Americans and Israelis had significantly different ideas. The CPONS, regardless of any areas it left still to be agreed upon, laid the groundwork for development of a more detailed combined SOP and was the essential basis for further planning.²³ By the end of March it had become clear that the operation would not be carried out, and all of the various elements of the task force stood down. The task force returned to Germany from 27 March through 3 April, with the command group returning on 6 April.²⁴

Carrying out its own thorough after action review of battalion actions between 31 January and 1 April, the 5–7 ADA identified a number of problems that deployment planning had revealed. The battalion's review was a lengthy document that naturally discussed revisions to unit procedures in detail and raised a host of problems of varying importance. Several matters, however, directly affected the potential for future deployments and merited the attention of the brigade and its senior headquarters.

The first had to do with the mechanics of deployment. The various courses of action the joint task force headquarters considered in the course of its planning stipulated differing troop packages for the deployment. That, in turn, required modifications of the troop and equipment manifests the battalion maintained. In any case, the task force needed periodic updates drawn from those manifests on key items such as the availability of protective equipment for soldiers. To simplify that process, the battalion staff developed a computer-driven manifest

format that allowed it not only to modify the manifest to suit the requirements of changed courses of action and easily report on status of key data elements, but also to modify the manifests to suit the capabilities of changed aircraft availability at the last minute. The deployment process itself came under close scrutiny. The principal lesson the battalion took from the experience of using the new USAREUR Deployment Processing Center was that the facility was not yet the "one-stop shopping" answer to deployment, since it had been unable to handle predeployment processing and soldier readiness processing for the battalion, and units had been obliged to turn to their local base support battalion for help.

At the command level, Lt. Col. Tim Glaeser, the 5-7 ADA battalion commander, noted that fatigue and stress rapidly became leadership problems. In the thirty days after the battalion's warning order arrived, long days and high stress were the rule. Carrying out deployment preparations under conditions of uncertainty and secrecy added to the stress, and both commanders and staff became thoroughly fatigued, in Glaeser's judgment. The battalion relearned an old lesson about resting leaders and developed plans for better work-rest cycles. On the other hand, there was one positive benefit of the process. Glaeser remarked on a commendable bonding of leaders and staff, as well as bonding within batteries.²⁵

Refinement of the Plan: Operation FLEXIBLE RESOLVE

A renewal of the crisis in November 1998 immediately involved the 69th ADA Brigade and its 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery. Initially known as Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD II, the mission was renamed Operation FLEXIBLE RESOLVE.²⁶ As before, the battalion never left Germany, although the fire units came much closer to deployment than on the previous occasion. The principal outcome of Operation FLEXIBLE RESOLVE was that 69th ADA Brigade and 5-7 ADA significantly advanced their mission planning and became better prepared for the deployment that eventually came a month later.

While the tensions surrounding Iraq's refusal to accommodate the requirements of the United Nations weapons inspection teams heightened, the Israeli Embassy in Washington dispatched to the Joint Staff a list of its requirements in the event of renewed crisis. The first item on the list was a U.S. Army Patriot missile battalion.²⁷ By the end of the first week of November the Joint Staff had already warned forces in Europe that a deployment was imminent; USAREUR had ordered the activation of a joint task force headquarters; and European Command had directed operational planning to begin.²⁸

On 9 November USAREUR directed V Corps to form a joint task force and to conduct an emergency deployment readiness exercise to evaluate the ability of the selected Patriot battalion task force to deploy on short notice. The exercise masked USAREUR's intent for the corps to prepare the first increment of that task force to deploy five days later, on 14 November. Lt. Gen. John Hendrix, the V Corps commander, selected his deputy commanding general, Maj.

Gen. Julian Burns, to command the joint task force, initially named Noble Defender.²⁹ Following the model that Rountree had earlier set, Burns used the 69th ADA Brigade and 5-7 ADA command and staff structure to provide the bulk of his ARFOR organization, which commanded the missile unit and all of those other necessary U.S. Army elements that were not a part of the Patriot battalion.³⁰

The order to execute the operation followed swiftly. On 14 November European Command directed the deployment of the joint task force headquarters, a Patriot battalion headquarters, three Patriot batteries, and the necessary command, control, communications, and logistical support to Israel to augment the Israeli missile defense. European Command ordered the first force package, which was to consist of the forward portions of the joint task force headquarters, to deploy immediately, with the remainder to follow within forty-eight to seventy-two hours. General Burns established the task force rear headquarters at Giebelstadt Army Air Field, Germany, using facilities belonging to 69th ADA Brigade. Further enhancing the task force's capabilities and giving its staff an interesting and novel lesson in interservice tactical integration, the U.S. Navy provided an Aegis missile cruiser and the necessary communications hardware to allow integration of Patriot and Navy missile fires.³¹

When he arrived in Israel, Burns immediately met with his Israeli counterparts and confirmed what General Rountree had earlier discovered: the Israelis lacked airspace control measures similar to those used by American forces. Therefore, the first major job the task force undertook was to establish such procedures in agreement with the Israelis. The joint task force also published an operations order on 14 November and transmitted it to the task force rear. Noting that a shipment of guidance enhanced missiles, an upgraded "PAC-II" Patriot missile with greater ability to hit ballistic missiles, was due to arrive in Israel on 17 November, Burns reviewed the stock of PAC II missiles already on hand in the War Reserve Stock-Israel (WRSI) and directed his staff to begin developing a plan to distribute the improved missiles among American and Israeli batteries.³² The next day Col. H. A. Graziano, the 69th ADA Brigade commander who was serving as both ARFOR commander and task force chief of staff, made a personal reconnaissance of all of the proposed Patriot battery sites, while Burns established working groups with the Israeli Defense Forces to resolve questions about force protection, command and control, NBC protection, mutual disclosure of intelligence information, and various categories of logistical support for the task force.

Reviewing progress to that point, Burns was pleased to report that the operation had entirely validated the advance party concept. A sudden decrease in international tension that day made a very long stay in Israel unlikely, and Burns reported to General Wesley Clark, the European commander in chief, that he had discussed with the European Command J3 the prospects of ending the deployment. Burns planned to scale back the operation to the level of a reconnaissance, complete the planning that was in progress, and return

the task force to Germany not later than Thanksgiving. Clark's immediate response was to question the need to remain in Israel at all. "Why do we need two weeks?" he asked, directing Burns to "get out as rapidly as we can—a few days at most."³³

Tensions continued to abate the next day, although Iraq's agreement to resume cooperation with the United Nations inspection teams, presumably to avoid allied coalition air strikes that might potentially have precipitated internal unrest, seemed contingent on the granting of concessions the United Nations would probably be unwilling to make. That issue would be resolved in a forthcoming comprehensive compliance review of Security Council resolutions. Burns' staff briefed him that, if Saddam Hussein's expectations for progress toward relief of sanctions were not realized, he was certain to provoke another crisis in the near future. Thus, Burns remained determined to work out as many details as possible for combined missile defense.³⁴ Responding to General Clark's question about a hasty redeployment, Burns answered that it would be possible to stand the task force down by 24 November.³⁵

Burns began sending troops and equipment back to Germany the next day, redeploying thirty-nine soldiers and most of his major pieces of communication equipment. He retained a staff of twenty-seven planners to continue working out details of the operation plan and staff cooperation and coordination issues with the Israelis, as well as to continue the reconnaissance he saw as necessary if the battalion was finally called forward to occupy the designated firing positions. He also laid plans to rehearse movement of Patriot missiles from the war reserve storage site and ordered the 5-7 ADA battalion commander and battery commanders to come to Israel to carry out their own leaders' reconnaissance and develop their "battle books"³⁶ for the operation. Rounding out another piece of the operation, the Navy team completed what Burns termed "extensive and most helpful work" with the task force rear to develop options for integrating Aegis and Patriot fires.³⁷

On 18 November the battalion commander and his battery commanders, having completed their reconnaissance of battle positions in conjunction with Israeli civil engineers and physical security specialists, continued to refine their battle books to reflect what they had learned. Discussions continued at the joint task force with Israeli officials, but Burns ruefully noted that many questions remained unresolved, chief among them issues about Patriot rules of engagement. On the American side, the major question to be dealt with was a query from European Command and USAREUR on how to keep the task force "warm" for a future short notice deployment and how to keep the MEP batteries ready to move for extended periods. The issue was not merely one of readiness, but also of speed of deployment. Americans made the presumption that the deployment time lines from Germany to Israel were known to Iraqi military staffs, giving them crucial information on which to base their own strike planning. Keeping the task force "warm," as European Command phrased it, would allow the task force to compress its deployment time, nullifying the value of the information that Iraq was presumed to possess.³⁸

Glaeser and his commanders supplied the essential air defense technical input for that discussion, while Burns, in coordination with the V Corps staff, began working on a plan to keep a Patriot battalion alerted for movement. The principal issue was one of force structure. The 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, which had been transferred from the 94th to the 69th ADA Brigade, was then in the process of moving to Fort Bliss, Texas. The other Patriot battalion in theater, 6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery, was then in block leave after completing a rotation in Southwest Asia. The only near-term solution was to keep 5-7 ADA assigned to the mission.³⁹ The next day, 20 November, Burns reported to General Clark that the task force advance party had returned to Germany and that the staff would conduct a series of after action reviews from 21 through 23 November and report to European Command unresolved issues.⁴⁰ In the course of that after action review, Burns' staff finalized the operation plan it had produced on 14 November and refined throughout the deployment, publishing it as a draft plan on 22 November.⁴¹

While Burns took his "Torch Party" to Israel at the beginning of the crisis, 5-7 ADA prepared in garrison for the move.⁴² Building upon the site surveys that had been done in February and March and on the rudimentary battle books they had inherited, the 5-7 ADA staff carried out extensive planning on the three missile sites they knew to be their most likely battle positions. The availability of those documents was particularly important because the base of experience for that particular mission was low. Routine reassignments had left few officers and soldiers in 5-7 in November who had also been there in the first quarter of the calendar year. Still, much had already been done, and there was the solid basis of the Combined Procedures for Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD, signed on 1 April, from which to proceed.

While the battalion commander and his three battery commanders were in Israel for their more detailed leaders' reconnaissance of the selected positions, Maj. Harry Cohen, the battalion and task force S-3, remained in Hanau to ready the unit for deployment. From his perspective, that five-day reconnaissance proved extremely valuable. As soon as the commanders returned to Germany, Cohen brought them together for a planning session to update the battle books, adding critical detail essential to air defense operations.⁴³

With the recon in progress, the battalion configured three minimum engagement packages, each based on one firing battery, and named them accordingly: Alfa MEP, Bravo MEP, and Charlie MEP. The first unit, Bravo MEP, together with a minimum command and control package, moved out to USAREUR's new deployment processing center at Rhein-Ordnance Barracks in Kaiserslautern shortly before Thanksgiving. The processing center had continued to develop since its first use in February, but was still a new concept that had a number of kinks to be worked out, and the arrival of Bravo MEP did much to help clarify what needed to be done. The buildings themselves still needed work, but the fundamental problem was the lack of a support or "pusher" unit, which the Army had discovered was essential during the deployment of VII Corps for the Persian Gulf War. The sister battalion, 1-7 ADA, although deep-

ly involved in moving to the United States, took over that responsibility. At that point, just before Thanksgiving, the process came to a halt as European Command awaited further developments in the Middle East.

The hiatus did not mean that the unit returned to its normal garrison routine. Instead, the battalion entered a 72- to 96-hour on-call status, with the prospect of remaining on short-notice recall indefinitely. While all the final preparations had been going on, the high level discussions had continued about how to keep the units "warm." The corps commander supported Burns' decision to pull both soldiers and equipment back from the deployment processing center while waiting on events. At first, European Command had wanted the battalion to remain at Kaiserslautern, but Graziano and Glaeser had strenuously pointed out the harm that would have done to unit readiness. Patriot equipment, they emphasized, was maintenance-intensive and required regular checks and services that could not be performed when it was simply sitting on a ramp in air-load configuration. Training had to be maintained as well, or else the highly perishable technical skills of the crewmen would degrade on a curve that the battalion believed it could accurately predict.⁴⁴

Cutting time from the deployment was just not that easy, as the 5-7 ADA staff pointed out. The battalion had no power to adjust many events in the sequence because some were synchronous, with groups of events sequential in nature, and almost literally a "critical path," to use operations research terminology. The principal way of compressing the time line, the battalion insisted, was giving the deployment priority for air lift, although that implied a much higher level of coordination than the task force could effect.⁴⁵ Consequently, 5-7 ADA withdrew to Underwood Kaserne in Hanau and tried to resume some semblance of a normal routine while keeping its soldiers on call in case events worsened. Preserving its readiness to move, the battalion kept the equipment configured for deployment. As before, the battalion used the interval to review the steps it had taken, seeking ways to improve the deployment process, a procedure echoed at the joint task force, where the J3 conducted a similar review for Burns.⁴⁶ There was but a short wait for action.

The First Real Test: Operation SHINING PRESENCE

Once again at the beginning of December Iraq refused to comply with UN Security Council resolutions and impeded the work of the United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq. In reaction, President Bill Clinton directed U.S. Central Command to send additional deterrent forces to the region and to be prepared to carry out military operations against Iraq. Carrying out its tasks under the umbrella of Operation DESERT FOX, Central Command was prepared to deliver air strikes on selected Iraqi targets, in conjunction with America's coalition partners. For its part, European Command again spun up the operation it had initiated in February and again in November to augment Israeli antimissile defenses.

The operation began on the morning of 5 December 1998 when V Corps received the draft order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare forces for the de-

ployment.⁴⁷ Responding to the order, General Burns, as Commander, Joint Task Force Shining Presence, alerted his task force to deploy three Patriot batteries and their associated command and control to Israel. The Joint Chiefs' order also placed the joint task force on 72-hour notice for deployment. The V Corps mission to Israel proceeded on the basis of the draft operations order that the task force had prepared at the end of November, as modified by the requirements of current events expressed in the message traffic concerning the deployment. Burns acknowledged the order the next day in an e-mail message he sent to Maj. Gen. Ronald Keyes, the European Command J-3, reporting that a mission analysis was under way, promising publication of an operations order in the course of the week, and openly worrying about operational security issues.⁴⁸

The mission, as briefed at European Command, was to augment existing Israeli theater missile defenses and biological detection capabilities as part of a coordinated effort to deter potential Iraqi aggression and, should deterrence fail, protect Israel against Iraqi ballistic missile attacks. The plan called for rapid and sequential deployment of the joint task force and Patriot battalion force packages, following the model established in the two previous crises, and using the air defense plans, procedures, and agreements previously arranged with the Israeli Defense Forces. The flow of forces into theater depended on an assumed availability of Transportation Command aircraft and envisioned placing the full task force into the theater by C+7,⁴⁹ including a biological integrated detection system platoon from the 310th Chemical Company, a reserve unit from the United States. The Army force headquarters was based on the 69th ADA Brigade and included elements of the 310th Chemical Company, the 66th Military Intelligence Group, and the 5th Signal Brigade. U.S. Navy, Europe, assigned an Aegis missile cruiser, the U.S.S. *Philippine Sea*, and associated equipment to link it to the task force command and control, and the U.S. Air Force provided both a tactical air liaison control element and a tactical missile defense control cell to integrate Army and Air Force airspace control and ballistic missile defense operations.⁵⁰

Because the crisis followed so closely on the heels of the November deployment, Burns was able to use virtually the same task force organization that he had exercised a month earlier, and most of the same people. That dramatically shortened the lead time for joint task force formation, training, and preparation. The joint manning document and associated task force structural documents already existed and were appropriate to meet the demands of the forthcoming deployment.

Also on 7 December, V Corps issued a mission order to the 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade directing Colonel Graziano and his staff to bring the first two elements of a Patriot task force to 72-hour deployment readiness not later than 10 December.⁵¹ That evening the corps issued a second order that directed all units participating in the mission to recall their soldiers to home stations in the course of the following afternoon, 8 December.⁵²

Shaping its preparations in consonance with the order, the 69th ADA Brigade readied three Patriot minimum engagement packages and a command and

control element for deployment to Israel within forty-eight hours of notification, where it was to establish an integrated and combined tactical ballistic missile defense of Tel Aviv and Haifa. Simultaneously, the force was to remain ready to conduct chemical and biological decontamination operations if required. The 310th Chemical Company alerted one biological agent detection platoon and its associated support package for deployment to task force control, under the direction of which it was prepared to conduct biological detection operations in Israel. The 66th Military Intelligence Group detailed technical surveillance countermeasure teams for deployment to satisfy task force intelligence requirements. The 5th Signal Brigade developed voice, data, and videoconferencing capabilities for the joint task force headquarters and was prepared to deploy an advance party and equipment as part of the advance party. Once in Israel, it would provide all essential communications support throughout the duration of the operation. Within ninety-six hours of notification the Navy was to make an Aegis cruiser available, with its commanding officer to assume the role of Commander, Task Force Naval Forces. The Aegis cruiser was to remain ready to transmit tactical ballistic missile early warning broadcasts to the shore, providing an air surveillance picture to the Patriot battalion tactical operation center.⁵³

The 69th ADA Brigade constituted Task Force Panther for its part of the mission, basing the organization on the 5th Battalion, 7th ADA. TF Panther was under command of Lt. Col. Tim Glaeser and involved the same staff and battery commanders as had carried out the reconnaissance and preparations for the November deployment. The battalion prepared its headquarters and headquarters battery (-), battery A (-), battery B (-), battery C (-), and the 19th Maintenance Company (-) as components of TF Panther, leaving the balance of the battalion in Hanau as TF Rear.⁵⁴ The battalion began to execute its highly structured deployment plan as articulated in two detailed task lists that it knew as the "x-hour sequence" and "n-hour sequence" on 9 December when it instituted a recall. All of its soldiers returned to Hanau within two hours, and the battalion began its predeployment processing with the assistance of the 414th Base Support Battalion in the midmorning hours of that day.⁵⁵

Crucially important in assuring a smooth deployment was the fact that the battalion had just completed a rigorous tactical evaluation thirty days before the deployment, in the course of which the batteries had exercised virtually every step they were called upon to carry out in December. First Sergeant Leander Benjamin of Battery A recalled that the brigade commander, Colonel Graziano, closely observed that exercise and commented several times on the importance of what the soldiers were doing. Encouraging the soldiers to greater efforts, Graziano told them repeatedly throughout the exercise, according to Benjamin, that "its not *all* about the TacEval."⁵⁶

The mission of the joint task force was the same as in the two previous partial deployments—to augment air and missile defenses of Israel and to protect the Israeli population. There was a confusion about operation and task force names that was, in part, deliberate. Since the operation was to occur so close to

Christmas, and because the leave plans of so many soldiers naturally had to be canceled, it was certain that the various news media would take note of the operation. In order to cover preparations for the movement of troops and equipment out of Europe, the task force was therefore initially designated Joint Task Force Alpha, notionally an element of the U.S. Marine Corps Exercise Noble Shirley. The substance of the public affairs news release was that the Commander in Chief, United States European Command, had ordered an emergency deployment readiness exercise for a Patriot battalion as part of Exercise Noble Shirley; that the exercise had been scheduled for many months and was part of a long-standing and well-publicized series of bilateral exercises between Israel and the United States; and that the deployment would test the ability quickly to deploy Patriot missile batteries during short notice crises in the European Command area of responsibility, improving the command's ability to integrate with U.S. Marine Corps forces.⁵⁷ On order, the task force was to redesignate itself from JTF Alpha to JTF Shining Presence for the operation in Israel. That is, the cover remained in effect until one of two things happened: the joint task force received the deployment order to activate Operation SHINING PRESENCE, or the order was given to redeploy the task force to Germany.⁵⁸

The deployment flow followed a seven-day time line, with the air defense units prepared to move not later than n-hour (notification hour) plus 96.⁵⁹ As plans developed, the battalion deployment was to be deliberate, but involved a compression of the battalion's n-hour and x-hour (execution hour) sequences, specifically sending system operators first and then following with maintenance and administrative soldiers.⁶⁰ For the task force as a whole, the 69th ADA Brigade conducted an emergency deployment readiness exercise that alerted, marshaled, and prepared the force to deploy. The first force package to leave Germany was the joint task force headquarters, which included the "Torch Party" that performed the initial reconnaissance of the joint operational area and the troops and equipment to receive the Patriot battalion, once it began arriving in Israel. Burns and six soldiers flew from Ramstein Air Force Base to Israel at 0830 on 9 December. Upon arrival in Israel, Burns met with the Israeli Defense Force J-5 and set up a forward command post at Nevatim Air Base. Simultaneously, the fifty-seven members of the advance party reported to Ramstein and prepared to join him the next day.⁶¹ Other components of the first force package were an appropriate command and control element for the joint task force and a tailored air defense command post. In sum, the first package was the joint task force forward command post and the equipment and supplies required to sustain it.

Burns and his party had no sooner left Ramstein Air Force Base than the lead elements of the Patriot task force began arriving at the Kaiserslautern Departure Processing Center to follow them.⁶² Upon alert, the battalion started its n-hour sequence, mustering soldiers and equipment for movement. On 10 December, in the midst of a snow storm, Bravo MEP, the second force package, road marched to Kaiserslautern, with other elements of the battalion meanwhile preparing to follow. On the next day, Bravo MEP, commanded by Capt.

Janice H. Chen, loaded aircraft at Ramstein and arrived in Israel on 12 December, using Nevatim Air Base in the Negev Desert as its aerial port of arrival.⁶³ The remainder of the forces arrived according to plan. (*Map 12*)

For Major Cohen and Bravo MEP, the period between Thanksgiving and the first week of December had been one of fits and starts of activity that saw them return, briefly, to the deployment processing center before being called back to Hanau. It was literally in the midst of the battalion's celebration of the Feast of St. Barbara⁶⁴ that the next alert notification arrived, on 8 December, when the corps received the European Command Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise Execute Order, which directed the joint task force commander to deploy the first two force packages to Israel.⁶⁵

Formally alerted on 9 December, the battalion was extremely busy over the succeeding twenty-four hours, completing much of the necessary coordination for the move by late afternoon on Thursday, 10 December. Working from the x-hour and n-hour sequences, the battalion activated its rear detachment and completed its predeployment processing for soldiers returning from USAREUR schools. The batteries finished lining up and loading their equipment for movement. Meanwhile, the battalion arranged convoy recovery support from the 16th Corps Support Group, coordinated convoy military police support with the 127th Military Police Company, set up prime mover support with the 37th Transportation Group, and arranged with the Joint Task Force J-4 for buses to take the soldiers to the deployment processing center. All units validated and finalized troop manifests, and the battalion conducted a risk assessment for the movement from Hanau to Kaiserslautern. The urgency of the mission dictated accepting the high risk of dispatching convoys on icy roads, and the first MEP left Hanau at three in the afternoon, the minimum command and control package departing two hours later. Both arrived at Kaiserslautern without incident.⁶⁶ Working through the night, the battalion dispatched the second MEP from Hanau at 1100 the next morning, 11 December, followed at 1800 in the evening of the same day by the remaining units.⁶⁷

The first elements of the leading MEP, Bravo MEP, departed Ramstein Air Force Base on the morning of 12 December, with the final air loads taking off the next morning, along with the minimum command and control element.⁶⁸ Battery C MEP left Ramstein on 14 December, along with the remainder of the command and control equipment. Minor equipment adjustments proved necessary. The battalion had to replace one launcher already sent to the deployment processing center and sent forty PRC-127 radios to the departure airfield for the deploying troops.⁶⁹ Handing over to 1-7 ADA the task of "pushing" the battalion out of Ramstein, the 5-7 ADA rear detachment commander and his troops returned from the deployment processing center to Hanau on 15 December after completing the movement of Force Package 2 and pre-positioning the Optimum Command and Control Package ready for Air Force joint inspection. Back at Hanau, the rear detachment maintained careful accountability of the soldiers assigned to force packages still awaiting movement.⁷⁰



MAP 12

The aerial port of arrival was in the Negev Desert, at Nevatim Air Base. When the fire units arrived there, they set up their equipment and received missiles from the war reserve storage site in Israel and loaded them on the launchers. Battery B MEP became operational at once to provide initial air defense coverage of the airfield and secure the arrival of additional units. Battalion and battery personnel immediately prepared to integrate their air defense operation with the Israeli air defense structure.⁷¹ While those preparations and combined training were going on, Major Cohen conducted another reconnaissance of the intended battery positions, taking with him the battery commanders and the task force engineer, intending to determine the engineering improvements needed for battery operations and for force protection as early as possible. The site at Stella Air Base, near Haifa, he found, was an acceptable location; as an old Hawk air defense missile site, it had a reasonable amount of hardstand and existing accommodations. Not ideal for the configuration of a Patriot battery, it was still adequate. Similarly, Tel Yona was a site in the middle of a large open area. It had been used before as a Patriot battery location and had some hardstand areas already prepared. There were no barracks there, so the soldiers would have to live in tents. Sde Dov, overlooking Tel Aviv, posed the greatest problems, since it had to house the battalion operations element, a firing battery, and elements of an Israeli Patriot battalion in a very small area. Making matters worse, from the security point of view, was the fact that Sde Dov was literally in Tel Aviv, where operations would inevitably draw large crowds. It would also certainly be a magnet for the media once the Americans arrived.⁷²

The forward elements of the battalion, already established at Nevatim Air Base, received the last flights of Force Package 2 on 15 December, along with repair parts for the battery fire control equipment and the battalion tactical operations center. The task force conducted tactical satellite radio training, established a secure e-mail net at the tactical operations center, and began a series of important meetings with Israeli forces to finalize details of communications and defense design, logistical support, and various administrative arrangements. Those were among the most important discussions, from the point of view of the battalion. Fortunately, a joint American-Israeli working group had already evolved a further development of the CPONS the two forces had agreed upon in November and considered it to be a good draft combined SOP on the basis of which the tactical discussions could continue.⁷³

Looking ahead, Glaeser and his staff worked out details of the convoy plan and order of march and developed a synchronization matrix for the movement north to the planned battery locations. The battalion planned for one day of combined training with the Israeli air defense units before road marching to the firing positions.⁷⁴ The next day, 16 December, Glaeser and his commanders met with the Israeli Patriot battalion commander and his staff and agreed on a two-day training plan for combined air defense operations, beginning that day. Responding to recommendations from the Patriot Project Office at Fort Bliss and to new intelligence information, the staff reassessed its defense design and made some changes that Colonel Graziano immediately approved. Rounding

out a busy day, the battalion hosted visits from the joint task force and Army force commanders and the Israeli brigade commander.⁷⁵

The second day of combined training never happened, though, because the coalition air strikes against Iraq began at that point, increasing the risk to Israeli population centers. The Israeli Patriot battalion moved out on the evening of 16 December and 5-7 ADA began its deployment from Nevatim Air Base to its battle positions in Tel Aviv and Haifa the next morning. The battalion tactical operations center and headquarters battery, together with Battery B MEP, went to Sde Dov; Battery A MEP went to Stella Air Base, near Haifa; and Battery C MEP went to Tel Yona. All of the battalion was operational at the new battery positions by early evening of 18 December, although site improvements continued through the night, especially at Sde Dov.

Also that evening, the battalion achieved a data link with the Aegis cruiser and established a lateral connection between the 5-7 ADA fire control equipment and the Israeli Patriot battalion fire control equipment. Essential to creating an integrated defense, communications were established connecting the integrated command and control equipment with all the battery locations, including a tropospheric link between Tel Aviv and Battery A MEP in Haifa, which provided several voice communications channels between these distant locations. The Guidance Enhanced Missiles were delivered on 18 December as well and distributed according to historical data on previous Iraqi Scud launches, with the majority of the missiles going to American and Israeli batteries in the Tel Aviv area.⁷⁶ High level visits from Israeli military and cabinet officials to the batteries continued, with particular interest focused on the American chemical platoon, which arrived on 19 December.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, the battalion rear detachment had continued to move soldiers and equipment to the deployment processing center, particularly the Optimum Command and Control package, and readied Force Package 4 for deployment,⁷⁸ beginning the movement of that force package to Kasierslautern on 18 December.⁷⁹

Over the night of 19-20 December the task force learned that American and coalition forces had declared a cease-fire in their bombing of Iraqi targets. The implication was that the mission would end soon. Nonetheless, the battalion laid further plans for a readiness state rotation plan that allowed both limited and deep maintenance for all units daily. Under the plan only one of the missile batteries would be at instant readiness to fire at any given time, so that the others could perform essential checks and maintenance. At the same time, the battalion began to consider courses of action to redeploy the task force to Germany.⁸⁰ Those orders soon came, directing redeployment to be conducted through Nevatim Air Base, while the task force concurrently returned the missiles to the war reserve storage facility.

The return to Germany was as swift as the deployment had been, much to the surprise of more senior soldiers who had been on other missions outside of Germany. Indeed, one of the issues that V Corps had been obliged to confront from time to time—and that it would continue to exercise as time went on—was that movement to a mission area was normally a matter of high priority, while

return of troops to home station often appeared to have no priority at all. The first sergeant of Battery A had already warned his troops to expect delays in returning to Germany and was shocked to find that the redeployment was so swift. "Normally, once we go on a mission," Sergeant Benjamin later dryly understated the case, "the return is much more deliberate, often with changes as we go along."

Once the order to stand down was received in the fire units in Israel, however, the batteries assembled unit convoys and prepared equipment for shipment not more than thirty-six hours later.⁸¹ The battalion credited Burns and the corps commander, General Hendrix, with pushing the issue of getting the soldiers home by Christmas. The corps commander was adamant, because the soldiers had been operating at a high tempo since long before Thanksgiving. His intervention appeared to have been crucial in obtaining the airlift to bring the task force back to home station quickly.⁸²

More significant, as the battalion assessed the experience, the entire deployment had been carried out with a remarkable lack of incident and an equally remarkable adherence to plan. Older soldiers who were experienced with the mobile Nike Hercules battalions reflected upon the enormous energies their battalions had expended to make even short deployments with that missile system, and no one recalled a time when the Nike Hercules had ever actually been loaded on aircraft and deployed overseas. The Patriot battalion, with more compact equipment configured differently than Nike Hercules units, had been designed from the start with aerial movement in mind. It had been sent to Israel within forty-eight hours, taking along a comparatively enormous tonnage of equipment and supplies, and returned to Germany just as rapidly.⁸³ The other important factor was that the operation had begun under high risk conditions, during a snowstorm, and that the mission had been completed without accident or incident. Sergeant Benjamin attributed that to a high standard of training in the battalion and to highly proficient noncommissioned officers who enforced safety standards. Tough training standards, culminating in the TacEval a month before the mission, naturally played their part. There was also an element of good fortune involved but, as Benjamin aptly remarked, "good soldiers have good luck."⁸⁴

The final consequence of Operation SHINING PRESENCE was the value of the experience itself. That was particularly important for the 69th ADA Brigade because its other standing deployment, to Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, only involved the movement of personnel and a minimal amount of supplies and equipment. After action reviews pointed up the criticality of deployment training within the units and remarked that the rotation of battalions through Operation SOUTHERN WATCH was of value in that regard because it helped maintain the skills of the officers and noncommissioned officers charged with handling movement control. One clear conclusion to be drawn was that readiness to deploy and be mission effective was much more than just a matter of the traditional "technical and tactical proficiency."

After the return from Israel, the task force also remarked on the lingering unanswered questions. Chief among them was that there still was not an ap-

proved combined standard operating procedure (SOP) with Israel, and that meant that important questions about rules of engagement, engagement authority, self-defense criteria, and giving another nation limited tactical control of American systems remained to be settled.⁸⁵ Whatever problems remained, however, the experience of sending 5-7 ADA to Israel had been of enormous value, and the brigade made certain that the fruits of that experience were communicated to its other battalion, 6-52 ADA. The transmission of that experience soon bore additional fruit, when 6-52 ADA deployed to Turkey for Operation NORTHERN WATCH.

Honing the Concept: Operation NORTHERN WATCH

Iraq remained at the center of events. Allied determination to enforce the United Nations resolutions concerning the no-fly zone in northern Iraq in January 1999 appeared likely to provoke some response from Saddam Hussein. Since allied aircraft were operating from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, it appeared possible that Iraq might fire missiles at the Incirlik area to punish Turkey for supporting the coalition against Iraq. Thus, the Turkish government passed a request through the American Embassy in Ankara to have an American Patriot task force sent to defend the area for the duration of the existing crisis. Turkey's chief concern was to defend the air base at Incirlik and the adjacent city of Adana. In response, European Command sent a survey and assessment team to Incirlik on 15 January to find a site for Patriot operations.⁸⁶

The threat assessment was much as it had been for the deployment to Israel. Iraq maintained somewhere between forty-five and sixty Al-Hussein Missiles (a Scud B variant) and between six and ten launchers within the missile's maximum range of the Turkish border. Previous assessments indicated the likely stationing of the launchers in positions whose range could include both Incirlik and the state of Israel. Those sites yielded a nominal missile flight time to Turkey of around eight minutes. Additionally, Iraq had six military airfields from which it could launch combat aircraft. The two northernmost were some 165 kilometers from the Turkish border and about twenty minutes' flight time from Incirlik. The number and types of Iraqi aircraft were known with a reasonable degree of certainty, although the degree of aircraft operational readiness was purely a matter of conjecture. Iraq had some 27 F-1 Mirage fighters and 23 MiG-23 Fishbed fighters at one airfield and 23 SU-22 attack aircraft at the other.

The aircraft were not the threat against which the Patriots were requested, however, since the allied air forces maintained a regular combat air patrol over the no-fly zone and were confident that they could detect and deflect any attack by aircraft. Instead, the problem was the Scud launchers, which Saddam Hussein could activate from hidden positions, particularly in major cities, readying them for action within an estimated ten to fourteen hours.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave the mission to United States European Command, which assigned it to USAREUR. USAREUR, in turn, swiftly passed the

requirement to V Corps, which immediately alerted its 69th ADA Brigade.⁸⁷ The operation had a short lead time. The brigade had to alert, assemble, and deploy a Patriot task force with all of its associated sustainment beginning not later than 0814 the next morning, 16 January, and provide an air and theater missile defense of Incirlik Air Base and, insofar as it was within the system's capabilities, also provide such a defense of the adjacent metropolitan area as quickly as possible.

The brigade commander, Colonel Graziano, made a quick reconnaissance visit to Incirlik, which informed the basis of the brigade plan. His survey included the probable threat level, the NBC detection capability at the air base, the current status of forces agreement, the existing force protection arrangements, and the command and control structure of Operation NORTHERN WATCH. He was reassured to find that his task force could anticipate no command and control problems with the joint task force in Incirlik and that the existing command architecture would allow his units to obtain accurate air traffic information. The Patriots would be under operational control of the commanding general of the existing U.S. joint task force.⁸⁸ To accomplish the tasks the warning order enumerated, he determined that the brigade would send one Patriot minimum engagement package, while preparing other MEPs for deployment if that became necessary. The initial plans envisioned a sixty-day mission.⁸⁹

Graziano gave the mission to the 6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery, then commanded by Lt. Col. Mark S. Bahr, and directed the unit to deliver its fire unit to the deployment processing center in Kaiserslautern by 1100 on 19 January. He expected the battalion to move to Incirlik Air Base within ninety-six hours of receipt of the brigade order—on or about 0800 on the morning of 20 January. The first air load was to carry the advance party and its equipment, and was to be followed by subsequent aircraft delivering the Patriot minimum engagement package, forty PAC II missiles, and the necessary command and control equipment. The commander of the advance party was immediately to coordinate with the commander of the combined joint task force in Incirlik to determine what had to be done to receive the unit and to set up sufficient support to sustain it at the air base.

Despite such active coordination, Task Force 6-52 was not to come under the operational control of the commander of the combined joint task force, Operation NORTHERN WATCH, until "wheels up" from Ramstein Air Force Base. To sustain operations, the battalion's 549th Maintenance Company deployed a section and its equipment as part of the task force. Graziano set the x-hour for deployment in the evening of 14 January 1999, with the n-hour sequence to start on the morning of 16 January. Graziano selected the S-3 of 6-52 ADA, Maj. Joseph A. Simonelli, Jr., as the Patriot task force commander. In the brief interval before deployment the battalion was able to do additional planning on the basis of a second reconnaissance that Graziano and three of his staff made on 17 January to consider air defense technical questions.⁹⁰

The alert order came at the start of a four-day weekend, a time when many soldiers were away from Ansbach, some as far afield as Switzerland. The bat-

talion received notice on Friday afternoon, 16 January, that the leaders should attend a briefing the next day, and therefore began recall procedures right away. Within four hours more than 90 percent of the battalion was present, and all the rest were on hand within a day. Using the x-hour and n-hour sequences that 5-7 ADA had developed and used in its deployment to Israel, 6-52 began preparing to move one minimum engagement package to Turkey, while keeping three other batteries ready to go if needed. A complicating factor was the on-going conversion of the entire 69th ADA Brigade to the new Patriot battalion configuration, so there was some turmoil at battery level for which junior leaders, in particular, had to allow.⁹¹

The battalion readied elements of headquarters and headquarters battery and the 549th Maintenance Company for movement and picked Battery D as the fire unit to deploy. The choice rested on a number of considerations. First among them was that Battery D was fully ready to deploy. Not only was the unit predeployment processing fully up to date, but the battery had also just completed a rigorous command inspection in which it had done particularly well. The fact that the battery had never fired annual service practice was not unusual for Patriot battalions at that time. None of the batteries had undergone a tactical evaluation more recently than two years earlier. Yet, reviewing Patriot system evaluations conducted as part of the command inspection, Simonelli knew that Battery D had two of the best Patriot crews in the battalion, not to mention a battery executive officer and first sergeant that he thought particularly strong. He was also impressed with the capabilities of the recently arrived battery commander, Capt. John Wanat, who knew Patriot tactics and operations thoroughly on the basis of extensive battery experience. In terms of overall training, Battery D had served as the "pusher" unit for batteries that had recently deployed for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and had been involved in helping those units train for their mission. Consequently, Simonelli thought Battery D was better prepared than either Battery C or Battery E for immediate deployment.

With only one firing battery actually deploying, the battalion was able to use its other batteries to carry out many of the necessary tasks to prepare for unit movement, leaving Battery D free to do some extra training with its fire control crews. Simonelli spent the same time in last minute training with his battalion tactical operations center crews. While that was going on, one of the other batteries prepared Battery D equipment for movement; a second road marched the equipment to Ramstein Air Force Base; and a third handled the entire air loading procedure. Within seventy-two hours of notification, the deployment package was at the aerial port of departure, and ninety-six hours after notification, on 20 January, the first flights were airborne from Ramstein. The lead aircraft arrived at Incirlik Air Base at 2230, local time, that same day.⁹²


The first of the air missions carried the battalion command post, the task force commander and battery commanders, and the personnel and equipment to begin setting up the defense. Subsequent aircraft brought in the rest of the MEP, the maintenance equipment, and the rest of the soldiers. A separate aircraft delivered the missiles. Wanat took over setting up the task force for opera-

tions, leaving Simonelli free to work out with the Operation NORTHERN WATCH American commander, Air Force Brig. Gen. David Deptula, how the Patriots would be integrated into the combined joint task force. Tactical disposition of the equipment was based on the conclusions that Graziano's reconnaissance team had already reached, and Wanat and Simonelli looked over the site and made final decisions about how to place the equipment. By the time that quick reconnaissance was done, the subsequent air loads had begun to arrive. Enough soldiers were available to unload each aircraft as it landed and to take the equipment to the positions from which they would operate. The final task was loading the missiles on the launchers.

While Battery D organized the defense, Simonelli began a series of meetings with Deptula and the Air Force general's Turkish counterpart to determine the rules of engagement and how the Patriot task force would be integrated into the combined joint task force. In effect, Simonelli was the ARFOR commander, although that formal command arrangement did not exist. The first day's discussions set the mission parameters. Task Force 6-52 was responsible for antitactical ballistic missile defense and not for defense against aircraft of any kind; fighter aircraft stationed at Incirlik were capable of handling fighters and bomber aircraft, the "air breathing threat," in air defense parlance. By the time the discussions were over, Deptula had agreed to endorse whatever rules of engagement his new air defense experts thought appropriate, a vote of confidence Simonelli appreciated. The Turkish co-commander likewise agreed, signing the first-ever agreement between the United States and Turkey on rules of engagement.

Site improvements proceeded rapidly with the help of Air Force engineers and security police. Temporary hardstands were soon replaced with concrete footings adequate to bear the weight of the launchers and radars; berms were erected; site drainage constructed; and wire strung for force protection. Soldiers dug "Scud bunkers" for emergency use, then built fighting positions in and around the battery location. Telephone lines were installed right away, and the battalion tactical operations center was quickly in direct communications with the combined air operations center, which was also located on the air base.

The task force soon established a daily routine. Acting on the presumption that there would be no Iraqi missile attacks during daylight, when the coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone would be in a position to observe any launches, the task force was able to keep the radars off for most of the daylight hours. (*Map 13*) Nights, or any time the coalition air forces were not flying, were the more likely times for a ballistic missile attack. Satellite early warning monitored the area for the recognized Scud launch profile, and that information could be down-linked instantly to the battalion tactical operations center through the Air Force command and control network. Consequently, the fire control crews were able to spend much of their time in training, using simulator tapes that kept them current not only on local air defense tactics, but also on the tactics used in NATO's Central Region. Routine system maintenance could be performed during the daylight hours, as well. Simonelli conducted periodic



MAP 13

unannounced operational readiness evaluations to test the battery's proficiency, and training was further enhanced by running a complete crew drill as part of any site tour for the combined joint task force commander or other visitor.

As events turned out, Iraq never launched any Scuds at Turkey while TF 6-52 was stationed there, although there were several alerts of possible attacks. The first came seven days into the mission, when early warning detected what appeared to be Scud launches. Simonelli later concluded that the Iraqis had actually launched a salvo of Scuds straight up, in a fruitless attempt to bring down some of the coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone. A similar series of launches occurred in April, but they, like the one on 27 January, were not directed at Turkey. Both "events," as the task force characterized them, served as opportunities to test unit operational readiness and validated the command and control architecture created for Operation Northern Watch.

Originally, the deployment had been envisioned as lasting some sixty days, but it was extended in length several times as the year progressed. On 13 March 1999 the Joint Chiefs of Staff lengthened the term of the mission in Turkey to on or about 20 May 1999.⁹³ The 69th ADA Brigade had already determined that, in the event of any prolongation of the mission, it would relieve the deployed unit and replace it with another battery from 6-52 ADA. Consequently, on 14 March the brigade ordered Battery E to relieve Battery D, which was to return to Germany.⁹⁴

In May the mission was again extended, that time until Independence Day, necessitating another rotation of fire units at Incirlik, with Battery A replacing Battery E.⁹⁵ As with the previous relief, soldiers from the headquarters and headquarters battery and 549th Maintenance Company were also replaced by troops arriving from Germany. The deployment of Battery A differed from the previous relief in place, however, because the brigade ordered it to take its Patriot equipment with it. When Battery E returned to Germany, it brought back the equipment that had been sent to Turkey in January so that required deep maintenance could be performed.⁹⁶

By the time summer arrived, the task force had begun to think of the mission in Turkey as a permanent one, much like Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Saudi Arabia. It was therefore with little surprise that the unit received notification at the beginning of July that the secretary of defense had decided to continue the deployment for another two months. Responding to that extension, the 69th ADA Brigade issued orders for Battery C to replace Battery A, with appropriate changes in supporting personnel as well.⁹⁷

On 16 July Maj. Thomas M. Walton, the newly arrived battalion S-3, replaced Simonelli as commander of TF 6-52. Only a few days after his arrival, Battery C replaced Battery A at Incirlik. Days later, notification arrived in Turkey that the mission was ending. In fact, the redeployment order came shortly after the last mission extension. Battery C was just in the process of assuming the mission when, on 21 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an order canceling the operation and V Corps issued instructions to implement that order.⁹⁸ Discussions about whether to redeploy by air or sea delayed the final arrangements for departure, which USAREUR confirmed on 23 July and which V Corps transmitted to the task force on 28 July. The intention was for the forces to return to Germany on or about 2 September or upon secretary of defense verbal approval and Joint Chiefs of Staff notification, whichever occurred earlier. The V Corps had been concerned about the deployment for some time because it exceeded the operational tempo capability of the Patriot force.⁹⁹ The 69th ADA Brigade detailed the final instructions for TF 6-52 on 30 July.¹⁰⁰

Walton arranged in sequence the tasks that needed to be done to return the task force to Germany, starting with updating redeployment data. Talking with 69th ADA Brigade, he learned that he had about seventy-five hours before the unit checklists for redeployment had to be started. The original plan was to return the task force to Germany via sea lift, so Walton and his small staff worked with the combined joint task force, with the Navy, with the Turkish

authorities, and with the Military Transportation Movement Command to make the arrangements to clear the equipment through customs, move it to the designated port, and then load it on ships. Eventually a decision was reached that it would actually be cheaper to fly the task force back to Germany. Another consideration was that sea lift would consume a lot of time, keeping the Patriot battalion unavailable for further assignment for an extended period. The battalion surmised that the demands of contingency missions, coupled with the scarcity of Patriots in Europe, had much to do with the decision to move the task force by air. Once the demanding task of clearing Turkish customs had been completed, the air flow went smoothly. The last aircraft left Incirlik on 13 August.

Once back in Germany, reconstitution and retraining turned out to be minor issues. Because the batteries that served in Turkey were able to train on Central Region tactics as well as the theater-specific tactics, the units returned to Germany fully capable of reassuming their mission there. The principal retraining issue had to do with things the batteries simply couldn't do at Incirlik. Because they were committed to a fixed site air defense, the troops couldn't do any mobility training. Captain Wanat remarked that moving the equipment, powering it down, powering it up, taking it off of the pads, and setting it up for operations were really perishable skills that needed to be exercised constantly. The units were able to do walk-throughs and discuss mobility training, but that was not the same thing. For various reasons, including political sensitivity, the units did little NBC training in Turkey, either, so that had to be made up after the return to Ansbach. In general, however, the recovery was quick. Battery D went through an external evaluation on NATO tactics within forty-five days of its return to Germany and scored well. The experience of the remainder of the battalion was similar.

Impact of Overseas Operations on ADA Doctrine

For V Corps and its air defense artillery brigade, the decade after the end of the Persian Gulf War was unquestionably a busy one. More than that, however, it heralded a way of looking at air defense operations that was completely at odds with previous habits of thought. Since the earliest days of the Cold War, the model for air defense operations had been integrated command and control (ICC), with every fire unit linked to centralized fire distribution centers that assigned priorities of fire and prevented fratricide, on the one hand; and the wastage of missiles by simultaneous engagement of a target by two fire units, on the other. Such a control architecture was appropriate for the missions envisioned for the air defense artillery, and particularly for the air defense of Western Europe from a Warsaw Pact attack. Communications and centralized control maximized the value of every fire unit. The integrated air defense system was a fundamental precept, as Maj. Harry Cohen observed:

We began writing the doctrine on Patriot at the height of the Cold War. . . . It was written with a high intensity conflict in mind, and the idea was that we fight as a battalion

and integrate fires through the ICC. In turn, you integrate those fires with Hawk across the battlefield through the AN/TSQ-73 system. There was that building-block mentality of air defense in the theater. We even talked about the "theater architecture of air defense." God forbid you should have a single battery out there, fighting on its own! That was the worst case scenario, because then you had a loose cannon, and the probability of fratricide went way up.¹⁰¹

All that abruptly changed after the end of the Cold War. By the time 69th ADA Brigade was sending its batteries and battalions to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel, that model no longer applied. It was true enough that the 69th ADA Brigade and its battalions continued to exercise the NATO tactical procedures and to undergo certifying inspections on a regular, if infrequent, schedule,¹⁰² thereby retaining a capacity to operate in the familiar structured, centralized air defense system envisioned by the doctrinal publications.¹⁰³ The deployments, however, opened up a new operational world. There was no superstructure of air defense command and control in northern Turkey or in Israel, so air defense task force operations had to be controlled from the battalion control center.

Moreover, the pace of operations was so brisk, and the rate of change in the tactical situation potentially so rapid, that the officer on the spot, often a major commanding a task force, or even a captain commanding a fire unit, had to make all the tactical decisions himself. There was little aid to be gleaned from the standing operating procedures in such situations. While each battalion had worked hard to build tactical procedures appropriate to the area of operations, the immediate tactical situation was, at least potentially, at variance with the assumptions that underlay any such document. An additional complication was that joint procedures and combined procedures remained in the process of being formulated, in many cases. Nothing written prior to a deployment could be expected to envision the situation an air defense task force would face.

Therefore Major Cohen spoke the truth when he said that the operational reality in 1999 was completely different than it had been in 1989. When deploying out of Germany, 69th ADA Brigade units were generally small and independent, and their commanders had to think in terms of stand-alone units. No longer could battery commanders look to a control and reporting center for engagement instructions. Instead, as Cohen observed, "we have to put people in charge of those units . . . that are capable of fighting . . . on their own, with only commander's intent to guide them."¹⁰⁴ The impacts on doctrinal development within the Air Defense Artillery branch were obvious.

At the same time, the 69th ADA Brigade strongly influenced the evolution of ADA doctrine as it sought to change its organization to meet the demands of swift deployment. Probably the single-most important innovation in the course of the decade was the invention of the Patriot Minimum Engagement Package, which made it possible to deploy enough firepower to satisfy immediate tactical requirements and to do so with the fewest possible Transportation Command aircraft. The deployments to Israel and Turkey proved the minimum engagement package concept, which the Air Defense Artillery School had already begun to adopt in its revisions of doctrinal manuals by the end of 1999.

Air defense missions in the latter part of the 1990s also demonstrated the necessity of retaining the brigade echelon of command for various types of battalions assigned above division level. The 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade staff commanded and managed all of the air defense deployments, a task completely beyond the capabilities of the small air defense element liaison team on the V Corps staff, as well as beyond the capabilities of an already heavily engaged corps staff. The deployment missions, not just of air defense artillery units, but also of other type units across the corps, argued strongly that the brigade-level staffs were utterly indispensable for the kinds of missions V Corps continued to be given.

NOTES

¹ The 32d AADCOM consisted of the 10th Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Brigade (HAWK), 69th ADA Brigade (HAWK), 94th ADA Brigade (Nike Hercules), 108th ADA Brigade (Chaparral-Vulcan), and the 11th Signal Battalion. The headquarters, commanded by a major general, was stationed at Cambrai-Fritsch Kaserne in Darmstadt and was assigned to Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army. This chapter has benefited from critical reviews by the following participants in the events described: Col. Tim R. Glaeser, Lt. Col. Harry Cohen, and Col. David Casmus. Their comments and recommendations have, as appropriate, been incorporated into the text.

² The 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) became the Army Forces and Joint Forces Land Component Commanders' (ARFOR/JFLCC) organization for theater air and missile defense planning, integration, coordination, and execution. The 32d AAMDC coordinated and integrated theater missile defense to protect contingency, forward-deployed, and reinforcing forces, as well as designated theater strategic forces and installations. The 32d AAMDC commanded echelon above corps (EAC) ADA brigades and other units as appropriate to a given mission. The 32d AAMDC was based at Fort Bliss, Texas, and fell within the authority and under the operational control of U.S. Forces Command. The headquarters derived from the 32d Army Air Defense Command, previously stationed at Darmstadt, Germany, after it was returned to the United States as part of the European drawdown of forces.

³ The 69th ADA Brigade was assigned to V Corps; the 108th ADA Brigade was assigned to XVIII Airborne Corps; the 10th ADA Brigade was inactivated; and the 94th ADA Brigade was assigned to USAREUR until inactivated in 1998. The 31st ADA Brigade, a unit already assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command, was assigned to III Corps. The 35th ADA Brigade was assigned to I Corps. The 11th ADA Brigade remained under control of U.S. Army Forces Command.

⁴ The 69th ADA Brigade and its subordinate elements were reassigned to V Corps effective 1 September 1991 per USAREUR Permanent Orders 138-3, 28 Aug 1991. Maintenance and ordnance companies were reassigned to V Corps effective 1 September 1991 per V Corps Permanent Orders 119-03, 27 Sep 1991. Effective date amended to 16 October 1991 per V Corps Permanent Orders 123-19, 8 Oct 1991.

⁵ To follow the debate, see testimony from the *Congressional Record*: John Conyers, Jr., "Opening Statement by the Chairman of the Committee on Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security. An Oversight Hearing on the Performance of the Patriot Missile in the Gulf War," 7 Apr 1992; and "Testimony before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, April 7, 1992," James W. Carter, Richard Davis, Maj. Gen. Jay M. Garner, Reuven Pedatzur, Theodore Postol, Peter D. Zimmerman, and Charles A. Zraket. Also see

the following reports: *Patriot Missile Defense Software Problems Led to Systems Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia*, General Accounting Office (GAO) Report B-2470949, February 1992; *Data Does Not Exist to Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed*, GAO Report B-250335, September 1992; *Performance of the Patriot Missile System in the Gulf War*, from *Report of the House Committee on Governmental Operations, One Hundred Second Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1991-1992*, Report 102-1086, 1992, pp. 179-88; Postol/Lewis Review of Army's Study on Patriot Effectiveness, Ltr, Ted Postol to Rep. John Conyers, Jr., 8 Sep 1992; Steven A. Hildreth, *Evaluation of U.S. Army Assessment of Patriot Antitactical Missile Effectiveness in the War Against Iraq*, Congressional Research Service for the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, 7 Apr 1992. Also see Max Boot, "New U.S. House Committee Report Will Say Patriot Missile Failed," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 Sep 1992; Seymour Hersh, "Missile Wars," *New Yorker*, 26 Sep 1994, pp. 86-99; Joseph Lovoce, "Conyers: Reopen Patriot Gulf Performance Review and Clear Up Army Discrepancies," *Defense Week*, 1 Jun 1993, pp. 15-16.

⁶ For discussion of this theme, see Terence M. Dorn, "Aftermath: The Emergence of Patriot as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Air Defense* (Spring 1998).

⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687 (3 Apr 1991), 688 (5 Apr 1991), and 949 (15 Oct 1994).

⁸ Information Paper, USAREUR ODCSOPS (DAMO-ODOM), 1 Dec 1999, sub: Patriot Missile Battalion Deployment Schedules.

⁹ Briefing, 1-7 ADA Operation DIGNIFIED REORGANIZATION, n.d., but 1998. Progressive decreases in force levels across the Army prevented the Air Defense from realizing that last objective of decreasing personnel turbulence.

¹⁰ Effective 16 May 1998, USAREUR Permanent Orders 114-8, 24 Apr 1998, assigned the 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery; the 5th Battalion, 7th ADA; the 549th Maintenance Company; and the 19th Maintenance Company to V Corps, which further assigned them to 69th ADA Brigade. Battalions were assigned to V Corps following inactivation of 94th ADA Brigade, effective 15 July 1995, per USAREUR Permanent Orders 208-2, 27 Jul 1995. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 7th ADA, was redesignated Battery D, 5th Battalion, 7th ADA, effective 16 July 1999 per USAREUR Permanent Orders 132-01, 12 May 1999. Battery F, 6th Battalion, 52d ADA, was redesignated Battery E, 5th Battalion, 7th ADA, effective 16 July 1999, per USAREUR Permanent Orders 132-2, 13 May 1999.

¹¹ 1-7 ADA Briefing for 94th ADA Bde, ARABIAN FURY, November 1996. This briefing assumed 1-7/5-7 ADA integration for the mission.

¹² 5-7 ADA Briefing, SWA CONPLANS, 6 Nov 1996.

¹³ E-mail, Lt. Col. Mike Locke (1-7) to Lt. Col. Dan Kirby (5-7), 22 Nov 1996, sub: SWA.

¹⁴ On the joint training process, refer to: Memo, 1-7 ADA for 94th Brigade S-3, 26 Sep 1996, sub: TF 1-7 ADA SWA Training Plan; Briefing, 5-7 ADA, SWA Training Focus, Fall 1996; HQ, 94th ADA Brigade Warning Order 97-004 (SWA CPXs), 11 Oct 1996; 5-7 ADA Warning Order 002 to OPORD 97-9 (SWA CPXs), 171600 Oct 1996; HQ, 94th ADA Brigade, FRAGO 001, to Warning Order 97-004 (SWA CPXs), 30 Oct 1996; Memo, 5-7 ADA for S-3, 30 Oct 1996, sub: Proposed OPD Topics and Tactical Seminars for Addition to MAC (Ch.#1); HQ, 94th ADA Brigade Operations Order 97-004 (SWA CPXs), 18 Nov 1996; 5-7 ADA Operation Order 97-9 (SWA CPX), 21 Nov 1996; 94th ADA Brigade, SWA TAC Seminar Briefing, 25 Nov 1996; 5-7 ADA Force Protection Training Plan, 2 Dec 1996; 5-7 ADA Proposed SWA Training Plan, January 1997; 5-7 ADA Proposed SWA Training Plan, February 1997; 5-7 ADA Proposed SWA Training Plan, March 1997; 5-7 ADA Proposed SWA Training Plan, April 1997; 94th ADA Brigade Briefing; n.d., SWA EXEVAL Overview; Briefing, n.d., 1-7 ADA Rear Detachment Operations.

¹⁵ 5-7 ADA Briefing, 10 Dec 1996, DCINC USAREUR SWA Briefing.

¹⁶ The concept was defined in the Patriot technical manuals and was further defined in USAREUR Pamphlet 350-44, 1998.

¹⁷ Until 1998 the 69th ADA Brigade had been a V Corps ADA brigade, assigned one Patriot missile battalion and one Stinger missile battalion, the latter a short-ranged system. Both battalions of the 7th Air Defense Artillery had previously been assigned to the 94th ADA Brigade, to which USAREUR assigned the strategic deployment mission.

¹⁸ Interv. author with Maj. Harry L. Cohen, Executive Officer, 69th ADA Brigade, and S-3, Task Force SHINING PRESENCE, 18 Jan 2000, Giebelstadt Army Air Field, Germany; 69th ADA Brigade MEP Briefing Slides, n.d.

¹⁹ Cohen interview.

²⁰ Joint Task Force Noble Safeguard Briefing, 17 Feb 1998, Cdr JTF Update.

²¹ Memo, HQ, USEUCOM for Chief, EUCOM Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT) to Israel, 15 Feb 1998, sub: Terms of Reference for ESAT to Israel; Memo, HQ, USEUCOM for Cdr, JTF Noble Safeguard, 25 Feb 1998, sub: Terms of Reference for Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD.

²² Memo, HQ, USEUCOM for Chief, EUCOM Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT) to Israel, 15 Feb 1998, sub: Terms of Reference for ESAT to Israel.

²³ Combined Procedures for Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD (CPONS), 1 Apr 1998.

²⁴ After Action Report for Joint Task Force Noble Safeguard, April 1998.

²⁵ MFR, HQ 5th Battalion (Patriot), 7th Air Defense Artillery, 7 Apr 1998, sub: Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD After Action Review (AAR).

²⁶ CJCS Order 6 Nov 1998, Order Directing Preparation for Deployment of U.S. Forces to Israel; USAREUR Order 070049Z Nov 1998: Warning Order #1, NOBLE SAFEGUARD II; USCINCEUR Order 091735Z Nov 1998: Operation NORDIC KNIGHT; V (US) Corps Order 102141Z Nov 1998: V (US) Corps EXORD for EDRE ISO of Operation NOBLE DEFENDER.

²⁷ Ltr, Defense and Armed Forces Attaché, Embassy of Israel, to the Joint Chief of Staff, J5, 6 Nov 1998.

²⁸ Msg, JCS to USAREUR, 7 Nov 1998, sub: JCS Prep to Execute Order; Msg, HQ, USAREUR to V Corps, 070848Z Nov 1998, sub: Warning Order #1, NOBLE SAFEGUARD II; Msg, HQ, USAREUR to multiple addressees, 091630Z Nov 1998, sub: Activation of JTF Headquarters (Operation NOBLE SAFEGUARD); HQ, USCINCEUR Order 091735Z Nov 1998, Directing Execution Level Planning for Operations to Augment Missile Defense of Israel.

²⁹ Msg, HQ, USAREUR for multiple addressees, 092315Z Nov 1998, sub: EXORD for EDRE ISO Operation NOBLE DEFENDER; Msg, HQ, V Corps to V Corps units, 102141Z Nov 1998, sub: V Corps EXORD for EDRE ISO Operation NOBLE DEFENDER. General Burns assumed duties as corps deputy commanding general on 28 August 1998, replacing Rountree, who received orders to a NATO assignment.

³⁰ Much of this discussion is drawn from Cohen interview. At the time of the mission, Cohen was the S-3 of 5-7 ADA and served as the JTF S-3 in Israel.

³¹ CJCS Order 111635Z Nov 1998, CJCS Deployment Preparation Order; USCINCEUR Order 122035Z Nov 1998, USCINCEUR Planning Order; Msg, USCINCEUR to all European Commands, 14xx35Z Nov 1998, sub: Operation FLEXIBLE RESOLVE.

³² Memo, JTF Commander for CINCEUR, 14 Nov 1998, sub: CDR's SitRep.

³³ Memo, JTF Commander for CINCEUR, 15 Nov 1998, sub: CDR's SitRep, with xerox copy of the report sent back to General Burns via telefax with General Clark's handwritten comments.

³⁴ Msg, COMJTF FLEXIBLE RESOLVE for EUCOM, 16 Nov 1998, SitRep #4 (covers activities from 150001Z Nov 1998 to 160001Z Nov 1998).

³⁵ Memo, JTF Commander for CINCEUR, 16 Nov 1998, sub: CDR's SitRep.

³⁶ A battle book was a unit's compilation of plans, orders, maps, reconnaissance surveys, and similar documents related to a particular mission.

³⁷ Memo, JTF Commander for CINCEUR, 17 Nov 1998, sub: CDR's SitRep.

³⁸ Cohen interview. That was the 69th ADA Brigade's interpretation of EUCOM's intentions, not a formal intelligence estimate.

³⁹ Memo, JTF Commander for CINCEUR, 18 Nov 1998, sub: Cdr's SitRep.

⁴⁰ Memo, JTF Commander for CINCEUR, 20 Nov 1998, sub: CDR's SitRep.

⁴¹ HQ, JTF, Operations Plan 98-11 22 2130L November 1998, Giebelstadt, Germany.

⁴² "Torch Party" was V Corps nomenclature for an advanced party, or ADVON.

⁴³ Cohen interview.

⁴⁴ 5-7 ADA Briefing Slide, Patriot Readiness Considerations, n.d., but Nov 1998.

⁴⁵ Cohen interview.

⁴⁶ See Memo, JTF Shining Presence J3 for JTF Chief of Staff, 22 Nov 1998, sub: Battle Book Comments. Also see Memo, HQ, 5th Battalion (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Unit Commanders and First Sergeants, 13 Nov 1998, sub: Support Equipment to be Readied.

⁴⁷ JCS Deployment Preparation Order, 051730Z Dec 1998; Msg, USCINCEUR for USAREUR et al., 061735Z Dec 1998, sub: Deployment Preparation Order.

⁴⁸ E-mail Msg, Maj. Gen. Julian B. Burns for Maj. Gen. Ronald Keys (USEUCOM J3), Maj. Gen. David D. McKiernan (USAREUR ODCSOPS), et al., 7 Dec 1998, 0850, sub: Receipt of EUCOM and USAREUR orders.

⁴⁹ C-Day denoted commitment day for the forces engaged.

⁵⁰ JTF Operations Plan Briefing, Operation FLEXIBLE RESOLVE, 231130Z Nov 1998.

⁵¹ Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for Cdr, 69th ADA Brigade and V Corps major subordinate commands, 071545Z Dec 1998, sub: V (US) Corps Mission Order 99-18 (SHINING PRESENCE).

⁵² Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for Cdr, 69th ADA Brigade and V Corps major subordinate commands, 072115Z Dec 1998, sub: V (US) Corps Mission Order 99-19, Immediate Recall of Augmentation to JTF Shining Presence.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ HQ, 5th Battalion, 7th ADA, Operation Order 98-06, Exercise Noble Shirley, 090700Z Dec 1998.

⁵⁵ Memo, 5th Battalion (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Cdr, JTF Noble Shirley, 9 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (091700Z DEC 1998).

⁵⁶ Interv, author with 1st Sgt. Leander Benjamin, Battery A, 5th Battalion, 7th ADA, Operation SHINING PRESENCE, 7 Dec 1999, Underwood Kaserne, Hanau, Germany, emphasis in original.

⁵⁷ Public affairs guidance from HQ, 5th Battalion, 7th ADA, Operation Order 98-06, Exercise Noble Shirley, 090700Z Dec 1998.

⁵⁸ JTF Alpha Operations Plan Briefing, 13 Dec 1998. Also see Sixth Fleet Concept of Operations and Schedule of Events for Exercise Noble Shirley, 030645Z Nov 1998; USCINCEUR Execute Order in support of Exercise Noble Shirley, 082235Z Dec 1998.

⁵⁹ The deployment orders: Msg, USCINCEUR for USAREUR et al., 082235Z Dec 1998, sub: Execute Order, EDRE of a Patriot Battalion (-) ISO Exercise Noble Shirley; Msg, Cdr, USAREUR, for Cdr, V Corps, et al., 090734Z Dec 1998, sub: Deployment Order for EDRE ISO Exercise Noble Shirley; Msg, Cdr, V Corps, for Cdr, 69th ADA Brigade and V Corps major subordinate commands, 090116Z Dec 1998, sub: V (US) Corps Mission Order 99-20 (Noble Shirley); Msg, USAREUR for multiple addressees, 091122Z Dec 1998, sub: Immediate Recall of Augmentation for EDRE of TF Alpha in Support of Exercise Noble Shirley; Msg, USCINCEUR for USAREUR et al., 091533Z Dec 1998, sub: Individual Augmentation Directive for Operation

SHINING PRESENCE; and Msg, USAREUR for multiple addressees, 091910Z Dec 1998, sub: Change 1 to Deployment Order for EDRE ISO Exercise Noble Shirley. Also see HQ, 5th Battalion, 7th ADA, WARNORD 99-003, Operation Noble Defender, 12 Nov 1998.

⁶⁰ HQ, 5th Battalion, 7th ADA, Operation Order 98-06, Exercise Noble Shirley, 090700Z Dec 1998.

⁶¹ Msg, DCOMJTF for USEUCOM, 10 Dec 1998, sub: SITREP #1: Covers Activities from 090001Z Dec 1998 to 100001Z Dec 1998; Memo, DCOMJTF for CINCEUR, 2230, 9 Dec 1998, sub: SITREP 02 JTF Noble Shirley; and handwritten note, Lt. Col. Jones, Current Operations, for V Corps G-3, attached to 69 ADA Brigade telefax cover sheet transmitting JTF SITREP 02.

⁶² Details on the deployment and other aspects of the operation have been extracted from Headquarters, JTF Shining Presence, Operations Order 4249A (JTF Shining Presence), 121300Z Dec 1998.

⁶³ Cohen interview; MFR, Battery B, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, 25 Feb 1999, sub: EDRE/Deployment Training Documentation.

⁶⁴ Observed annually in December, the Feast of St. Barbara honors the patron saint of the Artillery and, more particularly, the "traditional brotherhood of stonehurlers, catapulters, rocketeers, gunners, and missileers." The feast of Saint Barbara falls on December 4th and is traditionally recognized by a formal Dining-In or military dinner, often involving the presentation of the Order of Saint Barbara.

⁶⁵ USCINCEUR Deployment Preparation Order, 061735Z Dec 1998. The order directed the deployment to begin on 8 Dec 1998; Cohen interview.

⁶⁶ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Commander, JTF Noble Shirley, 10 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (101700Z DEC 1998).

⁶⁷ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Commander, JTF Noble Shirley, 11 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (111700Z DEC 1998).

⁶⁸ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Commander, JTF Noble Shirley, 12 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (121700Z DEC 1998); also Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Commander, JTF Noble Shirley, 13 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (131800Z DEC 1998).

⁶⁹ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Commander, JTF Noble Shirley, 14 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (141700Z DEC 1998).

⁷⁰ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Commander, JTF Noble Shirley, 15 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, Rear Detachment, TF 5-7 (151700Z DEC 1998).

⁷¹ Hq. HQ, 5th Bn, 7th ADA, Operation Order 98-06, Exercise Noble Shirley, 090700Z Dec 1998.

⁷² Cohen interview.

⁷³ U.S.-Israel Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Combined Standing Operating Procedures (CSOP) (Draft), 23 Sep 1998.

⁷⁴ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, thru ARFOR Cdr, for Cdr, JTF Alpha, 15 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (151700Z DEC 98). Meanwhile, the rear detachment consolidated its remaining troops and planned for the possibility that it might be required to support the deployed elements of the battalion. See Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Cdr, JTF Noble Shirley, 16 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, Rear Detachment, TF 5-7 (161700Z DEC 1998).

⁷⁵ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, thru ARFOR Cdr, for Cdr, JTF Alpha, 16 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (161700Z DEC 98).

⁷⁶ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, thru ARFOR Cdr, for Cdr, JTF Alpha, 18 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (181700Z DEC 98).

⁷⁷ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, thru ARFOR Cdr, for Cdr, JTF Alpha, 19 Dec 1998,

sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (191700Z DEC 98).

⁷⁸ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Cdr, JTF Noble Shirley, 17 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, Rear Detachment, TF 5-7 (171730Z DEC 1998).

⁷⁹ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, for Cdr, JTF Noble Shirley, 18 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, Rear Detachment, TF 5-7 (181800Z DEC 1998).

⁸⁰ Memo, 5th Bn (Patriot), 7th ADA, thru ARFOR Cdr, for Cdr, JTF Alpha, 20 Dec 1998, sub: Significant Activities Report, TF 5-7 (201700Z DEC 98).

⁸¹ Benjamin interview.

⁸² Cohen interview.

⁸³ Benjamin interview; Cohen interview. Sergeant Benjamin had served in the last of the mobile Nike Hercules battalions, the 2d Battalion (Nike Hercules), 52d ADA, stationed at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, for the continental United States air defense mission until 1978, and with a battalion element stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas. The battalion maintained two full sets of equipment. One was stationed in Florida for continental air defense and the other set was stored at Fort Gillem, Georgia, in readiness for deployment.

⁸⁴ Benjamin interview.

⁸⁵ Cohen interview.

⁸⁶ For general background information and details of the plans development process, see Briefing, 69th ADA Brigade Mission Analysis, Operation NORTHERN WATCH, for V Corps commander, January 1999.

⁸⁷ USCINCEUR Deployment Order, 132035Z Jan 1999. Units received the CJCS Planning Order on 14 January 1999. USAREUR, HQ, WARNO for deployment of PATRIOT to Turkey, 151332Z Jan 1999. V Corps Mission Order #99-30, PATRIOT Support to Operation NORTHERN WATCH, 161251Z Jan 1999. Additional guidance was gleaned from Msg, AMEMBASSY ANKARA for multiple addressees, 131500Z Jan 1999, sub: MFA on legal basis for No Fly Zones, ROE Northern Iraq, Patriots, and DECA.

⁸⁸ Memo, Col. H. A. Graziano for 69th ADA Brigade Leaders, 16 Jan 1999, sub: Initial Trip Report for Operation OTTOMAN WATCH.

⁸⁹ Unless otherwise cited, all details of the mission are drawn from HQ, 69th ADA Brigade, Operations Order 99-01, Patriot Support to Operation NORTHERN WATCH, 16 Jan 1999.

⁹⁰ Memo, Col. Graziano for 69th ADA Brigade Leaders, 17 Jan 1999, sub: Trip Report #2 for Operation OTTOMAN WATCH. The team returned to Germany on 18 January and immediately went to Ansbach to share its findings with TF 6-52 ADA.

⁹¹ Discussion of the deployment is based on the following, unless otherwise cited: Interviews, author with Maj. Joseph A. Simonelli, Jr., S-3, 69th ADA Brigade, and Cdr, Task Force 6-52, Operation NORTHERN WATCH, 18 Jan 2000, Giebelstadt Army Air Field, Germany, and with Maj. Thomas M. Walton, Executive Officer, 6th Battalion, and Capt. John Wanat, Commander, Battery D, 6th Battalion, 52d ADA, Operation NORTHERN WATCH, both on 13 Dec 1999 at Shipton Kaserne, Ansbach, Germany; and Michael Walton, "Ottoman Watch: 6-52 ADA Deploys to Defend Incirlik Against Iraqi Scuds, *Air Defense Magazine* (September 1999).

⁹² Also see Memo, Battery B, 6th Battalion, 52d ADA, for Bn Cdr, 24 Jan 1999, sub: D Btry Deployment After Action Review; and MFR, Battery D, TF 6-52 ADA, 29 Jan 1999, sub: Deployment After Action Report.

⁹³ CJCS Msg, 130315Z Mar 1999, Modification to CJCS DEPOD for Patriot Deployment to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

⁹⁴ 69th ADA Brigade Warning Order 99-05, Operation NORTHERN WATCH Patriot Task Force Relief in Place, 121200Z Mar 1999; 69th ADA Brigade Execute Order 99-06, Operation

NORTHERN WATCH Patriot Task Force Relief in Place, 141200Z Mar 1999.

⁹⁵ Msg, CJCS for multiple addressees, 121605Z May 1999, further extended the deployment to on or about 4 July 1999; Msg, USAREUR for multiple addressees, 071121Z May 1999, sub: Patriot Extension in Turkey, Mission 9905030; Msg, V Corps for 69th ADA Brigade, 071800Z May 1999, Mission Order 99-71, sub: Patriot Support to Operation NORTHERN WATCH; Msg, V Corps for 69th ADA Brigade, 141627Z May 1999, sub: Change 1 to Mission Order 99-71, Patriot Support Operation NORTHERN WATCH; 69th ADA Brigade Warning Order 99-09, 100700Z May 1999, Operation NORTHERN WATCH Patriot Task Force Transfer of Authority.

⁹⁶ 69th ADA Brigade Execute Order 99-11, 110800Z May 1999, Operation NORTHERN WATCH Patriot Task Force Transfer of Authority.

⁹⁷ CJCS Msg, 021850Z Jul 1999, sub: Operation NORTHERN WATCH, was modification 3 to the CJCS deployment order issued on 16 Jan 1999; 69th ADA Brigade Order 99-12, 031200Z Jul 1999, Operation NORTHERN WATCH Patriot Task Force Relief in Place; HQ, 6th Bn, 52d ADA FRAGO 2 to 69th ADA Brigade Operation Order 99-07, 291000Z Jun 1999, Operation NORTHERN WATCH (OTTOMAN WATCH).

⁹⁸ Msg, CJCS for multiple addressees, 211957Z Jul 1999, sub: CJCS Execute Order, Immediate Redeployment of Patriot Forces at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey; V Corps FRAGO 99-30, 211857Z Jul 1999, Immediate Redeployment of Patriot Forces at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

⁹⁹ Msg, USAREUR for V Corps, 231300Z Jul 1999, sub: Cdr USAREUR Redeployment Order of Patriots in Turkey, Mission 9907106; Msg, Cdr V Corps to Cdr 69th ADA Brigade, 282145Z Jul 1999, sub: V Corps Mission Order 99-83, Redeployment of Patriot Elements at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

¹⁰⁰ 69th ADA Brigade Execute Order 99-13, 301100Z Jul 1999, Operation NORTHERN WATCH Patriot Task Force Redeployment.

¹⁰¹ Cohen interview.

¹⁰² The principal external evaluation was the NATO Tactical Evaluation, or TacEval, designed to make certain that ADA fire units were able strictly to adhere to NATO standards. On the most recent NATO TacEval at the time of the Israel and Turkey deployments, see Col. Harold A. Graziano, "69th ADA Brigade Soldiers Dominate NATO TACEVAL," *Air Defense* (Spring 1998).

¹⁰³ In particular, Field Manual 44-00, *Air Defense Operations* (under revision as of March 2000) and Field Manual 44-85, *Patriot Battery/Battalion Operations* (under revision as of March 2000).

¹⁰⁴ Cohen interview.

The Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina

"We have all the possibility of a NATO contingency in Yugoslavia."

Col. William W. Alexander
V Corps Deputy Chief of Staff, 1992

"Stay focused and remain ready for any development."

Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams
V Corps Commanding General
27 November 1995

"The operational pace for the forces in the United States Army, Europe, is very high. The tempo is extremely high, soldiers are working extremely hard, and the bench is extremely shallow."

Maj. Gen. William L. Nash
Commanding General, 1st Armored Division
and Task Force Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina
16 May 1997

"Politics is to the strategic planner what weather is to the tactical planner."

Comment in V Corps Battle Staff Meeting
15 March 1996

The V Corps played a large part in the complicated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina that began in 1995. In some ways that assignment reflected the changes in operational technique with which the corps had been experimenting for five years, not to mention being a completely different type of mission. In the years after the end of the Cold War, V Corps had already reconsidered the way the headquarters might expect to be employed in various types of operations. Since the Persian Gulf War, V Corps had become accustomed merely to preparing, training, and providing forces that other commanders used, rather than commanding those forces itself. When the United States Army committed forces to the NATO Implementation Force in 1995, V Corps continued to prepare, train, and provide forces, just as it had done in other operations after 1992. In addition, however, the corps staff also provided forces from the strength of the Spe-

cial Troops Battalion¹ to erect the ad hoc headquarters required to support and sustain U.S. Army units under NATO control. As a consequence, 1995 and 1996 were in many ways the most difficult and demanding years the corps had so far experienced since the end of the Cold War.

The new headquarters, described in detail below, was dubbed USAREUR (Forward). It was stationed in Hungary and manned to a large extent with V Corps staff and troops. The nature and requirements of the mission made it very difficult to separate V Corps operations from those of the forward USAREUR headquarters. It was generally futile to try to determine what was a V Corps staff action and what was a USAREUR staff action because V Corps staff officers moved continuously between the corps staff and USAREUR (Forward) staff, of which they made up around 60 percent; because the corps commander also was the Deputy Commander, USAREUR (Forward), and conducted both V Corps and USAREUR business wherever he happened to be, in many cases using the same staff officers for both purposes; because the corps commander appeared generally to make no distinction between the missions assigned to USAREUR (Forward) and V Corps (Main) staffs; and because V Corps officers had been deeply involved in the planning process for years before the deployment, and intimately involved in the immediate plans that sent American forces to Bosnia.

Indeed, V Corps staff officers frequently lacked the time or the energy to take notice of which "hat" they were wearing when they worked a particular action, or the inclination much to care. The surrounding cast of characters was familiar, as well—a factor that complicated any attempt to make a distinction about which staff was dealing with an issue at a given moment. The 3d Corps Support Command, which provided V Corps logistics, essentially became 21st Theater Army Area Command (Forward), while the V Corps Artillery staff became the headquarters of Task Force Victory, which supported operations from Germany.² In many ways, therefore, the needs of the NATO mission dismembered the V Corps staff, and although many who served on that staff would argue the point with some asperity, it virtually ceased to exist as an independent headquarters during the first year of operations in Bosnia. It certainly functioned on a very reduced scale and served more as a pool from which the various other staffs running Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR drew manpower.

Accordingly, the story of V Corps and the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina became what members of the V Corps staff, however constituted and wherever located, did to plan and carry out their orders to place an American task force under NATO control for implementation of the peace in the Balkans. One thing is clear, however: command of all American forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina devolved upon NATO, and V Corps had no role to play at the tactical level in the former Yugoslav state. The story of V Corps operations instead lay in the planning for deployment, sustainment, and redeployment; creation and operation of the headquarters that delivered Task Force Eagle to NATO and provided American national support to that task force; and all operations within Germany that supported American forces in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

V Corps Plans from 1992 Through Early 1995

The possibility that the Army might receive some mission in the former Republic of Yugoslavia arose as early as the spring of 1992, when the civil war raging there captured world headlines. Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox, V Corps commander at that time, did not see the future of corps operations as being in central Europe. Instead, he considered eastern and southern Europe to be more volatile because the situation there, more than at any time since the Second World War, lacked control. The consequence, as Maddox remarked in 1992, was that "old national, ethnic, and religious differences have arisen that precipitate regional fighting." Yugoslavia was an obvious concern, although not unique and not, as he saw it, the end of a process that might require many peacekeeping missions on NATO's flanks.³

Still, Yugoslavia was the immediate flash point, and Maddox therefore asked his staff for regular briefings on the situation in the Balkans, as well as a careful consideration of the German attack on Yugoslavia in May 1941, and specifically including an analysis of base areas selected, rail and road routes used and the tonnage they carried, and the operations plan for that attack. Simultaneously, Company A, 302d Military Intelligence Battalion, presented an analysis of the military topography of the region, and the corps historian and intelligence analysts presented a joint briefing on the political and cultural background of the on-going civil war. Thereafter, updates on the political and military situation in the Balkans remained a regular feature of the twice-weekly V Corps operations and intelligence briefings.⁴ Concerned that there might be little time to react to a crisis, Maddox stressed the need for concise, timely orders. He set the standard that the corps staff had to be able to produce a complete operations plan within six hours. More specifically, he emphasized that the staff had to learn to write orders, instead of plans, the better to respond quickly to unforeseen threats.⁵

As the Republic of Yugoslavia continued to disintegrate, the United Nations took an interest in monitoring the process.⁶ In January 1992 the UN secretary general decided to send fifty military liaison officers to Bosnia to monitor the latest cease-fire there,⁷ and in February he established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as "an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."⁸ It was in support of that effort that V Corps sent Task Force 212, based on the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, to Zagreb, Croatia, to care for UNPROFOR casualties.⁹

Concerned about the possible need to rescue UN peacekeepers from Bosnia at some point, Pentagon officials in July 1992 asked USAREUR to determine what would be required to secure a land route from the Adriatic Sea to Sarajevo. Calling in V Corps planners, the USAREUR staff began a crash project to develop a concept to open a secure route with a thirty-kilometer buffer zone on each side. After three or four days the two headquarters arrived at a preliminary answer that some 200,000 soldiers would be needed. The planning task was

especially problematic because, in the words of one of the lead V Corps staff officers, it was really only a "sketchy mission analysis based on some really rudimentary map studies and the best intel we had at the time on what the Bosnian Serb army had in terms of forces and equipment."¹⁰ When the staff began to frame its estimates, the corps commander directed it to assume that there was a viable role for NATO in Bosnia, but not for a unilateral force. Therefore, his staff would not plan that the United States would conduct any Balkan operation entirely on its own. One of the major political considerations, and one arising from the Persian Gulf War, was a real question of whether it would even be politically and diplomatically possible to use Germany or some other third country to launch a non-NATO, unilateral contingency operation.¹¹

The corps staff took another long look at the problem starting in November 1992, going into considerable detail after the first of the new year when European Command organized a joint task force headquarters in Stuttgart to evaluate a number of different options and contingencies, including the eventual air-lifting of humanitarian supplies to beleaguered civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation PROVIDE PROMISE.¹² As a further complication for USAREUR, the United Nations on 11 December 1992 expanded its UNPROFOR mission to include observation of the Serbia-Macedonia border, a mission to which USAREUR, and eventually V Corps, provided forces.¹³ The V Corps staff work in January and February 1993 concerned the possibility of an evacuation of UN troops from Croatia, and in February 1993 the corps operations staff briefed the resulting draft plan to USAREUR, which then handed it off to the Berlin Brigade for execution, should that ever be required.¹⁴

Meanwhile, European Command used its joint task force in Stuttgart to consider various other planning options. Chief among them was NATO OPLAN 4228, a peace implementation plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina. USAREUR designated the V Corps staff as the lead Army planners for that operation, and their deliberations continued into May 1992, when the corps also brought the 1st Armored Division staff into the process. The operations staff already knew that the 1st Armored Division was the designated American contingent for any multinational or coalition operation. In late May or early June the NATO planners decided to use the Allied Command, Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps, or ARRC,¹⁵ for any mission in Bosnia, and the ARRC staff thereafter took over the direction of NATO Balkans planning. Meanwhile, the V Corps staff continued to do implementation planning in operations and logistics on behalf of the U.S. Army elements that would be assigned to the ARRC.

Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, by then corps commander, briefed the chief of staff of the Army on the developing plan in May and June 1993 and received additional guidance on how the Army should approach the problem. Among other things, the chief of staff wanted the hard lessons learned from the recent Somalia intervention wrapped into the planning process. In any event, it was at that point evident that the widely publicized Vance-Owen Peace Plan and the UN Peace Plan for Bosnia were not going to be implemented any time soon.¹⁶

Planning continued through 1993 and 1994 in various forms "at a very macro level of detail," as Lt. Col. Dan Sulka, the G-4 plans officer, put it, and never lower than division staff. It was not until May 1993 that the requirement existed to build a U.S. Army force deployment list to accompany the emerging plans.¹⁷ In December 1994 the staff looked again at various NATO contingency plans for the extraction of the UNPROFOR troops from Bosnia. As before, the corps was to be a force provider. NATO's planning concept was to try to adjust OPLAN 4228 for each mission, changing it as little as possible despite the fact that differing missions might be involved. When General George Joulwan became Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, he gave Admiral Jeremy Boorda at Allied Forces, Southern Europe, additional guidance to be ready on short notice to pull the UN troops out if the situation in Bosnia deteriorated. The resulting NATO OPLAN 40104, which considered extraction of the UNPROFOR from Bosnia, projected a six-month mission that used a ratio of two to two and one-half NATO soldiers for every one UN peacekeeper to be extracted. That plan was the most current NATO operation plan that existed as the events of 1995 began to heighten the crisis.¹⁸

Therefore, at the beginning of 1995 the V Corps staff had been involved for almost three years at varying degrees of intensity in plans for various contingencies in the Balkans generally, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically. It was a curious situation for planners educated in the Leavenworth tradition. There was never a corps plan, or a USAREUR plan, or even a theater plan. Instead, work was done at the NATO plans level, and the corps was given bits and pieces of those plans with instructions to implement them as a force provider to a NATO mission. Many frustrations arose. NATO planners did not necessarily look at military operations as American planners would, and the corps staff occasionally found itself to be at the mercy of concepts with which it did not necessarily agree.

From the deployment and logistical points of view, the concern was somewhat greater because political considerations kept V Corps planners distanced from reality. The battle staff was never permitted to make any actual reconnaissance of the ports, railheads, roads, and airfields in the Balkans. Instead, planners had to depend upon satellite imagery, analyses the G-2 terrain team provided, their own map analyses, UN reports on bridge and route classification, and other such second- and third-hand information. The staff, and particularly the G-4 plans staff, remained extremely uncomfortable about having to rely upon other peoples' assessments in making assumptions about information that would be so crucial in any movement of American troops. No one was so credulous as unquestioningly to accept those assessments as valid, particularly those that came from nonmilitary sources unfamiliar with technical military planning requirements.

Wary corps planners feared one other thing, as well. Throughout the years between 1992 and 1995, V Corps had carried out a number of operations outside of central Europe, some concurrent, some executed on the spot, and very few of which had ever gone through a formal planning process—the Task Force

212 medical mission to Croatia was a notable example. Planners worried that political events in the Balkans might not leave them adequate time to prepare properly to deploy the 1st Armored Division or other corps units as part of any NATO mission.¹⁹ Their fears turned out to be well-founded.

The corps had issued orders in March 1993 for the 1st Armored Division to begin training for various contingencies in Bosnia. Itself responding to the changing mission requirements, the Seventh Army Training Center developed a special training program based on needs determined in the course of division mission planning, and the battalions thereafter began to include what was then termed "operations other than war" as part of every training cycle. After March, the possibility of going to Bosnia became an almost continuous disruption, in the judgment of Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, then V Corps chief of staff. "Every little fluctuation of the international situation," he said in August 1994, had "resulted in a ripple of getting ready to go, involving some training and, depending on how serious the ripple was, some tweaking of the plans." The cost to readiness was high, Meigs concluded, when having one division "on the edge of a deployment situation for more than a year."²⁰

General Rutherford, noting the "lulls and peaks and valleys" in the crisis, also commented on the demands such duty placed on the division. "Depending on whether we think peace is at hand," he later said, "the division has had to lean forward again and again. That alone, to the leadership, causes a lot of turbulence."²¹ When Maj. Gen. William L. Nash assumed command of the 1st Armored Division in 1994, he was already aware of the almost two years of training that the division had undergone to ready itself for a contingency in Bosnia and of the costs the division had paid for that preparation. Such training remained one of many missions the division had to accomplish, Nash observed after the fact, because "Bosnia was a high priority when I assumed command, but it was not on the front burner."²² By the middle of 1995, that was to change.

Preliminary Steps in 1995

A steady escalation of the intensity of fighting in the former Republic of Yugoslavia through the summer of 1995 increased the likelihood that the UNPROFOR peacekeepers might require assistance. In March Croatia informed the United Nations that the UNPROFOR in that county had to be removed, but later agreed to a revised establishment, the UN Confidence Restoration Organization, created on 31 March.²³ Meanwhile, on 20 March Bosnia-Herzegovina launched a major military offensive against the Bosnian Serbs in its northeastern region. On 1 May the Croatian Army likewise delivered an attack some seventy-five miles southeast of Zagreb to regain territory held by the Bosnian Serbs, fighting that marked the renewal of the 1991 war during which Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Federal Yugoslav Army, captured nearly a third of Croatia.²⁴

Probably as a response to that fighting, the Bosnian Serbs soon thereafter made headlines by preventing UN peacekeepers from leaving their compound

in Sarajevo. By 5 May Croatian and Bosnian Serb forces had carried their fighting into the mandated UN separation zones. Also in the spring, Bosnian Serb troops took heavy weapons from a UN depot near Sarajevo and refused to return them. In response, NATO aircraft attacked eight Bosnian Serb ammunition depots, while the Serbs, in turn, fired on five UN-protected cities and, in a humiliating episode for the UNPROFOR, took more than 350 UN peacekeepers hostage. Thirteen more UN peacekeepers were used as "human shields" to protect Bosnian Serb ammunition depots at a military headquarters at Pale on 26 May. Two days later Bosnian Serbs seized thirty-three British members of the UNPROFOR near Gorazde.

By the end of June most of the hostages had been released, but Bosnian Serb forces on 12 July overran the UN-declared "safe area" of Srebrenica. In early August Croatian and Bosnian forces attacked Bosnian Serb units in a brisk campaign that regained control of the Krajina area of Croatia and substantial portions of northeastern Bosnia. Throughout that period, apparently random shelling and sniper fire continued to produce casualties, culminating in a Bosnian Serb shelling of a Sarajevo market on 28 August that killed thirty-seven and wounded eighty-five.²⁵ The steady escalation of the fighting, as well as its generalized spread throughout the region, revealed that the UNPROFOR was unable to keep the peace under the circumstances that then existed and could not even prevent the warring factions from taking UN soldiers hostage.

As early as July 1994 NATO had begun considering ways to retrieve the situation in Bosnia. In that month, Admiral Boorda's headquarters in Naples began drafting OPLAN 40104 for the extraction of UN peacekeepers by NATO forces. In the course of August the Joint Staff informally directed European Command to develop a concept plan to employ a peace implementation force using NATO troops. Curiously, the Joint Chiefs also instructed the European headquarters not to coordinate its evolving concept with its component commands.²⁶ As a consequence, planning at different levels of command proceeded without a commander's intent having been articulated—and therefore with varying assumptions and consequently taking varying directions.

NATO published its initial plan in the middle of January 1995, and American headquarters subsequently began their own planning in support of the NATO document. The USAREUR requirement, calculated in February 1995, was for around 24,000 soldiers to support OPLAN 40104, a troop level that European Command later reduced to 13,500. At the end of March USAREUR ordered its strategic reserve, the airborne task force assigned to the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) at Vicenza, Italy, to begin its own planning to extract the UN peacekeepers from Bosnia. Thus, on the first of April SETAF began working on a plan initially known as RISKY RUG RAT, and later as DARING LION.²⁷

Direct V Corps involvement began that month, when USAREUR directed the Corps to run an exercise to help the airborne task force prepare for DARING LION. Continuous SETAF planning and command post exercises culminated in Exercise Mountain Shield at the Grafenwöhr Training Area between 10 and 12 June 1995. Despite all the effort that SETAF had put into the planning, its

Task Force Lion arrived at Grafenwöhr with "only a modicum of a plan," in the judgment of the corps staff. During the command post exercise, members of the corps staff worked with the task force staff over a large-scale map in one of the maintenance bays at the exercise area, war-gaming the problem and proposing solutions. They were, as one staff officer characterized it, "scratching a plan out in the dirt" at that point. By the time the command post exercise was over, plans were still not written, but they had been well started and delineated with both a clear picture of the missions that had to be performed and a concept of how to accomplish those missions. To complete the task, the corps and SETAF returned in September for Exercise Mountain Shield II, where staffs more thoroughly developed plans and tested the implementing procedures.²⁸

From the point of view of later planning, the Mountain Shield exercises were valuable because they helped the staff to think through all of the problems involved in such an operation and to rough out solutions.²⁹ The early planning work immediately proved useful. General John Abrams, who came to corps command in mid-1995, discussed the issues involved at length with General William Crouch, the Army's commander in chief in Europe, and reached the provisional conclusion that the U.S. involvement would be limited at first to air power and intelligence operations, although inserting ground forces appeared likely if the various parties finally did sign a peace accord.³⁰ Providing against the likelihood that more than a light airborne task force would eventually be needed, USAREUR in July directed V Corps to develop a campaign plan for the deployment of an American ground force to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was with that step that V Corps became decisively involved in the forthcoming operation, and that the evolution of what eventually became USAREUR Campaign Plan 40105 began.³¹

Troops-to-Task Analysis and Mission Analysis

When the Joint Chiefs in August asked European Command for an operational concept and statement of requirements, General Joulwan passed the question of requirements to the USAREUR staff, which began a troops-to-task analysis and itself turned to V Corps, which would obviously be the principal provider of forces for any operation. The corps G-3 plans officers quickly generated their own troops-to-task analysis outlining the forces that would be necessary in three situations: at "minimum," at "mission essential," and at "prudent risk" levels. The corps forwarded its completed estimate to USAREUR, which reviewed it and established the corps computations as the base line for the U.S. force deployments to Bosnia.³²

Aside from the experience of the two Mountain Shield exercises to prepare SETAF's Task Force Lion for Operation DARING LION, a solid basis for further planning already existed. The corps had earlier developed a plan to deploy 1st Armored Division as part of the ARRC into Bosnia for peacekeeping missions of various sorts, and the division had been training and preparing itself for almost two years on the basis of that plan. There was also a plan in existence for

peacekeeping missions of the type carried out by the UNPROFOR, and the staff had further prepared a related plan to extract the UNPROFOR from Bosnia under conditions of duress, if that became necessary. Beyond that, there had been a dialogue between corps and USAREUR planners for a number of years about the possible employment of American, and specifically V Corps, units in the area of operations. Finally, there was the happy coincidence that the new V Corps chief of war plans, Lt. Col. Albert Bryant, had been a battalion commander in 1st Armored Division and brought with him a considerable amount of background knowledge about Bosnia-Herzegovina. Already assigned a notional sector in Bosnia, Bryant's battalion had studied the terrain and the technical and tactical requirements that operations there would impose and that would have conditioned the structure of his task force. His knowledge proved important to the plans staff as it began its work.

The G-3 planners were delighted to find that, for the first time, the corps was not given an up-front constraint about the number of soldiers that could be used. Rather, USAREUR asked the corps what forces were necessary to conduct an operation over a sustained period under the conditions that appeared to exist in Bosnia. The planning guidance issued by USAREUR and the corps commander anticipated a very different operation from those that had previously been envisioned. In the past, all operations assumed a low force level and a very short duration mission. Now, the G-3 was expected to plan for an operation that would last for more than six months, that would require sustainment of the force in theater for an extended time, and that would be a peace making or peace enforcement mission, rather than a peacekeeping mission—an important distinction in terms of the way the forces had to be organized, equipped, and trained. At that time, the projected mission involved two major functions. The first was organizing and developing an American force to assist in the NATO peace enforcement mission, and the second was an "equip and train" mission to provide assistance to the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The corps evolved three courses of action for a force level that it thought was appropriate for the anticipated tasks. Further guidance from the corps commander led planners to develop the estimate in the direction of a powerful, corps-size task organization, a heavy mechanized force capable of dealing with any tactical situation that might arise. That was a key decision, because it led the corps away from the concept of using a single division for all tasks. Implicit in the organization the corps suggested was some kind of national support element located in or adjacent to the theater to manage sustainment of the task force. All of the options were substantial ones: Course of Action #1 called for 38,000 ground troops; Course of Action #2 called for 34,000; and Course of Action #3 called for 31,000.

The corps sent its staff estimate back through USAREUR to U.S. European Command and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all three superior headquarters carefully discussed the document and reviewed its provisions and recommended courses of action. Out of that discussion emerged the force cap of 25,000 that was imposed on the total U.S. strength in Bosnia. Pondering that limitation, the

corps staff estimated that such a force would involve an acceptable risk because American troops would also be augmented by some three brigades of multinational forces, each of which would bring its own logistical support. The immediate conclusion, however, was that the 1st Armored Division staff needed to be considerably augmented, because its existing command and control structure would be overwhelmed by the additional forces and the wide range of missions that had to be supervised.

Preliminary and often detailed discussions continued into the month of September. Because the corps had been led to expect the possibility that it would be ordered to deploy troops as early as 1 October, the staff developed a short-notice plan based on the earlier plans to extract UN forces from Bosnia. The base planning consideration gave the U.S. forces an area around Tuzla, but called for them to enter the area of operations from the Adriatic coast, passing through the French and German sectors. The operations plan involved the 1st Armored Division and elements of five of the corps' separate brigades to provide the needed combat support and logistics. The other major development was that the "equip and train" mission was deleted. By that time the corps and the 3d Infantry Division military assistance plan had been briefed to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but it seemed clear that the political decision to put it into effect would not be made.³³

On 6 September selected portions of the corps battle staff went to Grafenwöhr to brief the corps commander on its progress with the mission analysis for the NATO Implementation Force.³⁴ General Abrams was not satisfied with the direction the analysis had taken. He told the planners that their thinking was too tactical in nature and too operationally concerned, and that they had made the basic mistake of doing a mission analysis for what would become Task Force Eagle, rather than for the V Corps commander, whose role in the mission was by then emerging as the deputy commander for USAREUR in a forward support base. The analysis also did not pay sufficient attention to training the task force, validating that training, and readying the task force for deployment.

Instead, Abrams wanted the staff carefully to review the connections between the strategic and tactical levels of warfare so that the corps would be able to assist the Task Force Eagle commander in carrying out the duties of the NATO Implementation Force. Abrams told the staff that the corps' role in the operation was twofold: it was the headquarters that would assist General Nash in coping with the operational level of war while deployed; and, probably initially more important, it would prepare the 1st Armored Division to take up its duties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following that meeting, the battle staff remained at Grafenwöhr for five or six days, developing the issues Abrams had raised, and then returned to Heidelberg to continue work on the mission analysis.

Devising a Force Structure

The original concept of the operation was that V Corps itself would have no part in the mission in Bosnia beyond preparing and providing forces. A re-

inforced 1st Armored Division, supported by normal logistics—the 16th Corps Support Group—would function under direction of the commanding general of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, or COMMARC, as he was called. The planners understood Abrams' initial concept as being that a very small element of the corps staff would go with the USAREUR (Forward) headquarters, while the majority of the corps staff would remain in Germany to handle on-going, routine corps operations. Majors Richard Dixon and Ronald Hansen, both assigned to G-3 Plans, developed a force structure based on the assumptions that the units would operate in northern Bosnia and that they would have to monitor a zone of separation between warring parties, that latter already an element of the ongoing peace negotiations. Abrams told the staff that force protection was his top priority, and the planners were therefore very conservative in building their force estimates. That understood, their principal planning imperatives were structuring the force, developing a strike capability, providing a reserve within each brigade for force protection, and security and sustainment of the units.

The terrain in Bosnia governed many of the decisions. While the northern region of the U.S. sector was fairly flat, the southern area was mountainous and difficult. Throughout the region the roads were poor and few of the bridges had been weight classified. The compartmented terrain limited communications, and it was immediately obvious that radio relay stations would have to be set up in some fairly isolated locations. Because of the poor roads, even the base camps would be difficult—and slow—to reinforce in an emergency. One of Dixon's and Hansen's first ideas was therefore to create a centrally located strike brigade consisting of attack and utility aircraft and a light infantry force that could reach any of the task force locations within fifteen to twenty minutes. That assumption governed stationing, with the result that planners tried to place the brigades at distances of not more than twenty to twenty-five kilometers from the base of the strike force.

Assuming a three-brigade American force, the planners decided to place the majority of the armor in the flatter northern part of the U.S. sector, while reserving the infantry for the eastern and western sectors. The plan gave each brigade commander an attack helicopter battalion and allotted an additional military police battalion for security missions. Working prior to the imposition of the 25,000-man cap, Dixon and Hansen ended up with an estimate of 38,000 ground troops to accomplish the mission in Bosnia, which corps forwarded to USAREUR as its preferred Course of Action #1. Presumably reacting to the USAREUR estimate, European Command issued a force cap of 38,000 for Task Force Eagle, although it reduced the allowable total to 35,000 the next day and to 20,000 on 23 August.³⁵

USAREUR responded to the force limitations by asking V Corps which parts of the force could satisfactorily be replaced by multinational units. The corps staff concluded that foreign construction engineers, combat engineers, and bridging units would present no interoperability problems. Similarly, transportation units for line haul could be from other armies, as could the chemical units, heavy rotary-wing airlift, and some of the signal units. Medical support,³⁶

however, should remain based on American units, as should psychological operations and civil affairs units, the latter chiefly because they were implementing national policies. Attack aviation, air defense, military intelligence, and artillery support should also continue to be parts of the U.S. force structure. When they finished that analysis, the G-3 planners concluded that some 11,291 of the total force could be from foreign armies, leaving a U.S. force structure of around 19,900. The final U.S. structure of the deploying force, Task Force Eagle, incorporated all of those considerations, as shown in *Table 10*.

TABLE 10—UNITS ASSIGNED TO TASK FORCE EAGLE

Headquarters, 1st Armd Div	
	Headquarters and Headquarters Co
	5th Bn, 3d Air Defense (Bradley-Avenger)
	501st Military Intell Bn
	141st Signal Bn
1st Bde	
	3d Bn, 5th Cavalry (Mech Inf)
	4th Bn, 67th Armor
2d Bde	
	4th Bn, 12th Inf (Mech)
	2d Bn, 68th Armor
4th (Aviation) Bde	
	1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry
	2d Bn, 227th Aviation (Attack)
	3d Bn, 227th Aviation (Attack)
	7th Bn, 227th Aviation (Assault Helicopter)
Engr Bde	
	23d Engr Bn
	40th Engr Bn
Div Arty	
	2d Bn, 3d Field Arty (155-mm. self-propelled)
	4th Bn, 29th Field Arty (155-mm. self-propelled)
	Battery C, 333d Field Arty (Target Acquisition)
Div Support Command	
	501st Forward Support Bn
	47th Support Bn
	123d Support Bn
	127th Support Bn
Attached elements of	
	30th Medical Bde (V Corps)
	22d Signal Bde (V Corps)
	16th Corps Support Gp (3d Corps Support Command)
	205th Military Intell Bde (V Corps)
	18th MP Bde (V Corps)

The Shift to a Decision Support Template

Underlining General Abrams' conclusion that his staff was developing its mission analysis at the wrong level was the fact that on 1 August the 1st Armored Division ceased routine operations and began to develop its own plan for possible deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁷ Clearly, the corps staff was duplicating work that the division was already doing.³⁸ Most likely thinking it the best way to redirect the battle staff's work, Abrams concluded that the G-3 should begin to develop a decision support template. The plans officers believed that Abrams thought the corps too far into preparation for the mission for the staff to back up in its planning process all the way to a mission analysis. The chief of war plans, Colonel Bryant, assigned development of the decision support template to Lt. Col. Peter Schifferle, and he began work on it on 13 September.³⁹

Schifferle designed the template on the basis of war-gaming an operations plan during the preparation of that plan. The initial draft decision support template had eight primary events, for each of which Schifferle identified between three and seven subsidiary steps. By the end of September he had accumulated about thirty critical steps, and the problem lay in figuring out what events had to occur before each succeeding step could be taken.⁴⁰ It soon became apparent that the task was an enormous one that involved a great many variables. To help deal with those variables, Col. Mark Gay, the corps deputy chief of staff, detailed Lt. Col. Francis A. I. Bowers III, the V Corps operations research, systems analysis officer, to help.

Starting at the end of September and working full time with the G-3 plans staff through October, Bowers meticulously identified the critical events and tasks for the deployment and placed them in the required sequence in which they had to be carried out. He eventually produced a chart that displayed all the information in what he later concluded was probably a confusing manner, but one in which the real value lay in the way the graphical representation of the mission established the relationships among the events that had to take place. The final events list amounted to 250 items. The principal early impact of the document was that it made clear how long the whole deployment process would take when considering the need to alert units, prepare them for movement, and actually load up and move out.

Thus the decision support template as used by the corps articulated the sequence of decisions that would confront the commanding general. It identified decision points and, perhaps more important, created an awareness of the impact of emerging events and the passage of time on forcing decisions to be made. The template was also valuable to the staff because it was a road map that clearly delineated the recommendations they had to have ready for the commander at various points to support the decisions he was going to have to make. It also forced the staff to come to grips with the inevitable changes in the process as time and political developments forced revision of the plan. Finally, the template allowed the staff to put the preparation, execution, and redeployment

of the task force into a discrete set of time lines that specified a similarly discrete set of events, each actuated by preceding events, and fostered an awareness that the environment might change and, with it, the plan. In short, the decision support template drove the refinement of the staff estimates that really should have been done during the mission analysis process.⁴¹

Events proved the decision support template to have been a well-conceived document, since it actually impelled the continuing planning process. The staff found that, although not every decision that had to be made had been identified on the template, there were no decisions on the template that did not have to be addressed. Increasingly, the template—or, perhaps more properly stated, the corps' use of that tool—began to drive events themselves. For example, an early decision support template decision point was the need to conduct a planning exercise to synchronize the activities of the 1st Armored Division, the 21st Theater Army Area Command, and the 3d Corps Support Command. In early October, referring to the template, the commanding general directed the corps G-3 to set up such a planning conference.

The Worry About Time Lines

General Abrams convened another planning conference at Grafenwöhr between 16 and 18 October, and in the course of that meeting he expressed concern about the development of time lines. The first ground for concern was that, from the standpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Crisis Action Procedure, the system was already "broken." The corps had begun planning on the basis of an order that European Command transmitted through USAREUR, but had received no information whatever about the mission through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) formal alerting system. As events later transpired, there was a lot of back-channel discussion going on among general officers about how to approach the task, but the lack of formal notification was, throughout September and October, a real and continuing concern. In fact, the corps learned in mid-November that the Joint Chiefs had issued a warning order in early October, but that European Command had not seen fit to transmit it to USAREUR. Although that did not turn out to have serious consequences, Schifferle recalled that the absence of an order "left us thinking that we were doing something here in Europe that the CJCS crisis action procedure was not authorizing us to do."⁴²

The second concern about time lines involved NATO. Early in the process the G-3 planners figured out that, the mission into Bosnia being a NATO operation, there was a conflict between the U.S. unilateral system for notification and alert procedures and the NATO system to activate an operations plan. Generally speaking, the corps anticipated that the NATO system would lag well behind the American system, and that turned out to be the case. There were valid political grounds for that lag, but that did not compensate for the problems that arose because of them.

As far as the corps battle staff could determine, the NATO staff in Naples was using the pre-existing OPLAN 40104 as a basis for executing the Imple-

mentation Force mission. Activating and adjusting OPLAN 40104 to serve as the IFOR plan was the Allied Force, Southern Europe, way of keeping up with the pace of events. That plan had already been approved by the North Atlantic Council, the political decision-making body of the alliance, which meant that there were forces associated with it, as well as implicit approval for further planning. Time—time that NATO and the corps might not have—would be required before the North Atlantic Council could issue a new planning directive and NATO could develop a plan on the basis of that directive. Using OPLAN 40104 was therefore a stopgap measure.

The battle staff quickly discovered serious problems with such a process, the first of which was a considerable mismatch between the concept of the new mission and the means allotted by the old plan. OPLAN 40104 was designed for the rapid movement of an extraction force into Bosnia-Herzegovina to remove UN peacekeepers under duress. In carrying out its mission, the extraction force intended to sustain itself from the logistical structure of the UN Protection Force that was already there. After extracting the UNPROFOR, the force would quickly leave the region. The contemplated duration of OPLAN 40104 was estimated at around ninety days, and the command and control, logistical support, and transportation arrangements all matched the mission the plan articulated. As it planned for the expanded mission, the NATO headquarters in Naples transferred the command and control, logistics, and transportation arrangements for OPLAN 40104 to a new plan Americans dubbed 40104X, and tied them to a much larger and differently constituted troop structure and a mission of one year's duration.

An equally serious worry about time lines was that the corps required sufficiently early notification to manage the execution of an operations plan. That was a political question linked to the conclusion of the preliminary Proximity Talks that opened on 31 October 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, among the parties to the fighting. There was no way to predict when those talks would conclude, or what the outcome might be. Obviously, it was desirable to have a deployment plan completed and awaiting developments in Dayton. At issue was the fact that the lack of firm planning guidance from USAREUR had resulted in a variety of plans among the Army subordinates that would execute the mission. There was no USAREUR commander's intent, nor was there yet a task organization.

General Nash and his 1st Armored Division planners had developed a concept for execution of the peace enforcement mission inside what would come to be termed the "box" in Bosnia. The corps plan outlined how V Corps staff officers thought the preparation and deployment would take place. There was also a SETAF plan, developed in Vicenza by Maj. Gen. Jack P. Nix, Jr., and the staff of his airborne force, that laid out a different view of how the operation would proceed. Finally, there was an outline support plan written by the 21st Theater Army Area Command in Kaiserslautern. Contributing to the problem was the fact that the NATO chain of command was also issuing instructions to 1st Armored Division via the ARRC. Meanwhile, the U.S. chain of com-

mand was issuing instructions through the European commander in chief's system. Finally, general officers were constantly conferring through personal meetings and telephone calls, while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense were making trips to Europe to discuss developing events. There were multiple chains of command, multiple sources of information, and multiple sources from which requirements issued.

In the judgment of the V Corps G-3 plans officers, it was indeed JCS crisis action planning, although without having the crisis action system activated, and it was NATO crisis planning without having the NATO crisis action system activated. The key to the problem was that the corps was trying to prepare an American force for inclusion in the ARRC without having the ARRC authorized yet by NATO to begin deliberate planning. The immediate task, as far as Schifferle could tell, was to synchronize SETAF's Task Force Lion planning with V Corps and 1st Armored Division planning for Task Force Eagle, refine the force packages, and synchronize U.S. logistical support. With that done, it would be possible more clearly to define the role of V Corps and USAREUR and then assist with the ARRC's execution of the mission.

Crucial Decisions—The October Conference at Grafenwöhr

The process to which the staff was driven was, according to Schifferle's subsequent ironic evaluation, "certainly an interesting way to do things." In trying to figure out what Task Forces Lion and Eagle were supposed to do, the staff attempted to coordinate the activities of two different headquarters, one of which did not belong to V Corps and the other which belonged to V Corps only until transfer of authority of 1st Armored Division to the ARRC. In the ideal planning environment, the ARRC would have planned the operation and issued requirements to the troop-contributing nations. Those nations would then have sorted out how they were going to place their forces in the area of operations, where transfer of authority to NATO control would occur. Unfortunately, however, because of the American push to have U.S. forces prepared, and because of the diplomatic efforts the United States was exerting as the lead nation in arranging the Dayton Peace Accord, NATO was about forty-five days behind the American commands in its planning process.

Well aware of the lead-time requirements for deployment systems, V Corps planners could not afford to wait for the ARRC to develop its plan, because the task force based on 1st Armored Division would not then have been ready to execute such a plan. General Abrams was emphatic that the task force would be thoroughly trained and prepared for its mission, and that the preparation and execution of the deployment would go well. The training was an especially crucial issue, since the peace enforcement mission that loomed ahead required a very different kind of training than that which prepared the division to fulfill the requirements of the Joint Service Capability Plan—the general war plan requirements. All of those needs made it imperative that the corps be well ahead of the ARRC in the planning process.

While all that was going on, the airborne task force, augmented by a V Corps aviation force, that SETAF had developed to carry out Operation DARING LION was available. It had been prepared and validated in the Mountain Shield exercises by both USAREUR and V Corps chains of command. Task Force Lion was familiar with its mission and the likely area of operations. Having a force ready for the mission was a distinct plus, and military logic demanded that some place be found for it in the development of the operations plan, on grounds of efficiency alone. That was a particularly acute consideration when the corps was facing the possibility of an early November deployment. As time went on, however, and 1st Armored Division became increasingly better prepared for the mission, there was correspondingly less reason to have Task Force Lion involved.

Thus there were a lot of subjects to discuss at the planning conference that General Abrams convened at Grafenwöhr in October. First of all, there had been a mission change since the time Task Force Lion had been prepared and trained. No longer was the task in Bosnia an extraction mission, but instead an occupation to carry out the tasks associated with the peace plan that was being worked out at Dayton. In that, Task Force Lion had no obvious role. Constituted for the UNPROFOR extraction mission, it was not appropriately organized for the NATO Implementation Force mission. However, as the staff assessed the suitability of the task organization, it concluded that, while Task Force Lion did not fit into the requirements as they then existed, its TF 3-325 Airborne Combat Team could still have a major part in the plan under the control of Task Force Eagle. The concept was that TF 3-325 Airborne would enter Tuzla quite early to establish the TF Eagle presence, allowing an orderly deployment of the heavy, mechanized forces of the 1st Armored Division. Abrams took that recommendation back for discussion with General Crouch and General Nix, and they ultimately agreed to use the SETAF elements in that way.

The more difficult problem that the planning group approached in mid-October was arranging the deployment of Task Force Eagle. It was necessary to "think operationally," as Abrams had directed, and not to consider issues of how to employ Task Force Eagle, which were matters for Nash and the ARRC commanding general. The corps commander's task was thus to deploy Task Force Eagle in accordance with the ARRC commander's desires, and that turned out to be a complicated business.

In the course of 1993 the 1st Armored Division had done detailed planning for a mission in Bosnia to support the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The concept relied on deployment by sea into the area of operation and a march from the Adriatic ports into Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was not feasible in 1995. Trying to pass Task Force Eagle through the Adriatic ports at the same time that the other NATO forces were landing there, given the limited capacity of the ports and the poor condition of the road network, would overwhelm both ports and roads. From both an operational and a logistical point of view, it was more desirable for the task force to enter Bosnia from the north, instead. In discussions among the corps chief of staff, the G-3 plans staff, and the corps political adviser, the idea emerged that it might be a good idea to have the U.S. forces enter Bosnia

through Croatia, and perhaps even through Serbia, in order to involve those two nations in the peace process. Conceptualizing such a means of entering Bosnia would be demanding, because the notion had never been assessed before, and the corps lacked the most basic information about the region with which to begin planning.

Up until that time the 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) had not been deeply involved in the work that was going on, probably because of USAREUR's reluctance to have that organization work on an operation that might not ever happen—to the detriment of the TAACOM's ongoing daily requirements as the USAREUR support structure. However, by 17 October Maj. Gen. James M. Wright, the 21st TAACOM commanding general, moved his planning staff to Grafenwöhr, where they began to work full time with the corps and division planning staffs. The group went through the problem in detail on 18–19 October and made a breakthrough when Wright's planners came up with the idea of using Hungary as an initial staging base. This was clearly the best course of action anyone had so far suggested, and the planning group immediately began considering means of deploying through Hungary, where an intermediate staging base could be constructed.⁴³

The combined planning group had spent two fruitful days at Grafenwöhr. On 16 October they worked out tasks and responsibilities for the various task forces. On 17 October they considered the force structure associated with Task Force Eagle and the force structure that would be needed to set up an intermediate staging base and to cross the Sava River to march Task Force Eagle into Bosnia. Also on 17 October, they made some basic decisions about the execution time lines and how long it would take to set up a transportation system, build the intermediate staging base, deliver the force to that base, and then to deploy the force into the area of operations. On 18 October the staffs remained in the relative seclusion of the training area and proceeded to the means of handling the deployment itself, as well as the associated logistics support requirements. For all of those purposes, the critical decision was where the intermediate staging base would be located, because that was the decision from which all else would flow. Bearing in mind the primary goal of force protection, the planners very quickly validated the suggestion of General Wright's planners that the only workable course of action was to put the base in Hungary.

The other courses of action had some advantages at the strategic level. Locating the intermediate supporting base in Serbia and moving American forces through Serbia and into Bosnia, some planners hoped, would demonstrate to the Serbs that the United States was not biased in favor of either the Moslem or Croatian sides in the conflict, and might even send the message that America was biased toward the Bosnian Serb side. Considering earlier American actions, including the bombing of Bosnian Serb facilities, that would probably have been a very good thing to do. However, political advice suggested that Serbia might be an unstable environment, and that was unsatisfactory from the point of view of force protection. Establishing the base near

Belgrade was not attractive, because there was only one route from Belgrade into the Tuzla area, one that crossed the Drina River. The condition of that road was poor. Moreover, the road from Belgrade to Tuzla paralleled the Drina River for about thirty kilometers, all of which was within range of mortar fire from Bosnian Serb positions across the river. The railroad from Belgrade to Tuzla was not operational. Similar considerations prevailed when the option of placing the staging base in Croatia was suggested. Locating the intermediate staging base near Zagreb was logistically insupportable, because Zagreb was already part of the NATO support plan and was in use by UNPROFOR and other organizations. Adding the American base would have overwhelmed the capacity of Croatia to support all the various organizations from the city of Zagreb.

A second alternative in Croatia was to occupy a base near Slavonski Brod. It had the disadvantage of being a small city with a limited rail network. It had also been shelled in the recent past—in October 1994, by the Bosnian Serbs—and the entire city was within mortar range of the Bosnian Serb positions. Many difficulties with using Slavonski Brod thus suggested themselves, not least the fact that it had no usable airfield within reach. Slavonski Brod was also poorly positioned in that it was in that part of Croatia that bordered on Serbia and that remained a bone of contention between the two states. It was therefore the worst of all the possibilities considered.

Hungary, by contrast, offered as many advantages as the other sites offered disadvantages. Hungary was not directly involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and all three of the warring factions would accordingly consider an American base there to be a neutral presence that showed no bias in favor of any of the factions. The government of Hungary seemed willing to entertain the idea of a semi-permanent U.S. base there and had a far better developed rail and road network than Serbia and Croatia to support such a base. It also offered, quite near the border, disused former Warsaw Pact military airfields that would be available to C-130 aircraft, if not the larger transports. There were also firing ranges in the immediate vicinity, which made it possible to consider training troops at the staging base, as well as maintaining the training readiness of the soldiers stationed in Hungary.

Most important, from the planners' point of view, was the fact that Hungary gave the U.S. force operational flexibility. It was possible to build a base there in a peacetime environment, with normal security arrangements. If the Dayton Accord was not signed, removing the troops would be easy. If the accord was signed but not implemented, U.S. forces would not be at risk. Placing the base in Hungary would also allow the United States to position its lead brigade very near the border, ready to move into Bosnia immediately, once agreement was reached at Dayton. In addition, a base in Hungary gave the Army a place to station a strike force out of harm's way, but close enough by aviation flight distance still to be effective as a reaction force for Task Force Eagle. The staff briefed the Hungary approach to General Abrams as the best course of action, and he selected it as the location for the intermediate staging base. The next step was to begin development of an operations plan that accounted for that decision.

The planning group developed the operations plan over the following two weeks, consulting closely with 21st TAACOM. The job was quickly done, and Schifferle briefed the plan to General Crouch on 5 November. Crouch approved what was by then known as the Campaign Plan as a basis for further planning and as the basis for execution. On 7 November Col. George Casey, the corps chief of staff, presented the same briefing to the secretary of defense when the secretary visited Hohenfels training area. There was some urgency to finish the plan, because developments on the political front seemed to promise an early order to execute the mission. The parties to the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina had by that time agreed to the Proximity Talks that began at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, on 1 November. In fact, the parties—Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—reached an agreement that they initialed on 21 November and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.⁴⁴

The Campaign Plan—USAREUR OPLAN 40105

The genealogy of the Campaign Plan, already alluded to, was not complex. When NATO's Allied Forces, Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), in the summer of 1995 changed the focus of its planning from extraction to an implementation force for a peace accord, it produced OPLAN 40104X, a revision of the earlier plan issued in hopes of avoiding the cumbersome process of obtaining planning permission from the North Atlantic Council. The plan was not, however, a feasible one because the UNPROFOR extraction was simply too different from the intended NATO operation. Thus, AFSOUTH issued OPLAN 40105, DECISIVE ENDEAVOR, the basis on which the ARRC developed its OPLAN 47402, DISCIPLINED GUARD. Meanwhile, General Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), in his NATO persona, had Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), develop a shorter and less detailed plan for an implementation force, OPLAN 10405, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. When the North Atlantic Council formally approved the on-going planning for the NATO implementation force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, SACEUR submitted a concept of operations to the North Atlantic Council on 6 October, which the NATO officials approved on 11 October. At the same time, AFSOUTH sent SHAPE an Implementation Force concept paper and continued working on OPLAN 40105.

Two points were particularly relevant as work proceeded. The NATO planning remained several weeks behind the planning that was then going on at USAREUR and V Corps; and all NATO planning was taking place without any firm commitment of forces by the NATO nations to the Implementation Force, by then generally known as "IFOR." Joulwan visited the Dayton Peace Talks to make sure he knew the likely outcomes and to be certain that NATO could do what was going to be asked of it. That done, he submitted SHAPE OPLAN 10405 to the North Atlantic Council on 15 November for approval, and on 24 November he resubmitted the supporting AFSOUTH OPLAN

40105, both of which had to be revised to bring them into harmony with the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement that was initialed on 21 November. On 16 December the North Atlantic Council approved SHAPE OPLAN 10405.⁴⁵

As outlined in the basic plan, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR consisted of five phases: predeployment, entry, implementation, transition to peace, and exit. It also involved two deploying forces, the Enabling Force and the Implementing Force. The Enabling Force provided command and control, reception, and a present force to accept the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR, to establish a credible military capability in country, and to provide support for the initial elements of the Implementation Force. The Implementing Force was to enforce the zones of separation between Bosnian Federation and Bosnian Serb troops and create an environment in which the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords could be carried out.

American planning for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, in progress since July, when USAREUR directed V Corps to develop a campaign plan, continued on the basis of the series of decisions reached in the planning sessions of September and October. Simultaneously USAREUR was working on OPLAN 4243, which was concerned with providing national support to deployed U.S. forces under Title 10, U.S. Code. By 30 November 1995 the V Corps product had been published as USAREUR 40105, Campaign Plan. The major provisions of the plan arose from the lengthy plans process. The American contribution to the IFOR, Task Force Eagle, would be built around 1st Armored Division. To provide the required national support to the task force, USAREUR would establish a forward headquarters near the area of operations. The V Corps commander would be designated Deputy Commanding General, USAREUR (Forward), to control that headquarters, which was to be placed in Hungary. USAREUR would retain control of nondeploying forces that remained in central Europe and continue its currently assigned operational missions. Meanwhile, V Corps would establish a task force to be known as Task Force Victory in Wiesbaden under control of the corps deputy commanding general. TF Victory would provide command and control for the rear detachments of the 1st Armored Division and V Corps separate brigades that deployed to Bosnia, as well as control nondeploying forces. Task Force Victory would be manned by elements of the V Corps Artillery staff, augmented by the 3d Corps Support Command. The V Corps (Main) headquarters would remain in Heidelberg to provide planning and mission support for deployed corps forces. Finally, the commanding general of the 3d Infantry Division retained command of nondeploying division forces, reporting directly to the commanding general of V Corps.

The deploying task force had a number of strategic objectives. Chiefly, it was to promote regional stability and the growth of democratic ideals, demonstrate NATO credibility and the credibility of U.S. leadership, stimulate respect for international law and order, and promote the formation of a democratic Bosnian state. Operationally, Task Force Eagle was to prevent the spread of fighting, foster the growth of democratic ideals, and promote a

regional balance of power. To do that, the plan imposed a force cap of 25,000 soldiers deployed into Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁶

As finally presented, the USAREUR campaign plan translated General Joulwan's intent for the mission into operational reality. Unquestionably, JOINT ENDEAVOR was NATO's principal mission, since Joulwan directed that all of NATO would support that effort. Admiral Boorda, as NATO's Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, would deploy essential command and control elements before signature of the peace agreement and would establish the Headquarters, Implementation Force, and the Headquarters, ARRC, within ninety-six hours after the decision to deploy. The Implementation Force, Joulwan stressed, would be established rapidly and there would be strict unity of command, with the IFOR "NATO-led from beginning to end." He wished particular emphasis on "shaping the operational environment" by using all available forces and showing the warring factions that IFOR was ready to use force if necessary, as authorized by the United Nations.⁴⁷ Within that context, the SACEUR particularly stressed the rules of engagement that all deploying forces had to understand. The intent of the Implementation Force, it was clear, was peaceful. It was equally clear, on the other hand, that IFOR was not to be trifled with.⁴⁸

The campaign plan spelled out the specific tasks for each of USAREUR's commands. High on the list of priorities was that all ongoing operational missions would continue to be supported, and that training and readiness of uncommitted forces would be maintained at a high level. Rear detachment operations for nondeploying units and home station communities continued as before, which meant that the remainder of V Corps would continue to carry out the full schedule of out-of-sector deployments, Military to Military Joint Contact Team Programs, and Partnership for Peace tasks with eastern European nations. While V Corps did not have a role to play in operations at the tactical level, the staff had to understand those operations thoroughly in order properly to train and prepare not only Task Force Eagle, but also any replacements or relieving forces that might ultimately become necessary.

A deliberate timetable provided for a sequential deployment, the start of which would be determined by the date the Dayton Peace Accord was signed. That date, G-Day (for Go Day), was the day on which the main force was to deploy into Bosnia. The Enabling Force would deploy fourteen days earlier, on C-Day (for Commencement Day). The transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR was planned for five days after G-Day on a date designated D-Day. Finally, by D+30 the Implementation Force was expected to be in control of the zone of separation between the former warring parties.

The plan called for an orderly and sequential deployment process. The first step was to create the base support element, the intermediate staging base, in Hungary. From that location, USAREUR (Forward) would manage reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces destined for the Implementation Force. While the basic facilities existed, a certain amount of time had to be allotted to moving the support units into place and making them opera-

tional. Next came the lines of communication opening force, or LOC Opening Force, as it was known, that would build a bridge across the Sava River and open the route from the base in Hungary to Tuzla. Then, the Initial Entry Force, a task force built around the 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Combat Team, was to assume control of the sector from UNPROFOR and establish U.S. and NATO presence in the area of operations.

Within forty-eight to seventy-two hours of that action, the Initial Entry Force expected to be relieved by the columns of Task Force Eagle marching down the ground line of communication from Hungary and across the Sava River. Since the staff anticipated orders to execute the mission in October, the corps planning estimate was for a fair weather deployment that had a time line of sixty days from beginning to end, and rationally structured the flow of forces to put the supporting elements in place in ample time to sustain the combat elements that would follow. A key factor was that development of the infrastructure of base camps would not be a critical problem during an early fall, fair weather, operation.⁴⁹

Throughout, V Corps had been engaged in a plans process that paralleled NATO, rather than supplemented NATO, for the reasons of time pressure that American staffs all understood very well. While the process still produced a good plan, there were some significant consequences arising from the lack of uniformity in NATO and U.S. preparations. The first was that the higher headquarters had not yet, as of 30 November, established a deployment system, either in plan or in effect. When the deployment order was issued, a plan existed, although it was immature and in need of staffing for implementation, in the judgment of the V Corps staff. Not only did that make it hard to synchronize the execution of the plan between U.S. and NATO headquarters, but it also made it difficult for the higher headquarters to track what was going on during the deployment.

Similarly, the U.S. order did not, at the outset, include adequate reporting mechanisms. To ameliorate such problems, the corps established a liaison cell with the ARRC and discussed the U.S. planning process with the NATO staff as it built an operations plan. At that point the American forces were involved at Hohenfels and Grafenwöhr in training and validation for the mission, and the liaison team was able to take the emerging documentation from the ARRC and use it as a basis for organizing training. Because the ARRC was a British-framework headquarters, it used British Army formats in its plans and orders. The corps staff began to write orders for Task Force Eagle's training in the ARRC format, using the terminology customary in that headquarters and applying it to the training environment. Therefore the American staffs, as they went through the process of analyzing the order and issuing their own subsequent orders, would do it in a format that was "ARRC-like," thereby mitigating some of the problems they would later have encountered in Bosnia.

By the end of November 1995 V Corps had drafted a thorough and coherent plan for the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Adopted by USAREUR and coordinated with the 21st TAACOM and SETAF, the plan was a rational approach

to the major issues confronting the Army in Europe. It specified the organization of the task forces involved, addressed the training needs of the soldiers who would carry out the mission, and structured the deployment in such a way that units would be properly controlled and sustained from their home stations in Germany to the area of operations in Bosnia. Hard work and careful liaison had overcome the problems inherent in the differing plans systems used by the United States, its allies, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As far as V Corps was concerned, it only remained to designate the operations plan an operations order and carry it out as specified.

In making that assumption, the corps staff displayed a certain naïveté from which it did not suffer again. Nothing, V Corps discovered, was necessarily orderly where international politics were concerned. In the course of carrying out the deployment, the staff developed the new maxim that "Politics is to the strategic planner what weather is to the tactical planner."⁵⁰ For the entire corps, the end of November was an extremely busy time, and an extremely tense one. The initialing of a peace treaty in Ohio a few days earlier would shortly lead to a formal peace treaty that would be signed in Paris. Informing his subordinate commanders of the situation, General Abrams warned them that there was no certainty when orders would come, but to remain ready for whatever happened. Orders to deploy, he emphasized, would come, although it "could be days or weeks," depending on the diplomatic process.⁵¹

Deployment of Task Force Eagle

Premonitions about political uncertainty were soon cloaked by an unpleasant reality that upset the careful plans the V Corps and USAREUR staffs had developed. The five-phase plan for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR called for a deliberate deployment and entry of the task force into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thirty days into the operation, the IFOR was expected to be in full control of the zone of separation between the former warring parties and establishing the environment in which the terms of the peace settlement could be carried out.

Only the beginning of that five-step process directly involved V Corps. The mission of Task Force Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina, like the dramatic bridging of the Sava River in flood conditions from 20 to 31 December, form no part of the story of V Corps operations, since those forces were no longer under V Corps control. Instead, Eagle functioned under the aegis of the NATO Implementation Force, while USAREUR (Forward) headquarters controlled operations from the base at Kaposvár-Taszár in Hungary and the river-crossing operation at Zupanja, Croatia. The corps involvement in the mission was limited to formation, preparation, and training of the task forces, their deployment out of Germany, and their eventual redeployment to home stations at the end of their tour of duty in the Balkans. As events turned out, however, the deployment by itself proved a demanding task.

Planners intended essential "housekeeping tasks" to fill the two-week interval between the fielding of the enabling force and deployment of Task Force

Eagle. With the opening of the lines of communication into Bosnia, and under the protection of the lead combat elements, construction of base camp areas and the immediately necessary infrastructure was to be carried forward sufficiently to house the arriving soldiers from the 1st Armored Division task force, with the remaining construction to be completed concurrently with the IFOR assumption of its mission. Staffs at all echelons planned the preparatory loading of trains with such a schedule in mind and ordered trains from the German railway system configured in accordance with that scheme.⁵²

In fact, the deployment was neither orderly nor deliberate, because Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR immediately "went off the synchronization matrix," as the staff described it, in an echo of a phrase long used in V Corps to indicate a plan gone awry. The parties meeting in Dayton, Ohio, initiated the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 21 November 1995. On that basis, G-Day was computed for 16 December, and C-Day for 2 December. The subsequent IFOR assumption of mission in Bosnia, referred to as D-Day, was consequently scheduled for 20 December. Unfortunately, the relevant political authorities did not issue orders to execute the plan until 7 December, and European Command and USAREUR could not act in the absence of such orders.⁵³ Thus the period between C-Day and G-Day was reduced from fourteen days to seven, with a consequent compression of all the deployment time lines, thereby generating a series of unforeseen problems.⁵⁴

Deployment problems, many of them difficult, arose. But those problems had longer term consequences, most realized only in Bosnia, where the soldiers of the 1st Armored Division arrived to find that the fortunate had to continue living on trains and the remainder in tents or other hasty shelters until base camp construction could be started. From the beginning of the planning process, V Corps and USAREUR staffs had been constrained by the imposition of the 25,000-man force cap for Task Force Eagle. Heavily biased toward combat forces because of uncertainty about the situation Eagle would find in Bosnia, the task force order of battle necessarily skimmed such things as construction engineers. Consequently, use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, or LOGCAP, to build camps was always an essential part of the plan. As events moved into the fall of 1995, planners realized that the eventual deployment of Task Force Eagle would occur in winter, rather than in summer, and that, in the words of Lt. Col. Albert Bryant, V Corps chief of war plans, "that made the requirement to immediately establish improved living conditions a priority that we had to solve."⁵⁵

Because the staff had not been permitted to visit Bosnia for site reconnaissance and had been obliged to rely upon UN reports and other second-hand information when planning base camp locations, other difficulties almost inevitably arose. The original plan had been to build eight big base camps, each with a population of around three thousand soldiers. Once in Bosnia, engineers discovered that the compartmentalization of the terrain in the area of operations, combined with the presence of far more land mines than anticipated, meant that Task Force Eagle instead needed more than twenty smaller base camps to

facilitate efficient peace enforcement operations. That decision produced a major change in infrastructure planning and induced further delays, because the efficiencies the logistical planners meant to gain by having large bases were lost. The principal contractor, Brown and Root, had, as Bryant said, agreed to "deliver x-thousand housing units within y amount of time." But the investments in site clearance—meticulous removal of land mines—and living facilities, power generation, water supply, and waste management were constants, whether a base camp held three thousand soldiers or two hundred, and construction requirements mushroomed accordingly. There were no large concrete pads or asphalt areas characteristic of built-up areas in western Europe, so there was also a large investment in gravel and other fill material to stabilize the soil sufficiently to use the ground. Moreover, by the time construction was under way, some areas were experiencing repeated snow falls with up to fourteen inches of snow on each occasion. "We had to get those kids out of the weather," Bryant stressed, adding that "once it thawed out down there, the mud conditions were horrible—you sank in up to your ankles."⁵⁶

Brown and Root had not contracted for engineering on that scale, and—one of the many painful lessons of the operation—turned out not to offer the initial entry engineering capability that force planners at other echelons had hoped for when Army decisions were made to reduce the size of the active duty engineer and logistics force structure. Even tentage proved a problem. Contractors on 10 December estimated that they could emplace tents in Bosnia for about three thousand soldiers within five days. In fact, they were unable to do it until 18 December, a three-day extension that seemed short to planners but long to soldiers living in the cold.⁵⁷ In consequence of contractor limitations, the task force made use of Navy Seabee construction units and Air Force "Red Horse" construction teams and "Prime Beef" power teams to get the work under way. Those units had to be inserted into the personnel flow into Bosnia, at a cost of some further disruption of the plan, and allowances had to be made to deliver their heavy equipment, for which transportation likewise had to be arranged. The multiple base camps by then planned also required much more construction material and gravel fill than had been allowed for in the original planning. All of that required more adjustments to the deployment process.

Solving the engineering problem turned out to be complicated, and a process largely managed by V Corps, acting both as corps staff and as USAREUR (Forward) staff. That one staff action illustrated for V Corps the perils of creating ad hoc headquarters for which no clear staff relationships existed with other organizations, complicated by the fact that General Abrams drew no particular line between the functioning of his officers as corps staff and as USAREUR (Forward) staff. In fact, Bryant later complained, there were at first problems in integrating the corps staff and the USAREUR Heidelberg staff. He implied that the USAREUR staff appeared to believe the USAREUR (Forward) headquarters would function independently under General Abrams, requiring no assistance from them. That administrative question was resolved by the end of December, when everyone finally accepted that Task Force Eagle was really going to be

deployed, but it meant that the task of adjusting plans to accord with changed circumstances of deployment initially fell in large part on the V Corps battle staff. "Believe me," Bryant observed in the spring of 1996, "it was not pretty."⁵⁸

It was not just the compressed deployment time that wrecked the carefully planned sequential deployment of Task Force Eagle and its supporting forces, however. Even accepting that the planned base camp areas in Bosnia had no viable infrastructure for the 1st Armored Division troops to use, there was the further problem that road networks, and particularly bridges, were in parlous state and, until repaired, unsuitable as main supply routes from the sustaining base in Hungary. There were few good rail lines into the area, and not many improved airfields. Knowing that the logistical support would be difficult at first, the staff carefully planned every truck, rail car, and airplane load of equipment and supplies. As one planner later pointed out, a few more 2 x 4 beams in a truck to satisfy an urgent construction requirement at one place meant that less of some other essential item could be carried. It was frankly a juggling act that inclement flying and driving weather made even more arduous.

External events also conspired to make the task harder. The deployment fell across the Christmas period, and American staffs were not quick to realize that Germans celebrated the holiday on a different schedule than the one to which Americans were accustomed. That, combined with long-planned holiday leave schedules of the German rail corporation, decreased the possible pace of rail-loading operations. At the same time, the French railway system was on strike, stranding in France 120 of the existing 250 deep-well flat cars essential to move Eagle's heavy equipment. Simultaneously, German antinuclear demonstrators, in an unrelated action, sabotaged switching equipment on the German rail lines in the vicinity of Hanau, base area for one of the 1st Armored Division's brigades, delaying all rail movements for two days during the heart of the marshaling process.

The upshot was that rail movements were slowed, a situation exacerbated by an American lack of understanding of their own regulations for ordering trains and of the German process of assembling the trains that the Army had ordered. Starting with the first day of rail movement, 6 December, trying to meet the demands of a changing situation, the corps staff sought at the last minute to change the configuration of a train, or the load programmed for a train, or the destination of a train. Both USAREUR transportation officers and Deutsche Bahn officials tried to cope with the sudden changes, but found that some of the stipulated lead times simply could not be transgressed. At one point the staff had the idea of starting a train toward Bosnia, its final destination to be decided while the train was en route—a scheme vetoed by the 37th Transportation Group traffic manager, who gruffly commented that international rail routing and switching procedures dictated that "you can't send a train to 'unknown.'"⁵⁹ Compounding the dilemma were differing train length and weight restrictions in Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, few of which corps planners either knew or understood when rail movement began.⁶⁰ At the railheads, unit rail loading inexperience further hampered the deployment as units arrived

with their equipment improperly configured for the scheduled train, without appropriate customs documentation, without sufficient or adequate blocking and bracing material, and often without enough materiel handling equipment to load the rail cars.⁶¹

The resequencing of the original rail movement had other unfortunate consequences that were not revealed for several months. When immediate deployment of combat troops became necessary, the supporting 1st Armored Division logistics units were all loaded on trains at the same time. That made it impossible for the division to operate according to accepted logistical doctrine, which called for supporting units to be echeloned forward, allowing operations to commence before all supporting units had been closed down in the division rear and displaced forward. Disruption of support battalion operations meant that, although repair parts might be delivered to the division forward area, it was not possible to process and deliver those parts to the battalions that needed them until the supporting units were unloaded and themselves ready to function. Spare parts, however, were not yet scheduled in the cargo flow because early plans called for the echeloned support units to provide an immediate stockage of parts. The end result was that tanks and infantry fighting vehicles began to become unserviceable in late January and early February, and the consequent decline in Task Force Eagle readiness rates became a crisis that demanded of the V Corps staff yet another reshuffling of movement priorities.⁶²

At the beginning of the process, however, last-minute adjustments kept the deployment on track. To compensate for rail movement shortfalls, the V Corps operations staff increased the amount of materiel delivered into Bosnia by air. For example, feedback from rail planners informed the G-3 that some of the tunnels through which trains had to pass were too narrow to allow Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLBs) to be delivered by rail to Bosnia. The AVLBs were necessary at the beginning of the deployment because of the decayed road network in Bosnia, where they were particularly useful in crossing collapsed culverts on the route Task Force Eagle meant to use. Bryant and his staff arranged instead to dismount the bridges from their armored vehicles and fly the spans to the intermediate base in Hungary via Air Force C-17 transports, an air load that had not even been tested at that time. After prodigious efforts throughout December and the first two weeks of January, the deployment process was brought back to schedule by mid-January 1996, after which deployments were chiefly by rail. By D+56 the Air Force had flown 1,358 sorties in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR deployments, of which more than one quarter were C-17 aircraft, the first operational mission for the new C-17. The V Corps planners adjudged the C-17 a great success, since its roughly four hundred sorties represented half of all cargo moved by air during that period.⁶³


Other changes followed as events and requirements dictated, the staff shifting various pieces of equipment and units from rail to air delivery in order to meet deadlines for projecting the task force into Bosnia. Many of those air loads were light but bulky and included the headquarters staffs, signal units, military police, and other organizations necessary to control task force movement.

Working from the USAREUR (Forward) command post at Taszár, Bryant monitored the daily delivery of units and equipment and, talking with the V Corps staff in Heidelberg, directed them to "change this, move this up, slow this down, move this over here, accelerate that," based on guidance from the command group.⁶⁴ Later musing that "all the bumps and bruises are fading now," he acknowledged that the quick response of the ad hoc headquarters structure to the deployment problems "demonstrated the flexibility of our command and control system."⁶⁵

By the time the deployment of Task Force Eagle was completed in mid-January 1996, some stability had also been imposed on the structure and tasks of the various controlling headquarters. (*Map 14*) Early V Corps involvement had been heavy, the battle staff having written the plan adopted by USAREUR as the campaign plan for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and programmed the complex deployment of forces. It had also framed the plans for the intermediate supporting base and selected the location for that base, as well as designing the structure of the USAREUR (Forward) headquarters itself. The V Corps staff planned the mission rehearsal exercises and conducted them, both for Task Force Lion and for Task Force Eagle, and in fact through 1998 continued to handle all mission rehearsal exercises for succeeding task forces that followed the 1st Armored Division's tour of duty in Bosnia. The corps delivered forces to the staging base in Hungary and was largely responsible for the hugely successful re-planning of that task "on the fly" when the deployment process was compressed by external events. At the corps main headquarters in Heidelberg, the remaining staff maintained budgetary control of the entire operation and trained the units of the corps still in Germany for operations other than peace support. Finally, the corps staff played a major part in the operation of the National Support Element in Hungary for the first eighteen months of the mission and entirely operated the support and sustaining operation in Germany for JOINT ENDEAVOR.⁶⁶


The chain of command for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was finalized at the end of December 1995 and remained in effect through October 1998, when U.S. Forces Command and USAREUR formally relieved V Corps of the task of training and providing forces for the NATO mission in Bosnia. *Chart 9* makes it clear how the divided chain of command made the planning process more complex at the beginning of the operation and illustrates the degree to which V Corps headquarters personnel were involved in the operation of the forward USAREUR headquarters.

The first year of the mission in Bosnia involved heavy participation by V Corps' separate brigades, as well, and the number and type of those forces gave scale to the magnitude of the preliminary mission rehearsal training the corps conducted on behalf of USAREUR. The NATO Enabling Force that entered Bosnia early included the 1st Armored Division's strike command post. The strike force, based at Kaposvár-Taszár to assist the initial entry forces in any emergency, was organized from the armored division's aviation brigade. It was composed of the following: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th (Aviation) Brigade, 1st Armored Division; 2d Battalion, 227th Aviation (Attack



MAP 14

CHART 9—CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR



— Command
→ Support, Sustainment, and/or Title 10 responsibilities

Helicopter) (AH-64 Apache); 3d Battalion, 1st Aviation (Attack Helicopter) (AH-64 Apache); 7th Battalion, 227th Aviation (Assault Helicopter) (UH-60 Blackhawk); Company A, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation (-) (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance); and 236th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) (UH-60).

The forces detailed to open the lines of communication from Hungary into Bosnia-Herzegovina included the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, of the 1st Armored Division, which served as the security unit. The 502d Engineer Company (Assault Float Bridge), the 38th Engineer Company (Medium Girder Bridge), and the 535th Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment) were likewise assigned, first of all to cross the Sava River, where the main highway bridge had been destroyed. The width of the river, combined with the drawdown of forces in Europe, meant that another assault float bridge company and medium girder bridge company had to be assigned from the United States to supplement the units remaining in Germany. The initial entry forces that crossed the Sava River and marched into Bosnia in advance of the 1st Armored Division task force included the airborne units that V Corps had previously trained as Task Force Lion. The full composition of the force is as follows: 1st Armored Division Assault Command Post; 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Combat Team; 67th Medical Detachment; Battery A, 25th Field Artillery (-) (Target Acquisition);

Tanks of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, crossing the Sava River as the lead elements of the 1st Armored Division's deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina to serve under NATO control as Task Force Eagle



and USAF personnel, including the Tactical Air Liaison Control Party, Prime Beef (Power), Combat Communications, Red Horse (Engineers), Security Police, and Air Evacuation Teams.⁶⁷ Finally, Task Force Eagle involved not only the bulk of the 1st Armored Division, as depicted in *Table 10*, but also elements of most of the V Corps separate brigades.

Recovery Operations

Naïve American expectations of a comparatively brief mission in Bosnia led V Corps and USAREUR planners to anticipate that, while a large part of the combatant force and its logistical sustainment structure in Europe would be committed to the Balkans, that mission might end as early as April 1996.⁶⁸ However much the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina had stabilized by that point, NATO and U.S. decision-makers were unwilling to assume the operational risk of removing all forces from the province at that time. Meanwhile, there was an imperative to maintain troops on the deployment no longer than 365 days and to replace the 1st Armored Division task force with a suitably configured and capable follow-on force. That force had to be drawn from V Corps, and the only candidate was the 1st Infantry Division, then stationed in Würzburg.

The plans staff abbreviated the 1st Armored Division tour of duty so as not to keep the division in Bosnia beyond one year yet still allow time for an orderly transfer of mission to the in-coming task force. Thus the division departed the Balkans effective 10 November 1996. While 1st Armored Division was in Bosnia, V Corps had organized and trained the designated 3d Infantry Division, subsequently redesignated the 1st Infantry Division, as the follow-on force.⁶⁹ That division entered Bosnia with one brigade before the end of the 1st Armored Division mission to serve as a covering force, systematically taking over operations to ensure a stable transitional environment before the onset of the worst of the winter weather while meeting General Joulwan's requirement to have a "capable force" in place until 20 December 1996.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, adhering to General Abrams' explicit guidelines, redeployment of the 1st Armored Division was a deliberate and methodical process. Abrams held two redeployment conferences in late June and again in mid-August 1996 to organize an efficient system for bringing Task Force Eagle back to Germany. During those conferences he established the transportation and other requirements to move units, personnel support requirements to superintend the movement, and the desired condition of units before returning to Germany. Those issues resolved, the staff then drew up detailed procedures to implement the redeployment.⁷¹

All withdrawing units returned to the intermediate staging base at Kaposvár-Taszár, where the troops spent seven days cleaning and maintaining vehicles and equipment, conducting full inventories of all sensitive items, such as night-vision devices, and carrying out many of the administrative and personnel actions necessary to wind up the task force. Normal command and control relationships were restored at that point and units turned in all excess equip-

ment that had been issued for the peace enforcement mission. The presumption was that a week of intensive recovery procedures carried out in Hungary could save up to two months of recovery time once the units returned to Germany. At that point, V Corps became involved again to carry out a series of specific tasks allotted by the redeployment plan. The corps set up a command post in Hungary on 15 September 1996 to resume control of redeploying units, using the headquarters of the 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade for that purpose. The command post inspected the units as they went through the transition process and verified unit readiness to proceed to Germany, where the parent V Corps units completed the recovery process and began the somewhat longer process of retraining the battalions for the heavy force combat mission. By the end of the redeployment process, the 69th ADA Brigade headquarters had processed over 300 units through the intermediate sustaining base, inspected more than 7,600 major pieces of equipment, returned some \$17 million worth of excess equipment to the Army inventory, and verified the individual readiness of more than 19,000 soldiers.

Back in Germany, Task Force Victory was the first step for redeploying 1st Armored Division units. The task force organized Reception Training Teams to help unit rear detachments coordinate the return of each unit's main body. Task Force Victory constituted the teams as much as forty-five days before units returned, in order to give the teams time to help the small rear detachments organize themselves to receive the homeward-bound soldiers. The teams remained available to the rear detachments for up to two weeks after unit return to provide additional manpower for all the administrative tasks involved in the process. The process was a lengthy one and involved preparing the barracks for occupation, organizing an arrival ceremony and reception processing station, receiving and unloading trains and delivering equipment to unit motor pools, and arranging the myriad personnel and community services that eased the return of soldiers to their units, their families, and their garrison duties.

By the close of the first year of Task Force Eagle operations, V Corps had developed a plan to restructure the command and control organization at Kaposvár-Taszár as a smaller headquarters that demanded less from the corps force structure. In part, a smaller National Support Element was possible because the success of Task Force Eagle through the year had created a more stable atmosphere in Bosnia-Herzegovina that allowed the deployment of a smaller successor task force that was, in its turn, less demanding of logistical sustainment. There was also the problem, however, that V Corps was the Army's only forward-deployed corps for contingency missions in the hemisphere and needed to maintain a capability to carry out the full spectrum of combat missions. To do that, the headquarters staff needed to be released from the USAREUR (Forward) mission and returned to its conventional corps functions. Thus, as the 1st Armored Division was in the process of leaving Bosnia, USAREUR (Forward) headquarters also underwent a reorganization.

The USAREUR (Forward) headquarters was in fact inactivated and replaced by a National Support Element that was at first commanded by the V Corps

deputy commanding general and then by the commanding general of the 21st Theater Army Area Command. The restructured National Support Element was charged with finishing the redeployment of 1st Armored Division forces, vehicles, equipment, and materiel and then with assuming the force protection, sustainment, and Title 10 responsibilities for which the previous headquarters had been responsible.⁷²

Subsequent Task Forces

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR extended from 31 December 1995 through 10 November 1996. When the 1st Armored Division mission ended 20 December 1996, the 1st Infantry Division provided a covering force for the transition period, with the expectation that it would remain in Bosnia. The mission went to the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, which deployed in October 1996. That brigade assumed the TF Eagle mission on 1 November 1996. On 12 December 1996 Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR ended and was replaced by Operation JOINT GUARD, UN Resolution 1088 simultaneously authorizing formation of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) to replace the Implementation Force. Thus the 1st Infantry Division's IFOR Covering Force became SFOR on 12 December and assumed the TF Eagle mission when IFOR departed on 20 December.

The 1st Infantry Division force was considerably smaller than the one that entered Bosnia in December 1995, although it did include a large aviation component drawn from the 11th Aviation Brigade of V Corps, as depicted in *Table 11*. A brigade combat team normally had no assigned aviation units, but the task force mission requirements, coupled with the difficult terrain and need for a quick reaction force in Bosnia, made such support advisable. The divisional aviation brigade remained in Germany, and the assignment to control the aviation units went instead to the 11th Aviation Brigade, which deployed its headquarters and headquarters company to command an Apache helicopter battalion, a Blackhawk utility battalion, and associated support units drawn from the 1st Infantry Division. One mechanized infantry battalion came from the brigade of the Big Red One stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. Logistical support from the division support command was the habitual "slice" normally supporting the 2d Brigade Combat Team.

Succeeding task forces in Bosnia were similarly organized. The responsibility for providing forces to the NATO Stabilization Force remained with V Corps until 1998, when the mission was transferred to U.S. Forces Command, which deployed the 1st Cavalry Division as SFOR III in June 1998.⁷³ On that date the mission was renamed Operation JOINT FORGE.

Observations on a Difficult Mission

The V Corps battle staff learned a lot of things as it prepared and deployed Task Force Eagle.⁷⁴ Not all of those lessons were welcome, nor were all pleasant. The most important was that the military vision of orderly planning and

TABLE 11—TASK FORCE EAGLE, MULTINATIONAL DIVISION-NORTH
(SFOR 1, 10 NOVEMBER 1996–12 OCTOBER 1997)

Headquarters and Headquarters Co, 1st Inf Div
2d Bde
Headquarters and Headquarters Co
Task Force 1st Bn, 18th Inf (Mech)
Task Force 1st Bn, 26th Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 41st Inf (Mech) (Fort Riley, Kansas)
1st Bn, 7th Field Arty
9th Engr Bn (-)
62d Engr Bn
Naval Mobile Construction Bn 40
121st Signal Bn
101st Military Intell Bn
519th MP Co
720th MP Co
11th Aviation Bde (-)
Headquarters and Headquarters Co
Co A, 7th Bn, 159th Aviation (Aviation Maintenance)
2d Squadron, 6th Cavalry (Attack)
2d Bn, 1st Aviation
4th Bn, 3d Air Defense Arty
Division Support Command
Headquarters and Headquarters Co
701st Forward Support Bn (-)
229th Forward Support Bn
1st Medical Bn
106th Finance Support Unit
361st Civil Affairs Bn
38th Personnel Service Bn (-)

Source: 1st Infantry Division OPORD 96–23, 071400Z Oct 1996, Operation DANGER ENDEAVOR, Annex A with Change 1.

equally orderly execution of plans was not necessarily a concept to which political authorities attached much value. Various members of the V Corps staff lamented the late-breaking political decisions that so affected their planning and upset the deliberate and sequential force deployment they had designed.⁷⁵ In fact, however, as they belatedly understood, political decisions during crises or momentous events customarily came later than the military would prefer. In the nature of things, political leaders could be expected to explore all of the possible nonmilitary solutions to a problem, literally until the eleventh hour, before finally resorting to the use, or threat of use, of force. Thus those decisions were apt to be made late and, in all likelihood, suddenly, and to be accompanied by an insistent demand for immediate military action to achieve the political objective. The hard fact of life, V Corps planners learned, was that political decisions were not usually made to accommodate military requirements. A related consequence was equally unpalatable. Higher military authorities could be as hamstrung as was the corps headquarters during the wait for a political deci-

sion. The entire process required great patience, great circumspection, great flexibility, and a different outlook.

Tactical planners had always acknowledged that terrain and weather were central elements of all planning for military operations. They were accustomed to receiving reports about the nature of the terrain and the probable course of the weather and making the appropriate allowances for both since, as V Corps analysts later pointed out, "neither the commander nor the staff can change the weather or the terrain in the area of operations."⁷⁶ Most of the plans staff had come to the realization that corps operations in the post-Cold War world, and certainly those in which V Corps had been engaged since 1990, often lay as much at the operational and strategic level as the tactical. Thus it was necessary for them to accept the political decision-making process at the strategic level as an analogue to the way they habitually thought about weather at the tactical level. In brief, as the realization came to the battle staff, and as planners reminded themselves by hanging signs over their desks in mid-1996, "the political process is to the strategic planner what weather is to the tactical planner."⁷⁷

Peace enforcement was an uncomfortable mission for V Corps, one in which it had little real experience and, in truth, desired little, much preferring the traditional heavy force combat mission with which it was thoroughly experienced and for which it was comprehensively trained. Yet it required little prescience to guess that the most likely operations for V Corps units in the future, and certainly as Balkan operations continued indefinitely, were peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, and other "nontraditional" tasks. The consequence was a requirement to amend the corps mission statement and mission essential task list to provide a basis for the training needed to carry out the new range of missions. That process started as Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was launched and culminated by the year 2000 in a mission statement that explicitly included NATO and UN military operations.⁷⁸

The corps had little influence on force structure decisions, and particularly in light of the centrally directed drawdown of forces that was even then gradually coming to an end in Germany. Yet the problems in force projection experienced in December 1995 pointed to requirements for transportation specialists, movement control specialists, and other capabilities that no longer existed in Europe in the numbers that obviously were needed. Over the next five years corps force management staff officers gradually worked to fill such of those deficiencies as were within their scope, particularly by creating authorizations for civilian employees to help units with movement control. Other problems, such as the shortage of truck companies and engineer units and the fact that a number of units were not manned at full strength, had no obvious solutions. Neither was there an easy solution to the reduced force structure of each division—two maneuver brigades and the appropriate proportion of artillery, aviation, engineer, and logistics support units—that diminished the number of task forces the corps could form at any one time. Thus the corps was obliged to accept that shortages in deploying units would continue to have to be filled by borrowing soldiers and equipment from units that would remain in Germany, with a con-

sequent lessening of the readiness and combat capability of those remaining units.

That practice—"cross-leveling"—was managerial language for a process the tactical leaders recognized as destructive to unit integrity. The haste of the deployment for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR required the last minute reassignment of soldiers from all over V Corps to fill vacancies in the 1st Armored Division. Thus well-established tactical teams were destroyed, but the filling of those vacancies did not automatically produce strong tactical capabilities in the gaining units. That process took time, as the V Corps after action report explained when its authors wrote that "Peacetime bromides about team-building are silenced in the excitement of deployment as squad members leave their teams to become anonymous fillers among strangers on the eve of deployment into the unknown."⁷⁹ The creation of ad hoc headquarters brought with it similar costs when officers of various ranks had to be pulled from nondeploying units to fill critical staff functions in Hungary or in Bosnia. Those officers were often battalion commanders, and the after action report again complained that such officers,

star performers by definition, are pulled from their business of leading troops and training junior leaders to respond to 911 [i.e., emergency] calls from on high that take commanders from their soldiers. Recognize what we do when we cross-level and when we take commanders from their troops.⁸⁰

The other piece of the personnel puzzle was the use of units and individuals of the Army Reserve to help meet mission requirements. Problems in activating and deploying reserve units, more fully addressed in the next chapter, pointed up the need to find a way to speed the process, and particularly for those specialized units that were intended to bring the 3d Corps Support Command and 19th Corps Materiel Management Center up to full wartime strength. Similarly, the corps began to reconsider the missions of those two units. Originally designed for wartime utilization, their use in peace enforcement operations raised the question of amending their mission statements, mission essential task lists, and perhaps even their organization.⁸¹

For other essential services, various corps analyses of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR concluded, contracting was useful when adequate time existed but inappropriate for a hasty deployment or an entry into theater requiring actual combat. In those cases, appropriate Army units, whether active force or reserve units, were needed, and "forces required early must be in theater before crises arise."⁸² That such stationing was unlikely, given the general Army reduction in strength after the end of the Persian Gulf War, did not, in the view of the V Corps battle staff, alter the validity of the observation.

Finally, various after action reports considering the many V Corps actions in Germany to sustain Task Force Eagle and maintain the readiness of the balance of the corps for other missions concluded that the headquarters had underestimated the magnitude of those rear area missions.⁸³ Without creating a special task force—Task Force Victory—to handle all those tasks, the small V

Corps headquarters staff would quickly have been overwhelmed. An emerging conclusion was that post-Cold War operations might indeed require a more elaborate and extensive structure of directing staffs, rather than smaller headquarters elements, to give corps the flexibility to direct and sustain more than one operation at a given moment.

NOTES

¹ In fact, the V Corps Special Troops Battalion (STB) was a provisional unit organized in July 1980. The MTOE recognized corps headquarters troops as being assigned to a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). The STB was organized because the staff structure of the HHC was inadequate to organize, deploy, and operate the Corps Main and Corps Forward command posts.

² The 21st TAACOM headquarters did not have a large enough military staff to provide a forward headquarters for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and still carry out its extensive responsibilities in Germany.

³ Interv, author with Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox, Commanding General, V Corps, 5 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁴ V Corps Historian Briefing Files, 1992; V Corps Secretary of the General Staff Weekly Calendar, 1992. Also see After Action Review, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996); V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans) Briefing Book, Bosnia-Herzegovina Update, 1993.

⁵ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Herbert Frandsen, Chief, G-3 Plans, V Corps, 5-6 Jan 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁶ Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991; fighting broke out between Slovenia and Serb-dominated Yugoslav federal forces immediately. In September the conflict spread to Croatia. In the same month, Macedonia declared its independence. On 15 October 1991 the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia.

⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 727, 8 Jan 1992.

⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, 21 Feb 1992. United Nations Security Council Resolution 749 of 7 April 1992 authorized the deployment of the UNPROFOR to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), created in February 1992, operated until March 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Created to secure protected areas in Croatia, UNPROFOR's mandate was enlarged several times to include monitoring implementation of periodic cease-fire agreements and, in September 1992, to support UNHCR activities. UNPROFOR extended its activities to include monitoring the stability of the Macedonian-Yugoslav border in December 1992. For a summary of this and other peacekeeping operations, see Barbara Benton, ed., *Soldiers for Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: Facts on File, 1996).

⁹ See Chapter 7 for details on the TF 212 mission.

¹⁰ Interv, author with Lt. Col. Daniel V. Sulka, Plans Chief, ACofS, G-4, V Corps, 9 Jun 1995, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

¹¹ Interv, author with Col. William W. Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 24 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

¹² Sulka interview.

¹³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 795, 11 Dec 1992. For details on the V Corps role in the mission to Macedonia, refer to Chapter 10.

¹⁴ Sulka interview.

¹⁵ The Allied Command, Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps, had headquarters at Rhein-Dahlen, Germany, and was a British framework headquarters. The ARRC ultimately became the land component command headquarters for the NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, responsible for implementing the Dayton Agreement and the Paris Peace Accords.

¹⁶ Sulka interview. On the V Corps role in Somalia operations, see Chapter 8.

¹⁷ V Corps ACoS, G-3 (Plans) Briefing Book, OPLAN 4228, 1993, which includes the OPLAN, briefings referring to that plan, and miscellaneous related messages and action officer notes.

¹⁸ Sulka interview.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Chief of Staff, V Corps, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²¹ Interv, author with Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, V Corps Commanding General, 19 Jan 1995, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

²² Interv, author with Maj. Gen. William L. Nash, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, and Commanding General, Task Force Eagle, for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 16 May 1997, Rose Barracks, Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

²³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 983, 31 Mar 1995.

²⁴ The best analysis of those operations is in Charles R. Shrader, *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003).

²⁵ There are many studies of the situation in the former Yugoslav state, many of which are frankly tendentious. The most useful review for military purposes is William T. Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 7 Nov 1995). For a sampling of more recent studies, also see Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992) for earlier events; Miron Rezun, *Europe and War in the Balkans: Toward a New Yugoslav Identity* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995); and Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Government publications remain useful in tracing public policy. See [U.S. Department of State], *Balkan Fact Sheet: Chronology of the Balkan Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, 6 Dec 1995); [U.S. Department of Defense], "U.S. Involvement Underwrites Bosnian Peace Bid" (Prepared Statement of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 17-18 October 1995), in *Defense Issues* 10 (October 1995):90; and [U.S. Department of Defense], "U.S. Policy on Bosnia Remains Consistent" (Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the Senate Armed Services Committee and House National Security Committee, 7 Jun 1995), in *Defense Issues* 10 (June, 1995):60.

²⁶ Annex B, Chronology, After Action Review, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), hereafter cited as Annex B, AAR, Ops in Central Region.

²⁷ Details on the sequence of planning actions in the various headquarters are drawn from

Annex B, Chronology, After Action Review, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996). Also see V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans) Briefing Book, Operation DARING LION, 1995. The allusion to a "rug rat" is obscure, but DARING LION referred to the Lion of the Veneto, the symbol of the region of Italy in which the American airborne force was based, and which it used as part of its insignia.

²⁸ Interv, author with Raymond D. Nolen, Chief, Exercises Branch, Training Division, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 16 Jul 1998, Campbell Barracks; V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans) Briefing Book, Exercise Mountain Shield II (2 vols.), 1995; and V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans) Working Book, Exercise Mountain Shield II, 1995.

²⁹ On the Mountain Shield exercises, see "Tribal Knowledge," After Action Review of the Mountain Eagle Exercises (V Corps History Office, 1998), which includes a discussion of the Mountain Shield exercises; Nolen interview; and the briefings and summaries contained in Exercise Files for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, V Corps Historical Reference Files.

³⁰ V Corps History Office Memo, The Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, dictated by Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams, V Corps commanding general, September 1995.

³¹ Annex B, AAR, Ops in Central Region. Also, V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans), Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR PLANEX Planning Book, 1995.

³² Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of V Corps planning is based upon the following interviews: Maj. Richard Thurston with Lt. Col. Albert Bryant, Jr., Chief, Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 25 Mar 1996, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany; Dr. Janet McDonnell with Lt. Col. Albert Bryant, Jr., Chief, Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 25 Mar 1996, Campbell Barracks, hereinafter cited as Bryant 2 interview; and Maj. Richard Thurston with Lt. Col. Peter Schifferle, Chief, War Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 16 Feb 1996; with Lt. Col. Daniel J. Gilbert, Deputy G-3, Headquarters, V Corps, 5 Mar 1996; with Lt. Col. Manuel J. F. Hernandez, Chief, Current Operations, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 22 Feb 1996; with Lt. Col. Francis A. I. Bowers, III, Chief, ORSA Cell, V Corps, 26 Mar 1996; with Maj. Ronald J. Hansen, Planner, War Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 6 Feb 1996; with Capt. Daniel J. Walczyk, G-3 Plans Officer, V Corps, 25 Mar 1996; and with Maj. Douglas Morrison, G-3 Plans Officer, V Corps, 12 Mar 1996, all at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

³³ ACofS, G-3 File, Equip and Train (1995), and associated documents filed in Historian Reference File, Equip and Train (1995); also, "Train and Arm: A Summary of U.S. Experience in Assisting the Armies of Developing Nations," HQ, V Corps, History Office Background Paper, August 1995.

³⁴ Critical dates are drawn from Lt. Col. Peter Schifferle's desk calendar for 1995-96, in Historian Reference File, G-3 Plans Miscellaneous Documents.

³⁵ Annex B, AAR, Ops in Central Region.

³⁶ Medical support was a touchy and intensely political issue. See Interv, Maj. Richard Thurston with Col. (Dr.) David Lam, V Corps Surgeon, 6 Mar 1996, Campbell Barracks.

³⁷ 1st Armored Division OPLAN Task Force Eagle 95-426 (IRON ENDEAVOR), August 1995.

³⁸ Annex B, AAR, Ops in Central Region.

³⁹ Schifferle desk calendar for 1995-96 in Historian Reference File, G-3 Plans, Miscellaneous Documents.

⁴⁰ G-3 Plans Draft DST [Decision Support Template], entitled "DST Work," 26 Sep 1995, Historian File, G-3 Reference Documents.

⁴¹ For the implementation of the DST, and a specific statement of its purpose, refer to HQ, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, Campaign Plan 40105, 30 Nov 1995 (often referred to as USAREUR OPLAN 40105), p. C-2-2, "Decisions in a Strategic and Operational Environment."

⁴² Schifferle interview.

⁴³ The other options were to enter through Serbia, with an intermediate supporting base (ISB) in the vicinity of Belgrade, and deploying through Croatia, with an ISB in the vicinity of Zagreb. A third possibility was setting up an ISB at Slavonski Brod in Croatia.

⁴⁴ [U.S. Department of State], *Chronology: Dayton Peace Agreement, November 1995–November 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, 7 Nov 1996); [U.S. Department of State], *Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 30 Nov 1995); and *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Paris, 14 Dec 1995).

⁴⁵ See After Action Review (AAR), V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), for details on the chronology of OPLAN development.

⁴⁶ USAREUR Campaign Plan 40105.

⁴⁷ The SACEUR authority to conduct Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR arose from a United Nations Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The North Atlantic Council, proceeding from that, authorized the SACEUR, in accordance with the SHAPE OPLAN, to designate CINCSOUTH to complete the military tasks in accordance with the peace agreement and rules of engagement.

⁴⁸ USAREUR Campaign Plan 40105.

⁴⁹ In addition to the OPLAN, details about the planned operation were gleaned from V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans) Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR Briefing Book, 1996; and V Corps Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR Briefing for Admiral Leighton Smith, COMIFOR (April 1996).

⁵⁰ Notes from V Corps Battle Staff "Hot Wash" discussion, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, conducted 15 Mar 1996, Historian File, OJE.

⁵¹ E-mail Msg, CG V Corps for Corps Staff, et al., 27 Nov 1995, 0944, sub: Statement for Commanders, Bosnia Peace Plan.

⁵² USAREUR Campaign Plan 40105.

⁵³ The essential orders were: Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 141335Z Nov 1995, sub: USCINCEUR Alert Order; Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 281435Z Nov 1995, sub: Guidance to IFOR Supporting CINCs and USEUCOM Subordinate Commands Regarding Movement/Prepositioning of U.S. Personnel/Equipment in Support of IFOR Operations; Msg, CJCS for multiple addressees, 021425Z Dec 1995, sub: Execute Order for U.S. Enabling Forces to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR; Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 062035Z Dec 1995, sub: Execute Order for U.S. National RSOI Forces to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR; Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 071216Z Dec 1995, sub: Execute Order for USAREUR Forces in Support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (Determined Effort); and Msg, SHAPE for multiple addressees, 160223Z Dec 1995, sub: IFOR-ACTORD for Main Forces, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

⁵⁴ Discussion of the Task Force Eagle deployment process has been drawn from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, USAREUR Headquarters After Action Report (2 vols.), May 1997, ch. 10; AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996); and Task Force Eagle After Action Report, 20 Dec 1995–10 Nov 1996 (2 vols.) ch. II.

⁵⁵ Interv, Dr. Janet McDonnell, Office of the Chief of Engineers Historian, with Lt. Col. Albert Bryant, Jr., Chief, Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 25 Mar 1996, Campbell Barracks.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Interv, Maj. Richard Thurston with Mr. Heinz Schneider, Traffic Manager, 39th Transportation Group, 21st Theater Army Area command, 26 Feb 1996, Kaiserslautern, Germany.

⁶⁰ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996).

⁶¹ On these points and other issues related to Task Force Eagle deployment from home stations, see Interviews, Maj. Richard Thurston with Capt. David K. Allen, Assistant S-2/3 and Railhead Commander, 221st Base Support Battalion, 13 May 1996, Wiesbaden Air Base; with Capt. Michael L. Bigham, Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 414th Base Support Battalion, 5 Jun 1996, Pioneer Kaserne, Hanau; with Lt. Col. Mark W. Clay, Commander, 410th Base Support Battalion, 12 Jun 1996, Marshall Kaserne, Bad Kreuznach; with Col. Tyrone A. Hunter, Commander, 26th Area Support Group, 6 Jun 1996, Patton Barracks, Heidelberg; with M. Sgt. John Nevitt, Transportation NCOIC, ACofS, G-4, V Corps, 5 Feb 1996, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg; with Lt. Col. Harold T. Stott, Jr., Commander, 222d Base Support Battalion, 3 Jun 1996, Smith Barracks, Baumholder; and with Lt. Col. Raymond R. Youngs, Commander, 293d Base Support Battalion, 19 Apr 1996, Sullivan Barracks, Mannheim, all in Germany.

⁶² AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996).

⁶³ Ibid. Meanwhile, road and rail traffic accounted for delivery of 63 percent of all soldiers and 87 percent of materiel and some 12,000 pieces of equipment, including 101 tanks, 251 Bradley fighting vehicles, 145 aircraft, and 57 pieces of artillery. Cost accounting showed the expected: of the three possible modes of transportation (air, rail, and truck), air was the most expensive by far at \$480 per short ton. Commercial trucks cost the government \$396 per short ton; military trucks, \$310 per short ton.

⁶⁴ Bryant interview.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996). Cf. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, USAREUR Headquarters After Action Report (2 vols.), May 1997.

⁶⁷ All orders of battle for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR have been drawn from C. E. Kirkpatrick, *V Corps Order of Battle, 1918-2003* (HQ, V Corps, History Office Draft MS), 2003.

⁶⁸ On the redeployment planning and process, see AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996).

⁶⁹ Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Infantry Division, redesignated Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Infantry Division, effective 15 February 1996, per USAREUR PO 335-23, 1 Dec 1995.

⁷⁰ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for multiple addressees, 043350Z Oct 1996, sub: FRAGO 57 (Deployment of 11D Covering Force, Redeployment of TF Eagle). The planning process was lengthy and complex. See the following V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans) briefings, plans, and reference volumes: Bosnia Briefing, 15 Jul 1996; Briefing Book, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, May 1996; Briefing, V Corps Plans Update, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR 1000-series, 2 Aug 1996; Briefing Book, 11D Covering Force, 1996; Briefing, IFOR-Restructuring the Force, 15 Jul 1996; Briefing, Operation JOINT GUARD, 11D Covering Force Mission Analysis, December 1996; and Briefing Book, 11D Covering Force, 1996. Also, USAREUR (Forward) Plans Briefing Book, 1AD/11D Swap OJE, Cost Analysis Team Command Briefing, 24 Oct 1996. The 1st Infantry Division plan was 1st Infantry Division OPORD 96-23, 071400Z Oct 1996, Operation DANGER ENDEAVOR, implementing USAREUR FRAGO 291 to USAREUR Campaign Plan 40105 (EXORD for withdrawal of the 1st AD and Deployment of the 1st ID Covering Force). Indicative of planners' frustrations at the apparent frequent changes of direction throughout the process was a September 1996 V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans) Briefing Book on various proposals to relieve the 1st Armored Division, entitled "Whatever Endeavor. Book 7. Pulling Teeth."

⁷¹ USAREUR Campaign Plan 40105, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Phase V (Redeployment),

26 Jul 1996; V Corps Briefing, V Corps Rear "Forward!" (Redeployment), 12 Nov 1996; USAREUR (Fwd) and V Corps Staff Functional Analysis, Redeployment, 11 Nov 1996.

⁷² For subsequent changes to the National Support Element composition and functioning, refer to the following V Corps, ACoS, G-3 (Plans) volumes: Briefing Book, NATO Stabilization Force 2, 1997; General Planning Book, NATO Stabilization Force 1, 1997; Briefing Book, Operation JOINT GUARD (Operation of ISB at Slavonski Brod), 1997; and Briefing Book, NSE Hungary, 1997.

⁷³ The 1st Cavalry Division (SFOR III) was succeeded in Bosnia by the 10th Mountain Division (SFOR IV) on 4 August 1999. In turn, 49th Armored Division (Texas Army National Guard) (SFOR V) assumed the mission on 7 March 2000, followed on 5 October 2000 by the 3d Infantry Division (SFOR VI).

⁷⁴ This summary is in part drawn from AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 6.

⁷⁵ For examples of such condemnations, refer to Bryant, Schifferle, Bertinetti, Goligowski, and Hernandez interviews.

⁷⁶ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 6.

⁷⁷ Notes from V Corps Battle Staff "Hot Wash" discussion, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, conducted 15 Mar 1996, Historian File, OJE.

⁷⁸ V Corps Mission Statement and Mission Essential Task List, 2000, in V Corps History Office Mission Statement Files. The evolution of the V Corps METL toward the 2000 statement can be seen in a document issued just prior to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. See Memo, Commanding General, V Corps, for Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, 26 Jul 1995, sub: V Corps Mission and METL. These issues are reiterated in V Corps ACoS, G-3 Exercise Division Briefing for V Corps Off-Site Conference, Maintaining Conventional Warfighting Proficiency, 1999.

⁷⁹ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 6.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ [V Corps History Office], 3d Corps Support Command (CONUS Augmentation), Summary of Active Duty Deployment for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, 14 December 1995-9 September 1996, January 1997.

⁸² AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 6.

⁸³ In addition to the V Corps after action report already cited, these and other conclusions are drawn from the following after action reports by V Corps units: Assistant Corps Engineer, 14 Mar 1997; Corps Chaplain, 10 Mar 1997; 18th Military Police Brigade, 21 Jan 1997; V Corps ACoS, G-6, 11 Mar 1997; V Corps Inspector General, 13 Mar 1997; V Corps Safety Office, 12 Mar 1997; V Corps Special Troops Battalion, 21 Mar 1997; Task Force Victory, 26 Feb 1997; 12th Aviation Brigade, 24 Mar 1997; 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 12 Mar 1997; and USAREUR (Forward) Public Affairs Officer, 1st Reserve Rotation, 25 Aug 1996.

Headquarters Restructuring and Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR Planning

"I don't know if it's an ad hoc headquarters or not."

Maj. Gen. Walter H. Yates
Deputy Commanding General, V Corps
May 1996

"Corps (Main) headquarters is in charge, despite the fact that the task force [TF Victory] is commanded by a major general and the Corps (Main) is commanded by a promotable colonel. . . . I think the jury is still out on this thing."

Lt. Col. David K. Swindell
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Task Force Victory
April 1996

"One thing that scared a lot of people away, I guess, is that the campaign plan is really thick."

Capt. Mac T. Balatico, Chief
Adjutant General Plans and Operations, V Corps
May 1996

By the time intensive planning for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina began in late 1995, European Command had already required USAREUR to be capable of deploying the nuclei of two joint task forces, one focused on humanitarian or disaster relief and non-combat evacuation operations in an uncertain or perhaps hostile environment, and the other prepared to conduct mid- to high-intensity combat operations.¹ Peace enforcement operations, however, fell between the two stools. Humanitarian operations required less combat power, but generally more, and more varied, logistical support. High-intensity combat operations naturally required the most powerful armored force the corps could field. One of the planners' general assumptions was that taking capabilities away from a combat force was a simpler proposition than adding combat capabilities to a force configured for humanitarian relief operations. Hence, the notional task force organization that

V Corps had submitted to European Command and that European Command had incorporated into its directives was most appropriate for a combat mission.² The V Corps planners used that manning scheme as the base document from which they adapted both the eventual headquarters organization and the eventual task force organization for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

For a number of reasons, the command relationships for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR were more than merely complex from the corps point of view. The first was that it was hard to call the arrangements anything other than ad hoc, since established command relationships did not apply in any recognizable way. Early in the planning process, the USAREUR deputy chief of staff, operations, and corps G-3 planners mooted about the concept of activating Seventh United States Army to serve as the National Support Element—that is, the forward sustaining base—for the task force to be deployed into Bosnia-Herzegovina. That idea did not pass muster, though for no clearly expressed reason. Equally unacceptable was any notion of using the V Corps headquarters itself to command the National Support Element. There was speculation among staff officers that the corps was not selected because the Army did not wish to appear to be encroaching on the NATO field commander's mission, and because using an ad hoc headquarters drawn from existing units would tend to diminish public perception of the level of American involvement in the Balkans. For whatever reason, General William Crouch, the USAREUR commander, decided to establish a forward element of his own headquarters in Hungary to do the job.³

Creation of USAREUR (Forward) Headquarters

With the campaign plan for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina well on the way to completion, attention turned to the issue of command. General John Abrams, the V Corps commander, convened an impromptu meeting in his office on the morning of 6 November to discuss a forthcoming meeting with the secretary of defense. He announced to the participants—Col. James L. Bryan, the acting deputy chief of staff; Col. George Casey, the chief of staff; Ms. Jane Anderson, the political adviser; and Lt. Col. Peter Schifferle, the lead G-3 planner for Balkan operations—that there were strong signs that the corps would execute the planned deployment into Bosnia, but that the operation would probably not commence until December.⁴ Two days later Abrams told his staff that he wanted to take maximum advantage of the extra two weeks of planning time to work out details on the additional tasks that had to be accomplished, such as building the intermediate supporting base and setting up contracts for support services.

Structuring the headquarters required for the operation was one of those tasks. In the opinion of his planners, Abrams had already started to think about the need to create a headquarters in Germany to command the stay-behind units. The immediate concern, however, was the headquarters that was to be placed in Hungary. He had already discussed that with Schifferle during the planning meetings at Grafenwöhr, where Schifferle had advanced the G-3 Plans

opinion that the forward headquarters had three missions: to exercise oversight for the entire deployment; to manage Title 10 responsibilities⁵ for the deployed force, particularly force protection; and to be prepared to become an operational headquarters *in extremis*, whether for a withdrawal of the force, for reinforcement, or for additional and currently unforeseen requirements. Abrams was hesitant to endorse the third task, in Schifferle's opinion because of the sensitivity within NATO of placing an American corps headquarters in the theater while a NATO corps was in operational control. Schifferle pressed the point, noting that unilateral American decisions could potentially remove the 1st Armored Division force from under the NATO umbrella. In that case, the division headquarters did not have a staff substantial enough to handle direct contact with Washington, particularly if the division was then engaged in some kind of withdrawal or other complex maneuver. Even the corps headquarters, he thought, would be stretched by the complexity and size of such a requirement.

During the October planning session at Grafenwöhr, the plans staff drafted the organization of a USAREUR (Forward) headquarters to undertake the missions that Abrams had outlined in his discussions with Schifferle. At first the staff assumed that the corps would be the headquarters chosen as the base of what came to be known as the National Support Element. Further analysis, however, showed that the corps lacked a staff large enough and diverse enough in capabilities to carry out all of the American national support duties, referred to as Title 10 tasks, that would have to be performed. Further, there were many missions that had never been contemplated when the corps authorization documents were drawn up. The engineer section within the staff, for example, was not large enough to superintend the massive engineering effort, which included bridging the Sava River, classifying routes and bridges all over Bosnia, and managing the camp construction requirements for the deployed task force. Similarly, the adjutant general section was not large enough for the size of the personnel mission that a six-month or longer mission entailed.

In the end Abrams, in consultation with Crouch, decided that the best solution was to create a new headquarters out of elements drawn from both V Corps and USAREUR, rather than to augment an existing staff. Working from Abrams' decision, G-3 Plans then developed and presented a draft table of organization for USAREUR (Forward), which USAREUR subsequently reviewed and approved. In the process of designing USAREUR (Forward), the intent was always to leave V Corps with sufficient capability to sustain itself and monitor and control its operations in Germany, while it augmented what was supposed to be an essentially USAREUR-based staff in Hungary. General Crouch named Abrams to be the Deputy Commander, USAREUR (Forward), with his duty position at that forward headquarters. Meanwhile, Abrams retained command of V Corps. Abrams' principal deputies were named at the same time. The chief of staff was to be Maj. Gen. Daniel J. Petrosky, at that time the deputy chief of staff, operations, for USAREUR and Seventh Army. The chief of operations was Brig. Gen. Burwell B. Bell, at that time the assistant division commander, support, of the 3d Infantry Division.⁶ The chief of logistics was Brig. Gen. Samuel



Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams

Kindred, at that time commanding general of the 3d Corps Support Command (COSCOM). He was also the commander of the 21st Theater Army Area Command (Forward), which would be built around the core of the 3d COSCOM staff and also located at the forward headquarters. Col. Fred Stein, commanding 5th Signal Command, put together the tactical communications nets that linked USAREUR, USAREUR (Forward), and Task Force Eagle, a task for which the V Corps G-6 was not organized. Despite the decision to distribute the USAREUR (Forward) positions between V Corps and USAREUR staffs, the burden that eventually fell on the corps was considerable.

Meanwhile, officers assigned to V Corps' separate brigades filled other USAREUR (Forward) positions. The commander of the 130th Engineer Brigade became the deputy chief of staff, engineer, while the 41st Field Artillery Brigade commander eventually became headquarters deputy chief of staff.⁷ The commander of the 30th Medical Brigade supervised the medical support that was split between the forward supporting base and Task Force Eagle. In the December 1995 manning document, V Corps personnel constituted 243 of 347 USAREUR (Forward) positions. Throughout the existence of USAREUR (Forward), the corps continued to provide a similar percentage of the total headquarters strength.⁸

Headquarters Commandant

Physical support of the corps headquarters in the field was the mission of the Special Troops Battalion, which sustained the corps tactical and main com-

mand posts. The corps rear command post was similarly sustained by the Special Troops Battalion of the 3d Corps Support Command.⁹ The original notion had been to assign the headquarters commandant mission for the USAREUR (Forward) mission to the COSCOM Special Troops Battalion, most of which would deploy to Hungary with the 3d COSCOM staff. Further analysis, however, convinced planners that the battalion did not have the manpower to run the entire complex at the Kaposvár-Taszár base. Therefore, on 6 October the G-3 informed the V Corps Special Troops Battalion that it might be deployed as part of USAREUR (Forward) to operate that headquarters' command post and administrative areas.

The battalion commander began his mission analysis on the basis of several assumptions, the principal one being that the corps forward command post would be the only V Corps command post deploying to Hungary, and that he would therefore be required to find the soldiers to operate only one location. In addition, he assumed that no personnel ceiling on deployments to Hungary would be imposed, such as had already been imposed on the task force destined for Bosnia. It also seemed evident that the forward command post would not collocate with any other command post, so that administrative support, billeting, messing, and physical security tasks could be shared. Instead, he had to plan for the unit to bear the entire burden

USAREUR (Forward) headquarters at Kaposvár-Taszár, Hungary, during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR



itself. Finally, he had to assume that both garrison and field exercise operations in Heidelberg would continue as before, so that he had to allocate enough soldiers for such tasks in Germany as well. Between 7 October and 19 November the battalion built a USAREUR (Forward) headquarters commandant structure that continued to evolve in size and composition as time went on and the battalion's perception of requirements became clearer. By the time the Dayton Peace Agreement was announced on 21 November, the battalion commander had concluded that twenty-four soldiers would be a sufficient addition from the battalion to support the operation of the command post in Taszár.¹⁰

Another task remained before the Special Troops Battalion could take up its duties in Hungary, and that was a revision of the battalion mission essential task list to add new battle tasks for support of peace enforcement operations. For example, the Special Troops Battalion had to add "operate a transportation motor pool" to the task "provide life support services to the main and tactical command posts." Similarly, the process of refocusing the task list involved a careful review of all the existing tasks and addition of new subordinate tasks to incorporate all of the specialized new requirements into the headquarters commandant mission.¹¹

Sustaining V Corps operations in Germany involved the full range of personnel and administrative services customarily made available to the headquarters in garrison—personnel administration, supply, and dining facility, among others—as well as the command maintenance program and field exercises. To accomplish that, the Special Troops Battalion, like other V Corps organizations involved in JOINT ENDEAVOR, conducted what became known as "split-based" operations. Roughly one-third of the battalion staff deployed to Hungary, but the tempo of operations in Germany still increased during the mission because of the need to support replacement operations for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, much of the battalion mission in NATO's Central Region still involved USAREUR (Forward), though at a distance.

The Special Troops Battalion managed training support for USAREUR (Forward), conducting monthly small arms qualification ranges and organizing other routine training tasks. The staff also coordinated individual replacement training at the Hohenfels training area. By the end of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR the battalion had managed the required predeployment situational training exercises for over 1,300 soldiers. The battalion also handled logistical and administrative support for USAREUR (Forward) by arranging predeployment processing for replacements; obtaining the additional organizational clothing and individual equipment for soldiers bound for the JOINT ENDEAVOR operation; coordinating bus and air transportation to Hungary for replacements; and managing out-processing for returning USAREUR (Forward) soldiers. While operating in garrison, the battalion also trained and equipped its own replacements, running two complete rotations of soldiers in Hungary that replaced every soldier every four months.

Creation of Task Force Victory

Units remaining in Germany required a sufficient command and control element to manage the war plans requirements for existing missions and the standard training requirements. From the outset it was clear that the NATO mission was going to involve "first team" participation from the staff, which meant that most of the staff principals would be assigned to USAREUR (Forward), as well as many of the staff deputies and a substantial portion of the key plans and operations sections of the staff. The headquarters design that the G-3 worked out required around 40 percent of the V Corps staff for duty in Hungary. Unfortunately, the corps headquarters at that time was no longer manned at the Cold War standard of more than 100 percent of authorizations. It soon became apparent that there was no way that the remaining staff could carry out all of the missions the corps retained for ongoing operations in Germany and elsewhere.¹²

Maintaining normal operations in Germany was therefore going to present a dilemma, but one in which the members of the staff deployed to Hungary could afford to take little interest. The solution to the problem of maintaining some normalcy in Germany was to establish yet another headquarters, which V Corps called Task Force Victory. Task Force Victory took command of the nondeploying elements of the corps' separate brigades and the rear detachments of the 1st Armored Division.¹³ General Abrams retained command of V Corps itself through his chief of staff, using the vehicle of a daily videoconference to exercise direction of the headquarters. Maj. Gen. Walter Yates assumed command of Task Force Victory, while continuing to serve as the deputy corps commander. To operate Task Force Victory, he had a composite general staff drawn largely from the V Corps Artillery, but also from nondeploying parts of the 3d Corps Support Command staff. Distribution of commanders and key staff was frankly a balancing act. The V Corps Artillery commander, Col. William J. Tetu, was initially assigned as General Yates' deputy, but ended up spending most of his time in Hungary. The commander of the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, Col. Michael Maples, stood in as V Corps Artillery commander, using his staff to run both the corps artillery and the brigade, and was himself eventually assigned to duty in Hungary.¹⁴

Ultimately, the USAREUR campaign plan directed creation of Task Force Victory,¹⁵ but the V Corps Artillery staff was already aware of the requirement before publication of the plan and conducted a mission analysis in the middle of November to develop an operational concept for the task force.¹⁶ The artillery staff then briefed the concept to Abrams on 26 November 1995. After obtaining his approval and further guidance, the corps artillery planners modified the concept and briefed it to the corps staff on 1 December and to the brigade commanders on 13 December. By 15 December the roles and missions of Task Force Victory had been firmly established:

Task Force Victory commands and controls V Corps non-deploying units and rear detachments of deployed units, excluding 3d Infantry Division. Trains these forces, assuring their readiness to conduct combat operations in a mid-intensity conflict. Supports continuing USEUCOM [U.S. European Command] and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] missions. Monitors and influences family and community support activities. Assists the reintegration of rear detachments with parent units.¹⁷


Yates set up the headquarters at Wiesbaden Air Base in the building recently vacated when the majority of 3d Corps Support Command staff deployed to Hungary to serve as the staff of the 21st Theater Army Area Command (Forward). That building had an emergency operations center and a large conference room and generally offered better facilities than those in the corps artillery building, which was also on the air base. An additional advantage of the collocation was that it enabled the task force to take advantage of staff elements not present in the corps artillery, but available as the residue of the 3d COSCOM staff. (*Chart 10*) Those included a public affairs officer, protocol officer, G-5, and a large resource management section. Despite that, the principal general staff sections still required augmentation to deal with their many responsibilities, while also helping to sustain the residual functions of the V Corps Artillery. By itself, the V Corps Artillery staff was too small for the job, and the task force staff was fleshed out by drawing in the remnant of the 3d Corps Support Command staff, officers from the 41st Field Artillery Brigade staff, and a number of Regular Army augmentees assigned from the United States.¹⁸

Reserve Component Backfill To Sustain the Headquarters

As a consequence of the reorganization, all of the staff sections within the corps were short-handed after December, although some of the most essential positions were temporarily filled by active component officers seconded from organizations in the continental United States.¹⁹ The principal deficiency resulting from the V Corps headquarters reorganization, however, was that there remained no staff to carry out the functions of the 3d Corps Support Command and its subordinate 19th Corps Materiel Management Center, both of which had largely deployed to Hungary. The answer to the problem lay in the post-Cold War organization of the corps support command.

In the course of steps taken to reduce the size of the Army in Europe, the overall manning level within the corps had been reduced from the Cold War standard of 100 percent or better to around 92 percent. Part of that process involved decreasing the authorizations, although not the requirements, for many of the senior staff officers.²⁰ Units and individual soldiers from the reserve components had played an important part in V Corps operations for many years. The mature concept was that the reserves supplied the personnel and equipment that the corps headquarters needed for operations in the field, but for which no positions existed on active component authorization

CHART 10—ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE VICTORY



RD stands for Rear Detachment.

documents.²¹ The corps assistant chief of staff, G-5, for example, was so austere manned that it could not function under wartime conditions without the Army Reserve's 308th Civil Affairs Group, which regularly trained with the G-5 staff.²² To cite another case, the 280th Rear Area Support Group, a reserve component unit assigned to the 7th U.S. Army Reserve Command in Schwetzingen, habitually deployed with the corps headquarters to handle physical security of the corps rear command post.²³ While the V Corps units did not actually "own" the reserve component units that supported them, they did customarily manage the property book of each unit, oversee its training, and comment on its mission essential task list. The relationship was formal to the extent that the commanding general of the 3d Corps Support Command, for example, was the rater for commanders of three of the four rear area support commands that served under his control in wartime.²⁴

Extraordinary operations generated additional requirements for reserve units. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM the need to provide security for vacated military installations in Germany required deployment of several battalions of National Guard infantry and other reserve component units from the United States. The relationship was further broadened when individual reservists reported to active duty and were battle-rostered and trained by V Corps units in anticipation of the requirement to provide a replacement flow for units assigned to United States Central Command in Southwest Asia.²⁵ Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR therefore did not create the need for reserve augmentation, but merely increased a requirement that the corps already recognized. Within USAREUR, the 7th U.S. Army Reserve Command maintained a number of platoon-size and larger units intended to support the command upon mobilization. Those units were rapidly called to active duty,²⁶ most to fulfill essential tasks in Germany, but many deploying to Hungary and some to Croatia and Bosnia.

Within the 3d Corps Support Command, a formal, direct, and unusual relationship existed between the active force unit and its reserve augmentation from the United States. The staff positions that could no longer be supported during the European drawdown were reallocated to an augmentation unit in the Army Reserve, which allowed the COSCOM to maintain itself on a reduced establishment during peacetime.²⁷ Similarly, the 19th Corps Materiel Management Center (CMMC) CONUS Augmentation allowed that active component unit to operate at lower manning levels during peacetime.²⁸ In most cases, the staff principal position—the colonel's slot—was moved to the reserve component table of distribution and allowances, while the Regular Army table of organization and equipment maintained a position in the rank of lieutenant colonel that was actually the staff deputy. Upon mobilization, therefore, the reserve component colonel was slated to serve as the staff principal. The same held true in the 19th CMMC, except that the unit commander upon mobilization was actually in the reserve component.²⁹ Thus, the 3d COSCOM (CONUS Augmentation) mission was to mobilize and deploy to a specified area of operations, where it was to provide the technical, supervisory, and logistical support

staff augmentation to bring the 3d COSCOM to full strength and enable it to conduct extended operations. The 19th CMMC (CONUS Augmentation) had the same mission with respect to its parent headquarters.

But by the start of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR those mission statements were as outdated as the USAREUR and V Corps war plans they had been drafted to support. The presumption, and the basis upon which the authorization documents had been written, was always that the CONUS unit would *augment* the 3d COSCOM upon general mobilization, and the presumed cause was a major crisis or general war in NATO's Central Region. By December 1995 it appeared more likely that the CONUS unit would instead *replace* the active component of the 3d COSCOM when the parent unit deployed outside of Germany to support a contingency mission.³⁰

Such was the case during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, when the staff and soldiers of the 3d COSCOM were sent to Hungary to man the 21st TAA-COM (Forward) in the National Support Element. In early December 1995, 3d COSCOM deployed 200 of its assigned 251 soldiers to Hungary. The CONUS augmentation arrived in Wiesbaden on Christmas Day with seventy-six soldiers, twenty of whom immediately went to Hungary to augment the 21st TAACOM (Forward). That meant that a total of 106 reserve and active component soldiers remained in Wiesbaden to support all of the missions previously accomplished by 251 active duty soldiers. That was despite the fact that the original intent was for the two units to come together upon mobilization with a total of 327 at wartime strength levels.³¹

In early November 1995 Brig. Gen. Thomas Bruner, the commanding general of the CONUS augmentation (CA), closely watching developing events in Europe, had alerted his unit and the 19th CMMC reserve augmentation unit that mobilization might be imminent. Although not yet authorized to take any extraordinary steps to prepare for deployment, Bruner directed his units to begin paying special attention to personnel readiness during their regular drills.³² As early as November both units had also begun to conduct the statutory pre-deployment training at home station, rather than wait for a mobilization order to begin it. That was done in hopes of decreasing the lead time for deployment if called.³³ Because active duty appeared likely, the units trained again in December, when the Readiness Group from Fort Riley observed and certified 3d COSCOM training, while the Readiness Group from Fort Snelling certified 19th CMMC training.³⁴

When they reported to their mobilization station at Fort Dix, the two units presented documentation that they had done much of the required training. Despite that, both were required to undergo the complete predeployment training process again and to have that training certified by the Fort Dix Readiness Group. While at Fort Dix, the soldiers also received some training—including operating in desert conditions—that was irrelevant to the impending mission. A further complication, and indication that the mobilization process lacked some desirable flexibility and that it was not in synchronization with the pace of Army operations, was that the soldiers were certified according to U.S. Army Forces

Command standards, rather than the somewhat more stringent, and differing, USAREUR standards that would apply where they were going to be assigned.³⁵

On 30 November 1995 European Command transmitted to the Armed Services a list of its reserve component requirements for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Among the units listed as backfill for USAREUR was the 3d COSCOM (CA).³⁶ Four days later Department of the Army notified Forces Command and USAREUR of the identified units and specifically authorized major commanders to notify those units so that preparation and training could begin, pending a final decision for a presidential selective reserve call-up. That message further refined the European Command requirement for a corps support command by naming the CONUS augmentation units of both the 3d COSCOM and the 19th CMMC, both of which were V Corps units.³⁷

On 12 December, in response to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Department of the Army issued the movement directive for Army units affected by the call-up. The 3d COSCOM (CA) was ordered to active duty for a period not to exceed 270 days, with an effective date of 14 December and an arrival date at the mobilization station of 18 December.³⁸ Still, despite ample forewarning and specific permission to alert reserve units as early as 4 December, the 3d COSCOM (CA) received official notification of its mobilization only thirty-six hours before its active duty reporting date.³⁹ Characteristically, as the COSCOM Augmentation's chief of staff, Col. Joseph Bertinetti, pointed out, employers wished for more notification lead time. He believed that the abbreviated notification period worked an unnecessary hardship on many soldiers, particularly those whose employers demanded a copy of the mobilization order before they would promise to hold the soldier's job open until his return.⁴⁰

A lengthy and involved orders process eventually, although not without problems, delivered the two augmentation units to Wiesbaden, where they assumed the missions of the 3d Corps Support Command and its subordinate 19th Corps Materiel Management Center.⁴¹ Unfortunately, the ponderous mobilization process prevented the reserve units from arriving before the active component units left for Hungary, and thereby prevented an orderly mission hand-off. One consequence was that, as most of the staff of the arriving units acknowledged, "the learning curve was steep."⁴² Long-standing practice acknowledged that the function of the CONUS augmentation in expanding the COSCOM's planning and management capabilities was essential for any wartime or contingency mission, and that the need for those planners was most acute early in the operation. Any delay in deployment naturally diminished those capabilities and reduced the unit's effectiveness and usefulness.⁴³ Previous attempts by COSCOM commanders to eliminate the delays in the mobilization process by having the augmentation units designated as direct deploying units had failed.⁴⁴ Therefore, the corps forfeited approximately 20 percent of the 270-day mobilization term to administrative requirements unrelated to the unit missions in Europe, a fact that meant that there remained an unfulfilled requirement to replace the reserve units well before the active 3d COSCOM could be expected to return from Hungary.⁴⁵ That problem remained to be solved as the NATO mission began.

Relationships Among the Headquarters

Once the several new headquarters had been established, their various and interlocking operations ran relatively smoothly, although no one could describe the relationship among them as simple or easy to understand. USAREUR (Forward) headquarters commanded the intermediate supporting base and the National Support Element, under which fell the 21st TAACOM (Forward) and the area support group responsible for maintaining and commanding the installations. The base retained command of all deploying elements of Task Force Eagle until they crossed the Sava River and came under operational control of the NATO force commander. Thereafter, USAREUR (Forward) provided all categories of U.S. support to Task Force Eagle and carried out Title 10 responsibilities for all American forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In particular, the forward headquarters retained the responsibility for establishing force protection rules and procedures. At the end of the operation, the USAREUR (Forward) headquarters managed the redeployment of forces to Germany.

The V Corps Main headquarters remained in Heidelberg, where it did the operational planning for missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and handled sustainment of deployed forces. In addition, V Corps Main carried out all day-to-day missions of the corps and remained ready to execute any European Command or Central Command missions that might be ordered. USAREUR Main headquarters likewise remained in Heidelberg where it commanded all of the area support groups and base support battalions in Germany and managed all community programs for the residual forces in the Central Region. Task Force Victory, meanwhile, planned command and control of the rear detachments and nondeploying units and readiness and training of the attached units. It carefully monitored and influenced family and community support activities for corps units in Germany. Victory also supported TF Eagle, TF Lion, and other operational missions and supported all deployments relating to the on-going Partnership for Peace program.

USAREUR (Main) commanded USAREUR (Forward). USAREUR (Forward), in turn, commanded TF Victory, V Corps (Main), and the 3d Infantry Division. Before the end of the mission, however, both the 3d Infantry Division (later redesignated the 1st Infantry Division) and TF Victory were placed under command of V Corps (Main), thus relieving USAREUR (Forward) of the task of controlling those units at long distance, while normalizing readiness reporting and logistical relationships. Placing the nondeploying units and rear detachments under Task Force Victory did not represent as much of a change as might be imagined, for the practice in V Corps had been for the deputy commanding general to "ride herd" on the separate brigades and oversee their readiness. Since General Yates was both TF Victory commander and corps deputy commanding general, the unit commanders within TF Victory did not have to accustom themselves to any new command relationships or procedures.⁴⁶

General Abrams commanded both USAREUR (Forward) and V Corps (Main), exercising command through the medium of daily videoconferencing.

Generally, the corps chief of staff remained at the corps (Main) headquarters to supervise daily operations. In practice, the movement of staff officers between the two headquarters was almost constant as V Corps learned the art of what became known as split-based operations. The novelty was not so much the concept of split-based operations as it was the absence of valid planning factors for peace enforcement missions. Army doctrine had not yet evolved anything comparable to the long-established planning factors for combat operations and the universally understood doctrine for combat. Insecurity about the precise nature of peace enforcement operations tended to force commanders to employ the most experienced staff forward and to rely upon less experienced staff for business as usual in the corps rear.

Personnel Planning

The lower manning level allowed the corps headquarters after the Cold War also applied to its major subordinate commands. Despite that, early in the planning process Abrams specified that every Task Force Eagle unit would deploy to Bosnia-Herzegovina at C-1 status for personnel.⁴⁷ Much of the "pick and shovel" work on the resulting personnel planning was done during the October conference at Grafenwöhr, when the battle staff and staffs of the other units involved worked out so much of the basic plan.⁴⁸ To fulfill Abrams' demands, the corps G-1 and adjutant general had no recourse but to order non-deploying units to send officers and soldiers to fill vacancies in the 1st Armored Division and other deploying units. A total of 523 enlisted soldiers was needed immediately. The countervailing problem was that the corps had to consider the risk associated with drawing down the nondeploying units to a lower personnel readiness status,⁴⁹ realizing that the 3d Infantry Division and other units might be called upon to execute another mission while Task Force Eagle remained in Bosnia. Among the critical skills involved in that cross-leveling process during September through December 1995 were Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle crewmen, armor crewmen, wheeled vehicle drivers, helicopter mechanics, and tracked vehicle mechanics. Even after cross-leveling was complete, however, serious shortages remained in the logistics skills.⁵⁰

Rather than reassignment or attachment, the corps chose to handle the cross-leveling process by using temporary change of station (TCS) orders, for which the corps adjutant general was the focal point. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, soldiers deployed on temporary duty. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was the first use of TCS orders for an operation of such size.⁵¹ The various other categories of orders, including attachments and temporary duty orders, were less satisfactory from an administrative point of view. Personnel reporting or pay issues sometimes "fell through the crack" when the soldier's parent unit assumed that the unit to which he was attached or sent on temporary duty would take care of such matters. The temporary change of station orders were sufficiently explicit and personnel and finance authorities were in agreement about its use so such problems did not arise.

Another problem loomed, however, in that a normal and anticipated percentage of the corps would soon be reaching the end of its tour of duty in Germany and be scheduled for reassignment to other units, normally in the continental United States. Personnel turbulence of that sort would be unfortunate during the stresses of deployment and assuming the NATO mission in Bosnia. The immediate solution was to impose an involuntary foreign service tour extension of ninety days on soldiers then serving in V Corps. That tour extension allowed an orderly deployment of forces into Bosnia and Hungary and postponed the problem until the late winter and early spring, when those extensions would expire—February through April 1996. Thus, it was possible to plan for replacement operations to begin at D+60, rather than immediately.⁵² The longer term solution to the various personnel problems was to find personnel augmentation for the corps, a task that the staff accomplished by submitting a request through USAREUR to Department of the Army for additional soldiers. The corps did not specify active or reserve component support, but was content to enumerate the requirements and allow the Department of the Army to determine the best source from which to meet those requirements.

The replacement flow began with the arrival of soldiers at the 64th Replacement Detachment at Rhein-Main Air Force Base. The 64th determined to which unit the individual soldier would be assigned, and the soldier was then delivered to the base support battalion serving the community in which the rear detachment of that unit was located, and thence to the rear detachment itself. Once there, the unit decided whether the soldier would be assigned to a forward area or remain with the rear detachment. If sent forward, the soldier first went to the Seventh Army Training Center at Grafenwöhr, Vilseck, or Hohenfels for the required theater-specific training to qualify for duty in Hungary or Bosnia. Once training was completed, the soldier returned to the rear detachment for the administrative preparations for deployment, including obtaining an identification card for the NATO Implementation Force, updating the record of emergency data, and completing immunizations. Once the rear detachment commander certified him ready for deployment, the soldier returned to the 64th Replacement Detachment for in-processing and movement to the ultimate unit of assignment. By March 1996 that replacement system was flowing smoothly.⁵³

One of the earliest decisions was that a sound policy for rear detachments would be crucial—a lesson learned during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.⁵⁴ Recognizing the importance to unit morale, and particularly to the morale of the families that would be left behind in Germany, the USAREUR deputy chief of staff, personnel, in November 1995 organized a two-day training conference for rear detachment commanders and noncommissioned officers, preparing around 160 officers for their new duties. In essence, the personnel course ensured that all rear detachment commanders understood the personnel replacement system, details of the family assistance program in the base support battalion and how to run family support groups in their own units, and what help was available in the communities for resolving family problems.

Given Abrams' emphasis on safety, the corps G-1 paid particular attention to risk assessment and risk management, using the corps safety office staff to help subordinate commanders establish programs that met their specific needs. Risk assessment was part of the campaign plan, which directed that risk management techniques be integrated into all mission planning for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The key to success, however, was that commanders emphasized safety and made that a principal consideration of all first line supervisors across the corps, right down to squad leaders.⁵⁵

The awards policy for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was based on the presumption that a peace enforcement operation would probably not involve combat. Therefore, award of the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal and authorization to wear the shoulder sleeve insignia on the right shoulder after the operation as a "combat patch"⁵⁶ would not be forthcoming. Instead, soldiers assigned for one day or more to Bosnia or Hungary would receive the Armed Forces Service Medal⁵⁷ and the new NATO service medal, the latter for thirty days of service in Bosnia and longer periods for support personnel elsewhere in the theater. Civilian employees with the task force or serving in Hungary were eligible to receive the NATO medal, but not the Armed Forces Service Medal. Within Bosnia, Task Force Eagle was authorized to award the Purple Heart Medal to any soldier or civilian wounded as a result of hostile fire, even if a state of belligerency did not exist.⁵⁸ Aside from that, the normal Army awards policy remained applicable until March 1999, when the Department of Defense decided to change its policy and authorized award of the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal to soldiers who had served in Bosnia. In an exception to policy, those soldiers were also allowed to retain the Armed Forces Service Medal they had previously been awarded.⁵⁹

Flies in the Ointment

Such a complicated structure of headquarters and personnel manning could not possibly function without difficulty and occasional friction. The first problems arose when the corps tried to articulate the mission of each headquarters and task force so that everyone understood the relationships among all those headquarters. The understanding within TF Victory was both clear and correct: that the task force provided the structure that allowed the corps to focus its attention as a planning staff for USAREUR Forward. In that context, Task Force Victory was the executor of planning that came from the corps headquarters. Despite having its mission announced in a corps order, however, the task force missions and responsibilities were not generally well understood by other units. In the judgment of Lt. Col. Robert Milford, the assistant chief of staff, G-1, it was "not that a signal was sent, and it was a confusing signal; it is just that it took time for the signal to be fully sent."⁶⁰ As much as anything else, the failure immediately to comprehend the Task Force Victory mission was a symptom of the fact that every unit in the corps was fully preoccupied with its own missions and its own problems in November and December 1995. At length, the difficulty was

satisfactorily addressed, but various internal problems persisted. The first was that the corps headquarters appeared to be nominally in charge of operations in Germany but was directed by an officer junior in grade to the commander of Task Force Victory, which was initially subordinated to it. While it was clear that Abrams commanded V Corps (Main) and used his chief of staff as a deputy there, the relationship was not an easy one at first. The eventual subordination of TF Victory to USAREUR (Forward) resolved the situation.

Within Task Force Victory, however, a similar problem existed, though at the staff principal level. The CONUS augmentation of the 3d COSCOM held the authorizations for the colonels who were actually the staff principals in that organization. When the active component officers left for Hungary, the reserve colonels assumed their duties in Wiesbaden. The next senior headquarters, however, Task Force Victory, had drawn its staff from the general staff of V Corps Artillery, which did not have the same grade structure as the general staff of the 3d COSCOM. The consequence was that the staff principals at TF Victory were majors and lieutenant colonels, and were placed in the position of directing the activities of a staff whose principals were colonels and lieutenant colonels. The two staffs worked amicably, in the main, reporting few difficulties arising from the differences in rank.⁶¹ The situation was nonetheless atypical of the Army at large, where the staffs of senior headquarters customarily outranked the staffs of junior headquarters.

Throughout the mission, V Corps (Main) treated TF Victory as it normally treated its two divisions. There was some justification for that, since TF Victory had roughly the strength and structure of a division, in terms of numbers of units. The task force staff, however, was not a division staff and lacked the capabilities of a division staff. Meeting all of the normal operating requirements throughout the year consequently remained a strain. Moreover, the ability of the corps to carry out other contingency missions while Task Force Eagle was in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the bulk of the corps staff was in Hungary was probably more pretense than reality, since the staff talent at every echelon within the corps was very thinly distributed. That was particularly true if the mission involved conventional heavy force operations, because there was really no staff remaining to carry out the duties of the V Corps Artillery, which had the particular mission of managing deep battle for the corps.⁶²

Most of those problems were, at their base, consequences of the European drawdown, which cast its shadow across all of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR from beginning to end. To even the most optimistic observer, there were too many missions, or at least potential missions, for the corps to carry out with the staff and units that it possessed in 1995 and 1996. What some soldiers saw as evil consequences were inevitable. Among the most serious were a loss of readiness and the erosion of unit teams, and the officers best placed to observe that were those assigned to the corps' various artillery organizations.

Basically, there were not enough officers left to do all the things that needed to be done. Particularly when new staffs were being formed, when large-scale exercises to prepare troops for duty in Bosnia had to be run, and when good

liaison officers had to be found, there was insufficient talent to satisfy all the needs. As one staff officer observed, USAREUR had developed a shorthand code for "I want a skilled and capable officer," and that code boiled down to "send me a commander." Col. Michael Maples, commanding 41st Field Artillery (FA) Brigade, was away from his command during JOINT ENDEAVOR as much as he was with it. Lt. Col. Andrew Wynarsky, commanding 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, was often absent to serve as a senior observer-controller during exercises and for other missions. The 41st Field Artillery Brigade staff filled in for many of the functions of the V Corps Artillery staff as well as serving on the Task Force Victory staff. Lt. Col. David Swindell, the 41st FA Brigade executive officer, was named acting brigade commander when Maples departed for Hungary. Almost immediately, he was further assigned as acting assistant chief of staff, G-3, for Task Force Victory. His judgment was that a lot could be done by e-mail and videoconference, but that he was essentially running the brigade by remote control.

That process was reproduced at many levels, and Swindell concluded that the real stresses on the Army in Europe as a consequence of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR were not obvious, but would manifest themselves only over time, and particularly in the qualifications of the junior officers and NCOs whose battalion time was meant to be, at least in part, an extended tutorial for more responsible duties later on. "You might say," he observed, "that this kind of goes with the territory and the pay grade . . . but I am not sure that it is a good idea to take battalion commanders, for example, away from their battalions. Lieutenants need to be led every day." Swindell worried that all of the myriad individual and group taskings the units in Germany carried out left the soldiers without real leadership: "you can't keep a unit cohesive and trained without a commander—it's hard. We managed to get through it, but it could have been a better situation. Being an OC [observer-controller] is good stuff, but so is staying with your team."⁶³

The need to cross-level soldiers across the corps to bring the deploying units to full strength produced another problem that was familiar to every small unit leader. "Cross-leveling" was managerial language for what the tactical leader recognized as the destruction of unit integrity. The peacetime Army stressed team building as an essential part of the tactical competence needed in time of war. During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR that imperative was essentially dismissed as a luxury the corps could not afford. In the rush to meet the deployment time lines, soldiers were reassigned from their squads to become anonymous fillers among strangers on the eve of a mission that could, potentially, involve combat operations. Cohesion, mutual trust, and tactical competence within the small unit teams had in many cases to be either rebuilt or reaffirmed as close-knit units were augmented by soldiers who were unknowns.⁶⁴

Another category of problem was more attributable to the speed of the deployment than anything else. Very early in the deployment the corps completely lost personnel accountability of the soldiers deploying into Bosnia and Hungary. That was particularly significant because the corps had to maintain

an accurate count of soldiers in Bosnia so as not to transgress the limitations of the force cap. The preliminary exercise, Mountain Shield, had demonstrated that personnel accountability was a weakness, so the staff was well aware that the problem existed.⁶⁵ Those problems manifested themselves again in the haste with which the deployment was eventually completed. Units frequently failed properly to complete the appropriate personnel transactions in the computerized personnel management system,⁶⁶ with the result that soldiers "got lost" in the personnel system. In some cases, soldiers were in Bosnia or Hungary, but records still identified them as being in Germany. Besides the worrying issue of violating the personnel limitations on deployment, the chaotic personnel reporting system made it very hard for the corps to identify soldiers in Germany that could be used as replacements in the forward area.

There were two principal reasons for what turned out to be, happily, a short-term personnel problem. When soldiers prepared to deploy, they were placed on temporary change of station orders, but did not normally wait to have those orders in hand before reporting to their new units. That was particularly the case for soldiers drawn from the 3d Infantry Division as part of the cross-leveling process. In some cases, those troops met their gaining units in the 1st Armored Division at the train, bus, or airplane and deployed with them without orders. Lacking the temporary change of station order as a source document, the gaining unit's Personnel and Administration Center could not prepare the necessary personnel transaction to "arrive" soldiers into the unit. Nor did the losing units have the necessary information to "depart" the soldiers. The second basis for the problem was that the rear detachments of the deploying units often failed to make the personnel entries simply because the Tactical Automated Command and Control System (TACCS) computers and all of the experienced TACCS and personnel clerks had deployed with the unit, leaving no one in the rear who was familiar with either system. Long after the deployment was completed, a time-consuming manual check had to be made to ensure that all the personnel transactions were made properly to account for all of the soldiers involved.⁶⁷

After the deployment, staffs at all levels began playing catch-up, a process happily facilitated by the technology available—the utilization of computers, e-mail, and the telefax. Still, about two months passed before the personnel management problems were finally resolved. At one point, Task Force Victory estimated that over 4,000 "ghost" soldiers were on the personnel data base. One consequence of the problem was that the V Corps adjutant general had to devise special personnel system training courses for all the rear detachment commanders and clerks in Germany. As a double check, units conducted full personnel asset inventories to establish base line unit strength. Finally, TF Victory built a separate computer data base, fed directly by the rear detachment commanders, to resolve personnel management backlogs and shortcomings. Once that was done, the personnel accountability problem was essentially solved for the balance of the mission.⁶⁸

Finally, V Corps also discovered that rear detachment operations posed more sophisticated challenges than expected. The fundamental problem was

that the scale of the deployment left the 1st Armored Division, in particular, as well as the corps separate brigades, with rear detachments composed of only a few soldiers—as few as five, in some cases—and generally commanded by a very junior officer, frequently assisted by an equally inexperienced noncommissioned officer. Especially in the operation of family support groups and in resolving all the problems associated with the families left behind in Germany, a higher level of experience was certainly desirable. Equally, the requirement to get on with the required maintenance of equipment in Germany and to support on-going missions and training demanded a lot of the tiny rear detachment staffs.⁶⁹ Recognizing all of those imperatives, Task Force Victory not only sponsored various training sessions for rear detachment commanders and noncommissioned officers, but also conducted frequent meetings to iron out problems and finally published a handbook on rear detachment operations. By the end of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, many staff officers believed that long-term out of sector deployment would be much more common in the future. The logical consequence, they felt, was to create a formal structure to embrace rear detachments and their operations and to add that structure to the V Corps Mission Essential Task List.⁷⁰

By the end of the first year of V Corps operations in the Balkans, the headquarters had worked out a satisfactory command and control arrangement that all of the subordinate units clearly understood. After the initial teething problems were overcome, all of the systems involved, from personnel management to all categories of logistical support, functioned smoothly both to sustain the forward-deployed forces and to continue normal operations in Germany.⁷¹ But the process had not been an easy one, and a good bit of what the staff regarded as “discovery learning” had gone on as the various sections built sustainment systems while they managed major unit deployments. In part, the difficulties V Corps encountered in organizing itself for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR were only to be expected as the Army undertook the new tasks involved in peace enforcement operations. That held true for such things as working out new standard planning factors for peace enforcement operations, devising appropriate rules of engagement to govern the conduct of soldiers engaged in those operations, and framing suitable training programs to ready units for duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The other major thread running through the problem, however, was the long-term consequence of the European drawdown of forces that began before the Persian Gulf War of 1990. The steady decrease in absolute numbers of soldiers and in whole units diminished the capability of the corps in predictable ways. Smaller and with fewer units, V Corps could neither undertake as many simultaneous missions nor apply as many resources to any given operational problem as before. In what the corps knew as “low density” skills, the matter was even more acute, since there were only so many specialized helicopter mechanics in the intermediate maintenance units, to cite only one example. Thus it did not matter how many helicopters were available for the new far-flung missions, when there was only enough of the essential maintenance capability to accompany one or two task forces at a time.

Discussions within the staff about how best to manage the drawdown at one time had centered on restating the V Corps mission. If the mission was to be peace enforcement, then a different force structure would be needed than the one that existed at the end of the Cold War. In fact, however, there was no new mission analysis and corresponding revision of the force structure for such missions. Instead, the USAREUR headquarters pursued a policy of what the corps staff called "salami slicing" when handling drawdown actions. Instead of tailoring the force, USAREUR simply demanded a proportionate reduction in all units across the board. Retaining a generic corps organization, rather than one optimized for one type mission or another, turned out to be the best answer, though this was not evident at the time. Thus when the mission in the Balkans began, V Corps retained all of its previous capabilities, though in smaller quantities.

The important lesson driven home by the mission in the Balkans in 1995 and 1996, however, was that command and control was a new limiting factor in determining how many missions V Corps could carry out at a given moment. The traditional command and control structure of the corps and of USAREUR was inappropriate to create, train, deploy, and support Task Force Eagle in its peace enforcement mission. Hence, both commands created ad hoc headquarters structures tailored for the requirements of the mission. In so doing, V Corps came to understand that the availability of staffs, and particularly of general staffs, was a crucial planning factor, and that the need for those staffs did not necessarily correspond to the size of the forces to be manipulated, but rather to the complexity of the prospective mission. Accordingly, the general staff of V Corps Artillery, a headquarters that commanded only one field artillery battalion and that consequently had been under consideration for elimination from the corps force structure for some time, turned out to be essential. Without it, V Corps could not have built Task Force Victory in 1995.

Availability of that staff became all the more important when it became obvious that the mission in the Balkans was not going to last only one year, but was in fact an open-ended requirement in which the corps might be involved indefinitely. By extension, the V Corps staff had by the end of 1996 learned that all of the staffs within the corps, and specifically the staffs of the separate brigades,⁷² had similar utility. Those staffs had already controlled the operations of task forces ranging from company to battalion in size in operations as far afield as Africa. More of the same undoubtedly lay in the future for V Corps, placing a premium on the staff skills available at every echelon of command. Reorganization of the headquarters for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR reinforced all those previous lessons and accustomed the staff to thinking more unconventionally about how to structure command and control arrangements in the future.

NOTES

¹ HQ, USEUCOM Directive 55-11, 7 Jul 1995.

² Ibid., app. B, V Corps Joint Task Force HQ Organization.

³ After Action Report (AAR), V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 2.

⁴ This section is based on Interviews, Maj. Richard Thurston with Lt. Col. Peter Schifferle, Chief, War Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 16 Feb 1996, and with Lt. Col. Albert Bryant, Jr., Chief, Plans, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 25 Mar 1996, both at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

⁵ In addition to force protection, by which was understood all those security measures to take care of soldiers, including both physical security and enforcement of stringent safety protocols, Title 10 responsibilities included the exclusively national sustainment tasks for an American force. These included intelligence, signal, and medical responsibilities; training; articulation and enforcement of standards of discipline and associated military justice; supply; and personnel support.

⁶ Subsequently, in the course of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, 3d Infantry Division was redesignated as 1st Infantry Division.

⁷ Removal of commanders and key staff officers from their units for such missions was not without cost. For one officer's views on this, see Interv, author with Lt. Col. David K. Swindell, Executive Officer, 41st Field Artillery Brigade, and Acting ACofS, G-3, Task Force Victory, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, 5 Apr 1996, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

⁸ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996); Draft TDA, USAREUR (Forward), 1 Dec 1995. Cf. app. B, USEUCOM Directive 55-11, 7 Jul 1995, "V Corps Joint Task Force HQ Organization."

⁹ This discussion is drawn from AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 2.

¹⁰ Discussion of the V Corps Special Troops Battalion (STB) is drawn from HQ, V Corps STB After Action Report, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, 21 Mar 1997.

¹¹ V Corps Special Troops Battalion Mission Essential Task List, 21 Nov 1995. The STB METL included: Transition to War/Deploy the Corps Headquarters; Supervise Setup of the Main CP and Life Support Area; Provide Life Support Services to the Main and Tactical CPs; Provide Force Protection; Supervise Equipment Maintenance; and Plan and Execute Movement of the Main and Tactical CPs.

¹² For comments on General Abrams' view of this situation, see Interv, Lt. Col. Walter E. Kretchik with Maj. Gen. Walter H. Yates, Deputy Commander, USAREUR (Forward), Commanding General, Task Force Victory, and Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 25 May 1996, Taszar, Hungary.

¹³ Essentially one and one-half battalions of the 1st Armored Division did not deploy.

¹⁴ The artillery continued to train, but the V Corps Artillery no longer had an operations focus, inasmuch as its headquarters was consumed by the work of Task Force Victory. That was a cost the corps consciously paid to manage the deployment, and it became a critical retraining and reconstitution issue at the end of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

¹⁵ USAREUR OPLAN 40105, Campaign Plan, 30 Nov 1995.

¹⁶ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 7.

¹⁷ Promulgated by FRAGO 24 to USAREUR Campaign Plan, 152300Z Dec 1995.

¹⁸ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 7. Also, Task Force Victory Command Briefing, 27 Feb 1996.

¹⁹ Msg, CINCUSAREUR for HQ DA and CDR FORSCOM, 160930Z Dec 1995, sub: Mobilization of RC Units in Support of JOINT ENDEAVOR. Aside from the individual officers augmenting the corps staff, a number of reserve component units arrived from the United States in December 1995 and January 1996 to replace deploying units in various V Corps communities. They included military police and Adjutant General postal, finance, and medical units and served under Area Support Group command, rather than under V Corps command. Units reporting directly to V Corps included the 90th Military History Detachment, replaced in the second rotation (270 days) by the 48th Military History Detachment.

²⁰ Discussion of general personnel policies for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR is drawn, except where otherwise cited, from the following Interviews: Maj. Richard Thurston with Col. Jeffrey N. Christianson, Adjutant General, V Corps, and CWO4 Patrick McElroy, Chief of Personnel Actions Division, V Corps Adjutant General, both 13 Feb 1996; Lt. Col. James Clifford, Deputy ACofS, G-1, V Corps, 14 Feb 1996; and Capt. Mac T. Balatico, Chief, AG Plans and Operations, V Corps, 7 May 1996, all at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

²¹ The Capstone program aligned reserve component (RC) and active component units in order to establish planning and training associations. The Army Wartrace Program, defined under Army Regulation 11-30, replaced Capstone. Under Wartrace, a tighter focus on mission guidance to subordinate units was possible, allowing enough detail for those units to develop a mission focused training program and mission essential task list associated with the active component unit with which they were aligned. The V Corps trained with a large number of RC units under the Wartrace concept. Those that regularly trained with the corps were the 34th, 35th, and 38th Infantry Divisions, the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 404th and 415th Chemical Brigades, the 308th Civil Affairs Brigade, and the 48th, 49th, and 326th Military History Detachments. The 3d COSCOM (CA) and its subordinate 19th Corps Materiel Management Center (CA) were aligned under the augmentation concept.

²² Interv, author with Col. Stuart H. Watkins, ACofS, G-5, V Corps, 13 Jan 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²³ Other 7th ARCOM units similarly supported other echelons of the corps during wartime operations. The 317th Rear Area Support Command normally deployed with the 3d COSCOM; the 309th Rear Area Support Command normally deployed with the 16th Corps Support Group; the 345th Rear Area Support Command normally deployed with the 7th Corps Support Group; and the 316th Rear Area Support Command, which had no habitual relationship, usually deployed to support a corps support group from the Army Reserve when one was assigned to the COSCOM.

²⁴ Interv, author with Maj. Michael P. De Groat, Reserve Component Advisor, 3d Corps Support Command, 6 Feb 1996, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

²⁵ Interviews, author with Col. William W. Alexander, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 24 Jun 1992, and with Lt. Col. James A. Cope, Chief of Training, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, 29 Jun 1992, both at Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

²⁶ See After Action Report, USAREUR (Forward) PAO, 1st Reserve Rotation, 25 Aug 1996;

Critical Events Summary, Bosnia Peace Enforcement Mission, HQ, USAREUR & 7th Army, 3 Jan 1997; and USAREUR RC MOBPLAN 4368-94, Reserve Component Mobilization Plan, 26 Jun 1995.

²⁷ The 3d COSCOM (CONUS) TDA was derived from that of the former 103d COSCOM, a reserve unit that had been aligned with V Corps on the Capstone trace. With that as a basis, the authors of the TDA constructed the document using the "required/not authorized" positions from the active component 3d COSCOM MTOE. See De Groat interview. In peacetime, the 3d Corps Support Command was organized at Authorized Level of Organization 5 (ALO-5), far below full strength (ALO-1).

²⁸ The 19th Corps Materiel Management Center was organized at ALO-6 in peacetime.

²⁹ De Groat interview.

³⁰ On operations of the 3d COSCOM (CONUS), refer to [V Corps History Office], Interim Report on Lessons Learned: 3rd Corps Support Command (CONUS Augmentation) Deployment to Wiesbaden for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR 14 Dec 1995-9 September 1996 (HQ, V Corps History Office: March 1996).

³¹ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 3.

³² Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Bruner, Commanding General, 3d COSCOM (CONUS), 12 Jun 1996, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

³³ 3d COSCOM (CA) briefing, Pre-Deployment Training Requirements, Group A (December 1995). The document outlines those training requirements validated at home station, as well as mobilization station requirements that were validated at home station to expedite deployment to Germany.

³⁴ MFR, AFRC-TAIA-CSPO (HQ, 3d COSCOM, CONUS Aug), 17 Dec 1995, sub: Validation of Required Mobilization Classes at Home Station; MFR, AFZN-RGFR-CSS (Readiness Group Fort Riley), 17 Dec 1995, sub: Validation of Pre-Mobilization Requirements; Memo, HQ, 19th Corps Materiel Management Center, for Commander, 3d COSCOM, 9 Jan 1996, sub: Mobilization AAR.

³⁵ For example, FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 required annual weapons qualification, while USAREUR Regulation 350-1 required semiannual qualification. On individual training issues and the problems involved, see Interv, author with CSM L. Dean Janovec, Command Sergeant Major, 3d COSCOM (CA), 29 Feb 1996, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

³⁶ Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 301530Z Nov 1995, sub: Reserve Component (RC) Requirements for USCINCEUR U.S. Contribution for NATO Implementation Force (IFOR).

³⁷ Msg, HQ DA for multiple addressees, 041714Z Dec 1995, sub: Notification of Reserve Component Forces Identified for Possible Participation in Implementation Force (IFOR) Operations.

³⁸ Msg, HQ DA for multiple addressees, 120057Z Dec 1995, sub: HQ DA Mobilization Orders 06-96.

³⁹ Memo, HQ, 3d Corps Support Command, for Commander, 21st TAACOM, 6 Jan 1996, sub: Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSRC) AAR; Memo, HQ, 19th Corps Materiel Management Center, for Commander, 3d COSCOM, 9 Jan 1996, sub: Mobilization AAR.

⁴⁰ On this point, see Interviews, author with Col. Joseph Bertinetti, Chief of Staff, 3d COSCOM (CONUS), 23 Feb 1996; with Lt. Col. Thomas Perusse, Chief, Transportation Division, 3d COSCOM (CONUS), 29 Feb 1996; and with Lt. Col. Lloyd Tobiassen, Chaplain, 3d COSCOM (CONUS), 27 Feb 1996, all at Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany; and Janovec interview.

⁴¹ HQ, Fifth United States Army Permanent Orders 348-2 (Corrected Copy), 14 Dec 1995; HQ, 19th Theater Army Area Command (CA) Orders 348-04, 14 Dec 1995; HQ, U.S. Army Fort Dix Orders 356-005, 22 Dec 1995; HQ, USAREUR and Seventh Army Permanent Orders 17-1, 17 Jan 1996; HQ, V Corps Permanent Orders 96-002, 16 Feb 1996.

⁴² Interv, author with Col. Dennis Collier, ACofS, G-1, 3d Corps Support Command (CONUS Augmentation), 29 Feb 1996, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany; Bertinetti interview; De Groat interview; Perusse interview.

⁴³ Particularly see Bertinetti, Collier, and Perusse interviews.

⁴⁴ Memo, Brig. Gen. Samuel L. Kindred, CG, 3d COSCOM for Cdr, V Corps, 5 Sep 1995, sub: Prioritization of Reserve Component Augmentation Unit.

⁴⁵ The 270-day PSRC "clock" began running when the unit reported to its armory at home station, and the unit was required to be back at home station on the 270th day. Home station preparations required five days; eight days were consumed at the mobilization station at Fort Dix; in-processing upon arrival in Germany cost two days; mission hand-off upon departure required five days; out-processing at the mobilization station at Fort Dix required eight days; and each soldier accrued 22.5 days of annual leave that he had to be accorded the opportunity to take. Thus the myriad of administrative requirements associated with the 270-day PSRC meant that V Corps could expect only 209.5 days of duty from the reserve units. AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 3.

⁴⁶ Ibid., ch. 2.

⁴⁷ To meet the C-1 standard, a unit required an aggregate of between 90 and 100 percent of authorized personnel and between 85 and 100 percent of senior grade personnel, and of the total, between 85 and 100 percent of all soldiers had to be fully qualified in their principal military specialty.

⁴⁸ Clifford interview; Balatico interview.

⁴⁹ The C-2 standard required an aggregate of authorized personnel at 80-89 percent, the senior grade personnel at 75-84 percent, and the skill-qualified personnel at 75-84 percent. At C-3, the figures dropped to 70-79 percent in aggregate, 65-74 percent for senior grade, and 75-84 percent for skill-qualified personnel.

⁵⁰ Except as otherwise cited, this discussion is drawn from AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 3.

⁵¹ On this issue, refer to Balatico interview. Temporary Duty (TDY) status, documented on the DD Form 1610, involved payment of per diem costs that varied with the geographical area in which the duty was being performed, and was accordingly more expensive than a temporary change of station. The rule of thumb that HQ DA established was that a soldier in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Hungary for thirty days or less would be on temporary duty. For soldiers serving thirty-one days or more, TCS orders were used. See Msg, HQ USAREUR (AEAGF-B) for V Corps, 161430Z Oct 1996, sub: FY97 Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) Travel/Per Diem Guidance; Msg, 1st PERSCOM for V Corps, undated, sub: Concept of Personnel Support for Contingency Operations Message Number 3—Temporary Change of Station; Memo, HQ V Corps for (AETV-GFB), 11 Sep 1996, sub: TCS Orders—Change I; and Memo, AETV-GFB (V Corps ACSRM) for multiple addressees, n.d., but September 1996, sub: FY97 Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) Temporary Change of Station (TCS) Orders.

⁵² McElroy interview. On this and other personnel issues, also see Interv, author with Lt. Col. Robert W. Milford, ACofS, G-1, Task Force Victory, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, 5 Feb 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

⁵³ Christianson interview; HQ, V Corps, D+60 Systems Review, 5 Feb 1996; V Corps Adjutant General Briefing, Replacement Operations (January 1996).

⁵⁴ Clifford interview. Colonel Clifford emphasized that the personnel lessons learned from those operations were important to V Corps planning for OJE.

⁵⁵ USAREUR OPLAN 40105, Campaign Plan, Annex; V Corps Safety Office OJE AAR, n.d.

⁵⁶ More properly, the SSI-FWO, or Shoulder Sleeve Insignia—Former Wartime Organization.

⁵⁷ Award of the Armed Forces Service Medal was made retroactive to 1992 for task forces that had already met the basic service criteria in the Balkans and elsewhere.

⁵⁸ Balatico interview; McElroy interview. Msg, Joint Staff for multiple addressees, 101530Z Oct 1997, sub: Termination of the AFSM for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and Award of the AFSM to Operation JOINT GUARD. The period of award for OJE was 20 November 1995 through 19 December 1996; the period of award for OJG was 20 December 1996 through 20 June 1998.

⁵⁹ Msg, Joint Staff for multiple addressees, 041443Z Mar 1999, sub: Award of the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (AFEM) to Implement Section 572 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY 1998.

⁶⁰ Milford interview.

⁶¹ Swindell interview.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 6.

⁶⁵ V Corps After Action Report, Exercise Mountain Shield, June 1995.

⁶⁶ The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System, or SIDPERS.

⁶⁷ AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 6.

⁶⁸ For further comments on this, see Christianson, McElroy, Balatico, and Milford interviews.

⁶⁹ For comments, specifically see Milford and Swindell interviews.

⁷⁰ Interv, Maj. Richard Thurston with Maj. John Lucynski, ACofS, G-3, Operations, Task Force Victory, 11 Jun 1996, Wiesbaden, Germany. The *Rear Detachment Commander's Handbook* outlined procedures and specified responsibilities of the rear detachment, base support battalion, and TF Victory. AAR, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Operations in Central Region (1996), ch. 6.

⁷¹ The process was under review shortly after Task Force Eagle went into Bosnia-Herzegovina. General Abrams required a survey, which the staff produced in part as HQ, V Corps, D+60 Systems Review, 5 Feb 1996; V Corps Adjutant General Briefing, Replacement Operations, January 1996.

⁷² The term "separate brigade" or, in V Corps usage, "the Separates," denoted those nondivisional brigades that supported corps operations with specialized skills. In 1995 they included: 3d Corps Support Command, V Corps Artillery, 41st Field Artillery Brigade, 11th Aviation Brigade, 12th Aviation Brigade, 18th Military Police Brigade, 22d Signal Brigade, 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 130th Engineer Brigade, and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade.

Task Force Hawk and Task Force Falcon

"... unresolved political problems place us in near impossible situations."

Brig. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, Jr.
Chief of Staff, V Corps, June 1999

"One of the hardest things that we do as a deploying force is set up our tactical assembly areas and prepare them for combat operations."

Brig. Gen. Richard A. Cody
Deputy Commanding General, Task Force Hawk
6 May 1999

"It was a mild spring day in Albania and I thought to myself that this was all going to be just fine. Little did I know, but it would be the last dry piece of ground I would look at for a long time."

Maj. William W. Nase
Task Force Hawk, 3 May 1999

"When the enemy was focused on trying to shoot down 24 AH-64s every night, it was not focused on shooting down fast movers overhead."

Maj. Daniel E. Williams
S-3, 2d Squadron, 6th Cavalry, 9 August 1999

Deep fissures appeared in what was left of the Yugoslav state in early 1999 when the ethnic Albanian population of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo agitated for independence or else for fusion with Albania, triggering a sharp and frequently violent response from the federal Yugoslav police and armed forces. Widely and effectively publicized by the news media, the plight of the Kosovars seemed likely to offer a repeat of the carnage that had taken place in Bosnia-Herzegovina several years before. The United Nations appearing incapable of effective action, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed the responsibility for mediating the conflict, while seeking UN sanction of alliance efforts.

The NATO nations convened peace talks between the Serbs¹ and Kosovar Albanians in early February at Rambouillet, France, seeking some peaceful resolution to the escalating violence. While that was going on, U.S. President Bill Clinton conferred both with his foreign policy advisors and congressional leaders to discuss the on-going NATO plans and—the evidently endless intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina prompting the question—the possibility of crafting a strategy that allowed an eventual exit, should the United States become involved. The upshot of those discussions was that the president on 16 February tentatively agreed to send up to 4,000 Americans into Kosovo as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping operation. The next day NATO finalized its plans for a peacekeeping force of some thirty thousand soldiers to serve in Kosovo as soon as the Rambouillet talks reached agreement.²

At length, both the Albanian and Serb delegations found some common ground, spurred in part by a European Union declaration that the EU would lift economic sanctions against Serbia and help rebuild Kosovo, were a peace agreement signed.³ On 23 February the two sides approved an interim agreement that provided greater autonomy for Kosovo and stipulated further talks starting in the middle of March. In the interlude, retired U.S. Senator Robert Dole went to Macedonia to lobby the Kosovo Liberation Army to accede to the agreement, while Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic for the same purpose. Milosevic, however, rejected the use of NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, a key element of the pending covenant. Although the Kosovar Albanians were willing to sign the Rambouillet Agreement and did so on 18 March, the Serbs refused and began what they called “live fire” exercises in Kosovo the next day, massing troops along the Kosovo border. At that point, on 20 March, the United Nations Kosovo Verification Mission, an element of the pre-existing UN Preventive Deployment, left Kosovo, and Serb forces immediately began an offensive in northeastern and north-central Kosovo.

Deploying a NATO peacekeeping force to Kosovo required Serb consent or at least acquiescence. Consent not forthcoming, the North Atlantic Council decided upon punitive air strikes to coerce Serb acquiescence, hoping that a show of force would compel Milosevic to cease his military operations and permit the NATO forces to enter Kosovo. The North Atlantic Council thus authorized the NATO secretary general to consider a broad range of air operations against Serbia, though in anticipation that such an air campaign would not last very long. Within NATO, the political leadership kept planning for both strategic and tactical use of air power under very tight control, and was reluctant to give military commanders the latitude to use what many air commanders considered to be the necessary force to accomplish what were still unfortunately vague military objectives.

Milosevic having not responded to various American and NATO ultimatums, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana directed the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), to begin operations against Serbia. General Wesley Clark, the senior American commander in Europe, complied in

his persona as SACEUR. Thus Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO air war against Serbia, commenced on 24 March.⁴ Serbia broke diplomatic relations with the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and France on 25 March. On 31 March the United Nations withdrew the UN Preventive Deployment forces from Kosovo and, on 10 June, belatedly authorized the NATO member nations to act to stabilize the situation there.⁵

While NATO planning went forward, the United States began preparing its forces to serve under NATO command, although its preparations were hampered by certain political complications that limited what the armed forces could do. On 12 March the U.S. House of Representatives had agreed in principle to send troops to Kosovo as part of NATO's pending Kosovo Force (KFOR). Without further amplification, however, the provisions of the Roberts Amendment were operative. The Roberts Amendment to the 1999 Defense Authorization Act prevented the Department of Defense from dispatching forces or spending money for any foreign intervention unless the president consulted with congressional leaders and sent a report to Congress that certified, among other things, why the operation was in the national interests of the United States, how large the forces were to be, how much the deployment was expected to cost, the specific mission the forces would be given, and the exit strategy for those forces.⁶ The amendment was clearly in response to the continuing deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, for which there was no end in sight. Until the requirements imposed by the Roberts Amendment were satisfied, the military forces alerted for deployment to Kosovo could not spend money, stage forces, undertake reconnaissance in the future areas of operation, or take any of the other necessary preparatory actions.

On 26 March President Clinton submitted a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate outlining the use of American forces contemplated in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE, thereby complying with the terms laid out in the Roberts Amendment.⁷ The political significance of that two-week interval aside, the delay had important implications for the U.S. Army forces that eventually took part in the operation because it obliged them to plan without adequate current information and to defer essential predeployment preparations.

Early Planning: Task Force Falcon

The Armed Forces of the United States conducted their operations throughout the Kosovo mission under the aegis of NATO, which began a serious planning effort in early February, as soon as the North Atlantic Council passed a planning authorization for a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo to its Military Committee and thence to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). The Allied Forces, Central Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps,⁸ generally referred to as the ARRC, then began planning for its role as ground command headquarters of KFOR, the NATO Kosovo Force.

The U.S. Army's planning began in earnest at the same time, although staffs had for some time been pondering the matter of military operations in the region. The V Corps staff had been considering operations in Kosovo and working with what plans officers wryly referred to as the "Balkan family of plans" since June 1998 and had undertaken a series of "what if" exercises related to the "grand" Balkan strategy in September. Concerned about the growing instability in Kosovo and fearing that it might easily spill across the border into Macedonia, European Command in June 1998 issued verbal orders to USAREUR to develop plans for two alternatives: to extract Task Force Able Sentry from Macedonia or to increase the protection available to those troops along the border with the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.⁹

The V Corps response to USAREUR's directive was Operation BALKAN SHIELD, a plan that offered a series of responses to suit a range of possible threats and that involved five different force packages that went from simple reinforcement of the task force to deployment of a division headquarters with one aviation brigade and one ground maneuver brigade. Significantly for later planning, BALKAN SHIELD contemplated using the port of Thessaloniki to bring the majority of forces into theater, then road marching them to Skopje, while some forces would be airlifted directly to Skopje. In the course of the month, Lt. Gen. John Hendrix, the V Corps commander, decided the best course would be simply to withdraw troops from Macedonia if the task force were threatened, and V Corps ceased work on BALKAN SHIELD.

The staff continued the planning process for various Balkan contingencies through December 1998, just as NATO began discussing the possibility of a bombing campaign against Serbia. By early December V Corps had proceeded from its earlier discussions to sketch a preliminary plan to send Task Force Falcon, a force of around three thousand soldiers, to Skopje, Macedonia, as part of KFOR for a mission the United States dubbed Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. The task force was constituted from elements of the 1st Infantry Division, and Brig. Gen. John Craddock, an assistant division commander in the Big Red One, was named as its commander. Early in January the task was formalized to the extent that USAREUR required the corps to consider what sort of American contribution could be assigned to a NATO force for peacekeeping in Kosovo.¹⁰

The process became much more brisk in early February. On 7 February, while the headquarters was conducting a Battle Command Training Program exercise at Grafenwöhr, USAREUR directed V Corps to begin detailed planning to deploy Task Force Falcon, and General Hendrix instructed the core of his battle staff to begin a hasty plan for what he expected would be about a 1,000-man task force that would depart very soon for Kosovo.¹¹ When the exercise at Grafenwöhr was over, the staff returned to Heidelberg and continued developing the plan.¹² Over the course of ten days the battle staff built a task force, planned operations, and framed training for Falcon as a brigade-size task force, basing its work on SACEUR OPLAN 10-4-10, later issued as OPLAN 10-4-13 (Operation JOINT GUARDIAN). Once the plan was done, the corps sent one of its G-3 planners, together with a plans officer from 1st Infantry Division and



Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix

a representative from the USAREUR operations staff, to Naples to coordinate with Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, the headquarters managing the American contribution to the NATO Kosovo force.¹³

During that period the corps and 1st Infantry Division quickly completed all necessary preparations short of deployment, including a detailed deployment rehearsal that included representatives from the Military Sea Lift Command at the port of Bremerhaven, all of the area support groups from which Task Force Falcon units would be launched, and the 1st Theater Army Movement Control Agency. By the conclusion of that exercise, the corps had walked through a full deployment rehearsal and had determined that it could deliver the force by moving from rail to sea, and by sea to Thessaloniki, Greece. From there, echoing plans laid for the earlier and abortive Operation BALKAN SHIELD, the force would head by ground convoy and rail to Skopje, Macedonia, which was to be the original staging area for Falcon. Serendipitously, the preparation for Task Force Falcon readied corps and theater systems for the eventual deployment of Task Force Hawk, a force that had not yet been imagined.

The attention of the staff was not undivided throughout that busy process, however, since several other missions were in progress or just completed. At the end of 1998 and into early 1999, the corps sent a joint task force headquarters and an air defense task force under the corps deputy commanding general to Israel as part of Operation DESERT FOX. At the same time, the corps sent other Patriot batteries to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, at the request of the Turkish government, in Operation NORTHERN WATCH.¹⁴ In the midst of those preparations, V Corps' 18th Military Police Brigade dispatched a military police

company to serve as a security element for the NATO Stabilization Force headquarters in Sarajevo.¹⁵

In the early stages of the planning there existed both a NATO chain of command and an American-only chain of command, since two planning efforts were going on in parallel and coming together only at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, in Belgium. The U.S. chain passed through the headquarters of United States European Command to Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, commanded by Admiral James Ellis, who was commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in his American role and commander in chief of NATO's Allied Force, Southern Europe, in his NATO capacity. The ARRC also worked under his direction as it prepared for its mission in Kosovo.

British and French troops arrived comparatively early, followed by the ARRC headquarters, fulfilling NATO plans that called for forces to enter the theater through Thessaloniki, Greece, and stage in Macedonia. Once there, the ARRC built upon the NATO extraction force that already existed in Macedonia. The French-led extraction force consisted of a little under two thousand soldiers, mostly French and German, prepared to enter Kosovo, should that become necessary, to extract the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission that had been operating in the province for several months.¹⁶ The extraction force existed as the base on which the NATO forces converged to form a peacekeeping organization under the ground control of the ARRC and under the operational command of Admiral Ellis.

Task Force Falcon, the American component of that force, was then to arrive in Skopje, Macedonia, where V Corps maintained a presence. Task Force Able Sentry had been in Macedonia for six years, working under the auspices of the United Nations but under the control of V Corps. The task force mission had been to monitor activities along the Kosovo-Serb border with Macedonia and was essentially to act as a deterrent force, one of two battalion-size UN task forces operating along that border. The American contingent was in the east, closer to Bulgaria, along the southwestern Serb border, while the Nordic Battalion, made up of Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish troops, was situated along the western battalion sector. Task Force Able Sentry had a major base camp at a former Yugoslav Air Force airfield at Skopje. The UN mandate was not extended, however, and the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) mission on the border ceased on 28 February 1999, just as Task Force 1-4 Cavalry arrived there for duty. General Hendrix directed TF 1-4 Cavalry to remain in Macedonia, retaining possession of Camp Able Sentry and the observation posts, with the idea that those facilities could serve as the staging base and eventually as the sustainment base for Task Force Falcon.¹⁷

On 28 March the secretary of defense approved the modified mission and TF 1-4 Cavalry was reconstituted as Task Force Sabre, charged with maintaining, preserving, and protecting the U.S. infrastructure in Macedonia for use as a forward staging and logistics area for the American contribution to the NATO-led implementation force in Kosovo. Task Force Sabre consisted of some 620 soldiers and a utility helicopter detachment and maintained its headquarters

at Camp Able Sentry. On 22 April 1999 operational control of TF Sabre transferred to NATO, whereupon it was redesignated Task Force Falcon Rear. TF Falcon Rear had the mission of reception, staging, and onward movement of U.S. forces to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, using Camp Able Sentry as a logistics staging area to sustain those forces. On 20 May 1999 Task Force 4-3 Air Defense Artillery assumed the mission from 1-4 Cavalry.¹⁸

Hendrix intended to deploy most of Task Force Falcon by ship from the north German ports and bring it into theater via Thessaloniki, whence the troops were to move overland into Macedonia to Camp Able Sentry, the marshaling and staging area, though plans also called for a small portion of the force to go to Skopje by theater airlift. The corps made all the necessary deployment preparations, including configuring the sea and air load packages, and moved a good portion of the force to the deployment processing center at Rhein Ordnance Barracks in Kaiserslautern, the Army's staging area for Ramstein Air Force Base, the aerial port of embarkation. There ensued a pause while NATO waited to see the results of its bombing campaign. For the V Corps staff, that pause was a welcome one.

Unique circumstances made the V Corps staff a particularly efficient instrument for the work that had to be done at that moment. At the senior level, the staff was both closely knit and highly experienced in general terms and possessed of special experience in deployment missions. General Hendrix came to V Corps from command of the 3d Infantry Division, which had considerable experience in handling force deployments. With him came Col. Robert Leon as deputy chief of staff. Leon had worked with Hendrix over a period of years in a series of assignments and knew the general's operational style and understood what he required of his staff. Brig. Gen. Raymond Odierno had worked under Hendrix in the corps for a year and had just left the position of corps chief of staff to become assistant division commander in the 1st Armored Division when planning for Task Force Hawk began. When he became part of the Task Force Hawk staff, he brought with him two years of accumulated knowledge about corps operations and a clear understanding of how Hendrix looked at operational issues. The new corps chief of staff, Brig. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, Jr., also arrived from 3d Infantry Division, in which he had just completed a brigade command that had included a brigade deployment to Kuwait and another to Egypt. He brought with him what was probably the most, and most current, deployment experience in the Army.

Also that summer, Maj. Gen. Julian H. Burns, Jr., arrived to replace Maj. Gen. Gregory Rountree as corps deputy commanding general. Burns had highly relevant theater experience, having spent a great deal of time in deployments since being promoted to general officer and having extensive service in Bosnia. As a consequence, he brought to the staff a deep understanding of that part of the world and a considerable ability to handle international operations. By the luck of the draw, as the deputy chief of staff later phrased it, the corps had a "unique synergy" between Burns and Brandenburg, who had been working together about nine months when the crisis began and who shared a very high

energy level. The command team, in short, was comfortable with each other and extremely well-qualified for the mission.

Finally, and not least important, was the fortunate fact that the corps staff, and particularly the officers in G-3 Plans, had not recently suffered from a heavy personnel turnover and that many of the key planners and operations officers from every staff section were in their second year in the headquarters. As a consequence, the level of staff integration was remarkable, and the levels of staff experience and knowledge were high. The finely tuned competence of the battle staff and the mutual understanding that existed among its members were crucially important assets for deployment planning.¹⁹

Even such an experienced and capable staff was affected by the circumstances of the moment, however, as work on Task Force Falcon drew to a close. Over the preceding nine months decreasing stability in the Balkans had manifested itself, as far as V Corps was concerned, in a continuing series of what the deputy chief of staff considered "bizarre planning drills" that became legendary among the planners.²⁰ Typically, according to Leon, a telephone would ring in the middle of the night to inform the corps that it was in the notional troop list for some sort of peace enforcement operation. There inevitably followed an intense seventy-two hours of work that, in Leon's judgment, "would drain every bit of staff energy out of this Corps." Among the drills was PULLING GUARD, a contingency for an emergency evacuation of UN forces in Macedonia. Another plan called for reinforcements to the UN in Macedonia. Another plan was a contingency to extract the Kosovo Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observer force. Another plan reinforced that OSCE observer force.²¹

"Spin drill," as the staff called the process, followed spin drill, and all had in common that they were triggered by a phone call, normally either from European Command or from USAREUR, and sometimes filtered through the senior headquarters' operations officer, but they never included a written planning directive. Everything, as Leon remembered it, was a panicked, middle of the night demand for a plan or a study, cataclysmic processes to answer demands for a product to give the chairman of the Joint Chiefs by dawn the next day, and typically consisting of a couple of PowerPoint slides to lay out a concept, a force structure against a force cap, assumptions, and a schedule. The only benefit, as he saw it, was that, while the process "sucked a lot out of the staff," it also trained them how to work fast, and on very limited information. "It wasn't fun and a lot of the time it wasn't pretty," Leon concluded, "and we can all argue about whether they were good products or not. But the bottom line was that this staff went through that process and got comfortable doing it. After you do this five or six times, you get used to doing it."²²

Unfortunately, the process also generated an unvoiced expectation in the staff that, while they would always go through the spin drill, the units would never really carry the operation through. When the corps sent a joint task force headquarters and air defense task force to Israel in December 1998, some were actually shocked. The subsequent drill to send a Patriot missile task force to

Turkey also was actually carried out and began to produce a different outlook about the viability of all the planning work. Fortunately, before Task Force Hawk was launched, the staff had gotten past any assumption that all the planning drills were merely paper exercises.

Combined, however, with the Battle Command Training Program War-fighter Exercise in February, the requirement to run Exercise Mountain Eagle VI in the last quarter of the preceding calendar year to prepare a 1st Infantry Division task force for duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the preparation for Task Force Falcon, and several other planning requirements, the many spin drills had a cumulative and negative impact on the staff. By Easter weekend, the staff was totally wrung out, in the opinion of the deputy chief of staff. "I'm not talking about the colonels," Leon later said, "but about the senior noncommissioned officers, the captains, the majors, the guys who really make this stuff happen. They were beyond exhaustion."²³ Hendrix walked the hallways and personally threw people out of the headquarters that weekend, fully realizing that even the "iron majors" of his planning staff needed to take whatever opportunity for rest presented itself. The continuing pause in deployment of Task Force Falcon offered just such a chance.

At that point, with forces prepared for deployment, the corps awaited events, since all planning was premised on the idea that a limited air campaign against Serbia would bring Milosevic to the negotiating table to sign a peace agreement, and that any such agreement would include an international peacekeeping force for Kosovo. The Rambouillet negotiations not having met with success, NATO decided to prosecute the air campaign against Serbia. At that juncture, the corps received a change of mission.

Change of Mission: Task Force Hawk

With Task Force Falcon staged and waiting, Hendrix received phone calls on 21 March from General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and from General Montgomery C. Meigs, the USAREUR commanding general, directing him to begin contingency planning for an Apache helicopter deep strike task force for possible use in Kosovo as part of the NATO phased air campaign. There was little more guidance at first, except that the force had to be ready for deployment by the first of April and that a concept briefing needed to be put together immediately for Pentagon approval. Within days, a series of messages formalized the requirement.²⁴ Working in conjunction with the USAREUR staff, Hendrix's planners designed a force of 1,782 soldiers to operate from Skopje, Macedonia, and designated it Task Force Hawk, finishing their outline plan just before midnight that same day.

Even after USAREUR outlined the Task Force Hawk concept of operations to the Joint Chiefs, European Command, and the Department of the Army, no specific mission was enunciated, and the only mission that was conceptualized was deep strike attack helicopter operations. In place of a mission, USAREUR directed V Corps to imbed a set of "capabilities" in the force to

handle command and control, targeting, deep strike, suppression of enemy air defenses, counterfire, and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces. Further adding to the difficulties was the fact that no overall campaign plan existed for Operation ALLIED FORCE, and no boundaries had been set for areas of responsibility, a failing that eventually caused some discord with the NATO land force commander in Albania. Instead, the Task Force Hawk commander "coordinated with and adjusted to the Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) Air Control Plan whenever training or moving his assets."²⁵

Rules of engagement posed another problem, because those that existed had been designed for the NATO air campaign and did not address capabilities and limitations of the Multiple Launch Rocket System or Army Tactical Missile System, which were both indirect and not precision guided, but which were essential components of any deep strike helicopter mission. Political sensitivity intervened at that point, because although NATO wished to punish the Serb armed forces as a means of forcing Milosevic to comply with the allied demands for a peacekeeping force in Kosovo, collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties was obviously highly undesirable. The Army's artillery systems could offer neither that kind of precision nor any assurance that such casualties could be avoided. Unable to keep the entire region under direct visual observation, the Army had instead to rely upon electronic means of observation for targeting, and that also was not allowed under the NATO rules of engagement. Hendrix asked early for rules of engagement specific to ground maneuver forces, but did not receive them.²⁶ As late as 15 May, V Corps planners were voicing the daily complaint that "ROE is still Amber," which meant that a valid set of rules of engagement had not yet been promulgated.²⁷

Complexities of Command and Control

The eventual decision was an uneasy compromise that was probably not really workable in practical terms. Task Force Hawk would function as a unilateral American force in support of NATO's Operation ALLIED FORCE, but it would not be an integral part of NATO and would remain under authority of the American Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, using a set of rules of engagement approved only through American channels. Since no land component commander was ever appointed in Kosovo, General Hendrix became the senior Army Component commander by default. Never effectively integrated into the overall command and control structure for Operation ALLIED FORCE, Task Force Hawk was therefore often reduced to planning without access to all relevant information and to operating in "an atmosphere of ambiguity," as USAREUR assessed the situation in its after action report. In the end, Hendrix was concerned not only with the attack aviation operations, but also with the threat of Serb cross-border operations from Kosovo and Montenegro, and with being the Title 10 authority for all United States forces in Kosovo, which included physical security, sustainment, and all categories of logistical support.

Parallel NATO and U.S. chains of command meant that command and control arrangements in Albania were complex and nearly dysfunctional. Not only did the U.S. Air Force and, later, the NATO authorities run Operation SHINING HOPE from Tirana, while sharing space with humanitarian relief operations of other nations not under NATO control, but there was also a NATO headquarters there.²⁸ Using its Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land), customarily referred to simply as the AMFL, NATO established Albania Force (AFOR) in Tirana as the senior NATO headquarters in the country. British Lt. Gen. John Reith commanded AFOR and had the responsibility to coordinate force protection for all NATO forces in Albania, as well as to participate in airspace command and coordination. Task Force Hawk was a purely American operation, but Hendrix was naturally required to coordinate with Reith, as well as with the Air Force commanders. Serious questions about who approved airspace command and control at different altitudes, who coordinated air defense, and who coordinated military operations and humanitarian assistance operations and linked them, when required, were never adequately resolved.

While General Reith was arriving with the AMFL to take over the humanitarian relief operation from the U.S. Air Force, Task Force Hawk was still evolving its headquarters structure and feeling out all the things it had to do to operate in Albania. There was naturally some overlap that generated friction. The question of which three-star general was in charge of what was finally resolved on 18 April, the day after Hendrix arrived in Albania, when General Clark flew into Tirana to visit both operations. Hendrix and Clark met by chance on the southern end of the airfield while Clark was touring the humanitarian relief operation with Reith.

Discussion of the conflicts between the two organizations arose as a matter of course, and Clark, in his capacity as SACEUR, briefly issued guidance on the missions of the two organizations, how they were to divide the tasks that overlapped, and how they should parcel out the space around the airfield. In fact, as Colonel Leon later pointed out, the meeting was not purely fortuitous, since the three generals met at what was at that moment the principal friction point between the two organizations, the southern part of Tirana-Rinas airfield, where the French had positioned their aircraft and supporting troops. Unfortunately and inevitably, disagreements about use of a too-small airfield constantly muttered along as an undertone to all operations based in Tirana. On the other hand, Reith took the humanitarian aid operations in hand and both controlled them and kept them from interfering with the purely military operations of Task Force Hawk.²⁹

Mission Statement and Task Force Organization

As had become usual in past deployments, Task Force Hawk began its planning and organization without reference to a specific order. The USAR-EUR operation order was not published until 22 April, by which time the task

force had already deployed and established an initial operational capability.³⁰ It was therefore from early discussions with USAREUR that V Corps developed its purely combatant mission statement for Task Force Hawk, organized to carry out Operation VICTORY HAWK:

On order, V (US) Corps forms, trains, and deploys a deep strike Task Force to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to conduct operations in support of NATO's Phased Air Operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.³¹

Basing the task force in Macedonia made reasonable the assumptions that the aircraft would operate from fixed facilities already in American hands and that adequate communications and logistical back up were available. Although the task force was under American command, the corps assumed that it could eventually fall under operational control of the ARRC if ground operations ever started. Planners likewise assumed that sufficient strategic airlift was available to move the headquarters and security elements as well as the attack helicopters and their associated support equipment.

The task force organization provided a command and control structure that could plan and execute deep operations, and early corps plans outlined an incremental force deployment to provide growing deep strike capability over time. Hendrix intended that a mission rehearsal exercise in Germany would be followed by rehearsals conducted in the area of operations. For support, Task Force Hawk planned to use facilities prepared by Task Force Able Sentry and maintained after February 1999 by Task Force Sabre. The Apache helicopters had an around-the-clock mission capability, enhanced by suppression of enemy air defense fires from Army Tactical Missile Systems fired by the Multiple Launch Rocket System batteries. The corps estimated that the task force would require 126 C-17 sorties to place all of its elements at Petrovec Airfield in Skopje, even if all of the helicopters self-deployed.³²

Within days it became clear that the task force was too small for the mission. However, in reconsidering the design of the force, Hendrix decided to keep units detailed for Task Force Hawk separate from those detailed for Task Force Falcon. If the air campaign were followed by deployment of peacekeeping forces to Kosovo, he did not want to have to retrain and re-prepare a force to send as Task Force Falcon. Besides that, Task Force Falcon had already gone through a complex mission rehearsal exercise at the Hohenfels training area for the mission in Kosovo, and the units were then standing by at the deployment processing center. With different forces, the corps would retain the ability to carry out both missions simultaneously, if required.

As mission planning began, haste was a major consideration. Above all else, Hendrix did "not want to be irrelevant" and show up after the war was over.³³ Weather was another consideration. He believed that any ground operation would have to begin not later than July if the maneuver campaign were to be completed by late October and thereby avoid the complications of a winter battle in the Balkans where poor road nets and terrible off-road trafficability historically limited the pace of operations. Inclement winter weather would

also restrict the viability of close air support because the cloud cover tended to increase and drop in altitude by October. Naturally, poor weather would also diminish the value of the aerial and satellite reconnaissance upon which targeting relied.

While awaiting approval of the Task Force Hawk concept, the aviators began to train the units slated for deployment, particularly the Apache squadrons of the 11th Aviation Regiment.³⁴ The two squadrons did a quick gunnery exercise of two or three days' duration at Grafenwöhr. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, the field artillery missile battalion from V Corps Artillery slated to join Task Force Hawk, ran its own exercise. While those units were returning to their garrisons after finishing their final training, the corps commander summoned their leaders to the Warrior Prep Center at Einsiedlerhof, near Kaiserslautern, where he conducted a simulation mission rehearsal for a day and a half, building on the abilities already developed in the recent Warfighter Exercises and in actual flying missions at Grafenwöhr, both live fire and at night, and also one exercise that the Apache units had flown in Bosnia in the late summer and early fall of the preceding year.

As events turned out, much of the terrain over which aviation units eventually operated had never been considered in V Corps simulations, and many of the methods that Task Force Hawk had to use to cooperate with the Allied air forces were likewise new, which underscored the need for the task force to be able quickly to adapt to novel circumstances in Albania. Finally, corps units began to stage the Hawk forces to Ramstein and Kaiserslautern for deployment, aiming to meet the 1 April deadline General Clark had stipulated. The forces did not deploy at that point, but by 3 April V Corps had positioned a total of fifty-seven C-17 loads at the airfield, staged and pre-inspected by the Army and Air Force and ready to fly.

Corps reconnaissance missions to Thessaloniki in Greece and to Macedonia enabled the battle staff to write operations orders in considerable detail to place Task Force Hawk in Skopje. While the task force was still destined for deployment to Macedonia, Colonel Leon recalled that one member of the battle staff, after reviewing the circumstances there and in Albania, summed the session up with this comment about Albania: "I'm glad we're never going to go there, because that place just . . . you couldn't make it work." However, on 29 March Macedonia rendered all the previous planning work irrelevant when it announced that it would not allow an expansion of NATO support within its borders, and likewise would not allow NATO combat forces to launch air strikes against Serbia from its soil. As a consequence, European Command on 1 April directed that the Apache task force would be based in Albania, rather than in Macedonia.

The next day, the staff dispatched a survey team under Lt. Col. Michael Clidas from G-3 Plans and including the corps G-3 aviation staff officer, a member of the G-2 staff, the S-4 of the 7th Corps Support Group, a transportation officer, a contracting officer, and a noncommissioned officer from the Air Force Air Mobility Control Flight to the airport at Tirana-Rinas. The team noted that

the ground around the airport was soft; that there were a number of serious security concerns, considering the physical layout of the airport; and that ports and the ground transportation network were not capable of sustaining a large deployment or logistics flow. Clidas drew attention to the fact that the geography of the area placed serious strains on radio communications. The team also remarked on the poverty of the region and the small labor force available to hire. The most serious consideration, however, was the capacity of the airport to support continuous relays of cargo aircraft while also serving the needs of the existing humanitarian relief operation.

Determining the specific loads the runways could bear had to await a technical inspection, but the team found that the field was capable of only daylight, visual flight rules operations and that it could handle a maximum of three C-17 transports on the ground at one time. Assuming that the civil authorities would authorize three C-17s on the ground at once, the team estimated that the entire force could not be delivered to Tirana in less than sixteen days. With two aircraft authorized on the ground, the figure rose to twenty-three days. With one aircraft permitted, force closure time amounted to forty-four days. Because of the limited support available in Albania and the fact that the task force would certainly have to rely upon itself for power, water, fuel, food, and medical support, the volume of delivered supplies and equipment rose alarmingly in planning estimates.

Although the team had serious and well-founded reservations about Tirana-Rinas, the airfield there was obviously better than the only alternative at Gjadër, and the corps commander issued planning guidance to his staff on that basis. Still, the initial corps survey was pessimistic about using Tirana as a base, particularly because it appeared the airfield was too small to use C-5 transports without running the risk of blocking the runway by allowing an airplane to become stuck in the mud.³⁵ Such an eventuality would have had disastrous consequences, particularly for an operation that would hinge so desperately on efficient and continuing airlift. In the process of figuring out how to deliver the force to Albania, the staff relied on a study that the G-2 had done for the corps commander the previous year. Because the country appeared to be unstable and so bedeviled by anarchy, there had from time to time been discussions about missions to extricate U.S. citizens if circumstances warranted it, and the basis of those plans was the G-2 country study, which now proved so useful in another context.

Hendrix understood that a completely new plan was necessary, since Skopje and Albania were fundamentally different from the operational point of view. Skopje was a strategic airfield where the corps had a well-established camp and good security measures already in place, not to mention a satisfactorily developed logistical support structure that could be tailored for any type of operation. From the operational point of view, the terrain in Macedonia was much more favorable, since the distances the Apaches would have to fly to make deep strikes into Kosovo were much shorter than from Albania. Albania, by contrast, had extremely mountainous terrain that limited aircraft loads and distances

from Kosovo that limited mission duration. In contrast to Macedonia, Albania had both a weak government and a weak army that had permitted anarchy to prevail for the preceding two years, so the internal security situation was poor. The border between Albania and Kosovo was really controlled only by the Serb Army and was accordingly very porous and therefore dangerous from the force protection point of view. The Albanian road network was disastrously bad when considered for military use, and the distance from the coast to the airfield at Tirana, the only logical base area, was considerable. Even though distances of between 80 and 120 kilometers separated Tirana and the border, depending on the route chosen, there was no other airfield available that could be supported at all by road. Because of the changed security requirement, logistics requirement, and attack requirement, the corps had to redesign the task force and had to do it very quickly.


As the destination of the force became clear, the corps relied on experienced aviators to elaborate an additional level of planning detail, and for that purpose, General Hendrix quietly brought the S-3 officers of 2d and 6th Squadrons, 6th Cavalry, and two of their warrant officers to Heidelberg in early April to exploit their operational Apache experience. Assuming a base in Albania and working purely from a map reconnaissance, the team roughed out a series of routes through open passages from Tirana into Kosovo and briefed its plan to Hendrix. The team also outlined requirements for auxiliary fuel tanks and pointed out the challenges of flying in mountainous terrain with extremely heavy aircraft.³⁶

The increased security requirement demanded more forces, and Hendrix on 12 April asked for relief from the arbitrary force cap of 2,500 soldiers. Approval from European Command and USAREUR was swift, and Hendrix's staff immediately made a traditional troop-to-task analysis and structured a larger force that included infantry and military police units.³⁷ As Task Force Hawk prepared for deployment, it therefore burgeoned from 1,782 to 5,500 soldiers in design, although Hendrix tried to keep the force to five thousand or less. (*Chart 11*) The other matter that argued for redesign of the force was the fact that Task Force Hawk was to be configured as an AH-64 Apache task force, supported by artillery, intended to begin cross-border operations in support of the strategic air campaign. The Task Force Hawk mission was explicitly combatant, and therefore diametrically different from the Task Force Falcon mission, since the latter was intended to be a peacekeeping force that would operate in a benign environment.

Task Force Thunder

At the end of March, in the middle of preparations for Task Force Hawk, General Wesley Clark, the U.S. commander in chief in Europe, issued verbal instructions to General Montgomery Meigs, the USAREUR commander, to prepare an artillery force to suppress air defenses inside Serbia.³⁸ Clark wished to assist the air campaign by defeating the Serb missile batteries, which were proving a persistent threat to the allied aircraft. General Meigs, in turn, directed

CHART 11—TASK FORCE HAWK ORGANIZATION AT 5,500 SOLDIERS (MID-APRIL 1999)



Source: Briefing, TF Hawk, 1-6 Infantry Task Organization (1115); 1st Armored Division Briefing, 14 Apr 1999, 1AD Contributions to TF Hawk, Heavy Package; Memo, Chief of Staff, V Corps, for Commander, V Corps, 17 Apr 1999, sub: Force Cap Reduction in TF Hawk; HQ, 1st Armored Division, FRAGO 32 (n.d.) to OPLAN 99-64 (Victory Hawk) alerted the 2d Brigade Combat Team for on-order movement with a force not to exceed 555 soldiers in TF 1-6 Infantry and 80 in the brigade headquarters element.

Hendrix at V Corps to design and ready an appropriate force. Guidance on how to organize for and perform the suppression of enemy air defense mission was, as Hendrix characterized it, "sketchy," but he understood that he needed to assemble a small Army Tactical Missile System task force that could operate either from Croatia or from Hungary. Preparing for that eventuality, he sent reconnaissance teams to each country to locate firing positions and to begin to figure out how the task forces would operate there.

Task Force Thunder, as the force was named, was intended to deliver fires specifically at SA-6 missile sites around Belgrade and to support cross-border operations of the attack helicopters. The air campaign had already begun on 24 March, and the V Corps plans staff therefore anticipated that there was some intention to use the Army tactical missile fire to help protect the NATO strike aircraft operating deep in Serbia as well.

This mission statement governed corps planning:

On order, V (US) Corps forms, trains, and deploys a SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defense] capable Task Force to Hungary to conduct operations in support of NATO's Phased Air Operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.³⁹

Maj. Mike Scully led the planning work to develop a basic concept that included placing the task force into Croatia or Hungary within forty-eight hours of alert notification by means of air or rail movement. Initial plans called for locating Task Force Thunder either near Pecs, in Hungary, or near Slavonski Brod, in Croatia. He devised two options. Each included a command element from the field artillery battalion. Option 1 used a larger force that included one rocket artillery battery of twelve launchers, the battalion headquarters and service battery, an infantry company for local security, a Patriot missile battery for air defense of the task force, and built-in signal and logistics support. With such an organization, the task force had enough launchers to maintain fires while moving the other part of the unit to an alternate firing location. Employing what artillerymen referred to as "shoot and scoot" tactics, the task force could fire a salvo within four minutes of receiving a mission and have rounds on target within five to ten minutes. Meanwhile, the battery could move and be set up to fire another mission within thirty minutes. Option 1 involved about 490 soldiers and carried the cost of thirty-five sorties by Air Force C-17 transports.

Option 2 was more modest. Instead of an artillery battery, it involved only one firing platoon of six launchers and was supported by a single dismounted infantry company and a logistics section. A force so designed could move into the theater of operations more quickly because it involved only 120 soldiers and ten C-17 sorties. However, it could not "shoot and scoot" and could not mass fires as readily as the other configuration. More important, it had the logistical support to sustain itself only briefly in action. Naturally, moving the units by rail was also a possibility planners considered. The difficulty with rail movement was that it required commercial deep-well railcars, always in short supply in the German train network and needing advanced notification to obtain.

After reviewing the options and considering further guidance he received from Meigs, Hendrix issued a warning order to the 1st Armored Division that called for a modification of Option 2. He directed the division to ready three launchers and appropriate logistics, command and control, and security forces for deployment within 48-hours' notice. The order made clear that the longer-range Army Tactical Missile System round was required for Task Force Thunder because of the distance of the nominated targets from any possible task force fire base. He ordered that the task force draw most of its support from the National Support Element that still existed at Taszár, Hungary, to sustain Task Force Eagle in the on-going NATO Sustainment Force mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Command and control, he determined, would be exercised by linking TF Thunder to the Combined Air Operations Center, and the task force would, upon arrival in the theater of operations, be under operational control of NATO's Allied Forces, Southern Europe, which might further delegate control to the commander of allied air forces in the region.⁴⁰

While practical preparations were going on, negotiations to obtain Croatian or Hungarian permission to fire from their territory proceeded, as did some refinement of General Clark's original concept. To some degree, Clark's intentions remained unclear in the course of that month, since USAREUR and V Corps had been directed to prepare Task Force Falcon for peacekeeping operations in what European Command termed a "permissive environment," as well as to prepare two combat forces, Task Force Hawk and Task Force Thunder. As the notion of a heavy ground campaign took shape through the course of the month, the corps increasingly thought deployment of TF Thunder likely to augment such a force. Task Force Falcon, however, would deploy in any case, just as soon as on-going combat operations produced the desired results of acquiescence from Serbia, since the NATO peacekeeping force was an integral part of the agreement upon which the alliance insisted.

Therefore, V Corps still had to be very careful to keep the forces committed to each task force clearly separate, in case one or all received an execute order. No unit from 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, could be used for Hawk or Thunder, and the corps had to be careful how the 7th Corps Support Group was tasked, since it already had missions relating to Task Force Falcon. Once planning was complete, the task force remained ready, loaded on heavy equipment transporters, awaiting a deployment decision that never came, in part because neither Croatia nor Hungary wished to pay the political cost of allowing such missions to be fired from their soil.⁴¹

Deployment of Task Force Hawk

The headquarters and its deploying units had invested a great deal of energy in making themselves ready for deployment because General Hendrix insisted that no Air Force airplane was ever going to have to wait for an Army load. Thus, on 3 April, the same day that the president gave his approval to send two battalions of Apache helicopters into Albania, the corps already had

fifty-seven air loads of equipment staged at the deployment processing center at Kaiserslautern for movement. (*Map 15*) The next day the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the execute order for Task Force Hawk deployment, with the caveat that the force would not be employed outside Albania until the president gave specific permission. Also on 4 April, the government issued a public announcement that Task Force Hawk, with twenty-four Apaches and 1,500 soldiers, would deploy to Albania within eight days.⁴²

After Hendrix learned from USAREUR that the mission was going to be executed, the next obvious step was to dispatch an advanced party, known at V Corps as a "Torch Party." The Roberts Amendment restrictions having been lifted on 5 April, that travel was finally legal. Given the complexities of the situation, the corps expanded the concept and put together a larger team that it referred to as "Super Torch," under the command of Maj. Gen. J. H. Burns, the deputy commanding general of the corps.⁴³ Hastily obtaining country clearances for the visit, Burns selected Colonel Leon and a communications sergeant to accompany him while the corps mustered the rest of the advance party.

Burns and Leon flew to Ramstein Air Force Base on 5 April, where they met Air Force Maj. Gen. William Hinton, 3d Air Force commander, who was also in charge of Operation SHINING HOPE, the humanitarian aid mission that was based at Tirana-Rinas. Together, they flew from Ramstein to Tirana, discussing the ongoing relief operations while en route and meeting with U.S. Embassy and Albanian officials at the airfield. Upon arrival, Burns also reviewed security issues in Albania and immediately determined that force protection would be a critical matter in establishing the task force.⁴⁴

Burns' team arrived on the night of 5 April, with the remainder of the advance party arriving the next morning by C-130. While Burns' party began its assessments, the corps headquarters became the focus of an interplay of communications via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), followed up by written orders from European Command, through USAREUR, to V Corps, which then began producing written orders for its deploying units. His part of the mission completed, Burns returned to Germany on 8 April while the rest of the Torch Party began to function as an advanced element for Task Force Hawk. By the time the deputy commanding general returned to Heidelberg, the corps had already begun spending money to buy the critical resources that the advanced party had determined were necessary to operate in Albania. One of the first of those was barrier material, since physical security was immediately necessary for what Burns considered to be a very vulnerable airfield.

The initial survey of the airfield was not particularly encouraging, and elaboration of airlift plans had to await an Air Force technical survey of the field to determine what weight airplanes the runway and aprons would support, how much ramp area was available to turn aircraft around, and the amount of additional air traffic control support that would be required. The ramps were on the west side of the field with the civilian tower, and that was



MAP 15

where a sprawling and essentially uncontrolled humanitarian relief operation was already in progress to support the many refugees who were streaming across the border from Kosovo into Albania. The remaining available space was on the east side of the runway, a part of the southern periphery, and a dirt area on the southwest side of the field, all of which was unimproved. Like it or not, the land available to Task Force Hawk produced a base area in a linear configuration that extended its security and logistical requirements.

Of equal concern was the ground itself—soft clay soil that had a very high water table. As Burns' aircraft took off from Tirana, a persistent rain began to fall, and it became clear to the advance party that trafficability on the soft ground was going to be extremely poor. Within three days the base camp area was literally under water, and Leon, by then in charge of the advance party, consequently asked General Brandenburg to push engineer units up in the deployment schedule. The only good news on 7 April was that the Italian Ministry of Defense had approved an American request to stage Task Force Hawk's Apaches through Italian bases and to deploy them combat loaded.⁴⁵ The same day, the Albanian legislature gave permission for Task Force Hawk to enter the country and to use Tirana-Rinas as a base.

Meanwhile, in Heidelberg, V Corps began considering how best to deliver TF Hawk to Albania, working and reworking the lists of pallets and the equipment and materiel needed for the mission, as well as their priority for shipment. The next day, 8 April, designated N-Day, the Air Force began to move the task force from Ramstein to Tirana. Force Package A1, an infantry platoon and four M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles from 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, arrived that morning, the first of seven planned force package deployments. There were six C-17 sorties a day for two days, a pace that increased when the Air Force established the capability to run around-the-clock flight operations at Tirana-Rinas airfield. Using Super Torch communications to stay current on the latest requirements in Albania, Brandenburg supervised staff actions to organize and send the materials and capabilities that were required. "We were hanging on their every word," Brandenburg later commented, emphasizing the importance of the advance party in the development of the mission.

The deployment process extended over a period of twenty-nine days, from 8 April through 7 May.⁴⁶ Hendrix planned to have the Apaches self-deploy, but withheld the final decision for a while because of the unpredictable Alpine weather. However they went to Albania, the helicopters needed to arrive relatively early, because General Clark wanted the corps to establish the earliest possible initial operating capability, so that Task Force Hawk could begin operations while the remainder of the force was still arriving at Tirana. Therefore, Hendrix decided to package the deployment in a way that gave the task force the essential equipment and supplies that it needed to be able to commence operations early, including a certain amount of command and control, logistical support, artillery, and, of course, helicopters and their associated support organizations and equipment. The task force planning and targeting capability was fully operational on 15 April. The aircraft arrival was, however, delayed until 21 April.

The first flight of helicopters landed at Pisa, Italy, on 14 April, and the second group the next day, but they could not immediately proceed any further. The continuing rain and space limitations at Tirana imposed part of the delay. The constant rain and the heavy traffic in the base camp had reduced the area to a quagmire where one could sink to a depth of a foot in some places to as much as five feet in others, "just an absolutely abominable sea of mud," according to Hendrix. The mud made living conditions extremely difficult and somewhat hazardous from the point of view of health, since the ground had been used as pasture land and the mud mix included considerable amounts of sheep droppings. At the very least, as Lt. Col. Jim Embrey, commander of 1-6 Infantry, later observed, the sheep dung "added wonders to the ambiance of the whole situation."⁴⁷ The mud severely restricted not only operations, but also base camp development.⁴⁸

From the point of view of the mission, the mud and soft ground that had been selected as a parking area for the Apaches—selected because no other space was available—also tended to defeat the whole purpose of having some five thousand soldiers in Albania, which was operating the twenty-four Apache helicopters. In the conditions that existed by the end of the first week of April, there was no doubt that aircraft would simply sink into the mud if they landed on the unprepared ground at Rinas. Space allocation was the other aspect of the problem. The situation at the airfield was, as Hendrix later said, what "someone described as being like the bar scene in *Star Wars*."⁴⁹ The small airfield was packed with three major operations: Operation SHINING HOPE, the humanitarian relief mission that involved a great many countries with differing ways of doing things; the Air Force airfield operation; and Task Force Hawk and its combatant mission.

There was simply a lot of dangerous equipment in a very small space, and there were real safety concerns, particularly for armed aircraft and for the requirement to observe proper quantity-distance factors for explosive safety. Once it became obvious that the Army was not going to be allocated any share of the concrete ramp space at the airfield, since most of it was already consumed by the humanitarian relief operation, some other solution had to be found. Immediately after he arrived in Tirana, General Richard Cody, the task force deputy commander for air and special operations, decided to put forty landing pads on the north side of the airfield, and the task force switched all of its engineering effort toward building those pads. On 18 April nineteen sets of AN2 matting were delivered, and the engineers determined that they could have them all in place within four and one-half days, which set the earliest possible arrival date for the aircraft.

The second delay was diplomatic. Despite transit permission granted by the Italian government, at first the Apache task force was not allowed to upload live ammunition for the flight across the Adriatic into Albania. Once the aircraft were in Italy, ammunition teams from the 1st Battalion, 501st Aviation, in Hanau, went to Brindisi to load rockets, Hellfires, and 30-mm. ammunition. However, obtaining that diplomatic agreement consumed six or seven

days. Hence it was 21 April, thirteen days after the deployment started, before the first twelve Apaches landed at Tirana. Emphasizing the uncertainty about what was going to happen in Albania, the crews flew the air mission across the Adriatic strictly as a combat mission, accompanied by an armed PAVELOW helicopter to one side and supported by Navy Seal teams below them at critical turns.⁵⁰

Base Camp Development

Between the end of the Cold War and 1994 V Corps had adhered to a rigid exercise schedule that saw the headquarters deploy for operations in the field roughly once a quarter to retain deployment proficiency. After Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR began in 1995, however, such routine training was no longer possible. In any case, the headquarters had characteristically operated in the field from asphalt or concrete hard stands, and usually in places such as Grafenwöhr, where there were improved billets and messes for the troops and improved shelters for the command posts.

Since as early as 1992 the corps had relied upon commercial power generators, but the work that had been done in those years to find the right combination of equipment to power the corps main command post had fallen by the wayside as the Special Troops Battalion focused upon meeting the requirements of the increasing number of deployment missions, and especially of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.⁵¹ More to the point, the exercise process was wholly unrealistic, in the judgment of some. In an attempt to conserve the time of an overworked staff, exercises concentrated entirely on the tactical problems at hand, not on the processes involved in operating from field locations. Exercises normally began with junior soldiers and noncommissioned officers going to the field up to two weeks before the exercise began to set up the command posts and life support areas. At that point, the corps staff would walk into an elaborate, functioning organization and begin working on the tactical problems.⁵²

When he assumed command, Hendrix immediately saw that the way the corps deployed its main command post was unsatisfactory and entirely unsuited to the requirements of a contingency mission, and in September 1997 he began considering ways to improve it. Working from a study that Leon and Col. Henry J. Hughes III, the corps resource management officer, undertook in December, he outlined a set of equipment that the corps would need to operate in an austere field environment and used year-end funds to buy that equipment. Among the purchases was a set of commercial design 320-kW generators that at first proved unreliable when used in a Battle Command Training Program exercise, but which were eventually modified so that they adequately supplied the command post's needs. The same generators reliably provided power to the headquarters in Albania. The situation with tents was much the same as it had been with generators. Few were on hand, and those that did exist were neither well maintained nor properly stored for rapid deployment. Once tents, heaters, and the ancillary equipment needed to live in the field were bought, General

Hendrix went to the next step of purchasing standard, civilian-design ISU-90 airline containers in which to store all the gear so that it could easily be loaded on airplanes for rapid deployment. Colonel Leon, who was essentially the "mayor" of the camp in Tirana, stressed the importance to that mission of Hendrix's early vision and his forcefulness to cause the staff to carry out that vision of a deployable corps headquarters.

Despite those preparations, base camp development still did not proceed as smoothly as might have been wished. The day after Burns left Tirana, the balance of the Super Torch party arrived to help Leon establish a base infrastructure as quickly as possible. The corps surgeon, a contracting officer, a finance officer to act as a purchasing agent, and the communications sergeant were among the key players. The next day the advance party itself began to arrive. Since the mission was to create an aviation task force, the "long pole in the tent" was obviously going to be aviation fuel supply, so the COSCOM sent a noncommissioned officer (NCO) to begin working on storage for the estimated 80,000 gallons of fuel per day that sustained combat operations would require. With him came a base logistics officer to deal with all other combat service support actions.

Since, as Leon later wryly remarked, "we were all concerned about being able to withstand a GAO audit some day," another member of the team was an officer from the corps resource management office to oversee the budget. In reality, since he was an infantryman, that officer, Maj. William Nase, became Leon's *de facto* operations officer and security officer until the rest of the headquarters arrived, and thus he worried about resource management in his spare time. The real issue, Leon found, was not accounting for money, but how fast money could be spent to build capability. Rounding out the team were an engineer, a representative from the Brown and Root corporation, a representative from Defense Logistics Agency, a Special Forces sergeant major from the corps staff to begin working on force protection matters, and a civilian real estate expert whose service proved invaluable.⁵³ The other key member of the team was an officer who had worked in the U.S. Embassy in Albania and who was fluent in Albanian. General Burns remembered that that officer was in the region and arranged his assignment to the task force to serve as G-5. As a six-day deluge set in, Leon recalled that he and his expanded team "were all sitting there, looking at each other, trying to figure out what to do."

The first requirement was transportation, and obtaining it demonstrated one of the limitations of contracting as a means of meeting the Army's logistical requirements, particularly in an area noted for its poverty. Since humanitarian relief had been funneled through Tirana-Rinas for some time, and since the Air Force was also there, three major organizations were competing for a very limited amount of civilian-provided material and equipment. Quickly, everything that could be rented, was rented. On the first full day of advance party operations, the contracting officer managed to lease six vehicles that would at least run, but later reported that finding rental equipment was not going to be easy. Using the rented vehicles, the members of Leon's party dispersed, each in his



Tirana-Rinas Airport, Albania

own direction, to do the work that needed to be done to make the arrangements for arrival of the first force package. A significant first decision was therefore that the party had to take some risks if it was to get anything done at all; it could not afford to operate in the four-vehicle convoy that was standard for operations elsewhere in the Balkans. For the first few days the usual technique was to send everybody away to do his work through the day and then to get together at around eight o'clock in the evening for a daily three-hour debrief to share information and coordinate efforts. Naturally, a series of tasks emerged that were not specifically in anyone's bailiwick.

Another obvious early duty was to figure out how to lay out the task force at the airfield. Although Sgt. Maj. Mark Vargas, a Special Forces NCO from the corps staff, was there to handle force protection, he also had to take on terrain management and allocation of space to the units that were shortly to arrive. Meanwhile Major Nase worked on security issues, and particularly cooperation on security with the Air Force. Leon focused on establishing a relationship with the Air Force on the other side of the airfield, and he handled that by having the surgeon, Lt. Col. Alan Moloff, link up with his Air Force medical counterpart. At the same time, Leon had the good fortune to find that the Air Force officer who was setting up the air base operation was Lt. Col. Cliff Bray, who had been his classmate at the Army War College. That fortunate coincidence made it easy for the two organizations to work hand in hand, particularly during the first difficult weeks.

Extreme poverty characterized those first weeks in Tirana, since the advance party had nothing like the supplies and equipment it needed to function without external support. Leon arranged to draw power from Air Force generators, borrowed one of their few tents, and arranged for his party to mess with the sister service. The only physical security at the time was provided by the Air Force, which also agreed to give the Army medical support until the task force could bring in its own medical teams.

As the advance party's work began, Leon's biggest single task was to stake out Army ownership of as much of the airfield as he could and to keep the Air Force and humanitarian aid agencies from occupying it, since the task force would require a substantial amount of space to park helicopters and set up maintenance, ordnance storage, and living areas. While Leon worked to secure the land, the task force deployment began to unfold according to plan. The plan, however, by then did not suit the requirements that the advance party found in Albania, and they discovered that it was difficult that removed from Heidelberg to make changes in what was deployed, and when. In part because of the unfortunate experiences involved in changing the deployment flow during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in 1995 and 1996, the corps and USAREUR staffs were very much inclined not to tinker with the air loads that were inspected and ready to go, and generally took the attitude that "we've already got a plan, and we're executing that plan."⁵⁴

Affecting the problem was the fact that aircraft loads in Germany had been planned as C-130 or C-5 loads, while C-17 aircraft were used, requiring off-the-cuff load modifications on the ramp. Nonetheless, resistance to modifying the deployment plan remained strong, even when Leon reported that the steady rain was generating a whole new set of requirements, especially for engineers. Consequently, the first airplane loads to arrive, chiefly the security force of 1-6 Infantry, arrived with full rucksacks and ready to fight, but without tents. Living conditions became grim as the rain continued to fall, and the surgeon began to worry about soldiers developing hypothermia because they were always wet through and through and the wind had picked up.

The second issue was material handling equipment, which had not been scheduled early in the air flow from Germany, but which was needed to unload the aircraft and move the pallets of equipment and ammunition away from the congested ramp area. Fortunately, the Air Force had a forklift and was willing to help, at least in part in order to keep their ramp clear and thereby maintain the tempo of flight operations that supported not only Task Force Hawk, but also the humanitarian relief effort. Once again, reality bumped up against the experience of corps exercises such as Warfighter, where the basic load of ammunition simply became available when needed.

For Leon and his few soldiers, the reality was that huge pallets of ammunition—twenty tons—were suddenly disgorged from cargo aircraft, and the soldiers had neither the equipment to handle those pallets nor the trucks to move them, not to mention lacking a properly configured and secured ammunition storage area. With Air Force help, Leon positioned the 1-6 Infantry on the south

end of the airfield among a fortress of ammunition pallets, pallets of food and water, and pallets of barrier material. Arriving in Albania with the idea in mind that there might be a fire fight the first night, cold and wet infantrymen instead found themselves surrounded by a sea of mud and huge pallets of supplies and equipment, but without tents or any of the other creature comforts.⁵⁵

The hard fact was that C-17 aircraft arrived every two hours, and the Super Torch party came to be consumed by the sheer mechanics of moving soldiers and equipment off of airplanes and putting them where they needed to be. Often, the shortage of handling equipment meant that the soldiers had to break down a pallet on the ramp itself and carry the supplies away piecemeal, or at least break it down into small enough loads that the few decrepit old flat-bed Albanian trucks the contracting agent had been able to find could carry. Vast rejoicing greeted the first Army forklift to arrive, but as it rolled off the airplane, Leon discovered that it had a flat tire. In the meanwhile, the men and pallets of equipment—that did not yet include tents—arrayed themselves on the eastern side of the airfield, which had been a sheep pasture and consequently became churned into mud that had a peculiar odor. The primitive drainage system around the airfield did not prevent the large open pasture areas from flooding, and those quickly became huge pools of water. As soon as the first Army vehicles arrived, the open areas were transformed by the traffic into equally huge pools of mud. "Of course," as Leon sourly observed, "we were down here getting that sage advice from the experts in the rear, which was 'manage your traffic flow, now, really carefully, so you don't mess up your area,'" advice that did not touch reality at any point, as he saw it. "Those," he said, "are the type of questions you don't answer."

Leon set a routine of conferring with Brandenburg daily, late in the day, after the scramble of daily planning sessions at corps and USAREUR had abated. He and the chief of staff exchanged information about the changes as seen from the headquarters perspective and the requirements that were being created as the base camp development proceeded, and cooperated to amend the plan as needed. The lessons continued to accumulate, and the ostensibly simple issue of communications itself became one of the first problems. Some nights the secure telephone did not work, and the advance party resorted to the satellite communication system. It, however, was evidently not designed for continuous usage and quickly burned out and had to be replaced, generating thought about how many such systems the corps really required to conduct contingency missions.

The other issue was communications among far-flung members of the advance party as they tried to control the growing pace of arrivals in Tirana. One of the early failures was that the advance party did not bring any portable communications system with it, but frequently needed to coordinate the efforts of its various members throughout the day. Until such matters could be resolved, Leon felt that the task force was lucky that the airfield was not yet on 24-hour operations, which would have allowed an operational pace he did not think his advance party could have survived without better communications and transportation.

The couple of extra days involved in the Air Force airfield survey and setting of navigational aids for round-the-clock flight operations gave Leon and his party time to "gather our wits together," as he later said, and devise a plan that would allow them to keep up with the pace. That was especially important since most of the advance party was by that time entirely occupied with meeting aircraft and moving soldiers, baggage, and equipment to where they needed to go. Since soldiers' baggage was on pallets and the only real time to get those moved was at night, the advance party worked hard to ingratiate itself not with the Air Force colonels, who were in a very real way deciding the fate of the task force at that point, but with the three young airmen who were working the three forklifts. One of the outstanding facts of the first days in Tirana, as Leon emphatically pointed out, was the willingness of the Air Force to help.

The airlift started on 8 April. By 11 April the first members of the corps battle staff arrived, and those additional officers from the G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-6 went to work solving problems as they arose, which also very much relieved the stress on the advance party. On 12 April Col. Raymond Odierno, who was a brigadier general designate detailed from the 1st Armored Division to be task force deputy commander for battle synchronization, arrived at midnight. His arrival allowed Leon to focus on what at that time was still the problem of receiving the force, while Odierno began to focus on the mission. Fortuitously, Leon had worked with Odierno for a year when the latter was corps chief of staff, and both knew the battle staff officers who had just arrived. Leon asserted that there was no learning curve; everyone walked off the plane and went to work in what he described as a "defining moment" for the task force deployment. True for the detailed work involved in setting up a base area, Leon's assertion was perhaps less true once operations began, since Task Force Hawk was engaged in something entirely new in the Army's experience. With an air war already in progress, the Army had to suit its tactics, techniques, and procedures to an operation governed by another service's way of doing things, and events subsequently proved that there was indeed a learning curve involved in that process.

The big issues at that point were where the helicopters were going to be put, since there was no concrete hard stand available for them and the other side of the airfield was covered in water; how to provide for the bare survival of the soldiers who continued to arrive; how the task force base would be finally configured; and how a functioning tactical operations center and deep operations coordination cell would be laid out, so that planning and intra-staff communication would be easy. The nascent staff began to deal with the problems simultaneously. Initial placement of the task force was one of the crucial decisions.

The north side of the airfield was never seriously considered because it was completely open and because the goal was to base the military operation as far away from the civilian terminal as possible. More to the point, the only direction that expansion was possible, if it became necessary, was to the south, where the terrain was more favorable. A berm that already existed on the east side of the airfield allowed the easy development of a 75-meter stand-off from the

outer perimeter fence to the south, thus making that area even more desirable. The berm was high enough to protect the lower ground inside it from direct observation and direct fire. The south was thus the best-protected terrain. Even in the south, however, the security problem was enormous. The perimeter fence didn't exist over long stretches, and other sections had huge holes. The airfield was covered with flocks of sheep that, with the onset of rain, the Albanians began trying to remove to higher ground. Civilians of every description, and especially children, intensely curious about the soldiers, were everywhere. Dealing with physical security became the task of 1-6 Infantry. The other immediate issue was preserving the terrain.

One of Odierno's first decisions was to draw a line across the airfield and prohibit vehicular traffic beyond it. Placing barbed wire across the ground at that point underscored the order and preserved the northern part of the field for future placement of helicopter pads and servicing areas. General Richard Cody eventually determined where the airfield operation would be set down, indeed selecting the northern part of the field and thereby embracing the option that Odierno had kept open for him. Preserving the remaining open area intact was an important decision, given the soft, waterlogged ground and the continuing heavy rain.

The corps tactical operations center and deep operations coordination cell were located in vans that were pulled into position by bulldozer or by M113 armored personnel carrier. One of the first major contracts that Brown and Root let was road construction from south to north through the task force area. The only way to build on such terrain was by adding material. Even then, the ground swallowed tons of gravel without difficulty. Finally, ground convoys from Macedonia delivered geotech material to stabilize the earth.

The road was a work in progress while the task force continued to arrive, and it limited the pace at which the headquarters could be laid out. Once at the end of the road, the only method open to soldiers trying to position the heavy equipment was to drive into the soft ground as hard and fast as possible, until the prime mover finally was stuck. A few pieces of equipment couldn't be moved on the road and were instead moved up the runway at night, while flight operations were suspended. Leon and Alejandro Branch, the G-3 sergeant major, superintended the task of getting the various vans in place, driving them into the muck as far as possible and then using the bulldozer and an armored personnel carrier to position them. The soldiers, "up to their waists in mud," brought the other vehicles in one by one in what everyone regarded as an incredibly dangerous, not to mention incredibly miserable, situation. Finally, the deep operations coordination cell was in place with its forty-foot trailer carrying the two 320-kW generators, as were the remainder of the task force headquarters vans and a growing billeting area.

One of the principal dilemmas that confronted the leaders early on was that there was a finite engineering capability in Albania and great competition to use what did exist. A delicate balance had to be struck between doing the construction needed to establish the attack aviation initial operational capability—the

reason the task force was there in the first place—and meeting the demands to create a secure compound and build living areas. Simultaneously, Air Force and various humanitarian aid agencies were competing with Task Force Hawk for the few available trucks to be leased and raw materials to be purchased.

When General Cody arrived in Tirana, he immediately met with Leon and with the commanders and executive officers of TF 11 and TF 12, the two aviation task forces, to talk about where to locate the airfield, the key decision that had to be made since it would determine where to “spend the engineering nickel.” Cody made two quick decisions. The first was to fight with the Air Force to get his fair share of the airfield—something that had no hope of success but that he felt he had to do. The second was to put the airfield in the north, in the area that Odierno had reserved. Immediately, priority of construction swung to completing the road to the airfield area so that hard stands could be put down to receive the aircraft. The second reason for completing the road was to be able to feed in the extensive logistical tail that airfield operations involved—the fuel, munitions, and maintenance. All of that took a certain amount of time and somewhat delayed the entry of the helicopters. The task force worked frantically to build the capability, because no one was certain when the aircraft would begin to arrive. Thus the focus entirely shifted from building the headquarters and living areas to accommodating twenty-four attack helicopters and roughly the same number of support aircraft from the in-bound Task Force 12.

The Ground Force

The original concept of Task Force Hawk called for a very small infantry force. The plan attached a platoon of Company E, 51st Infantry (Long Range Surveillance), to TF 12 to serve as a security element for downed aircraft recovery missions, and an infantry company from 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, to TF 11 for base camp security missions.⁵⁶ As soon as the task force destination shifted to Albania, the infantry contingent was increased because the security requirement at Rinas airport was larger and more complex. The original mission analysis conducted at the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, contemplated a mission that only involved providing air base security for an area about the same size as Eagle Base, the headquarters of Task Force Eagle in Bosnia. Still, that task had required just over three hundred soldiers, more than 1–6 Infantry was sending to Albania.

The infantry mission steadily expanded, however, since 1–6 Infantry had to provide local security for the artillery that would fire the air defense suppression missions that were part of the attack helicopter operation, as well as secure the base camp and conduct the necessary patrols into the hills around the airfield. The movement of an artillery battery forward to occupy a firing position and then securing the aviation forward area refueling and rearming points were each large tasks in themselves. Analyzing the mission, the task force staff soon concluded that the infantry needed a command and control

element to supervise the artillery convoy, a translator, and a few civil affairs and psychological operations troops for crowd control. There was furthermore the problem of defending the avenue of approach extending to Tirana from Montenegro and controlling the artillery and armor that arrived at the airfield to assist in that task. In fact, the new mission was far more than physical security and required a big enough command and control element to manage the full array of combined arms operations that might be called for.⁵⁷

Col. Volney Warner, commander of the 2d Brigade, discussed those problems with the 1-6 Infantry commander, Lt. Col. James Embrey, who saw the security mission at the airfield alone as an all-consuming task for his battalion and its staff. Two specific requirements emerged from their discussion. The first was to increase the size of the infantry force, and the second was to bring in a brigade combat team headquarters to handle all the staff functions associated with the growing infantry missions. When Warner talked the problem over with his division commander, Maj. Gen. Larry Ellis, he learned that an airborne infantry battalion from the 82d Airborne Division was already scheduled to arrive in Albania to reinforce 1-6 Infantry. The 2d Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, with an attached 105-mm. artillery battery and a company attached from 3-505 Airborne Infantry, began arriving at Tirana on 24 April.⁵⁸

The 2-505 Airborne Infantry arrived in Albania in increments landing between 17 and 26 April, using three C-17 flights per day, for a total of thirty air missions. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Joe Anderson, worked directly for General Hendrix until about 2 May, when Warner's 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, assumed tactical command of the battalion. The 2-505 had six distinct missions in Albania: local security, and specifically airfield security; quick reaction force; patrolling, both for purposes of establishing presence and for assessment of local conditions; supporting artillery gun raids; downed aircraft recovery team missions; and security for helicopter forward arming and refueling points.⁵⁹

Warner was convinced that the job of protecting artillery batteries—including their larger organization of integrated counterbattery radars, air defense elements, and engineers—and the security of forward area arming and refueling points, were all actually combined arms operations. Because of the complexities of those tasks, he further argued that a brigade commander and staff were needed in Albania. Warner proposed that Ellis take his 42-man brigade headquarters as a tactical command post to control the ground maneuver operations. After discussing the issue with Colonel Odierno, Ellis obtained Hendrix's approval and began moving the 2d Brigade Combat Team tactical command post to Rinas airport, with the nucleus of the command group arriving shortly before the airborne battalion from Fort Bragg got there.

Thereafter, the 2d Brigade headquarters conducted ground operations, having been given the specific mission to

conduct offensive and defensive operations to defeat enemy attacks toward the task force assembly area and to provide security (force protection) to the task force

assembly area and the artillery team located at a tactical assembly area known as the Forward Operating Base (FOB).⁶⁰

The total infantry force consisted of two infantry battalion task forces. The Task Force 1-6 Infantry commanded its headquarters and headquarters company, two mechanized infantry companies, an attached airborne infantry company, an attached tank company, an attached 155-mm. Paladin self-propelled artillery battery, two scout platoons, a platoon of combat engineers, and a platoon of construction engineers. Task Force 2-505 Airborne Infantry consisted of its headquarters and headquarters company, three airborne infantry companies, an attached 105-mm. towed artillery battery, an attached military intelligence company equipped with Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS), and two platoons of engineers. The brigade headquarters controlled the AN/TSQ-36 and AN/TSQ-37 radar sections and an air defense artillery battery.⁶¹

With the deployment of the ground forces, Task Force Hawk was complete. Infantry and armor in the quantity eventually sent to Albania had been no part of the original planning. General Hendrix and his staff made adjustments to the force levels as the degree of threat, or risk, became more apparent after their arrival at Tirana. Operational in terms of its mission once the helicopters arrived, Task Force Hawk's subsequent growth was aimed at measures to ensure the physical security of the deployed forces.

NOTES

¹ Throughout this discussion, the terms "Serb," "Yugoslav," "federal government of Yugoslavia," "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," and "former Republic of Yugoslavia" have been used interchangeably, since Serbia was the dominant entity within the rump Yugoslav state after the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

² Background data are drawn from Capt. Donald Hamilton, "Operation VICTORY HAWK Chronology (February–September 1999)," typescript Ms in V Corps History Office files. This chapter benefited from critical reviews by the following participants in the events described: General John W. Hendrix, Maj. Gen. John Craddock, Maj. Gen. Julian B. Burns, Brig. Gen. Daniel Hahn, Col. Robert M. Leon, Lt. Col. Mark J. McKearn, Lt. Col. Daniel E. Williams, and Lt. Col. Thomas Reilly. Their comments and recommendations have, as appropriate, been incorporated into the text. For the European commander in chief's perspective on Operation VICTORY HAWK, see Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

³ The United Nations imposed a comprehensive arms embargo on Serbia in March 1998. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), adopted on 31 March 1998. Subsequent actions established an economic embargo of Serbia.

⁴ A series of CJCS, SHAPE, and USEUCOM documents detail the background of Operation ALLIED FORCE. See SHAPE OPLAN 10601, "Allied Force," SACEUR Operation Plan for the Phased Air Operation in Kosovo, 5 Oct 1998; Msg, CJCS for USAREUR et al., 062355Z Oct 1998, sub: Force Prep ISO NATO CONOPLAN 10601; and SHAPE OPLAN 10602, "Eagle Eye," NATO Kosovo Verification Mission, 20 Oct 1999.

⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted on 10 Jun 1999, authorized member states and relevant international organizations to "establish the international security presence in Kosovo" and set forth the tasks, both military and civil, to be accomplished in order to create security and stability.

⁶ The Roberts Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law 105–262, sec. 8115.

⁷ Ltr, President of the United States to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, 25 Mar 1999.

⁸ Allied Command, Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), was a British-framework unit stationed at Rhein-Dahlen, Germany. The ARRC commanded NATO forces in Bosnia during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD.

⁹ See Chapter 10 for discussion of Task Force Able Sentry.

¹⁰ V Corps ACofS, G–3, Operations, Daily Command Center Files, February 1999; V Corps History Office Staff Briefing Notes, February 1999–March 1999; ACofS, G–3 Briefing, Task Force Falcon, February 1999. Also see Msg, USEUCOM for USAREUR, 311635Z Jan 1998, sub: JTF NA PLANORD; SACEUR Operation Plan 10413, JOINT GUARDIAN, for Implementation of the Interim Agreement in Kosovo, Final Draft, 16 Feb 1999; CINCSOUTH Operations Plan

40413, DECISIVE GUARDIAN Final Draft, 22 Feb 1999; USCINCEUR OPLAN 4256-99, Basic Plan for OPLAN 4256-98, U.S. Forces in Support of NATO OPLAN 10413 "Joint Guardian" for the Implementation and as Necessary the Enforcement of an Interim Agreement in Kosovo, 10 Mar 1999; USAREUR OPLAN 4256-99, Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, 061600Z Apr 1999.

¹¹ The planners who did most of the work on Task Force Falcon were Lt. Col. Michael Clidas, the chief of plans, then-Maj. Thomas Reilly, and Maj. Mike Scully. See Interv. Capt. Donald Hamilton with Maj. Mike Scully, G-3 (Plans), V Corps and Task Force Hawk, 23 Jun 1999, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

¹² Except where otherwise cited, discussion of the planning process has been drawn from Interviews, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix, Commanding General, V Corps and Task Force Hawk, 2 and 6 May 1999, and with Col. Robert M. Leon, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 2, 13, and 27 May 1999, both at Tirana, Albania; and with Brig. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, Jr., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 1-10 Jun 1999, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

¹³ The planning bases were: SACEUR Operation Plan 10413, 16 Feb 1999; CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40413, 22 Feb 1999; and USCINCEUR OPLAN 4256-99, 10 Mar 1999.

¹⁴ For discussion of the air defense missions to Israel and Turkey, see Chapter 12.

¹⁵ V Corps ACofS, G-3, Command Center daily briefing files, October 1999. Also see E-mail Msg, Col. Stephen M. Speakes, V Corps Chief of Staff, for V Corps Staff information, 13 Oct 1999, sub: EXSUM on 793d MP Bn Visit.

¹⁶ The Observer Mission was a group of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO military and civilian representatives who sought to determine whether various brutalities and international war crimes were being committed or not, and who were there to observe the spread of the fighting. Milosevic had originally agreed to their presence.

¹⁷ For details on the conclusion of Task Force Able Sentry operations, refer to Chapter 10.

¹⁸ For the evolution of TF Sabre, refer to V Corps ACofS, G-3, Operations, Daily Operations Summary for February, March, and April 1999.

¹⁹ For a more thorough discussion of the "depth" of the V Corps staff when Operation VICTORY HAWK began, see Interv. Capt. Donald Hamilton with Lt. Col. Michael J. Clidas, Chief, ACofS, G-3 (Plans), V Corps, 4 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania.

²⁰ Leon interview.

²¹ For details on the sequence of plans leading to the Albanian deployment, see Clidas interview.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Msg, Cdr V Corps for multiple addressees, 2241950Z Mar 1999, sub: Hawk WARNO 1 to 99-03-D1 (Operation VICTORY HAWK) ordered planning for a force to be deployed to Macedonia. Msg, CG USAREUR for multiple addressees, 262200Z Mar 1999, sub: Warning Order 001 (TF Hawk Deployment), directed V Corps to form, train, and be ready to dispatch the task force to the Balkans. Msg, USEUCOM to CJCS, 262235Z Mar 1999, sub: Request for JCS Assistance in Coordinating Army Attack, was the formal USEUCOM request to employ forces it had already directed the USAREUR commander to prepare.

²⁵ Details on defining the Task Force Hawk mission and rules of engagement are drawn from [USAREUR ODCSOPS, Operations, Plans and Training Analysis Branch], Operation VICTORY HAWK After Action Report, 28 Jun 2000, which has also been used for general background throughout this chapter. Refer to the following messages and orders for additional details: Msg, CJCS for USAREUR et al., 260136Z Mar 1999, DEPORD of Hunter UAV; USAREUR Warning Order 001, Task Force Hawk Deployment, 262200Z Mar 1999;

USEUCOM Warning Order 001, TF Hawk Deployment, 281835Z Mar 1999; USEUCOM Alert Order 1, TF Hawk Deployment, 040001Z Apr 1999; CJCS Alert Order, Mod 1, ALLIED FORCE 10601, 042145Z Apr 1999; USAREUR Deployment Order, TF Hawk Deployment, 4 Apr 1999, with FRAGO 1, 4 Apr 1999.

²⁶ Generic instructions were in CJCS Instruction 3121.01 (1 Oct 1994) with Change 1 (22 Dec 1994), JCS Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). For V Corps requests for more specific ROE, see Msg, Cdr, V Corps for JJTF Noble Anvil, 092000Z Apr 1999, sub: Request for Changes and Supplements to ROE Guidance and V Corps Briefing, TF Hawk Rules of Engagement Assessment, 9 Apr 1999.

²⁷ The staff routinely used the verbal shorthand of "red," "amber," and "green" to denote actions that were not ready, in process, and completed, respectively. Further details on the Task Force Hawk planning and deployment process have been drawn from USAREUR MFRs, V Corps Planning for Task Force Hawk, 6 April 1999 through 21 May 1999, which summarized the key points in daily discussions among General Hendrix and key members of the USAREUR staff.

²⁸ Twelve other nations or international groups were operating helicopters from Rinas Airport: military helicopter units from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, and the United Arab Emirates; and commercially provided helicopters from the International Red Cross, the World Food Program, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). On the humanitarian relief operation, see CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40414, DESIGNATED HARBOUR, Humanitarian Assistance in Albania, 6 Apr 1999.

²⁹ CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40414, 6 Apr 1999.

³⁰ USAREUR OPLAN 4256-B, 22 Apr 1999, Operation VICTORY HAWK, was derived from the earlier USAREUR OPLAN 4256, Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, for Task Force Falcon.

³¹ ACofS, G-3 Briefing, Task Force Hawk, February 1999; further developed in V Corps Briefing, Task Force Victory Hawk Operational Concept Brief, General Shelton, 12 Apr 1999.

³² V (US) Corps Operation VICTORY HAWK Concept Brief, 241630 Mar 1999.

³³ USAREUR MFR, 6 Apr 1999, sub: V Corps Planning for Task Force Hawk.

³⁴ Within V Corps the unit was referred to as a regiment, although it was actually an aviation group according to the authorization documents current at the Department of the Army. For clarity, and particularly because internal V Corps and aviation unit records and reports used that designation, I have retained the use of the designation "regiment" throughout this discussion.

³⁵ MFR, V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Plans), 2 Apr 1999, sub: Trip report for V Corps Site Reconnaissance, Tirana-Rinas, Albania Airfield.

³⁶ Comments and notes provided by Lt. Col. Daniel E. Williams, S-3 of 2d Squadron, 6th Cavalry, during Operation VICTORY HAWK.

³⁷ Msg, USCINCEUR for multiple addressees, 121230Z Apr 1999, sub: Unit Sourcing Request for TF Hawk ISO ALLIED FORCE. The message detailed the requirement to increase Task Force Hawk to 5,500 soldiers, including a light infantry battalion task force.

³⁸ Except as otherwise cited, this discussion is based upon: V Corps ACofS, G-3, Operation Victory Thunder Concept Brief, 29 Mar 1999; HQ, 1st Armored Division Warning Order 99-71 (Victory Thunder), 292300 Mar 1999; E-mail Msg, Maj. Michael Scully to 1st Armored Division G-3, 15 Apr 1999, sub: USAREUR Draft WARNO, with attached draft warning order; HQ, V Corps Warning Order 152100Z Apr 1999, sub: Warning Order for Task Force Thunder; USAREUR WARNORD Task Force Thunder, 15 Apr 1999; and Msg, USMISSION USNATO to SecState, 190457Z Apr 1999, sub: Deployment of Task Force Thunder.

³⁹ E-mail Msg, Scully to 1st AD G-3, 15 Apr 1999, sub: USAREUR Draft WARNO; V Corps ACofS, G-3, Operation Victory Thunder Concept Brief, 29 Mar 1999.

⁴⁰ V Corps Warning Order 152100Z Apr 1999, sub: Warning Order for Task Force Thunder.

⁴¹ Discussion of Task Force Thunder is drawn from Hendrix interview; Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Maj. Gen. Julian Burns, Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 14 Jun 1999, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany; Leon interview; Brandenburg interview; Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Lt. Col. Michael J. Clidas, G-3 (Plans) V Corps, 4 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania; V Corps Daily Command Briefing Files, March 1999.

⁴² USAREUR Operation Victory Hawk AAR; Hendrix interview; Leon interview.

⁴³ Super Torch was the name for the team that preceded the larger Torch party. It landed at Tirana-Rinas on 6 April 1999.

⁴⁴ Burns interview.

⁴⁵ The Italian government evidently subsequently withdrew that permission, for further negotiations became necessary before the Apaches could take off, at a further cost in time.

⁴⁶ The V Corps headquarters element began deploying 6 April 1999. See V Corps Special Troops Battalion, OPOD 99-11, 290945 Mar 1999; V Corps Special Troops Battalion FRAGO 001 to STB, V Corps OPOD 99-11, 071945 Apr 1999; and V Corps Special Troops Battalion, Orders 99-0001, 9 Apr 1999.

⁴⁷ Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Lt. Col. James Embrey, Commander, 1-6 Infantry, 22 Sep 2000, Baumholder, Germany.

⁴⁸ Various interviews discuss the trafficability problem, but particularly see Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Sgt. Maj. Alejandro Branch, V Corps ACofS, G-3, and Task Force Hawk, 8 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania.

⁴⁹ End of Tour Interv, author with Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix, Commanding General, V Corps, 2 Nov 1999, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

⁵⁰ Notes and comments by Lt. Col. Daniel E. Williams, S-3 of 2-6 Cavalry during Operation VICTORY HAWK, in e-mail msg., Williams to author, 25 Sep 2001.

⁵¹ For background on the use of commercial power generators, see Interv, author with Lt. Col. Gary Heuser, Commander, Special Troops Battalion, Headquarters, V Corps, 2 Jul 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁵² This section is based principally on the Leon and Branch interviews and on Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Maj. William W. Nase, HRMO, V Corps ACSRM, 3 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania.

⁵³ Torch and Super Torch composition: Col. Robert M. Leon, Jr., DCS/OIC; Lt. Col. Alan Moloff, CO 312 MASH; Maj. William W. Nase, ACSRM; Maj. Daniel M. Rosso, contractor; Maj. William H. McQuail, finance officer; Maj. Richard Manganello, SPO; Cpt. Michael J. Zatlukal, engineer; Sgt. Maj. Mark Vargas, SGM/NCOIC force protection; SFC Ronald Caldwell, COSCOM fuels NCO; Sgt. Mathew Sluss-Tiller, communications NCO; Mr. Steve Sagehorn, Brown and Root representative; and Mr. Dale D. Vandagriff, real estate engineer.

⁵⁴ Leon interview.

⁵⁵ That the 1-6 Infantry arrived without tents was not a matter of oversight but a calculated decision based on the need to prioritize items for air movement. Only ten air missions were allocated to move the infantry task force, and the battalion and brigade staffs went over the equipment lists again and again before deployment to decrease the size of the loads. See Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Col. Volney James Warner, Commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 26 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania.

⁵⁶ V (US) Corps Operation Plan (OPLAN) 99-03-D1 (Operation VICTORY HAWK), 271500Z Mar 99.

⁵⁷ Warner interview.

⁵⁸ Ibid.; Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Lt. Col. Joe Anderson, Commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, 25 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania.

⁵⁹ Anderson e-mail, 20 Feb 2001.

⁶⁰ As cited in [Center for Army Lessons Learned], TF Hawk CAAT Initial Impressions Report (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 2000).

⁶¹ Ibid.

Hawk and Falcon Operations

"TF Hawk is not the kind of force that you really want to move into close contact. . . . We just didn't come in here big enough to get too stupid or brave by trying to get right up on the border."

Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix
Commanding General, V Corps
and Task Force Hawk
6 May 1999

With Task Force Hawk in place and the base camp facilities either built or on their way to construction, attention turned to operations. The distance from Tirana to the border with Kosovo, combined with rugged terrain, imposed serious constraints on attack helicopter operations. The deep operations coordination cell and the aviation task force staffs began to deal with those tactical issues. Meanwhile, the corps staff, both in Albania and in Germany, remained busy and focused on two related but different missions: the deep strike task force in the Balkans and the peace enforcement task force waiting to implement the NATO plan for Kosovo. Thus, while Task Force Hawk worked out the operational techniques that would yield the best results, Task Force Falcon continued to train and waited in the wings in Germany, ready to move into Kosovo when the allied air campaign brought results.

Security and Force Projection

Aside from the general state of anarchy in Albania, where numerous, often criminal, groups vied with a weak government for control, there was the dangerous complication that many Albanians routinely went about armed. As a consequence, the general security situation for Task Force Hawk was not particularly encouraging. Various foreign intelligence services maintained active operations in Albania, and some acknowledged terrorist groups also operated bases there. In fact, the Iranian Republican Guard Corps had a well developed and secure terrorist training camp not far from Tirana. The geography of the

area and the absence of organized Albanian national security forces made it easy for anyone to keep the base camp under continuous covert observation, and the G-2 had no doubt that Task Force Hawk was the target of many intelligence-gathering operations. Military security was similarly tenuous. The border with Kosovo lay to the east-northeast, and Montenegro, where part of the Yugoslav Army was based, was to the northwest. Between Montenegro and Tirana was a direct, low ground avenue of approach where was found the only supporting road network of any consequence in that part of the country. Any ground attack from Montenegro could easily be supported by the MiG-29s and Super Galebs that the Yugoslav air force based at Podgorica.¹ Rinas airfield was outside the range of Serb artillery, either in Kosovo or in Montenegro, but the Soviet-designed "Flat Face" radar located at Podgorica could acquire the Apache helicopters as soon as they were launched from Tirana, either alerting Serb air defense forces in Kosovo or, in the worst case, dispatching interceptors from Podgorica, only ten minutes' flying time from Tirana.²

The border with Kosovo was porous and controlled by the Yugoslav Army, which could cross into Albania at will. General Hendrix assumed that Serb special forces operated throughout Albania and that such units probably kept Tirana under direct and continuous observation. The potential for direct and indirect artillery, rocket, and mortar fire on the base was obvious. A new aspect of the security problem was that, although FM radios did not operate well in the mountainous terrain, cell phones could easily link Serb reconnaissance elements in Kosovo with larger military forces elsewhere. Yugoslav Army units routinely operated across the Kosovo-Albanian border and, while not a threat to Tirana, were a potential menace to forward-based artillery units that would fire in direct support of Apache cross-border missions, thus creating the requirement for a substantial infantry security force to be sent with the artillery whenever it moved.

The primary force protection requirement at Tirana was creating a perimeter for basic security and then maintaining regular reconnaissance patrols outside that perimeter and as far as the high ground around the airport. The 2-505 Infantry and 1-6 Infantry assumed those tasks. From Hendrix's point of view, something also had to be done about the avenue of approach into Tirana from Montenegro, not to mention air defense against the aircraft based at Podgorica, since it was only prudent to anticipate some sort of Serb military response if attack helicopter operations commenced. Thus he ordered deployment of an Abrams tank company and a number of Bradley fighting vehicles to establish blocking positions along the road leading north and brought in as much air defense as possible—a battery (minus) of Avengers from the 1st Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery, and Bradley-Stinger teams, all linked to the Air Force combined air operations center. He also assured himself that the Air Force maintained a combat air patrol over Tirana. Taken together, those measures gave the task force the ability to respond rapidly to any air or ground threat that might develop on the northern ground avenue of approach, espe-

cially after task force engineers laid countermobility plans to exploit natural choke points along the route between Montenegro and Tirana.

In the earliest days of the planning, Hendrix had asked for help from U.S. Army Special Forces to facilitate operations, and to satisfy that requirement, the 10th Special Forces Group assigned to the task force teams amounting to roughly company strength.³ Launching operations at such distances from the border, the task force needed reconnaissance to tell it what the Serb special operations forces were doing in the mountain passes. Ideally, Task Force Hawk needed to know where those forces were located and how they could communicate to alert Serb units inside Kosovo that the U.S. task force was in motion. The Special Forces could also scout locations for forward operating bases and forward area refuel and rearm points in the mountains and recon the roads to determine whether they would support movement forward with tracked vehicles such as the M109 howitzers and rocket artillery, so that the task force could fire from positions closer to the border and thereby extend suppression of enemy air defense coverage further into Kosovo to protect the aviators. Hendrix believed that the Special Forces were also the right organization to investigate the refugee populations in the area, in which he assumed Serb military observers were embedded. The Serbs were not the only concern, however, and another part of the Special Forces mission was determining what the Kosovo Liberation Army, most of which was staged from Albania and all of which was unpredictable, was doing.

As time went on, operational difficulties arose that limited task force capabilities somewhat. In practical terms, moving Task Force Hawk closer to the border was never an option because it was not a ground combat force but a specially structured force intended to project attack helicopters supported by rocket artillery fire. It was not, as Hendrix later remarked, "the kind of force that you really want to move into close contact."⁴ The original plan called for Hawk to move rocket artillery, which had a high volume of fire, to temporary fire bases close to the border to launch anti-air defense missions deep into Kosovo in support of helicopter attacks. The road network was so poor, however, that a massive amount of engineering work would have had to be done to allow the movement of the large tracked vehicles so far forward, and the time and resources were not available to do that. The fallback plan was to fire those missions with longer-ranged Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles from areas closer to Tirana, a plan that Hendrix never liked but into which he was forced because of the lack of any alternative.

Combat related considerations aside, there was simply no area closer to the border that could have served as a base, so that moving Task Force Hawk was never a possibility. As time went on, successive reconnaissance missions did find forward artillery bases that could be supported with less engineering work to repair the roads. That coincided with the availability of construction engineers, who by then had improved the route from Durrës to Tirana and done extensive work to improve the base camp. As a side benefit, the road repairs also aided the humanitarian assistance operations in Albania. Once the forward

operating bases were found, the Albanian government gave permission to U.S. forces to use them, including a base at Shkodër near Kukës.

Periodically, Hendrix exercised his forces, sending various units equipped with 105-mm. howitzers for artillery raids forward to various points along the border. Not only did such missions train the forces and familiarize them with the operational area, but they also kept the Serb forces⁵ along the border destabilized and uncertain when or where attacks might come, or of what sort. Hendrix thought such missions were essential, because Task Force Hawk was "such a precarious type of operation" that the Army had never tried before. Echoing General Cody's thoughts about the nondoctrinal nature of the mission, Hendrix noted that "we just didn't come in here big enough to get too stupid or brave by trying to get right up on the border," adding that

We do have a deep operations doctrine, but the fact is that deep operations doctrine is generally in support of a force laid down along a forward line of own troops in contact, so that you have other options for diversion and support. Here, we have a very small Apache force located one hundred kilometers from the border. It has to project about 150 kilometers or so, at least, to be effective at all. And it is not supported by this line of ground troops. And it has to fly through these difficult mountains. So, it's precarious. We haven't done this before at these distances and in a sustained way.⁶

Not a Doctrinal Mission

On 9 April Brig. Gen. Richard Cody, an officer with extensive experience in attack aviation and special operations and at that time assistant division commander in the 4th Infantry Division, arrived in Heidelberg to confer with Generals Hendrix and Meigs about using helicopter units in deep strike missions. Cody had led the 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation, an Apache unit, in Operation DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991 and then had commanded a special operations squadron for two years. After commanding a brigade in the 1st Cavalry Division, he had commanded the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Regarded as particularly knowledgeable about attack aviation, Cody was in a position to offer cogent advice about the tactical situation in Albania. After their meeting, Hendrix decided he wanted Cody to be his deputy commanding general for air and special operations in Task Force Hawk, an assignment that had already been authorized by the Department of the Army.⁷

On 10 April, following his initial discussions with the corps commander, Cody went to Illesheim, home station of the 11th Aviation Regiment, to discuss the forthcoming mission with Col. Oliver Hunter and his two squadron commanders. Cody reviewed the squadrons' training and maintenance status and began discussions about aviation command and control and the tactics, techniques, and procedures the task force might use in Kosovo. An immediate consequence of the review was a training program to qualify all of the co-pilot/gunners in the use of night-vision goggles. Considering the distances involved, additional fuel was obviously necessary, so plans were made to use an externally

mounted 230-gallon fuel tank on one of the aircraft pylons. That discussion led naturally to what ordnance would be carried on the balance of the pylon space. Cody believed that the cavalymen would have to perform a lot of their own air defense suppression, and he took immediate steps to acquire the Mark 66 Flechette rocket and train the crews to use it.⁸ Cody had done a terrain analysis that convinced him the aircraft would never obtain responsive air defense suppression from the multiple launch rocket systems based in Albania, even when firing the longer-ranged Army Tactical Missile System rockets, given the terrain and nature of the enemy. With those concerns in mind, Cody met with the pilots in the two squadrons and generally discussed deep attack raids with them.⁹

Cody's particular attention to how helicopters should be employed in Kosovo arose from the fact that Task Force Hawk was not going to be carrying out its mission in accordance with established doctrine. Doctrinally, a corps attack helicopter brigade was used against the enemy's second echelon motorized rifle regiments, combat armored reserves, and other combat elements deep behind the forward edge of the battle area on which the divisions of the corps were engaged.¹⁰ The mission into Kosovo contemplated deep raids, rather than deep strikes, and Cody noted that the targets were "deep" only when considering the distance the aircraft had to fly from the base to the border between Kosovo and Albania. The other key issue was that the Apaches would not be attacking maneuvering battalions or artillery, but single armored vehicles that could be expected to be well hidden and camouflaged from the high altitude bombing campaign that had been going on during the preceding forty days. Thus the aviators had to carefully reconsider both the targeting process and their usual tactical procedures.

At a lower level, a number of the aviators in the two cavalry squadrons were far less troubled by the fact that the mission was "nondoctrinal," some of them pointing out that the Persian Gulf War experience on which Cody based many of his observations about Apache operations had also involved missions that had been contrary to established doctrine. Maj. Dan Williams, operations officer of the 2d Squadron, 6th Cavalry, later said that he and other pilots simply regarded the whole operation as a matter of "thinking asymmetrically" and tailoring unit capabilities to unique mission requirements.¹¹

After meeting with the 11th Aviation Regiment, Cody traveled to Giebelstadt for similar discussions with Col. Jeff Schloesser and the leaders of the 12th Aviation Brigade. The 12th Aviation Brigade provided general support for the attack squadrons and configured a task force of 59 aircraft and 225 soldiers from the brigade headquarters; the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation; the 159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance); the 3d Battalion, 58th Aviation (Air Traffic Service); and Company E, 51st Infantry (Long Range Surveillance). Following discussions about training, maintenance, and readiness, Cody and Schloesser focused on the issue of downed aviator recovery teams, which Cody envisioned as one of the brigade's principal missions. Cody believed the task force needed its own recovery capability, since the Air Force and Special Operations Command missions for combat search and rescue would be a limited and finite re-

source. After considering the terrain, Cody and Hendrix agreed that the task force needed its own rapid capability to pick up downed aircrews on either side of the border and to recover downed aircraft.

After further discussions with the corps commander, from which he understood that General Clark wanted an initial operational capability in Albania about 27 April, Cody began considering a battle rhythm for the two aviation task forces and the deep operations coordination cell that would allow intelligence collection for targeting and the subsequent building of combat orders in such a cycle that the squadrons could operate every night. Planning backward from the firing of a Hellfire missile at a target, Cody and the two aviation commanders worked through all the required actions to fly the mission, including coordination with the Combined Air Operations Center to place the mission on the Air Force's air tasking order, coordination with artillery for suppression of enemy air defense fires, and coordination with the Air Force for both lethal and nonlethal joint suppression of enemy air defenses. That done, he consulted with Hendrix about mission rehearsal exercises to allow the aviators to be operational in Kosovo by the end of April.

The aviators devised three basic mission scenarios before they left Illesheim. Putting those in the hands of the units as a framework for possible operations, the task force could move immediately into squadron and troop rehearsals. While still in Germany, aviation planners selected route and air control points, as well as potential engagement areas in Kosovo that were synchronized with the Air Force templated target boxes.¹² Thus the critical part of the planning was already done before the aviators deployed. Much of that work was completed while the task force headquarters was arriving in Albania and setting up the communications linkages, living areas, and airfield.

Traditional Army mission analysis techniques¹³ really drove the mission rehearsal exercises, thus dictating the tactics selected for use. Task Force Hawk had neither operational security nor surprise working in its favor. The Apache crews of Task Force 11 expected to have to fly sixty to seventy kilometers, knowing that the only border it could cross was the Albanian-Kosovo border and knowing that the enemy also knew that. The Serb forces were seasoned, fighting on their own terrain, and well equipped with proven anti-aircraft missiles of Soviet design. The anti-aircraft threat included the SA-7B, a shoulder-fired missile with a range of just under four kilometers; the SA-18, a shoulder-fired dual optic tracking missile; and the SA-6 "Straight Flush" radar and missile system—all very capable against helicopters. The other consideration was that the task force only had twenty-four Apaches available, so much finesse in employment of aircraft in diversionary missions was really not feasible. It was clear that the Serbs could not be surprised in terms of where the attacks would enter Kosovo, since they already knew the Task Force Hawk operating base—it had been reported by the news media—and the routes in and out of Albania. Obviously, Serb air defense forces understood key terrain features and likely air avenues of approach. Consequently, the task force devised tactics that sought an advantage by not being predictable and by exploiting the fruits that were available to the

aviators of the considerable American intelligence collection apparatus to give the pilots a clear picture of Serb actions and reactions, as well as of their defensive systems' reaction times.

Second, the task force considered how to use the rugged terrain, including mountain ranges with sheer ridgelines reaching as high as 8,000 feet, to best advantage. Climate played a role as well, since the cloud ceiling often blocked key mountain passes. Thus, early planning laid out a flexible series of routes by which aircraft could enter Kosovo so as to avoid the problems of terrain, weather, and the reported emplacement of Serb air defenses. The task force established its flying minimums as 2 miles of visibility and a 1,000-foot ceiling. The lack of a campaign plan complicated the aviators' mission planning process. In order to have "something logical we could put our hands on, rather than hopping from end to end along the FLOT [forward line, own troops]," as one cavalry planner phrased it, the squadrons agreed that 2-6 Cavalry should develop a plan for operations via the Pristina Valley, while 6-6 Cavalry should focus on the terrain to the west. Route selection was also profoundly affected by aircraft weight and the height of the terrain. The Apaches were at or over their maximum gross weight for any mission flown from Tirana, which presented risks that became only too clear after the two crashes the task force suffered, and the squadrons were literally managing weight down to individual rockets and individual 30-mm. ammunition rounds.¹⁴

Cody believed the task force should anticipate that the Serb forces had adequate intelligence on the Albanian side of the border to be able to know when aircraft took off from Tirana-Rinas. In compensation, the mission rehearsal exercises practiced deception operations that were intended to confuse the Serb defenders about the border crossing points, mission composition and size, and route timings. Each mission rehearsal exercise that the task force flew in Albania added to the flyers' understanding of Serb capabilities, as intelligence resources gauged the Serb response. In practical terms, the exercises trained the aviators to use the hazardous terrain to best advantage and to use an execution checklist in a disciplined way to meet the air control points and cross the border at exact times and perfectly in synchronization with artillery strikes.

Considering the existing tactical situation, the squadrons concluded that smaller formations of Apaches would be better than battalion-size formations for the mission into Kosovo, given the Serb radar capabilities. The concept was to use a squadron of Apaches, two troops with four to six Apaches in each troop, attacking along multiple routes across the border. The squadron was supported by a "three pack" of UH-60 helicopters under the command of Task Force 12, flying in a restricted operating zone on the Albanian side of the border. The "three pack" consisted of a command and control aircraft, a medical evacuation helicopter, and a UH-60 carrying a six-man infantry security team from Company E, 51st Infantry (Long Range Surveillance), and equipped with a Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System. The supporting team was to rescue aircrew and secure downed aircraft, and was itself supported by a CH-47 helicopter with a recovery team, security team, and maintenance team. Another UH-60

command and control helicopter assumed squadron control of all the supporting aircraft. The mission rehearsal exercises practiced such recoveries. Because of the distances involved and the fuel capacity of the Apaches, Task Force 12 reconfigured some of its CH-47 helicopters as "Fat Cows" to serve as mobile forward area arming and refueling points.

The Apache employment envisioned for Task Force Hawk was certainly not doctrinal in the sense that there were no ground maneuver forces with which the attack aircraft could synchronize their operations, but operations did continue to focus at the tactical level of war. Doctrinally, the corps fought enemy field army forces, taking war to the tactical level, rather than targeting lines of communication, industrial bases, and the like. Task Force Hawk had that specific mission in Albania. The NATO air forces carried out the strategic end of the bombardment and also attacked discrete point targets such as individual armored vehicles. Apaches and Army tactical missiles, backed up by a capable deep operations coordination cell and airspace coordination element, added another dimension to the air battle by offering the threat of an attack near the ground and at the tactical level.

External evidence showed that the Serbs were certainly worried about helicopter attacks, since they had been observed accidentally shooting down some of their own rotary-wing aircraft. Intelligence reports also verified that the Serbs had pushed many of their air defense units up to the Albanian border, which obviously helped the NATO air forces, if Task Force Hawk did nothing else. The key point was that adding the Apache helicopters to the equation divided Serb attention and forced Serb commanders to worry about more than a single dimensional threat—not just high altitude bombing, but also, potentially, low-level attack.

The DOCC: An Ad Hoc Command Post

The Deep Operations Coordination Cell, or "DOCC," was an ad hoc organization that V Corps, like other corps across the Army, created to manage deep operations in the heavy force battle. The DOCC had proven to be effective in short duration exercises such as the Battle Command Training Program Warfighter and various other command post exercises. There was, however, no Army doctrine for such an organization at division or corps level, and V Corps lacked the personnel to staff the DOCC for extended, around-the-clock operations. In effect, the DOCC attempted to replicate those functions of the Corps Main command post that had to do with deep fires and deep battle, while incorporating the battle management processes that the V Corps Artillery had long since devised to coordinate artillery and aviation deep attacks.

Inasmuch as it was not a function contemplated when the corps table of organization and equipment was last revised, however, the DOCC lacked adequate communications equipment to accomplish its varied missions, not to mention adequate personnel. As the Task Force Hawk mission continued, the tasks assigned to the DOCC also expanded far beyond its capabilities, a prob-

lem exacerbated by the fact that members of its staff also had to be detailed for other tasks, reducing personnel availability for the DOCC and thereby diminishing its capability for sustained operations. One of the lessons the corps drew from Task Force Hawk was the need to develop a standardized corps authorization document that included DOCC personnel and equipment, especially long-range communications equipment. For targeting, a principal function of the DOCC, it was certain that target acquisition equipment and units needed to be assigned to the corps, especially unmanned aerial vehicles and the target acquisition battery for corps artillery.¹⁵

In practical terms, Task Force Hawk simply assembled various existing pieces of the Corps main command post in Albania in a different way to form the DOCC. The main elements were the deep operations cell in a set of five-ton expando vans and the air liaison vans. The vans were placed close together and connected by a ramp, keeping the electronic equipment out of the mud. Within the DOCC, secure and nonsecure local area computer networks connected the staff with units in Albania and with headquarters in Germany and in the United States. Associated with the DOCC was the corps intelligence-gathering apparatus, built around Company A, 302d Military Intelligence Battalion. A very large structure, the intelligence shop focused on targeting information gathered from every possible source, including signal intelligence, electronic imagery, data provided by national intelligence means, human intelligence, and information from the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle task force based in Macedonia. Later, the intelligence picture was enhanced through data gathered by the AN/TSQ-36 radars belonging to Task Force Hawk.

While the DOCC and intelligence organization provided the basic information needed to launch and recover aircraft and direct them in their attack missions, a more traditional command post turned out to be needed as well to manage the administrative and logistical requirements of the task force. The task force expanded the G-3 operation to serve those needs, providing command and control to all of the forces located in and operating from the base camp at Tirana-Rinas. In the process, it found that more FM radios than previously anticipated were required to establish a command radio net, an admin-log net, and a force protection net. The various radio nets channeled information to the G-3 to provide early warning for battle drills, air strikes, and incoming artillery or mortar fire; to synchronize reconnaissance outside the perimeter wire; to publish plans and orders; and to work the campaign plan development. In fact, it became necessary to include in the task force a number of staff elements normally found in the corps rear command post, so the set-up used by Task Force Hawk was anything but a familiar one.¹⁶

The key to DOCC operations was developing a battle rhythm that suited the pace of operations and delivered orders and information to the aviation task forces in adequate time for the aviators to develop their mission plans and launch aircraft when ordered. The experience of using the DOCC in earlier corps exercises helped to work out that battle rhythm and a supplementary process of synchronizing operations. The first element was the mission support briefing

at 0800 daily, roughly a one-hour-long briefing known in exercises as the battle update briefing. It focused on synchronization of the commanders and battle-field operating systems to resolve base camp issues that included logistical sustainment, security, quality of life, and the policies and procedures necessary to operate the camp efficiently. Almost immediately, General Hendrix decided to incorporate the V Corps staff in Heidelberg into the morning briefing via videoconference, so that General Burns could better direct the staff to support the deployed task force. For information purposes, the 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division, Task Force Sabre in Macedonia, and all local stations within the Task Force Hawk net were included in the briefing as well.

Following the mission support briefing, a command-group-only session followed to review discussion points for the next briefing, the secure videoconference with SACEUR, chaired by General Wesley Clark at 0945 each morning. Admiral James Ellis, the JTF Noble Anvil commander, was also a party to that conference, as were Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, the director of the Combined Air Operations Center and air component commander for the mission; General Meigs; and General John P. Jumper, the commanding general of U.S. Air Forces in Europe. The other party to that briefing was Admiral Steve Abbot, Clark's deputy in Stuttgart. In that meeting, Hendrix routinely briefed Clark on the task force's readiness to conduct operations. The current air attack plan was briefed by the Combined Air Operations Center staff and, based on input from the commanders, Clark decided whether or not to deliver attacks on the targets that were nominated as part of the NATO master plan.

Following the secure videoconference, normally at about 1100 daily, Hendrix issued guidance to his staff, which then developed the necessary plans and orders until the daily 1400 target board briefing, in which the task force looked out some twenty-four to seventy-two hours and scheduled its various air and ground tactical operations, both projected deep operations and operations within Albania. During that briefing, Colonel Warner, commanding the 2d Brigade, briefed Hendrix on security matters and integration of security with deep attacks. Movement and use of artillery to support the aviation missions was naturally an integral part of the discussion as well. In effect, the target board briefing was really a tactical situation update, the logical counterpart to the 0800 situational update that was more logistical in nature. Much of the staff was present at those briefings, though the principal participant was the DOCC, which was run by Col. Daniel Hahn, the V Corps Artillery commander.

Concurrently, the task force chief of staff held a meeting for the task force primary and special staff to review the questions that had arisen in the course of the day and to synchronize the entire staff in support of the aviation mission. In parallel with the target board briefing, the base camp commander ran an early afternoon meeting three days a week that representatives of every unit attended. That was the "housekeeping" meeting, in which discussion centered around the practical administrative and logistical side of the base camp operations. Shower points, fuel points, dining facilities, construction priorities, traffic control, and other internal base camp issues were the meat of those discussions.

Similarly, the commander of the 7th Corps Support Group held a meeting at about the same time three days a week to settle matters pertaining to aviation maintenance and maintenance of ground equipment, as well as resolving related administrative and logistical questions that arose from those discussions. The key purpose of that meeting was to keep the sustainment structure working properly. Finally, roughly three days a week at 1600, Cody and Odierno held a meeting for colonel-level commanders, simply as an opportunity to discuss the matters in which the commanding general was interested and to synchronize their collective efforts.

With the decisions made about the missions to be undertaken, the focus shifted to the individual battalion command posts for detailed tactical planning. The 1-27 Field Artillery command post superintended artillery planning, while the 2d Brigade Combat Team command post, working with the two infantry battalion staffs, worked out the necessary security and support arrangements to cover artillery movements. Similarly, TF 12 and its subordinate units and TF 11 and its two cavalry squadrons handled the details of the air mission planning. The aviators, in particular, suggested that the DOCC tended to eat too deeply into squadron planning time in the early days of the mission, but within a couple of weeks a battle rhythm developed that worked to the satisfaction of both echelons of command.¹⁷

Attached to the daily battle rhythm were several other important events. One was the "rock drill," or mission rehearsal, led by the G-3 to synchronize the attack helicopter squadron and its supporting TF 12 aircraft with the mission support for deep attacks. Key participants were the pilots who commanded lead aircraft and commanders of the artillery, special operations, combat search and rescue teams, and downed aviator recovery teams. The briefing deliberately went through the sequence of events for each plan, completing the discussion eight and a half hours before the proposed incursion into Kosovo airspace. For each operation, aviators could fly the mission in real time on a mission simulator known as TOP SCENE, which allowed the pilots to see in digital form the terrain over which they would fly. Then, three hours before the mission was to be launched, the staff held a go/no-go decision briefing. Missions normally launched at about H-1 to allow for the forty-minute flight time to the border. Frequently, General Hendrix boarded a command and control aircraft to observe the mission rehearsal. After the mission was over, the task force conducted a thorough after action review, bringing the pilots together with the staff and commanders to discuss the results of the mission just flown and how the operation could be improved, reviewing aircraft gun tapes.¹⁸

Mission Rehearsals for the DOCC and Aviators

While still in Germany, the V Corps operations staff formulated plans for mission rehearsal exercises in Albania. The original concept was fairly simple and focused directly on the aviation mission. It called for three mission rehearsals per squadron, the last one including a live fire, though the exercise program

soon expanded dramatically. The intention was quickly to certify to USAREUR that each squadron was mission ready. In the mission rehearsal exercise, the aircraft flew forward along routes they actually intended to use, halting somewhere short of the border with Kosovo and then returning to base. Part of the exercise, as originally conceived, was to include live fire exercises of suppression of enemy air defenses by the Army Tactical Missile System. That process in fact began as planned, though the task force never obtained clearance for the live fire phase. At the beginning of the deployment, the task force ran one mission rehearsal exercise every evening, though the pace then slowed to one every three days to sustain mission capability. Live fires, however, were restricted to 105-mm. howitzers, conducted in the course of a simulated air assault at an old Albanian Army training area.¹⁹

While the aviation exercises went on, however, the task force significantly broadened the scope of the rehearsal to involve the deep operations coordination cell, the airspace coordination element, the balance of the corps staff, the air liaison officer, and the two aviation task force staffs to synchronize parallel planning seventy-two to ninety-two hours prior to launch of a mission. Operations of the DOCC had for some time been part of the Warfighter exercises V Corps conducted in Germany, and everyone was familiar with how the cell operated. Suiting DOCC operations to the tactical situation in Albania required some adjustments, however, and the transition from the world of exercises to the world of operations was not entirely seamless.

One aspect of the problem was that the tempo of operations in the air war was nothing like the operational tempo to which the staff had been accustomed in exercises, and the requirement to do detailed staff work right down to aviation company level imposed a much more demanding battle rhythm than was typical of a Warfighter exercise. Some things, including enforcing a sleep plan for the staffs so that continuous operations could be sustained, simply had to be re-learned in Albania.²⁰

Early target selection based in part on information from the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle surveillance aircraft launched from Skopje allowed the DOCC to plan an operation and coordinate it with the combined air operations center in Naples. Simultaneously, TF 11 and TF 12 and the 1-27 Field Artillery used that information for direct strike planning. Such a staff organization was capable of planning many missions, but Cody, in particular, was concerned to avoid exhausting battle staffs that could plan more missions than the units could execute.

An important product of the rehearsals was a mission execution checklist that the DOCC used to synchronize all the mission elements, ranging from intelligence sensors to the composition of the strike package and its supporting aircraft and artillery. As the series of mission rehearsal exercises continued, the task force refined the process of fighting one battle while, at the same time, planning for the execution of the two or three succeeding operations. A number of important lessons emerged from the process, including how the DOCC should be configured and the best interface with the Air Force Air-

space Control Element and its intelligence inputs, including overhead imagery, to provide the best possible targeting board data. Major issues that the rehearsals addressed were familiarization of the pilots with the terrain, integration of the rocket and 105-mm. artillery batteries firing air defense suppression, and development of the ability to generate targets in the G-2 and the DOCC. They also rigorously exercised translating the plans into actual route selection, engagement area selection, attacks by fire, positioning of the attack squadrons, positioning and operations of the TF 12 recovery aircraft, and other details of the mission.

The Task Force Artillery

Task Force Hawk had a lot of indirect fire weapons—everything from 60-mm. mortars through Army tactical missiles—providing General Hendrix with a broad range of fire support with which to accomplish the several missions he assigned to the artillery.²¹ The first was force protection, both at the airfield and for the Apache units when they delivered their attacks into Kosovo. The artillery and infantry at Tirana-Rinas developed a carefully thought-out counter-reconnaissance plan and perimeter defense plan to deal with any threat of ground attack on the base areas. The Task Force G-2 assessed such threats as unlikely, and the threats were probably limited to special operations forces or small unit infantry raids or terrorist strikes, mortar attacks, rocket-propelled grenade launches against parked aircraft, and the like, all most probably with the intention of influencing the American public to withdraw its support for the operation by killing a few American soldiers.

Daily aerial reconnaissance into the hillsides around Tirana-Rinas by infantry patrols and mounted scouts operating under artillery cover was supplemented by AN/TSQ-36 radar surveillance all around the airfield. The radar coverage was linked with the 105-mm. howitzers and the larger caliber Paladins for countermortar or counterbattery fire. Artillery also covered the quick reaction forces, which comprised one light infantry force that deployed by helicopter and one mounted infantry force, as well as an Apache helicopter quick reaction force. The principal problem with base defense was that the NATO rules of engagement then in effect did not address indirect artillery fire.

On 10 May, based on the results of Special Forces reconnaissance, Task Force Hawk established a forward operating base at Kukës. The 2-505 Airborne Infantry moved to the forward operating base as a security element, and on 12 May 9 rocket launchers, 3 Paladin 155-mm. guns, 2 Avenger air defense systems, and 4 M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles were readied to occupy the base. On 13 May supplies and equipment for 2-505 Airborne Infantry were sling-loaded into the forward base by cargo helicopters. Five days later positions were prepared for AN/TSQ-36 and AN/TSQ-37 counterbattery radars. Once having occupied the forward base, the task force began an orderly rotation of security forces on 24 May, with 2-505 Airborne Infantry and 1-6 Infantry sharing the mission.

With the forward operating base a going proposition, more intelligence information became available to the task force headquarters. On 30 May Task Force Hawk was able to report to the combined air operations center that the counterbattery radars at Kukës had acquired fifty-one Serb targets across the border. From Kukës, about 120 kilometers by road from Tirana or some 70 kilometers straight-line distance to the north, the artillery could range more deeply into Kosovo in support of Apache attacks. Basing that close to the border with Kosovo also gave the task force artillery more flexibility, because ordinary field artillery rockets, and not just the longer-range Army tactical missiles, could be fired and because the 155-mm. Paladin artillery could fire Charge 8 and rocket-assisted projectiles across the border from there. Thus all of the rocket artillery and the heavy conventional artillery could fire air defense suppression missions from the forward operating base, thereby allowing a far greater density of fire on any given target.

But setting up the forward base was no simple task. The engineer battalion commander conducted a detailed route reconnaissance along roads that he judged were "pretty awful" in the direction of Kukës. Based on the results of that recon, Colonel Warner directed 1-6 Infantry to develop a movement plan for the artillery to a forward operating base there. The battalion used the only four lowboy trailers in the task force to move the artillery to a tactical assembly area just east of Shkodër, where the rocket launchers were downloaded for a motor march to the base. Warner and Embrey, the 1-6 Infantry commander, considered the roads so bad, however, that they could only denote the march as a high-risk operation.

Embrey's concept of the operation was to use a military police platoon to reconnoiter the route extensively ahead of the main body. The launchers used fifteen turn-outs from the road to await the completed reconnaissance of each segment before driving forward to the next turn-out, where the process was repeated. The distance to the forward base was roughly a four-hour trip in a light tactical truck, but closer to a six-hour trip in convoy. Those times were really meaningless, because the march took essentially all day when moving the artillery with such anti-ambush precautions. Once in place, the forward operating base fell under command of the battalion commander of the 1-27 Field Artillery.²²

When the airborne contingent arrived from Fort Bragg, it brought with it a light artillery battery of towed 105-mm. howitzers, which were comparatively short-range weapons. The howitzers proved useful in helping to secure the base at Tirana and in providing fire support, if needed, for the regular American patrols into the surrounding hills that augmented base camp security by denying guerrilla forces the ability to station mortars and rockets there. Light artillery also gave the task force the additional combat power to launch aerial assaults along the border to the north, if required, or to conduct artillery raids. Finally, the battery of 105-mm. artillery, being light, could easily be moved by CH-47 helicopters, and therefore was perfectly suited for random artillery strikes, either planned or on call. The extreme mobility of that bat-

tery added to the task force's ability to defend the blocking positions along the northern corridor toward Montenegro, to defend the base camp, to defend the forward operating base, and to deliver accurate fires on any threatening concentrations of Serb forces anywhere along the border area once operations began.

Mission Creep

Planning for cross-border Apache attacks was a detailed and time-consuming process, but the Task Force Hawk staff was immediately distracted by other requirements as well. As early as 7 May, when the task force established a minimum mission planning capability, the phenomenon of "mission creep" began to intrude, and Hendrix's staff in Tirana, supported by that portion of the corps staff remaining in Heidelberg, began to plan for an astonishingly wide range of other possible tasks. Once intelligence began to signal the buildup of Serb forces around Podgorica airfield in Montenegro, where Serb ground maneuver units arrived to add to the existing air force threat, the staff began to wargame a series of possible operations into Montenegro to forestall any possible attack into Albania. A similar Serb force concentration in Kosovo, forward along the Albanian border, necessitated the development of plans for a deep attack to interdict and disrupt those forces. Ground combat along the Albanian-Kosovo border to suppress Serb air defenses also began to appear possible by the middle of April, when Task Force Hawk learned that Serb reconnaissance teams were operating as much as twenty-five kilometers inside Albania and that the Serb military was reinforcing its air defenses all along the frontier.

Local security requirements were among the first to expand. When NATO activated Operation ALLIED HARBOUR, the refugee relief operation that the United States supported with Joint Task Force Shining Hope in Tirana, a sprawl of governmental and nongovernmental organizations from many nations quickly centered their own operations on Tirana-Rinas, the only useful airfield in the region. The NATO operation had no security arrangements of any kind comparable to those usual for American deployments, and Task Force Hawk grudgingly expanded its security perimeter to give JTF Shining Hope adequate protection. The larger demand for physical security around the airfield created the requirement for more soldiers and more equipment than the original troop-to-task analysis for Task Force Hawk had anticipated.

Base development generated additional missions as well, and preparing and sustaining the Task Force Hawk base required V Corps to send more engineers to Albania than had originally been planned. Extensive work on the drainage system at Tirana-Rinas was an early project, as was construction of a road on the Task Force Hawk side of the airfield. Overland support originated in the port of Durrës, but the roads between Tirana and Durrës were in shockingly poor condition. As quickly as possible, the engineers therefore turned their attention to repairing and improving those highways upon which the task force relied.

Operations within the Deep Operations Coordination Cell also expanded when the Albanian Army asked for help with intelligence and targeting information along its border with Kosovo. Special Forces likewise needed intelligence support, including detailed information about the location and activities of the combatant forces of all the armies engaged on both sides of the border and throughout the area of operations. The task force accordingly took on the job of preparing and distributing the available information as required, focusing particularly on the location of Serb forces. One result of the intelligence operation was the implied requirement to target the Serb military and security forces for the NATO air strikes. In the latter stages of the air campaign, NATO asked Hendrix's staff to help locate targets for tactical air strikes, a process that Colonel Hahn found consumed a great deal of the DOCC's time.

Finally, the busy task force staff had to look to the future, toward the end of a successful air campaign and the mission to deliver the peacekeeping force to Kosovo that the corps had already prepared and trained. Since Task Force Hawk was already forward deployed in the Balkans, it was logical that it should take on the mission of superintending the deployment of Task Force Falcon and perhaps augmenting the combat forces available to Falcon when it became part of NATO's Kosovo Force in Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. That consideration required a certain amount of at least rudimentary contingency planning.

Mission creep was directly related to the personnel shortages that really dominated task force operations. There were not enough engineers to do all the work the task force needed to have done, and that was because of the force cap. In the early days, personnel limitations made it impossible for the task force both to establish the base camp and to do route reconnaissance toward the border with Kosovo that the corps needed to have done as it prepared contingency plans for ground operations. As the mission matured, planning to provide some kind of semi-permanent infrastructure for the task force at Tirana-Rinas and in the forward operating base placed additional strains on limited personnel. Thus, the most serious problem with mission creep was that the mission set grew while the force cap remained in effect. Any new capability that needed to be added to support a new requirement meant that some existing capability had to be deleted, and the trade-offs implied in those decisions kept the task force under increasing pressure.

End of the Air Campaign and Task Force Hawk Stand-Down

Though later criticized for the speed with which it got to Albania, Task Force Hawk received more than 5,000 soldiers and more than 5,200 pieces of equipment at Tirana-Rinas in only twenty-six days. The helicopters self-deployed without incident from Germany through Italy in the marginal flying conditions of spring weather. By 9 April TF Hawk had positioned its principal command and control, target planning, RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration), security, and medical support elements in Albania. On 18 April elements of the 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry

Regiment, arrived from Fort Bragg, and the first increment of Apaches arrived on 21 April. The following day TF Hawk established a minimum capability to conduct offensive air operations. By 26 April, only eighteen days after the mission kicked off, TF Hawk was fully mission capable with a force of fifty-one aircraft, of which twenty-four were AH-64A Apache attack helicopters. Joint Chiefs of Staff orders withheld deployment of the second increment of twenty-four Apaches that were then ready to fly from Germany to Albania. On 7 May TF Hawk came under operational control of Joint Task Force (JTF) Noble Anvil. Thus Task Force Hawk met General Clark's specified date to be mission ready.

On 8 May General Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, visited Task Force Hawk and discussed its operations with Hendrix. Following a series of briefings on the task force and concept of operations, he reportedly spoke with Clark and voiced his reluctance to support Apache attacks into Kosovo except when done in coordination with operations by ground maneuver forces.²³ By that time, however, it was becoming clear that there would be no ground attack into Kosovo. As the air campaign of Operation ALLIED FORCE progressed, the probability that Task Force Hawk would ever launch any Apache missions had in any case been steadily decreasing. In the end, the Pentagon decided against it for a variety of reasons.²⁴

The first was that Phase I of the allied air campaign never achieved one of its principal objectives, which was the disruption of the Serb integrated air defense system in Kosovo. While that was true for radar-guided, high altitude air defense systems, it was even more true for low altitude air defenses such as man-portable missiles and anti-aircraft guns that emitted no radio frequency signature and that were therefore impossible to locate except visually. Copious intelligence informed the task force that the Serb forces had arrayed such systems liberally and in depth along the routes the Apaches would have to use to enter and leave Kosovo. Because there were so few routes through the mountainous terrain into Kosovo, the Serb defense planning problem was vastly simplified and the Serb air defense capability was much improved because weapons could be concentrated on the most likely helicopter approach corridors. One of the reasons that the air defense suppression was unlikely to be very effective was that the rules of engagement limited the way those fires could be delivered. The imperative to avoid civilian casualties remained a governing planning consideration. Practically speaking, suppression of enemy air defense, however liberally such missions were fired, could never guarantee clear attack routes, and the risk of Apache losses to Serb air defenses remained very high.

One of the original reasons to use Apaches was that they could find and destroy targets at low altitudes, unaffected by the poor flying weather that limited the fixed-wing operations over Kosovo during the late winter. As the spring weather arrived and skies began to clear, the effectiveness of the allied air forces was thought to have improved enough that the risks of using helicopters no longer needed to be accepted. More directly influential was

the fact that the various headquarters involved in organizing, deploying, and commanding Task Force Hawk never reached agreement on how the force should be used, or about the trade-offs between risks to the aviators in comparison to the expected tactical benefits of the missions. Most aviators believed that they could fly effective missions, despite the heavy Serb air defenses and the dispersion and camouflage of the targets, but acknowledged that those missions could not be flown without loss. What those losses might be, and what political consequences might result from them, were questions that were never resolved. Naturally, an assessment of such political consequences was a task that lay entirely outside the responsibilities of the Army commanders involved and could only be made at the national level.

After seventy-eight days of air operations, through most of which Task Force Hawk was present and threatening its own operations against Serb forces, the Yugoslav government initialed the Military Technical Agreement. That act, on 10 June, ended Operation ALLIED FORCE. Therewith, on 9 June, some elements of TF Hawk began deploying to Macedonia as part of TF Falcon. Four days later TF Falcon started its deployment into Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), while other Task Force Hawk elements redeployed to Central Region. On 22 June JTF Noble Anvil relinquished operational control of Task Force Hawk to USAREUR. By 2 August 1999 all the major TF Hawk units had left Albania.

Deployment and Mission of Task Force Falcon

When forming Task Force Hawk, Hendrix had made a firm decision to fence off the units already allotted to Task Force Falcon, since they had already gone through a comprehensive mission rehearsal exercise for the forthcoming peace enforcement mission in Kosovo and were organized for deployment.²⁵ That process began when the UN mandate expired in Macedonia and the V Corps task force removed all nontransferable U.S. Army property from the observation posts and then turned over responsibility for border monitoring to the Macedonian Army III Corps, completing that process by 22 March 1999. A bilateral agreement with the government of Macedonia allowed the United States to retain possession of Camp Able Sentry at Skopje for possible future use as an intermediate staging base of the National Support Element for future operations in the Balkans.²⁶

The NATO planning for a peace support operation in Kosovo was based on the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the headquarters of which had already arrived in Skopje by March 1999, and structured as a corps headquarters that consisted of five multinational brigades—one each from the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy. The American contingent, known in early planning as USKFOR (U.S. Kosovo Force), was a hybrid multinational brigade headquarters built around the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, with augmentations to allow it to perform the many additional peace support missions for which neither brigades nor divisions were structured.

The brigade, by then dubbed Task Force Falcon, conducted its first mission rehearsal exercise in late February, working on the assumption that the deployment would be in a "permissive" environment.²⁷

At the start of May 1999 the 1st Infantry Division's 3d Brigade Combat Team, slated for Kosovo, was still at Vilseck, while the TF Falcon commander, Brig. Gen. John Craddock, was at Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia with the nucleus of his staff. At that point it appeared that the air campaign was not going to succeed in forcing Serb compliance, and a ground campaign would become necessary to force entry into Kosovo. Maj. Gen. David Grange, the commander of the 1st Infantry Division, directed Craddock to return to Germany to take the 3d Brigade Combat Team into hurried training to prepare for that eventuality.²⁸ Those exercises focused on high intensity combat missions—ground combat, should that prove necessary. The prevailing mood in the 1st Infantry Division at the time was that such combat would indeed be required, and the idea that "Task Force Falcon is dead" was routinely voiced and widely accepted.²⁹

Then, by late May, the situation once again changed dramatically and Craddock, deeply involved in exercises with the brigade, received another telephone call from Grange to let him know that it looked as if "peace might be breaking out" in Kosovo, since there were indications that the Serbs were going to agree to the terms laid down at Rambouillet and the bombing campaign would end. Leaving the exercise in the hands of the division G-3, Craddock hurried to Macedonia where, with the Serb capitulation, the NATO forces already staged in Macedonia were on the move. Politically, it was urgent to have American forces moving along with the rest of NATO, but the 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was still in Germany.³⁰

When the Serb government finally acceded to NATO demands in June, the division reverted to planning for a semi-permissive peace support operation, though with the assumption that the best the brigade could hope for from the Serb population of Kosovo was a hostile attitude. Hence more combat elements and combat support units such as artillery and aviation were added to the force mix. At the same time, the complete lack of effective civil government, law enforcement, and a functioning judicial system in Kosovo added complexity to the mission. As a consequence, the brigade force cap was doubled from 3,497 to 7,004.³¹

Meanwhile, acknowledging that 3d Brigade Combat Team was alerted and could move into the theater within seventy-two hours, but understanding that Clark wanted American forces in Kosovo as early as possible, Hendrix began considering other possibilities and decided to use the ground forces already in Albania. He established that he could retain the 2d Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, for at least another month and gave it, along with a mechanized battalion from the 1st Armored Division's 2d Brigade Combat Team, to Craddock. Literally overnight, units from the 1st Armored Division's 2d Brigade, led by the 2-505 Airborne Infantry, positioned themselves in Macedonia to march into Kosovo with KFOR. That naturally threw all the earlier careful

planning out the window, because KFOR looked nothing at all like the force that the corps had originally designed.³²

Craddock and his staff, busy gathering information from the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission and many other sources, were meanwhile completing reconnaissance to validate their plans for building a base camp in the province. Informed of the decision to substitute units from 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, for his own division's 3d BCT, Craddock immediately objected that the 2d Brigade did not have the appropriate training for the peace enforcement mission and did not have the same knowledge of the area of operations that his 3d Brigade enjoyed. He pointed out that the mission in Kosovo would not merely be peace support operations, but would involve a much broader understanding of the environment, the political parties, and the specific situation that then prevailed in Kosovo. The need for speed finally governed, however, and the corps accepted the calculated risk of dispatching the 2d BCT units to Kosovo, with the idea of training them as much as possible after arrival. As soon as reasonably possible, the 3d Brigade of the Big Red One would replace the soldiers of the 2d Brigade Combat Team, which would lose the 2-505 Airborne Infantry within ninety days in any case.³³

Administrative considerations complicated the deployment of Task Force Falcon as well. The delays imposed by the Roberts Amendment were not terribly significant to the operations of Task Force Falcon, but the decision by the Department of the Army to disapprove the USAREUR and V Corps request for a "stop loss" order to administratively halt normal personnel departures from the unit was consequential. Craddock had kept roughly a dozen members of his staff in Macedonia for several months to deal with the myriad actions relating to the eventual deployment and employment of Task Force Falcon. In the spring normal personnel rotations carried away a portion of that staff to other assignments, and though they were replaced by other capable officers, the learning curve, as Craddock characterized it, was "about vertical." The loss of accumulated theater-specific knowledge presented problems because the newly constituted task force staff had to absorb the depth of understanding of the plans the preceding staff group had developed and had to figure out all over again how to deal with the ARRC staff and with Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. The real problem was that the change in personnel came right at the time the task force was to deploy, so that the new officers had to learn in the course of the actual operation. Even those officers with experience in Bosnia found that what they knew was not particularly relevant, because it did not fit the existing situation and operational environment in Kosovo.³⁴

The major planning challenge for the task force staff was handling the flow of Task Force Falcon in such a way that the units arrived in Kosovo in close coordination with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army units, thereby maintaining close control of the countryside and preventing any possible acts of retribution or retaliation between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. Negotiations to work out details of the Military Technical Agreement were lengthy, and all of the KFOR brigade commanders worked closely with Yugoslav Army command-


ers to craft a retrograde plan for the Serbs and deployment plan for KFOR that would prevent any opportunity for lawless elements to operate. The agreement was signed on 9 June, and Serb forces began withdrawing from Kosovo late on 11 June and early on 12 June. British and French brigades immediately began to move into the province. Initial plans called for the American brigade to arrive as the last of the five.³⁵

That, too, changed, as European Command ordered Craddock's staff on 11 June to deploy its headquarters along with the lead KFOR multinational brigades. Therefore, as the British brigade marched into Kosovo via the main highway from Macedonia to Pristina, the forward headquarters element of Task Force Falcon accompanied it with a small number of vehicles, a troop headquarters, and a platoon from the 2d Brigade reconnaissance troop, a total of some fifty-five soldiers. On 12–13 June task force engineers confirmed that the planned command post locations could be used, and on 13 June Craddock selected the sites for the American base camps—Camp Bondsteel in the western portion of the U.S. sector and Camp Monteith in the northeast. The remainder of the headquarters deployed along with initial Army and Marine Corps units on 14 June.³⁶ (*Map 16*)

The occupation of base camps proceeded relatively smoothly, and the American units settled into the duties that had become usual with peace enforcement missions. Craddock was pleased to note that, despite lacking the specialized training that the 3d BCT had undergone, the soldiers of the sister division's 2d Brigade Combat Team came to Kosovo with a great situational awareness that lay at the heart of force protection. Craddock was impressed with how well they managed operations in a very difficult environment where the degree of danger was unknown. The soldiers were always alert and always followed their rules of engagement and worked hard to build skills on how to run checkpoints, do vehicle searches, conduct peace enforcement patrols, and other needed functions. He found the small unit leadership skills of the airborne battalion a crucial factor in those early days, as were the tactical skills of the heavy forces from Bad Kreuznach and Baumholder, particularly since those soldiers were learning the difficult techniques of dismounted operations as they went along. Soon thereafter, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived to briefly strengthen Task Force Falcon until additional Army units could arrive.³⁷

Departing from the planned use of forces, Task Force Falcon used four force packages in its first thirty days of operation in Kosovo. The first to arrive were selected Task Force Hawk units that corresponded to forces in the original Task Force Falcon troop list. The second was the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and the third to arrive were 1st Infantry Division units from Germany. The fourth contingent of the brigade consisted of the multinational unit forces: a Greek mechanized infantry battalion, a Polish airborne battalion, and a Russian airborne task group.³⁸

As the Task Force Falcon mission proceeded, an orderly rotation of brigades in Kosovo followed the pattern set by Task Force Eagle in Bosnia. The American contribution to the NATO implementation force in Kosovo was one heavy



MAP 16

brigade of approximately seven thousand soldiers. The brigade also had a staff sufficiently augmented to command the other national units that fell under its control as Multinational Brigade (East). In addition, the United States provided personnel, units, and equipment to other components of the NATO force in Kosovo, either to reinforce existing capabilities or to provide logistical support those armies were unable to deploy. The Task Force Falcon mission was initially to ensure the safe return to Kosovo of the ethnic Albanian refugees and then, more generally, to enforce all aspects of the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and Serbia.³⁹

As it had done for Task Force Eagle, the corps headquarters managed the orderly transition from one task force to the next and devised and conducted

the mission rehearsal exercises to prepare the units for duty in Kosovo. The similarities between the *process* of conducting the mission, if not the details of the missions themselves, were more striking than their differences. One of the more interesting things was that working within the context of a NATO command structure, as well as working within the context of a joint command structure, was no easier in 1999 than it had been in 1995 and 1996, despite the experience that had accumulated in the intervening years.⁴⁰

The first issue had to do with Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, which turned out to be little more than a reporting headquarters. The joint staff in Naples had an enormous appetite for information and demanded reports from TF Falcon every four hours, a reporting requirement that frankly overwhelmed Craddock's staff. No one on the TF Falcon staff was especially familiar with Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) operations, although many, including Craddock, had been involved with joint task forces in the past and had some feel for what was involved. Craddock was frustrated to find that, when he sent information to JTF Noble Anvil in response to one of its requests, he was taken to task for his lack of knowledge about and use of joint rules, regulations, procedures, and the joint lexicon of terms. "I didn't need a lesson on what was technically correct," Craddock later commented, but instead needed help with the problems being discussed. That was symptomatic of the relationship between TF Falcon and JTF Noble Anvil, which was, in the opinion of some members of the TF Falcon staff, "looking for work" because the air war was over and the joint task force was still heavily staffed with field grade officers of all services. The TF Falcon staff was frankly amazed at how many "of those guys came out of the woodwork to basically get in the way," and was delighted when JTF Noble Anvil was eliminated in the third week of July.⁴¹

The relationship with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps was more direct and of course more substantial, but also was difficult at times. The TF Falcon staff considered that the NATO staff was simply too bureaucratic and inflexible. In sum, according to American staff officers in Kosovo, the staff of the NATO corps was "typically late in their guidance, late in their directives, gave us very little planning time, and they had no concept of [the] one-third, two-thirds rule for staff planning."⁴² Those who listened carefully could hear the faint but clear echo of similar criticisms the V Corps staff had leveled at the ARRC staff during the planning for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in 1995.

The TF Falcon staff believed that the NATO corps staff was very resistant to change of any kind and was frustrated that the NATO staff officers appeared periodically to issue instructions that were in contradiction to the command guidance that the ARRC commander, British Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Jackson, had issued. On several occasions Craddock had to go to Jackson to resolve such situations, with the first being the order of march of forces from Macedonia into Kosovo. Aggravating the situation, the normal relationships that staffs in the U.S. Army were accustomed to establishing with the staffs of other units simply never existed between TF Falcon and the ARRC. Nothing ever worked "normally," as the Americans saw it, because what they considered the rigidity

and bureaucracy of the ARRC staff prevented the familiar action officer to action officer, battle staff to battle staff, battle captain to battle captain relationships from ever being forged. Instead, all actions between staffs had to go up through the chain of command for initial coordination at the chief of staff level, ponderously slowing the pace of decision-making and coordination between the headquarters.

A second persistent issue was the NATO sensitivity to rank. The TF Falcon staff was really "under-ranked" as compared to the typical NATO staff. "If you're not a lieutenant colonel as an LNO [liaison officer] to KFOR," American officers pointed out, "you can't get in the door." The task force liaison officers were frequently captains who were capable and fully competent to deal with the various issues in their areas of responsibility, but who found that the NATO staff officers did not acknowledge that competence because of their junior rank. The task force did the best it could by sending senior captains and majors to be liaison officers at the ARRC, with the consequence that lieutenants wound up serving as battle captains at task force headquarters.

In any case, working with the NATO staff was a rude awakening for many of the more junior American officers. They found that only the "King's English" would do, and that how they pronounced words and how they phrased sentences became critically important if they wanted to be understood, since the other members of the staff—the German, Italian, and French officers—had an academic knowledge of English as taught in Europe. Therefore the slang, acronyms, and verbal short cuts Americans were accustomed to using were simply not understood. In many cases, officers and senior noncommissioned officers learned that fact the hard way. "We had to be very specific in our syntax and diction, and say in exact terms what it was we wanted, then thoroughly analyze the information we got back," Americans learned, adding that "we were never quite clear on what their intent was, or how it was interpreted. We found out eventually, unfortunately, that it was easier and more productive to go from the top down."⁴³

One Kosovo Deployment

Typical KFOR deployments were smaller than those to which V Corps had become accustomed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the task forces had for years been of division size. Just over a year into the mission in Kosovo, the corps had already established a familiar routine of organizing a task force, superintending it through a tailored series of mission rehearsal exercises and theater-specific qualifications, and then deploying it to serve for six months under NATO command. Continuing tensions in the province kept the task forces alert, but elements of routine had already begun to show themselves. The experience of a single battalion illustrates the case.

The 1st Armored Division provided troops for the KFOR 2A rotation in Kosovo from 20 June through 18 December 2000. (*Table 12*) In December 1996 the 1st Brigade Combat Team had returned from Bosnia-Herzegovina, where it

TABLE 12—THE 1ST BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT), 1ST ARMORED DIVISION,
ORDER OF BATTLE FOR KFOR 2A

1st BCT, 1st Armd Div
Headquarters and Headquarters Co
1st Bn, 36th Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 37th Armor
2d Bn, 3d Field Arty
501st Forward Support Bn
16th Engr Bn
501st Military Intell Bn (-)
Co A
Co B
141st Signal Bn (-)
1st Bn, 501st Aviation

Source: Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *V Corps Order of Battle, 1918–2003* (Headquarters, V Corps, draft Ms, 2003).

had formed part of Task Force Eagle during the first year of NATO operations there. In the interval, elements of the brigade had been assigned to other missions, including the second rotation of troops for the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia in 1997 and 1998. Deployed as Task Force Falcon, the brigade's organization was little changed from its garrison configuration.

Upon arrival at Camp Able Sentry in Skopje, the task force moved by road to Camp Monteith, where the staff received briefings on the current operational situation from the units the brigade was relieving in place, and the leaders conducted a "right seat ride" with their counterparts in the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division. Over succeeding days, the two brigade commanders toured the area of operations and, following some adjustments in minor detail, the formal reliefs began by 16 June. On that date, TF 1–37 Armor relieved TF 1–63 Armor and assumed responsibility for its sector.⁴⁴

There then began the continuous round of patrols, liaison with officials of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and contacts with local officials intended to enhance political stability. A particular task for the entire task force was supervision of the elections that took place during that period. Occasional flare-ups, such as six days of protests in the town of Cernica, where Company A effectively kept the peace, enlivened an otherwise monotonous routine of patrols, cordons and searches for illegal weapons and ammunition, and miscellaneous humanitarian relief tasks. Company B, for example, delivered building materials so that Kosovars could rebuild homes damaged in the fighting and worked with the U.S. Agency for International Development to build a new school in Pones. Company C likewise distributed donated clothing to people in its sector.

Tactically, the battalion established 274 tactical control points during its six months in Kosovo, conducted 4,250 patrols, set up 95 temporary observation posts, and escorted groups of Serbs to and from places of work 810 times. The task force built two roads and improved two more. Members of the staff calculated that the battalion had delivered more than 1,300 cubic meters of wood to various communities and distributed 213 large boxes of donated clothing sent from nine states. Throughout, the task force assessment was that the sector was relatively stable and remained free from major acts of violence, although the Serb community remained intimidated by, and fearful of, the ethnic Albanians. Routine operations were enlivened by periodic visits by senior officers, including a trip that Admiral James Ellis made to Camp Monteith on 14 August, accompanied by Maj. Gen. George Casey, the division commander, and a visit by the corps commander, Lt. Gen. James Riley, at the end of that month. Periodic visits by senior officers occurred throughout the rotation. A highlight of the period was the deployment of the V Corps Immediate Ready Force to the sector in August 2000. In a test of the concept, USAREUR sent the Medium Ready Company to reinforce Task Force Falcon. The unit arrived at Camp Monteith on 24 August and, over the succeeding week, was integrated into 1-37 Armor's operations.

Evidence of the growing routine, however, lay in the fact that the battalion could also find time for a great deal of training, conducting modified tank gunnery tables on the one hand and conducting platoon live fire exercises both in defense and in breach of defenses. The S-3 counted 662 weapons systems qualifications completed during the six-month deployment, and 51 soldiers certified as combat lifesavers. At the individual level, 94 soldiers earned school certifications and 132 soldiers earned credit for 292 semester hours of college classes. Such things were possible only in a relatively stable tactical environment.

In December 2000, at the end of the rotation, the battalion handed off its mission to TF 1-35 Armor and returned to Germany after spending six more or less uneventful months in Kosovo. Daily situation reports sent to the V Corps command center in Heidelberg attested to the steady daily routine, inundating the corps G-3 with an accumulation of figures about patrols conducted, miles driven, and persons escorted, not to mention detailed information about maintenance and all of the other traditional indicators of unit readiness. In sum, the Kosovo mission, while it remained demanding and required close attention to security matters, rapidly became unexceptional.

Outcomes of the Deployments

When the mission was over, Task Force Hawk had deployed an attack helicopter regimental task force of 24 aircraft in two squadrons; a corps aviation brigade task force with 31 support aircraft; a reinforced rocket artillery battalion with 27 launchers; one heavy and one light tube artillery battery; a mechanized infantry brigade combat team with one mechanized and one airborne battalion; a deep operations coordination cell; a support package organized by a

corps support group that included transportation, quartermaster, and ordnance units; finance, military police, and engineer units; and a task organized signal battalion. The force was a nonstandard organization that was not a division, not a brigade, and not a corps, but that partook of elements of all three. It carried out a nondoctrinal mission with an ad hoc control element for which it devised operational procedures and created an organization and equipment list. In the course of the mission, Task Force Hawk overcame a number of awkward limitations.

It deployed into a theater of operations that had extremely limited air, land, and sea lines of communication. It operated without a campaign plan and without clearly defined relationships between U.S. forces and NATO forces. Throughout its mission, TF Hawk operated under rules of engagement that severely limited its ability to see targets in Kosovo and that were not entirely appropriate for Army forces. It constituted the task force without benefit of a stop-loss or stop-movement order, so that personnel problems were frequently acute, particularly for the attack aviation units, which were not maintained at full manning in the first place.

The attack aviation units did not yet have the second generation upgrades for the AH-64 forward-looking infrared radar, largely a consequence of USAR-EUR having already been designated a "legacy force" that would be among the last in the Army to benefit from system improvements. Furthermore, the attack helicopter battalions were not authorized night-vision goggles by their tables of organization and equipment. Aircraft operated in a mountainous environment that degraded communications systems and required additional aircrew training to reach proficiency for survivability. Compounding the risks, the force operated in a battle space fraught with disadvantages, including the fact that it was nonlinear and that, while the enemy was dispersed, the friendly forces were clustered. Finally, Task Force Hawk managed other in-theater contingencies that limited the number of headquarters staff personnel that could be assigned to the task force, thus necessitating assignment of large numbers of augmentees.⁴⁵

Task Force Hawk was, as the Center for Army Lessons Learned report concluded, a "unique task organized force, designed to accomplish a special deep operations mission in an austere environment," and where the command and control relationships were complex and occasionally strained. The lessons learned analysts concluded that "TF Hawk was a living, learning, growing unit. It was a 'come as you are, but bring what you need' organization."⁴⁶ In fact, it was much more than that.

There was little to distinguish Operation JOINT GUARDIAN qualitatively from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Both were peace enforcement operations in relatively "permissive" environments, and the V Corps involvement in both was essentially the same, though Operation JOINT GUARDIAN required far less in terms of commitment of manpower. Preparing and training forces and then delivering them to the NATO headquarters that commanded the operation consumed a good deal of organizational time and energy, but there was little

new about it. Similarly, the corps managed the replacement of one task force by another at regular intervals, no small task in terms of staff involvement, but again nothing particularly difficult in view of the staff's accumulated experience. The deployment to Kosovo was even less complicated because the corps headquarters did not have to create the intermediate sustaining base. Camp Able Sentry already being in existence and under corps control, the corps did not have to man a forward headquarters to carry out Title 10 responsibilities for the task force in Kosovo. Operation VICTORY HAWK, however, was another matter. For the first time since World War II, excluding the Cold War mission, V Corps headquarters itself was directly involved in an operation that was explicitly combatant, commanding V Corps subordinate units and deployed to an active theater.

The eventual decision that the Apache helicopters would not be used in the air campaign obscured the real effect the deployment had on operations over Kosovo. The capabilities of the Apaches were of course well known and the lethality it demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War was widely respected. Likewise known and respected were the capabilities of the Multiple Launch Rocket System the task force was known to possess. Deployment of the force demanded some counterpoise from the Serb armed forces, and one of the major influences on the air campaign was the repositioning of Serb antiaircraft systems and acquisition radars from the interior of the country to the border region between Kosovo and Albania, thereby diminishing the air defense coverage elsewhere, to the benefit of the NATO airmen of Operation ALLIED FORCE.⁴⁷

A second benefit arose from the forty operations disingenuously called "mission rehearsal exercises" that Task Force Hawk regularly launched from Tirana-Rinas. In fact, they were more properly *combat feints*, fully planned and carefully organized missions that explored the various avenues of approach to the Albanian-Kosovo border and that in each case provoked responses from the Serb forces that the task force carefully measured and evaluated, an accumulation of information that was of enormous intelligence value and that played its part in making the next mission rehearsal even more sophisticated. The mission rehearsal exercises and artillery raids all looked like the beginnings of actual attacks. They kept the Serb forces in motion and drew attention—and combat power—to the border.⁴⁸

Finally, the task force played an important and largely unacknowledged role in delivering timely and important targeting information to the allied air forces for their strikes on Serb military units. The mission rehearsals regularly identified and updated the locations of radars and antiaircraft systems. The counter-battery radars that accompanied the artillery to the forward operating bases also delivered a wealth of information about the locations of Serb units and equipment to the task force, which passed that information to the Combined Air Operations Center. The very well-defined information gathered in that way supplemented the data procured through use of the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicles launched from Macedonia and the on-going high-level Air Force reconnaissance.⁴⁹ By early June General Wesley Clark's assessment was that "Task

Force Hawk continued to pass more targets than the airmen could strike," both from direct aerial observation of the border and from the data gleaned from the task force radars.⁵⁰

The mission also directly affected the course of future V Corps operations. The frankly abysmal conditions at the Task Force Hawk base camp and the very high number of airlift missions required to put the 5,000-man task force in place emphasized the importance of making the headquarters lighter and more easily deployable, a matter that had been under earnest study before the start of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR at the end of 1995 and to which corps planners had already returned before Task Force Hawk was created. General Hendrix's earlier steps to create a field headquarters accustomed to operating away from prepared base areas and configured for rapid deployment using standard air cargo containers made displacement of the corps tactical operations center and deep operations coordination cell to Albania possible. The experience of wrestling heavy vans through feet of mud, however, stressed the need to make the headquarters equipment lighter still. Survivability of the equipment was not at stake, as Brig. Gen. Steve Speakes, the corps chief of staff in 1999 and 2000, pointed out when he reminded the staff that soldiers and sophisticated equipment were really no better protected against artillery fire inside vans than under canvas. The countervailing bias, as he saw it, was that "we love to live in Green Things," and he pushed the staff to change its notion of what a proper headquarters should look like.⁵¹

The point about the deployment that really impelled a more serious attempt to make the command post smaller, though, was the enormous number of air missions required to move it. The final Hawk headquarters configuration used, in round figures, 160 MILVANS. As early as 6 May, Operation VICTORY HAWK had consumed more than three hundred C-17 sorties and a great many additional C-130 sorties.⁵² By the end of the operation, the Task Force Hawk deployment had required some 475 C-17 missions.⁵³ Aircraft were not always available when Army air loads were ready to be moved, and, as Operation VICTORY HAWK demonstrated, the corps could not make the assumption that strategic airlift would be readily or immediately available to satisfy Army requirements. Consequently, attention turned to configuring the headquarters so that tactical airlift—the venerable C-130 Hercules that was available in Europe—could move what the corps needed when it deployed.⁵⁴

Speed of deployment became one of the most widely publicized issues about Task Force Hawk, and the Army suffered unwarranted criticism for the length of time required to place the Apache helicopters in Albania.⁵⁵ Various delays in strategic airlift availability played their part in the process, but two other factors were more important—and both were entirely beyond Army control. The first was physical: By the time the task force started deploying, the ground available to the Army at Tirana-Rinas had become waterlogged and incapable of supporting airfield operations. Until construction work to finish helicopter pads and access roads could be completed, no helicopter could land there. That construction work had to be contracted because the Army's drawdown had sharply

constricted the number of construction engineer battalions available across the force. Complicating the problem, contracting in Albania proved an enormous problem because of the region's poverty, and much of the manpower, equipment, and materiel had to be imported from Italy, Macedonia, and elsewhere.⁵⁶ All of that required time.

The second limitation was diplomatic: Austria refused permission for Army aircraft to over-fly its territory en route to Albania, so the helicopter self-deployment had to proceed through France and via Pisa to Brindisi, which took a little longer. More important, however, the Italian permission for the Apaches to depart from their bases combat-loaded for the flight into Albania was obtained only after negotiation. Ironing out those questions took more time. Even so, the deployment was reasonably swift. The first troops went to Albania on 8 May and the helicopters had staged as far as Pisa by 14 May. Brown and Root Corporation, which contracted much of the construction work at Tirana, was not able even to begin engineering development of the base until 15 May. Engineering work and diplomatic clearances had both progressed far enough that the first Apaches were able to land at Tirana on 21 May. General Hendrix, reacting sharply to what he considered ill-informed media criticism of the time it took the Apaches to become operational, rated the deployment as a success, pointing out that none of the delays had anything to do with the helicopters, their crews, or the process of deployment itself.⁵⁷

Ill-informed though their criticisms might have been, it remained difficult to fault the journalists for expressing disappointment with what they saw as a dilatory pace of deployment, since the Pentagon public affairs spokesman had announced on 4 April that the helicopter task force would be in place within eight days.⁵⁸ A dispassionate observer might remark that a high-level news release about the Apache deployment that cited a specific number of days was a public affairs gaffe, since it was so clearly an announcement profoundly uninformed by any study of the operational realities that governed the movement of the forces from Germany to Albania.

In terms of joint operations, the most important lesson the services took away from Operation VICTORY HAWK was that, despite continuing discussion of the matter since the time of the Persian Gulf War, the Army and the Air Force still did not understand each other, operationally speaking. The Air Force did not have a good understanding of how the Army fought the deep battle or the fact that the Army considered the aviation brigade another maneuver element, and the Army did not understand the real impact of the Air Force's air tasking order at the tactical level or the way the Air Force prosecuted its war. Unfortunately, the services actually never exercised together enough to develop such understanding or to understand the communications required to make joint warfare work effectively.

In the Army, much of that sort of thing was scripted in Battle Command Training Program exercises, and the staffs did not have to do the work to coordinate Army and Air Force operations in deep attacks, where clearing airspace for Army Tactical Missile System and Multiple Launch Rocket System fires be-

came a real issue, for example. Army pilots were not accustomed to having to coordinate en route with Air Force mission controllers, using Air Force terminology. For its part, the Combined Air Operations Center in Naples did not understand the capabilities and requirements—air space requirements, planning requirements, and targeting requirements—for Apache operations supported by rocket artillery fires. At times, the problem was as fundamental as the two services not understanding each others' radio call signs.⁵⁹

The controversy over placing Army attack helicopters on the Air Force air tasking order was an unfortunate one, in part because it demonstrated that inter-Service cooperation and mutual understanding were absent even within the V Corps staff, where the Air Support Operations Group and the G-3 ought to have been completely in synch. From that imbroglio, though, the corps learned that coordination of the air tasking order process was very important for such key decisions as placement of Army radars, to avoid fratricide from Air Force antiradiation missile strikes at enemy air defense installations. From the other side, it became clear that the Air Force had only the most hazy understanding of the flight profile of Army long range artillery, which common sense dictated should be incorporated into its briefings for aviators. As far as V Corps planners could see, an obvious and crucial task for any future joint training was for each service to achieve a better understanding of how the other planned operations and fought, the better to integrate Army and Air Force efforts. As Cody pointed out, most of the problems lay at the staff level, since aviators could quickly absorb the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the other service at the tactical level. Integration of fires and synchronization of missions became the real challenge.⁶⁰

The mission also raised the question of how well Army aviators were trained, with the implication that there were not enough resources available to do an adequate job, particularly for commissioned aviators. Much of that discussion was based on the need to qualify 11th Aviation Regiment pilots and copilots to operate with night-vision goggles, and the consequent discussion about the difficulty of obtaining from the Germans permission to do enough low-level night flying to accomplish that training. In fact, the regiment was fully qualified to operate with the forward-looking infrared sensors with which the aircraft were equipped and on which its operations were conceptually based. Cody believed, however, on the basis of his experiences in the Persian Gulf War and elsewhere, that the operational environment in Kosovo was sufficiently hazardous that the crews needed the additional advantage of night-vision goggle capability. Thus, to that extent, the training problem was not one of making up a deficiency, but instead of adding a qualification. Equally pertinent was the fact that night-vision goggles were not part of the attack helicopter battalion table of organization and equipment.⁶¹

In more general terms, however, there were certainly issues that needed to be resolved about aviator training, since the number of flying hours allotted to a unit by the Department of the Army was based on the number of aircraft assigned to that unit, rather than the number of aviators assigned. In fact, units al-

ways had more aviators than aircraft, so that making enough flying hours available to maintain proficiency and to hone the combat edge of those pilots was always a delicate process as the units allotted the time. The amount of flying a pilot needed to do to attain and sustain various proficiencies was often a matter of judgment. The majority opinion of V Corps aviators, however, was that more flying hours were needed across the board. That was not, however, an issue that could be addressed at corps level.⁶²

The experience of Operation VICTORY HAWK had much to do with the practical aspects of creating a deployable headquarters. Probably the most significant outcome of the mission, however, was its influence on thinking about the best way to train and exercise that headquarters for future missions. Common ground was an acknowledgement that the Battle Command Training Program process was artificial to the extent that it generally began in the middle of an operation and assumed the placement of forces in theater and the outcome of preceding operations as the starting position for the exercise. That was unquestionably valid in light of the Army's intention to train senior leaders to conduct military operations and to conserve the precious time and other resources that units, staffs, and commanders could devote to major exercises, focusing on what most regarded as the most important elements of the training. Conduct of offensive operations, for example, imposed stresses on leaders and staffs and forced them to make difficult decisions, which was the point of the Warfighter exercise.

The problem was that none of the exercises paid attention to what became the principal problem in Albania, which was establishing the base, securing the base, and simultaneously establishing an initial operational capability in an environment that was at least potentially hostile and that was certainly difficult and poor in resources. There were many dichotomies in Albania to confuse the issue. On one side of Tirana-Rinas airport, civilian flight operations proceeded much as usual, and the administrative processes of the humanitarian aid programs went on in a peacetime setting. Working from that side of the field, the Air Force operation was far more administrative than tactical. On the other side of the field—what Air Force pundits called the "Dark Side"—Task Force Hawk nestled in the mud, built bunkers, strung perimeter wire, habitually wore helmets and body armor, conducted regular patrols, and generally maintained a wartime posture. Army perceptions of the threat potential were always higher, and security measures took priority over comfort. There was still some ambiguity in the Army's outlook, though. In effect, as Col. Bob Leon pointed out, there was always a certain amount of indecision in the early days about whether his mission was to create a base camp or a tactical assembly area—two very different tasks.

There were important decisions to be made about the trade-offs between base development and tactical reconnaissance when the number of soldiers and quantity of equipment were both small and the time pressure to accomplish both tasks was intense. Delivery of the required logistical capabilities was another issue, as well as developing the flexibility to alter the deployment flow to

accommodate the needs the advance party discovered, or to suit a tactical environment that had been changed by something as basic as extremes of weather.⁶³ All of those matters demanded consideration, and as the battle staff began to put together the after action report for Operation VICTORY HAWK, there was consequently a lot of discussion about the need to incorporate the deployment phase of a mission into corps exercises.

Finally, Operation VICTORY HAWK validated an adage that V Corps had first discovered during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: "politics is to the strategic planner what weather is to the tactical planner." Increasingly, the corps staff came to understand that, in the very nature of politics, decisions were habitually deferred as long as possible in the interests of reaching some compromise, or gaining an advantage because of changing conditions, or some other perfectly valid reasons having to do with good statecraft and diplomacy. Then, often quite suddenly, decisions would be reached and military action required. For the soldier, and particularly for the staff planner, it was difficult to adjust to and accept that process because of the horrendous effects it had on soldiers and on missions. Making preparations while awaiting decisions, anticipating the probable changes in directives likely to be issued, and remaining ready to act at a moment's notice constituted over the four or five months of Operations VICTORY HAWK and JOINT GUARDIAN what V Corps staff officers referred to as the "devil's ARTEP,"⁶⁴ the periodic Army Test and Evaluation Program, to which all units were subject.

In sum, the two operations confirmed a change in the military culture of the Army in Europe. General Speakes, reflecting on the mission to Kosovo and other recent corps operations, aptly summarized the situation when he said that the corps "no longer got missions with clarity," and then commented that "we realized that we were never going to be free of the mission of doing some kind of CONOPS [contingency operations] on a semi-permanent basis, or at least not daring to hope that we would get out of that in the near term," emphasizing that time lines would always be short and stresses were going to remain high.⁶⁵

For the immediate future, the experience of Task Force Hawk and the transition to the Task Force Falcon mission was decisive for V Corps in two ways. First, it led directly to renewed planning and experimentation to reduce the size of a deployable corps headquarters and to find ways to move it with theater, as opposed to strategic, airlift. Second, it was directly tied to General Meigs' determination to review the state of Army aviation and make recommendations to improve it and, through that review, to design a new series of exercises, later conducted in Poland, to refine corps deep strike capabilities.

NOTES

¹ The G-4 Super Galeb was a two-place ground attack fighter armed with a 23-mm. gun. The aircraft could deliver general purpose bombs, fragmentation bombs, rockets, and air-to-air missiles. The Galeb's maximum range was 1,565 nautical miles at a maximum speed of 0.9 mach and with a service ceiling of 42,160 feet.

² Discussion of security issues and the operational situation in Albania was drawn from: interviews, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Maj. Mike Scully, G-3 (Plans), V Corps and Task Force Hawk, 23 Jun 1999, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany; with Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix, Commanding General, V Corps and Task Force Hawk, 2 and 6 May 1999; with Col. Robert M. Leon, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, V Corps, 2, 13, and 27 May 1999; with Lt. Col. Michael J. Clidas, ACoS, G-3 (Plans), V Corps, 4 May 1999; with Col. Volney James Warner, Commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 26 May 1999; and with Lt. Col. Joe Anderson, Commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, 25 May 1999, all at Tirana-Rinas, Albania; Hamilton with Lt. Col. James Embrey, Commander, 1-6 Infantry, 22 Sep 2000, Baumholder, Germany; and author with Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix, Commanding General, V Corps, 2 Nov 1999, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

³ An Operational Detachment—Alfa from Company B, 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group.

⁴ Interv, Hamilton with Hendrix, 6 May 1999.

⁵ Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Vojska Jugoslavije), the best organized and equipped of all armed forces in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisted of ground, air, and naval forces. As of 1995 it was assessed as retaining the capability to conduct extended brigade-size, combined arms operations. At that time, Serb ground forces amounted to 114,000 active duty soldiers supported by an estimated 1,400 pieces of artillery, 1,270 tanks that included T-72, T-74, and T-55 models, and M-84 and M-825 armored fighting vehicles. Substantial antiaircraft units were armed with a mix of approximately one hundred SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, SA-14, and SA-16 missiles, supplemented by around 1,850 pieces of antiaircraft artillery. The Serb air forces had 240 combat aircraft, among them MiG-21 and MiG-29 fighters, and 48 attack helicopters. Serb forces operating in Kosovo at that time amounted to about 40,000 soldiers equipped with about one hundred tanks and armored personnel carriers. They were divided into deployed forces, garrison troops, and reserves, including a further thirty tanks. One concentration of Serb forces was along the border between Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Information from Headquarters, USEUCOM, open source information summaries, USEUCOM Public Affairs Office.

⁶ Interv, Hamilton with Hendrix, 2 and 6 May 1999.

⁷ Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Maj. Gen. Richard Cody, Deputy Commanding General, Air and Special Operations, Task Force Hawk, 6 and 22 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania, and 10 May 2000, Washington, D.C.

⁸ In a casualty-averse environment, and in a situation where civilian casualties had to be avoided at all costs, use of the Flechette rocket generated some worries among aviators.

⁹ Discussion of the tactical employment of Apaches for Task Force Hawk missions is drawn from [USAREUR DCSOPS Lessons Learned], Task Force Hawk, USAREUR After Action Review, August 1999; Cody interview; Hendrix interview, 6 May 1999; Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Maj. Robert Douthit, S-3, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, 11th Aviation Regiment, 16 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania; and Lt. Col. Joseph E. Maher, Jr., "History of Task Force 12" (HQ, 12th Aviation Brigade, typescript, 1999).

¹⁰ Refer to Department of the Army Field Manuals 1-100, *Army Aviation Operations* (21 Feb 1997); 1-112, *Attack Helicopter Operations* (2 Apr 1997); 1-114, *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Regimental Aviation Squadron* (20 Feb 1991); and 100-5, *Operations* (14 Jun 1993).

¹¹ Comments and notes provided by Lt. Col. Daniel E. Williams, S-3 of 2d Squadron, 6th Cavalry, during Operation VICTORY HAWK.

¹² The chief planners were officers in the S-3 sections of the two cavalry squadrons: Maj. Dan Williams and CW4 William Sullivan in 6-6 Cavalry, and Maj. Robert Douthit, CW4 Brian Dunn, and CW3 Clay Carnes in 2-6 Cavalry.

¹³ Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain, and Troops, or METT-T, in planners' shorthand.

¹⁴ Williams comments. On the evening of 26 April 1999, an AH-64A aircraft of Troop B, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, crashed some thirty-five kilometers north of Rinas Airfield, near Tirana, Albania, while conducting a combat mission rehearsal. The two aircrew received minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed after it suddenly descended rapidly into a field, landed hard, and rolled over. There was a small explosion due to an auxiliary tank breaking loose. However, there was no serious fire. Cause of the accident was "settling with power." The aircraft was heavily loaded and was in a tail wind condition, creating high power requirements. The cause of the accident was determined to be human error. A second accident occurred on 5 May 1999 at approximately one-thirty in the morning when an AH-64A of Troop C, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, crashed about seventy-two kilometers north of the airfield, again in the course of combat mission rehearsal training. The two pilots were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. The nose of the aircraft pitched up and the aircraft rolled right, then descended out of control in a nose-low attitude into the ground, exploding on impact. The specific accident cause could not be determined because of the lack of recorded data and information. Deceased were CWO3 David A. Gibbs (38) and CWO2 Kevin L. Reichert (28). See MFR, V Corps History Office, 12 Dec 2001, sub: Information Paper, Summary of Class A Aircraft Accidents Involving Fatalities.

¹⁵ Operation VICTORY HAWK, V Corps After Action Review Briefing, n.d. The corps no longer had a target acquisition battery, having lost Battery B, 25th Field Artillery (TAB), from the order of battle of the 41st Field Artillery Brigade of V Corps Artillery in the course of the European drawdown of forces.

¹⁶ Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Lt. Col. Thomas Muir, CofS, Task Force Hawk, 7 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania.

¹⁷ Williams comments.

¹⁸ Muir interview.

¹⁹ This section is drawn primarily from USAREUR Operation VICTORY HAWK AAR; Cody interview; Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Col. Raymond T. Odierno, Deputy Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, and Deputy Commander for Battle Synchronization, Task Force Hawk, 17 and 23 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania.

²⁰ Williams comments.

²¹ Odierno interview.

²² Warner interview; Embrey interview.

²³ Task Force Hawk Operational Concept Briefing for General Dennis Reimer, 8 May 1999.

²⁴ This section is based upon: [USAREUR ODCSOPS, Operations, Plans and Training Analysis Branch], Operation VICTORY HAWK After Action Report, 28 Jun 2000; [USAREUR DCSOPS Lessons Learned], Task Force Hawk, USAREUR After Action Review, August 1999; and Operation VICTORY HAWK, V Corps After Action Review Briefing, n.d.

²⁵ On the KFOR mission, refer to SACEUR Operation Plan 10413, JOINT GUARDIAN, For Implementation of the Interim Agreement in Kosovo, Final Draft, 16 Feb 1999; USCINCEUR OPLAN 4256-99, Basic Plan for OPLAN 4256-98, U.S. Forces in Support of NATO OPLAN 10413 JOINT GUARDIAN for the Implementation and as Necessary the Enforcement of an Interim Agreement in Kosovo, 10 Mar 1999; USAREUR OPLAN 4256-99, Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, 081600Z Apr 1999; and V Corps OPLAN 99-02-C2, Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, Monitoring, Verification and Enforcing Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) in Kosovo, 21800Z Mar 1999.

²⁶ Information about the Operation JOINT GUARDIAN mission of the USKFOR has been drawn from Maj. Gen. John Craddock, "The First Thirty Days—Kosovo; Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, June–July 1999," Ms, 1999.

²⁷ Craddock Ms.

²⁸ Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Brig. Gen. John Craddock, Commander, Seventh Army Training Center and previously Commanding General, Task Force Falcon (KFOR), 11 Jul 2000, Grafenwöhr, Germany.

²⁹ Craddock Ms.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Craddock Ms.

³² Interv, Capt. Donald Hamilton with Maj. Robert McKinley, PSYOPS Officer, Task Force Hawk, 25 May 2000, Heidelberg, Germany. McKinley was present in the TF Hawk TOC when General Hendrix discussed the issue with Colonel Anderson of the 2-505 Airborne Infantry and Colonel Warner of the 2d BCT and made his decision. Also see E-mail Msg, Col. Joe Anderson to author, 20 Feb 2001, sub: TF Hawk. V Corps OPLAN 99-02-C2, 18 Mar 1999, specified a troop list for the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, that included an assault command post, TF 2-2 Infantry, TF 2-63 Armor, TF 1-1 Aviation, a forward support battalion, supporting brigade troops, and a slice from the 7th Corps Support Group of 3d Corps Support Command (Annex A).

³³ Craddock interview.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Craddock Ms.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Craddock Ms.

³⁹ Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 3 Jun 1999.

⁴⁰ Data on successive task force rotations in Kosovo were drawn from V Corps ACofS, G-3 (Operations), daily staff journal files, 1999.

⁴¹ Craddock interview.

⁴² MFR, V Corps History Office, 10 Jul 1999, sub: Information Paper, Summary of Staff After Action Comments Concerning Combined Staffs and Combined Operations.

⁴³ Ibid. To cite only one example of the differing usage of the same word, the ARRC staff understood "to table an action" as meaning that it was immediately to be discussed—that is, literally to place it upon the table—while Americans, deriving their meaning of the term from

Robert's Rules of Order, understood it to mean that the action would not be discussed at all.

⁴⁴ For these and other details of TF 1-37 Armor operations in Kosovo, see HQ, 1st Battalion, 37th Armor, TF 1-37 Armor Chronology, KFOR 2A, Jun-Dec 2000; and 1st Armored Division briefing, 1AD Deployment History, n.d., but January 2001.

⁴⁵ These conclusions are drawn from Operation VICTORY HAWK, V Corps After Action Review Briefing, n.d., and from [Center for Army Lessons Learned], TF Hawk CAAT Initial Impressions Report (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 2000).

⁴⁶ TF Hawk CAAT Initial Impressions Report.

⁴⁷ Hendrix interview; Cody interview.

⁴⁸ McKearn interview.

⁴⁹ [USAREUR DCSOPS Lessons Learned], Task Force Hawk, USAREUR After Action Review, August 1999; Hendrix, Cody, and Douthit interviews.

⁵⁰ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 337.

⁵¹ Speakes interview.

⁵² V Corps ACofS, G-3, Command Center Daily Update Briefing, 6 May 1999; Hendrix interview.

⁵³ V Corps ACofS, G-3, Command Center Daily Update Briefing, 25 May 1999; Brandenburg interview.

⁵⁴ Speakes interview.

⁵⁵ A typical article was "How Fear of Losses Kept Super-Copters from Kosovo Action," *Herald Tribune*, 30 Dec 1999, which drew all the wrong conclusions and used them as a basis for castigating the Army as too slow, resistant to change, obsessed with casualties, and still in a post-Cold War identity crisis.

⁵⁶ Leon interview; Cody interview.

⁵⁷ Sean D. Naylor, "Commander Defends Mission that Launched a Thousand Criticisms," *Army Times*, 17 Apr 2000; Hendrix interview, 6 May 1999; McKearn interview.

⁵⁸ TF Hawk Public Affairs Daily Sitrep Summary, 5 Apr 1999, in TF Hawk Historian Reference File Set.

⁵⁹ Cody interview; Hendrix interview.

⁶⁰ Cody interview; for the Air Force point of view, see Interv. Capt. Donald Hamilton with Col. John Rhodes, USAF, Task Force Hawk ALO, 19 May 1999, Tirana-Rinas, Albania.

⁶¹ Cody interview; McKearn interview; Statement by Brigadier General Richard A. Cody, Director, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Before the Readiness Sub-Committee, House Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, 1st Sess., 106th Congress, 1 July 1999.

⁶² McKearn interview.

⁶³ Leon interview; Nolen interview, 12 May 2000.

⁶⁴ Brandenburg interview.

⁶⁵ Speakes interview.

Conclusions

A Changing Heavy Corps

"If you don't like deployments, get into another line of work."

Lt. Gen. Jerry Rutherford
V Corps Commanding General, 1993

"We have certainly learned how to run these deployments more smoothly. Like anything else, the more you do it, the better you get at it."

Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford
V Corps Commanding General, 1994

"The half-life of a good TOC is one night in the motor pool. The half-life of deployment knowledge is about ninety days. You get a rotation of two, three, four, or five key people, and it is just amazing how ignorant you can become."

Brig. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Commanding General
3d Corps Support Command, 1995

"Let me tell you how I see our job and my job. We build readiness. The CINCs consume readiness."

Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix
V Corps Commanding General, 1999

"Hell, I don't know where they're going to send me next, or what they're going to tell me to do."

A Private First Class Rifleman assigned
in V Corps, 1999

The V Corps that existed in 2001 bore precious little similarity to the V Corps of 1990. The headquarters and all of its subordinate commands had undergone massive changes in training, operations, manning, and definition of mission since the end of the Cold War. In many ways, that change was not yet complete in the year 2001, nor had all of the implications of the many changes been realized so that the appropriate adjustments could be made. Even so, V Corps in 2001 was a profoundly transformed organization. In the post-Cold War world, V Corps operated at the boundary between the

operational and the strategic levels of war, rather than at purely the tactical and operational, as it did during the Cold War. The V Corps directly implemented national policy in environments where the political stakes were generally higher than the military stakes, and where the dividing line between the two was frequently blurred. The changed corps routinely conducted operations not previously thought of as appropriate for a heavy force, and did so almost uniformly in a joint or joint and combined environment, if not actually under joint or allied command. Furthermore, the corps had in many cases become a force provider, rather than a command and control headquarters itself, sending task forces and force packages out of Germany to be utilized by other commands. Viewed from any point save one, V Corps was different in 2001 than in 1990. Although smaller, the corps was organizationally unchanged and was perfectly recognizable as a heavy, mechanized combat force. Organization had not been tailored to suit the new types of missions, and that, although unintentional, turned out to be both fortuitous and consequential.

A snapshot of the Army in Europe in 1988 points up the contrast between the Cold War and post-Cold War forces. With virtually half of the active duty Army positioned to defend the classic invasion routes through the Fulda Gap and Cheb Corridor, USAREUR commanded around 213,000 soldiers in two armored corps, each consisting of one mechanized and one armored division and each with an armored cavalry regiment. USAREUR also commanded forward-deployed brigades of two more divisions. To that force was added the panoply of units from the artillery, aviation, air defense, and other supporting arms and services, not to mention a tactical air force commitment of another 100,000 airmen.

Exercises across the West German countryside were virtually continuous, as were training and other exercises at the designated training areas of Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, Baumholder, and many local training areas adjacent to the cantonments. The annual REFORGER exercise tested the war plan and the ability of the United States to reinforce the Seventh Army. Frequent competitions among the NATO allies kept gunnery and other combat skills sharply honed. The Canadian Army hosted a competition for tank gunners, and the Bundeswehr had a similar competition for cavalry scouts. There were also similar competitions for engineers and other categories of troops. In 1988, American armor units trained at Grafenwöhr 363 days out of the year and all soldiers spent roughly one-third of their year in field training of one sort or another.

In 1998, USAREUR consisted of only 68,000 soldiers and the force level had been cut to one heavy corps with two divisions but without a cavalry regiment. The divisions stationed one brigade in the United States, leaving USAREUR with only four maneuver brigades in theater. Deep cuts in the supporting tactical air forces accompanied cuts in the Army levels of organization. By 1998 too, the type and frequency of training had been reduced, with almost no exercises across the German countryside at all. REFORGER exercises became computer-assisted staff drills and then were eliminated altogether, with the annual USAREUR exercise instead focusing on its new mission of operating outside



Many aspects of traditional training fell by the wayside after the end of the Cold War. NATO armies no longer funded such competitions as the Canadian Army Trophy for tank gunnery and the "Sapper Stakes" for the best engineer squad. Competing here is a team from the 237th Engineer Battalion (130th Engineer Brigade).

of Germany in response to USEUCOM directives. The average training year at Grafenwöhr for American forces had been reduced from 363 days to 233 days, and with strict limitations on night firing exercises and night flying. All of the NATO-hosted gunnery and similar competitions had ended. In any case, the United States had such a heavy commitment of its cavalry units in the Balkans for peace support operations that it could not participate in the Bundeswehr's scout competition. The nature of training also changed, with the emphasis falling on stability and support operations of various kinds at least as heavily as on conventional heavy force maneuver.¹

Summarizing the Changes

Until 1989 V Corps focused entirely on the heavy force battle along the inter-German border.² The two most important elements of that preparation were readiness and gunnery, and corps training specifically addressed those two principal concerns. The corps centered its entire attention on the General Defense Plan of Western Europe and on the one slice of terrain that plan allotted it. There were some important implications of such an emphasis. The first was that the corps dealt with only one major operations plan, albeit one that

was thoroughly integrated into the correlative plans of Seventh United States Army and the sister U.S. VII Corps, and that was a contributing part of the overall plan of NATO's Central Army Group. The corps, like all echelons of command in Europe, constantly studied and revised the plan for general war to allow for changes in the political and military circumstances. Detailed planning, elaborate battle books, frequent terrain walks, constant rehearsals, and endless exercises based on the plan concentrated the attention of the entire corps on a single tactical problem and produced very sophisticated capabilities. It was a frequently remarked truism that V Corps had a detailed and intimate knowledge of the terrain on which it expected to fight—a knowledge probably unrivaled in the history of the U.S. Army.

The corps' Cold War battlefield was essentially linear and organized from back to front in a traditional manner. Command post emplacement was thoroughly rehearsed, though the corps rear command post, an enormous organization, did not displace.³ Logistical support was carefully orchestrated to fit the requirements of the general defense plan battle—a push system based on the conventional, linear battlefield. Host nation support was equally meticulously integrated into the overall plan, and the V Corps staff and commanders knew what they could expect, and when, and where, from the German Territorial Army. Host nation support was above all reliable and predictable and involved what U.S. forces *drew from* the Germans, not what U.S. forces *delivered to* the Bundeswehr. Soldier and unit equipment were tailored for the general defense plan battle in a specific region under known and predictable climactic conditions, and the Army sent the best and newest of all classes of weapons and equipment to its troops in Germany. New equipment was fielded first in Europe.

Corps force structure was tailored for heavy force battle. Aside from the armored cavalry regiment, the corps possessed what were essentially two armored divisions: the 8th Infantry Division with six mechanized and five tank battalions, and the 3d Armored Division with five mechanized and six tank battalions. Two artillery groups were in general support under V Corps Artillery command. Because the Army in Europe was the single most important major command in the Army in those years, V Corps was assured that its units would be maintained at full strength. In fact, the Department of the Army manned USAREUR at 102 percent of authorizations for most of the years through 1990.

Conceptually, the general defense plan was also a joint and combined fight, and preeminently an AirLand battle, in the peculiar orthographic construct of the day. The operations of the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces were carefully integrated into the plans for ground maneuver and into the buttressing plans for deep battle. Indeed, tactical air power was one of the factors, along with technological superiority in tanks and other ground combat systems, that enabled the Central Army Group to "fight outnumbered and win."⁴ Such interservice cooperation was nonetheless deceptive. Although each corps had an Air Force air support operations group to coordinate and manage the air battle in support of the land battle, there was no substantial service integration.

Combined operations were in a similar case. While the Army was accustomed to fighting alongside other NATO corps and had for years given lip service to NATO standardization, standardized NATO agreements, and combined operations at the tactical level, there was no real involvement with the armed forces of other nations beyond the more or less social contacts of the unit partnership program. Every component of Central Army Group kept very much, as the common expression had it, "in its own lane," and combined logistics and similar subjects remained in the realm of speculation.

By 1992 V Corps had started to become involved in operations in which *none* of those factors any longer applied, and even as early as 1989 the stimuli for the changes with which the corps had to live over the succeeding decade had become apparent. The single most important element of that change, and a thread running throughout everything V Corps did between 1990 and 2001, was the post-Cold War drawdown of forces in Europe. The corps decreased in size from a peak of around 108,000 in fiscal year 1991 to 38,000 in 1999. Unit inactivations naturally matched the decreases in troop strength and were even more consequential than the decrease in total manpower, because capabilities were lost as different types of units ceased colors or were returned to the United States. The corps lost its cavalry regiment and one of the artillery brigades in the corps artillery, with the remaining brigade having only one battalion, and reduced each of its divisions by one maneuver brigade. In an extremely rapid drawdown, V Corps inactivated or sent to the United States some fifty-six battalions and thirty-seven company-size units between March 1991 and June 1992. Corps attention was focused on little else during that period. Strength maintenance was similarly degraded. The Army in Europe lost priority of manpower fill and ceased to be manned at over 100 percent. By the time V Corps began its mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1995, the corps was at 92 percent of authorized strength in the aggregate. By 1999 the corps fill target was at 93 to 94 percent of authorization.⁵

The implications were obvious. Loss of the two maneuver brigades from the divisions meant that the corps could no longer fight a heavy force battle with the same endurance, bring as much firepower to the fight, or fight nearly as sophisticated a maneuver battle as before. Loss of virtually all of the corps' general support artillery similarly degraded the ability to wage a high intensity armored battle. Reassignment of the cavalry regiment to the United States denuded the corps of its screening force, reconnaissance, and the flexibility inherent in a heavy brigade-size combined arms force. In years to come, operations planners frequently bemoaned the fact that the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment no longer belonged to V Corps, because such an organization had virtually the perfect mix of forces for many of the out-of-sector missions, and particularly the peace enforcement missions, that came the way of the Victory Corps.

Even for peacekeeping operations, reduction of each division had a profound effect on corps capabilities, albeit one difficult to explain to laymen. The example of the Task Force Able Sentry commitment of a battalion to United Nations duty in Macedonia demonstrates the point. At any one moment, the

steady-state load of that commitment was three battalions—one preparing to assume the mission, one engaged in the mission, and one wholly occupied in recovery and retraining after completing its rotation in Skopje. Thus one brigade equivalent out of only four maneuver brigades was permanently unavailable to the corps commander. The effects were worse than they appeared, however, since no single brigade had enough mechanized infantry battalions assigned to absorb the entire mission itself. Therefore, up to three maneuver brigades at a time had an infantry battalion involved in the Able Sentry assignment. The consequence was degraded training, readiness, and combat capability in all three brigades, since each required an infantry battalion for task organization of tank-infantry teams in the task forces of the brigade combat team. All of that disruption, loss of combat capability, and degraded readiness was the cost of stationing a 350-man force in Macedonia for 179 days at a time between 1994 and 1999.

All of those changes informed the prescient observer that no one really seemed to anticipate that V Corps would again engage in a heavy force mission. It was, however, the loss of the many logistical units from the corps—and from the Army in Europe generally—that really conditioned future capabilities and set up the deployment and sustainment problems that V Corps later experienced. Mention of two cases may suffice to illustrate the point. The theater's loss of the theater-level transportation units and expertise that could effect major troop movements was first acutely felt when V Corps began its deployment of 1st Armored Division to Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1995. Subsequently, reliance on the one remaining transportation battalion in the corps support command to sustain and support Task Force Eagle—the 181st Transportation Battalion, a unit itself not organized at full strength—produced its own problems.

There were many criticisms of the drawdown process. In retrospect, some of the more significant criticisms appear not to have been valid. It is true that the drawdown was carried out with little or no mission area analysis. Instead, the "salami slice" technique was used, with proportionate reductions generally imposed across the board. Senior commanders earnestly debated each decision without knowing what the bottom line for Army strength in Europe was going to be. Many decisions, such as the ones to inactivate the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 3d Armored Division, were highly emotional. But mission area analysis might not have helped in any case, since no very clear mission for USAREUR had been articulated by 1992, and certainly not the world of stability and support, humanitarian assistance, and peace enforcement operations that existed by 1999. In 1992 USAREUR defined the V Corps missions and capabilities simply as U.S. leadership of a bi-national corps; participation in a German-led bi-national corps; providing troops to support the Allied Forces, Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps; supporting the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land); integrated air defense of ground forces in Europe; and providing units for TRU/ARPS (Theater Reserve in Unit Sets/Army Readiness Package South [i.e., Italy], the post-Cold War successor to the POMCUS concept).⁶

Fundamentally, two considerations were most influential in managing the drawdown. The first was a determination to retain as much combat power as possible, and the second was to retain as many units as possible, irrespective of the level at which those units could be manned. For example, retaining V Corps Artillery, even as a shell that had only one battalion, gave the corps the capability to receive and command additional field artillery brigades in future missions.⁷

Several politico-military realities influenced and supported those considerations. The first was a perceived mission to ensure European security as the former Warsaw Pact broke up amid enormous political uncertainty and regional instability.⁸ That is, USAREUR saw a possible mission to stabilize and secure NATO's flanks, a task that would almost certainly require heavy forces. Even without considering operations outside of Europe, planners thought it essential to recognize that many Third World nations had built their armed forces on the Soviet model, and specifically around the motor-rifle organization. The heavy force organization the Army built to oppose the Warsaw Pact remained the best force structure to employ if operations in or involving such countries occurred.

Circumstances, however, somewhat constrained the corps' ability to carry out those and other missions outside Germany because it simply became harder to get to the scene of the action. The drawdown eliminated much of the support infrastructure in Europe. In particular, transportation and movement control were hard hit. As one corps planner put it, no one could imagine the need to deploy a large force out of Germany again after the Persian Gulf War was over. At the same time, and outside the purview of this study, the U.S. Air Force was decreasing the size of its forces committed to Europe and reconsidering its basing. That drawdown also had an important impact on V Corps readiness to deploy and became a time-influencing factor that had to be considered. The pull-back from Rhein-Main Air Force Base, a terminal designed with airlift in mind and centrally located for corps units, was an inhibitor, since Ramstein Air Force Base had, until its renovation later in the decade, limitations as a springboard for deployment. Ramstein was built as a fighter base and, until significant construction began to alter its configuration, lacked aprons and taxi-ways for cargo aircraft, thus increasing turn-around time. That became a significant issue during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Ramstein was also a considerable distance from most of the V Corps major subordinate commands, although it did have the advantage of being close to the ammunition supply point at Miesau Army Depot.

Changing domestic circumstances in Germany were also relevant to potential V Corps operations.⁹ After the end of the Cold War, German understanding of the need to train, and tolerance for the noise and inconvenience associated with Army training, sharply decreased. To spin up forces for deployment now required a concerted civil-military effort to explain to the German communities involved the need for them to accept the inconveniences involved with increased Army training, and especially night flying. That was done successfully

as part of the Task Force 5-158 Aviation deployment to Somalia in 1993. In general, however, German public support for the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Germany decreased because the average German no longer saw any threat—and hence no justification for U.S. military presence. In some quarters, that was expressed as a sovereignty issue. In others, it became an environmental issue. In any case, it began to be reflected in such things as the continuing German demands to modify the Status of Forces Agreement.

On the practical side, privatization of the Deutsche Bahn, the German rail network formerly known as the Bundesbahn, dramatically affected the speed with which U.S. forces could be deployed, particularly in contrast to the way the VII Corps deployment for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was handled. By 1995 the Army was working with a corporation, rather than with an agency of the German government, which implied a loss of leverage. When managing short notice deployments, the Army was competing for scarce rail car resources with major corporations that represented continuing, steady-state business for the Deutsche Bahn. Down-sizing of the railroad as part of the privatization process left the Army with far fewer loading sites, fewer railroad personnel to work with, and fewer of the needed cars, especially the deep-well cars essential for over-size equipment. One result was that V Corps units had to use the most congested part of the German rail system (i.e., the Frankfurt-Darmstadt-Mannheim area), further slowing the pace.

In sum, V Corps toward the end of the decade of the 1990s had very much an "end of the dance" feel, in terms of the traditional missions and traditional military organization. The corps had not merely allowed those changes to wash over it, however, but had, under successive commanders who were determined to find the appropriate operational niche for the corps, looked to the future and begun making the adjustments necessary to fit it for many different kinds of operations.

Adapting to New Operational Circumstances

Brig. Gen. Stephen Speakes, the V Corps chief of staff in 1999 and 2000, encapsulated the essence of the new operational circumstances when he said that the headquarters had in a way not yet really adapted to the post-Cold War era. "We continue to believe," he said, "that tomorrow, or next month, or next year, we will return to steady-state operations where we will have predictability and will be able to essentially 'pay back' our people for all they have been asked to do. After having been in this Corps for a year, it was clear to me that this was a fallacious notion."¹⁰ At last, V Corps realized that it was never going to be free of the semi-permanent commitment of its forces to some kind of contingency mission. Stability and its allied predictability, real characteristics of the Cold War years, were not things the corps was ever likely to enjoy again.

The record of events bore out Speakes' conclusions, with 1995 through 1997 offering typical examples. During operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, V Corps deployed a peak of 8,358 soldiers to missions associated with NATO's Imple-

mentation Force and Stabilization Force. During that period every single brigade was involved in some aspect of the mission. Meanwhile, another 1,100 soldiers were taking part in one of the headquarters' other concurrent "campaigns," which included the Partnership for Peace exercises, some eleven exercises in the course of a single year; the continuing mission in Macedonia; humanitarian assistance; and the Beirut Air Bridge.¹¹ There was no more normality, and the term "steady state operations" by then bore entirely new connotations.

Carrying out the new range of missions placed demands on the corps that necessitated some of the kinds of changes that Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki was starting to make in the process of transforming the service. USAREUR, however, was a "legacy force," a polite term that meant the command would not receive the number of people or the amount of money it had in the past, and that its units would be among the last in the Army to benefit from the new organization and equipment with which the service had begun experimenting. Thus, out of sheer necessity, USAREUR and its major tactical organization, V Corps, began their own process of transformation, anticipating some of the changes that would eventually occur elsewhere in the Army. At the unit level, V Corps had to focus on its principal customer, the regional commander in chief, and make itself useful to him for the missions that European Command and Central Command had to carry out.

Of the two matters that principally concerned V Corps during the Cold War, readiness and gunnery, readiness became considerably the more important by 2001, though it was readiness defined in a different way than V Corps had understood the term in 1990. Usefulness in the post-Cold War context meant that V Corps had to be able rapidly to deploy various size forces configured for a wide range of missions, serving USAREUR as a provider of trained and ready forces and operating on the dictum that Lt. Gen. John Hendrix had earlier enunciated that "we produce readiness; CinCs consume it."¹² Deployment might proceed with adequate planning time, but the demand might also be acute, requiring V Corps to have at its disposal the kind of ready force that the 82d Airborne Division had traditionally maintained. A wide range of forces might also be required, not merely combat task forces or groupings of logistics units, but also command posts or headquarters elements for joint or combined task forces. Capable soldiers could shoot well, but few of the V Corps missions between 1990 and 2001 called upon them to do so, and certainly not for the same reasons that had existed during the Cold War, since there was no longer an overwhelmingly strong foe to be defeated by superior gunnery.

The corps progressed steadily, if slowly, toward all of those goals from 1990 onwards. The path of change was never clear and the requirements seemed constantly changing. From each mission, however, starting with the deployment of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to Kuwait in 1992, V Corps drew useful lessons. As time went on, the corps incorporated those lessons into a revised set of operational concepts and devised a training and exercise strategy to determine how best to execute those concepts. It would be a mistake to say that there was a master plan that spanned the decade, or that successive corps command-

ers hewed to a distinct and clearly envisioned developmental path. In many cases, uncertainty about the future and about the resources and forces available made the way unclear, and the process was occasionally one of groping toward an indistinct goal.

However, the broad outlines were obvious enough. To meet its future missions, V Corps needed to be able to fight or carry out one of a wide range of other tasks somewhere other than Germany, which meant that it had to develop new operational concepts to reach that distant battlefield and sophisticated deployment techniques to move its forces swiftly. It needed to develop new exercise techniques to translate that understanding of operational requirements into the reality of units capable of carrying them out. It required adequate technology to communicate with and control far-flung forces. It needed to reconfigure its command post concepts for something other than the heavy force battle. Finally, it needed to develop staff procedures and techniques that were sufficiently flexible and fast to accommodate the new operational world.

A Force Ready To Go

For forty years and more, meticulous and detailed planning, followed by thorough and comprehensive exercises of those plans, were hallmarks of V Corps operations. By 2001 flexibility and agility had become far more important. In the process of reacting to political decision-making in a rapidly changing situation, careful plans were more often than not suddenly overcome by events, and the corps had to improvise in order to deliver the task forces to the required point by the demanded time. Two examples illustrated that fact. The first was the deployment of Task Force Eagle in December 1995, when the orderly deployment flow that had been carefully planned was utterly disrupted by a political decision to move the 1st Armored Division into Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately, scrapping the two weeks of lead time the corps thought it had been promised. The second was the sudden, mid-course decision to substitute a composite 2d Brigade Combat Team of 1st Armored Division for the Big Red One's trained 3d Brigade Combat Team when 1st Infantry Division assumed the Task Force Falcon mission in Kosovo during May 1999, again in the interests of placing an American force into the area of operations quickly. In both the Cold War model of detailed planning and the post-Cold War model of ad hoc operations the essential element of success was the same. Readiness lay at the heart of all corps operations. The definition of readiness simply varied somewhat from 1990 to 2001.

A frequently heard criticism of the heavy corps in the Cold War years was that it was "immovable," and there was some justice in that view, since its mission was indeed highly specialized for the highest intensity conventional battle the mind could conceive. But after a decade of rapid change, V Corps was in danger of being open to a similar criticism from the opposite end of the spectrum—that it had become so highly specialized for peace enforcement missions that it could no longer undertake conventional battle. There appeared to be a

point of view in the Army at large that V Corps was indeed the "Balkan Corps," and that any missions that might arise there should go to V Corps as a matter of course, based on the headquarters' extensive experience in that area of operations and in peace enforcement missions. As he was on the point of relinquishing command of V Corps, General Hendrix continued to worry about that point and stressed that the corps had to continue the difficult process of remaining ready for many types of missions:

We really go to wherever the guns sound, and that is determined by the pace of world events. Right now, we are sort of the "Balkan Corps," if we allow that to happen—but I refuse to allow that to happen; that is, to become a corps adapted solely to one peace support mission in a single area of the world. That is one part of our context at the moment. We are not the Balkan Corps. We are also, for example, the Southwest Asia Corps, and we can't let that slide away from us. We must be prepared for employment anywhere in the world.¹³

All of the major actions that were under way during the tenure of his successor in command, Lt. Gen. James Riley, pointed along the azimuth that Hendrix had indicated. In January 2001 the command post redesign to enable it to be more rapidly and easily deployable reached at least its interim goal of being strategically mobile on around two dozen C-130 air loads. Working in concert with USAREUR, the corps had also focused attention on the USAREUR Aviation Initiative that General Montgomery Meigs had stressed since reviewing the after action reports on Task Force Hawk. Future Army aviation missions would largely be "come as you are" night operations in the toughest possible terrain and under adverse environmental conditions, using split-based operations, for prolonged periods of time, as Meigs saw it.¹⁴ The V Corps Victory Strike exercise in 2000, and the annual Victory Strike exercises planned for succeeding years, aimed at achieving that goal. The heart of the future vision of the corps was encapsulated in its training program for the forthcoming five years. Acknowledging that stability and certainty were problematical, the corps nonetheless aimed toward sustaining a training plan that kept its units prepared for both heavy force conventional battle and contingency operations, with the focus between the two alternating every other year.

The essentially new corps staff that arrived in the summer rotation in 2000 received its first orientation to the way the corps meant to function in the field with its new deployable command post in a corps exercise in September, Exercise Victory Start. That was followed in October by Exercise Victory Strike, conducted at training areas in Poland, where the corps exercised its deep operations coordination cell in the direction of a live fire exercise involving deep strike attack helicopter operations supported by rocket artillery fires. Currency in joint operations was maintained through corps participation in Exercise Internal Look, conducted at Fort Bragg in November and focused on the Joint Strategic Capability Plan. Then, turning to the heavy force conventional scenario, the headquarters in January 2001 conducted Exercise Victory Focus, a command post exercise that used a Southwest Asia scenario and that was to

serve as the ramp-up to the next Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercise. Exercises planned for succeeding months included a joint 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division Warfighter exercise that was also set in Southwest Asia. Then, in June 2001, when V Corps units finished their most current rotation as part of NATO's Kosovo Force and turned over that mission to XVIII Airborne Corps, the entire corps training focus was scheduled to shift to the Joint Strategic Capability Plan through June 2002, starting with a leaders reconnaissance to Southwest Asia sometime after June. The five-year projection alternated between the heavy conventional battle and the contingency operations mission.¹⁵

The focus of operations from 1990 through 2001 varied widely, and throughout the first half of the decade V Corps had generally been more likely to dispatch logistical troops of various kinds or medical units than combat forces for its out-of-sector missions. Indeed, after the conclusion of Operation POSITIVE FORCE in Kuwait, at the end of the Persian Gulf War, it appeared for a time that medical, general aviation, engineer, and water purification units were becoming the principal players in the contingency operations drama. The steady requirement for combat battalion task forces in Task Force Able Sentry in Macedonia and the heavy force deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina starting in December 1995 balanced that trend, however. By the end of the decade planners had ceased to make assumptions about the nature of future missions, which might as easily involve major combat as humanitarian relief, either with little prior notice.

While V Corps more often provided forces for the regional commanders in chief to use on various missions through the decade, elements of the headquarters and the corps headquarters itself were periodically involved in major deployment missions, notably Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and Operation VICTORY HAWK. One of the principal lessons of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was that the several general staffs within V Corps were precious commodities. While V Corps Artillery commanded a single artillery brigade, its general staff made possible the creation of Task Force Victory, without which support and sustainment of forces for Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have been possible. Again and again, the corps was asked to provide either staffs or key members of general staffs for various other task forces. That staff expertise became even more crucial as V Corps began to follow the evolutionary path limned by demands that went from forming a simple joint task force to forming a command post to run a joint force land component command—evolving a headquarters structure to satisfy the varied requirements of joint and combined operations.

Developing that notion of a modular headquarters that could deliver the right kind of command and control was an important part of satisfying the regional commanders in chief's requirements for effective command of joint forces in a very wide range of possible scenarios. In aid of all that, the corps' evolution of a command post that was easily deployable was obviously an essential step, and involved some key decisions about the tradeoffs that had to be made between mobility and survivability. Strategic mobility was the qualifying

test. If V Corps could not meet that requirement, its other capabilities were essentially meaningless. Tactical mobility in the theater of operations was the second test, and the steadily evolving deployable command post sought to satisfy both imperatives.

The essence of the "ready to go" force was the USAREUR and V Corps concept of the Immediate Ready Force, which gave the Army in Germany the ability to dispatch a light combat force into a trouble spot immediately, followed by force packages that delivered various other capabilities, including mechanized forces if needed. The immediate ready force established a new way of looking at the deployment and contingency mission, since it was really not an end in itself, but a means of projecting into a contingency theater some or all of the forces under command of United States Army, Europe, depending upon the requirement.

A New Approach to Training and Exercises

USAREUR diverged from the rest of the Army in many ways over the decade between 1990 and 2001. One of the most prominent was in training. When General Speakes arrived in Heidelberg from brigade command in the 1st Cavalry Division and took up duties as V Corps G-3 and subsequently chief of staff, he observed that he assumed he was coming from Fort Hood to another operational part of the Army that spoke the same language. He found instead that USAREUR took a different approach to training and the relationship of training to operations, and particularly to contingency operations. He did not suggest that only USAREUR was doing contingency operations, but did think that USAREUR was the only command that seemed repeatedly to be deploying its soldiers into challenging political and military situations of varying types.¹⁶

The situation in U.S. Forces Command had been a different experience for him. His brigade participated in the Intrinsic Action exercise series in Kuwait, for example, where the exercise certainly had a political-military purpose. At the tactical level, however, the brigade drew pre-positioned equipment and engaged in purely tactical operations for which *Field Manual 71-2* was the bible, and the standard of measurement was how similar events were run at the National Training Center. The closer a unit could approach training center standards, the better, and the scenarios did not involve any sort of sophisticated political-military situations.

In USAREUR, by contrast, the existing Army doctrine and practices had been embedded or modified in training events to make them relevant to a world dominated by contingency operations. The result was the mission rehearsal exercise, a training event focused on a specific type of operation and built around a master events list and a digest of dynamic story lines that produced extremely high competencies in the soldiers and units being trained, both at the individual and at the collective levels. The Army in Europe was confronted with the need to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict, and had to structure its exercise program to support the demands of being ready for con-

tingency operations and for high intensity warfare and for the many sorts of peace enforcement and humanitarian support missions that lay somewhere in between. The answer, Speakes thought, was the USAREUR 270-day retraining model, a training rhythm that specifically focused not on the abstract, but on a unit's abilities at a given moment in terms of its readiness to assume the next operational mission. The theater "measured the status of forces not against standard Army criteria," he concluded, "but rather against a new recognition of where a unit was in terms of its return from CONOPS [contingency operations] or preparation for the next one."¹⁷

A Different Model of Staff Organization

Accomplishing all those many tasks demanded much of the corps staff. At the heart of the V Corps staff lay the tested and able organization of the battle staff, which had proved itself again and again to be capable of producing astonishingly high quality work on equally astonishingly short time lines, though generally also at astonishingly high costs in terms of fatigue and "using up" talented staff officers. The traditional staff methodology still applied, and V Corps continued to use the time-worn five paragraph field order and the traditional military decision-making process to organize its planning work, regardless of the mission. The mechanical means of carrying out that planning, however, were vastly speeded up by the use of secure telephones, videoconferences, and e-mail. When the corps no longer received missions with clarity, the battle staff could no longer relate to higher headquarters in the traditional way. The "heart-beat of the Corps"¹⁸ on a day-to-day basis, the battle staff was the tool that made possible the essential synchronization of planning before a mission and the crucial detailed integration of command and control during execution, regardless of whether the mission happened to be heavy force combat or peace enforcement. The level of experience and diverse competencies that resided in the battle staff ensured that all battlefield operating systems were properly and effectively integrated for mission accomplishment.

The staff estimate remained the crux of the planning process, but V Corps was rapidly reaching the conclusion that the military decision-making process as traditionally construed and as taught at Fort Leavenworth was only marginally relevant to its fast-paced world and needed to be reconsidered and realigned. While the battle staff used the that process as a planning tool, management of mission execution tended increasingly to be handled by use of the "rolling" or "running" estimate. The running estimate reached back to the synchronization matrix that General David Maddox had made a part of all V Corps planning in 1991 and 1992, using it as a means of referring to the types of decisions, and sequences of decisions, that had to be made as compared to the unfolding of events in an operation. The first major operational use of such a device was in late 1995 and early 1996, when V Corps managed the deployment of 1st Armored Division as Task Force Eagle by means of a decision

support template, a method forced upon the staff by the suddenly compressed time available for the deployment.

A major part of the reorganization of the corps command post involved changes to reform the way the corps staff worked, reaching toward a goal of greater efficiency and smaller size. Consolidation of duplicative functions in the corps main command post, as well as the rear command post, a concept to which serious attention had been paid as early as 1994 and which had fallen into abeyance while the corps was preoccupied with operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were cautiously implemented. Cooperative staff work became the goal, rather than the customary method of working within individual staff sections and by organizational echelon. Throughout 1999 in particular, the staff considered a series of proposed internal reforms to increase teamwork and productivity and to enhance information-sharing.

That meant violating the traditional hierarchical staff structure, but did not necessarily change the conceptual processes of good staff work. However, the goal was to establish staff processes that were predictable, and the principal tool indeed became the running estimate, rather than the military decision-making process: a continuous self-assessment that considered the need to reprioritize and reset mission parameters. Technology helped decrease the size of the deployable headquarters staff, since vastly improved communications allowed the corps to retain major staff elements at its various headquarters in Germany and access them through the techniques of "reach-back," always acknowledging the risks inherent in loss of inter-theater communications, particularly in high intensity battle. Finally, at the end of the decade, the V Corps staff had found the technical means to implement the essence of the "four horsemen" concept of managing the battle by operating systems, rather than by hierarchical staff structure, that General Maddox had proposed in 1992.

Crystal Ball Gazing for an Army in Transition

Commanders at all levels repeatedly agreed over the course of the decade of the 1990s that the "new world order" made things more difficult for the United States Army, rather than easier, and that military operations in the uncertain world after the collapse of communism demanded far more of soldiers—and particularly of leaders—than ever before. The flexibility of mind to undertake missions across the spectrum of conflict, the readiness to serve in a humanitarian relief operation one month and a low-level combat operation the next, and maintaining the logistics and communications capabilities and staff expertise to command, serve alongside, or accompany bi-national, multinational, or joint or combined service headquarters, as well as nongovernmental entities, demanded much of everyone who wore a uniform.

Naturally, V Corps found it impossible to remain fully trained for every mission all the time, which meant that some ordering of training priorities between conventional warfare and contingency operations was utterly necessary. The traditional tension between plans and eventualities demanded that

the corps commander, his staff, and the organizations subordinate to V Corps attempt to remain as ready for any mission as possible, because world events were not regulated by the Army's training rhythm. The deployment of Task Force Hawk to Albania was an excellent illustration of the problem. Although it went to Tirana as a small scale force tailored for a small scale contingency, the corps commander made certain that he embedded in the task force structure the capabilities to carry out operations at any level of intensity, since the political volatility of the region offered no guarantees that the mission would remain either low level or small scale. Hence, for all operations, V Corps had to incorporate into its planning methodology the concept that, whatever the original mission order, the ultimate task might differ according to the changing operational environment.

The problems that confronted V Corps from 1990 through 2001 were the same as those that concerned the Army at large after the end of the Cold War, the turning point that spelled the end of the dangerous, familiar, but paradoxically stable bipolar politico-military situation that had endured since the end of World War II. Just as at the end of all of America's wars, the Army after 1990 had to react to a vastly changed set of conditions that included the key element of the public perception of the service. Thoughtful soldiers found the post-Cold War world a much more dangerous, unstable, and unpredictable place, a conclusion that all Americans did not share. The eventual demand for a smaller military requiring a smaller share of the national treasure was perfectly consistent with the situation the Army had experienced in 1919 and in 1946.

Unlike 1919 and 1946, however, there was in 1990 no shortage of perceived threats and no dearth of potential enemies, at least to those who had the willingness to concede their existence. That truism was first demonstrated by the Persian Gulf War and subsequently by the many smaller conflicts that erupted along the periphery of what was once the Warsaw Pact and across the Third World. The Army might argue that it had to maintain a heavy conventional force because future threats to national security were not always, or even usually, perceptible while they were in gestation, citing the example of World War II as viewed from the perspective of 1919. Such an effort never had any chance of succeeding in the face of the political and fiscal realities current in 1990, however, and the issue for the Army became one not of convincing the public or fighting out the issue of the probable shape of future war, but of providing appropriate military forces to meet the existing and presumed demands within the constraints imposed by the share of national resources that could be allocated.

Thus, in what might be termed a flight from irrelevance, the Army as a whole, and V Corps in microcosm, considered how to transform the conventional heavy force into one that could more easily cope with a wide range of tasks, including nonmilitary tasks, and still fight capably at any level across the spectrum of conflict. Readiness, deployability, strategic mobility, sophisticated command and control, and flexibility imposed demands that resulted in changes to hardware, doctrine, organization for battle, and training.

As the decade between 1990 and 2001 illustrates, the process was not an easy one, and probably the most visible and dramatic examples of the changes lay in Europe, where the Army had been most specifically tailored for a single, by then outdated, mission. Thus the accommodation of V Corps to changing circumstances over that decade demonstrates on an understandable scale the problems confronting the larger United States Army on a much larger and more complex scale. Many of the solutions at which the corps commander, staff, and soldiers arrived anticipated later changes in direction that the Army selected for all of its forces. Clearly, nowhere else in the Army were the stresses the modern pace of operations imposed on soldiers and their families more evident than in V Corps and the United States Army, Europe.

In sum, however, if one overriding conclusion could be drawn from the experiences of V Corps across the decade from 1990 through 2001, it was the continued relevance of the corps echelon of command. Particularly when comparing the United States Army corps organization with those of other nations, or even with other tactical organizations of the U.S. armed services, the inescapable conclusion is that the corps provides a unique set of capabilities—combat capabilities, logistical support capabilities, force projection capabilities, and command and control capabilities—all as essential to the world of contingency missions as they were to conduct of major combat operations.

The parallel conclusion, and a surprising one to many, is that the generic heavy corps organization that characterized the Army at the end of the Cold War proved both durable and functional in post-Cold War operations. In its numerous deployments between 1990 and 2001, V Corps tailored task forces that were appropriately organized for the mission of the moment, often drawing elements from both of its divisions and many of its separate brigades for the purpose. The corps could do that precisely because its order of battle retained all of those traditional elements of military force that had characterized what many considered an outmoded style of military organization. The generic heavy force organization gave V Corps the ability to build a combat force for one mission and a peace enforcement for the next, meanwhile structuring a humanitarian relief task force from its medical or logistical units. Such diverse organizations would have been beyond the capabilities of V Corps had it been reconfigured for peace support operations, as had occasionally been suggested at various times during the decade of the 1990s.

Having built such task forces, the corps also developed unique abilities to train—or perhaps rehearse would be a more accurate term—them for their forthcoming missions; to command them, if required; and to sustain them in far-flung theaters of operations. The essential mechanism for doing that was the corps battle staff organization, a tested and capable tool that had the range of skills and abilities to conduct many types of operations and often to conduct them simultaneously, and the depth of personnel to do so around the clock for long periods of time. In many ways, the major transformation that affected V Corps after 1990 was not physical, organizational, or technical, although all three played their parts in giving the headquarters the flexibility to do the jobs

that came its way. Instead, the principal element of transformation lay within the staff, and particularly within the battle staff, where a deep intellectual change took place.

In fact, the decade of experience in the transformation of V Corps after it grudgingly gave up its Cold War mission persuasively demonstrated that the essence of "transformation" lay in the human element, in commanders and supporting staffs that could find ways to achieve the desired military effects with the means at hand. Starting with General David Maddox's experiments to find ways to move V Corps to some other battlefield than the inter-German border and to control it on the move to a meeting engagement, and continuing through the steadily evolving processes for moving the corps, commanding the corps, and configuring the corps for many possible future missions, and finally to adjusting the attitudes of its leaders and staffs to embrace the ambiguity of those future battlefields, V Corps built a generation of leaders at all levels and staffs at all echelons that no longer functioned according to the deliberate processes that characterized the Cold War service. Thus the transformation of V Corps after the end of the Cold War was primarily a transformation of attitude and of ways of thinking about military operations, which is to say that it was far more intellectual than physical.

Hence, the interplay of fiscal reality and military practicality yielded an unanticipated conclusion: that the Army was well-served by the traditional corps organization because that organization provided both a wide range of capabilities and the flexibility to package forces for many tasks. It was also certain that in a smaller army, too much specialization was unwise, and that the Army could not afford to have, for example, a corps optimized for peace support operations, when so few large formations existed at all. Using traditional organization to cope with nontraditional missions was not easy, of course, and the experience of the Army in Europe over the decade showed that the process required intensive, carefully considered training and exercises and great mental flexibility in its leaders, all eminently evident in the transformation of V Corps between 1990 and 2001.

NOTES

¹ This summary is drawn from Maj. Dwayne A. Edwards, "Warriors or Referees," unpublished Ms, June 1998.

² Unless otherwise cited, this section is based upon V Corps Information Paper, AETV-CSH, 29 Jul 1999, sub: Observations on Continuing Issues in V Corps Deployments, 1989–1999.

³ In the Cold War years, black humor abounded, in view of what was seen as the overwhelming Warsaw Pact threat. Noting the size and relative immobility of the Corps Rear command post (CP), junior officers had been heard to remark that the "culminating point" of the great future battle in central Germany would be reached when the corps' most forward combat element, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, conducted a passage of lines through the Corps Rear CP billeting area.

⁴ In the language of Field Manual 100–5, *Operations* (1982).

⁵ Personnel manning figures from MFR, V Corps ACofS, G–1, 9 Jul 1999, sub: Personnel Manning for FY 2000.

⁶ See Field Manual 100–17–2, *Army Prepositioned Load* (16 Feb 1999). Mission data drawn from V Corps Command Briefing, December 1992.

⁷ Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Swain, V Corps Artillery commander in 1994–95, particularly stressed that point. See Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Swain, Commanding General, V Corps Artillery, 31 May 1995, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany.

⁸ On this point, see General Maddox's comments in End of Tour Interv, author with Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox, Commanding General, V Corps, 5 Jun 1992, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

⁹ HQ, V Corps, ACofS, G–5, GRA (Government Relations Advisor) action and briefing files for the period 1990–93 illuminate this issue, pointing up what the GRA, Dr. R. S. Garnett, Jr., referred to as "measles on the map" of contentious issues with local German communities, particularly with respect to training noise. Also see the GRA's comments in Interv, author with Dr. Robert S. Garnett, Jr., Government Relations Advisor, HQ, V Corps, 29 Aug 1994, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

¹⁰ Interv, author with Brig. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes, Chief of Staff, V Corps, 7 Aug 2000, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

¹¹ Secretary of Defense Update Briefing, 28 Feb 1997, sub: V Corps Briefing, Operational Engagement in Practice: V Corps, EUCOM/CENTCOM's Contingency Corps.

¹² V Corps Historian Staff Call Notes, 17 Mar 1999.

¹³ Interv, author with Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix, Commanding General, V Corps, 2 Nov 1999, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

¹⁴ USAREUR White Paper, "USAREUR Army Aviation in the 21st Century—A Vision for Training Excellence," 22 Nov 2000.

¹⁵ V Corps Staff Orientation Briefing for new members of V Corps Staff, 3 Aug 2000.

¹⁶ Speakes interview.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ In the words of Mr. Doug Nolen. See Interv, author with Mr. Raymond D. Nolen, Chief, Exercises Branch, Training Division, ACofS, G-3, V Corps, *re* Exercise Urgent Victory '01, 6 Jun 2001, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

Commanding Generals of V Corps 1990–2001

George A. Joulwan, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, V Corps, 7 August 1989–9 November 1990. George A. Joulwan graduated from West Point in 1961 as an infantry officer and served as an infantry company commander in the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam, 1966–67. He served a second tour in Vietnam, 1971–72, as a brigade S–3 and division deputy G–3 in the 101st Airborne Division. Successive assignments followed as a Reserve Officers' Training Corps instructor at Loyola University of Chicago; a tactical officer at West Point; assistant executive officer to the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; special assistant to the President; special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; executive officer to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of Force Requirements on the Department of the Army Staff. He commanded 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, in the 1st Infantry Division, 1975–77, and the 2d Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division. He commanded the 3d Armored Division from 4 March 1988 to 4 August 1989.

After leaving command of V Corps, General Joulwan became Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, in Panama. From 1993 through 1997, when he retired from active duty, he was Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. After retirement, he served as Olin Professor for National Security at the United States Military Academy.

David M. Maddox, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, V Corps, 9 November 1990–17 June 1992. David Maddox was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 5 April 1938. Upon completion of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps curriculum and graduation from the Virginia Military Institute in 1960, he was commissioned an armor second lieutenant and awarded a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics. He also holds a Master of Science degree in operations research and systems analysis with an engineering specialty from Southern Illinois University. His military education includes the Armor Basic and Advanced Officers Courses, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Army War College.

He commanded at every level between cavalry troop and corps before assuming command of V Corps, including four tours of duty in Germany. Among his principal assignments were command of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in VII Corps, Germany; Commanding General of the Combined Arms Operations Research Activity at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Assistant Division Commander (Operations and Training), 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado; and Commander, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), in Germany.

Prior to those senior assignments, he commanded at troop level in the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany. He was a Senior Operations Advisor with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, after which he served as Military Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research), and subsequently, Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C. He was transferred to Europe and commanded the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, in V Corps, and then attended the Army War College before serving as the Director of Studies and Analysis Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

After relinquishing command of V Corps, he was promoted to the rank of general and on 9 July 1992 became Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, as well as Commander of NATO's Central Army Group. He retired from the Army after relinquishing command of USAREUR on 19 December 1994.

Jerry R. Rutherford, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, V Corps, 17 June 1992–6 April 1995. Upon completion of the Reserve Officer Training Corps curriculum, and after receiving a bachelor's degree in journalism at Pittsburgh State University, Jerry R. Rutherford was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry. His first assignment was to Bravo Company, 1st Battle Group, 5th Infantry, Fort Riley, Kansas, as a platoon leader, from August to October 1962. He completed the Infantry Officer Orientation Course and Ranger Course at the United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, from November 1962 through April 1963.

Assigned to Germany after Ranger School, he was a platoon leader in Company B, 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry, in the 3d Armored Division in Friedberg, from April 1963 to August 1964. He was aide de camp to the commanding general, 3d Armored Division, from November 1964 to June 1966. He completed the Armor Officer Advanced Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in June 1967 and remained at Fort Knox to command D Troop, 5th Reconnaissance Squadron, 1st Training Brigade, United States Army Training Center.

During the Vietnam War Rutherford was assistant S-3 for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from May 1968 to May 1969. Upon return to the United States, he served as Instructor/Team Chief, Company Tactical Committee, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, from May 1969 to January 1971. He attended the District Operations Course, Vietnam Training Center,

Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C., from January to May 1971. In May 1971 he returned to Vietnam and served as District Senior Advisor, Bien Hoa Province, Advisory Team 98, and returned to the United States in April 1972 to attend the Naval Command and Staff College at Newport, Rhode Island.

He was then assigned as the S-3 and Executive Officer for the 1st Squadron, and later as Regimental S-3, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Bliss, Texas, from June 1973 through December 1975. In 1976 he was Staff Officer, Doctrine and Systems Integration Division, Requirements Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army. From February 1978 to August 1979 he commanded the 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Bliss.

In September 1979 he became Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, G-3, for the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, where he served until June 1981. He then attended the United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, graduating in June 1982. In August of that year, he returned to Germany as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, G-3, V Corps. Returning to the 3d Armored Division, he assumed command of the 3d Brigade from June 1983 until November 1985. He then returned to V Corps as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, until October 1986, when he was assigned as the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Fort Riley, Kansas, a post he relinquished in August 1989.

In that month, Rutherford took command of the 2d Armored Division (Forward), "Hell on Wheels," in Garlstedt, Germany. During deployment in the Persian Gulf for Operation DESERT STORM, he relinquished command of the 2d Armored Division (Forward) on 6 April and assumed command of the 3d Armored Division, "Spearhead," on 7 April 1991.

On 17 January 1992 he assumed duties as Deputy Commanding General, V Corps. On 17 June 1992 he assumed command of V Corps. Upon relinquishing command of V Corps, General Rutherford retired from the Army.

John N. Abrams, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, V Corps, 6 April 1995–31 July 1997. John N. Abrams was commissioned through Officer Candidate School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on 3 February 1967 after enlisting in the United States Army on 17 February 1966. He is a graduate of Bowling Green State University in Ohio with a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and of Shippensburg State University of Pennsylvania, which conferred the degree of Master of Science in Public Administration. He is a 1986 graduate of the Army War College.

General Abrams served in command and staff positions over a period of thirty-two years. He served in Vietnam from August 1967 to July 1969, where he was an armored cavalry platoon leader and armored cavalry troop commander with the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, which deployed from the 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fulda, Germany, from 1988 to 1990; the 2d Infantry Division, U-

jongbu, Korea, from 1993 to 1995; and V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany, from 1995 to 1997. Prior to assuming command of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on 14 September 1998, he was the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General from August 1997 to September 1998.

His service includes staff assignments as Chief of Staff of the 3d Armored Division in Germany; Military Science Instructor at the United States Military Academy at West Point; and Army Staff Officer in War Plans and Deputy Director of Operations Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans.

After commanding V Corps, General Abrams was promoted to the rank of general and became Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, a post that he held until his retirement on 7 November 2002.

John W. Hendrix, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, V Corps, 31 July 1997–16 November 1999. John (Jay) W. Hendrix was commissioned from the Georgia Institute of Technology and entered active duty in November 1965. He received the Master of Arts in History from Middle Tennessee State University and completed the U.S. Army War College in 1984. He had two combat assignments as a rifle company commander in Vietnam. Other assignments include Instructor, U.S. Army Ranger School; Battalion Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry (Mechanized); Brigade S-3, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized); Commander, 2d Battalion, 13th Infantry (Mechanized); and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 24th Infantry Division.

Later assignments included Chief, Testing Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army; Commander, 2d Brigade, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized); Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armored Division, in Operation DESERT STORM; Executive Officer to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander-in-Chief, Europe; Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School and the Deputy Commanding General of Fort Benning, Georgia; Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Army, Europe; Commander, U.S. Army Infantry Center, and Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School; and Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, Georgia, from 15 July 1996 to July 1997.

Hendrix assumed command of V Corps in Heidelberg, Germany, on 31 July 1997. He is a Ranger and Master Parachutist and a graduate of the Infantry Advanced Course, Fixed Wing Aviator Course, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Following his command of V Corps, General Hendrix was promoted to the rank of general and assumed command of United States Forces Command in Atlanta, Georgia on 23 November 1999. He retired from the Army in 2002.

James C. Riley, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, V Corps, 16 November 1999–18 July 2001. James C. Riley entered the Army in December 1965 as an enlisted soldier. He attended Officer Candidate School and was commissioned as an Infantry officer in 1966.

Early in his career he served in the 82d Airborne Division. Thereafter, he was an advisor in the Vietnamese 25th Infantry Division. Later assignments included duty with the 4th Battalion, 35th Armor, as the Assistant S-3; with the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, of the 1st Armored Division, in Germany as company commander, S-4, and as battalion maintenance officer; and with the United States Recruiting Command. He again served with the 1st Armored Division as Deputy G-3; Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry; and S-3, 3d Brigade. Later he commanded the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas, and served as the G-3 and Chief of Staff, 2d Armored Division (Forward), in Germany.

He later commanded the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, in Germany, a unit that served with the 1st Armored Division in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; and served as Chief, European Division, J-5, the Joint Staff, and as the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative for European Security Matters in Washington, D.C., and Vienna, Austria. From June 1994 until August 1995 he was the Assistant Division Commander for Support, 1st Armored Division, in Hanau, Germany. In October 1995 he became the Chief, United States Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia.

General Riley commanded the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, Georgia, from 27 June 1997 to 10 November 1999. He assumed command of V Corps on 16 November 1999. Upon leaving V Corps, General Riley became Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He retired from the Army in August 2003.

General Riley is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Advance Course, United States Army Command and General Staff College, and of the United States Army War College. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Nebraska and a Master of Arts degree from Webster University.

William S. Wallace, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, V Corps, 18 July 2001–14 June 2003. William S. Wallace was commissioned a second lieutenant in Armor upon graduation from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1969. He graduated from the Army Airborne and Ranger courses before reporting to Fort Knox, Kentucky, where he attended the Armor Officer Basic Course. His first assignment was as a platoon leader and troop executive officer in the 2d Squadron, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Meade, Maryland. His next duty was in Vietnam, where he was an assistant district advisor and later operations advisor in the Bac Lieu Province. Leaving Vietnam for Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1972, he served with the 82d Airborne Division as a company commander, battalion adjutant, and battalion operations officer for 4th Battalion (Light) (Airborne), 68th Armor.

In 1977 he attended the Armor Officer Advanced Course, followed by advanced civil schooling at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he earned a Master of Science degree in operations analysis. Following graduation he remained in Monterey to serve as a project officer. Six months later he returned to Fort Knox, where he served as an operations re-

search analyst and project officer in the U.S. Army Armor Center's Operations Research Systems Analysis Branch, and later as chief of the studies division of that branch.

In 1983 he attended the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After graduation he began his first tour in Germany as a squadron executive officer, regimental operations officer, and regimental executive officer with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. He then commanded the regiment's 3d Squadron, following which he attended the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

General Wallace was then assigned as the Senior Armored Task Force Trainer at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. In June 1991 he became chief of staff of the NTC and Fort Irwin. Following that tour, he returned to Germany, where he first served with V Corps as the 55th Colonel of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fulda. When the regiment was inactivated in the spring of 1994, he returned to Fort Irwin, where he commanded the NTC's operations group and later became commander of the NTC and Fort Irwin.

From Fort Irwin, he moved to Fort Hood, Texas, where he commanded the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) until his reassignment to the U.S. Joint Forces Command. General Wallace was the Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, and Director of Joint Training at the U.S. Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia, immediately before taking command of V Corps. There, he was responsible for the management of the joint force exercise and training development program; the review, coordination, development, and application of the joint doctrine program; and assisting with the planning and execution of joint task force commander and staff integration training and contingency planning.

On 18 July 2001 he assumed the responsibilities as Commanding General, V Corps. After relinquishing command of V Corps, General Wallace became Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, in June 2003.

Appendix B

Deputy Commanding Generals of V Corps 1990–2001

The position of Deputy Commanding General was first authorized under TOE 52–2H (28 September 1974). The V Corps, however, did not organize under that TOE until 21 May 1977. Until that time, it functioned under TOE 52–1H.

Donald E. Eckelbarger, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 25 May 1988–9 August 1990. Donald Eckelbarger was commissioned in the Field Artillery from the U.S. Military Academy in 1959, where he earned the Bachelor of Science degree. He later earned the Master of Science degree in Engineering Administration from George Washington University. He was a graduate of the Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

In Vietnam, he was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division as assistant fire support coordinator, and later as S–3 and executive officer of the 2d Battalion, 5th Field Artillery. He subsequently returned to the United States in 1969 to attend the Command and General Staff College. After graduation, he was an assignment officer in the Field Artillery Branch, Office of Personnel Operations. He remained in Washington to serve as Assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, after which he joined the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas. After a short tour as 2d Division Artillery executive officer, he assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 78th Field Artillery. An assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, completed his tour at Fort Hood.

Attendance at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces brought him back to Washington, where he remained after graduation to serve as the Chief of the Reserve Forces Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). In February 1977 he was reassigned to Germany and

became the 3d Armored Division chief of staff. He remained in that capacity until February 1978, when he took command of the 3d Armored Division Artillery.

Immediately before being assigned as V Corps Deputy Commanding General in May 1988, he served as Director, Human Resources Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, in Washington, D.C. He had also served as Chief of Staff of the Field Artillery Center and School; Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School; and Commanding General, VII Corps Artillery.

Jay M. Garner, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 9 August 1990–13 December 1991. Jay Montgomery Garner earned a Bachelor of Science in history from Florida State University. Following service as an enlisted marine, he was commissioned in the Army as an Air Defense Artillery officer in 1962. He subsequently earned the Master of Science in Public Administration from Shippensburg University. He graduated from the Air Defense Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Defense Language Institute, the Marine Command and Staff College, and the United States Army War College.

He served as a platoon leader and battery executive officer in the 3d Missile Battalion, 7th Artillery, in Germany, 1962–64. In 1965–66 he was assistant operations officer in the 53d Artillery Brigade at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, following which he held a similar position in the 13th Artillery Group at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.

He served as an assistant subsector advisor and later deputy district senior advisor with Advisory Team 38 in the Republic of Vietnam in 1967 and 1968. Upon his return to the United States, he commanded Battery B, 5th Battalion, 7th Artillery (Nike Hercules), at Franklin Lakes, New Jersey. In 1969 and 1970 he was assigned as a staff officer in the Logistics Division of the Office of Military Assistance, U.S. Army Southern Command, at Fort Amador, Canal Zone.

Following training at the Foreign Service Institute, he returned to Vietnam in 1971 as District Senior Advisor in Advisory Team 36. From 1972 to 1973 he was S-3 and Plans and Training Officer for the Reserve Component Study, and then became S-3 of the 1st Battalion, 3d Air Defense Artillery, in the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. After serving as a staff officer at Headquarters, Department of the Army, he commanded the 2d Battalion, 59th Air Defense Artillery, in Germany, 1978–81, following his command with another assignment at Department of the Army. After graduation from the Army War College, he commanded the 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade of 32d Army Air Defense Command in Germany, 1984–86, and then returned to Department of the Army, where he was Director of Force Requirements (Combat Support Systems) in DCSOPS from 1986 through 1988.

Garner was Deputy Commanding General and Assistant Commandant, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Center, at Fort Bliss, Texas, prior to becoming Deputy Commanding General of V Corps on 9 August 1990. He commanded relief operations in Northern Iraq during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991–92. He retired from the Army on 31 August 1997 after serving Assistant

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans for Force Development at the Department of the Army; as Commanding General, United States Army Space and Strategic Defense Command; and finally as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army. In retirement, he served in the interim civilian administration of Iraq in 2003.

Jerry R. Rutherford, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 21 January 1992–17 June 1992. See Appendix A for biography.

Jarrett J. Robertson, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 17 June 1992–23 February 1993. Jarrett Jackson Robertson earned the degree of Bachelor of Science from Southwest Missouri State University and was commissioned a second lieutenant in Armor in July 1963. He subsequently earned the Master of Science in History from the University of Missouri-Columbia. He was a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the National War College.

He had a variety of staff assignments that included brigade S-2, battalion executive officer, and deputy G-3 in the 3d Armored Division, 1974–77; staff officer in the War Plans Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1977–78 and 1984–85; aide de camp and assistant executive officer to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1979–80; and Executive Officer, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1982–83.

During two tours of duty in the Republic of Vietnam he was Assistant Regional Force/Popular Force Advisor, Advisory Team #1, U.S. Military Assistance Command, 1965–66; and S-4, assistant S-3, and cavalry troop commander in the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1968–69.

He commanded the 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Bliss, Texas, 1980–82; the Operations Group at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, 1986–87; and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, 1987–89. He was the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for the 3d Infantry Division, 1989–91, during which time the division served in Southwest Asia in the DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM campaigns from November 1990 through May 1991. He was Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General for VII Corps, 1991–92.

He assumed the post of Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, on 17 June 1992. On 23 February 1993 General Robertson was killed when the UH-60 helicopter in which he was returning from Stuttgart crashed at Wiesbaden Air Base.

Henry Albert Kievenaar, Jr., Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 18 May 1993–23 September 1994. Henry A. Kievenaar, Jr. earned the Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from Norwich University and the Master of Science in Public Administration from Shippens-

burg State University. He graduated from the Armor Office Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

After serving as a platoon leader in the 3d Battalion, 68th Armor, in Germany, 1964–66, and attending the airborne course at Fort Benning, Georgia, he served in the Republic of Vietnam, 1967–68, as assistant G–2 in the 101st Airborne Division. He then commanded Company A, 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, in that division, July to December 1968. He returned to the United States for the advanced course and a tour of duty as a Reserve Officer Training Corps instructor at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, and then returned to Vietnam as Operations Advisor in Advisory Team 109, working with the Vietnamese 4th Armor Brigade, 1972–73. He remained in Vietnam in 1973 as a protocol officer for the Four Party Joint Military Commission.

After serving as S–4 in the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, he became S–3 of the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas; aide de camp to the III Corps commanding general; and S–3 of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 1973–77. Between 1978 and 1981 he was a staff officer at the Army Military Personnel Center.

From 1981 through 1984 he commanded the 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, in the 1st Armored Division in Germany, and he returned to Germany in 1985 to command the 1st Brigade of the 3d Armored Division. In 1987 he was G–3 for VII Corps, and following that assignment he became G–3 for NATO's Central Army Group, 1988–89. He was then Deputy Chief of Staff (Support) for Central Army Group until 1991, when he became Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia, 1991–92.

General Kievenaar became Chief of Staff of V Corps on 3 August 1992 and was then promoted and assigned as V Corps Deputy Commanding General on 18 May 1993. From October 1994 through September 1997 he was Commander, Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land), and from September 1997 through May 1999 he was Principal Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, European and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Affairs, in the Department of Defense. He retired from the Army on 31 May 1999.

Walter H. Yates, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 26 September 1994–24 September 1996. Walter Harvey Yates graduated from the University of Southern Mississippi and was commissioned an Infantry second lieutenant and awarded the Bachelor of Science in mathematics. He later earned the degree of Master of Science in Foreign Affairs from George Washington University. His military education included the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the Army Aviation School, the Naval College of Command and Staff, and the U.S. Army War College.

As a company grade officer, he served in various positions in the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry (Mechanized), 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Fort Carson, Colorado. Following two assignments as an aviator in the United States Army, Vietnam, he returned to Fort Carson where he commanded an infantry company and served as an infantry battalion S–3.

After graduating from the Naval College of Command and Staff and the Army Aviation School, he twice served as an aviation battalion S-3 and later commanded an attack helicopter troop at Fort Hood, Texas. He then commanded the 503d Aviation Battalion (Combat), of the 3d Armored Division. Returning to the United States from Germany, he became Deputy Commander, 6th Cavalry Brigade; then Commander, Apache Training Brigade; and finally Commander, 6th Cavalry Brigade, all at Fort Hood.

He held a wide variety of command and staff positions culminating in his position as Deputy Commanding General, V Corps. Immediately prior to that duty, he was Commanding General, U.S. Army, Berlin, and the Berlin Brigade; Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 3d Armored Division; and Deputy Director, National Military Command Center, J-3, the Joint Staff, in Washington, D.C. After leaving V Corps General Yates was Deputy Commanding General of the Fifth U.S. Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He retired from the Army on 31 January 1998.

Gregory A. Rountree, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 23 September 1996–28 August 1998. Gregory Rountree graduated from the Southern University of Agriculture and Mining with a Bachelor of Science in Psychology degree and was commissioned in the Air Defense Artillery through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in 1970. He subsequently earned the degree of Master of Arts in Management and Human Relations from Webster University.

He was a graduate of the Air Defense Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Systems Management College Program Management Course, and the United States Army War College.

He served in a variety of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) assignments, beginning in 1970 in a warhead detachment of the 559th Artillery Group in Italy. He commanded Battery B, 1st Battalion, 65th Air Defense Artillery (Hawk), in Key West, Florida, and was then battalion assistant S-3. Assigned to Korea in 1977, he served as Chief, Management Control Unit, C-3/J-3/G-3, of the United Nations Command/United States Forces, Korea. Following a tour at Fort Bliss, Texas, as a project officer, he became S-4 of the 108th ADA Group in Germany in 1980 and subsequently Executive Officer of the 2d Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery, also in Germany.

After graduating from Command and General Staff College in 1984 and from an acquisition management course at Fort Lee, Virginia, later in that year, he became Staff Officer, Missiles and Air Defense Systems Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition, in Washington, D.C.

From 1987 through 1989 he commanded the 6th Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery, at Fort Bliss and in Germany. He graduated from the Army War College in 1990 and in 1991 commanded the 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade in Germany. In 1993 he became Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Space and Strategic

Defense Command, at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado. From 1994 to 1995 he was Commanding General, 2d ROTC Region, at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and from 1995 to 1996 he was Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Center and Fort Bliss.

In September 1996 General Rountree became Deputy Commanding General of V Corps, a post he held until August 1998, when he became Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (J-3/J-7), Regional Command North, Germany. In August 2000 he became Principal Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, European and NATO Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. His final assignment, from October 2000 through March 2003, was as Principal Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, European and NATO Affairs, in the Department of Defense. He retired from the Army in May 2003.

Julian H. Burns, Jr., Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 28 August 1998–16 August 1999. Julian H. Burns, Jr., graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1970 and was commissioned into the Armor. His military education included the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the United States Army War College. He commanded and served on staff in units in the United States, Germany, Italy, Korea, Southwest Asia, the Balkans, and Israel.

General Burns commanded the 2d Battalion, 68th Armor, in Europe; was a Senior Live Fire Observer Controller at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; commanded the 1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, in Korea; was Chief of Staff of the Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; was Assistant Division Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; served as J-5 for Allied Forces, Southern Europe, Naples, and for the NATO Implementation Force, Sarajevo; and then became Chief of Operations in NATO Stabilization Force, Sarajevo.

He was also a staff officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Operation and Plans, Special Assistant to two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Burns was assigned as Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, on 28 August 1998. After his assignment in V Corps, General Burns became Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Forces Command, at Fort McPherson, Georgia.

Reginald Graham Clemmons, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 16 August 1999–1 November 2000. Reginald G. Clemmons graduated from North Carolina Agricultural and Technological State University, from the ROTC detachment of which he was commissioned into the field artillery in 1968. He earned a Master's Degree in Education from South Carolina State College. His military education includes the Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Army War College.

He served as forward observer and liaison officer in the 7th Battalion, 13th Field Artillery, in the Republic of Vietnam. In Colorado Springs, Colorado, he commanded Headquarters and Service Battery and Battery B, 5th Battalion, 80th Field Artillery, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized); and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Upon assignment to Germany, he was a battalion assistant operations officer and then commanded Battery B, 3d Battalion, 21st Field Artillery. He later became assistant operations officer in the 1st Battalion, 80th Field Artillery (Lance).

He was an Assistant Professor of Military Science, South Carolina State College. Upon transfer to Korea, he was the 2d Infantry Division Assistant Fire Support Coordinator and Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery. He served as an operations research analyst at the U.S. Army Logistics Center, Fort Lee, Virginia. He also served as the Operations Officer and later the Executive Officer, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He commanded the 2d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, 82d Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg.

Clemmons was the Senior Observer/Controller, United States Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, and later served as the Commander, 1st Battlefield Coordination Detachment, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg. He commanded the 25th Division Artillery, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; then became the Director, Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department, United States Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Allied Land Forces Central Europe, from August 1995 to October 1996. He was the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Germany, from October 1996 to November 1997, and prior to taking his assignment as Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, he served as the Deputy Commander, Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, Turkey, from November 1997 to August 1999. Following his tour of duty in V Corps, General Clemmons became Commandant, National War College, in Washington, D.C. He retired from the Army in September 2003.

Robert F. Dees, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, 1 November 2000–September 2002. Robert F. Dees graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1972, was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry, and was awarded a Bachelor of Science degree. He also holds a Master of Science degree in operations research and systems analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School.

Upon commissioning, Dees attended the Infantry Officer Basic, Airborne, and Ranger Courses. He then served in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) as a rifle platoon leader, company executive officer, aide-de-camp, company commander, and battalion adjutant. In 1977 he attended the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, followed by the Naval Postgraduate School. He then taught operations research at the U.S. Military Academy, serving part of that time as an intern on the Joint Staff. In 1983 he attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

He next served in Germany, initially as a division chief of war plans and later as deputy division operations officer for 1st Armored Division. He then served as executive officer in the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 1st Armored Division.

Returning to the United States in July 1987, he served on the Army Staff as an operations research analyst in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. In November 1988 he commanded the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado.

Returning to Washington in July 1991, he attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. He then commanded 3d Brigade, "Rakkasan," 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, until November 1994. He was then appointed a research fellow at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, England, from December 1994 until January 1996. After serving as Vice Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability, J-7, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., he became the Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell from July 1997 through September 1998, and Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army from September 1998 through October 2000.

On 1 November 2000 he was assigned as Deputy Commanding General, V Corps. He retired from active duty in September 2002. He is a registered Professional Engineer in Virginia.

Appendix C

Chiefs of Staff of V Corps

1990–2001

James R. Harding, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 5 November 1989–9 June 1991. James Raymond Harding graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1964 and was commissioned in Armor. He later earned the degree of Master of Business Administration (MBA) from Harvard University. He was a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the United States Army War College.

In 1965 he was a platoon leader and later commanded Troop A, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, in the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The next year he was a platoon leader in Troop A, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division, in Vietnam, following which he was Assistant S-1 for the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

After earning the MBA at Harvard, he was instructor and assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point. In 1974 he became a joint plans officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, United States Atlantic Command, in Norfolk, Virginia. In 1976 he became executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, in the 1st Armored Division in Germany, following which he was S-3 for 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division.

In November 1977 he assumed command of the 3d Battalion, 35th Armor, in the 3d Brigade of the 1st Armored Division. In 1979 he returned to Fort Riley, Kansas, where he became Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for the 1st Infantry Division. In 1982 he commanded the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He was then Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division, at Fort Riley from November 1984 through September 1986. From then until May 1988 he was a special project officer in the United States Southern Command at Quarry Heights, Panama.

From June 1988 through taking up his duties as Chief of Staff, V Corps, General Harding was Assistant Division Commander of the 3d Armored Divi-

sion in Germany. After leaving V Corps, General Harding became Director, Inter-American Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, until July 1992. From July 1992 through July 1995 he was Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board. His final assignment, from September 1995 through July 1996, was Deputy Commanding General of First U.S. Army at Fort Meade, Maryland. He retired from the Army as a major general on 31 July 1996.

James Stuart Dickey, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 10 June 1991–10 July 1992. James S. Dickey graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1963 with a Bachelor of Science degree. In 1971 he earned a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Yale University. His military education included the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff Officer Course, and the National War College.

His first assignments in the Army were as reconnaissance platoon leader, company executive officer, and company commander in the 4th Battalion, 35th Armor, of the 4th Armored Division in Europe. He next served as aide de camp in the division headquarters. In 1966 he moved to Vietnam, where he was an assistant subsector advisor and, later, Senior Subsector Advisor, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. After the Armor Officer Advanced Course, he commanded Troop H and then served as S-3 in the 2d Squadron, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Meade, Maryland.

He returned to Vietnam in June 1971 as the Chief, Reports and Analysis Section, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and was later appointed Senior Advisor to the 2d (Vietnamese) Armored Cavalry Regiment. From April 1972 through June 1975 he was successively instructor and assistant professor in the Department of History, United States Military Academy, at West Point, New York.

After Command and General Staff College he served as assistant G-3 (Plans), 1st Armored Division, in Germany. He then assumed duties as executive officer, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, in the same division. Following that assignment, he became the emergency actions officer and later senior emergency actions officer for the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. He then moved to the Army Staff, where he served as speech writer for the Under Secretary of the Army. Following that tour of duty, he was assigned as Commander, 1st Battalion, 63d Armor, in the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Riley, Kansas.

After attending the National War College at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., he returned to Fort Riley, where he became Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), in the 1st Infantry Division. He then served two years as the Chief, Combat Maneuver Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, in Washington.

On 7 June 1991 General Dickey began duties as the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, V Corps, in Frankfurt. Previously, beginning on 12 August 1990,

he served as both the Assistant Division Commander (Support), 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and as the Mainz Military Community Commander. Prior assignments included service as executive officer to the Secretary of the Army in Washington, D.C., and commander of the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Fort Carson, Colorado.

After leaving V Corps, General Dickey served as Chief of Staff, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and then, upon retirement, became regional director for Europe for the American Battle Monuments Commission.

Henry A. Kievenaar, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 3 August 1992–17 May 1993. See Appendix B for biography.

Montgomery C. Meigs, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 17 May 1993–28 August 1994. Montgomery C. Meigs was commissioned a second lieutenant from the United States Military Academy in 1967. He commanded troops in the 3d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, in Europe and in the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, in Vietnam. He returned to Europe in 1972 and, during his first tour in the 1st Armored Division, served as a troop commander and S-3 in the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, in Schwabach.

After graduate school at the University of Wisconsin, he taught in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy from 1979 to 1981. In 1982 he joined the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment as its executive officer and, in 1984, returned to the First Dragoons as squadron commander. Between June 1987 and April 1990 he served as a strategic planner on the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C. He assumed command of the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, on 26 September 1990 and led it through DESERT STORM and its subsequent redesignation as 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division.

He took command of Seventh Army Training Center in Grafenwöhr, Germany, in November 1991 and then became V Corps Chief of Staff in May 1993. He was selected for promotion to major general and, in August 1994, took up duties as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, Europe, in Heidelberg. Following that assignment, he assumed command of the 3d Infantry Division, subsequently redesignated the 1st Infantry Division, in Würzburg. In December 1996 his division assumed responsibility for the Sustainment Force mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following division command, he was promoted to lieutenant general and took command of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1998 he returned to Germany and, promoted to general, became Commanding General, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army. He retired from the Army in January 2003.

General Meigs earned a Ph.D. in History at the University of Wisconsin and held post-doctoral fellowships at the National War College and the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of *Slide Rules and Submarines* (NDU Press). He is a graduate of the British Royal Army Long Army Infantry Course, the U.S. Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

George H. Harmeyer, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 28 August 1994–25 June 1995. George Herbert Harmeyer was commissioned in the Armor as a Distinguished Military Graduate of Western Maryland College in June 1965. Following the Armor Officer Basic Course, he became cavalry platoon leader, troop executive officer, and troop commander in the 1st Squadron, 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, in Fulda, Germany.

He served in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969 in the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, where he was assistant squadron S-3, troop commander, and squadron motor officer. He returned to Fort Knox, Kentucky, in 1969 for the Armor Officer Advanced Course, following which he went back to Germany as a troop commander and later squadron S-3 in the 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, at Bamberg.

He received the Master of Arts degree in Geography at the University of Washington in Seattle, after which he was an instructor at the United States Military Academy. Following graduation from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1978, he was assigned to the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, where he was S-3 of the 4th ("Phoenix") Brigade, division G-3 Operations Officer, and deputy division G-3.

In 1981 he returned to Europe, assigned to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, in Mons, Belgium, where he was a manpower survey staff officer. He assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 70th Armor, in the 4th Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, with the battalion assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Wiesbaden, Germany, in June 1982. He then was G-3, 2d Armored Division (Forward), in Germany, following which he attended the Army War College. After graduation he was assigned to Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, as Chief, Training Support Division.

He became Chief of Staff of the 2d Armored Division and subsequently commanded the 1st ("Ironhorse") Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood starting in June 1988. He commanded the brigade during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Following brigade command, he commanded the Operations Group, National Training Center, at Fort Irwin, California.

He was then assigned to Schweinfurt, Germany, where he was Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 3d Infantry Division, and Schweinfurt Senior Tactical Commander until becoming V Corps Chief of Staff in August 1994.

When he relinquished his post in V Corps, General Harmeyer was promoted to major general and became Commanding General, U.S. Army School and Fort Knox, Kentucky. He retired from the Army on 30 September 1999.

George W. Casey, Jr., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 3 October 1995–17 August 1996. George W. Casey, Jr., earned the Bachelor of Science in International Relations at Georgetown University and was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps into the Infantry in 1970. He graduated from the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Armed Forces Staff College, and completed a Senior Service College Fellowship with the Atlantic Council. He also earned the Master of Arts in International Relations from the University of Denver.

He was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 509th Airborne Infantry, of the 8th Infantry Division in Germany in 1971 as a mortar platoon leader and rifle platoon leader. In 1973 he served in that regiment's 1st Battalion in the Southern European Task Force, Italy, as platoon leader and company executive officer. He was a staff officer in the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, from 1975 to 1977 and then commanded Company C of that battalion from 1977 to 1978 and the Combat Support Company in the second half of 1978.

In 1981–82 he was a Department of Defense Military Observer, United States Military Observer Group, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Jerusalem. From 1982 through 1984 he was S–3 and then Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, of the 4th Infantry Division. Following that assignment, he served as secretary of the general staff for that division. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, from 1985 through 1987.

In 1988 he was Congressional Program Coordinator, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, in Washington, D.C., and the following year became Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army. In 1991 he assumed duties as Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas.

He commanded the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, from May 1993 through March 1995 and then became Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, for V Corps, a post he held until October 1995, when he became V Corps Chief of Staff.

From August 1996 through August 1997 he was Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, in Germany. From 1997 to 1999 he was Director for Politico-Military Affairs, J–5, on the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C.

Promoted to major general, he assumed command of 1st Armored Division in Germany in July 1999. In July 2001 he became Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/Director, Joint Training, J–7, United States Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia. Promoted to lieutenant general, he became Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5, Joint Staff, in the Pentagon in October 2001. In October 2003, promoted to the rank of general, Casey became Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. In July 2004 he became Commander Multi-National Force, in Iraq.

B. B. Bell, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 23 August 1996–30 May 1997. Burwell B. Bell graduated from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga with the Bachelor of Science in Business Administration and was commissioned into the Armor through the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1969. He subsequently earned the Master of Science in Systems Management from the University of South Carolina. He graduated from the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff College, and the National War College.

From 1969 through 1972 he was platoon leader and executive officer in Troop M and motor officer for 3d Reconnaissance Squadron and commanded Troop L of the 3d Reconnaissance Squadron, 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment,

in Germany. Returning to the United States, he was assistant S-3 in the 2d Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Brigade, and later S-3 of the 1st AIT Brigade in the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1972-74. He then commanded Troop D, 5th Cavalry Squadron, of the 1st AIT Brigade in 1974 and 1975 and served as Chief, Individual Training Department, at the Armor Center in 1975 and 1976.

After teaching in the Reserve Officer Training Corps at Texas Tech University at Lubbock, he went to Korea in 1979, where he was S-3 of the 1st Battalion, 72d Armor, of the 2d Infantry Division. Assigned to Washington, he was a staff officer in the Army Force Modernization Coordination Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, from 1981 to 1983. He then served just over a year as a force plans analyst in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.

He commanded the 2d Squadron, 9th Cavalry, in the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, from 1984 through 1987 and, after graduating from the National War College, served as an organizational policy planner in the Policy Division, J-5, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Washington, D.C. From 1988 to 1991 he was Executive Officer to the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, accompanying General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to Saudi Arabia for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

From 1991 through 1993 he commanded the 2d Brigade of the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and then was Chief of Staff of the 3d Infantry Division in Germany from 1993 through 1994. After a year as Senior Army Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, he returned to Germany in 1995 as Assistant Division Commander of the 3d Infantry Division.

From the end of 1995 through March 1996 he was Chief of Staff of U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army (Forward) at Kaposvár-Taszár, Hungary, for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the NATO-led peace enforcement mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He then returned to his duties as assistant division commander in 3d Infantry Division, by then redesignated the 1st Infantry Division, until August 1996, when he became Chief of Staff of V Corps.

He was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and Seventh Army, in 1997 and 1998, and then USAREUR Chief of Staff from 1998 to 1999. He then became Commanding General, United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox. In 2001 he was promoted to lieutenant general and assumed command of III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. Promoted to general, he assumed command of United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army in December 2002.

Raymond T. Odierno, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 21 July 1997–15 August 1998. Raymond T. Odierno graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1976 and was commissioned into the Field Artillery (FA). He served in the 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (Pershing), in Germany as a platoon leader, assistant S-3, and aide de camp. After the Officer Advanced Course, he was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, of the 18th FA

Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he was assistant S-3, Service Battery commander, commander of Battery A, and battalion S-3.

He attended North Carolina State University and received a Master of Nuclear Engineering degree, whereupon he was assigned to the Defense Nuclear Agency and was involved in anti-ballistic missile verification and served as a member of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Negotiation Team in Geneva, Switzerland.

Upon graduation from the Naval War College, where he received a Master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies, he became executive officer of the 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 3d Armored Division, and was subsequently executive officer of 3d Armored Division Artillery during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Returning to Germany, he assumed command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, and relocated that battalion to Fort Lewis, Washington.

He graduated from the Army War College in 1995, following which he commanded the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery from 1995 through 1997. In July 1997 he became V Corps Chief of Staff. In August 1998 he was reassigned as Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armored Division. In the course of that assignment, General Odierno was detailed to serve as Deputy Commander for Battle Integration in Task Force Hawk during Operation VICTORY HAWK in Albania in 1999. Promoted to major general, he was assigned to Washington following the end of his tour of duty in Germany. In October 2001 he took command of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which he commanded in Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

William H. Brandenburg, Jr., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 16 August 1998–21 June 1999. William H. Brandenburg, Jr., was a Distinguished Military Graduate from the Citadel in 1973 and was commissioned into the Infantry. He served in the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, at Fort Carson, Colorado, where he was a rifle platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, officer in charge of fielding and training the division soldiers on the TOW and Dragon, and battalion and brigade assistant S-3. In 1978, after graduation from the Infantry Advanced Course, he was assigned to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, where he served as commander of Company C, and later Combat Support Company, of the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. He also served as the assistant S-3 before being reassigned to Fort Hood, Texas, where he was materiel officer and executive officer of the Armor Support Battalion, 13th Corps Support Command.

He was then executive officer and S-3 of 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division. Upon graduation from the Command and General Staff College, he served as Chief of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle New Equipment Training Team. He was then assigned as the Chief of Doctrine at the United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. While at Fort Benning, he received a Master's degree in Management from Troy State University.

In 1991 he assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, in Schweinfurt, Germany. Following battalion command, he attend-

ed the Air War College, after which he was assigned to the Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate, J-5, on the United States Pacific Command Staff, Camp Smith, Hawaii.

From 1996 to 1998 he commanded the 1st Brigade (Raider), 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. On 16 August 1998 he arrived in Heidelberg, Germany, and became the V Corps Chief of Staff. He was subsequently assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, for NATO's Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, and in September 2001 he became Deputy Commanding General for Training and Readiness, I Corps, at Fort Lewis, Washington. In August 2003 he was assigned as Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army, Pacific. He was promoted to major general on 19 May 2004.

Stephen M. Speakes, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 21 June 1999–11 August 2000. Stephen Manning Speakes was commissioned from West Point as an armor officer in 1974. His initial assignment was to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas. He completed that tour as a tank company commander in 1979. Following graduation from the Armor Officer Advanced Course, he was assigned to the 4th Battalion, 64th Armor, in Aschaffenburg, Germany, as the battalion operations officer. He completed his first tour in Europe as the S-3 of the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, in 1983.

He returned to the United States and reported for duty as an intern on the Joint Staff. Follow-on assignments during that tour in the Pentagon included service on the 1984 presidential inauguration committee and as executive officer to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations-Force Development while acquiring a Master's degree in Government from Georgetown University.

He graduated from Command and General Staff College in 1987 and returned to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, where he was the regimental operations officer and squadron executive officer in the 2d Squadron. In 1990 he was selected to command of the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, at Bad Kissingen, Germany. Following Operation DESERT STORM, the squadron deployed to Kuwait for Operation POSITIVE FORCE in the summer of 1991.

In 1992 he was a fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, focusing on the design of a United Nations military force for peace enforcement operations. While in Boston, he also ran the Boston Marathon. He then reported for duty to the Joint Staff and served as a war planner in J-7 from 1993 through 1995.

In November 1995 he assumed command of the 2d "Blackjack" Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. During his tenure in command the brigade deployed to the National Training Center twice and to Korea for Exercise Foal Eagle. In December 1997 he returned to Europe and reported for duty as Chief of Staff, 7th Army Training Command.

In August 1998 Colonel Speakes reported for duty as the G-3 of V Corps. He moved from that position to V Corps Chief of Staff in July 1999, upon being selected for promotion to brigadier general. After leaving V Corps, General Speakes served from August 2000 through July 2001 as Assistant Deputy Chief

of Staff for Operations (Readiness) at United States Army Forces Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia. From July 2001 through August 2002 he was Chief of Staff of III Corps at Fort Hood. In August 2002 he was assigned as Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

In June 2003 General Speakes was assigned as Deputy Commanding General (Operations), Third U.S. Army, to include duty as Deputy Commanding General (Operations) for Coalition Land Component Command at Camp Doha, Kuwait, for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He was promoted to major general on 1 November 2003. In August 2004 he became Director, Force Development, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army.

Randal M. Tieszen, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 11 August 2000–2 August 2001. Randal M. Tieszen was commissioned a second lieutenant in Armor from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program at the University of South Dakota. He served as a tank platoon leader in the 4th Infantry Division and as a scout platoon leader and weapons platoon leader in Troop E, 1st Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He then commanded a tank company in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, an armored cavalry troop in the 2d Infantry Division, and an air cavalry troop in the 24th Infantry Division and served as the S-3 of the 24th Division's cavalry squadron.

Following completion of Command and General Staff College, he was assigned to the Pentagon as Chief, Aviation Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; aide-de-camp to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and Executive Officer to General Colin Powell.

He then commanded 5th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment, in Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq; Readiness Group Redstone in Huntsville, Alabama; and the 6th Cavalry Brigade in Fort Hood, Texas, and the Republic of Korea. He next served as the Director of Operations for Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center and then as the Chief of Staff, 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson, Colorado.

Tieszen served as Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, 1st Armored Division, Hanau, Germany, following which he assumed duties as Chief of Staff, V Corps, in August 2000. General Tieszen is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and holds a Master's degree in Management.

In August 2001 he began service as Deputy Commanding General/Assistant Commandant, United States Army Aviation Center, with duty as Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Training Center and Fort Jackson, South Carolina. He retired from the Army in October 2003.

Kenneth J. Quinlan, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, V Corps, 27 August 2001–24 June 2002. Kenneth J. Quinlan was commissioned as an Infantry officer in 1973 following graduation from the University of Rhode Island and began service as a rifle platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division. Following aviation training and assignment to the 9th Infantry Division, he served as section leader and platoon commander in D Troop, 3d Squadron, 5th Cav-

alry Regiment. Reassigned to the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, he served as adjutant, assistant S-3, and rifle company commander.

His other assignments included duty in Alaska as platoon commander and operations officer, D Troop, 1st Cavalry; operations officer, D Troop, 1st Squadron, 26th Cavalry Regiment, Rhode Island National Guard; Chief of Force Integration, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); and S-3, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment. He served in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM as the 101st Aviation Brigade S-3 and subsequently as Commander, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division. He commanded the 10th Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, and served as Chief of the Strategic Plans Division, Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate, United States Pacific Command. He served as the Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama, following which he became Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armored Division, where he also served as Task Force Falcon commander in Kosovo.

Selected for promotion to major general, he became Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Stabilization Force (Sarajevo), Joint Headquarters Centre, Allied Command, Europe, in August 2002. In June 2003 he became the Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia.

His military education included the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the Army War College. His degrees include a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Rhode Island and Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Appendix D

V Corps Order of Battle

1990¹

Twenty-three Maneuver Battalions and Squadrons Ten Battalions General Support and General Support, Reinforcing, Artillery

In 1990 V Corps was a heavy armored corps that consisted of an armored division and a mechanized infantry division that was an armored division in all but name. In organization, doctrine, and training, the corps was prepared for heavy maneuver force operations in consonance with AirLand Battle doctrine as expressed in Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, and was positioned to execute its portion of the General Defense Plan of Western Europe. In September 1990 USAREUR adopted a new community command concept that created numbered Area Support Groups and Base Support Battalions to replace the functions of the old Military Communities and Military Sub-Communities, thereby relieving V Corps units of those duties. The V Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Company reorganized under the H-series MTOE in 1990, which gave it a required/authorized strength of 144/104 officers, 7/7 warrant officers, and 304/251 enlisted, for an aggregate of 455/362.² The following is the author's reconstruction of the unit designations and organization that existed at the time.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, V Corps. Stationed at C. W. Abrams Complex (former I. G. Farben Building), Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
Special Troops Battalion (Provisional)³

¹ Source: V Corps History Office Order of Battle Files, citing ACofS, G-3, V Corps, Order of Battle Reference File, 1990; 3d Armored Division Annual Historical Report, 1988; E-mail Msg, Mr. David Feller, 3d Armored Division Association, to author, 21 May 2002, sub: 3AD in DESERT STORM; 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Annual Historical Review, 1990.

² Effective 16 Jan 1991 per USAREUR Permanent Orders 127-8, 12 Sep 1990.

³ Organized in 1980 as a provisional unit, although the framework of a battalion organization had existed for some years before creation of the provisional structure.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 Band
 4th Battalion, 2d Air Defense Artillery⁴

3d Armored Division.⁵ Headquarters stationed at Drake Kaserne and Edwards Kaserne, Frankfurt am Main.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

1st Brigade

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry (Mech) (Infantry)⁶
 5th Battalion, 5th Cavalry (Mech) (Infantry)⁷
 2d Battalion, 32d Armor
 4th Battalion, 32d Armor

2d Brigade

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 4th Battalion, 18th Infantry (Mech)⁸
 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Armor)
 4th Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Armor)

3d Brigade

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 5th Battalion, 18th Infantry (Mech)⁹
 2d Battalion, 67th Armor
 4th Battalion, 67th Armor

Aviation Brigade

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 3d Squadron, 12th Cavalry
 2d Battalion, 227th Aviation (Attack Helicopter)
 3d Battalion, 227th Aviation (Attack Helicopter)
 Company H, 227th Aviation (Combat Aviation)
 Company G, 227th Aviation (General Support)

Division Artillery

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery (155-mm. self-propelled [SP])

⁴ 4th Battalion, 2d ADA, activated and assigned to V Corps effective 16 Oct 1990, per USAREUR Permanent Orders 156-1, 16 Nov 1989.

⁵ The use of the Cavalry designation within 3d Armored Division requires special comment. During various unit redesignations and reflaggings, attempts to retain old and distinguished lineages within the active force led to the assignment of various cavalry units to divisions as both armor and mechanized infantry battalions. This led to endless confusion. In general, however, the convention was that such a unit was designated a battalion of a cavalry regiment, with the type unit following the unit name in parentheses. For example: 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry (Mech), or 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Armor).

⁶ Formerly 2d Battalion, 36th Infantry, 16 Oct 1988.

⁷ Formerly 3d Battalion, 36th Infantry, 16 Oct 1988.

⁸ Formerly 1st Battalion, 48th Infantry, 16 Jun 1989.

⁹ Formerly 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry, 16 Oct 1988.

- 2d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (155-mm. SP)¹⁰
- 4th Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (155-mm. SP)¹¹
- Battery E, 333d Field Artillery (Target Acquisition)
- Battery A, 40th Field Artillery (MLRS)
- Division Support Command
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 45th Forward Support Battalion
 - 54th Forward Support Battalion
 - 503d Forward Support Battalion
 - 122d Main Support Battalion
 - Company I, 227th Aviation (Maintenance)
- 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry¹²
- 23d Engineer Battalion
- 3d Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery
- 143d Signal Battalion
- 533d Military Intelligence Battalion
- 503d Military Police Company
- 22d Chemical Company
- 3d Armored Division Band

8th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Headquarters stationed at Bad Kreuznach.

- Headquarters and Headquarters Company
- 1st Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Infantry) (Mech)
 - 5th Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Infantry) (Mech)
 - 4th Battalion, 34th Armor
 - 1st Battalion, 68th Armor
- 2d Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry (Mech)
 - 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry (Mech)
 - 2d Battalion, 68th Armor
- 3d Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 4th Battalion, 8th Infantry
 - 3d Battalion, 77th Armor
 - 5th Battalion, 77th Armor
- 4th (Aviation) Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - Task Force Skyhawk (Provisional)

¹⁰ Formerly 2d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, in 1988.

¹¹ Formerly 2d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery, in 1988.

¹² Formerly 3d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 16 Feb 1989.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 Company G, 4th Aviation (Support)
 Company H, 4th Aviation (Combat Aviation)
 Company I, 4th Aviation (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance)
 2d Battalion, 4th Aviation (Attack Helicopter)¹³
 3d Battalion, 4th Aviation (Attack Helicopter)
 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry
 Division Support Command
 Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 118th Forward Support Battalion
 208th Forward Support Battalion
 202d Forward Support Battalion
 708th Main Support Battalion
 Division Artillery
 Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
 2d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery (155-mm. SP)
 4th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery (155-mm. SP)
 6th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery (155-mm. SP)¹⁴
 Battery C, 333d Field Artillery (Target Acquisition)
 Battery C, 16th Field Artillery (MLRS)¹⁵
 12th Engineer Battalion
 5th Battalion, 3d Air Defense Artillery (Chaparral/Vulcan)
 8th Signal Battalion
 108th Military Intelligence Battalion
 8th Military Police Company
 25th Chemical Company
 8th Infantry Division Band

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Regimental Headquarters at Fulda.

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
 1st Squadron
 2d Squadron
 3d Squadron
 4th (Aviation) Squadron
 Combat Service Support Squadron
 511th Military Intelligence Company
 54th Chemical Company
 58th Engineer Company

¹³ Inactivated 15 Dec 1990.

¹⁴ On USAREUR orders, the battalion began to restructure as a MLRS battalion in the course of 1990.

¹⁵ Formerly 3d Battalion, 16th Field Artillery. The change occurred on 16 Sep 1988, according to 8th Infantry Division (Mech) Annual Historical Review 1988.

V Corps Artillery. Headquarters stationed at Frankfurt am Main.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

41st Field Artillery Brigade

1st Battalion, 32d Field Artillery (Lance)

4th Battalion, 18th Field Artillery (8-inch)

4th Battalion, 77th Field Artillery (8-inch)

2d Battalion, 75th Field Artillery (155-mm.)

1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS)

42d Field Artillery Brigade

2d Battalion, 32d Field Artillery (Lance)

3d Battalion, 32d Field Artillery (Lance)

5th Battalion, 3d Field Artillery (8-inch)

2d Battalion, 20th Field Artillery (8-inch)

4th Battalion, 7th Field Artillery (8-inch)¹⁶**3d Corps Support Command.** Headquarters stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base.

16th Support Group

8th Maintenance Battalion

19th Maintenance Battalion

85th Maintenance Battalion

142d Supply and Service Battalion

68th Medical Group

Special Troops Battalion

181st Transportation Battalion

15th Ordnance Battalion

8th Battalion, 158th Aviation (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance)

12th Aviation Brigade. Headquarters stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base.

5th Squadron, 6th Cavalry

5th Battalion, 158th Aviation

Company B, 6th Battalion, 158th Aviation

Company C, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation

18th Military Police Brigade. Stationed at Gibbs Kaserne, Frankfurt am Main.

709th Military Police Battalion

93d Military Police Battalion

22d Signal Brigade. Headquarters stationed at Darmstadt.

17th Signal Battalion

32d Signal Battalion

440th Signal Battalion

¹⁶ Unit inactivated effective 1 Mar 1991 per USAREUR Permanent Orders 125-1, 10 Sep 1990.

130th Engineer Brigade. Headquarters stationed at Hanau.

- 54th Combat Engineer Battalion
- 317th Combat Engineer Battalion
- 547th Combat Engineer Battalion
- 568th Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment)
- 814th Engineer Company (Assault Float Bridge)
- 516th Engineer Company (Medium Girder Bridge)
- Attachments:
- 8591st Civil Support Group

205th Military Intelligence Brigade. Headquarters stationed at the C. W. Abrams Building, Frankfurt am Main.

- 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)
- 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Exploitation, Heavy)
- 302d Military Intelligence Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence)

5th Personnel Group.¹⁷ Headquarters stationed at the C. W. Abrams Building, Frankfurt am Main.

- Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
- 1st Battalion (Provisional)
- 2d Battalion (Provisional)
- 52d Personnel Service Company
- 55th Personnel Service Company
- 177th Personnel Service Company
- 178th Personnel Service Company
- 198th Personnel Service Company
- 257th Personnel Service Company
- 258th Personnel Service Company
- 259th Personnel Service Company
- 261st Personnel Service Company
- 368th Personnel Service Company
- 369th Personnel Service Company¹⁸
- 378th Personnel Service Company
- 400th Personnel Service Company
- 520th Personnel Service Company¹⁹
- 569th Personnel Service Company

¹⁷ Activated 1 Jun 1990. Department of the Army Certificate of Lineage and Honors, 5th Personnel Group. Activated in V Corps effective 16 Sep 1990, per USAREUR Permanent Orders 23-2, 23 Feb 1990, and USAREUR Permanent Orders 95-4, 17 Jul 1990.

¹⁸ Assigned to 5th Personnel Group effective 1 Oct 1990 per V Corps Permanent Orders 150-4, 18 Oct 1990.

¹⁹ Assigned to 5th Personnel Group effective 1 Oct 1990 per V Corps Permanent Orders 150-5, 18 Oct 1990.

574th Personnel Service Company
575th Personnel Service Company
64th Replacement Detachment

5th Finance Group. Headquarters stationed at the C. W. Abrams Building, Frankfurt am Main.

3d Finance Support Unit
8th Finance Support Unit
14th Finance Support Unit
17th Finance Support Unit
22d Finance Support Unit
39th Finance Support Unit
78th Finance Support Unit
105th Finance Support Unit
106th Finance Support Unit
117th Finance Support Unit
201st Finance Support Unit²⁰
208th Finance Support Unit²¹
501st Finance Support Unit
503d Finance Support Unit

4th Air Support Operations Group (USAF).²² Headquarters stationed at the C. W. Abrams Building, Frankfurt am Main.

²⁰ Activated per USAREUR Permanent Orders 23-1, 23 Feb 1990.

²¹ Activated per USAREUR Permanent Orders 23-1, 23 Feb 1990.

²² Formerly 601st Air Support Operations Group, 1 Mar 1988.

Appendix E

V Corps Order of Battle

2000¹

Fourteen Maneuver Battalions and Squadrons
Six Maneuver Battalions and Squadrons Stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas
One Battalion General Support and General Support, Reinforcing, Artillery

By the year 2000 V Corps had decreased in size dramatically as a consequence of the post–Cold War drawdown of forces in Europe, each division stationing one of its maneuver brigades in the continental United States. In part as a recognition of the mobility requirement for operations outside of NATO’s Central Region, the V Corps aviation force structure was considerably larger than it had ever been before. The V Corps Artillery, on the other hand, was substantially smaller, down from two Field Artillery brigades to a single battalion. In the event of high intensity war, the existing V Corps Artillery and Field Artillery brigade relied on units assigned from the reserve components to bring them up to strength. The same was true across the corps, and particularly in the corps support command, where many staff positions existed in a CONUS augmentation that, upon mobilization, brought the units to full strength. The following is the author’s reconstruction of the unit designations and organization that existed at the time.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, V Corps. Stationed at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany.

Special Troops Battalion (Provisional)

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Band

1st Armored Division. Headquarters stationed at Bad Kreuznach.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

1st Brigade

¹ Source: V Corps History Office Order of Battle Files, citing Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, V Corps, Force Inventory, 2000.

- Headquarters and Headquarters Company
- 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry (Mech)
- 1st Battalion, 37th Armor
- 2d Battalion, 37th Armor
- 2d Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mech)
 - 2d Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mech)
 - 1st Battalion, 35th Armor
- 3d Brigade (Stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas)
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry (Mech)
 - 1st Battalion, 13th Armor
 - 2d Battalion, 70th Armor
- 4th (Aviation) Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 1st Battalion, 501st Aviation (Attack)
 - 2d Battalion, 501st Aviation
- Division Artillery
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
 - 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery (155-mm. self-propelled [SP])
 - 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery (155-mm. SP)
 - 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (155-mm. SP)
 - Battery C, 333d Field Artillery (Target Acquisition)
 - Battery A, 94th Field Artillery (MLRS)
- Division Support Command
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 47th Forward Support Battalion
 - 125th Forward Support Battalion
 - 501st Forward Support Battalion
 - 123d Main Support Battalion
 - 127th Division Aviation Support Battalion
- Engineer Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 16th Engineer Battalion
 - 40th Engineer Battalion
 - 70th Engineer Battalion (Located at Fort Riley, Kansas)
- 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry
- Troop F, 1st Cavalry²
- Troop G, 1st Cavalry³
- 1st Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery (Bradley/Avenger)

² Activated 16 Feb 2000 per USAREUR Permanent Orders 280-1, 7 Oct 1999.

³ Activated effective 16 Oct 1999 per USAREUR Permanent Orders 280-2, 7 Oct 1999.

- 501st Military Intelligence Battalion
- 141st Signal Battalion
- 501st Military Police Company
- 69th Chemical Company
- 1st Armored Division Band

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). Headquarters stationed at Würzburg.

- Headquarters and Headquarters Company
- 1st Brigade (Stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas)
 - 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry (Mech)
 - 1st Battalion, 34th Armor
 - 2d Battalion, 34th Armor
- 2d Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry (Mech)
 - 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry (Mech)
 - 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
- 3d Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (Mech)
 - 1st Battalion, 63d Armor
 - 2d Battalion, 63d Armor
 - Troop F, 4th Cavalry⁴
- 4th (Aviation) Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 1st Battalion, 1st Aviation (Attack)
 - 2d Battalion, 1st Aviation
- Division Artillery
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
 - 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery
 - 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery
 - 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery
 - 1st Battalion, 33d Field Artillery
- Engineer Brigade
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - 1st Engineer Battalion (Located at Fort Riley, Kansas)
 - 9th Engineer Battalion
 - 82d Engineer Battalion
- Division Support Command
 - 101st Forward Support Battalion
 - 201st Forward Support Battalion
 - 701st Main Support Battalion
 - 601st Division Aviation Support Battalion

⁴ Activated effective 16 Jan 1999 per USAREUR Permanent Orders 352-1, 18 Dec 1988.

- 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
- 4th Battalion, 3d Air Defense Artillery (Bradley/Avenger)
- 101st Military Intelligence Battalion
- 121st Signal Battalion
- 1st Military Police Company
- 12th Signal Company
- 1st Infantry Division Band

V Corps Artillery. Stationed at Schwetzingen.
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
41st Field Artillery Brigade
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS)

3d Corps Support Command. Headquarters stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base.
7th Corps Support Group
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
71st Corps Support Battalion
7th Battalion, 159th Aviation (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance)
181st Transportation Battalion
16th Corps Support Group
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
18th Corps Support Battalion
485th Corps Support Battalion
19th Corps Materiel Management Center
27th Transportation Battalion
Special Troops Battalion

11th Aviation Regiment.⁵ Stationed at Illesheim.
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
2d Squadron, 6th Cavalry (Attack)
6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry (Attack)

12th Aviation Brigade. Stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base.
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
3d Battalion, 58th Aviation
5th Battalion, 158th Aviation
Company F, 159th Aviation

18th Military Police Brigade. Stationed at Mannheim.
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
709th Military Police Battalion
793d Military Police Battalion

⁵ This unit was usually referred to, although incorrectly, as the "11th Aviation Regiment." By MTOE, it was an aviation group and so recognized by HQ, DA.

22d Signal Brigade. Headquarters stationed at Darmstadt.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
17th Signal Battalion
32d Signal Battalion
440th Signal Battalion

30th Medical Brigade. Headquarters stationed at Heidelberg-Rohrbach.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
93d Medical Battalion (Direct Support)
226th Medical Battalion (Logistical)
421st Medical Battalion (Evacuation)
67th Combat Support Hospital
212th Surgical Hospital
100th Medical Detachment (Veterinary HQ)
21st Medical Detachment (Veterinary Small)
79th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Small)
64th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Service)
72d Medical Detachment (Veterinary Service)
51st Medical Detachment (Veterinary Medicine)

69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade.⁶ Headquarters stationed at Giebelstadt.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery (Patriot)⁷
6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery (Patriot)
549th Maintenance Company

130th Engineer Brigade. Headquarters stationed at Hanau.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
94th Engineer Battalion (Construction)
54th Engineer Battalion (Mech)
565th Engineer Battalion (Provisional)

⁶ Effective 16 May 1998, USAREUR Permanent Orders 114-8, 24 Apr 1998, assigned the 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery; the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery; the 549th Maintenance Company; and the 19th Maintenance Company to V Corps, which further assigned them to 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. In the course of 1999, incident to the Patriot Reorganization Plan, the 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, was reassigned to Fort Bliss, Texas, together with its maintenance company.

⁷ This battalion was assigned to V Corps following inactivation of 94th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, effective 15 Jul 1995, per USAREUR Permanent Orders 208-2, 27 Jul 1995. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, became Battery D, 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, effective 16 Jul 1999 per USAREUR Permanent Orders 132-01, 12 May 1999. Battery F, 6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery, became Battery E, 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, effective 16 Jul 1999, per USAREUR Permanent Orders 132-2, 13 May 1999.

205th Military Intelligence Brigade. Headquarters stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)

165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Exploitation)

302d Military Intelligence Battalion (Operations)

4th Air Support Operations Group (USAF). Headquarters stationed at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg.

Appendix F

Summary of Major V Corps Partnership for Peace Exercises 1994–95¹

The early Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises were the most significant ones, in that they created the framework for what might be called a “standard” PfP event. There were many Partnership for Peace or “in the spirit of Partnership for Peace” events. Only those that involved V Corps participation are listed here. By the end of 1995 the Partnership for Peace had become an accepted part of the planning landscape, part of the steady state exercise load in V Corps, and excited little comment.

Cooperative Bridge 94 (9–17 September 1994). The first PfP exercise, Cooperative Bridge 94 was co-directed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Poland. The object was to identify and assess basic tactical interoperability issues in NATO, former Warsaw Pact nations, and other non-NATO nations’ approaches to planning and executing multinational peacekeeping operations. The NATO Allied Forces, Central Europe, headquarters conducted the exercise at Biedrusko (just north of Poznan), Poland. Some 650 soldiers from fourteen nations participated: the United States, Poland, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Great Britain, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Lithuania, Denmark, Slovakia, and Ukraine. English was selected as the official language for the exercise.

Six officers and ninety-four soldiers from Company C, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry (1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division) comprised the American contingent. They had just thirty-four days from warning order to deployment and

¹ Unless otherwise cited, summaries were based on V Corps History Office report by Maj. A. R. Koenig, “Partnership for Peace Exercises Summary” (Headquarters, V Corps, History Office, Ms, July 1997). The document was based on V Corps ACofS, G3, PfP files and PfP files in USAREUR ODCSOPS.

were unfamiliar with the Poles and had no knowledge of the designated training area as they began to build the exercise.

Training objectives included training NATO and PFP partners in coordinated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for peacekeeping operations. The negotiated TTP created a common reference for assessment and evaluation of training. Realistic small unit and individual Mission Essential Task List training, evaluation and enhancement of interoperability, and enhanced mutual understanding and cooperation were also objectives of the exercise.

Since Cooperative Bridge was the first exercise of its kind, considerable effort went into demonstrating commitment, enhancing cooperation, and setting the tone for future PFP endeavors. The exercise emphasized a multinational force mix of units to conduct peacekeeping tasks scaled for platoons and companies. Training included four field training exercises for companies, during which troops practiced observation, route control, patrolling, escorting convoys, escorting VIPs and refugees, weapons familiarization, and mine awareness. Poland provided logistical and aviation support. Platoons conducted situational training exercises, and a multinational battalion headquarters conducted a command post exercise. The training focused on peacekeeping missions and tasks consistent with the guidance, training philosophy, and mission essential task lists provided by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army.²

Peacekeeper 94 (September 1994). The American and Russian armies conducted this bilateral peacekeeping exercise in September 1994. The guiding document was the "Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Combined Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises." The document was used in subsequent exercises, and the Ukrainians accepted an updated and revised version based on lessons learned as the doctrinal basis for their later exercise. One problem encountered in Peacekeeper 94 was that there were insufficient interpreters to keep the exercise moving properly.³

MEDCEUR 95-1 (12-22 March 1995). USAREUR sponsored the exercise, which the American Ambassador to Albania considered essential to U.S.-Albanian relations. Originally intended to consist of fifty-five personnel from the Air Force, Army, Navy, and National Guard, the team was scaled back to eigh-

² Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe, First PFP—Training Exercise Operations Order (EXOPORD), Exercise Cooperative Bridge 94, 22 Aug 1994; 1st Armored Division EXOPORD 94-196, Cooperative Bridge 94, 231800 Aug 1994; 1st Armored Division Briefing for Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, CG, V Corps, 021145 Sep 1994, Partnership for Peace Exercise: Cooperative Bridge '94, Biedrusko, Poland, 9-17 Sep 1994; V Corps ACofS, G3, Operations, Action Officer Files, Exercise Cooperative Bridge 94.

³ Briefing, 3d Infantry Division, Peacekeeper 94 IPR to the Chief of Staff, 11 Aug 1994; Briefing, 3d Infantry Division, 1st Brigade Training Validation Exercise, Peacekeeper 94, n.d. but second week of August 1994.

teen soldiers from the 159th Medical Company of the 30th Medical Brigade. The medical team deployed by military aircraft from Spangdahlem Air Base to Tirana, Albania, for ten days, where it conducted joint training and exchanged medical information with the host nation's military medical personnel.

The exercise had three phases. The top priority phase focused on joint training with the Albanians and involved emergency medical procedures including triage, stabilization, evacuation, and disaster planning. The training was a combination of didactic presentations in classrooms, demonstrations, and practical exercises. The second phase involved implementing the skills through a mass casualty exercise. The third phase, completed only as time allowed, addressed civic action, medical screening, immunizations, consultative services, and the exchange of medical information.

Upon its arrival on 12 March, the American team set up a base camp at Rinas Air Base, colocated with Tirana International Airport. From 13 to 15 March it conducted joint training, and on 16 March participated in the mass casualty exercise. From 17 to 21 March the exercise stressed civic action, sending its specialists to military hospitals and running an overnight MEDCAP to northern Albania. The team also taught classes in water treatment and flight medicine. Considering the volatile nature of the area, V Corps maintained an intelligence overwatch to assess and advise on potential threats to the force, remaining in communication with the team and receiving daily situation reports.⁴

New Spirit 95 (21–26 May 1995). The United States and Greece sponsored New Spirit 95, conducted "in the spirit of PFP" at Katamata, Greece. The purpose was to demonstrate cooperative humanitarian aid operations in a simulated earthquake disaster area. Company-size elements from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and the United States took part.

The 21st Theater Army Area Command was the U.S. Army, Europe (USAR-EUR), lead agency for the exercise and established a composite combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) company that consisted of a headquarters cell and an engineer squad, a medical squad, two military police squads, and a transportation squad. Troops for the contingent came from the 94th Engineer Battalion of the 130th Engineer Brigade, which provided seven engineers and six medics. The 3d Infantry Division provided a public affairs specialist.

On 21 May the Americans deployed to Kalamata by C-130, attending an opening ceremony the next day and moving directly into classes on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance skills. Over the succeeding days the directing staff issued an operations order for companies to execute training based on the initial classes.⁵

⁴ Memo, 159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) for Commander, 421st Medical Evacuation Battalion, 10 Apr 1995, sub: 159th Med Co (AA) AAR MEDCEUR 95; V Corps ACofS, G3, Operations file, MEDCEUR 95, with trip reports, briefings, and action officer notes.

⁵ V Corps Command Briefing, Exercise New Spirit 95.

Peace Shield 95 (19 May–1 June 1995). USAREUR sponsored this bilateral, company level exercise "set in the PFP mold." Peace Shield 95 involved Company C, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (3d Infantry Division), and a Ukrainian infantry company and was conducted in L'viv, Ukraine. Training focused on individual and small unit peacekeeping skills such as escorting humanitarian aid convoys and checkpoint operations.

As anticipated, the exercise revealed both strengths and weaknesses. Privates first class demonstrated initiative and focus, and soldiers in general proved to be good diplomats who were imbued with respect for their hosts and a sense of community. Translators accompanied every American squad. Tasks that needed retraining centered around improvement of positions in the field, to include the need for engineer work at checkpoints to enhance survivability in fixed positions. Noncommissioned officers showed considerable initiative during the exercise and set good examples for their subordinates. They were flexible, a quality all the more evident in the face of the far less detailed training plans of the other nation. Tasks that needed retraining for NCOs included checking and exercising Quick Reaction Force communications and improvement of fixed positions as the situation changed.

At the multinational force headquarters, some tasks required remedial action. Problems were uncovered in deployment and reception that showed a need for more detailed predeployment planning. The need for an active public affairs cell became obvious as the exercise went on. Combined logistics proved much harder than expected. The exercise demonstrated clearly that standardized reporting procedures needed to be developed and revealed that problems of interoperability among the national communications systems affected communications between unit headquarters.

One of the most glaring shortcomings demonstrated in Peace Shield 95 involved helicopters, vital both in conventional operations and in operations other than war. Observers commented on how nations differed markedly in helicopter coordination and interoperability. Loading configurations and procedures, communications, flight operations, and landing techniques varied widely.

The directing staff noted the high quality of role players. While role players and events were better than those of Peacekeeper 94, several tasks still needed improvement. Militia and local government role players were still required. Furthermore, radio communications needed to be evaluated, especially those of the quick reaction force, and communications interoperability in general required a more stringent exercise. A common after action review (AAR) process was desirable. Observers also commented that the exercise "reinvented" the Master Events List and needed to devise simulation techniques.

Lack of a command relationship between the 3d Infantry Division task force and the Air Force Tactical Air Liaison Control Element made that element unresponsive to requests for information and to requests that they maintain tactical satellite radio contact with headquarters in Germany. A command or OPCON relationship between all subordinate units and the exercise commander was essential for distributing information, assuring coordination, establishing uniform standards of conduct, and providing a single American point of contact for the host nation.

It was also found necessary to minimize changes in execution. That was a legacy from the Soviet Army, which centralized decision making and limited the flexibility and responsiveness of subordinate commanders. That tendency remained in former Warsaw Pact armies, which required planning in detail and an avoidance of ambiguity. Contingencies that an American commander could easily improvise for often proved insurmountable for commanders accustomed to the Soviet technique of command. Modifications to plans, the Americans found, were best done early in the planning cycle, since last-minute variations were always unwelcome. While Peace Shield 95 was a major improvement over Peacekeeper 94, communications and operational procedures nonetheless remained separate. The U.S. forces functioned mainly by FM radio, while the Ukrainians relied almost exclusively on wire. Thus, opportunities for the two forces to communicate by radio were limited. Analysts accordingly recommended that the next exercise should establish one radio net and one command frequency for both forces.

Staff and reporting procedures needed standardization for combined operations, but during the exercise each national element followed its own staff procedures and adhered to its own reporting systems and requirements. The Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Guide contained some basic report formats, but the Ukrainians did not use them. Those procedures clearly needed to be agreed upon during the coordination conferences and incorporated into the TTP, to be used and validated during the exercise.

Airspace management was very different from the system to which NATO forces were accustomed. During the exercise Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopters flew throughout the area of operations without coordination. There were no communications between helicopters transporting the quick reaction force and the unit to be supported or reinforced. That was evaluated as an issue to be coordinated before the next exercise, incorporated into the TTP guide, and validated during the exercise.

For unknown reasons, Ukrainians refused to relent on passport and visa requirements for U.S. troops. Ukrainians provided only a few interpreters, underscoring the importance of USAREUR aggressively seeking qualified linguists from the active and reserve components, as well as from other services. The Ukrainians specified detailed customs and manifest requirements for arriving personnel and equipment only days prior to the exercise. Only the use of a "worst case" plan allowed the U.S. forces to meet those requirements. Including customs officials in planning for future exercises was one of the specific recommendations coming out of the exercise. The Defense Attaché Office in Kiev provided invaluable liaison with the Ukrainian Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and helped resolve funding issues, itinerary coordination, and problems with customs and entry requirements.⁶

⁶ Memo, AETV-BGC, Commander, 3d Infantry Division, for Commander, V Corps, 23 Jun 1995, sub: Peace Shield 95 After-Action Report; USEUCOM Exercise Directive for US-Ukraine Bilateral Peacekeeper Exercise, Peace Shield 95, 15 Jan 1995; Memo, Commander, 3d Infantry Division for CINC, USEUCOM, 21 Jun 1995, sub: Peace Shield 95 After-Action Report.

Exercise Double Eagle 95 (5–15 July 1995). USAREUR sponsored Double Eagle as a bilateral exercise with Poland “in the spirit of Pfp.” In November 1994 the Polish Ministry of Defense requested a combined exercise to incorporate combat-related skills such as close air support and airborne operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the request that month, since it was limited to humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping objectives and was therefore within the framework of established Pfp exercises. European Command notified USAREUR of the exercise on 14 February 1995.

USAREUR intended to expand NATO-Polish military contacts while building on the successes of Cooperative Bridge 94, as well as to assess the current state of interoperability with a view to improvement, while also encouraging progress on both democratization and regional stability. USAREUR wanted to integrate USAREUR forces and Polish forces in an effective combined joint task force. It also wanted to maximize use of the USAREUR training model. Finally, USAREUR expected to perform unit collective training, focusing on peacekeeping tasks. Poland’s objectives were threefold. First, they also wished to build on the success of Cooperative Bridge 94. Second, they wanted to improve NATO-Polish interoperability. Third, they wanted to expand the range of combined operations. Meanwhile, European Command’s objectives included evaluating the ability of NATO and Pfp national units to conduct combined air, ground, and medical operations in a peacekeeping environment.

Participants included about one hundred forty V Corps and 1st Armored Division soldiers. USAREUR designated the corps as the lead agency, with the corps commander the officer conducting the exercise. His Polish counterpart was the commander of the Silesian Military District. Two helicopters from the 236th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) provided aeromedical evacuation capability, if needed, and were also integrated into the training scenario. Brig. Gen. James Riley, Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Armored Division, was exercise codirector and the counterpart of Brig. Gen. Jerzy Baranowski, the commander of the Polish 4th Mechanized Division. The 1st Armored Division staff and the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, provided directing staff and maneuver observation and control team members. Troop C, 1–1 Cavalry, completed a dismounted peacekeeping rotation at the USAREUR Combat Maneuver Training Center on 23 June. Both the troop commander and first sergeant had been involved in exercise planning as of the first planning conference in March.

U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), contributed three C-130 aircraft and thirty-two airmen of the 85th Airlift Wing. Those aircraft, along with Polish Air Force units, conducted airborne insertion of Special Forces units and a cargo airdrop integrated into the exercise scenario. The Flying Ambulance Severe Trauma team of the 52d Medical Group augmented a Polish field hospital while taking part in a mass casualty exercise. Thirty-two soldiers from Company C, 10th Special Forces Group, parachuted into the exercise and linked up with Polish special forces at the beginning of the exercise.

The Polish 4th Mechanized Division provided the bulk of the troops involved in Double Eagle. Besides providing the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regi-

ment, as the Polish contribution to the combined joint task force, the division sent almost 800 soldiers to work on directing staff and various role-playing activities during the exercise, as well as running the bulk of the joint visitor and joint information bureaus.

Double Eagle 95 was conducted at the Wedrzyn training area in western Poland, about 650 kilometers from Heidelberg and about 100 kilometers east of Berlin. The aerial port of debarkation, Babimost Air Base, was about twenty kilometers from the training area. Polish hosts provided ground transportation between the aerial port of departure and the training area base camp.

Training tasks addressed by Double Eagle included maintaining trained and ready forces, contributing to regional stability, training for and exercising deployment operations, and exercising Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) for assigned and attached forces. The Polish-U.S. combined peacekeeping battalion featured one American platoon attached to a Polish light infantry company and one Polish platoon attached to Troop C, 1-1 Cavalry.⁷

Cooperative Determination 95 (7-16 September 1995). NATO LAND-SOUTHEAST sponsored a platoon-level peacekeeping/humanitarian relief PfP exercise that included a field training exercise. The goal was to promote interoperability in multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, and attachments, deployed to Sibiu, Romania, about twenty-five kilometers northwest of Bucharest. In January 1995 Romania accepted a NATO overture to host the first PfP event ever held in that country. European Command notified USAREUR of the commitment on 8 March 1995. The purpose of the exercise was to promote partnership among PfP forces by developing a common understanding of peacekeeping operations and to enhance military interoperability through exercising selected basic military skills related to peacekeeping operations.

LANDSOUTHEAST saw the exercise as a way to integrate NATO and non-NATO forces into an effective combined joint task force. The European Command objective was to enhance relations among participating countries to foster continued progress toward the larger NATO goal of eventual integration. Meanwhile, USAREUR wished to gain effective training on collective peacekeeping tasks while promoting regional stability by establishing a friendly working relationship with Romania.

Because the exercise was run by LANDSOUTHEAST, the eight step USAREUR training model was not used, except by USAREUR forces. The NATO AAR process was used, instead of the more interactive version that USAREUR favored. In general, NATO tended to base many of its plans on consensus, which resulted in more general concepts. Also, USAREUR realized that when it only sent one "player" unit to participate in an exercise, it was essential that it par-

⁷ Memo, Headquarters, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, for Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, 6 Jul 1995, sub: Exercise Double Eagle Certification for Deployment.

ticipate in the early planning phases to infuse USAREUR doctrine and exercise concepts, insofar as possible.

The exercise was the first NATO PFP for 3d Infantry Division. The division sent forty-nine soldiers, who formed a company headquarters and one platoon. Of the remainder, four were instructors for mine warfare and small arms, one was a liaison officer, and the other was a surgeon. Three more were public affairs specialists, two were in communications, and one was a USAREUR observer. No status of forces agreement was constructed for the exercise.

The Romanian army provided a composite force consisting of three infantry platoons, one company headquarters, and battalion staff elements. Other participants included Bulgaria, with one platoon; Germany, with two platoons and a company headquarters; Hungary, with one platoon; Luxembourg, with one platoon; Netherlands, with one platoon; Slovakia, with one platoon; and Turkey, with one platoon and a company headquarters. There were eleven platoons in all, formed into four companies led by the United States, Germany, Romania, and Turkey. The four companies fell under a Romanian-led battalion headquarters.

On 7 September U.S. forces deployed from Ramstein using two C-130 aircraft, landing at Sibiu Airfield in central Romania for the seven-day exercise. Participants formed a multinational battalion of four companies, each company consisting of three platoons from different countries. The first two days were spent in preparation for situational training exercises, recons, and social events. Opening ceremonies were on 10 September, followed by four days of situational training exercises. Each company rotated on a given day to one of the lanes, which involved small arms firing, convoy escort, patrolling (including observation posts, guarding a key facility and vehicle checkpoints, mine awareness, and medical evacuation training). The exercise ended on 15 September, and the American contingent redeployed to Ramstein using one C-130 aircraft the next day.

Americans were disappointed that LANDSOUTHEAST observer-controllers did not use current and accepted peacekeeping operational doctrine or an accepted set of techniques, tactics, and procedures for the AARs. The American standard at the time was the Seventh Army Training Command White Paper on Operations Other Than War, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, and the TTP for Combined Peacekeeping Forces during the Conduct of Peacekeeping Exercises developed during Peacekeeper 94 and Peace Shield 95.⁸

Peaceful Eagle 95 (12–20 September 1995). USAREUR sponsored Peaceful Eagle, a U.S.-Albanian exercise “in the spirit of PFP.” The exercise trained Albanian

⁸ HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, CINCUSAREUR Operations Order 095-04-PFP, 180700A Jul 1995, PFP Exercise Cooperative Determination 95 Tasking Support Operations Order; V Corps ACofS, G3, Operations, Action Officer File, Exercise Cooperative Determination 95; Memo, HQ, 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, for CINCUSAREUR, 22 Sep 1995, sub: Cooperative Determination 95 Initial Impressions Report.

forces in planning and conducting peacekeeping operations and improved interoperability between American and Albanian armies. USAREUR tasked V Corps to be the lead agent and provide the U.S. officer in charge, mainly because the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) was then involved with an operational contingency. The V Corps, in turn, tasked the 3d Infantry Division to plan, coordinate, and execute the exercise with the support and assistance of the 30th Medical Brigade and V Corps staff. The 3d Infantry Division selected its 82d Engineer Battalion to execute the mission.

While interoperability was a mutually agreed upon goal of the exercise, there was also a desire to expand NATO-Albanian military contacts. USAREUR hoped to provide an example of a modern, well trained, and well equipped western army. Improving Albanian capabilities to run peacekeeping operations was also a major goal.

Considering Albania's history, there were some concerns about whether Albania would be receptive to a PFP exercise. The Communist dictator Enver Hoxha died in 1985, leaving Albania the most backward nation in Europe. His successor, Ramiz Alia, responded favorably to the wave of democratization of the late 1980s and broadened relations with the West. By 1991 Albania had resumed diplomatic relations with the United States, and the Communists were voted out of office in 1992. Sali Barisha became president of a constitutional democracy with an indirectly elected president and a unicameral legislature. President Barisha visited Washington from 11–15 September 1995 and lobbied for American help in constructing a national military training center and hosting a Partnership for Peace exercise.

Much to the delight of the Americans, the Albanians proved agreeable to accepting the U.S. training management system, basic doctrine, and AAR system. They were ready and willing to train on the six tasks that USAREUR units habitually trained at the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels: operating checkpoints, operating observation posts, escorting convoys, conducting patrols, conducting refugee assistance operations, and establishing a lodgment area.

In their preliminary assessments, the 82d Engineers discovered that the new Albanian peacekeeping battalion had no experience in peacekeeping doctrine or training management, which prompted the U.S. unit to conduct a staff exercise from 10–14 July to train the Albanian staff. That exercise proved invaluable, since the Albanians later sent troops from the same unit to Exercise Cooperative Nugget at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in August 1995. Other conferences supplemented the training prior to the exercise.

Lack of training was not the only issue. During Exercise Ule Crystal (Clear Water), the South Carolina National Guard and NAVFOR encountered several problems in deploying to an underdeveloped country. Linguist support was crucial, since there were few English speakers in Albania. Among other tasks, the advance party had to construct a base camp infrastructure before the main body arrived. That base force had to take all of the essentials with it, because no local infrastructure was available.⁹ One of the major issues was that the local water supply was contaminated.

⁹ When Task Force Hawk deployed to Albania from V Corps in 1999, it discovered the same problem.

In light of those problems, European Command J3 recommended a cycle of "T" rations and MREs, and the exercise planners decided to bring bottled water and fresh fruit from Germany.

The exercise was held at Tirana and at Shiak, the former a thirty-minute drive from the Shiak Training area. The American personnel included the officer in charge and deputy exercise commander, an exercise staff, Company C of the 82d Engineer Battalion, a battalion commander and his staff, an observer-controller cell, Medevac support from the 30th Medical Brigade, and members of the V Corps staff to assist and monitor as required. Albania provided limited linguist support, a battalion and company staff, and an infantry company of 130 soldiers from the Shijaku Brigade. Skills exercises included establishing and operating an observation post, conducting patrols, establishing and operating a combined movement control point, route clearance, mine detection, command and control, and force protection.

Olsina 95 (12–20 September 1995). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) sponsored Exercise Olsina 95, which was a trilateral peacekeeping training exercise conducted "in the spirit of PffP" that promoted interoperability among the United States, Germany, and the Czech Republic. Named after a lake in the Czech Republic, Olsina 95 was the first peacekeeping exercise involving those three nations. It was also the first time that the Bundeswehr participated in a military exercise outside of Germany. About 134 USAREUR soldiers, 34 soldiers from the Texas Army National Guard,¹⁰ 135 Bundeswehr soldiers, and 314 soldiers of the Czech Army participated in the event at the Boletice training area, located in the southwestern part of the Czech Republic.

The Czechs proposed the exercise in September 1994 as part of their PffP work plan, and the Joint Chiefs accepted it in March 1995. The Czechs were eager to engage in the training, inasmuch as they considered it a stepping stone to expanding military contacts with the West. European Command designated the CINCUSAREUR as the officer to conduct the exercise. The purposes of the exercise were to assess and improve interoperability of U.S., German, and Czech forces; to expand military contacts and regional confidence and security building; and to improve capabilities to conduct peacekeeping operations.

The participation of the Czech 3d Mechanized Brigade was ironic, since that unit was once designated the spearhead unit in war plans of the Warsaw Pact for an attack on NATO.

USAREUR hoped the exercise would improve interoperability of the three nations' forces by integrating them into a peacekeeping Combined Joint Task Force and wished to demonstrate the use of the USAREUR training model to both Germans and Czechs. Naturally, USAREUR also wanted to use the exercise to enhance regional stability.

Previous exercises (Cooperative Bridge 94, Peacekeeper 94, Peace Shield 95, and Double Eagle 95) had shown that several things were essential for a success-

¹⁰ The State of Texas is the partner state to the Czech Republic for Mil-to-Mil purposes.

ful PFP exercise. Competent linguists were needed for planning and for execution. Command, control, and communications had to be consolidated under a U.S. officer in charge. Americans had to be prepared for host nation inflexibility involving decision making and changes to exercise plans. Furthermore, the exercise control center had to be combined and uniform staff reporting procedures were essential. Airspace management, to include language and technical skills, was critical. OPFOR (opposition force) and role players had to rehearse thoroughly prior to the exercise. Passport and customs decisions invariably came at the last minute, complicating deployments. Finally, defense attaché office involvement helped considerably.

USAREUR focused on four training tasks: maintenance of trained and ready forces, contributing to regional stability, training for exercise deployment operations, and exercising C3I for assigned and attached forces. Situational training exercise lanes prepared for checkpoint operations, mine awareness, observation post operation, establishing combined mobile checkpoints, route clearance operations, and securing key vulnerable points. After the situational training exercise (STX), lessons learned were incorporated into a field training exercise (FTX).

USAREUR sent a Press Information Center, while V Corps sent two Medevac helicopters (UH-60) from the 421st Medical Battalion. The 1st Armored Division sent a battalion staff, commander, and liaison officer to serve as directing staff; one dismounted infantry company, Company B(-), 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry; battalion staff elements from Kirch Gons; and a Joint Visitor Bureau. The Texas Army National Guard sent one infantry platoon from the 143d Long Range Surveillance Unit.

The Bundeswehr sent 130 soldiers from the 113th Mountain Battalion and battalion staff elements. The Czech Army contributed about 200 soldiers of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Company, 3d Mechanized Brigade, and brigade staff elements.

Troops began arriving for the exercise on 12–13 September. On 14 September soldiers completed training involving weapons and communications familiarization. Peacekeeping STX lanes provided training on 15 and 16 September. The peacekeeping FTX ran from 18 to 19 September, with on-site after action review on 19 September. Closing ceremonies and redeployment were on 20 September.

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) constraints proved problematic, since PFP SOFAs were not in effect for the exercise. Moreover, the JCS waiver was received late.¹¹

¹¹ USEUCOM Draft Exercise Directive for Czech-US-German Trilateral Peacekeeping Exercise "Olsina 95," 2 Jun 1995; HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, CINCUSAREUR Operations Order 095-03-PFP, 060700A Jul 1995, PFP Exercise Olsina 95 Tasking Support Operations Order; Memo, 1st Armored Division for participating units, 3 Aug 1995, sub: Exercise Directive, Exercise Olsina 95.

Cooperative Challenge III (25 September–6 October 1995). This LANDCENT PfP was a battalion-level command post exercise held in the Czech Republic. Americans sent the commanding general and assistant division commander of the 1st Armored Division, the division staff, a brigade staff, and a battalion response cell (about 150 in all) to participate.

Cooperative Challenge 95 (26 September–6 October 1995). Cooperative Challenge 95 was a multinational Pfp exercise based on a peacekeeping scenario within the overall Allied Command, Europe, Cooperation program for 1995. The purpose of the exercise was to exercise staff command, control, and communications at brigade and battalion levels in a multinational peacekeeping environment under direction of a NATO headquarters. Training focused on the brigade staff functions and interaction between brigade and thirteen battalion response cells. Goals included enhancing relations among participant nations and facilitating interoperability of NATO and non-NATO Pfp forces, which were naturally all equipped and organized differently and operated according to different doctrines.

Major objectives of the exercise included developing an understanding of the relationships with the United Nations, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and other agencies. Another objective was development of a multinational brigade staff organization and standard operating procedures (SOP) to plan and control peacekeeping operations. Finally, those who conducted the exercise hoped to familiarize participants with air operation procedures in brigade-level headquarters. Those procedures involved airlift, aeromedical evacuation, and aerial delivery of humanitarian aid.

Through the exercise, European Command hoped to enhance relations among participating countries to foster continued progress toward the larger NATO goal of eventual integration. Meanwhile, USAREUR hoped to gain effective training on tasks for collective peacekeeping while promoting regional stability by establishing a friendly working relationship with NATO and non-NATO Pfp countries. USAREUR intended the exercise to run on the basis of the USAREUR eight-step training model.

LANDCENT was the exercise sponsor, and the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, deployed a contingent of ninety-one soldiers. Four soldiers from the 30th Medical Brigade took part with one UH-60 aircraft. Maj. Gen. William L. Nash, commanding general of 1st Armored Division, was the exercise co-director. The exercise was held at the Ground Forces Academy at Vyskov, near Brno, in the Czech Republic.

In January 1995 the Czechs asked the United States to provide the exercise co-director and brigade headquarters to serve as the basis for the multinational brigade headquarters. USAREUR was notified that the exercise might soon be approved, and USCINCEUR in fact approved the request in February. USAREUR conducted a leaders' reconnaissance from 9 to 13 May in Vyskov.

Fourteen nations took part. Five were NATO members: the United States, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Nine were Pfp states: Aus-

tria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden. Three to ten soldiers from each nation formed battalion response cells, and those were variously designated as infantry, engineer, and support or logistics units. The only exception was the Belgian cell, which represented an air defense battery.

USAREUR training tasks included maintaining trained and ready forces, contributing to regional stability, training for and exercising deployment operations, and exercising C3I for assigned and attached forces. LANDCENT sponsored the exercise, so its terminology was used. The directing staff was HICON (Higher Control) and the response cell was LOCON (Lower Control). The directing staff prompted the brigade staff to perform training tasks through orders, reports, and intelligence inputs. The battalion response cells, at the direction of the directing staff, reported training items to the brigade staff, which the staff then acted upon. That format allowed the directing staff to accelerate or decelerate the play, depending on how well the brigade staff functioned.

Lessons learned from previous PFP exercises were applied to Cooperative Challenge 95. Unity of command was achieved by basing the multinational brigade on 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. Media activities were integrated throughout the exercise. To be well prepared for the exercise, staffs conducted four days of staff training and rehearsals. Understaffed visitor bureaus had proved to be burdens on the unit in training, so LANDCENT provided a robust visitors bureau. All participants deployed with passports. For reasons not disclosed, NATO resisted the use of simulation models and AAR procedures, but U.S. units conducted their own AARs.¹²

Cooperative Jaguar (2–13 October 1995). The Allied Forces, Baltic Approaches (BALTOP), a NATO command, sponsored this PFP exercise. The land portion was conducted during the first two weeks of October at Camp Oksboel, a Danish tactical training facility. The purpose of the command post exercise (CPX) was to exercise staff procedures for multinational peacekeeping operations. Ten nations participated: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France (observers only), Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and the United States.

The V Corps sent soldiers from 2–37 Armor of the 3d Infantry Division, including a ten-man battalion staff cell, a four-man company response cell, an officer for the directing staff, an officer for the joint visitor bureau, a communications specialist from the 123d Signal Battalion, and an officer from the Army Reserve's 415th Civil Affairs Battalion (Kalamazoo, Michigan).

During the first week of the exercise the directing staff conducted stability operations training for the staffs of the eight participating battalions. The training consisted of lectures, seminars, small group discussions, and staff work designed to prepare a foundation of peacekeeping procedures. The training

¹² HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, CINCUSAREUR Operations Order 095–12–PFP, 050711A Sep 1995, PFP Exercise Cooperative Challenge 95 Tasking Support Operations Order; V Corps ACofS, G3, Operations, Action Officer File, Exercise Cooperative Challenge 95.

concluded with a completed battalion OPLAN. During the second week the staff took part in a command post exercise at the Danish Army Tactical Trainer facility, responding to over five hundred incidents and preparing five task force FRAGOs concerning various contingencies in the peacekeeping scenario.

Soldiers from 2-37 Armor used the Combat Maneuver Training Center methodology, though many of the role players doubled as observers and controllers. The directing staff used current United Nations tactical manuals and SOPs that were provided well in advance for preparatory training. TF 2-37 used the Seventh Army Training Command White Paper on Operations Other Than War, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, and the unit Operations Other Than War SOP. The Danish Army provided a permanent liaison officer. English was the designated exercise language.¹³

Peacekeeper 95 (23 October–2 November 1995). Peacekeeper 95 was a U.S.-Russian peacekeeping command post exercise, held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and field training exercise, held at Fort Riley, Kansas, conducted "in the spirit of PFP." The purpose was to train in combined operations while improving U.S.-Russian relations. Atlantic Command sponsored and funded the exercise, which was directed by United States Forces Command. The V Corps involvement amounted to one dismounted company from the 3d Infantry Division for the field training exercise.

The exercise purpose was to build on the experience of Peacekeeper 94, which meant that it would more efficiently conduct combined peacekeeping operations by integrating U.S. and Russian units into an effective, combined peacekeeping force. The exercise was intended also to contribute to regional stability by reducing tensions through familiarizing participants with each others' military systems. Finally, the exercise would determine the degree to which the two armed forces were interoperable.

Those purposes were congruent with objectives at higher levels of command. USEUCOM's objective was to enhance relations between the participating nations and facilitate U.S.-Russian interoperability. USAREUR likewise sought to improve interoperability, gain effective training on collective peacekeeping training tasks, and promote regional stability by establishing a friendly working relationship with the Russian military. USAREUR intended to use its eight-step training model for the training tasks, which included maintaining trained and ready forces, contributing to regional stability, and training for and exercising deployment operations.

¹³ HQ, V Corps, ACoFS, G3, Operations, Information Paper for CG, V Corps, 7 Sep 1995, sub: CCIRs for partnership for Peace (PFP) Exercise Cooperative Jaguar (02-13 October 1995) in Denmark; Corps LANDJUT Supplement to COMBALTAP Exercise Operation Order, PFP Cooperative Jaguar 1995, 16 Jun 1995; Memo, 3d Infantry Division for participating units, 16 May 1995, sub: Memorandum of Instruction for 3ID Participation in Exercise Cooperative Jaguar 95; Memo, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, for Commander, 3d Infantry Division, 17 Oct 1995, sub: Cooperative Jaguar Initial Impressions Report.

The choice of the 3d Infantry Division consciously built on that division's existing relationship with the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (GMRD), which began in May 1993 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the 3d Infantry Division as that unit's counterpart. The division sent 103 soldiers of Company D, 2-64 Armor, augmented by soldiers from HHC, Company A, Company B, and Company C of that battalion. Some Atlantic Command sponsors joined the unit. Ten interpreters were attached. The Russians sent the 8th Company, 3d Battalion, 437th Motorized Rifle Regiment, of the 27th GMRD, along with battalion and regimental staff elements.

The exercise scenario involved UN Chapter VI peacekeeping in an intra-state conflict. A truce had been signed and a buffer zone established. U.S. and Russian forces were to operate as part of a larger multinational peacekeeping force under a United Nations mandate authorizing peacekeeping operations.

Some of the first exercise activities involved the division cross-training troops on weapons and running situational training exercise lanes for both Americans and Russians over the course of three days. Troops practiced dismounted patrols, checkpoint operation, and convoy escort. They then exercised those skills at the company level in a four-day field training exercise under control of the 4-37 Armor battalion staff, using observer-controllers and role players at the Fort Riley training area. Meanwhile, a battalion/regimental size simulation was practiced in a command post exercise at the Fort Riley Simulation Center. For added realism, the CPX simulations were linked to actual training to simulate a larger force.

The exercise organized the Russians and Americans into a Combined Peacekeeping Force (CPKF) subordinate to UNKANFOR (United Nations Kansas Force), commanded by the American Maj. Gen. Randolph W. House or the Russian Col. G. M. Aver'yanov, depending on the 24-hour rotation. Mythical or notional units were added to the force for purposes of simulation.

The head of the Russian Ground Forces Peacekeeping operation for Peacekeeper 95 was General-Lieutenant (U.S. major general equivalent) Aleksandr Ivanovich Sokolov. Since 1992 he had served as Deputy Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces for Emergency Operations and Peacekeeping. His background included service with motorized rifle troops, and he was a graduate of the Frunze Academy and the General Staff Academy.

Col. Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Aver'yanov had recently been appointed commander of the 27th GMRD. A recent graduate of the General Staff Academy, he served as exercise co-director and Joint Commander of the Combined Peacekeeping Force.

Lessons learned from Peacekeeper 94 were applied. Media activities and rehearsals were integrated throughout the exercise. Interpreters were attached to squad level, and all soldiers received training in how to handle the media.

There was some question about the selection of the American unit to participate, but the final decision was that it would send a powerful message to use a unit that was actually slated to be part of any future deployment to Bos-

nia, and that this would emphasize the ability and resolve of the United States and Russia to cooperate in real-world operations.¹⁴

Cooperative Light III (16–20 October 1995). LANDCENT sponsored this battalion-level command post exercise in the Czech Republic. The 3d Infantry Division provided a battalion response cell consisting of ten soldiers, which participated in a brief exercise.

¹⁴ 3d Infantry Division Exercise Directive for Exercise Peacekeeper 95, 28 Jul 1995; V Corps ACofS, G3, Operations, Action Officer File, Exercise Peacekeeper 95.

Bibliographical Note

This study was drawn from the records generated in the years between 1990 and 2001 by V Corps and its subordinate units, specifically including the files of the principal sections of the general staff and special staff, but also records maintained by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, at Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, and the Office of the Command Historian, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army. Some few of those records were reproduced and maintained at the V Corps History Office during the writing of this study, but have since been retired to archives. The mass of records in the staff sections have since been largely disposed of according to the Modern Army Record Keeping System and are either at the Records Holding Area in Germany or in possession of the Archivist of the Army.

Because of the pace of operations and the expanding use of information technology, much of the information on which the study is based originated in e-mail communications among staff principals and in conversations and discussions conducted in the course of command teleconference sessions. Few of those sessions produced permanent records, a fact particularly true of the critical teleconference sessions that dominated the decision-making process in the course of actual operations. Hence, a large set of oral history interviews, conducted at the time of operations or soon after the fact, sought to document the kind of information that existed nowhere else and that was key to understanding the rationale behind the decisions reached and courses of action taken. Those interviews were conducted either by the V Corps Historian or by Military History Detachments of the Reserve Components while operating with V Corps or serving with V Corps for training purposes. A list of those interviews is appended. The interviews themselves have been transferred to the United States Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Very little published secondary material exists on the issues this study considers. Where such books, articles, and published papers do exist and were relevant, they have been cited in footnotes to the chapters.

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Glossary

AAR	After Action Review
ACLANT	Allied Command, Atlantic
ACOM	Atlantic Command
ACP	Air Control Point
ACS	Army Community Services
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
A/DACG	Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group
AFCENT	Allied Forces, Central Europe
AFOR	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Albania Force
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces, Southern Europe
AH-64	The Apache attack helicopter, which replaced the AH-1 Cobra in V Corps attack aviation battalions.
ALO	Authorized Level of Organization
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
ARFOR	Army Force
ARRC	Allied Forces, Central Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps
ASE	Advanced Support Element
ASG	Area Support Group
ASL	Authorized Stockage Level
ASOC	Air Support Operations Center
ASOG	Air Support Operations Group
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
ATCCS	Army Tactical Command and Control System
Atlantic Resolve	Exercise series that succeeded the REFORGER exercises.
ATO	Air Tasking Order
Autobahn	The German high speed, limited access highway

	analogous to the Interstate Highway System in the United States.
Avenger	The Avenger air defense system was a pedestal-mounted Stinger system mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The one-man gyro-stabilized electric turret carried two four-missile Stinger surface to air missile launchers and a .50-caliber machine gun under the right launcher. The system had a forward-looking infrared system and a laser range finder. The system had a crew of three and carried eight missiles and 200 .50-caliber rounds.
AVLB	Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
AWRPS	Army War Reserve Prepositioned Stocks
BALTAP	Baltic Approaches, the NATO headquarters in Denmark
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
Bradley	Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The M2 (infantry squad carrier) or M3 (cavalry squad carrier) that replaced the M113 armored personnel carrier in mechanized infantry battalions and cavalry regiments. The Bradley was armed with a 25-mm. gun and TOW missile and .56-mm. firing port weapons.
BSB	Base Support Battalion
Bundesbahn	The German federal rail system, replaced by the privatized Deutsche Bahn.
C2	Command and Control
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C4	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
Capable Corps	Term applied in U.S. Army, Europe, to denote a corps that was configured and trained for missions that were tactically and regionally diverse. The term essentially meant "contingency corps."
Caravan Guard	A corps-level command post exercise used as

	a preliminary to major USAREUR exercises, although originally intended to alternate with REFORGER.
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CAX	Computer Assisted Exercise
CCGV	Corps Command Group Vehicle
CENTAG	Central Army Group
Central Fortress	A corps-level command post exercise used as a preliminary to major USAREUR exercises, particularly REFORGER.
CEV	Combat Engineer Vehicle
CFE	Conventional Forces, Europe
CFX	Command Field Exercise.
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCSOUTH	NATO Commander in Chief, South, with headquarters in Naples, Italy.
CINCUSARE	Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, whose headquarters is at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg. Subsequently changed to Commanding General, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army.
CIS	Company Information System
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMMC	Corps Materiel Management Command
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center
COE	Command Operating Element
CONUS	Continental United States
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
COSCOM	Corps Support Command
CP	Command Post
CPD	Civilian Personnel Directorate
CPKF	Combined Peacekeeping Force
CPO	Civilian Personnel Office
CPSC	Civilian Personnel Support Center
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CS	Combat Support
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSCE	Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTF	Combined Task Force
CTOSE	Corps Tactical Operations Support Element

CTT	Common Task Test
DARING LION	A 1995 plan to use SETAF's airborne task force to evacuate United Nations peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief. In Europe, this was generally used as a shortened form of DCIN-CUSAREUR, or Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army.
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
Deep Division	A V Corps tactical concept, 1992-93, that placed all deep battle assets, including long-range field artillery, Army attack aviation, and Air Force tactical air support, under command of the commanding general of V Corps Artillery, who ran the deep battle in corps conventional operations.
DEH	Directorate of Engineering and Housing
Deutsche Bahn	Following privatization of the Bundesbahn in the mid-1990s, the name of the German rail network changed to Deutsche Bahn.
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DivArty	Division Artillery
DOCC	Deep Operations Coordination Cell
DPW	Directorate of Public Works
Dragon Hammer	One of the first joint task force exercises after the end of the Cold War, Dragon Hammer 92 was a mixed heavy and light force drawn from various NATO powers. The exercise was conducted on Sardinia, with JTF headquarters at Camp Tuelada.
Drawdown	Term used in U.S. Army, Europe, to denote the progressive reduction in force after 1990.
DRMO	Defense Reutilization Management Office
DSA	Division Support Area
E-date	Effective date
EAC	Emergency Action Center
ECC	Exercise Control Cell
EDRE	Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise
E-mail	Electronic Mail
Expando Van	A multiple use tactical military shelter that could be expanded and that was designed

to be transported by a tactical truck. The expando van did not have the standard lock downs/tie downs to be transported by commercial means and was not as large as an ISO van.

48 Hours

A recurring United States European Command exercise, 48 Hours brought together the staff of a joint task force headquarters and set a planning problem. In the course of what was originally two days, but later became a week-long exercise, the ad hoc staff developed options and framed an operations plan.

FA

Field Artillery

FAARP

Forward Area Arming and Refueling Point (aviation)

FLOT

Forward Line of Own Troops

FOB

Forward Operating Base

FORSCOM

U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

"Four Horsemen"

During Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox's tenure of command, the officers who managed the battlefield operating systems: the G3 (maneuver/operations), the G2 (intelligence), the corps artillery commander (fire support), and the COSCOM commander (combat service support). In practice, each "Horseman" was represented by a selected major or lieutenant colonel both in the corps main command post and in the corps commander's mobile command post.

FRAGO

Fragmentary Order

FSB

Forward Support Battalion

Functional Command Post

An Army study that identified which functions needed to be accomplished, and at what level of detail, in tactical, main, and rear command posts from corps through battalion level, tested by V Corps in 1991 and 1992.

FYROM

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GDP

General Defense Plan

GMRD

Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Soviet Army, later the Russian Army.

Heavy Forces

A term used to denote armored and mechanized

HEMTT	divisions.
HMMWV	Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
Hot Topics	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
	"Hot Topics" was the nickname given to a weekly meeting that then-Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs instituted while V Corps chief of staff. The meeting was attended only by staff principals, the DCS, the SGS, and the corps historian. The intention was for the meeting to run no more than thirty minutes, and for the staff principals to bring to the chief of staff's attention only those <i>major</i> issues with which he needed to concern himself during the week.
HRC	Heavy Ready Company
HUMINT	Human Intelligence, often referred to as human resources intelligence.
IFOR	NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina
IGB	Intra-German Border. The former border between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic German Republic.
"In the Spirit of PfP"	Phrase describing a type of military exercise involving various nations. The Partnership for Peace exercises were conducted only under NATO auspices, but the United States military unilaterally conducted other exercises "in the spirit of PfP" outside that umbrella with nations in eastern and southern Europe. The exercises stressed interoperability among the participants with a view to working together in peacekeeping operations.
Intrinsic Action	Army exercise series that rotated units to Saudi Arabia, where they drew equipment from pre-positioned stocks and conducted heavy force maneuvers in cooperation with other forces in the region.
IPR	In-Progress Review
IRC	Immediate Ready Company
IRF	Immediate Ready Force
IRR	Individual Ready Reservist
ISB	Intermediate Supporting Base; occasionally, Intermediate Staging Base.

ISO Van	International Standard Operations Van, an expandable shelter that was 8 by 8 by 20 feet in overall dimensions and that could expand an additional 8 feet on each side, depending on configuration.
JSEAD	Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
JTF	Joint Task Force
JVB	Joint Visitors Bureau
KFOR	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Kosovo Force
LANDCENT	Land Forces, Central Europe, the NATO headquarters of AFCENT, located in Heidelberg, Germany.
"Law Firm"	Personal staff group for the V Corps commander
Light Forces	A term used to denote infantry divisions that were aurally deployable in 300 sorties by C-141 type aircraft. Airborne and air assault divisions were not light forces within this meaning of the term.
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LTA	Local Training Area
M119	The M119 105-mm. howitzer was an American variant of the British L118 Light Gun.
MAA	Mission Area Analysis
MACE	Mobile Assessment and Coordination Element
MAIT	Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team
MAPEX	Map Exercise
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MCS	Maneuver Control System
MEDCEUR	MEDical Central/Eastern EUROpe, an exercise that involved sending medical personnel to a nation to perform a specific mission that often had a "curative effect." MEDCEURs were spin-offs of the USEUCOMO medical exercises in Africa, the MEDFLAG series.
MEL	Master Events List
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, Time
Mil-to-Mil	The Military-to-Military program was an Army program that sent teams of Army specialists to assist the armed forces of

	former Warsaw Pact nations to modernize. The Mil-to-Mil team operated under the aegis of an American Military Liaison Team resident in the host nation.
MILES	Multiple Integrated Laser Exercise System
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
Mountain Shield	Name for a series of exercises run by V Corps in 1995 and 1996 to prepare forces for deployment to, and operations in, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as part of Task Force Eagle, the U.S. component of the NATO Implementation Force.
MOVEX	Movement Exercise
MRE	Mission Rehearsal Exercise
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MSE	Mobile Subscriber Equipment
MTDA	Modified Table of Distribution and Allowances
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NCA	National Command Authority
NG	National Guard
NIMBY	Not In My Back Yard
NTG	NATO Training Group
NTV	Non-tactical vehicle
ODCSINT	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
ODCSLOG	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
ODCSPER	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
ODP	Officer Distribution Plan
O&I	Operations & Intelligence Briefing, 1990-94
OPCON	Operational Control
OPD	Officer Professional Development
OPFOR	Opposing Force
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
OR	Operational Readiness
ORB	Officer Record Brief
Partnership for Peace	Following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, underlying tensions appeared in several areas of Europe.

With the diminished likelihood of having to combat conventional forces on a large scale, NATO made overtures to many of its former opponents in the hopes that European nations might work together. The overtures included invitations to conduct peacekeeping training in preparation for multinational efforts and resulted in a long series of Partnership for Peace exercises.

PCS

Permanent Change of Station

PKO

Peacekeeping Operations

PLL

Prescribed Load List

POM

Preparation for Overseas Movement

POMCUS

Prepositioning of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets

PREPO AFLOAT

Prepositioned Equipment Set III, located in Rotterdam, consisted of the equipment formerly assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 2d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, reconditioned, brought to a high state of preparedness, and loaded in ships. The set consisted of balanced brigade sets of two mechanized battalions, two tank battalions, an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a forward support battalion, and certain other elements including air defense artillery.

Purple

A term used to denote joint staff, in contrast to Green (Army). When used within the V Corps staff, the term "purple procedures," meaning joint staff procedures, was often a synonym for "slow."

REFORGER

Return of Forces to Germany. An annual exercise to validate the ability of American forces rapidly to reinforce the forward-deployed divisions in Germany. At the height of the Cold War, REFORGER exercises involved major maneuvers of large formations of troops across German terrain. By the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, REFORGER had become largely a command post exercise that also tested the ability of combat service support units to sustain deploying combat forces.

RIF







Reduction in Force

Right Seat Ride	An informal process in which the leaders of a unit visited the unit they were to relieve and spent a period of time observing task force procedures and operations.
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration of forces
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SASO	Stability and Support Operations
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
SERB	Selective Early Retirement Board
SETAF	Southern European Task Force
SFOR	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SICPS	Standardized Integrated Command Post System
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SIGMA STAR	Name given to the developmental battlefield automation system that encompassed five subsystems: Maneuver Control System (MCS); FAAD C ² I (Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Information); AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System); ASAS (All Source Analysis System); and CSSCS (Combat Service Support Computer System).
STANAG	Standardized NATO Agreements
STB	Special Troops Battalion
Sticker Drill	Term used to denote a V Corps war game used to work out anticipated problems in upcoming maneuvers, tests, exercises, or operations. The sticker drill was conducted with the commanding general, corps staff, and commanders of major participating subordinate commands.
STX	Situational Training Exercise
SWA	Southwest Asia
Synchronization Cell	Corps term applied to the staff functioning of the "four horsemen" in the corps main command post, specifically in the chief of staff's ISO Van. The synchronization cell was responsible for keeping track of the

	current status of each of the battlefield operating systems.
Synchronization Matrix	A chart that displayed critical information pertaining to operations orders in a graphic form, appended to operations orders in V Corps. The synchronization matrix showed time on the x-axis, development of battlefield operating systems on the negative y-axis, and anticipated courses of action on the positive y-axis.
TAA	Tactical Assembly Area
TAACOM	Theater Army Area Command
TALCE	Tactical Air Liaison Control Element (U.S. Air Force)
TCP	Tactical Computer Processor
TCS	Temporary Change of Station
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TF	Task Force
TFMV	Task Force Move Victory
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TRU/ARPS	Theater Reserve in Unit Sets/Army Readiness Package South (i.e., Italy)
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UH-60	The Blackhawk utility helicopter, capable of lifting one infantry squad or equipment and supply loads in various configurations.
UIC	Unit Identification Code
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protective Force
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces, Europe
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
War Trace	System of aligning reserve component units with active component units, so that the reserve units could prepare mission statements and mission essential task lists that provided training adequate for those reserve organizations to prepare themselves for mobilization.

Military Map Symbols













Military Unit—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery - - - - -	
Armor - - - - -	
Armored Cavalry - - - - -	
Aviation - - - - -	
Division Support Command - - - - -	
Engineers - - - - -	
Field Artillery - - - - -	
Finance - - - - -	
Infantry - - - - -	
Mechanized Infantry - - - - -	
Military Intelligence - - - - -	
Military Police - - - - -	
Signal Corps - - - - -	
Support Command - - - - -	

Size Symbols

Battalion or Squadron	-----	
Regiment or Group	-----	
Brigade	-----	X
Division	-----	XX
Corps	-----	XXX
Army	-----	XXXXX
Army Group	-----	XXXXXX

Examples

19th Guards Engineer Battalion	-----	 19 G
94th Guards Rocket Launcher Regiment	-----	 94 G Rkt
38th Antitank Brigade	-----	 38
13th Antiaircraft Artillery Division	-----	 13
21st Guards Mechanized Division	-----	 21 G
57th Guards Rifle Division	-----	 57 G
Eighth Guards Army	-----	 8
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	-----	11 ACR 
130th Engineer Brigade	-----	130 
Combat Aviation Brigade, 3d Armored Division	--	 XXX 3
41st Artillery Brigade, V Corps	-----	41  XXX 5
V Corps	-----	 V

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