"If you act promptly and rapidly, we shall bag the whole crowd."

_MG John Pope, ordering MG McDowell to "pursue" Jackson_

"The success of the present movement and the result of the battle soon to be fought depends on the full and exact execution of orders. I fear liquor more than General Pope's army."

_MG Thomas J. Jackson, as his men sacked Manassas Junction_

Jackson's march into the rear of Pope's army opened the Battle of Second Manassas. a battle which has many lessons worthy of study; the deep strike, unity of command, intelligence, logistics and importance of terrain, just to name a few.

Accordingly, the purpose of the Manassas staff ride is to learn lessons of the past by analyzing this battle through the eyes of the men who were there, both leaders and rank and file soldiers. Hopefully, the actions or inactions of certain Civil War commanders and the reactions of their troops will allow us to gain insights into decision-making and the human condition during battle.

In 1906, Major Eben Swift took twelve officer-students from Fort Leavenworth's General Service and Staff School on the Army's first staff ride to the Chickamauga Battlefield. Since then staff rides have been used to varying degrees in the education of Army officers to narrow the gap between peacetime training and war. That gap is of special concern in today's Army in which few leaders have experienced the stresses of combat. The staff ride, therefore, not only assists participants to understand the realities of war, it teaches warfighting, and in turn enhances unit readiness. It is a training method which commanders can use for the professional development of their subordinates and to enliven the unit's esprit de corps -- constant objectives of all commanders in peacetime.

At some time in their careers most officers have memorized many well-known maxims of the military art, probably without fully understanding or analyzing them. Now, whether you think of yourself as a tactician, operational artist, strategist, or just a soldier as you walk this battlefield, you should search for those operational principles and human characteristics which do not change over time. Place yourself in the minds of the leaders in the battle and analyze the factors involved in their decisions and determine if they could have done better. Only in this way can you fix in your mind the thought processes that must be second nature to you in the crisis of combat.

We are convinced that the staff ride is one of the best ways to do this.

Billy Arthur

Ted Ballard
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SECOND BULL RUN CAMPAIGN


FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

The Union failures in the Valley campaign, (Jackson’s Valley Campaign, June 1862) caused by the impossibility of coordinating the different Union commands from Washington, probably convinced President Lincoln that the departmental organization he had set up was not sound. On 26 June, he created the Army of Virginia which incorporated the forces of Banks, Fremont, McDowell, and several lesser forces—the troops in Washington (Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis’ Reserve Division), a small force at Winchester, and the division of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox in West Virginia. For its commander, Lincoln selected one of the more successful generals from the western theater, Maj. Gen. John Pope. The new commander was junior to all of his corps commanders. Fremont objected to this arrangement and resigned. His corps was given to German-born Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, whose selection may have been influenced by the fact that many of the men in the corps were of German extraction. The two cavalry brigades were assigned as organic elements of corps - Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch’s to the II Corps and Bayard’s to the III Corps. Hence, Pope had no cavalry directly under his control, and the consequences of this deficiency became apparent as the campaign progressed.

Shield’s division, decimated in the rugged fighting in the Valley, was broken up and its units sent elsewhere. It was a general Union policy during the war not to rebuild battle-tested veteran regiments, but instead to allow them to decline to the point of ineffectiveness, after which they were often dissolved. This process was due primarily to the Union mobilization system, which was based on unit rather than individual replacement. Thus, when Jackson’s operations in the Valley induced an intensified Union recruiting program, only 50,000 men were obtained as replacements for the veteran regiments while, at the same time, an additional 420,000 were formed into new units.

Pope’s mission contained three principal provisions: to protect Washington against attack from the direction of Richmond; to assure the safety of the Shenandoah Valley; and, by operating toward Gordonsville, to draw Confederate troops away from Richmond, thus aiding McClellan’s operations. The mission implied that some offensive operations would be necessary, but Pope was not expected, nor did he plan, to move on Richmond. It will be recalled that on 26 June, the day Pope’s army was constituted, Lee attacked McClellan’s north flank at Mechanicsville, thus initiating the Seven Days’ Battles. Upon their conclusion, when McClellan withdrew to Harrison’s Landing, Pope’s future operations would of necessity have to conform to the subsequent disposition and activity of McClellan’s army.

The resultant Second Battle of Bull Run was fought on substantially the same ground as the first battle. The area of preliminary maneuvering, however, bears examination, for it had an important influence on most of the campaigns in Virginia. The Rappahannock and
Rapidan Rivers, though bridged at some points and fordable at others during the dry season, were nevertheless good defensive obstacles. North and west of Gordonsville (See Map 1) the country is mountainous and was then fairly heavily wooded. The roads were primarily earthen (thus muddy in wet weather), but the Warrenton-Alexandria Turnpike was hard-surfaced. The Bull Run Mountains were another obstacle and could be crossed by large bodies of troops only at certain passes. The railroads were of great importance to both sides. Note that the Confederate railroads from the west, south, and east converge at Gordonsville. Therefore, retention of that town was a matter of primary concern to Lee. On 11 July, 1862, Lincoln appointed Halleck as general in chief of all the Union forces, thus returning the direction of military operations to military hands. Pope was directed to remain in Washington until Halleck could assume his new duties. Meanwhile, in pursuance of his mission, Pope ordered his corps to concentrate east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Since it was necessary to leave one division to protect the base at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, which had been established by McDowell preparatory to his previously contemplated move south, Pope had to disperse his troops over a wider front than he felt was desirable.

On the 14th, Banks was ordered to dispatch Hatch's cavalry to destroy the railroad connecting Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg. Instead of moving lightly and with speed as ordered, Hatch so encumbered his force with artillery and a wagon train, and moved so slowly, that it was the 19th before he reached a point ten miles from Gordonsville. Then he learned that Jackson had just occupied the town in considerable strength.

Meanwhile, Halleck pondered the employment of McClellan's army, which had been resting at Harrison's Landing since 3 July (see Map 1, Page 3). On 27 July, he discussed the matter with McClellan at the landing. Though McClellan argued that the decision by arms should be reached in the Petersburg-Richmond area, Halleck concluded and Lincoln approved that the army should be moved to Aquia Landing, just north of Falmouth. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's IX Corps, which had arrived at Fort Monroe from North Carolina on 28 June as a reinforcement for McClellan, was also ordered to Aquia Landing.

At first glance, Halleck's decision seems open to criticism. The Army of the Potomac was in position to threaten Petersburg, the gateway to Richmond. Three years later Grant was to achieve final victory by operating through Petersburg. But Halleck had to face reality. The simple, governing fact was that McClellan was not the man to undertake this task. Even though he knew that Jackson had gone to Gordonsville, McClellan estimated Lee's army in front of Richmond at 200,000. (It was actually weaker than the Army of the Potomac). Giving his own strength as 90,000, McClellan stated that, if he were reinforced with 20,000 men, he would try to take Richmond. If the disparity in strength was as great as McClellan believed -- and Halleck was by no means so convinced -- then the safest course dictated that the forces of Pope and McClellan be combined before attacking Lee. Perhaps the proper course would have been to leave the Army of the Potomac where it was and to provide it with a more energetic and less cautious commander.

During July and early August, Lee faced a dilemma equally as perplexing as that which confronted Halleck. He had no desire to continue operations in the Richmond area, but, as long as McClellan's army remained there posing a threat to the capital, he was powerless to employ his full force in major operations elsewhere. Nor could he sit idly by and allow Pope to advance south and sever Confederate communications with the Valley and
the west. Thus, when he learned on 12 July of Pope’s advance east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, Lee immediately dispatched Jackson, with two divisions, to Gordonsville.

Seldom, however, was Lee content to remain on the defensive if any opportunity could be found to strike a blow. Since he occupied a central position between Pope and McClellan, he might be able to concentrate against each of them in turn. There was a chance that Jackson could defeat Pope, then rejoin Lee for a new drive against McClellan. So Lee proceeded to gather reinforcements for Jackson. One means was to arrange to move at least two brigades from South Carolina to the Richmond area; another was to strengthen the fortifications at Richmond to allow the release of some troops.

On 27 July, Lee, deciding to gamble on McClellan’s continued inactivity, sent A.P. Hill, with 12,000 men, to join Jackson in operations against Pope. To mislead McClellan, he conducted diversionary operations (primarily artillery bombardments) against the Union base at Harrison’s Landing. On 5 August, Burnside arrived in Fredericksburg from Fort Monroe. It now appeared that the Union strategy provided for a major effort in northern Virginia. But Lee became skeptical of this idea when, on 5 August, some of McClellan’s troops moved north from Harrison’s Landing to Malvern Hill. Lee moved south from Richmond to give battle. Some preliminary skirmishing and preparations for a fight ensued, but, when 7 August dawned, Lee found that the Union troops had returned to the landing. Claiming he could not move the remainder of his army up to support them in time, McClellan had ordered their withdrawal. Now in a quandary, Lee decided to grant authority to Jackson to act as he saw fit. However, Jackson, not waiting for any such authority, had begun a march on Culpeper on 7 August. He hoped to deal with Pope’s corps individually before they could unite.

Pope himself had left Washington for the field on 29 July, after having been apprised by Halleck that McClellan’s army was to be moved north to unite with his own. Pope should now have appreciated the fact that this movement of the Army of the Potomac invalidated part of his previously assigned mission. Once McClellan left the Peninsula, Lee was sure to join Jackson with the rest of his force, and Pope would then be confronted with a Confederate force slightly larger than his own. Thus, logic dictated that he should await a juncture with McClellan’s army, falling back before Lee, if necessary. But, influenced primarily by Halleck’s determination to hold the Aquia Landing base, he moved forward to a position near Cedar Mountain, from which he could launch cavalry raids against Gordonsville.

About noon on 9 August, Jackson arrived at Cedar Mountain, forcing Bayard’s cavalry back before him. Banks, sent forward by Pope to delay Jackson while Pope concentrated, attacked the Confederates. In the fighting which followed (see Map 2, page 5), Winder was killed and his division was badly mauled by a surprise attack against its left flank. The arrival of A. P. Hill’s division prevented a rout and enabled Jackson to mount a counterattack which drove Banks, badly outnumbered, back across Cedar Creek. At the end of the day, Jackson’s advance was stopped by Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts’ division, which had been hurried forward by Pope. Jackson now learned that all of Pope’s corps were in the vicinity and hence that his opportunity to defeat them individually had disappeared. He remained in position until 12 August, hoping that Pope would attack. On that date he fell back to Gordonsville.

The fierce afternoon battle had cost Banks 2,381 casualties and Jackson 1,365. Neither commander had acquitted himself well. It was Pope’s intention that Banks would defend until
Sigel's corps arrived on the field of battle. But his orders, given orally, were poor and were misunderstood by Banks. Consequently, he had attacked without reserves and had delayed sending back for reinforcements when the need was indicated. Jackson's orders to his units had also been unclear and had led to confusion and unwarranted delay in the advance from Gordonsville. His initial dispositions on the battlefield had not been good, and his reluctance to divulge his plans had disturbed A.P. Hill and had prevented his playing a greater part in the battle.

Jackson's withdrawal convinced Lee that Jackson alone could not defeat Pope. Again he relied on McClellan's inactivity and, on 13 August, sent Longstreet to reinforce Jackson. On 14 August, upon learning definitely that McClellan was leaving the Peninsula, he started all but two brigades of his army northward. Lee's primary concern was now to meet and defeat Pope before the latter could be joined by McClellan. When Lee arrived at Gordonsville on 15 August, he at once evolved a plan for offensive operations against Pope before the latter could be reinforced by McClellan. Should this juncture occur before Pope was defeated, the combined Union armies would so outnumbered Lee as to make an attack by him unfeasible. Accordingly, Lee sought to maneuver quickly against Pope's line of communications in order to cut him off from his base of supply and then to attack and defeat him.

In pursuance of this plan, Lee massed his army behind Clark's Mountain with a view to moving to the Rapidan River, concealed from Pope's vision by the hill mass. He was to be preceded by his cavalry, under Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, who would cross the Rapidan east of Somerville Ford, proceed to Rappahannock Station, and destroy the railroad bridge at that point. Lee, crossing at Somerville Ford, would then fall upon Pope's left and rear and wreak destruction upon the Union army, whose major route of withdrawal would have been severed by Stuart. Lee's plan called for crossing the Rapidan on 18 August (see Map 3, page 7).

Meanwhile, Pope, far from being discouraged by his repulse at Cedar Mountain, continued to act aggressively, though not in such a state of ignorance of events as has often been supposed. On 16 August, he exhorted Halleck to speed the movement of McClellan's forces, pointing out the danger should Jackson and Lee unite. But despite his fears of being cut off, Pope remained in his exposed position at Cedar Mountain. He may have been influenced by the fact that, through no fault of his own, he was receiving troops and supplies over two lines of communications, one from Aquia Landing and the other from Manassas. It was not until 22 August that Halleck began diverting McClellan's troops to Alexandria because of inadequate berthing facilities at Aquia. Then Pope's line through Manassas became his major route.

Lee's excellent plan to turn Pope's left on 18 August was never executed. Confederate logistical difficulties and the failure of Stuart's cavalry to cross the Rapidan on schedule precluded Lee's crossing at Somerville Ford until 20 August. By that time, Pope had withdrawn behind the Rappahannock. This wise move resulted from the capture by raids of Confederate cavalry of a copy of Lee's order for the 18 August operations. Stuart himself barely escaped capture, but his cloak and handsome plumed hat fell into Union hands. Perhaps enraged at such humiliating treatment, Stuart retaliated on 22 August with a raid on Pope's headquarters in which he made off with that general's dress coat as well as with
papers which helped to establish the fact that Union reinforcements were enroute.

Prior to Stuart’s raid, Lee had followed Pope to the Rappahannock. He had made several attempts to turn the Union position both to the northwest and the southeast, but Pope’s vigilance, plus rising waters brought on by rains on 22 and 23 August, had combined to nullify his efforts. Pope had seriously considered crossing the river to strike Lee’s flank, but the flooded river prevented such a move. He had, however, ordered Sigel and Banks to attack the two Confederate brigades which, in an attempt at crossing the river at Waterloo, had been marooned by the high water. Sigel’s slowness and the falling river enabled Jackson to extricate these brigades before an attack could be launched against them.

Thus, on 24 August, the two armies faced each other across the Rappahannock. A week of maneuvering by Lee had brought him nought. Aware of the reinforcements Pope was beginning to receive, Lee realized that his opportunity to strike before he was confronted with superior forces was rapidly disappearing. Lee hopeful of cutting off and defeating Pope before he could be further reinforced, conceived a new plan. On 24 August, he discussed it with Jackson and explained the part the latter was to play. The boldness of the plan stimulated Jackson, who had grown weary of futile attempts to cross the river in the face of Union resistance.

In brief, Lee prescribed that Jackson, with half of the army and Stuart’s cavalry, was to move secretly up the river, cross it where feasible, and then get astride Pope’s line of communications, the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. To divert attention from Jackson’s movement, the remainder of the army would conduct diversionary operations against Pope and then follow Jackson. It was Lee’s expectation that this maneuver would force Pope to retreat and, in so doing, would create the opportunity for the decisive Confederate attack which had been seeking so desperately.

Lee’s plan has been regarded by some critics as being too audacious—even foolhardy. Others contend that, under the existing circumstances, Lee was forced to take bold measures immediately or face eventual defeat by overwhelming forces. It is not likely that Lee conceived his venturous maneuver in disdain for Pope’s ability, for the latter had frustrated every Confederate move during the preceding week. Rather, it was probably born of necessity and of Lee’s confidence in his own ability to take advantage of any error by Pope.

Early on 25 August, Jackson moved north and, by driving his men hard all day, reached Salem that night. At dawn on the 26th, he started his cavalry for Thoroughfare Gap with instructions to seize and hold it for passage of his troops. The movement through the mountain pass was accomplished with practically no Federal opposition. That night Jackson bivouacked at Bristoe Station, on Pope’s line of communications (see Map 4, page 9). Upon learning that the bulk of the Union supplies were at Manassas Junction, Jackson sent Stuart’s cavalry and Trimble’s brigade to seize the junction before it could be reinforced from Alexandria. This same night (26 August) Longstreet was at Orleans, enroute to join Jackson, and McClellan himself arrived in Alexandria.

The corps of McClellan’s army had debarked, some at Aquia Landing and others at Alexandria. Heintzelman’s III and Porter’s V Corps had already joined Pope. McClellan was under the impression that he was to command the combined forces; Pope understood that Halleck would do so. Halleck, burdened with details and concerned over the critical Union situation in Kentucky and Tennessee, had given little thought to the matter. So, on the eve of
battle, the Union high-command structure was far from clear.

Meanwhile, Pope was not ignorant of Jackson’s initial movements. By noon of the 25th, he had received detailed reports of Jackson’s march and had accurately estimated his strength. But his cavalry, being in a run-down state, soon lost track of Jackson’s force; and both Pope and McDowell first conjectured that Jackson was covering the movement of Lee’s entire army to the Valley. On the 26th, some troops were sent to Waterloo in search of the Confederates; others were directed to concentrate and to be prepared to march on short notice.

At 8:00 p.m. that night, the telegraph line to Manassas went dead. At 10:00 p.m., McDowell’s scouts reported that Jackson had moved east on Manassas. Early the next morning, a party that had been sent to Bristoe Station to investigate the broken telegraph line returned with the news which Pope had begun to suspect, that Jackson was at Manassas.

McDowell jubilantly pointed out to Pope that, with Lee’s army now split, a golden opportunity had arisen. All depended upon the troop dispositions and movements now ordered by Pope. If judiciously made and expeditiously executed, these could well frustrate Lee’s bold plan and perhaps lead to his defeat. On the morning of 27 August, General John Pope made a sound estimate of the prevailing situation and arrived at an excellent decision as to the employment of his forces. He knew that a major force of all arms was astride his line of communications at Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction. His cavalry and signal observation parties had apprised him of Longstreet’s northward movement. It was clear to him that the movements of Lee’s forces had made his position on the Rappahannock untenable. On the other hand, if he moved his troops promptly and properly, he had an excellent opportunity to interpose his army between Jackson and Longstreet and to defeat them separately.

By the evening of the 27th, the Union forces had reached the positions prescribed in Pope’s orders (see Map 5, page 11). Hooker had been directed to move to Bristoe Station, drive away the enemy, and reopen communications with Alexandria. He found the station occupied by Ewell who, though outnumbering Hooker, was under orders to avoid becoming heavily engaged and, accordingly, withdrew to join Jackson at Manassas Junction. That night Hooker encamped at Bristoe Station. His remaining ammunition supply was sufficient for only about five rounds per man. (The III Corps, of which he was a part, and Porter’s V Corps had arrived from the Peninsula short of ammunition, artillery, and transportation.) There were several deficiencies in Pope’s otherwise excellent plan. First, Hooker’s division was too small a force to send on his assigned mission, especially since Pope had known that Jackson was at Manassas Junction with about 25,000 men. Secondly, he had failed to order McDowell to defend the mountain passes, particularly Thoroughfare Gap, through which Longstreet would have to move to unite with Jackson. Finally, he had assigned his cavalry to subordinate units and had none under his direct control.

At 10:00 a.m., Pope had sent a message to Halleck, via Burnside, informing him of Jackson’s activities and of the orders he, Pope, had issued to his troops. He requested Halleck to send provisions and construction materials to Manassas Junction, expecting to reopen communications with Washington that night. However, Halleck already knew of Jackson’s severance of the Union rail communications, having been apprised by Brig. Gen. Herman Haupt, who brilliantly supervised the railroad for Pope. Haupt, concerned for the safety of the important bridge at Union Mills, had managed to obtain the use of a brigade from the VI
Corps at Alexandria and two regiments from Cox's division, recently arrived from West Virginia. This force, under Brig. Gen. George W. Taylor, moved to Union Mills by train on 27 August. Instead of taking up a position from which he which he could protect the bridge, Taylor foolishly advanced to attack Jackson. A. P. Hill easily repulsed the attack, drove the Federals back, and captured many of them. Then he destroyed the Union Mills bridge.

The morning of 27 August had found Jackson concentrated at Manassas Junction while three brigades under Ewell at Bristoe Station protected his rear. Except for the attacks of Hooker and Taylor, the day passed uneventfully. During the day his troops looted, plundered, and gorged themselves on the abundant stores which had been assembled at the junction to supply the two Union armies. Even Jackson's iron discipline could not restrain them. Late in the day he ordered wagons filled with ammunition, his troops to carry four days' rations, and the torch applied to what remained. He had accomplished the first part of his mission -- the cutting of the railroad. Now he sought a position in which he could defend against Pope's expected attack while awaiting the arrival of Longstreet. The position he chose was Stony Ridge, near Sudley Springs. The night of 27 August was an uneasy one for Pope, then at Bristoe Station. He was rightfully concerned that his only force in proximity to Jackson's 25,000 men at Manassas Junction was Hooker's division -- 4,000 men, almost out of ammunition. His apprehension probably led to a conclusion that Jackson was likely to remain in the vicinity of the junction and launch an attack on the exposed Union right flank at Bristoe Station. To forestall such maneuver, Pope ordered the concentration of his army at Manassas Junction. Porter was directed at 1:00 a.m. to hasten to Bristoe Station to join with Hooker; the remainder of the army was to move at dawn, 28 August. Pope's orders for the move included the optimistic prediction: "We shall bag the whole crowd [Jackson's force]."

In his anxiety to destroy Jackson, Pope had either ignored or forgotten Longstreet. McDowell, on his own initiative, had sent Ricketts' division and the cavalry brigades of Bayard and Buford to hold Thoroughfare Gap against Longstreet. This, admittedly, was only a token force, but, in view of his orders to move to Manassas Junction, McDowell could not very well have dispatched a large force.

The movements of Jackson's divisions further confused Pope. While the latter meditated at Bristoe Station on the night of the 27th, Jackson began to move his divisions to the defensive position he had selected on Stony Ridge. Because of confusing instructions issued by the secretive Jackson, Ewell and A. P. Hill took roundabout routes to the new position, and it was early afternoon before all arrived on the ridge. Meanwhile, Pope himself had entered Manassas Junction and found it abandoned. Having no information other than a report that A. P. Hill had been seen at Centreville (on his circuitous route to Stony Ridge), Pope concluded that Jackson was in that vicinity, and, at 4:15 p.m., his corps were directed to march on Centreville.

By now, Pope had lost control of the situation. Since dawn he had been marching his forces to and fro in vain attempts to locate and attack Jackson. With no cavalry under his direct control to secure the information he needed, he made decisions based on erroneous or imaginary concepts. By 5:30 p.m., the Federal forces were in the process of executing Pope's latest order to concentrate at Centreville (see Map 6). Sigel and Reynolds had begun a countermarch to get on the Warrenton Turnpike, and King had turned eastward onto the pike.

Meanwhile, Jackson, in position at Stony Ridge, had been hoping for an opportunity to
fall on Pope’s troops. Misinterpreting a captured copy of Pope’s order to assemble at Manassas Junction, Jackson feared that Pope was retreating across Bull Run to unite with the remainder of McClellan’s army. He expected Longstreet momentarily and wished to prevent the concentration of the Union armies so that a decisive victory over Pope could be achieved. So, when King appeared in front of his position at 5:30 p.m., Jackson attacked (see Map 6 page 14), hoping to draw Pope’s army upon himself and prevent the movement across Bull Run. King resisted stubbornly the attacks of the divisions of Ewell and Brig. Gen. William A. Taliaferro. Fierce but indecisive fighting continued until 9:00 p.m., with both sides sustaining heavy casualties. One of King’s brigades, that of Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, here earned its title of “The Iron Brigade.” (Other accounts indicate the nickname was acquired later at South Mountain, during the Antietam campaign). On the Confederate side, Ewell was wounded and the Stonewall Brigade was reduced in strength to about 400 men.

To the west, Longstreet had arrived at Thoroughfare Gap at 3:00 p.m. Finding his way blocked, he sent troops to force the gap at Hopewell to outflank Ricketts’ division. To the east, McClellan retained the corps of Franklin and Sumner at Alexandria despite Halleck’s earlier instructions to send them to Pope. With his penchant for overestimating his opposition, McClellan believed that Jackson had 100,000 men—in spite of Pope’s earlier message giving Jackson’s strength accurately as 25,000. Dawn of 29 August found Pope’s forces in the locations shown on Map 7, page 15. The march during the previous night had been confused and fatiguing due to changes in Pope’s orders, which caused countermarching. Heintzelman and Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno had reached Centreville; Sigel and Reynolds, Warrenton Turnpike at Henry House Hill; Porter and Banks, Bristoe Station. Brig. Gen. Rufus King was at Manassas Junction, and Ricketts was at Bristoe Station. Two cavalry brigades opposed Longstreet’s advance.

Late on the night of the 28th, Pope had issued orders for the battle he expected to wage with Jackson the next day. The contents of his orders indicate clearly that when he had formulated them he had neither correct knowledge of the activities of his own forces nor of those of Longstreet. King’s fight with Jackson had given Pope the idea that Jackson was withdrawing down the pike toward Gainesville. His orders directed Sigel and Reynolds to attack the Confederates at daybreak, Heintzelman and Reno to march to Sigel’s support, Porter to move to Centreville, and McDowell to march east from the Gainesville area and join in the attack. Thus, with forces converging on Jackson from east and west, Pope visualized complete victory on the 29th.

Pope’s orders to McDowell make it evident that the Union commander was ignorant as to the whereabouts of two of the latter’s divisions—those of King and Ricketts. Ricketts, after being forced away from Thoroughfare Gap by Longstreet’s enveloping maneuver through the pass at Hopewell, had fallen back to Gainesville. Here he had met King who, after his encounter with Jackson at Groveton, had reversed his march on the turnpike. McDowell had gone in search of Pope; in his absence, King (who was extremely ill) had, instead of waiting for orders, marched his division to Manassas. Ricketts likewise had moved to Bristoe Station. Thus, by the time McDowell learned of Pope’s plan for the 29th, these two divisions were not available to carry out their assigned missions.

It will be noted that Pope’s orders made no provision for possible participation by Longstreet in the coming battle. Somehow, Pope had gained the impression that Longstreet
SECOND BULL RUN
CAMPAIGN
Situation 5:30 PM, 28 Aug, and
Movements Since Midnight, 27-28 Aug. 1862
SECOND BULL RUN CAMPAIGN
Situation at Dawn, 29 Aug., and Movements During Night of 28-29 Aug. 1862
had earlier forced the gap, but had thereafter been driven back to the west of the mountains. How he had arrived at this erroneous understanding is puzzling, for at no time had he issued instructions to anyone to defend the gaps. Actually, Longstreet was east of the mountains at dawn of the 29th. His troops were less than ten miles from those of Jackson, and between them were only two worn down brigades of Union cavalry.

Pope became aware of McDowell’s actual dispositions early on the 29th. The orders he had issued for battle that day were no longer feasible; they would have to be modified to conform to realities. In modifying his plan, Pope retained the idea of attacking Jackson from both east and west. About 5:00 a.m., 29 August, he ordered Porter to reverse his march and proceed to Gainesville, taking with him King’s division of McDowell’s corps. McDowell had received no new orders, but, noting that one of his divisions was to go with Porter, he anticipated that he would be ordered to do likewise and so followed Porter with Ricketts’ division.

About two hours later, as Porter and McDowell were approaching Bethlehem Church on the Manassas-Gainesville Road, they received a joint message from Pope. The message indicated that, for the first time, Pope was worried about Longstreet—and that he was also concerned over the matter of supply. It furthermore suggested that Pope still believed Jackson was withdrawing and recognized that he might escape interception, for it directed that, once Porter and McDowell made contact with Sigel, the entire command should halt. Then Pope would decide whether to continue the advance beyond Gainesville or to fall back east of Bull Run to replenish supplies and to await the attack of Lee’s united army. The message contained no attack instructions for Porter or McDowell, but it authorized departure from its provisions "if any considerable advantages are to be gained." Presumably, the corps commanders could attack or not as they saw fit. Though the message indicated that Pope considered Longstreet a threat, it also showed that Pope grossly miscalculated the imminence of that threat, for he predicted that, if unopposed, Longstreet could not arrive at Centreville before dark of the following day.

Actually, Longstreet’s four divisions had passed through Gainesville at 9:00 a.m. on the 29th and were in position before noon (see Map 8, page 17). At 11:00 a.m., Brig. Gen. John Buford’s cavalry reported to McDowell that the Confederates had been at Gainesville at 9:00 a.m. and gave an accurate count of Longstreet’s force. This report would have clarified whatever misconceptions Pope had concerning Longstreet, but McDowell failed to forward it to him.

McDowell and Porter pondered the message and discussed courses to adopt. They could hear artillery fire to the north and could see dust clouds to the west. Finally, McDowell, the senior, decided to have Porter continue his march toward Gainesville while he moved his corps north through New Market to aid Sigel. Meanwhile, the attack on Jackson from the east had been made as planned, Sigel and Reynolds having assaulted early in the morning and having been joined before noon by Reno and Heintzelman. But Pope’s attacks were all frontal, piecemeal, and poorly coordinated. No attempt was made to envelop Jackson’s flank. Though the Confederate left came perilously close to breaking, when the fighting subsided at sunset all of the Union assaults had been beaten back.

While Jackson struggled at Stony Ridge, Longstreet remained inactive in position nearby. Late in the evening he dispatched Brig. Gen. John B. Hood’s division (his own left-
SECOND BULL RUN CAMPAIGN
Situation About 5:30 P.M., and Movements Since Dew, 29 August 1862

BANKS remained at Bristoe Sta. guarding trains until the night of 30-31 Aug.
flank division) forward to reconnoiter for a likely spot for an attack the next day, but Hood encountered Hatch (who had taken over King’s division) and withdrew to his lines. On three different occasions Lee had wanted Longstreet to attack Pope’s south flank, but each time he had reluctantly succumbed to Longstreet’s pleas for postponement. Had Lee been insistent, it is very likely that the Confederates would have gained an important victory.

In the meantime, Porter had stopped at Dawkins Branch where he had encountered Stuart’s cavalry. Between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. he received a message from Pope directing him to attack the Confederate right but at the same time to maintain contact with Reynolds. Apparently, Pope was still unaware of Longstreet’s arrival and had in mind an envelopment of Jackson. Obviously, Porter could not obey both provisions of the order simultaneously. But he could have felt out Longstreet’s position and informed Pope of true state of affairs. He was later court-martialed for failing to obey Pope’s order and was dismissed from the service. Twenty years later, when the real circumstances became known his sentence was remitted.

Hood’s withdrawal on the evening of 29 August, combined with reports on the morning of the 30th from McDowell and Heintzelman, seemed to convince Pope that the Confederates were withdrawing from the field of battle. Ever sanguine in his outlook, Pope, about noon on the 30th, issued orders for McDowell to take up the pursuit with his own corps and the corps of Heintzelman and Porter (The latter had arrived that morning from his position of the previous day at Dawkins Branch).

However, a withdrawal was the action least contemplated by Lee. Not desiring to assault the Union position, he was formulating plans to maneuver deep around Pope’s right to interpose his army between the Union army and Alexandria. Nor had he expected Pope to resume the offensive. Thus, when Jackson came under heavy attack about 1:30 p.m. on the 30th, Lee was surprised. He immediately saw the opportunity for a Confederate counterstroke while the Union forces were out of position and in the open.

Shortly after Pope had issued his orders for the pursuit, Reynolds apprised him that the Confederates were not retreating, as Pope had believed. The Union commander then decided to renew the attack on Jackson’s position. Porter’s relatively fresh corps was ordered to make the main attack on Jackson’s right while Heintzelman’s corps and Hatch’s and Ricketts’ divisions of McDowell’s corps attacked on the left. Reno and Sigel were placed in reserve, and Reynolds was directed to hold Bald Hill, in order to protect the south flank. Initially, Porter’s assault achieved considerable success. Jackson’s line, weakened from three days of fighting, became so hard-pressed on the right that he asked for reinforcements. When Longstreet had taken up his position, most of his artillery had been placed on high ground that dominated that area over which Porter was attacking. So in response to Jackson’s plea, Lee ordered Longstreet to unleash a strong artillery bombardment on Porter’s troops. Surprised and taken in the flank by this artillery fire, Porter’s corps broke and was forced back. Reynolds’ division, except for one brigade, was rushed from Bald Hill to support Porter (see Map 9, page 19).

Both Lee and Longstreet now perceived the excellent opportunity to strike a decisive blow on Pope’s southern flank. Lee ordered the attack, and Longstreet, already prepared, set his five divisions (Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s division had arrived the previous evening) in motion. Bald Hill was quickly seized and held, despite repeated counterattacks by Sigel. Pope drew troops from his right to strengthen his left.
The opposition on his north flank thus weakened, Jackson was enabled to advance there in support of Longstreet’s attack. The Union army eventually was forced back to a position at Henry House Hill (see Map 10, page 21). Though the fighting there raged until dark, Lee was unable to dislodge the Union forces.

As the tired troops rested, Pope prepared plans for a withdrawal to Centreville. It would have been possible to bring up Franklin’s fresh corps and strengthen the defenses during the night, so that by morning Lee would have been confronted with a formidable and well-manned position at Henry House Hill. But Pope, shaken over the failure of his plans during the last two days, apparently felt that a withdrawal was the wisest course. Pope issued his order for withdrawal to Centreville at 7:00 p.m., 30 August. The movement began after dark, with McDowell’s corps acting as a covering force. Sigel’s troops, the last to cross Bull Run, destroyed Stone Bridge. The march was uneventful and proceeded in a calm and orderly manner. By midnight, the bulk of the Union army was in position at Centreville.

The withdrawal might have been different if Lee had followed it aggressively during the night, but his troops were extremely tired and, at this period in history, night attacks were not frequently attempted.

It will be remembered that Banks had been left at Bristoe Station to guard the army’s trains. He was now ordered to rejoin the army at Centreville. Since the railroad bridge over Bull Run at Union Mills had been demolished, he was ordered to destroy much rolling stock and the many supplies which he could not take with him and to cross at Blackburn’s Ford. All this he accomplished without serious interference from the Confederates.

Early on 31 August, as heavy rains fell, Pope composed a message to Halleck, introducing for the first time a note of discouragement. He intimated that if Lee should attack again, the Union army might be destroyed. Lee, however, had no intention of trying to cross the swollen Bull Run and attack frontally. Instead, he sent Jackson to the north to get behind the Union position at Centreville. Longstreet remained in position one day to deceive Pope, and then followed. Jackson bivouacked that night at Pleasant Valley, a few miles north of Centreville. Later in the day, Pope’s spirits improved. In a wire to Halleck, he correctly predicted Lee’s turning movement and expressed confidence in his ability to cope with it.

Meanwhile, McClellan, at Alexandria, had been badgering Halleck, in Washington, since early morning with messages reflecting fear for the safety of Washington. By noon, he had conjured up visions of Lee’s already occupying Fairfax Court House and threatening to cut off Pope. Two days earlier he had harassed Halleck into allowing him to retain Franklin unnecessarily. Now, Halleck, relying on Pope’s latest dispatch, would not order the army to withdraw from Centreville, much to McClellan’s dissatisfaction.

Early the next morning (1 September), Pope ordered Sumner, who had arrived at Centreville, to send a brigade north to reconnoiter. Sumner’s cavalry being so exhausted it was necessary to send infantry on the mission. About 9:00 a.m., Pope’s mood again changed and he wired Halleck that, though he intended to fight, he believed the army should be recalled to Washington. At noon he sent McDowell to occupy Germantown. Then he sent two brigades of the IX Corps, under Maj. Gen. Isaac I. Stevens, to Chantilly to block Jackson. Kearny’s division joined Stevens later in the afternoon.

That same morning Jackson had started from Pleasant Valley toward Fairfax Court
House. But his troops were hungry—not having received rations the previous evening—and almost exhausted from seven days of marching and fighting. By the middle of the afternoon, they had advanced only three miles—and then encountered Stevens' troops. The Battle of Chantilly (see Map 10 inset, top right) followed and continued until dark. The Confederates attacked several times, but, though outnumbering the defenders, they were repulsed. Both Stevens and Kearny were killed. That night Longstreet arrived to relieve Jackson's troops, and the Union force retired to Germantown and Fairfax Court House. In the morning, Pope again wired Halleck, recommending withdrawal. At noon he received authority to move into the fortifications of Washington.

So ended second Bull Run campaign. Lee, bold to the extreme, had outmaneuvered his opponents and won a notable victory. The Union, plagued with divided command problems and Pope's misconceptions at critical times, found its army practically besieged in Washington and the country threatened with invasion. Lee's victory, however, had not been without cost -- he had suffered about 9,500 casualties while inflicting some 14,500 on the Federals.
Army of Virginia
Maj. Gen. John Pope, Commanding

I Corps, Army of Virginia (Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel)
1st Division (Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck)
  1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Julius H. Stahel)
    27th Pennsylvania
    8th New York
    41st New York
    45th New York
  2d Brigade (Col. Nathaniel C. McLean)
    25th Ohio
    55th Ohio
    73d Ohio
    75th Ohio

2d Division (merged in the others)
3d Division (Brig. Gen. Carl Schulz)
  1st Brigade (Col. Alexander Schimmelfennig)
    61st Ohio
    74th Pennsylvania
    8th West Virginia
  2d Brigade (Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski)
    54th New York
    56th New York
    75th Pennsylvania
  3d Brigade (Col. John A. Koltes)
    29th New York
    68th New York
    73d Pennsylvania

Independent Brigade (Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy)
  2d West Virginia
  3d West Virginia
  5th West Virginia
  1st West Virginia Cavalry
  93d Ohio

Artillery of the I Corps, Army of Virginia
  K, 1st Ohio Light (Haskin’s)
  L, 2d New York Light (Schirmer’s)
  F, Pennsylvania Light (Hampton’s)
  L, 2d New York Light (Roemer’s)
  I, 1st Ohio Light (Dilger’s)
  12th Battery, Ohio Light (Johnson’s)
  I, 1st New York Light (Wiedrich’s)
  13th Battery, New York Light (Dieckmann’s)
  C, West Virginia Light (Hill’s)

II Corps, Army of Virginia (Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks)
1st Division (Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams)
  1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford)
    10th Maine
    46th Pennsylvania
    28th New York
    5th Connecticut
  2d Brigade (merged in the others)
  3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon)
    2d Massachusetts
    3d Wisconsin
    27th Indiana
  2d Division (Brig. Gen. George S. Greene)
    1st Brigade (Col. Charles Candy)
      5th Ohio
      7th Ohio
      29th Ohio
      60th Ohio
      28th Pennsylvania
    2d Brigade (Col. M. Schlaudecker)
      109th Pennsylvania
      111th Pennsylvania
      3d Maryland
      102d New York
      18th U.S. Infantry
      12th U.S. Infantry
    3d Brigade (Col. James A. Tait)
      1st District of Columbia
      78th New York
      60th New York
      Purnell Legion, Maryland
      3d Delaware
    Artillery of the II Corps, Army of Virginia
      4th Battery, Maine Light (Robinson’s)
      6th Battery, Maine Light (McGilvery’s)
      M Battery, 1st New York Light (Cohran’s)
      10th Battery, New York Light (Braun’s)
      E Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Knap’s)
      F Battery, 4th U.S. (Best’s)

III Corps, Army of Virginia (Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell)
1st Division (Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch vice Rufus King)
  1st Brigade (Col. Timothy Sullivan vice John P. Hatch)
    2d U.S. Sharpshooters
    22d New York
    24th New York
    30th New York
    84th New York
  2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday)
    56th Pennsylvania
    76th New York
    95th New York
  3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick)
    21st New York
    23d New York
    25th New York
    80th New York
  4th Brigade (Brig. Gen. John Gibbon)
    2d Wisconsin
    19th Indiana
    6th Wisconsin
    7th Wisconsin

2d Division (Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts)
  1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Abram Duryee)
    97th New York
    104th New York
    105th New York
    107th New York
  2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Zealous B. Tower)
    26th New York
    94th New York
    88th Pennsylvania
    90th Pennsylvania
  3d Brigade (Col. John W. Stiles)
    11th Pennsylvania
    83d New York
    12th Massachusetts
    13th Massachusetts
  4th Brigade (Col. Joseph Thoburn)
    1st West Virginia
    84th Pennsylvania
    110th Pennsylvania
    7th Indiana

Pennsylvania Reserves (Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds)
  1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. George G. Meade)
    1st Rifles
    3d Infantry
    4th Infantry
    7th Infantry
    8th Infantry
  2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour)
    1st Infantry
    2d Infantry
    5th Infantry
    6th Infantry
  3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Conrad F. Jackson)
    9th Infantry
    10th Infantry
    11th Infantry
    12th Infantry

Artillery of the III Corps, Army of Virginia
(Major Tellson, Chief of Artillery)
  1st Battery, New Hampshire Light (Gerrish’s)
  D Battery, 1st Rhode Island Light (Monroe’s)
  B Battery, 4th U.S. (Campbell’s)
  C Battery, 5th U.S. (Ransom’s)
  2d Battery, Maine Light (Hall’s)
  5th Battery, Maine Light (Leppien’s)
  A Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Simpson’s)
  B Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Cooper’s)
  C Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Thompson’s)
  G Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Kerns’)

Cavalry of the Army of Virginia
Cavalry of the I Corps
  Buford’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. John Buford)
    1st Michigan
    1st Vermont
    1st West Virginia
Beardsley’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. John Beardsley)
1st Connecticut Battalion
1st Maryland
4th New York
9th New York
6th Ohio

Cavalry of the III Corps
Bayard’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard)
1st New Jersey
1st Pennsylvania
1st Rhode Island
1st Maine
1st New York

III Corps, Army of the Potomac (Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman)
1st Division (Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny)
1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson)
20th Indiana
63d Pennsylvania
105th Pennsylvania
30th Ohio (6 companies)
2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. David D. Birney)
1st New York
38th New York
101st New York
57th Pennsylvania
3d Maine
4th Maine
3d Brigade (Col. Orlando M. Poe)
37th New York
2d Michigan
3d Michigan
5th Michigan
99th Pennsylvania

2d Division (Brig. Gen. George Sykes)
1st Brigade (Lt. Col. Robert C. Buchanan)
3d U.S. Infantry
4th U.S. Infantry
12th U.S. Infantry, 1st Battalion
14th U.S. Infantry, 1st Battalion
14th U.S. Infantry, 2d Battalion
2d Brigade (Lt. Col. William Chapman)
1st U.S. Infantry (Company G)
2d U.S. Infantry
6th U.S. Infantry
10th U.S. Infantry
11th U.S. Infantry
17th U.S. Infantry
3d Brigade (Col. Gouverneur K. Warren)
5th New York
10th New York
Piatt’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. Sanders Piatt)
86th New York
63d Indiana

Artillery of the III Corps, Army of the Potomac
K Battery, 1st U.S. (Graham’s)
E Battery, 1st Rhode Island (Randolph’s)
6th Battery, Main Light (McGilvery’s)

V Corps, Army of the Potomac (Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter)
1st Division (Maj. Gen. George W. Morell)
1st Brigade (Col. James Barnes)
2d Maine
18th Massachusetts
22d Massachusetts
13th New York
25th New York
1st Michigan
2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin)
9th Massachusetts
32d Massachusetts
14th New York
62d Pennsylvania
4th Michigan
Sharpshooters
3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Dan Butterfield)
12th New York
17th New York
44th New York
16th Michigan
83d Pennsylvania
1st U.S.

2d Division (Brig. Gen. George Sykes)
1st Brigade (Lt. Col. Robert C. Buchanan)
3d U.S. Infantry
4th U.S. Infantry
12th U.S. Infantry, 1st Battalion
2d U.S. Infantry
6th U.S. Infantry
10th U.S. Infantry
11th U.S. Infantry
17th U.S. Infantry
3d Brigade (Col. Gouverneur K. Warren)
5th New York
10th New York
Platt’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. Sanders Piatt)
86th New York
63d Indiana

Artillery of the V Corps, Army of the Potomac
3d Massachusetts Battery (Martin’s)
C Battery, 1st Rhode Island Light
(Waterman’s)
E and G Batteries, 1st U.S. (Randolph’s)
D Battery, 5th U.S. (Hazlett’s)
1 Battery, 5th U.S. (Weed’s)
K Battery, 5th U.S. (Smead’s)

IX Corps, Army of the Potomac (Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno)
1st Division (Brig. Gen. Isaac I. Stevens)
1st Brigade (Col. Benjamin C. Christ)
8th Michigan
50th Pennsylvania
2d Brigade (Col. Daniel Leasure)
100th Pennsylvania
46th New York
3d Brigade (Col. Addison Farnsworth)
79th New York
28th Massachusetts

2d Division (Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno)
1st Brigade (Col. James Nagle)
48th Pennsylvania
2d Maryland
6th New Hampshire
2d Brigade (Col. Edward Ferrero)
51st New York
51st Pennsylvania
21st Massachusetts

Artillery of the IX Corps, Army of the Potomac
E Battery, 2d U.S. (Benjamin’s)
D Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Durell’s)
Order of Battle

Order of Battle
28–30 August 1862

Army of Northern Virginia
General Robert E. Lee, Commanding

Right Wing (Lt. Gen. James Longstreet)
Infantry
Hood's (Evans') Division (Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans)
Hood's Brigade (Brig. Gen. John B. Hood)
  1st Texas
  4th Texas
  5th Texas
  18th Georgia
Hampton's Legion
Whiting's (or Law's) Brigade (Col. Evander M. Law)
  4th Alabama
  6th North Carolina
  2d Mississippi
  11th Mississippi
Evans' Brigade (Col. P. F. Stevens)
  17th South Carolina
  18th South Carolina
  22d South Carolina
  23d South Carolina
Holcombe's Legion
Wilcox's Division (Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox)
Wilcox's Brigade
  8th Alabama
  9th Alabama
  10th Alabama
  11th Alabama
Pryor's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Roger A. Pryor)
  2d Florida
  5th Florida
  8th Florida
  3d Virginia
  14th Alabama
Featherston's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Featherston)
  2d Mississippi
  12th Mississippi
  16th Mississippi
  19th Mississippi
Kemper's Division (Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper)
Kemper's Brigade (Col. Montgomery D. Corse)
  1st Virginia
  7th Virginia
  11th Virginia
  17th Virginia
  24th Virginia
Jenkins' Brigade (Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins)
  1st South Carolina
  2d South Carolina
  5th South Carolina
  6th South Carolina
  Palmetto
Pickett's Brigade (Col. Eppa Hunton)
  8th Virginia
  18th Virginia
  19th Virginia
  28th Virginia
  56th Virginia
D. R. Jones' Division (Brig. Gen. David R. Jones)
Anderson's Brigade (Col. G. T. Anderson)
  1st Georgia
  7th Georgia
  8th Georgia
  9th Georgia
  11th Georgia
Toomb's Brigade (Col. Henry L. Benning)
  2d Georgia
  15th Georgia
  17th Georgia
  20th Georgia
Drayton's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Drayton)
  15th South Carolina
  50th Georgia
  51st Georgia
Mahone's Brigade (Brig. Gen. William Mahone)
  6th Virginia
  12th Virginia
  16th Virginia
  41st Virginia
Wright's Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright)
  3d Georgia
  22d Georgia
  48th Georgia
  44th Alabama
Armistead's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Armistead)
  9th Virginia
  14th Virginia
  38th Virginia
  53d Virginia
  57th Virginia
  5th Virginia Battalion

Artillery
Lee's Battalion (Col. Stephen D. Lee)
  Bath Artillery, Virginia (Eubanks')
  Portsmouth Artillery, Virginia (Oakham's)
  Bedford Artillery, Virginia (Jordan's)
  Parker's Battery, Virginia
  Taylor's Battery, Virginia
  Rhett's Battery, South Carolina
Washington Artillery Battalion, Louisiana (Maj. J. B. Walton)
  1st Company (Squire's)
  2d Company (Richardson's)
  3d Company (Miller's)
  4th Company (Eshleman's)

Division Batteries
Thomas Artillery, Virginia (Anderson's)
  Dixie Artillery, Virginia (Chapman's)
  German Artillery, South Carolina (Bachman's)
  Palmetto Artillery, South Carolina (Garden's)
  Moorman's Battery, Virginia
  Loudon Artillery, Virginia (Rogers')
  Rowan Artillery, North Carolina (Reilly's)
  Macbeth Artillery, South Carolina (Royer's)
  Norfolk Artillery, Virginia (Huger's)
  Goochland Artillery, Virginia (Turner's)
  Donaldsonville Artillery, Louisiana
  Faquier Artillery, Virginia (Stirling's)

Left Wing (Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson)
Ewell's Division (Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton)
Early's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early)
  13th Virginia
  25th Virginia
  31st Virginia
  44th Virginia
  49th Virginia
  52d Virginia
  58th Virginia
Lawton's Brigade (Col. Marcellus Douglas)
  13th Georgia
  26th Georgia
  31st Georgia
  38th Georgia
  60th Georgia
  61st Georgia
Hay's Brigade (Col. Strong)
  5th Louisiana
  6th Louisiana
  7th Louisiana
  8th Louisiana
  9th Louisiana
Trimble’s Brigade (Capt. W. F. Brown)
- 12th Georgia
- 21st Georgia
- 21st North Carolina
- 15th Alabama
- 1st North Carolina Battalion

Light Division (Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill)
Branch’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. Lawrence O’B. Branch)
- 7th North Carolina
- 18th North Carolina
- 28th North Carolina
- 33d North Carolina
- 37th North Carolina

Gregg’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. Maxey Gregg)
- Orr’s Rifles, South Carolina
- 1st South Carolina
- 12th South Carolina
- 13th South Carolina
- 14th South Carolina

Field’s Brigade (Col. J. M. Brockenbrough)
- 22d Virginia Battalion
- 40th Virginia
- 47th Virginia
- 55th Virginia

Pender’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. William D. Pender)
- 16th North Carolina
- 22d North Carolina
- 34th North Carolina
- 38th North Carolina

Archer’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. James J. Archer)
- 1st Tennessee
- 7th Tennessee
- 14th Tennessee
- 19th Tennessee
- 5th Alabama

Thomas’ Brigade (Col. Edward L. Thomas)
- 14th Georgia
- 35th Georgia
- 45th Georgia
- 49th Georgia

Jackson’s Division (Brig. Gen. William E. Starke vice William Taliaferro)
“Stonewall” Brigade (Col. William S. H. Baylor)
- 2d Virginia
- 4th Virginia
- 5th Virginia
- 27th Virginia
- 33d Virginia

Campbell’s (or J. R. Jones’) Brigade (Col. Bradley T. Johnson)
- 1st Virginia Battalion
- 21st Virginia
- 42d Virginia
- 48th Virginia

Taliaferro’s Brigade (Col. Alexander G. Taliaferro)
- 10th Virginia
- 23d Virginia
- 37th Virginia
- 47th Alabama
- 48th Alabama

Stafford’s Brigade (Col. Leroy A. Stafford)
- 1st Louisiana
- 2d Louisiana
- 9th Louisiana
- 10th Louisiana
- 15th Louisiana

Coppen’s Battalion

Cavalry (Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart)
Robertson’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson)
- 2d Virginia
- 6th Virginia
- 7th Virginia
- 12th Virginia
- 17th Virginia

Lee’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. Fitzugh Lee)
- 1st Virginia
- 3d Virginia
- 4th Virginia
- 5th Virginia
- 9th Virginia

Artillery
Jackson’s Division (Maj. L. M. Shumaker)
- Baltimore Artillery, Maryland (Breckenbrough’s)
- Allegheny Artillery, Virginia (Carpenter’s)
- Hampden Artillery, Virginia (Caskie’s)
- Winchester Battery, Virginia (Cutshaw’s)
- Rockbridge Artillery, Virginia (Poague’s)
- Lee Artillery, Virginia (Raines’)
- Rice’s Battery, Virginia
- Danville Artillery, Virginia (Wooding’s)

Hill’s Division (Lt. Col. Robert L. Walker)
- Fredericksburg Artillery, Virginia (Braxton’s)
- Crenshaw’s Battery, Virginia
- Letcher Artillery, Virginia (Davidson’s)
- Middlesex Artillery, Virginia (Hardy’s)
- Purcell Artillery, Virginia (Pegram’s)
- Branch Artillery, North Carolina (Potts’)
- Pee Dee Artillery, South Carolina (McIntosh’s)

Ewell’s Division
- Louisiana Guard Artillery (D’Aquin’s)
- Chesapeake Artillery, Maryland (Brown’s)
- 1st Maryland Battery (Dement’s)
- Johnson’s Battery, Virginia
- Courtney Artillery, Virginia (Latimer’s)
- Staunton Artillery, Virginia (Garber’s)
UNION CASUALTIES: 28 AUG-1 SEP 1862

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army of Virginia:</th>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>WOUNDED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Corps (Sigel)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Division (Schenck)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>369</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Division (Schurz)</td>
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<td>Independent Brigade (Milroy)</td>
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<td>Cavalry (Buford/Beardsley)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I Corps Total</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1064</td>
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</table>

| II Corps (Banks)            |        |         |
| 1st Division (Williams)     | 0      | 0       |
| 2d Division (Greene)        | 4      | 36      |
| II Corps Total              | 4      | 36      |

| III Corps (McDowell)        |        |         |
| 1st Division (Hatch)        | 324    | 1560    |
| 2d Division (Ricketts)      | 192    | 845     |
| Pennsylvania Reserves (Reynolds) | 66 | 399    |
| Cavalry (Bayard)            | 13     | 44      |
| III Corps Total             | 595    | 2848    |

| Army of the Potomac:        |        |         |
| III Corps (Heintzelman)     |        |         |
| 1st Division (Kearny)       | 110    | 741     |
| 2d Division (Hooker)        | 150    | 784     |
| III Corps Total             | 260    | 1525    |

| V Corps (Porter)            |        |         |
| 1st Division (Morell)       | 178    | 777     |
| 2d Division (Sykes)         | 153    | 585     |
| V Corps Total               | 331    | 1362    |

| IX Corps (Reno)             |        |         |
| 1st Division (Stevens)      | 95     | 585     |
| 2d Division (Reno)          | 109    | 415     |
| IX Corps Total              | 204    | 1000    |

Grand Total                  | 1650   | 7835    |
CONFEDERATE CASUALTIES: 28 AUG-1 SEP 1862

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army of Northern Virginia</th>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>WOUNDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right Wing (Longstreet)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hood’s (Evans’) Division</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilcox’s Division (Pryor’s Brigade)*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemper’s Division</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. R. Jones’ Division</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. H. Anderson’s Division</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>542</strong></td>
<td><strong>3196</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Casualty figures for Wilcox and Featherston’s brigades omitted from original report. Wilcox reported his total loss (in Wilcox’s Pryor’s and Featherston’s brigades) as 326 killed and wounded.

| Left Wing (Jackson)                            |        |         |
| Ewell’s (Lawton) Division                      | 236    | 961     |
| Light (A. P. Hill’s) Division                 | 134    | 1096    |
| Jackson’s (Starke’s) Division                 | 178    | 896     |
| **Total**                                      | **548** | **2953** |

| Cavalry (Stuart)                               |        |         |
|                                               | 6      | 48      |

| **Grand Total**                                | **1096** | **6197** |

ORGANIZATION

The infantry regiment was the basic administrative and tactical unit of the Civil War armies. Regimental headquarters consisted of a colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, adjutant, quartermaster, surgeon (with rank of major), two assistant surgeons, a chaplain, sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, commissary sergeant, hospital steward, and two principal musicians. Each company was staffed by a captain, a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, a first sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, and one wagoner.

The authorized strength of a Civil War infantry regiment was about 1,000 officers and men, arranged in ten companies plus a headquarters and (for the first half of the war at least) a band. Discharges for physical disability, disease, special assignments (bakers, hospital nurses, or wagoners), court martial, and battle injuries all combined to reduce effective combat strength. Before too long a typical regiment might be reduced to less than 500 troops.

Brigades were made up of two or more regiments, with four regiments being most common. Union brigades averaged 1,000 to 1,500 infantry, while a Confederate brigade averaged 1,500 to 1,800. Union brigades were designated by a number within their division, and each Confederate brigade was designated by the name of a current or former commander.

Divisions were formed of two or more brigades. Union divisions contained 2,500 to 4,000 infantry, while the Confederate infantry division was somewhat larger, containing 5,000 to 6,000 men. Union divisions were designated by a number within their corps, and Confederate divisions took the name of a current or former commander.

Corps were formed of two or more divisions. Two or more corps usually constituted an army, the largest operational organization. In the Eastern Theater, during the Second Bull Run campaign, the principal adversaries were the Union Army of Virginia and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. The Army of Virginia was organized into three army corps, each with a brigade of cavalry, and three brigades of Pennsylvania Reserves. Three corps of the Army of the Potomac had joined the Army of Virginia at the time of the battle. Union artillery was organized into brigades of about five batteries each, with each corps having one brigade. Total number of Union troops engaged at Second Bull Run was about 75,000.

The Army of Northern Virginia consisted of two infantry commands, or "wing's, and two cavalry brigades. The right wing, commanded by Longstreet, contained five divisions and the left wing, commanded by Jackson, had three divisions. Confederate artillery was organized into brigades of about four batteries, each brigade assigned to a division. In addition, Longstreet's command had an artillery reserve of six batteries. Total number of Confederate troops engaged at Second Bull Run was slightly less than 50,000.
CHART OF CIVIL WAR ARMY ORGANIZATION

ARMY
General (CSA)
Major General (USA)

CORPS

DIVISION
Major General

BRIGADE
Brigadier General

BATTALION
(less than 10 companies)
Lieutenant Colonel or Major

REGENCY
(10 companies)
Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel

COMPANY
Captain

COMPANY
71-100 men
LOGISTICS

BUREAU SYSTEM. Bureau chiefs and heads of staff departments were responsible for various aspects of the Army's administration and logistics and reported directly to the Secretary of War. The division of responsibility and authority over them among the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretaries, and the General in Chief was never spelled out, and the supply departments functioned independently and without effective coordination throughout most of the Civil War, although much improved after Grant took command.

Logistical support was entrusted to the heads of four supply departments in Washington: the Quartermaster General, responsible for clothing and equipment, forage, animals, transportation, and housing; the Commissary General for rations; the Chief of Ordnance for weapons, ammunition, and miscellaneous related equipment; and the Surgeon General for medical supplies, evacuation, treatment, and hospitalization of the wounded.

For other support there were the Adjutant General, the Inspector General, the Paymaster General, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of Topographical Engineers.

The military department was the basic organizational unit for administrative and logistical purposes, and the commander of each department controlled the support in that area with no intervening level between his departmental headquarters and the bureau chiefs in Washington. There were six departments when the war started (East, West, Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and Pacific); however, later on, boundaries changed and several geographical departments might be grouped together as a military "division" headquarters.

Army depots were located in major cities: Boston, New York, Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco. Philadelphia was the chief depot and manufacturing center for clothing. Advanced and temporary supply bases were established as needed to support active operations. Until 1864 most depots were authorized the rank of captain as commander, who despite their low rank and meager pay, had tremendous resources of men, money, and material under their control. There were a few exceptions, notably COL Daniel H. Rucker at the Washington QM Depot and COL George D. Ramsay at the Washington Arsenal. The primary function of the depots was to procure supplies and prepare them for use in the field by repacking, assembling, or other similar tasks.

Procurement was decentralized. Purchases were made on the market by low-bid contract in the major cities and producing areas by depot officers. Flour and some other commodities were procured closer to the troops when possible. Cattle were contracted for at specific points, and major beef depots were maintained at Washington (on the grounds of the unfinished Washington Monument), Alexandria, VA, and Louisville, KY. The Subsistence Department developed a highly effective system of moving cattle on the hoof to the immediate rear of the armies in the field, to be slaughtered by brigade butchers and issued to the troops the day before consumption.

The Confederate Army used a similar system with depots at Richmond, Staunton, Raleigh, Atlanta, Columbus (GA), Huntsville, Montgomery, Jackson (MS), Little Rock, Alexandria (LA), and San Antonio.
SUPPLY OPERATIONS. Most unit logistics were accomplished at regimental level. The regimental QM was normally a line lieutenant designated by the regimental commander. His duties included submitting requisitions for all QM supplies and transport, accounting for regimental property including tentage, camp equipment, extra clothing, wagons, forage, and animals; issuing supplies and managing the regimental trains. The regimental commissary officer, also designated from the line, requisitioned, accounted for, and issued rations. The regimental ordnance officer had similar duties regarding arms and ammunition and managed the movement of the unit ammunition train.

In theory, logistical staff positions above the regiment were filled by a fully qualified officer of the supply department concerned. However, experienced officers were in perpetual short supply, and many authorized positions were filled by officers and noncommissioned officers from line units or left vacant, the duties performed by someone in addition to their own. This problem existed in both armies, where inexperience and ignorance of logistical principles and procedures generally reduced levels of support.

The Soldier’s Load: About 45 lbs. (Union) - Musket and bayonet (14 lbs.), 60 rounds, 3-8 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat, shelter half, ground sheet, mess gear (cup, knife, fork, spoon, skillet), personal items (sewing kit, razor, letters, Bible, etc.). Confederates usually had less, about 30 lbs.

Official US Ration: 20 oz. of fresh or salt beef or 12 oz. of pork or bacon, 18 oz. of flour or 20 oz. of corn meal (bread in lieu if possible), 1.6 oz. of rice or 0.6 oz. of beans or 1.5 oz. of dried potatoes, 1.6 oz. of coffee or 0.24 oz. of tea, 2.4 oz. of sugar, 0.54 oz. of salt, 0.32 gill of vinegar.

Union Marching Ration: 16 oz. of “hardtack,” 12 oz. salt pork or 4 oz. fresh meat, 1 oz. coffee, 3 oz. sugar, and salt.

Confederate Ration: Basically the same but with slightly more sugar and less meat, coffee, vinegar and salt, and seldom issued in full. For the Army of Northern Virginia usually half of meat issued and coffee available only when captured or exchanged through the lines for sugar and tobacco. During the Maryland campaign foraging was disappointing, so Confederate soldiers supplemented the issue ration with corn from the fields and fruit from the orchards.

Forage: Each horse required 14 lbs. of hay and 12 lbs. of grain per day; mules needed the same amount of hay and 9 lbs of grain. No other item was so bulky and difficult to transport.

Union Annual Clothing Issue: 2 caps, 1 hat, 2 dress coats, 3 pr. trousers, 3 flannel shirts, 3 flannel drawers, 4 pr. stockings and 4 pr. bootees (high top shoes). Artillerymen and cavalrymen were issued jackets and boots instead of bootees. Allowance = $42.

Confederate: Officially, the Confederate soldier was almost equally well clothed, but the QM was seldom able to supply the required items and soldiers wore whatever came to hand,
the home-dyed butternut jackets and trousers being characteristic items. Shortages of shoes were a constant problem.

Tents: Sibley (tepee) held 20 men feet to center pole; early in war Union introduced the tente de'Abri (shelter half), used by the French Army, and called "dog" tent by witty soldiers, now pup tent.

Baggage: Enlisted men of both armies were required to carry their own. Union order of Sep 1862 limited officers to blankets, one small valise or carpet bag and an ordinary mess kit. Confederate standards allowed generals 80 lbs., field officers 65 lbs., and captains and subalterns 50 lbs.

Wagons: Union’s standard 6-mule Army wagon could haul 4,000 lbs on good roads in the best of conditions but seldom exceeded 2,000 or with 4 mules 1,800 lbs. at rate of 12-24 miles a day. Confederates often used 4-mule wagon with smaller capacity.

Army of the Potomac authorized wagons as follows:

- corps hq: 4
- div and bde hq: 3
- regt of Inf: 6
- arty bty and cav: 3

One wagon per regiment was reserved for hospital stores and one for grain for officers’ horses.

The Army of Northern Virginia used 4-mule wagons as follows:

- div hq: 3
- bde hq: 2
- regt hq: 1
- regt’s medical stores: 1
- regt’s ammunition: 1

1/100 men per regt for baggage, camp equipment, rations, etc.

Numbers of supply wagons per 1,000 men:

- Army of the Potomac (1862): 29
- Jackson in the Valley (1862): 7
- Army of Northern Virginia (1863): 28
- Army of the Potomac (1864): 36
- Sherman’s March to the Sea (1864): 40
- Napoleon’s standard: 12.5
SMALL ARMS

In 1855 the U. S. Army adopted a .58 caliber rifled-musket to replace a .69 caliber smooth-bore musket. The new infantry arm was muzzle-loaded, its rifled barrel taking a hollow-based cylindro-conical bullet slightly smaller than the bore. Loading procedure required the soldier to withdraw a paper cartridge (containing powder and bullet) from his cartridge box, tear open one end with his teeth, pour the powder into the muzzle, place the bullet in the muzzle and ram it to the breech using a metal ramrod. A copper percussion cap was then placed on a hollow cone at the breech. To fire the weapon the hammer was cocked, and when the trigger was pulled the hammer struck the cap and ignited the powder charge. Each soldier was expected to be capable of loading and firing three aimed shots per minute. Although the maximum range of a rifled-musket might be over 1,000 yards actual fields of fire were often very short, the emphasis of musketry fire resting upon volume at close range rather than accuracy at long.

The basic ammunition load for each infantry soldier was 40 rounds in the cartridge box. When a large action was expected 20 additional rounds were issued to each soldier, who placed them in his uniform pockets or knapsack. In addition, 100 rounds per man were held in the brigade or division trains and 100 rounds in the corps trains.

At the beginning of the war a shortage of rifled-muskets on both sides forced the Northern and Southern governments to issue the older smooth-bore weapons, or purchase weapons from European nations. As the war progressed most soldiers eventually were armed with rifled-muskets, although even late in the war some troops on both sides still carried smooth-bores.

Before and during the war there were dozens of breech-loading rifles and carbines, both single and multiple-shot. Several types were purchased by the Government but were not issued in any numbers because of complicated construction, mechanical problems and cost. Three breech-loading rifles used by infantry were the .52 caliber, single-shot Sharps, .52 caliber, seven-shot Spencer, and .44 caliber fifteen-shot Henry. While the Sharps used a linen cartridge, the Spencer and Henry weapons used metallic, rimfire cartridges.

Handguns, both single and multiple shot, generally were generally carried by officers and possibly artillerymen. Although the types of handguns used by both sides were innumerable, two of the most common were six-shot revolvers produced by Colt and Remington, both in .36 and .44 caliber.

Union cavalry were initially armed with sabers and handguns, but soon added breech-loading carbines. In addition to Sharps and Spencer carbines, dozens of other types of breech-loaders, from .52 to .56 caliber, were issued. Confederate cavalrymen might be armed with a wide variety of handguns, shotguns, muzzle-loading carbines or captured Federal weapons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>EFF. RANGE</th>
<th>RATE OF FIRE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. rifled-musket, muzzle-loaded, cal .58</td>
<td>200-500 yds</td>
<td>3 rds/min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Enfield rifled-musket, muzzle-loaded, cal .577</td>
<td>200-500 yds</td>
<td>3 rds/min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smooth-bore musket, muzzle-loaded, cal .69</td>
<td>50-80 yds</td>
<td>3 rds/min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry rifle, fifteen-shot magazine, breech-loaded, cal .44</td>
<td>200-500 yds</td>
<td>16 rds/11 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer carbine, seven-round magazine, breech-loaded, cal .52</td>
<td>150-200 yds</td>
<td>8 rds/20 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharps carbine, single-shot, breech-loaded, cal .52</td>
<td>150-200 yds</td>
<td>9 rds/min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnside carbine, single-shot, breech-loaded, cal .54</td>
<td>150-200 yds</td>
<td>9 rds/min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers, six-shot, cal .44</td>
<td>20-50 yds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ARTILLERY

Civil War field artillery was organized into batteries of four or six guns. Regulations prescribed a captain as battery commander, while lieutenants commanded two-gun "sections." Each gun made up a platoon, under a sergeant ("chief of the piece") with 8 crewmen and six drivers.

During transportation each gun was attached to a limber, drawn by a six-horse team. The limber chest carried thirty to fifty rounds of ammunition, depending on the type of guns in the battery. In addition to the limbers, each gun had at least one caisson, also drawn by a six-horse team. The caisson carried additional ammunition in its two chests, as well as a spare wheel and tools. A horse-drawn forge and a battery wagon with tools accompanied each battery. A battery at full regulation strength, including all officers, noncoms, buglers, horse holders and other specialized functions, might exceed 100 officers and men. With spare horses included, a typical six-gun battery might have about 100-150 horses.

A battery could unlimber and fire an initial volley in about one minute, and each gun could continue firing two aimed shots a minute. The battery could limber up in about three minutes. Firing was by "direct fire," that is fire in which the target is in view of the gun. The prescribed distance between guns was fourteen yards from hub to hub. Therefore, a six-gun battery would represent a normal front of a little over 100 yards. Depth of the battery position, from the gun muzzle, passing the limber, to the rear of the caisson, was prescribed as 47 yards. In practice these measurements might be altered by terrain.

During firing cannoneers took their positions as in the diagram below. At the command "Commence firing," the gunner ordered "Load." While the gunner sighted the piece, Number 1 sponged the bore, Number 5 received a round from Number 7 at the limber and carried the round to Number 2, who placed it in the bore. Number 1 rammed the round to the breech while Number 3 "thumbed the vent." When the gun was loaded and sighted, Number 3 inserted a vent pick in the vent and punctured the cartridge bag. Number 4 attached a lanyard to a friction primer and inserted the primer in the vent. At the command "Fire," Number 4 yanked the lanyard. Number 6 cut fuses (if needed). The process was repeated until the command "Cease firing."

![Diagram of artillery battery firing process]
# CIVIL WAR FIELD ARTILLERY - STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>TUBE COMPOSITION</th>
<th>EFF. RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-Pdr</td>
<td>bronze</td>
<td>1500 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smooth-bore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.67 in. bore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Pdr</td>
<td>bronze</td>
<td>1600 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smooth-bore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Napoleon)</td>
<td>4.62 in. bore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Pdr</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>1800 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Parrott)</td>
<td>3.00 in. bore*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-inch</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>1800 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ordnance)</td>
<td>3.00 in. bore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Pdr</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>1900 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Parrott)</td>
<td>3.67 in. bore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5-inch siege</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>2100 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ordnance)</td>
<td>4.5 in. bore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Pdr</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>2200 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Parrott)</td>
<td>4.2 in. bore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Caliber of Parrott M1861 is 2.9 in.; M1863 is 3.0 in.
ARTILLERY PROJECTILES

Four basic types of projectiles were employed by Civil War field artillery:

SOLID PROJECTILES - Round (spherical) projectiles of solid iron for smooth-bores were commonly called "cannonballs" or just plain "shot." When elongated for rifled weapons the projectile was known as a "bolt." Solid projectiles were used against opposing batteries, wagons, buildings, etc., as well as enemy personnel. While shot could ricochet across open ground against advancing infantry or cavalry, bolts tended to bury themselves upon impact with the ground and therefore were not used a great deal by field artillery.

SHELL - The shell, whether spherical or conical, was a hollow iron projectile filled with a black powder bursting charge. It was designed to break into several ragged fragments. Spherical shells exploded by fuses set into an opening in the shell, and were ignited by the flame of the cannon’s propelling charge. The time of detonation was determined by adjusting the length of the fuse. Conical shells were detonated by similar timed fuses, or by impact. Shells were intended to impact on the target.
CASE SHOT - Case shot, or "shrapnel" was the invention of Henry Shrapnel, an English artillery officer. The projectile had a thinner wall than a shell and was filled with a number of small lead or iron balls (27 for a 12-pounder). A timed fuse ignited a small bursting charge which fragmented the casing and scattered the contents in the air. Case shot was intended to burst from fifty to seventy-five yards short of the target, the fragments being carried forward by the velocity of the shot.

CANISTER - Canister consisted of a tin cylinder in which was packed a number of iron or lead balls. Upon discharge the cylinder split open and the smaller projectiles fanned out. Canister was an extremely effective anti-personnel weapon, with a maximum range of 400 yards. In emergencies double loads of canister could be used at ranges less than 200 yards, using a single propelling charge.
### TABLE OF FIRE. LIGHT 12-POUNDER GUN. MODEL 1857.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEVATION (In Degrees)</th>
<th>RANGE (In Yards)</th>
<th>TIME OF FLIGHT (In Seconds)</th>
<th>RANGE (In Yards)</th>
<th>TIME OF FLIGHT (In Seconds)</th>
<th>RANGE (In Yards)</th>
<th>TIME OF FLIGHT (In Seconds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0°</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1&quot;</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1°25</td>
<td>615</td>
<td></td>
<td>615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>2°25</td>
<td>785</td>
<td></td>
<td>785</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>3°25</td>
<td>925</td>
<td></td>
<td>925</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>4°25</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td></td>
<td>1080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>5°25</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td></td>
<td>1300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Shot.**
- Charge 2 Pounds.

**Spherical Case Shot.**
- Charge 2 Pounds.

**Shell.**
- Charge 2 Pounds.

---

Use SHOT at masses of troops, and to batter, from 600 up to 2,000 yards. Use SHELL for firing buildings, at troops posted in woods, in pursuit, and to produce a moral rather than a physical effect; greatest effective range 1,500 yards. Use SPHERICAL CASE SHOT at masses of troops, at not less than 500 yards; generally up to 1,500 yards. CANISTER is not effective at 600 yards; it should not be used beyond 500 yards, and by very seldom and over the most favorable ground at that distance; at short ranges, 200 to 200 yards, in emergency, use double canister, with single charge. Do not employ RICHOCHET at less distance than 1,000 to 1,000 yards.

---

**CARE OF AMMUNITION CHEST.**
1st. Keep everything out that does not belong in them, except a bunch of cord or wire for breakage; beware of loose tacks, nails, bolts, or scraps.
2d. Keep friction primers in their papers, tied up. The pouch containing those for instant service must be closed, and so placed as to be secure.
Take every precaution that primers do not get loose; a single one may cause an explosion. Use plenty of tow in packing.

(This sheet is to be glued on to the inside of Limber Chest Cover.)

---

### TABLE OF FIRE

20-PDR. PARROTT GUN

Charge, 2 lbs. of Mortar Powder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEVATION (In Degrees)</th>
<th>PROJECTILE</th>
<th>RANGE (In Yards)</th>
<th>TIME OF FLIGHT (In Seconds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Case Shot, 19½ lbs.</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1⅞</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Case Shot, 19½ lbs.</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>3⅝</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½</td>
<td>Shell, 18¾ lbs.</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>4¾</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shell, 18¾ lbs.</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>6½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shell, 18¾ lbs.</td>
<td>3350</td>
<td>11¼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shell, 18¾ lbs.</td>
<td>4400</td>
<td>17¼</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARE OF AMMUNITION CHEST.**
1st. Keep everything out that does not belong in them, except a bunch of cord or wire for breakage; beware of loose tacks, nails, bolts, or scraps.
2d. Keep friction primers in their papers, tied up. The pouch containing those for instant service must be closed, and so placed as to be secure.
Take every precaution that primers do not get loose; a single one may cause an explosion. Use plenty of tow in packing.

(This sheet is to be glued on to the inside of Limber Chest Cover.)

Reproduction of two tables of fire which was glued to inside of limber chest covers.
TACTICS

The tactical legacy of the eighteenth century had emphasized close order formations of soldiers trained to maneuver in concert and fire by volleys. These "linear" tactics stressed the tactical offensive. Assault troops advanced in line, two ranks deep, with cadenced steps, stopping to fire volleys on command and finally rushing the last few yards to pierce the enemy line with a bayonet charge.

These tactics were adequate for troops armed with single-shot, muzzle-loading, smooth-bore muskets with an effective range of about eighty yards. The close-order formation was therefore necessary to concentrate the fire power of these inaccurate weapons. Bayonet charges might then succeed because infantry could rush the last eighty yards before the defending infantrymen could reload their muskets after firing a volley.

The U.S. Army's transition from smooth-bore muskets to rifled-muskets in the mid-nineteenth century would have two main effects in the American Civil War: it would strengthen the tactical defensive and increase the number of casualties in the attacking force. With a weapon which could cause casualties out to 1,000 yards defenders firing rifles could decimate infantry formations attacking according to linear tactics.

During the Civil War the widespread use of the rifled-musket caused infantry assault formations to loosen up somewhat, with individual soldiers seeking available cover and concealment. However, because officers needed to maintain visual and verbal control of their commands during the noise, smoke and chaos of combat, close-order tactics to some degree would continue to the end of the war.

A typical combat formation of a regiment might be six companies in the main line, with two in reserve, and two out in front in extended skirmish order. During battle additional companies might be fed into the skirmish line, or the skirmishers might regroup on the main line.

Rapid movement of units on roads or cross country, was generally by formation of a column four men abreast. The speed of such columns was prescribed as 2 miles per hour. Upon reaching the field each regiment was typically formed into a line two ranks deep, the shoulders of each man in each rank touching the shoulders of the man on either side. The distance between ranks was prescribed as thirteen inches. A regiment of 500 men (250 men in each rank), might have a front of about 200 yards. Both front and rear ranks were capable of firing, either by volley or individual fire.
Regiment Formed Into Line of Battle
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EAST</th>
<th>WEST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JAN.</td>
<td></td>
<td>HENRY AND DONELSON CAMPAIGN</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEB.</td>
<td>PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN</td>
<td>Fort Henry    Fort Donelson</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Troops Embark</td>
<td>SHILOH CAMPAIGN</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Battle of Pea Ridge</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shiloh</td>
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<tr>
<td>APR.</td>
<td>Siege of Yorktown</td>
<td>STONES RIVER CAMPAIGN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>VALLEY CAMPAIGN</td>
<td>Capture of New Orleans</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>Seven Pines</td>
<td>McDowell    Winchester</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Seven Days' Battles</td>
<td>Port Republic    Jackson Leaves the Valley</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>2D BULL RUN CAMPAIGN</td>
<td>Corinth Captured    Buell Starts</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combined Fleet and Land Operations Against Vicksburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>2D BULL Run</td>
<td>Buell Halted</td>
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<td>AUG.</td>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>Cedar Mountain</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Kirby Smith Starts North    Bragg Starts North</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEPT.</td>
<td>Antietam</td>
<td>GRANT'S FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buell at Louisville    Perryville</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCT.</td>
<td>FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN</td>
<td>Corinth</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McClellan Relieved</td>
<td>Grant Reaches Oxford</td>
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<td>Rosecrans at Nashville    Holly Springs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chickashaw Bluffs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOV.</td>
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<td>Stoner River</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEC.</td>
<td>Fredericksburg</td>
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Lincoln was born in Kentucky and raised on the edge of the frontier, growing up with scant formal education. His family then settled in Ill., where Lincoln held various clerking jobs, and was partner in a grocery store that failed and left him heavily in debt. He studied law and his forceful character and honesty made him a favorite in the community and elected him to the state legislature as a Whig. Licensed as a lawyer in 1836, he settled in Springfield where he married Mary Todd in 1842. After one term in Congress (1847-49) he was not returned by his constituents and retired from public life.

While a lawyer for the Illinois Central Railroad he became acquainted with George McClellan (vice-president) and Ambrose Burnside (treasurer). It was also during this time he became acquainted with Edwin Stanton, having been temporarily hired by Stanton’s law firm. In opposition to Stephen A. Douglas and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Lincoln entered into the growing debate of sectionalism, joining the Republican party in 1856.

The famous Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 ended in Douglas' election to the Senate, but Lincoln emerged as a powerful national figure. He was a serious contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 1860, and after his campaign managers struck a deal with Pennsylvania political boss Simon Cameron, that if elected Lincoln would name Cameron secretary of war, Lincoln gained the nomination (In Jan '62 Lincoln, unhappy with Cameron’s performance, replaced him with Edwin Stanton).

When Lincoln was elected on 6 Nov '60 the South saw the end of their political power in the Union, and southern states began seceding. After the attack on Fort Sumter, S.C., in Apr '61, he called upon the various states to furnish 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion. Frequently advised by governors and congressmen, Lincoln selected many generals from
among leading politicians in order to give himself a broader base of political support. Some political generals, such as John A. Logan and Francis P. Blair, distinguished themselves, whereas others proved military hindrances. Other commissions were given to Regulars on active duty, former West Pointers like McClellan and Burnside, who had resigned to pursue business careers, or those who had held volunteer commissions in the Mexican War.

During the war Lincoln appointed and discarded a secession of commanding generals as he was subjected to repeated humiliation in the defeat of Union arms. After McDowell’s defeat at First Bull Run in Jul ’61, he made McClellan commander-in-chief of all armies, and acquiesced in that commander’s oblique movement with the Army of the Potomac against Richmond via the Peninsula. After this unsuccessful campaign, however, Lincoln relieved McClellan of supreme command, allowing him to retain command of the Army of the Potomac, and put John Pope in command of a separate Army of Virginia.

After Pope’s defeat at Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug ’62) Lincoln reconsolidated both armies under McClellan, who led the hastily assembled force to block Lee’s invasion of Maryland.

Earlier, Lincoln had drafted a proclamation freeing slaves in the rebellious states but withheld it because, after Union reverses, it might appear an act of desperation. When McClellan’s army successfully halted Lee at Antietam (17 Sep ’62), the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, changing the war’s focus (heretofore fought to preserve the Union and not to disrupt the South’s social fabric) to include ending slavery.

When McClellan failed to pursue Lee after Antietam Lincoln relieved him. The failure of McClellan’s successors - Burnside at Fredericksburg (13 Dec ’62) and Hooker at Chancellorsville (1-4 May ’63) - added to Lincoln’s perplexity and tended to discredit his ability in military matters. Meade’s success at Gettysburg (1-3 Jul ’63) was marred by the failure to pursue and crush Lee’s army. Even under Grant, whom Lincoln brought East in the spring of 1864, there were months of sanguinary fighting with hope deferred.

Lincoln’s political enemies mustered strength before the ’64 election, and it looked as though he would be displaced in the White House by Democratic challenger George McClellan. But the military successes of Grant’s overland campaign and Sherman’s capture of Atlanta swung sentiment to him, and Lincoln was re-elected. He was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth on 14 Apr ’65 at Ford’s Theater, Washington, five weeks after his second inauguration and five days after Lee’s surrender.
In 1827 Stanton’s father died, forcing the 13-year-old to leave school and work in a bookstore to supplement the family’s income. He studied law in Columbus and was admitted to the bar in 1836. From 1849 to 1856 he was counsel for the state of Pennsylvania, establishing a national reputation. In 1859 he successfully defended Congressman Daniel Sickles in a celebrated Washington murder case, and in the waning days of the Buchanan administration he was appointed attorney general.

Nominally a Democrat, Stanton backed John C. Breckinridge in the election of 1860, and after Lincoln was inaugurated he returned to private life. In Jan ’62 Lincoln offered him the position of secretary of war, which he accepted, sacrificing a yearly income of $40,000 as a successful lawyer for a cabinet post of $8,000.

With no military experience, he moved into office with zeal, fighting fraud and waste in the rapidly enlarged military. A capable organizer, he brought order out of chaos. He generally worked well with congressional leaders and generals in the field. However, when George McClellan, a personal friend, failed to perform adequately Stanton was one of the leading forces pushing for his removal. His manner and restrictions on the press earned him few friends and later led to some apparently unfounded charges that he was involved in the assassination of Lincoln.

After the war Stanton worked with the Radical Republicans in their efforts to secure harsher treatment for the South. This brought him into conflict with his new president, Andrew Johnson. Matters came to a head in 1868 when the president removed him from office. Congress reinstated him under the Tenure of Office Act but Johnson persisted, naming Grant as secretary of war. Stanton, however, barricaded himself in his office and Grant, supportive of Stanton, refused to take office. The crisis ended on 26 May ’68 when Stanton finally resigned and resumed his legal practice.

In Dec ’69, on Grant’s election to the presidency, Stanton was named to the U.S. Supreme Court, but died four days after Congress confirmed the nomination.
After graduating from West Point Halleck was assigned to work on the fortifications in New York Harbor, then toured Europe and inspecting fortifications. Afterwards he was invited by the Lowell Institute of Boston to deliver a series of twelve lectures on the elements of military art and science. When the Mexican War broke out Halleck, then a first lieutenant, was assigned to Monterey, California, where he filled varied and responsible positions. He was brevetted captain for gallantry "in affairs with the enemy" on 1 May '47. After the war he was an inspector and engineer of lighthouses and acted a member of a board of engineers for fortifications on the Pacific Coast. He was promoted CPT, 1 Jui '53, but because of cuts in the army after the war and the hopeless future in a profession little rewarded by the government, he resigned 1 Aug '54. The same year he became head of the leading law firm in California, refusing offers to run for the U.S. Senate. Halleck later became director of the New Almaden quick-silver mine and a major general of California militia.

At the beginning of the Civil War Halleck was commissioned MG in the R.A. (19 Aug '61), and commanded the Department of the Missouri. The success of his subordinates, Grant and Foote at Donelson, Curtis at Pea Ridge, Pope at Island No. 10, and Grant at Shiloh, brought prestige to Halleck's department. The departments of Kansas and Ohio were added to his command on 11 Mar '62, and the whole named the Department of the Mississippi. Halleck then took to the field in person. Although his army had double the number of his opponent's forces, Halleck's labors in the field were not so meritorious as in the office. Though he captured Corinth he allowed the enemy's forces to escape and failed to pursue them with vigor. This movement ended Halleck's active campaigning, during which he was known to the soldiers as "Old Brains."

On 11 Jul '62, he was summoned to Washington and made military advisor to the President with the title of general-in-chief. Brusque, mathematical, direct, wholly impersonal and impartial, Halleck not only antagonized office seekers and politicians but also his subordinates far away in the field. His counsels to his generals were frequent and often superfluous and he
devoted much of his time to minutiae and the manner of raising soldiers and equipment.

On 12 Mar '64, after Grant was promoted to LTG, Halleck’s status was changed from general-in-chief to chief of staff. Although the new office was more logical and appropriate to the work Halleck had been doing, it nevertheless was a demotion. Unlike other generals, who asked to be relieved or reassigned when they could not have positions to which they believed themselves entitled, Halleck pursued his duties with his same unflagging energy. On 19 Apr '65, after Appomattox, he was relieved from the office of chief of staff and three days later assigned to command the Military Division of the James, with headquarters in Richmond. On 30 Aug '65 he was transferred to command the Military Division of the Pacific with headquarters at San Francisco and on 16 Mar '69 he was placed in command of the Division of the South, at Louisville, Ky., his last assignment before his death.

POPE, John
1822-1892, KY
USMA 1842 (17/56); Top. Engrs.

After graduation from West Point Pope was engaged in survey work, first in Florida and later on the northeastern boundary line. In 1846 he was ordered to Taylor’s army in Texas, where he served throughout the Mexican campaign, receiving two brevets.

After the war Pope served in various topographical engineering projects including surveying a route for the Pacific railway. From 1859 until the opening of the Civil War he served on lighthouse construction duty in the northeast, being promoted to 1LT (3 Mar 53) then CPT (1 Jul 56).

From 15 Apr to 29 Jul '61 he was a mustering officer at Chicago, then promoted BG of vols (17 May) and sent to join Fremont’s force in Missouri. In Mar and Apr '62 Pope commanded the Army of the Mississippi in Halleck’s operations to open that river. Capturing
the river fortifications at New Madrid, Mo., then the rebel batteries at Island No. 10, Pope opened the river nearly down to Memphis. During these operation he was promoted MG of vols (21 Mar '62). The Army of the Mississippi then joined the Armies of the Tennessee (Grant) and of the Ohio (Buell) for an advance upon Corinth under Halleck’s personal command.

The reputation Pope had won in the western theater of operations caused Lincoln to order him east. On 27 Jun '62 he was placed in command of all the separate forces in the region of the Rappahannock and the Shenandoah, which were then consolidated and named the Army of Virginia. This new force was expected to protect Washington and relieve the pressure upon McClellan’s Army of the Potomac, then on the Virginia Peninsula. During this concentration Pope was promoted BG in the R.A., continuing to serve, however, as a MG of vols.

In the middle of July the Peninsula campaign was regarded as a failure and the Army of the Potomac was ordered to withdraw to the vicinity of Washington and join with Pope’s Army of Virginia. The Confederate army, relieved from anxiety for Richmond, moved toward Pope, whose operations, originally conceived as secondary, now became of primary importance. Lee acted swiftly to strike Pope before both Union forces united.

Jackson’s command arrived first and defeated Bank’s advanced corps at Cedar Mountain (9 Aug '62). When the remainder of Lee’s army arrived Pope withdrew behind the Rappahannock. Jackson then swung around Pope’s right, through Thoroughfare Gap, and captured Manassas Junction. While the Confederates destroyed enormous amounts of Union supplies at Manassas, Longstreet marched to join Jackson. Pope attempted to strike Jackson before Longstreet could arrive but his movements were groping and ineffective and Longstreet joined Jackson on 29 Aug ’62. In the ensuing battle of Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug ’62) the Union army was defeated, falling back to the defenses of Washington. Pope was relieved of command and sent to the Department of the Northwest, where he served against hostile Indians. The Armies of Virginia and of the Potomac were consolidated under McClellan’s command.

In January ’65, Pope assumed command of the Division of the Missouri. He was promoted brevet MG in the R.A. (13 Mar 65). After the war he commanded various departments in the southeast and west, promoted MG R.A., 1882, and retired for age in 1886.
After only a few years in common schools Banks went to work in a cotton mill, from which fact in later years he was nicknamed "the Bobbin Boy of Massachusetts." Keenly ambitious, he set to work to remedy the deficiencies in his own education. By his own efforts he learned Latin and Spanish, and seized every opportunity for practice at public speaking, lecturing on temperance and taking an active part in a local debating society. For a short time he was an actor, but soon turned to law. At twenty-three Banks was admitted to the bar, but never practiced in courts. He first entered public service as an inspector in the Boston customs house, and later was proprietor and editor of a local weekly newspaper. In 1849 he was elected to the Massachusetts legislature, and later served in the U.S. Congress from 1853 to 1857. Banks was then elected Governor of Massachusetts, serving until 1861.

In Jan '61 he moved to Chicago to succeed George B. McClellan as an officer of the Illinois Central Railroad. After the fall of Fort Sumter in Apr Banks offered his services to the government and was appointed MG of vols (May '61).

Banks commanded the Department of Shenandoah to Mar '62, then commanded the V Corps, Army of the Potomac. While detached from the Army of the Potomac Banks' command defeated Jackson at Kernstown (Mar '62), then was defeated in turn during the May Valley campaign (McDowell, Front Royal, and Winchester). Appointed to command the II Corps, Army of Virginia, Banks was again defeated by Jackson, this time at Cedar Mountain (Aug '62). He commanded the defenses of Washington (Sep-Oct '62), then succeeded Butler as commander of the Department of the Gulf. Banks became bogged down in the Red River Campaign in late '63 and early '64, which prevented him from attacking Mobile as part of Grant's grand strategy of 1864. He resigned his commission after being relieved of command in May '64. Banks served in Congress until 1890 when he retired from public life because of a "mental disorder."
In 1847 Heinzelman joined Scott’s expedition against the City of Mexico, receiving a
brevet to MAJ for gallant and meritorious conduct. After the war he was promoted MAJ
(1855) and served against the Indians in California (brevetted CPT). He founded Ft. Yuma,
Arizona, and served along the Rio Grande border until early ’61. Heinzelman was then called
to Washington as inspector of the forces being gathered there, and was promoted COL, R.A.,
and BG of vols. Soon afterward was appointed to command a division in McDowell’s army,
and was seriously wounded at First Bull Run (21 Jul ’61). In the spring of ’62 Heinzelman
commanded the III Corps, Army of the Potomac, in the Peninsula campaign. He was
promoted MG of vols (4 Jul ’62). In the Fall his corps was withdrawn from the Peninsula
and ordered to join Pope’s Army of Virginia.

On 29 Aug Heinzelman joined in an attack on what was supposed to be a retreating
Jackson, but instead found the enemy awaiting him. This attack, and another the next day,
was repulsed and Heinzelman’s command joined in the retreat to Washington.

Heintzelman was then assigned to duty in the defenses of Washington, where he remained
until Oct ’63.

Early in ’64 he was given command of the Northern (Central States) Department until Oct,
when he was assigned courts-martial duty until the end of the war. In the post-war years he
commanded the 17th Infantry, serving mostly in Texas, until he retired in 1869. Heinzelman
then resided in Washington (being made a MG retired by special act of Congress) until his
death.
McDowell received his early education at the college of Troyes, in France. At age of sixteen he entered the USMA and after graduation served in Maine with the First Artillery until 1841. McDowell was then detailed for duty at the Military Academy, of which he was the Adjutant until Oct '45, being then appointed Aide-de-Camp to BG Wool and promoted LT. He participated in the Mexican War, where he was breveted CPT for "gallant and meritorious conduct". From then until the outbreak of the Civil War McDowell was employed in staff duties at Washington, New York and Texas, during which he was promoted brevet MAJ (31 Mar '56).

McDowell was promoted BG, R.A. (at the urging of Secretary of War Chase, a close friend) and was selected to lead the newly organized army at Washington. In the ensuing battle of First Bull Run (21 Jul '61), McDowell's army was defeated and he was superseded by McClellan as commander. First assigned command of a division he later was promoted MG of vols (14 Mar '62), and appointed command of the I Corps to accompany McClellan in the Peninsular campaign. The government, however, fearing for the safety of Washington, retained McDowell's command, designated it the Army of the Rappahannock, and placed it along that river. After Jackson's Valley campaign the government decided to consolidate McDowell's army with those troops of Fremont and Banks, then in the Valley, into a force to be known as the Army of Virginia. McDowell's command was redesignated III Corps, and John Pope was appointed army commander.

After the withdrawal of McClellan's forces from the Peninsula, to reinforce Pope, the Confederate army under Lee marched to attack Pope before the two Union armies could effect a junction. In the battle of Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug '62) Pope was defeated and all
Union troops withdrew into the defenses of Washington. After accusations of not fully supporting Pope during the campaign McDowell was relieved of command (6 Sep '62). Although a court of inquiry found nothing to warrant a court martial, a strong prejudice remained against him in the public mind and he held no further field command during the war. From May to Jul '63 he served on a board to investigate alleged cotton frauds, served on a retirement board, Jul '63 - May '64, and was commander of the Department of the Pacific until the end of the war.

McDowell was commander of the Department of California until '68, Department of the East, '72, (MG, R.A., 25 Nov '72), Division of the South, Division of the Pacific, 1882, retired 15 Oct '82.

Porter fought in the Mexican War (2 brevets, 1 wound) and afterwards served as an artillery and cavalry instructor at West Point. He was appointed COL, R.A. (14 May '61) and BG of vols three days later. Porter was chief of staff of the Dept of Pennsylvania and to Banks and Patterson in the Valley until October, when he commanded a division in the Army of the Potomac (3 Oct '61-18 May '62). Porter was promoted BG of vols (27 Jun '62). Appointed to command the V Corps, he was promoted MG of vols (4 Jul '62) and led his corps through the Seven Days (25 Jun-1 Jul '62) and Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug '62). After the latter battle Porter was relieved of command "for disobedience, disloyalty, and misconduct in the face of the enemy." Pending a court martial Lincoln allowed him to retain command during the crisis of the Maryland campaign.

After Antietam (17 Sep '62), where the V Corps remained in reserve, Porter was court martialed and cashiered from the army (10 Jan '63). He later became a mine superintendent in Colorado, a merchant, and New York City commissioner of police, fire, and then public
works. In 1869 he turned down an offer of a commission in the Egyptian Army. Porter spent the rest of his life in an effort to vindicate his name and have it reinstated on the Army roster. It was not until 1886, however, after a new hearing overturned his conviction, that he was reinstated, without back pay, as COL to rank from 14 May '61, and placed on the retired list.

RENO, Jesse L.
1823-1862, VA (WVA)
USMA, 1846 (8/59); Ord.

Upon graduation Reno served in Mexico with Scott, receiving 2 brevets and 1 wound. After the war he served as Assistant Professor of Mathematics at the Military Academy, then on a board to prepare a system of instruction for heavy artillery, and later on coast survey duty. In 1857 Reno accompanied COL Albert Sidney Johnson, as his chief of ordnance, in the Utah Expedition. Afterward, he commanded the Mount Vernon Arsenal, Alabama, until it was seized by the Confederates in 1861. Reno then briefly served as commander of Leavenworth Arsenal. When Burnside, who had been a cadet with Reno, was organizing the North Carolina Expedition, he arranged for Reno to be promoted BG of vols (12 Nov '61) and assigned command of a brigade. Reno served with distinction in the capture of Roanoke Island, Newberne, and Camden and was promoted MG of vols 18 Jul '62. After the failure of McClellan's Peninsula campaign the Army of the Potomac and Burnside's forces (designated IX Corps) moved to join Pope's Army of Virginia. While Burnside remained at Falmouth to forward troops Reno was assigned temporary commander of the IX Corps and joined Pope. After the Union defeat at Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug '62) Reno led the IX Corps in the beginning of the Maryland campaign and was killed at South Mountain, 14 Sep '62.
Graduated from Karlsruhe Military Academy, Sigel became a lieutenant in the Army of the Duchy of Baden. He served as minister of war for the German revolutionary forces in 1848 and was forced to flee to the United States when Prussian forces suppressed the revolt. Sigel then worked as a school administrator in New York City and later St. Louis, Missouri. When the Civil War began he was commissioned COL of vols in May '61. Because of his popularity among German-Americans, and his ability to recruit from that community, Sigel was soon promoted BG of vols. He commanded a brigade in the Army of the Southwest Missouri, Jan-Feb '62, then was promoted MG of vols and given command of a division.

Sigel commanded a division in the Shenandoah Valley during Jun '62, and shortly afterward was assigned to command the I Corps, Army of Virginia (Jun-Sep '62). At the Battle of Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug '62) Sigel's corps joined the futile attacks against Jackson's entrenched line, and assisted in delaying actions during the Union retreat. He was appointed command of the XI Corps, Army of the Potomac (Sep-'62-Jan '63), and later Department of Virginia (Mar-May '64). After Sigel's defeat at the Battle of New Market (15 May '64) he was relieved and held no important commands for the rest of the war. After the war he was active in publishing and politics in New York City.
After West Point Davis spent the first seven years of his army career on the Northwest frontier. Eloping with Zachary Taylor's daughter, he resigned as 1LT (1835) and settled down in Mississippi as a planter, his wife dying three months after their marriage. In 1845 he remarried and was elected the same year to the US Congress, resigning the following year to fight in the Mexican War. He was severely wounded at Buena Vista while commanding a volunteer regiment known as the "Mississippi Rifles."

Davis declined the appointment of BG in the Regular Army in 1847 and instead was elected to the U.S. Senate. In 1853 he was appointed Secretary of War by Pierce, served four years then re-entered the Senate, serving there until Jan '61, when Mississippi seceded. Appointed MG of the State Militia, he was chosen provisional president of the government set up by the Confederate Congress at Montgomery, Ala., and inaugurated there on 9 Feb '61. In November he was elected to a six-year term of the permanent government at Richmond and inaugurated on Washington's Birthday in Feb '62.

As the war progressed, Davis kept a close hand upon the management of the Confederate armies. His war secretaries served as little more than clerks as Davis supervised the affairs of the department. To Lee alone does he appear to have conceded preeminence. He made frequent trips to the field, arriving at First Bull Run as the fight was ending, and was under fire at Seven Pines. Later he toured the Western Theater. His handling of high command was extremely controversial. There were long standing feuds with Beauregard and Johnston, and his defense of generals such as Bragg and Pemberton irritated many in the South. On the political front his autocratic ways fostered a large and well-organized anti-Davis faction in
the Confederate Congress, especially in the senate. Issues arising from strong states rights sentiments did much to hamper Davis' efforts. When the President suspended habeas corpus, some states reacted by refusing to hold prisoners arrested under the act. The Georgia legislature even "nullified" Davis' act by declaring it unconstitutional. It was not uncommon for Confederate state governments to obstruct tax collection and to interfere with the process of conscription for constitutional reasons.

Newspapers proved to be a constant source of criticism of the government. The Richmond Examiner, The Charleston Mercury, and a number of other influential southern papers denounced the President regularly. Under these conditions Davis was never able to accumulate wartime powers in the Confederate Presidency such as Lincoln assumed in the North.

With the fall of Petersburg imminent Davis fled Richmond (2 Apr '65) with his cabinet for Danville, calling on his people to resist to the last and promising the recapture of the capitol. After Lee's surrender (9 Apr '65) the group turned south, where Davis was captured one month later at Irwinsville, Ga. He was held for two years at Fort Monroe, accused of complicity in the Lincoln assassination. He was finally released (13 May '67) and after travel in Europe, and several unsuccessful business ventures, he settled in New Orleans, where he died in poverty at the age of 82.

LEE, Robert E.
1807-1870, VA
USMA 1829 (2/46); Engrs.

Scion of a prominent Va. family, Lee served at Forts Pulaski, Monroe, and Hamilton, before being superintending engineer for the St. Louis harbor. In 1846 he was sent to San Antonio as assistant engineer but soon joined GEN Scott in the Vera Cruz expedition. During the Mexican War (1 wound, 3 brevets) Lee's extraordinary industry and capacity won him the lasting confidence and esteem of Scott and he emerged from the war with a brilliant
reputation. He then supervised the construction of Fort Carroll in Baltimore Harbor, until his appointment as superintendent at West Point (1852-1855). Being in Washington when John Brown made his raid on Harpers Ferry (1859), Lee was sent to capture the raiders with a force of Marines from the Navy Yard.

At the beginning of the Civil War, at Scott’s urging, Lincoln offered Lee command of the Federal armies (18 Apr ’61). Lee declined, and resigned two days later to take command of Virginia troops. After his first campaign in the field led to failure at Cheat Mountain, West Virginia (10-15 Sep ’61), Lee commanded forces along the South Atlantic coast before being recalled to Richmond to serve as military advisor to President Davis. On 1 Jun ’62, Lee succeeded J. E. Johnston (wounded during the Peninsula Campaign) in the command of the force that then became known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

Lee then embarked upon an offensive campaign known as the Seven Days Battles in which the Confederate Army of the Potomac fell back from Richmond. With the immediate danger to the Confederate capitol ended Lee moved against a second Federal army, the Army of Virginia under John Pope. After defeating Pope at Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug ’62) Lee was determined to retain the initiative and crossed the Potomac into Maryland in his first invasion of the North. McClellan, having been placed in command of the combined troops of his own and Pope’s forces, moved to counter the Confederate maneuver. When McClellan came into possession of Lee’s march orders Lee was forced to concentrate his army along Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg, Md. In the Battle of Antietam (17 Sep ’62) the two armies fought to a bloody stalemate and Lee recrossed the Potomac two days later.

After McClellan was replaced by Ambrose Burnside the new Federal commander attempted to move on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg. In the Battle of Fredericksburg (13 Dec ’62) Lee successfully blocked the maneuver and both armies went into winter quarters.

In the spring, Lee achieved his military masterpiece at Chancellorsville (1-4 May ’63), but his army was too weakened by the death of Jackson and dwindling supplies of manpower and material ever to recover its former combat effectiveness. Furthermore, the Federal armies were increasing in strength and proficiency and competent military leadership was finally being found. The high tide of the Confederacy was reached when Lee was unable to destroy the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg (1-3 Jul ’63) and was forced to retreat into Virginia.

Coming East from the simultaneous and equally decisive victory at Vicksburg, Grant assumed command of all Federal armies, formulated an over-all strategic plan, and then proceeded to destroy Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in a costly 11-month campaign of attribution. It was not until Feb ’65 - two months before his surrender - that Lee was given over-all command of all Confederate armies. Accepting the presidency of Washington College, after the war, Lee served until his death (22 Oct ’70) at the age of 64, and was buried there. (The name was later changed to Washington and Lee University.)
Having received the brevets of captain and major during the Mexican War, Jackson resigned his commission (1852) to become an instructor at Virginia Military Institute. At the beginning of the Civil War Jackson became a colonel of Virginia militia and was ordered to command at Harpers Ferry. In May he was superseded by Joseph Johnson and promoted to BG the following month. After distinguished service at First Bull Run (21 Jul '61) - where he and his brigade earned the sobriquet "Stonewall" - Jackson was promoted to MG (7 Aug '61). In November he was dispatched to the Valley, where he waged the magnificent Valley Campaign the following year against three Federal armies (May-Jun '62). After defeating his adversaries, and forcing the Government at Washington to withhold reinforcements from McClellan's army threatening Richmond, Jackson joined Lee's forces in the Seven Days Battles (25 Jun-1 Jul '62). Jackson's lightning-like turning movement against Pope in August was a crucial factor in the victory that followed at Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug '62).

In the Maryland campaign Jackson captured the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry before rejoining Lee at Sharpsburg in the Battle of Antietam (17 Sep '62).

In October Lee reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia and Jackson was promoted LTG and made commander of the Second Corps. He commanded the right wing in the victory at Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62). His career reached its high point in the famous flank march around Hooker's right at Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63). Later that same night (2 May) Jackson was accidentally shot by his own men. He died on 10 May of pneumonia, which developed after amputation of his left arm.
LONGSTREET, James ("Pete")
1821-1904, SC
USMA 1842 (54/56); Inf.

Longstreet served in the Seminole wars, the Mexican War (1 wound, 2 brevets), and on the frontier before resigning 1 June '61. Appointed BG, C.S.A. 17 Jun '61, Longstreet commanded a brigade at First Bull Run (21 Jul '61). He was promoted MG, 7 Oct. '61, and commanded a division at Yorktown and Williamsburg, Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. In the reorganization that followed the Peninsular campaign Longstreet was given command of a wing containing over half of Lee's infantry. During Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug '62) his command fell on the Union left flank to route the Federals. At Antietam Longstreet's command held the Confederate right flank. He was promoted LTG on 9 Oct '62. Shortly thereafter his command was reorganized and designated the First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. At Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62) his corps performed with distinction, throwing back multiple attacks on Lee's left flank. In Feb '63 Longstreet was sent to the Suffolk, Virginia as temporary commander of the Confederate Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia.

Rejoining Lee's army after Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63), Longstreet joined the army's march into Pennsylvania. He was opposed to the Gettysburg campaign in general and instead favored an offensive by Lee in the West. But since Lee was determined to invade Pennsylvania, Longstreet felt the campaign should be strategically offensive but tactically defensive and had the erroneous impression that Lee subscribed to this theory. His delay in attacking on the second day at Gettysburg, and his perceived lethargy in organizing "Pickett's Charge" on 3 Jul exposed him to the most vindictive criticism by Southerners after the war. However, Lee never gave any intimation that he considered Longstreet's failure at Gettysburg more than the error of a good soldier.
In Sep '63 Longstreet was sent with two of his divisions to support Bragg's army in the West. After the Battle of Chickamauga he was sent to oppose Burnside in the Knoxville Campaign. In '64 he led his command back to join Lee for the Wilderness campaign and was seriously wounded on 6 May '64 by his own men, almost precisely a year after Jackson had been mortally wounded under similar circumstances nearby. Longstreet was out of action until 19 Oct, when he was put in command of the forces at Bermuda Hundred and north of the James River. Longstreet joined Lee's army on its retreat to Appomattox where he surrendered (9 Apr '65). After the war he became president of an insurance company and joined the Republican party. He was at one time Minister Resident to Turkey.

STUART, James Ewell Brown
("Jeb")
1833-1864, VA
USMA 1854 (13/46);
Mounted Rifles-Cav.

Stuart served on the frontier in Indian fighting (seriously wounded) and in Kansas during the border disturbances. While on a leave of absence he was Lee's volunteer aide during the capture of John Brown at Harpers Ferry (1859). Stuart resigned from the R.A. on 3 May '61, he determined to follow his state, although his Virginia-born and West Point educated father-in-law, Philip St. George Cooke, stayed with the Union. Stuart was commissioned LTC of Virginia infantry on 10 May '61 and 14 days later was named CPT of cavalry. During that summer he was stationed at Harpers Ferry and First Bull Run. He was appointed BG, on 24 Sep '61. At the beginning of the Peninsular campaign Stuart's cavalry fought at Williamsburg, and in Jun '62 participated in the "ride around McClellan." Stuart's command fought in the Seven Days' Battles and at Harrison's Landing, before his promotion to MG (25 Jul '62). He then took command of all the cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia. He led his command at Second Bull Run (29-30 Aug '62), and at Antietam (17 Sep '62) his horse
artillery held Lee’s left flank near the Potomac River.

Stuart commanded his cavalry division at Fredericksburg and briefly served as acting
commander of the II Corps (3 May '63) at Chancellorsville after Jackson’s wounding. In the
Gettysburg campaign Stuart’s Cavalry Corps fought at Brandy Station (9 Jun ’63) and in a
number of cavalry skirmishes before attempting to ride around the Union army. His
command became separated from the main army, however, and he did not rejoin Lee’s army
until the evening on 2 Jul, at Gettysburg. The following day Stuart’s cavalry fought on the
Confederate left, but was held in check by Gregg’s cavalry. In the spring of ’64 Stuart fought
in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania campaigns, and at the Battle of Yellow Tavern, where he
was mortally wounded (11 May ’64), while attempting to block Sheridan’s raid on Richmond.
He died the next day.