

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

# ARMY HISTORY

WINTER 2021

PB20-21-1 No. 118

WASHINGTON D.C.



## THE GULF WAR AT 30

BY J. TRAVIS MOGER

## TOUCHING HISTORY

MATERIAL CULTURE AT WEST POINT

BY GAIL E. YOSHITANI, EDWIN C. DEN HARDER,  
RICHARD S. LOVERING, KEVIN S. MALMQUIST,  
JUSTINE M. MEBERG, AND JARED D. WIGTON

# ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

**JAMES C. MCCONVILLE**  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

Official:



**KATHLEEN S. MILLER**  
Administrative Assistant  
to the Secretary of the Army  
2033601

**PAUL E. FUNK II**  
General, United States Army  
Training and Doctrine Command

Chief of Military History  
Charles R. Bowery Jr.

Managing Editor  
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editor  
Deborah A. Stultz

Layout and Design  
Michael R. Gill

Cartographer  
Matthew T. Boan

The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes *Army History* (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development of Army historians and as Army educational and training literature. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical work or Army educational and training programs.

Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribution of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5060, or sent by e-mail to [usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil).

Those individuals and institutions that do not qualify for free copies may opt for paid subscriptions from the U.S. Government Publishing Office. The cost of a subscription is \$20 per year. Order by title and enter List ID as ARHIS. To order online, go to <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>. To order by phone, call toll free 866-512-1800, or in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, 202-512-1800; by fax, 202-512-2104; or by e-mail, [contactcenter@gpo.gov](mailto:contactcenter@gpo.gov). Send mail orders to U.S. Government Publishing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000.

The opinions expressed in *Army History* are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its constituent elements. The bulletin's contents do not necessarily reflect official Army positions and do not supersede information in other official Army publications or Army regulations. The bulletin is approved for official dissemination of material to keep the Army knowledgeable of developments in Army history and to enhance professional development. The Department of the Army approved the use of funds for printing this publication on 7 September 1983.

The reproduction of images not obtained from federal sources is prohibited.

**Front Cover:** An M1A1 Abrams main battle tank lays a smoke screen during Operation DESERT STORM. *National Archives*

**Back Cover:** An M551 Sheridan light tank preparing to be airlifted to Saudi Arabia during Operation DESERT SHIELD. *National Archives*

## EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In the Winter 2021 issue of *Army History*, we are pleased to offer two engaging articles, an interesting selection of book reviews, a look at some unique Army art, and an announcement concerning the opening of the National Museum of the United States Army.

The first article, by J. Travis Moger, commemorates the thirtieth anniversary of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Moger details the complexities of joint operations and coalition warfare while examining the lasting impact the Gulf War has had on the Army, the Middle East, and the world. The second article looks at the use of material culture in the classrooms at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Faculty there, in partnership with the West Point Museum, utilize art and artifacts in a way that gives cadets a greater appreciation and understanding of the history they are being taught.

As I work on putting together this Winter issue, I think about the small group of editors, cartographers, and designers who labor on this publication with me. All of us are facing different challenges during this period as we are teleworking full-time, some with children who are attending school online. I can't help but be thankful for the Center of Military History (CMH) and its leadership's flexibility during the pandemic. CMH decided to put the health and well-being of its employees above any possible disruptions in workflow that might arise with almost the entire staff working virtually. The CMH workforce has risen to the occasion and, to my knowledge, there have been almost no significant disruptions. Within my division, work continues to progress, books and journals continue to be published, and some of my coworkers have reported an increase in individual productivity. None of this would have been possible without trust from CMH's leadership and a belief that we care about the Center's missions and goals. Pandemic or not, we were going to get the job done.

Speaking of the staff of *Army History*, I know this period will be remembered as a testament to the adaptability and commitment of my colleagues, who, during difficult times, kept this journal moving forward and provided its readers with quality and thought-provoking content. I am proud of us. I know that *Army History's* patrons appreciate the work that goes into each issue, and they have my promise that we will continue to deliver.

**BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH**  
MANAGING EDITOR

# CONTENTS

## FEATURES

THE CHIEF'S CORNER..... 4  
 CURRENT CHALLENGES

NEWS NOTES ..... 5

NMUSA FEATURE..... 26  
 NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM OPENS WITH INSPIRING CEREMONY AND STELLAR REVIEWS

U.S. ARMY ART SPOTLIGHT ..... 28  
 BATAAN DEATH MARCH CARVINGS

BOOK REVIEWS..... 37  
 MILITARY REALISM: THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF FORCE AND INNOVATION IN THE U.S. ARMY  
 WAR NARRATIVES: SHAPING BELIEFS, BLURRING TRUTHS IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
 WINNING WESTEROS: HOW GAME OF THRONES EXPLAINS MODERN MILITARY CONFLICT  
 HUNTER LIGGETT: A SOLDIER'S GENERAL  
 CAPTIVES OF LIBERTY: PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE POLITICS OF VENGEANCE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION  
 A REPUBLIC IN THE RANKS: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC  
 THE UNION ASSAULTS AT VICKSBURG: GRANT ATTACKS PEMBERTON, MAY 17–22, 1863  
 ROSEBUD, JUNE 17, 1876: PRELUDE TO THE LITTLE BIG HORN

CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE..... 47  
 CAREER PROGRAM 61 UPDATE

## ARTICLES

- 06 ▶ THE GULF WAR AT 30  
 BY J. TRAVIS MOGER
- 30 ▶ TOUCHING HISTORY  
 MATERIAL CULTURE AT WEST POINT  
 BY GAIL E. YOSHITANI, EDWIN C. DEN HARDER, RICHARD S. LOVERING,  
 KEVIN S. MALMQUIST, JUSTINE M. MEBERG, AND JARED D. WIGTON



# THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERLY JR.

## CURRENT CHALLENGES

As you are reading this issue of *Army History*, the National Museum of the United States Army is open for business! That statement has been a very long time in coming, but because of the incredible hard work of a dedicated team of museum and history professionals, that time is now.

I am mindful that as I write this column, though, we are still gripped by the COVID-19 pandemic, and conditions are uncertain. So “open for business” means anything from steady admission to the Museum campus of hundreds of visitors each day, to a purely virtual presentation that protects public health. We will remain flexible and mindful of current conditions as the facility opens. Regardless of our operating stance, what you will see in the Museum’s exhibits and programs are cutting-edge examples of twenty-first century public history, and a comprehensive telling of the Army’s story from the colonial era to the present day. The National Army Museum pulls no punches about our past, and deals with our history warts and all. Our guiding philosophy since day one of the project has been to tell the story of the United States of America through the lives and experiences of the millions of women and men who have served in the Army.

I want to remind you that the opening of the brick-and-mortar Museum is just the beginning, and that we will remain agile and innovative in the platforms that we use to educate the nation on our Army’s history. Educational programs, virtual programs, teacher education, social media, worldwide educational experiences, rotating exhibitions—all of these features will grow and change over time, and as the Army continues to make history each day, our national Museum will continue to tell the story. The original advertising products of the Museum project office used the tagline: “A Great Army Deserves a Great Museum,” and that remains true today, years after the project began. I’m proud to say that we will continue to deliver that great Museum to our Army and our nation.

Finally, I will also take this moment to remind our readers that the Army Museum Enterprise continues to welcome our soldiers and civilians, along with the public, to more than forty separate museum facilities nationwide and in Germany and South Korea. Army Museums continue to educate, inspire, and preserve our shared past.



# NEWSNOTES

## EDWARD MCKENZIE COFFMAN (1929–2020)

One of the fathers of the “new military history” and of oral history, Edward “Mac” Coffman died on 16 September 2020 at age 91. He schooled a generation of military historians as professor of military history for thirty-one years at the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Born in Kentucky, he attended the University of Kentucky and served as an infantry officer in the Korean War. He returned to Lexington for his Ph.D., published a biography of General Peyton C. March, and became a research assistant for Forrest C. Pogue in his magisterial work on George C. Marshall. Coffman’s second book, *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (Madison, Wis., 1986), remains one of the best books on the United States in the Great War. His magnum opus was a two-volume study of the Army in peacetime from 1784 to 1940. It displayed his skills as a scholar who was not solely—or even mainly—interested in battles, but in military institutions and the lives of soldiers, their families, and the societies from which they came. It relied heavily on interviews with a range of military figures. He used the traditional historical tools to address untraditional questions, at the same time never forgetting the humanity of the people he studied. He also taught at West Point, the Air Force Academy, the Army War College, and the Command and General Staff College. In 1990, he received the Society for Military History’s Samuel Eliot Morison Prize for lifetime achievement. A great friend of Army history, he served on the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee and was a valued advocate for Army history programs. In his spare time, he read mysteries, played the clarinet, and listened to jazz, especially Duke Ellington. He is survived by his wife of

sixty-five years, Anne; three children; six grandchildren; and eight great-grandchildren.

His former student Edgar F. Raines Jr. speaks for all the profession when he remembers: “In my mind’s eye I see him at a lectern in a large lecture hall filled with students. They are consumed by laughter. The professor . . . cuts an unprepossessing figure on the stage, but he has a sense of humor and deft timing. If you are sitting close enough to the stage you may detect a twinkle in his eye. He is about to bring down the house with another droll observation delivered with a slight Kentucky drawl. . . . Farewell, great friend. I already miss you more than I can say.”



Edward McKenzie Coffman

## AUSA PUBLISHES NEW GRAPHIC NOVEL


The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) has released the latest addition to its series of graphic novels, *Medal of Honor: Tibor Rubin*. Tibor Rubin was the only Holocaust survivor to be awarded the Medal of Honor. After his liberation from the Mauthausen concentration camp in May 1945, Rubin immigrated to the United States and joined the Army. While in combat in Korea in July 1950, he single-handedly fought off a North Korean


assault, inflicting a staggering number of casualties. He was later captured and risked his life to gather food for fellow prisoners. Rubin was recognized for his actions, both as a combatant and as a prisoner of war, with the nation’s highest honor.

AUSA is a nonprofit organization devoted to the U.S. Army and its soldiers, and the book is being distributed free of charge as part of its educational mission. This new graphic novel is the fourth issue in the second volume of the Medal of Honor series, which launched in October 2018 with *Medal of Honor: Alvin York* and continued with profiles of Roy Benavidez, Audie Murphy, and Sal Giunta.

Previously in 2020, AUSA released three other titles: *Medal of Honor: Daniel Inouye*, to honor the World War II hero turned senator; *Medal of Honor: Henry Johnson*, for the Harlem Hellfighter made famous during World War I; and *Medal of Honor: Mary Walker*, to recognize the Civil War surgeon and the only female recipient.

Information and links to all of the graphic novels are available on AUSA’s Medal of Honor series page at <https://www.ausa.org/medal-honor-graphic-novels>.





# The GULF WAR at 30

BY J. TRAVIS MOGER

**A company from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) marches across the apron to board the aircraft that will carry the unit to Saudi Arabia for Operation DESERT SHIELD.** *National Archives*

Thirty years ago, a U.S.-led coalition fought and won a lightning-fast war to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi army. Though Iraq had the fourth-largest army in the world at the time, eight years of recent combat against Iran had both seasoned and exhausted its troops. After a hundred hours of ground combat, President George H. W. Bush declared a cease-fire, stating that the coalition had succeeded in its goal of ending the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Mindful of the threat that American public opinion would turn against a prolonged and costly war, as it had during the Vietnam era, Bush was anxious to secure a swift conclusion to the conflict as criticisms about the U.S.-led coalition waging a disproportionate war were mounting. The day after the cease-fire went into effect, the president exulted over his political and military victory: “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!”<sup>1</sup> A proud American nation celebrated its conquering heroes with parades in New York City, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

The initial euphoria eventually gave way to frustration as news reports throughout the 1990s chronicled the ongoing struggle to contain Iraq and remove the weapons of mass destruction that it had been building

and stockpiling since the 1970s. Even as triumphalist accounts of the war began to appear in print, pundits disputed their rosy assessments. Some said the war had been unnecessary, because the United Nations (UN) sanctions imposed immediately after Kuwait’s invasion and occupation had isolated Iraq politically and economically, and the U.S. military force that had deployed to Saudi Arabia in the late summer and early fall of 1990 was sufficient to deter further Iraqi aggression and protect U.S. interests in the region.<sup>3</sup> Others claimed the war did not go far enough, because it left Iraq’s brutal dictator Saddam Hussein in power and his army intact. Exactly how the U.S. military could have achieved regime change in Baghdad without alienating Arab members of the coalition and becoming embroiled in a long and costly occupation of Iraq remained unexplained.<sup>4</sup> Iraqi propaganda also latched onto the war’s ambiguous outcome, spinning the regime’s survival into a victory.

Since the mid-1990s, appraisals of the war have been mixed.<sup>5</sup> Literary treatments of the conflict—robust in its immediate aftermath—slowed to a trickle even before a second Iraq War began in 2003. Within

a decade after the conflict, authors like Alberto Bin, Richard Hill, and Arthur Jones called the Gulf War a “forgotten war.”<sup>6</sup> In 2016, the Pentagon chose not to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the U.S. military’s triumph in the desert, angering some veterans.<sup>7</sup> Three decades on, Operation DESERT STORM—the coalition’s code name for the war—seems to have been a tactical success, with a few notable caveats, but a strategic failure.

## BACKGROUND

Iraq had coveted Kuwait for a long time. The emirate’s enormous oil wealth and strategic location on the Persian Gulf made it a target. Kuwait had been under formal British protection since 1899, even though it was officially part of the Ottoman Empire at the time. After World War I, when Britain created the Kingdom of Iraq as a British mandate, Kuwait remained separate. When Iraq gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1932, it recognized the border with Kuwait. However, in 1937, Iraq’s young King Ghazi began calling for his country to annex Kuwait.<sup>8</sup> Ghazi died in 1939 without achieving his aim. In 1958, a



had supported Iraq financially during Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the largest and deadliest conflict in modern Middle Eastern history.<sup>10</sup> This war was not merely deadly but dirty, involving the deployment of more chemical weapons than in any conflict since World War I.<sup>11</sup> Baghdad used its high number of war dead as moral leverage to argue that other Arab countries should provide debt relief, because the Iraqis had paid in blood to protect them from the Persian threat.<sup>12</sup> By war’s end, Iraq had spent virtually all its roughly \$85 billion reserves.<sup>13</sup> It owed around \$80 billion, roughly one and a half times the nation’s annual income. Extensive infrastructure damage, estimated at \$90 billion, left Iraq unable to pay these debts. In July 1990, Saddam Hussein demanded that Kuwait forgive Iraqi war debt and provide additional aid.

Kuwait’s oil policies also angered Saddam. He accused the emirate of pumping more oil than its OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) quota allowed. Overproduction depressed the price of oil, making it even more difficult for Iraq to meet its war-related obligations. Further, Saddam accused Kuwait of stealing oil from Iraq by means of slant drilling, demanded compensation for the purported theft, and renewed Iraq’s claim to all of Kuwait. Even as Saddam was involved in ongoing bilateral negotiations over his concerns, he moved more than 100,000 troops to the Kuwaiti border.

In the predawn hours of 2 August 1990, three heavy divisions of the Iraqi army’s elite *Republican Guard* rumbled across the Kuwaiti border and quickly overran the emirate’s small, unsuspecting military. Two of these divisions—the *Hammurabi* and *Tawakalna*—raced toward the capital, while a third—the armored *Medina Division*—moved into blocking positions to the west. By midmorning, the attacking ground units had linked up with two helicopter-borne Iraqi special forces brigades already operating in Kuwait City. The emir and his family and the remnants of the Kuwaiti army fled south to nearby Saudi Arabia. By 1900, Iraqi forces had secured the capital city and had detained thousands of American, British, and European civilians, trapped in Iraq and Kuwait, to use as human shields to protect military and industrial sites in Iraq from attack.<sup>14</sup> By noon on 4 August, *Republican Guard* divisions had sealed Kuwait’s border with Saudi Arabia as well. In just two days, Saddam’s

leftist coup d’état overthrew the monarchy and brought the new Iraqi Republic into the Soviet sphere of influence. After Kuwait achieved self-rule in 1961, Baghdad laid claim to the emirate based on the fact that it formerly belonged to the Ottoman province (*vilayet*) of Al Basra, one of three provinces that had been combined to form Iraq. The British deployed troops to protect Kuwaiti sovereignty, and Iraq formally recognized Kuwait’s independence in 1963. However,

territorial disputes continued. In 1973, the Iraqi military attacked and occupied the small border post of Samita in northeastern Kuwait in an unsuccessful attempt to coerce the emirate into relinquishing Warbah and Bubiyan islands, which controlled access to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.<sup>9</sup>

By the late 1980s, Iraq’s monetary debt to Kuwait became a major point of contention. Despite Iraq’s occasional assaults on its neighboring country’s sovereignty, Kuwait

military had gained complete control of the country.<sup>15</sup>

## RESPONSES TO IRAQI AGGRESSION

The United States quickly denounced Iraq's aggression. President Bush learned of the invasion almost immediately. Later that day, the U.S. government released a statement condemning Iraq's action. The president held a news conference in which he said, "There is no place for this sort of naked aggression in today's world, and I've taken a number of steps to indicate the deep concern that I feel over the events that have taken place."<sup>16</sup> Three days later, Bush sharpened his tone, stating emphatically, "This shall not stand."<sup>17</sup>

The president's foreign policy priorities informed his determination to respond forcefully to Iraq's violent annexation of its neighbor. Exactly ten months before the Iraqi army attacked Kuwait, Bush had signed a national security directive, which labeled access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the region as "vital to U.S. national security." The document went on to declare that, "The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force."<sup>18</sup>

With the United States in the lead, most of the world closed ranks against Iraq. On the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning Iraq's behavior.<sup>19</sup> This brief document demanded "that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces" from Kuwait and called for negotiations to settle the crisis.<sup>20</sup> When Baghdad refused, the Security Council passed a second resolution on 6 August, imposing economic sanctions on Iraq in the form of a near-total financial and trade embargo.<sup>21</sup>

## DEFENDING SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia had built strong trade and defense relationships with the United States since World War II, but it had always been reluctant to have large numbers of foreign troops on its soil, which Muslims consider sacred. However, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait changed the game almost overnight. The Iraqi army, positioned within striking distance of Saudi oil fields and capable of launching a full-scale attack on the kingdom, now posed a real threat to Saudi sovereignty. On 6 August, King Fahd

allowed American and other forces into Saudi Arabia. The United States proceeded to deploy troops to the Saudi kingdom while it built a multinational coalition.

Interservice sensitivities and coalition diversity complicated the command and control structure. The mission of defending Saudi Arabia, called Operation DESERT SHIELD, fell to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), led by its commander in chief (CINC), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. The Third United States Army, under Lt. Gen. John J. Yeosock, was designated U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT).

The Third Army served a threefold purpose. As a field army headquarters, it directed "echelons above corps." As a theater army, it was in charge of overall logistics and service support. And as theater army headquarters, it assumed responsibility for all U.S. Army forces in theater, excluding special operations units.<sup>22</sup> Although Schwarzkopf tasked Yeosock with developing an overall plan for a potential ground war, he reserved for himself the role of land forces commander to avoid offending either the Marines or the Saudis by placing their forces under a U.S. Army command. The Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian forces came under an independent, Saudi-led chain of command, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) reported directly to CENTCOM. "This convoluted arrangement," author John Bonin argues, "violated the principles of simplicity and unity of command."<sup>23</sup>

One of General Schwarzkopf's first priorities was to build combat power. Because he

had limited air- and sealift assets with which to face a possible imminent Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, Schwarzkopf prioritized combat units over support units.<sup>24</sup> This approach had its drawbacks.<sup>25</sup> President Bush announced a U.S. troop deployment on 8 August. Within seven days, 4,575 soldiers from the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, arrived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,



**General Schwarzkopf, commander in chief, U.S. Central Command, addresses members of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).** *National Archives*



**General Yeosock, commander of the 3d U.S. Army and Army Forces, U.S. Central Command, receives an update on the ground war at the Army Command Operations and Intelligence Center during Operation DESERT STORM.** *National Archives*



**Saddam Hussein** *Department of Defense*



to defend its airfield and the nearby port of Ad Dammam.<sup>26</sup> When the lead elements arrived, “there was no logistical structure to support the troops, no shelter from the 120 degree heat, no A-ration [fresh food] meal support, little water availability, and no available sanitation facilities.”<sup>27</sup>

The soldiers faced another vulnerability. The assumption that an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia was imminent had provided the rationale for the rapid deployment of U.S. ground forces. Knowing that the 82d Airborne Division’s light weapons were no match for Saddam’s tanks, the paratroopers began calling themselves “speed bumps.”<sup>28</sup>

But the 82d Airborne Division would not have to fight Iraq alone. A provisional Arab mechanized division—composed of Saudi, Kuwaiti, and other forces, and equipped with M60 tanks and AMX10 wheeled guns—guarded the Saudi frontier during the early days of the buildup.<sup>29</sup> By the end of August, the U.S. Air Force had deployed some 200 ground-attack aircraft to provide close air support to land forces.<sup>30</sup> In the same month, the 101st Airborne Division, led by Maj. Gen. J. H. Binford Peay III, deployed 117 helicopters.<sup>31</sup>

Even though Saddam Hussein had an overwhelming advantage in ground combat power, his military did not invade Saudi Arabia immediately. Instead, Iraqi army units dug in along the Kuwaiti coast and Saudi



**J. H. Binford Peay III, shown here as a brigadier general.**

*National Archives*

border, signaling Saddam’s willingness to fight for Kuwait.<sup>32</sup> To ensure victory against Iraq in case of war, CENTCOM needed more warfighters and more combat power.

The U.S. Military Airlift Command built an air bridge to carry troops and supplies to the Middle East. Although sealift transported approximately 85 percent of the military equipment, 99 percent of the



**General Pagonis** *National Archives*

personnel arrived in theater on aircraft. By mid-December, an average of 65 planes delivered some 8,000 troops to 16 different airfields daily, with landings every 22 minutes on average. To expedite mission-critical supplies, the command launched an overnight delivery service from the United States and Europe called the Desert Express, reminiscent of the Red Ball Express in World War II and Vietnam.<sup>33</sup> The logistics effort benefited from experienced leadership.

AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING FORCE (APF) ACTIVATION/FIRST VOYAGE BY SEAPORT OF DEBARKATION (SPOD) ARRIVAL DATE*							
Ship Name	Activation Date	Activation Location	Departure Date	SPOD Location	SPOD Arrival	Short Tons	Unit and Cargo
<i>Anderson</i>	7 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	8 AUG 1990	Al Jubayl	15 AUG 1990	10,270	7th MEB, USMC Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Bonnyman</i>	7 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	8 AUG 1990	Al Jubayl	15 AUG 1990	10,174	7th MEB, USMC Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Hauge</i>	7 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	8 AUG 1990	Al Jubayl	15 AUG 1990	12,199	7th MEB, USMC Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Fisher</i>	7 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	8 AUG 1990	Al Jubayl	24 AUG 1990	9,999	7th MEB, USMC Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Baugh</i>	7 AUG 1990	Jacksonville, Florida	10 AUG 1990	Al Jubayl	5 SEP 1990	10,400	7th MEB, USMC Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Austral Rainbow</i>	8 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	9 AUG 1990	Ad Dammam	17 AUG 1990	22,652	USA/USAF Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Green Harbour</i>	8 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	9 AUG 1990	Ad Dammam	17 AUG 1990	20,494	USA/USAF Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Green Island</i>	8 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	9 AUG 1990	Ad Dammam	17 AUG 1990	24,389	USA/USAF Eqp. & Supplies
<i>American Cormorant</i>	8 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	9 AUG 1990	Ad Dammam	18 AUG 1990	6,918	USA/USAF Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Santa Victoria</i>	8 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	9 AUG 1990	Ad Dammam	18 AUG 1990	9,617	USA/USAF Eqp. & Supplies
<i>American Kestrel</i>	8 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	9 AUG 1990	Abu Dhabi	19 AUG 1990	20,063	USA/USAF Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Advantage</i>	8 AUG 1990	Villefranche, France	9 AUG 1990	Jeddah	20 AUG 1990	9,410	USA/USAF Eqp. & Supplies
<i>Noble Star</i>	8 AUG 1990	Diego Garcia	9 AUG 1990	Ad Dammam	21 AUG 1990	3,434	USA/USAF Eqp. & Supplies

\* James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, *So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C. and Scott Air Force Base, Ill.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Research Center, United States Transportation Command, 1995), pp. 267, 269.

Air Force General Hansford T. Johnson, commander of the U.S. Transportation Command and CINC, U.S. Military Airlift Command, provided air- and sealift to move forces, equipment, and supplies into the theater. Maj. Gen. William G. Pagonis led the Army's Herculean logistics effort from his newly created 22d Support Command.

Saudi Arabia's wealth, modern infrastructure, and host-nation support smoothed the military build-up, but other factors complicated it. The imbalanced combat-to-support unit or "tooth-to-tail" ratio reflected a shortage of logisticians. Insufficient numbers of available ships, aircraft, and trucks, especially heavy equipment transporters, slowed the movement of soldiers and materiel.

Pre-positioned U.S. military equipment and supplies on ships ensured that the troops arriving in theater first had what they needed to fight, but even these stocks proved challenging to move in a timely fashion.<sup>34</sup> Although not a heavy force, the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) fielded some 50 M60 tanks, 100 tracked assault amphibious vehicles, and 30 light armored vehicles, which had been pre-positioned aboard five roll-on/roll-off ships.<sup>35</sup> Three of the five ships left Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean on 8 August and made it to Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, one week later. Because the two other ships were off station for maintenance, it took almost a month for the rest of the 7th MEB's equipment to arrive.<sup>36</sup> Maj. Gen.

Barry R. McCaffrey's 24th Infantry Division (ID), the first heavy unit the Army sent to the Gulf, experienced similar challenges.<sup>37</sup> When activated, their seven designated "fast sealift ships" proceeded from various ports up and down the east coast and in the Gulf of Mexico, and steamed toward Savannah, Georgia, to pick up the unit's equipment. One vessel was undergoing refurbishment and another broke down in transit, causing delays. The total transit time ranged from less than three weeks to almost seven.<sup>38</sup>

Despite the logistical setbacks, over six months twenty-eight nations sent a massive force of about 700,000 troops to the Gulf.<sup>39</sup> The U.S. Army contributed two army corps: the U.S.-based XVIII Airborne Corps and the VII Corps from Germany. In all, approximately 300,000 Army troops deployed to Saudi Arabia.

### PREPARING FOR WAR

After sufficient combat units from Lt. Gen. Gary E. Luck's XVIII Airborne Corps had arrived in theater, planning turned toward possible offensive operations. The CENTCOM war plan consisted of four phases: (1) attack strategic targets inside Iraq; (2) take out Iraqi air defenses; (3) prepare the battlefield; and (4) expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait with a ground offensive.<sup>40</sup> Air Force planners developed the first three phases, which would take place simultaneously.<sup>41</sup>

These were largely uncontroversial; however, the ground war phase was anything but. Unlike the Air Force, which enjoyed total superiority in the skies, the Army faced a more difficult challenge. It had to fight outnumbered and win. Fortunately, this scenario was exactly what the Army had spent decades preparing to do against the Warsaw Pact's much larger ground forces in central Europe.

By February 1991, Iraq fielded a formidable army of "more than 1 million men—about 950,000 regulars, of which some 480,000 were reserve and new conscripts, and about 90,000 volunteers."<sup>42</sup> Their army consisted of seven corps with the number of divisions fluctuating between forty-five and sixty during the seven-month crisis. The corps-sized *Republican Guard Forces Command* had the best-trained and best-equipped units, including seven divisions—eight counting special forces brigades. The Iraqi army fielded a variety of Warsaw Pact equipment and weapons plus some from other countries, including France. This arsenal included a number of long-range Scud missiles, tactical missiles, and artillery pieces. By mid-February the Iraqis had forty-three divisions in the Kuwait Theater of Operations, which included Kuwait and the area of Iraq south of 31° latitude.<sup>43</sup> The Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait carried out political executions, mistreated civilians, and looted Kuwait's wealth. Regular army divisions guarded the coast against an amphibious assault. A line of infantry units stretched along Kuwait's southern border from the Persian Gulf westward—well beyond the Wadi al Batin, the dry riverbed that ran from southwest to northeast along the border between Kuwait and Iraq. However, the Iraqi army left its western flank exposed, because its leaders believed an attack across the open desert was impossible.<sup>44</sup>

To defeat such a force, Schwarzkopf needed a larger army. Even before the XVIII Airborne Corps finished deploying the last of its units on 30 October, the general believed "that to plan an offensive that did not court military disaster required another 'heavy corps' of two armored divisions."<sup>45</sup> After the midterm congressional elections in early November, President Bush announced his decision to send 200,000 more troops to the Gulf, including Lt. Gen. Frederick M. Franks Jr.'s VII Corps from Germany.



General McCaffrey *National Archives*



Gary E. Luck, shown here as a brigadier general.

*Department of Defense*



**Frederick M. Franks Jr., shown here as a four-star general.**

*National Archives*

Bush did this, he said, to convince Saddam to withdraw his troops from Kuwait.<sup>46</sup> However, the reinforcements also allowed a viable military option to resolve the crisis. Schwarzkopf got his second heavy corps, although it would take more than two months for the additional ground troops to arrive in theater.

With the VII Corps en route, Army planners stopped working on a single-corps war plan and focused exclusively on a two-corps option they also had been developing. Before the ground war phase could begin, coalition air attacks would weaken enemy forces to 50 percent. Then, the XVIII Airborne Corps would shift far to the west in order to attack through open desert deep into Iraq, cutting the enemy's main line of communications between Baghdad and Kuwait. Far to the east, Arab and Marine forces, reinforced by the Army's Tiger Brigade—1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division—would conduct a supporting attack north along the coast. Additional Arab forces on the Marines' left would penetrate Iraqi defenses and liberate Kuwait City. To deceive the enemy, the 1st Cavalry Division would execute a feint up the Wadi al Batin, the most likely avenue of approach for the main attack. In the real main effort, the VII Corps would breach defenses west of the wadi, pass its heavy divisions through and around the enemy's right flank, then turn east to engage Iraq's *Republican Guard* and regular army formations. The corps' mission was no less than

the "destruction of the RGFC [*Republican Guard Forces Command*] in zone."<sup>47</sup>

One of the major unknowns was whether the Iraqis would employ chemical weapons, as they had done repeatedly in the Iran–Iraq War. To minimize this risk and fix the enemy in place, General Schwarzkopf emphasized the need for rapid and continuous forward movement. He told General Yeosock, "I want VII Corps to *slam* into the Republican Guard."<sup>48</sup> How the VII Corps could concentrate its forces for the main attack without pausing, or keep the enemy from slipping away if it did, remained unresolved. It was also unclear whether any of the well-crafted war plans would become necessary.

Despite the continuing coalition military build-up in the fall and harsh sanctions designed to pressure Iraq to remove its army from Kuwait, Saddam remained intransigent. On 29 November 1990, the UN authorized "all necessary means" to end the Iraqi occupation and set 15 January 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw.<sup>49</sup> Two days after the deadline had passed, Operation DESERT SHIELD became DESERT STORM and the U.S.-led coalition transitioned from defense and war preparation to the first phase of combat.

### AIR OPERATIONS

Like the war itself, the air campaign was a multinational and joint affair. Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, commander of the Ninth U.S. Air Force, served as CENTCOM's Joint Forces Air Component Commander. As such, General Horner was responsible for planning the air campaign and coordinating 2,700 aircraft from 14 nations and service components. Still, the bulk of the airpower came from the United States.<sup>50</sup> "Viewed from a theater level," one Army historian wrote, "Desert Storm was a war of attrition based upon air power."<sup>51</sup> Although the Air Force took the lead in the skies, Army aviation played an important role. The Army even fired the first shots of the air war, when the 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation's AH-64 Apache helicopters took out an enemy radar complex.<sup>52</sup> Missiles, strike aircraft, and long-range bombers targeted Iraq's command-and-control nodes, air defenses, military bases, suspected weapons of mass destruction facilities, and bridges leading to the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Coalition forces quickly achieved air supremacy, neutralizing the Iraqi air force and much of Iraq's air defense network. To escape



**General Horner** *National Archives*

destruction, a number of Iraqi pilots even fled to Iran in their planes. As the ground war drew closer, air operations focused on tactical targets, preparing the battlefield. Coalition air provided close air support, air mobility, and medical evacuations. However, multiple friendly fire incidents caused 18 percent of all U.S. battle casualties, and the collateral damage from airstrikes included the lives of hundreds of civilians killed in a Baghdad air-raid shelter.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, the seemingly disproportionate killing of hundreds of Iraqi troops retreating on the main road from Kuwait to Basra—later dubbed by the news media as the "Highway of Death"—tarnished the air campaign's otherwise brilliant success.

Much of the air component's attention focused on neutralizing Iraqi Scud missiles. "Iraq fired 88 Scuds during the war, 42 at Israel and 46 at the Persian Gulf nations."<sup>54</sup> The disproportionate level of attacks on Israel was part of an attempt to draw it into the war and at the same time entice Arab states away from the coalition. In response, the United States sent Patriot missile batteries to Israel and dedicated 22 percent of the air campaign's total sorties to the anti-Scud effort. However, neither Patriots nor coalition air destroyed a significant number of the missiles. Although notoriously inaccurate, some Scuds hit their target. On 25 February, a Scud missile killed twenty-eight American soldiers and wounded another ninety-eight when it smashed into a Dhahran warehouse that served as a barracks for, among others,



**Desert Storm 101st Style**, by Peter G. Varisano U.S. Army Art Collection

the 14th Quartermaster Detachment, a reserve unit from Pennsylvania.<sup>55</sup>

### MARITIME OPERATIONS

Maritime operations—under Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command—made important contributions to the war effort. At the outbreak of hostilities, the collection of Soviet-built missile patrol boats and auxiliary vessels that comprised the Iraqi navy proved no

match for a U.S.-led armada.<sup>56</sup> “Coalition naval forces essentially destroyed the Iraqi Navy in three weeks, secured control of the northern Gulf, and maintained the region’s sea LOCs [lines of communications] with minimal Iraqi interference.”<sup>57</sup> The allied navies also secured the coalition’s eastern flank off the Kuwaiti coast, deterred Iran, and provided naval gunfire, missiles, and strike aircraft to attack Iraqi targets. Up to the beginning of the ground war, a thirty-one-ship amphibious task force deceived the Iraqis into believing an amphibious assault


on Kuwait was imminent, fixing seven Iraqi divisions along the coast. When Marine and Arab units attacked Kuwait from the south, they relied on naval gunfire and close air support. Although not the main effort, coalition navies performed essential missions that contributed to the war’s overall success.

### THE BATTLE OF KHAFJI

Two weeks into the air war, the enemy seized the initiative with a cross-border operation from southern Kuwait into Saudi



**Demolished Iraqi vehicles line a roadway in the Euphrates River valley in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM.** National Archives



**Admiral Arthur** *National Archives*

Arabia, surprising coalition commanders. On 29 January, Iraqi maneuver forces executed diversionary attacks, penetrating well inside the Saudi border. Although U.S. Marine ground troops and coalition aircraft inflicted much damage on the attacking enemy units and forced them to withdraw, the attacks focused attention away from the coast where the enemy's main objective lay.

Later that evening under cover of darkness, Iraq's *5th Mechanized Division* swept aside a thin screen of defenders, raced south, and captured the port town of Khafji. Saddam Hussein, who had approved the military plan, wanted his forces to occupy and hold the town in order to draw coalition forces into a land war of attrition.<sup>58</sup>

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Khafji lay within range of enemy artillery. Although the Saudis had evacuated the town, King Fahd was outraged by the presence of Iraqi troops on Saudi soil and called for the immediate recapture of Khafji. Under withering coalition fire from air, sea, and land, the Iraqis could not hold the town long. Still, it took two Saudi Arabian National Guard battalions, supported by two Qatari tank companies, two days to push the Iraqis out of Khafji. By all measures, the operation was a tactical win for the coalition, but Iraqi leaders claimed victory, not least to bolster their troops' flagging morale.<sup>59</sup>

### A 100-HOUR GROUND CAMPAIGN

Nightly artillery duels, border skirmishes, and demonstrations on both sides took


place for weeks leading up to the main coalition ground offensive. Off the coast, an amphibious feint kept up the ruse that a major attack would come from the sea. On 21 February, the 2d Marine Division sent light armored infantry teams into Kuwait as a prelude for a cross-border raid. For two days, these units aggressively maneuvered in front of the Iraqi lines, convincing the enemy that a major attack was beginning.<sup>60</sup> In an eleventh-hour attempt to head off a ground war against its ally, the Soviet Union dispatched special envoy Yevgeny M. Primakov to Baghdad to convince Saddam Hussein to give up Kuwait and avoid a humiliating battlefield defeat. This effort resulted in a proposal—announced by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev on 22 February—that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait within three weeks. Baghdad accepted these terms, but Washington did not. Bush countered with an ultimatum that Iraqi troops begin withdrawing from Kuwait within twenty-four hours or accept the consequences. Iraq rejected this ultimatum and set about destroying Kuwait's petroleum infrastructure, igniting more than 600 oil wells with pre-positioned explosives.



**USS Wisconsin (BB-64)** fires its 16-inch guns on Iraqi positions in southern Kuwait. *U.S. Navy*



A Navy F-14 Tomcat flies above burning oil wells in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM. *National Archives*





**Yevgeny M. Primakov**

*Department of Defense*



**James H. Johnson Jr., shown here as a brigadier general**

*National Archives*



**William M. Keys, shown here as a lieutenant general.**

*U.S. Marine Corps*

The purpose may have been to shield Iraqi ground troops from aerial surveillance and incessant coalition bombardment. Bush accused Iraq of carrying out a scorched-earth policy and announced that he had directed General Schwarzkopf to use “all forces available including ground forces to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait.”<sup>61</sup>

## DAY ONE

An hour after midnight on 24 February, General Luck’s XVIII Airborne Corps set its war plan in motion. French Brig. Gen. Bernard Janvier’s 6th Light Armored Division, reinforced by Maj. Gen. James H. Johnson Jr.’s 82d Airborne Division, sped into Iraq and defeated enemy defenders from Iraq’s 45th Infantry Division. Continuing north, the French destroyed a company of Iraqi tanks just south of As Salman. After a delay of more than two hours due to fog, General Peay’s division launched its attack at 0727. In one of the largest helicopter-borne operations in military history, 300 of the 101st Airborne Division’s helicopters, led by AH-1 Cobras and AH-64 Apaches, ferried the division’s soldiers to their first objective, Forward Operating Base (FOB) COBRA, deep inside Iraq.<sup>62</sup> After securing COBRA and refueling, Peay’s units cleared the area of light Iraqi forces, then prepared to shift north to the Euphrates River the next day. General McCaffrey’s 24th ID also headed toward the Euphrates. Although the

division was not scheduled to commence its attack until the next day, McCaffrey received permission from General Luck to launch at 1500, fifteen hours ahead of schedule. Throughout the afternoon and night, the 24th ID moved through a blinding sandstorm and arrived at its waypoint, Phase Line LION. Everywhere XVIII Airborne Corps went, it met little resistance. McCaffrey, who was gaining a reputation as the “Third Army’s most driven and perhaps most aggressive commander,” pushed his subordinates to keep going through the night toward the Euphrates.<sup>63</sup>

Coalition forces on the far right, near the coast, also made better progress than expected. The 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, sandwiched between two Arab formations, cut through the Iraqi defenses with a textbook breaching operation. Armed with newer M1A1 tanks, the Army’s Tiger Brigade passed through Maj. Gen. William M. Keys’ 2d Marine Division to guard the exposed left flank of the entire Marine offensive. By late afternoon, the 2d Marine Division had navigated through two Iraqi mine belts and were well into Kuwait, meeting sporadic resistance as they went. The 1st Marine Division, led by Maj. Gen. James M. Myatt, also met weak resistance during the day. By 1800, the 1st Marine Division had isolated “MEF Objective A,” the now-abandoned Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, destroying several enemy tanks in the area before pushing further into Kuwait.

Although some Iraqi troops stood their ground and fought, many more, stunned and demoralized, surrendered in droves. By the day’s end, the I MEF was twenty miles inside Kuwait and had taken several thousand Iraqi prisoners. The Marines, having met their first day’s objectives, halted for the night. On the right flank, Joint Forces Command-East (JFC-E)—made up of units from Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman—advanced into Kuwait along the coastal highway, supported by naval



**General Myatt** *U.S. Marine Corps*



**John H. Tilelli Jr., shown here as a major general.** *National Archives*

gunfire. On the Marines' left, Joint Forces Command-North (JFC-N)—composed of Egyptians, Syrians, Kuwaitis, and Saudis—was not scheduled to attack until the next day and said they were unable to move up their timetable. The Marines' swift advance and JFC-N's inflexibility threatened to expose the Marines' flank to the enemy and risked drawing the *Republican Guard* divisions away from the armored VII Corps, which possessed both the mission and firepower to destroy them. Conversely, I MEF might push the whole Iraqi army out of Kuwait before the back door of the retreat could be shut.

The rapid progress on the flanks caused Schwarzkopf to move up the VII Corps' timetable by one day. Brig. Gen. John H. Tilelli Jr.'s 1st Cavalry Division, Schwarzkopf's reserve, executed a feint. Tilelli's troopers advanced up the Wadi al Batin, hitting the Iraqi 27th Infantry Division and drawing the enemy's attention away from the main effort farther west. Meanwhile, General Franks sent a massive heavy force around the Iraqi army's right flank, including 2d Armored Cavalry plus the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions.

As the U.S. armored units went around Iraqi defenses, Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Rhame's 1st ID plowed through them. The division breached the berms and minefields and made quick work of the enemy's front line without losing a single soldier.<sup>64</sup> In order to concentrate his corps

before proceeding, Franks halted his force at the end of the first day, having captured around thirteen hundred enemy prisoners. Franks' operational pauses would become a point of contention between him and Schwarzkopf.

## DAY TWO

Bad weather continued to hinder the coalition effort. On 25 February, wind and rain increased as the day wore on, reducing visibility and hampering the progress of ground forces. The British described the weather as "very dirty, indeed."<sup>65</sup> In the Marines' sector, thick smoke from burning oil darkened the sky, reduced visibility, and interfered with signals from navigational satellites. Marines began calling Kuwait the "land of darkness."<sup>66</sup> Despite bad weather and billowing smoke, the coalition pressed its attack.

As the 82d Airborne Division, firmly on the ground, followed the French division to As Salman, General Peay launched his 3d Brigade in UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to an area just south of the Euphrates River near An Nasiriyah. By evening, the 101st Airborne Division had cut Highway 8, the main road connecting Baghdad to the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. As Peay's helicopters were making the jump north, General McCaffrey was ordered to consolidate his forces to slow his relentless push toward the Euphrates.<sup>67</sup> The operational pause allowed him time to refuel and reorganize his brigades. The 24th ID was outpacing the VII Corps divisions to its east, and General Schwarzkopf was concerned that they might have to face the *Republican Guard* alone.

To counter the Marines' progress, Iraq's *III Corps* executed a two-pronged counterattack, using the smoke-engulfed Al Burqan oil field for concealment. From the north, the 7th Infantry Division hit the 2d Marine Division, while the 5th Mechanized Division assaulted the 1st Marine Division from the southwest. The 1st Marine Division beat back two efforts to overrun General Myatt's lightly defended forward headquarters, the first contest lasting an hour. Once General Walter E. Boomer's Marine forces had defeated the Iraqi counterattack, the 2d Marine Division moved north to seize a built-up area they called the "Ice Cube Tray"—named for its appearance on coalition maps—en route to Mutla Ridge, a 300-foot escarpment northwest of Kuwait



**General Rhame** *National Archives*

City. As the 1st Marine Division prepared to attack Kuwait International Airport, Schwarzkopf encouraged General Khalid bin Sultan to move his pan-Arab forces at a faster pace. The Marines, sensing victory, were asking for permission to liberate Kuwait City, a mission assigned to the Arab forces.<sup>68</sup> By the afternoon, Iraq's *III Corps* had fallen back to Kuwait City and "reported to Baghdad that the 7th, 14th, and 29th Divisions were combat ineffective."<sup>69</sup> As *III Corps* made plans for a hasty defense of Kuwait's capital, it received word that Saddam had ordered all remaining units to withdraw from Kuwait to the Basra area.<sup>70</sup>

As Schwarzkopf fumed about the VII Corps pausing for the night, Franks continued fighting Iraqi units. Once the 1st ID had secured a lodgment across the border, the British 1st Armoured Division, led by Maj. Gen. Sir Rupert A. Smith, passed through the American lines with long delays caused by traffic jams, then turned east. General Smith's mission was to defeat the 52d Armored Division and protect the VII Corps' right flank. To do this, the division fought through the crumbling defenses of the Iraqi *VII Corps* in search of the 52d Armored Division.

The VII Corps' organic armored units also made good progress on the second day of the ground war. Maj. Gen. Ronald H. Griffith's 1st Armored Division advanced seventy miles in six hours of maneuver





**A UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter delivers supplies to a base camp during Operation DESERT SHIELD.** *National Archives*

and combat, before halting to prepare for a deliberate attack on a massive Iraqi logistics stockpile. That evening and into the next morning, the 1st Armored Division destroyed the *26th Infantry Division* in the Battle of Al Busayyah. Maj. Gen. Paul E. Funk's 3d Armored Division followed the 2d Armored Cavalry and destroyed Iraqi units that the regiment had bypassed.

ID had taken up positions along Highway 8 and continued to engage Iraqi units through the night and into the next day.

As Luck's XVIII Airborne Corps secured the Euphrates valley, Boomer's Marines advanced farther into Kuwait with intermittent fighting as they went. The 2d Marine Division, with the Tiger Brigade screening

its left flank, drove north to Mutla Ridge and seized a major highway intersection, thereby blocking the escape route for Iraqi units still in Kuwait City. The 1st Marine Division veered to the northeast to attack and capture Kuwait International Airport and the capital's suburbs. General Boomer's drive was now pushing the Iraqi army out of

### DAY THREE

Having received orders to evacuate Kuwait, the Iraqi army began its mass exodus late on 25 February. Realizing that the enemy was beginning to slip through his fingers, Schwarzkopf ordered Yeosock to take McCaffrey off his leash and to push Franks to destroy the *Republican Guard*.<sup>71</sup> By noon, Schwarzkopf received reports that Moscow was calling for the UN Security Council to meet to discuss a cease-fire. Time was running out.

With the French 6th Light Armored Division and the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions protecting the coalition's western flank, General McCaffrey's 24th ID continued its assault into the Euphrates valley. During the initial engagement, the 1st Brigade, 24th ID met stiff resistance from the *26th Iraqi Commando Brigade*.<sup>72</sup> By evening, the 24th



**General Boomer** *U.S. Marine Corps*



**Ronald H. Griffith, shown here as a brigadier general.** *National Archives*




**General Funk** *National Archives*

Kuwait before the VII Corps could close the door on its retreat.

However, not all Iraqi units managed to escape. Some had remained in Kuwait to cover the retreat. On 26 February, General Franks' VII Corps hit the *Republican Guard's Tawakalna Division* as it fought a rearguard action. In one of the most celebrated engagements of the war, Col. Leonard D. Holder Jr.'s 2d Armored Cavalry, maneuvering through a blinding mix of rain and sand, destroyed two of the *Tawakalna Division's* brigades—the 18th Mechanized and the 9th Armored—in a six-hour melee. After the war, one of the *Tawakalna's* battalion commanders commented, “When the air operations started, I had 39 tanks. After 38 days of the air battle, I had 32 tanks. After 20 minutes against the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, I had zero tanks.”<sup>73</sup>

On both VII Corps flanks, coalition forces also pressed the attack. In the south, the British 1st Armoured Division fought a series of running battles against Iraq's 48th Infantry Division and 52d Armored Division. In the north around 1500, Griffith's 1st Armored Division scrapped with Iraq's 46th Brigade, 12th Armored Division, and later that night with the 29th Brigade, *Tawakalna Division*, and elements of the *Republican Guard's Medina Division*.<sup>74</sup> General Franks “ordered 1st Cavalry Division, which Schwarzkopf had just released from theater reserve, to move



rapidly into formation just behind the 1st Armored Division.”<sup>75</sup> Squeezed between the 1st Armored Division and the 1st ID, Funk's 3d Armored Division joined the 1st Armored Division's fight, then took on the *Tawakalna's* 9th Armored Brigade. In the ensuing action, Funk's division “killed” at least six enemy tanks and nine tracked vehicles, but lost two Bradley fighting vehicles to enemy fire and two to friendly fire.<sup>76</sup> Fighting in the desert in bad weather with reduced visibility proved difficult, even for the

technologically superior and better trained Americans.

### DAY FOUR

In the XVIII Airborne Corps' sector, General Peay moved his forces east. Having assumed command of the 12th Aviation Brigade, the corps' reserve, Peay ordered his 2d Brigade to jump to FOB VIPER near Jalibah Airfield. From there, AH-64 Apache helicopters launched far to the east to attack Iraqi vehicles on Highway 6, one of the last



**Leonard D. Holder Jr., shown here as a lieutenant general.**

*U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center*

remaining escape routes, running north out of Basra.

General McCaffrey split his division to fight in two directions. The 197th Infantry Brigade captured Tallil Air Base to the west, and the 24th ID's two organic brigades overran a theater logistics site and Jalibah

Airfield farther east.<sup>77</sup> After securing the air base, the 1st and 2d Brigades oriented toward the east and linked up with the 3d Armored Cavalry, which tied in with the VII Corps to the south. McCaffrey's forces now became the left (north) flank of the coalition formation and attacked east along the Highway 8 corridor, chewing up every enemy vehicle in its path.

On the coalition's east flank, General Boomer's forces, having achieved their objectives and controlling the approaches to Kuwait City, held their positions. JFC-N passed from west to east through the 2d Marine Division's lines to liberate the capital. JFC-E had broken through the Iraqi defenses the previous afternoon and had entered the city from the south. The Egyptians and Syrians of JFC-N and the Saudis of JFC-E met in the middle of Kuwait City, near the water towers.<sup>78</sup> Celebrations broke out in the capital while coalition forces in the area engaged in mopping-up operations. The Tiger Brigade spent the day clearing bunker complexes, Ali Al Salem Air Base, and the Kuwaiti Royal Summer Palace, and processing prisoners of war.<sup>79</sup>


In the VII Corps sector, the war remained far from over. Now with five heavy divisions all oriented to the east, Franks directed the full firepower of his corps on the *Republican Guard*. Under

rainy, overcast skies, Griffith's division, with three brigades moving abreast, attacked east, engaging the *Medina Armored Division's 2d Brigade*. Taking advantage of their M1A1 tanks' greater range and thermal sites, as well as close air support from AH-64 Apache helicopters and Air Force ground-attack aircraft, Griffith's division decimated the enemy's armor, which had dug in along the reverse slope of a low ridge. After two hours of intense combat, the battlefield was littered with hundreds of burning enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers.<sup>80</sup> This one-sided contest would become known as the Battle of Medina Ridge, one of the largest coalition tank battles of the war.

Further south, the 1st ID had engaged enemy units—the *Tawakalna's* southernmost brigade and a brigade of the *12th Armored Division*—through the night, picking up where the 2d Armored Cavalry had left off. General Rhame's division had driven through the enemy's rear by daylight. After refueling, the 1st ID began an exploitation that ended that night with their units astride the Kuwait City-Basra Highway: Objective DENVER. The other VII Corps divisions were also in an exploitation phase of combat. Some Iraqi units remaining in their path chose to fight. Others did not. At times, some Iraqi units



**M1A1 Abrams tanks and M998 High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles of the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 7th Corps, move across the desert in northern Kuwait during Operation DESERT STORM.** *National Archives*



Kuwait and suffered enormous losses of personnel, equipment, and territory, he could celebrate the survival of his army as a victory in much the same way the British remember the Dunkirk evacuation in World War II.

The cease-fire did not end the fighting, because coalition commanders maintained the right to defend their units. In the predawn hours of 2 March, scouts from 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 24th ID, observed a large column of tanks and support vehicles of the *Republican Guard's Hammurabi Division* redeploying north through the Rumaylah oil field toward a causeway across a marshy lake in southern Iraq. At 0800, the 2-7 Infantry scouts began taking fire from Iraqi armored vehicles and T72 tanks. In response, Col. John M. LeMoynes 1st Brigade coordinated an assault on the Iraqi formation. Cobra helicopters fired at the causeway to cut off the enemy's retreat, and Apaches and artillery pounded the convoy from above. While two mechanized battalions set up blocking positions to the west, Lt. Col. Bantz J. "John" Craddock's 4th Battalion, 64th Armor, swept around to attack the Iraqi column from the south. Although thousands of Iraqis managed to flee, many on foot, the 24th ID destroyed 185 armored vehicles, 400 trucks, and 34 artillery pieces, and took hundreds of prisoners. Many of the Iraqi vehicles that had escaped farther to the east or already had made it north of the causeway survived, because they posed no threat to friendly forces.<sup>84</sup> Saddam would use these and other intact military units to subdue violent postwar uprisings, enabling him to remain in power.

## REBUILDING AND SECURING POSTWAR KUWAIT


The Third Army's responsibilities did not end with the cease-fire. In the wake of combat operations, this headquarters assumed responsibility for three very different missions: occupy southeastern Iraq until a UN cease-fire and observer force was in place, provide emergency support to Kuwait until relieved by the Department of Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (which would happen at the end of April), and begin redeploying forces immediately.<sup>85</sup> To make Kuwait safe again, the Third Army destroyed hundreds of pieces of equipment abandoned by fleeing Iraqi units. Ordnance

continued to attack even as their comrades were surrendering.<sup>81</sup>

## END STATE

Instead of a final climactic battle, the war sputtered to an end. On 27 February, President Bush announced a cease-fire to take effect the following morning. This politically expedient decision stopped the relentless killing of enemy soldiers and allowed the Iraqi army to continue its retreat, unopposed for the most part.

Before the ground war, Schwarzkopf had emphasized to his commanders that their mission included the destruction of the *Republican Guard*.<sup>82</sup> By agreeing to the cease-fire as the Third Army was ready to administer the coup de grâce to the enemy, the CENTCOM commander ensured that this objective would go unmet.<sup>83</sup> After the war, Iraq inactivated only one *Republican Guard* division, the unfortunate *Tawakalna*, due to damage sustained in the conflict. Although Saddam Hussein was unable to hold onto



**President Bush greets troops in Saudi Arabia during his Thanksgiving visit.** *George Bush Presidential Library and Museum*

removal continued for years. The Third Army also helped the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission establish a 15-kilometer (9-mile) demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border.<sup>86</sup> The Third Army provided food, water, shelter, and medical care to displaced Iraqis and assisted with the relocation of 20,000 Iraqi civilians to a refugee camp in Saudi Arabia.<sup>87</sup>

To assure Kuwaitis of the United States' ongoing commitment to the defense of their country, CENTCOM ordered the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, to remain in Kuwait temporarily as a security force.<sup>88</sup> This brigade utilized equipment left behind after the war and relocated to Kuwait City on 12 May 1991 "to occupy assembly areas as the theater reserve, provide a continued U.S. presence in Kuwait to deter further aggression, and prepare to counterattack and destroy any Iraqi penetration of the demilitarized zone."<sup>89</sup>


### ANALYSIS

Although the war was an overwhelming tactical victory for the United States and its coalition partners, the strategic outcomes were mixed. For the U.S. Army, the victory over Iraq proved the basic soundness of its AirLand Battle doctrine, developed after the Vietnam War for conventional warfare and oriented on the European theater.<sup>90</sup> It also justified the Army's investment in new military hardware in the 1980s,

including the "big five": Abrams tanks, Apache attack helicopters, Bradley fighting vehicles, Black Hawk utility helicopters, and the Patriot missile system—although the Patriot missiles' performance left much to be desired.<sup>91</sup>

The war validated the Army's comprehensive training in maneuver warfare.

Real-world, force-on-force exercises at the National Training Center in California's Mojave Desert honed tactical skills at the brigade level and below. Computer-simulated war games of the Battle Command Training Program afforded general officers and their staffs opportunities to test their abilities





**M-109 launching stations for the MIM-104 Patriot Missile stand ready for use during Operation DESERT SHIELD.**

*National Archives*

against experienced opposition force controllers.<sup>92</sup>

DESERT STORM also established the usefulness of the post-Vietnam Total Force policy, which drove the military services to integrate their active and reserve components.<sup>93</sup> One in four U.S. military members who deployed to Southwest Asia in support of the Gulf War came from the reserve component and contributed to its successful outcome.<sup>94</sup> The proportion of reservists was

even greater for ARCENT, where “more than half of its personnel and units were assigned to the reserve component.”<sup>95</sup> And by the war’s end, a full 70 percent of theater combat service support personnel came from the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.<sup>96</sup>

However, operational command and control of the ground forces proved problematic. General Schwarzkopf made the decision not to delegate the role of land

forces commander for the same reason as General William C. Westmoreland did in Vietnam: to avoid offending the host nation by putting its ground forces under a subordinate U.S. command.<sup>97</sup> However, without an overall land component commander other than Schwarzkopf himself, coordination among the Army, Marine Corps, and Arab divisions did not function as smoothly as it could have in the Gulf War. This disjointed command-and-control



**Paul D. Wolfowitz (right), undersecretary of defense for policy, takes notes while General Colin L. Powell, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Schwarzkopf, listen to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney answer questions from the media. The men are taking part in a press conference held by U.S. and Saudi Arabian officials during Operation DESERT STORM.** *National Archives*

structure, inherent to coalition warfare, may have contributed to the failure to destroy the *Republican Guard*.<sup>98</sup>

This shortcoming did not obscure the fact that the United States and its allies accomplished the primary mission of liberating Kuwait with a surprisingly low cost in lives. The coalition lost 245 troops killed in action, including 146 Americans.<sup>99</sup> Although any loss of life is tragic, these remarkably small numbers for the scope and size of the operation fell far below the American prewar casualty estimates in the thousands and seemed to validate a new method of technologically advanced warfare.

## NO CLEAN END

One day after the fighting stopped, President Bush wrote in his diary, “It hasn’t been a clean end—there’s no battleship *Missouri* surrender.”<sup>100</sup> Despite the decisive battlefield outcome, the Gulf War neither removed Saddam Hussein from power nor eliminated his ability to threaten neighboring countries and vital U.S. interests in the region, especially ensuring the unrestricted flow of oil. Not all coalition partners shared these American goals. Nor were they part of the UN resolution that authorized the use of force against Iraq. President Bush’s decision to call a cease-fire after a hundred hours of ground combat meant that although Saddam’s forces had been badly mauled, they survived and remained a threat in the region. In hindsight, the great victory in the desert, as impressive as it was, appears incomplete. The strategic failures of Operation DESERT STORM led in 2003 to another war with Iraq—one with ongoing consequences for the United States, the Middle East, and the world.

**DR. J. TRAVIS MOGER** is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and a retired Navy Reserve officer. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and currently is preparing a monograph titled, *After the Storm: U.S. Army Operations in the Persian Gulf, 1991–2001*.



## NOTES

1. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council,” 1 Mar 1991, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2754>.

2. Robert D. McFadden, “Broadway Throngs Roar for Veterans of Gulf War,” *New York Times*, 11 June 1991; Edward Walsh and Lauren Ina, “Chicago Cheers Gulf Vets: Parade also Salutes Vietnam Soldiers,” *Washington Post*, 11 May 1991; Michael Wines, “Parade Unfurls Symbols of Patriotism in the Capital: A Display of Hardware and Veterans of a Triumph,” *New York Times*, 9 June 1991.

3. Christopher Layne, “Why the Gulf War Was Not in the National Interest,” *Atlantic Monthly* 268 (July 1991): 54–81. See also, Jeffrey Record, *Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993), pp. 15–42.

4. In a 1994 interview, former Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney explained why he believed that the U.S. military should not have continued onto Baghdad. “The Life and Career of Dick Cheney,” C-SPAN video, 42:43, 26 Jun, 1994, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?58277-1/life-career-dick-cheney>.

5. Robert A. Divine, “The Persian Gulf War Revisited: Tactical Victory, Strategic Failure,” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 129–38.

6. Alberto Bin, Richard Hill, and Archer Jones. *Desert Storm: A Forgotten War* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999).

7. Ian Shapira, “Persian Gulf War Veterans Fume As a 25th Anniversary Goes Unmarked by Pentagon,” *Washington Post*, 27 Feb 2016.

8. Pesach Malovany, *Wars of Modern Babylon: A History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2017), p. 503.

9. Juan de Onis, “Baghdad’s Troops Pull Out—2 Islands are at Issue,” *New York Times*, 5 Apr 1973.

10. For the best treatment of the Iran–Iraq War, see Pierre Razoux, *The Iran–Iraq War*, trans. Nicholas Elliott (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2015).

11. Jim Garamone, “Iraq and the Use of Chemical Weapons,” *DoD News*, 23 Jan 2003.

12. Razoux, *Iran–Iraq War*, pp. 470, 569. Razoux estimated the total Iraqi war dead at 350,000 of which 125,000 were Iraq military killed in action.

13. Phebe Marr and Ibrahim al-Marashi, *Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2017), p. 202.

14. Laurie Collier Hillstrom, *War in the Persian Gulf Almanac: From Operation Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2004), pp. 32–33.

15. Malovany, *Wars of Modern Babylon*, pp. 510–14. The four *Republican Guard* divisions that secured Kuwait’s southern border were

as follows: *Medina* (armored), *Tawakalna* (mechanized), *Baghdad* (mechanized), *Adnan* (infantry).

16. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” 2 Aug 1990, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2123>.

17. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” 5 Aug 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110704>.

18. National Security Directive 26, “U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” 2 Oct 1989, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/nsd/nsd26.pdf>.

19. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660, “The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait,” 2 Aug 1990, United Nations Security Council, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/660\(1990\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/660(1990)).

20. *Ibid.*

21. UNSCR 661, “The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait,” 6 Aug 1990, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/661\(1990\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/661(1990)).

22. Richard M. Swain, “*Lucky War*”: *Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), p. 25; John J. Yeosock, “H + 100: An Army Comes of Age in the Persian Gulf,” *Army* 42 (Oct 1991): 47–50.

23. John A. Bonin, “Unified and Joint Land Operations: Doctrine for Landpower,” *Land Warfare Papers*, no. 102 (Aug 2014): 6.

24. William G. Pagonis with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p. 89; Robert H. Scales Jr., *Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993), p. 58.

25. Pagonis and Cruikshank, *Moving Mountains*, p. 76.

26. Scales, *Certain Victory*, p. 51.

27. Rpt., “22d Support Command After Action Review Documentation,” 8 April 1991, Historians files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH).

28. Richard Stewart, ed., *American Military History*, vol. 2, *The United States Army in a Global Era 1917–2008*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 2010), p. 417.

29. Scales, *Certain Victory*, p. 93.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 89. The rest of the 101st Airborne Division closed on Saudi Arabia by 6 October;

- see James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, *So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: Research Center, United States Transportation Command and Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), p. 250.
32. Swain, "Lucky War," p. 79.
33. Bernard C. Nalty, ed., *Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force*, vol. 2 1950–1997 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), pp. 448, 450; for the Red Ball Express in Vietnam, see Joseph M. Heiser Jr., *Vietnam Studies: Logistics Support* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974), pp. 50–51.
34. The Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) included four tankers and eight cargo ships—eleven based in Diego Garcia and one in the Mediterranean—carrying U.S. Army and Air Force equipment. Eight APF ships offloaded their cargo in Saudi Arabia, 17–21 August 1990. Matthews and Holt, *So Many, So Much*, pp. 118, 269.
35. Matthews and Holt, *So Many, So Much*, p. 118.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 267–68.
37. The 82d Airborne Division's Sheridan light tank company had arrived in theater earlier but was hardly a "heavy" unit. Within ten days, nineteen of fifty-one M551 Sheridans had arrived in Saudi Arabia. Scales, *Certain Victory*, pp. 82, 86.
38. Six ships uploaded 24th ID's equipment in Savannah, Georgia; one in Wilmington, North Carolina. Matthews and Holt, *So Many, So Much*, p. 271.
39. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1994), p. 130.
40. Scales, *Certain Victory*, p. 106.
41. Nalty, *Winged Shield, Winged Sword*, p. 456.
42. Schubert and Kraus, *Whirlwind War*, p. 134.
43. For a complete Iraqi army order of battle, see Kevin M. Woods, *The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Gulf War* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008), p. 204.
44. Schubert and Kraus, *Whirlwind War*, pp. 133–36; Scales, *Certain Victory*, pp. 112–18.
45. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography* (New York: Bantam, 1992), p. 359.
46. Ann Devroy, "Bush Orders 200,000 More Troops to Gulf," *Washington Post*, 9 Nov 1990.
47. Swain, "Lucky War," p. 207.
48. Quoted in Swain, "Lucky War," p. 123. Emphasis in the original.
49. UNSCR 678, 29 Nov 1990, United Nations Security Council, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/678\(1990\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/678(1990)).
50. Nalty, *Winged Shield, Winged Sword*, p. 456.
51. Swain, "Lucky War," p. 71.
52. Scales, *Certain Victory*, pp. 157–60.
53. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1993), pp. 68–69; Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, p. 4. For friendly-fire statistics, see Richard P. Hallion, *Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), pp. 247–48. "Army-vs.-Army fire claimed 21 killed and 63 wounded, 22 percent of all Army personnel killed in action and 18 percent of all Army personnel wounded in action" (p. 247).
54. Nalty, *Winged Shield, Winged Sword*, p. 471.
55. Swain, "Lucky War," p. 241.
56. Rpt., Department of Defense (DoD), "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress," (Washington, D.C.: DoD, 1992), p. 15.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
58. Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, p. 16.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.
60. Paul W. Westermeyer, *U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991: Liberating Kuwait* (Quantico, Va.: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2014), pp. 156–57.
61. George H. W. Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Ground Action in the Persian Gulf," 23 Feb 1991, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2734>.
62. Richard W. Stewart, *War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, August 1990–March 1991* (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 2010), p. 38.
63. Swain, "Lucky War," p. 238.
64. Stewart, *War in the Persian Gulf*, p. 42.
65. Quoted in Swain, "Lucky War," p. 239.
66. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little Brown, 1995), p. 371.
67. James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 399. Compare with Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, p. 456; Swain, "Lucky War," p. 243.
68. Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, p. 460.
69. Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, p. 227. Italics added.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, pp. 461–62.
72. Jason K. Kamiya, *A History of the 24th Mechanized Division During Operation Desert Storm: "The Attack to Free Kuwait" (January through March 1991)* (Fort Stewart, Ga.: 24th Infantry Division, n.d.), p. 26.
73. Quoted in Stephen A. Bourque, *Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2002), p. 364.
74. Gregory Fontenot, *The 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2017), p. 321.
75. Scales, *Certain Victory*, p. 253.
76. Fontenot, *1st Infantry Division*, p. 322.
77. Swain, "Lucky War," p. 252.
78. Westermeyer, *U.S. Marines in the Gulf War*, p. 207.
79. Stewart, *War in the Persian Gulf*, p. 62.
80. Bourque, *Jayhawk!*, pp. 358, 369.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 370.
82. Swain, "Lucky War," p. 90; Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, p. 383.
83. Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, pp. 468–70. After the fact, Schwarzkopf recalled telling the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, mistakenly, that "the destruction of the enemy forces . . . for all intents and purposes we've accomplished that objective," p. 470.
84. Kamiya, *24th Mechanized Division*, pp. 36–37, 65–66; Scales, *Certain Victory*, pp. 312–14.
85. Swain, "Lucky War," p. 9.
86. "The DMZ, which is about 200 kilometres (125 miles) long, extends 10 kilometres (6 miles) into Iraq and 5 kilometres (3 miles) into Kuwait. Except for the oilfields and two towns—Umm Qasr, which became Iraq's only outlet to the sea, and Safwan—the zone is barren and almost uninhabited." United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, "Background," 2003, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unikom/background.html>.
87. Yeosock, "H + 100," p. 58.
88. "[Secretary of Defense Richard B.] Cheney emphasized that the United States had no intention of permanently stationing ground forces in the Persian Gulf and that the deployment from Europe simply met a temporary need to provide security while the government of Kuwait reconstituted its own forces." Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *Ruck It Up! The Post-Cold War Transformation of V Corps, 1990–2001* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2006), p. 174.



89. Kirkpatrick, "Ruck it up!," p. 172.
90. Bourque, *Jayhawk!*, p. 460; Scales, *Certain Victory*, pp. 25–27. "The ground offensive was planned and conducted in accordance with the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine"; see Swain, "Lucky War," p. 72. For the original AirLand Battle doctrine, see U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, FM 100–5, 1982 ed. (Washington, D.C., 1982).
91. Gordon and Trainor, *The Generals' War*, p. 239. Compare with Rpt, DoD, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Appendix T, "Performance of Selected Weapon Systems," pp. 151–54.
92. Scales, *Certain Victory*, pp. 20–23.
93. "By the late eighties, the Total Force Policy had been so firmly embedded in the Army's structure that 52 percent of combat forces and 67 percent of other forces were Guard or Reserve." Scales, *Certain Victory*, p.18.
94. Forrest L. Marion and Jon T. Hoffman, *Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), p. 69.
95. Yeosock, "H + 100," p. 46.
96. Scales, *Certain Victory*, p. 378.
97. Bonin, "Unified and Joint Land Operations," p. 6; Swain, "Lucky War," p. 330. Bonin also mentioned Schwarzkopf's desire to avoid offending the U.S. Marine Corps by placing Marine forces under an Army land forces commander. "In addition, the Marines opposed the concept of a JFLCC [Joint Force Land Component Commander] as they did not want to be dismembered by the two functional components: joint force air component commander (JFACC) and JFLCC." See Bonin, "Unified and Joint Land Operations," p. 7.
98. Mark H. Stroman, "The Gulf War: Operational Leadership and the Failure to Destroy the Republican Guard," (Master's thesis, Naval War College, 2001), p. 4; Bonin, "Unified and Joint Land Operations," p. 6; Bourque, *Jayhawk!*, p. 458.
99. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank D. Sobchak, eds., *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War: vol.1, Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War, 2003–2006* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019), p. 1. In contrast, Iraq lost between 25,000 and 50,000 Iraqi soldiers killed and 80,000 captured. See Bourque, *Jayhawk!*, p. 455. Numbers of enemy prisoners vary widely. CMH publication *The Whirlwind War* estimates the total at 60,000; Schubert and Kraus, *Whirlwind War*, p. 201.
100. Quoted in George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), p. 487.

## ARMY HISTORY

# CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

**A** *Army History* welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 4,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, which should be embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. A manuscript, preferably in Microsoft Word format, should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at [usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil).

*Army History* encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take, or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable *Army History* to obtain permission to reproduce the images, if necessary.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images on readable electronic media (DVD, CD, USB flash drive) by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Collins Hall, Bldg. 35, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.

# NMUSA FEATURE



The Golden Knights parachuted onto the Museum campus with an American flag and the ceremonial sword.

## NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM OPENS WITH INSPIRING CEREMONY AND STELLAR REVIEWS

In a year of unexpected challenges, the National Museum of the United States Army finally completed finishing work on its exhibits and formally opened its doors on Veterans Day, 11 November 2020, with a virtual opening ceremony.

The National Army Museum, a joint effort between the Army and the Army Historical Foundation, is the first and only museum to tell the full history of the U.S. Army in its entirety. It provides a comprehensive portrayal of Army history and traditions through the eyes of the American soldier. Anchored by a 185,500-square-foot building, the Museum consists of 11 galleries displaying nearly 1,390 artifacts. Construction began on the Museum in 2017 at its dedicated site near Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Although pandemic safety restrictions required a virtual ceremony, top Army leadership came together on Veterans Day to laud the Museum's mission and Army history. "The Army's history is America's history," said Army Chief of Staff General James C. McConville. "The Army has been here since before the birth of our nation. . . . The Army museum has done an incredible job of bringing to life the inspirational stories of service and sacrifice of American soldiers."<sup>1</sup>

The opening ceremony was also a reflection of the Museum's mission to commemorate and educate. "We cannot truly appreciate the sacrifice of our soldiers in the Continental Army to today or comprehend what they went through unless we see the weapons they use, feel the uniforms they wore, hear the stories they told, or read the letters they wrote," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley said. "But we can come here and we can see the relics and hear the stories through the eyes and the voices of the individual soldiers who endured so much for the cause of freedom and their unrelenting devotion."<sup>2</sup>

The Museum's opening also brought a flood of positive reviews and press coverage. *Washington Post* art and architecture critic Philip Kennicott wrote, "The Army and the Army Historical Foundation have devoted substantial resources to create a museum that now ranks among the major public-history institutions in and near the nation's capital."<sup>3</sup> Mark Yost of the *Wall Street Journal* noted, "Until recently, there have been two pre-eminent military museums in the United States, the National World War II Museum in New Orleans and the National Museum of the Pacific War, a hidden gem in Fredericksburg, Texas. Now there is a third: the National Museum of the United States Army."<sup>4</sup>

The Museum has implemented enhanced health and safety protocols to ensure the public can visit confidently. In order to maintain social distancing requirements and manage capacity, visitors must reserve free, timed tickets in advance of their arrival. More information on visiting the Museum is available at [theNMUSA.org](https://www.nmusa.org).

### NOTES

1. "National Army Museum Opening Ceremony," Fort Belvoir, Va., 11 Nov. 2020, Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, <https://www.dvidshub.net/video/772509/national-army-museum-opening-ceremony>.

2. Ibid.

3. Philip Kennicott, "Trump Has Tried to Coopt the Army. This New Museum Shows Why That Won't Be Easy," *Washington Post*, 12 Nov. 2020, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/national-army-museum-opens-fort-belvoir/2020/11/11/ed07ea06-2442-11eb-952e-0c475972cfc0\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/national-army-museum-opens-fort-belvoir/2020/11/11/ed07ea06-2442-11eb-952e-0c475972cfc0_story.html).

4. Mark Yost, "A Five-Star Museum Joins the Ranks," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 Nov. 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-five-star-museum-joins-the-ranks-11604750400>.



The National Army Museum opening ceremony stage, set up in the Museum's lobby in front of the Soldiers' Stories gallery. The Campaign Wall is to the right and the ceiling is decorated with glass tiles of campaign ribbons.



Museum Director Tammy E. Call cuts the ribbon with a ceremonial sword.



Old Guard Soldiers in period uniforms stand in front of the Campaign Wall.



Museum Opening Ceremony. *Left to Right:* Army Chief of Staff General James C. McConville, Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher C. Miller, Sergeant Major of the Army Michael A. Grinston, Secretary of the Army Ryan D. McCarthy, Museum Director Tammy E. Call, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley

# U.S. ARMY ART SPOTLIGHT

## BATAAN DEATH MARCH CARVINGS

BY SARAH G. FORGEY

Six carved wooden figural groups portraying participants in the Bataan Death March are among the most raw and emotional works in the Army Art Collection. Each figural group was carved from a single piece of wood, believed to be Pacific wood collected by the artist. The carvings are carved in a primitive, roughly hewn style, showing the marks of the carving tools.

The creator of these carvings was Pfc. Clayton M. Rollins, an 18-year-old American soldier who had been captured during the Battle of Corregidor in the Philippines and imprisoned in a concentration camp in Mariveles, Bataan. In April 1942, Rollins was one of the prisoners forcibly transferred eighty-five miles under harsh conditions and with little food, known as the Bataan Death March. During the march, Rollins escaped from his captors and joined a group of Filipino guerrilla fighters near Manila. After the war, Rollins remained in the Army for twenty-seven years, also serving in Korea and Vietnam.

The six sculptures are coarsely carved figural groups depicting prisoners during the Bataan Death March. Some of the figures stumble or slump, reaching out their hands to catch themselves. Some support others or carry them along. The figures are anonymous, carved without facial features and with few details to distinguish one from another. Their body language indicates exhaustion, but most of their faces are lifted upward as if inspired to continue and assist their companions. Although the Army has never had the wood tested to determine if it is indeed Pacific wood, it is likely that the artist created them shortly after the march, while he was still in the Philippines.

Two of the six figural groups are currently on display in “The Art of Soldiering,” located in the second-floor temporary exhibit gallery in the National Museum of the United States Army. The remaining four carvings are preserved at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.



SARAH G. FORGEY is the chief art curator of the Army Museum Enterprise.





# TOUCHING HISTORY

## MATERIAL CULTURE AT WEST POINT



BY GAIL E. YOSHITANI, EDWIN C. DEN HARDER, RICHARD S. LOVERING,  
KEVIN S. MALMQUIST, JUSTINE M. MEBERG, AND JARED D. WIGTON

Cadets in Maj. Justine M. Meberg's *History of the United States* class gathered around as she held up a strange wooden cylinder with brass caps on each end and a small brass plaque in its center. She explained that they would use the cylinder to begin their lesson on the Mexican War, and that she would tell them three stories about the object. These tales would launch the class into a discussion about the war and its consequences. Before she began, cadets had an opportunity to interact with the object—a portion of the flagstaff that General Winfield Scott's army had captured after storming Chapultepec, a fortification on the outer edge of Mexico City. They touched the weathered wood and the polished brass, and they noted the plaque that described how the brass ends came from captured Mexican muskets that the Americans had melted down.

Then, the stories began. First, Major Meberg told cadets how American units had won the fight for Chapultepec and how Scott claimed the flagstaff as a

war trophy. He then donated it to West Point, commemorating the military contributions of academy graduates and marking the Mexican War's place in American military memory. Next, she described how Mexico also considered this battle to be an important site. According to legend, several young Mexican cadets refused to evacuate from the *colegio militar* (military academy) located in Chapultepec and instead fought the American advance. One of the students, Juan Escutia, was said to have taken the Mexican flag down from the flagstaff, wrapped it around his body, and leaped to his death rather than allow it to fall into enemy hands. The story of the *Niños Héroes*—the “Young Heroes” who fought to the death rather than surrender—helped Mexico to remember the battle and marked the moment when the Mexican military academy became the Heroico Colegio Militar in honor of the cadets' bravery.

Finally, the students heard how raising the American flag on Chapultepec's flagstaff

was the signal Col. William S. Harney had been waiting for. When he saw it, he gave the order to hang thirty men, members of the *Batallón de San Patricio* (St. Patrick's Battalion)—named for its Irish contingent—who had deserted the U.S. Army to fight for Mexico.<sup>1</sup> Cadets went on to discuss how the war fit into national memory in both the United States and Mexico and how nativism influenced a Regular Army where most of the enlisted men were immigrants. They also tackled the paradox of how victories in Mexico increased American nationalism in many ways but also contributed to the disunity that ended in the Civil War. The role of the flagstaff in this history class demonstrates the effectiveness of material culture as a pedagogical tool—and also shows the evolution of the West Point Material Culture Team.

Material culture is “the study through artifacts of the beliefs—values, ideas, attitudes, and assumptions—of a particular community or society at a given time.”<sup>2</sup>



**An aerial view of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point** *Army Times*




**The West Point Museum** *U.S. Military Academy*

It is both a method of historical inquiry and a pedagogical approach. Historians are accustomed to connecting with primary sources in archives, but students and teachers sometimes struggle to bring history off the page. The Department of History at West Point initiated a material culture program in 2018 to deepen cadet education. The program began by bringing objects from the West Point Museum collection into the classroom. Material culture professionals engage the cadets' senses in learning history, thereby creating unique, powerful, and unexpected connections in their education. Putting students into direct contact with a bugle, or a coat, or a saber encourages them to hear, see, and touch history. These interactions help students to approach history with a curious and open mind. History courses that use material culture weave historical narratives and objects into opportunities for cadets to learn history more effectively. By bringing material culture into the



**Justine M. Meberg, shown here as a captain, holds a portion of Chapultepec's flagstaff.** *U.S. Military Academy*



**The brass plaque on Chapultepec's flagstaff** *U.S. Military Academy*

classroom, we can encourage students to critically examine their assumptions, confront their biases, and experience history anew.

The West Point Material Culture Team uses these concepts to create material culture studies specific to the military academy. Material culture, in a broad sense, allows a teacher to make fresh connections between the students and the course content. However, we have applied the academy's focus on developing leaders of character to create a unique version of material culture driven by empathetic leadership. Using material culture in a West Point classroom reveals cadets' assumptions and cultural perspectives and helps them comprehend different systems of belief. This practice helps cadets to learn how they each attach meaning to objects in personal ways and also provides a forum to discuss these differences.

Although the Department of History at West Point has a long tradition of bringing historic weapons to class to support instruction in the military arts, it recently expanded the understanding of material culture as a mode of scholarly investigation. Our Material Culture Team consists of scholars from both the history department and the West Point Museum. They collaborate to help faculty and students gain a deeper appreciation of the value that historical objects can offer to our instruction. We are not alone in using material culture for student education, but we do believe that our focus on helping cadets gain critical competencies for building inclusive teams is unique.<sup>3</sup>

Our department's use of material culture would not be possible without the world-class support of the West Point Museum. The team of curators led by David M. Reel goes above and beyond to accomplish this mission. They regularly transport unique, compelling, and often fragile objects to our classrooms for interactive instruction. Curators are regular guests in our classes, providing expert knowledge of art, uniforms, weapons, and more. Building on West Point's special traditions, history of service, and modern mission, we will offer a brief survey of what this innovative concept looks like in practice. The authors have contributed to a discussion of material culture at West Point and they outline exciting aspects of their approach to this unique discipline, which include West Point's strong emphasis on engaging with the material world, the mechanics of partnering with the West Point Museum,





**John Richard Coke Smyth, *Indians Bartering*, lithograph** U.S. Military Academy

and the ways in which the program will grow in the coming years.

### A TRADITION OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE MATERIAL WORLD

In 1842, all cadets at West Point were required to take a drawing course under the supervision of the famed painter of the Hudson River School, Robert Walter Weir. Weir, whose *Embarkation of the Pilgrims* hangs today in the U.S. Capitol Rotunda, included in his course the task of mechanically reproducing works of other artists. In the days before photography and video, the skill of accurately

reproducing images and landscapes by drawing them was considered essential for the battlefield. This training was especially desirable for the many engineer officers the antebellum military academy produced.

As a cadet enrolled in Weir's drawing class, Ulysses S. Grant was given the assignment of reproducing a lithograph of John Richard Coke Smyth, titled "Indians Bartering," from a collection published in Smyth's 1839 book, *Sketches in the Canadas*.<sup>4</sup> Grant painstakingly reproduced the lithograph, capturing the details of the original work with great accuracy. Yet Grant's copy holds a vibrancy absent in Smyth's version.

**Ulysses S. Grant's reproduction of *Indians Bartering*** U.S. Military Academy



For example, the blanket offered by the trader takes on a striking blue and white color in Grant's version, compared to the original tan. The mother's hair falls more naturally around her face, while the man sits with a slightly more straight and dignified posture. Even the furs of the dog and the pelts appear warmer and more textured in Grant's reproduction.

A cadet's grade in mechanical drawing depended on their faithfulness to reproduction, not on their creative expression, and Grant received a middling grade in the class, being ranked nineteen out of forty by Weir at the end of the year.<sup>5</sup> What is clear, however, is that Grant was engaging his senses in the "cultural empathy" that Jules D. Prown argues is the heart of material culture studies. He spent long hours staring at the details of "Indians Bartering," painstakingly replicating a scene that is an idealized encounter of two cultures. Grant would of course go on to be one of the most important graduates West Point ever produced, both as a Civil War general and as president of the United States. As president, Grant would make critical decisions on Native American policy.

In hindsight, his drawing echoes the idealized vision with which Grant approached Native American policy. Using this drawing in a West Point classroom today offers opportunities to contrast the peaceful intent in Grant's depiction with the realities of the reservation system he supported and the wars he approved to keep Indians on them. An instructor might also use the drawing to explore the complex attitude of Army officers toward frontier service and fighting in the Indian Wars. Our process of cultural empathy would then echo Grant's encounter with material culture, when he closely interacted with the lithograph of "Indians Bartering." This is an important point in understanding the heart of material culture studies at West Point. The scholars training cadets in this discipline are not creating something new, but building on part of West Point's 200-year history. Grant's lithograph, an assignment that reflected his era's instructional focus on recitation and reproduction, can be used today to challenge students, explore multiple perspectives, and engage in discussion.

### PARTNERING WITH THE WEST POINT MUSEUM

The Department of History at West Point has a long-standing relationship with the West Point Museum—a collaboration that has

yielded strong dividends over the years. This relationship was enhanced with the creation of the Material Culture Team in late 2018. The team is responsible for coordination between the Department and the Museum and makes the necessary arrangements to transport objects from the Museum's collection to the classroom. Instructors work with members of the Material Culture Team to search the collection and request items that they feel would be most effective for their lesson objectives. Depending on the item, or an instructor's request, a curator will accompany the object to ensure proper handling and provide additional information regarding the object. This collaboration between the Museum and the Department enables instructors to bring history to life in the classroom. A few examples demonstrate the richness of this educational innovation.

The traditional use of material objects in the West Point classroom has been in military history instruction. Here, the objects stimulate the senses and help instructors craft their lessons to convey a sense of the battlefields past. For example, cadets enrolled in the *History of the Military Art from 1904 to 2013* have often struggled to move beyond simplistic understandings of trench warfare during lessons on World War I. Instructor Maj. Edwin C. den Harder overcame this difficulty by bringing a German Maschinengewehr 08 (MG08) machine gun to class. The MG08 illustrates the machine guns used by the various powers at war in 1914. When brought into the classroom, cadets are not just shown the weapon. They can handle it and the sled it rested on and experience the significant weight of both. As cadets compare this cumbersome weapon to the modern machine guns they have carried during their training, they quickly realize the constraints this weight imposed upon a soldier's mobility. This realization fosters a discussion of the tactical and operational problems posed by trench warfare and how neither side could break the deadlock on the Western Front until 1918.

Material culture can also go beyond weapons. In *The Army of the Republic: Leading Citizen Soldiers*, Major Meberg helps cadets imagine being a Revolutionary War soldier by examining their clothing. A central issue of revolutionary historiography is the role of the militia in helping the United States achieve victory. To facilitate this, Major Meberg brings in two mannequins from the museum dressed in reproduction uniforms. One mannequin wears a typical Conti-



**Cadets discuss early styles of uniforms** U.S. Military Academy

mental Army uniform and the other wears a hunting shirt and other items common to a militiaman. The two mannequins stand at opposites ends of the classroom with a line drawn on the chalkboard between them, with "Regulars" and "Militia" marking the ends. Written underneath the line is the question, "who won the revolution?" Major Meberg introduces the lesson with a brief clip from the musical *Hamilton*, "The World Turned Upside Down (Yorktown)." The video features the same kind of buff and blue coat in the classroom, creating an immediate sensory connection to the lesson.

She then draws the cadets' attention back to the uniforms and juxtaposes the wool of the Continental coat with the linen of the hunting shirt. Major Meberg argues that these two objects serve as a tactile metaphor for the regular and militia understandings of why the United States won the war. The regulars claimed it was because they formed solid battle lines, holding firm like the thick wool coat. The militia claimed it was because they executed raids and harassment actions with agility, moving lightly like the linen hunting shirt.<sup>6</sup> The coat and hunting shirt allow cadets to use their senses and build a connection to the past.

Cadets have time to interact with the uniforms, consider the wool and linen metaphor, and initial their position on the chalk spectrum. Next, they discuss a variety of opinions. Who thinks the militia won, why, and drawing on what evidence? Who thinks the regulars won? Some cadets change their position on the chalk line as

the discussion progresses. As this question becomes more fully explored, Major Meberg complicates the simple binary of regular/militia traditions by introducing the role of privateers. The discussion ranges from there into a survey of the major civil-military episodes of the Revolutionary era, including the Newburgh Conspiracy, Washington's Newburgh Address, and controversy over organizations like the Society of the Cincinnati. The discussion pushes even further into the major themes of the early Republic. Major Meberg contends that the regular/militia dilemma foreshadows the larger debate of Federalists and Republicans. She lays the groundwork for the next lesson when cadets will be asked to unravel the seeming paradox of why the archetypal Republican president, Thomas Jefferson, founded the seemingly Federalist United States Military Academy.

The regular/militia distinction also allows for a nuanced understanding of the required reading for the lesson: James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender's *"A Respectable Army": The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789* (Malden, Mass., 2015). The authors underscore the fundamental irony that the least republican institution won the independence of the American republic.<sup>7</sup> The regular uniform's obvious similarities to British uniforms make this apparent and help cadets grasp and evaluate the arguments of both the authors and the instructor. The students glean all of this from a few, relatively

simple objects hanging on mannequins in the corners of Major Meberg's classroom. Watching cadets engage in such immediate and high-level discussion, only weeks into their plebe (first) year, demonstrates our belief that material culture is a groundbreaking pedagogical tool.

## GAINING MOMENTUM

The discipline of material culture is already having a tremendous impact on how history is taught at West Point. We are most excited, however, about what lies ahead. The Department of History is overseeing multiple initiatives that will bear fruit over the next several years. These include fostering cadet research using material culture as primary sources, the evolution and expansion of material culture lesson packages for every core history course, the growth of an online repository of material culture knowledge, and the integration of material culture resources from outside organizations.

Over the past year, our team has met with leading scholars of material culture to learn more about the discipline. These meetings have made clear that West Point is in a unique position to bring this discipline to the undergraduate level. The Material Culture Team has begun sponsoring various cadet projects that use material culture as a methodology. For example, Maj. Jared D. Wigton has each cadet enrolled in his *History of the Military Art from 1904 to 2013* class give a presentation on an object of their choosing over the semester. The only stipulation is that the object must help explain the course reading of the day. The objects chosen by cadets have been as creative as they have been effective in fostering learning for their class.

During a lesson on World War I, Cadet Scott T. Donnellon played a French antiwar song, "La Chanson de Craonne," for his class. This song followed the French mutinies of 1917 and conveys the disillusionment that years on the front lines had created among the rank and file. Cadet Donnellon used this recording to explain not only why French soldiers on the Western Front refused to go "over the top" during the failed Nivelle Offensive, but also why the French memory of the 1917 mutinies remained controversial for decades after the war. With a single piece, Cadet Donnellon opened a whole national culture to his peers. This is just one instance that demonstrates how adeptly cadets

latch onto the idea of material culture and employ it in their studies.

The Material Culture Team is working with the West Point Museum and course directors to develop packages for the core history course the Department offers. In previous years, only *The History of the Military Art* had prebuilt packages each semester. These packages facilitated knowledge among the "Mil Art" teaching team. Junior instructors unfamiliar with a weapon or other artifact could watch senior faculty use the item, then employ the object in their class. By developing packages for core courses in American and International History, the Material Culture Team meets a broader demand from instructors to foster the same collaboration centered around objects. We have expanded our portfolio of typical items to include artwork, posters, maps, flags, clothing, uniforms, cooking and eating utensils, everyday items, and other pieces from the West Point Museum's 27,000-item collection. These have enabled cadets in all core history courses to establish a sensory connection with the past.

Sustaining this excitement among instructors and cadets is a challenging task for the Material Culture Team, especially with the high level of turnover among junior instructors who return to the operational Army after two to three years at West Point. To continue the momentum of this initiative, the team is constructing an online repository of material culture knowledge. This repository will allow instructors to access not only the history of the items they use, but also the ways in which previous instructors have used them to support lesson objectives.

The website will also provide an opportunity for faculty to publish brief articles that will contribute to the broader conversation in higher education of how to implement material culture in the classroom.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, the Material Culture Team is developing partnerships with organizations across West Point to expand the types of material culture available to instructors. Notably, the West Point Band is taking on a growing role in the history classroom. Members of the band provided a brief concert for cadets enrolled in Maj. Benjamin R. Flores' *History of Modern America* course. This concert covered major periods in American music, allowing cadets to hear the evolution of sound from the Jazz Age to the Rock Age. Maj. Alexander M. Humes asked band members to play the music used to direct troop movements on the Civil War battlefield for his sections of *Civil War America*. The music conveyed to the cadets how difficult command and control could be when a unit was under fire.

## DISTINCTIVE MATERIAL CULTURE

Prown writes that "by undertaking cultural interpretation through artifacts, we can engage the other culture in the first instance not with our minds, the seat of our cultural biases, but with our senses." He continues, "the fact is that cultural perspective is only a problem or liability to the extent that one is unaware or unable to adjust for it."<sup>9</sup> By making cadets' cultural perspective visible to them, material culture effectively aids the development

**Cadets interact with weapons from the West Point Museum.** U.S. Military Academy



of greater self-awareness and humility. Both these qualities are essential for becoming empathetic leaders. As faculty members in the Department of History at West Point, we believe that our discipline, and the courses we teach, play a critical role in helping cadets gain the empathy, respect, and humility necessary to forge inclusive teams in a multicultural Army. We approach diversity and inclusion from a variety of avenues, one of which is our use of material culture. The West Point Material Culture Team believes that the introduction of artifacts to cadet instruction develops leaders of character who can process and understand a complex past, and thus better negotiate a complex future as Army officers.

The most surprising aspect of developing material culture for use at West Point has been our rediscovery of West Point itself. Material culture has helped us understand why our storied institution holds such a unique place in the American psyche. From Trophy Point to the Long Gray Line, and from Kościuszko's Statue to the Cadet Mess Hall, West Point is an enduring place in the collective historical imagination of our nation. Through its distinctive material culture and its history of providing educated leaders of character to the Army in peace and war, we hope that our program can offer support and encouragement to other institutions for developing leaders of character.



**COL. GAIL YOSHITANI** is a professor and the head of the Department of History at the United States Military Academy.

**MAJ. EDWIN DEN HARDER** is a military history instructor at West Point and is a Ph.D. candidate at the Ohio State University.

**MAJ. RICHARD LOVERING** was most recently a military history instructor at West Point. He has a master's in history from the University of Southern Mississippi.

**MAJ. KEVIN MALMQUIST** is a military history instructor at West Point and a Ph.D. candidate at Florida State University.

**MAJ. JUSTINE MEBERG** is an American history instructor at West Point and a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University.

**MAJ. JARED WIGTON** is a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and a Ph.D. candidate at Princeton University.

## NOTES

1. George Rollie Adams, *General William S. Harney: Prince of Dragoons* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pp. 102–03.

2. Jules David Prown, "Mind in Matter: An Introduction to Material Culture Theory and Method," *Winterthur Portfolio* 17, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 1.

3. At Bard College, Ivan Gaskell's *Focus Project—Gallery as Classroom* "aims to produce faculty and students who are adept in both museum and academic modes of scholarly investigation"; see the project website at <https://www.bgc.bard.edu/research-forum/projects/5/focus-project-gallery-as-classroom>. At Harvard, Laurel Thatcher Ulrich's *Tangible Things: Making History through Objects* explores how "the mobilization of material

things can enhance any comprehensive historical inquiry"; see Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, Ivan Gaskell, Sara J. Schechner, Sarah Anne Carter, and Samantha S. B. van Gerbig, *Tangible Things: Making History through Objects* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 3.

4. See "Cadet Fine Arts Forum of the United States Corps of Cadets," in *Robert Weir, Artist and Teacher of West Point* (West Point, N.Y.: Cadet Fine Arts Forum of the United States Corps of Cadets, 1976), p. 20. See also Richard Coke Smyth, *Sketches in the Canadas* (London: T. McLean, 1839). Many thanks to Marlana Cook, the Curator of Art at the West Point Museum, for her assistance in tracking down the history of this painting and giving insight into the practice of art at West Point in the nineteenth century.

5. *Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New-York, June 1842* (New York: J. P. Wright, 1842), p. 9.

6. Samuel J. Watson, "The U.S. Army to 1900," in *A Companion to American Military History*, ed. James C. Bradford, vol. 1 (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 339.


7. James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, "A Respectable Army": *The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789*, 3d ed., American History Series (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), pp. xi–xii.

8. Material Culture Studies at West Point, United States Military Academy: West Point, n.d., <https://www.westpoint.edu/academics/academic-departments/history/material-culture>.

9. Prown, "Mind in Matter," p. 5.



# BOOK REVIEWS



## MILITARY REALISM: THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF FORCE AND INNOVATION IN THE U.S. ARMY

BY PETER CAMPBELL

University of Missouri Press, 2019  
Pp. xvi, 374. \$50

REVIEW BY JEB S. GRAYDON

In his book *Military Realism: The Logic and Limits of Force and Innovation in the U.S. Army*, Peter Campbell offers a new perspective on doctrinal change from Vietnam to the Global War on Terrorism. Campbell's initial motivation for research was to determine how the U.S. Army came to embrace counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine once again in recent years after sharply rejecting such doctrine following Vietnam. To answer this, Campbell presents his "theory of military realism," arguing senior military officers exercise significant caution when applying force because they use a "military realist mind-set" involving the scaled use of force and an understanding of the friction limiting its use (p. 4). Campbell's theory recognizes that although civilian officials impose their authority to influence doctrinal changes from time to time, senior

military officers remain the driving force behind doctrinal development. Campbell's historical examples show that those officers often began implementing doctrinal changes before any civilian intervention occurred. Additionally, his theory asserts senior military officers will adopt doctrinal changes that are contrary to bureaucratic interests if it will result in gaining an advantage over the most significant threat. Lastly, Campbell asserts the military realist mindset—inculcated in top military commanders throughout the course of their careers—influences those officers to develop doctrine that is less aggressive than it would be otherwise.

The book analyzes U.S. Army doctrine from 1960 to 2008 using five case studies to provide a detailed defense of the author's premise against competing theories. Throughout each study, Campbell follows three dichotomies found in doctrine: traditional versus nuclear forces; offensive versus defensive strategies; and COIN versus conventional tactics. In doing so, Campbell provides valuable context showing the continuity of ideas over time.

Campbell, a political science professor at Baylor University, boldly asserts that many popular ideas about doctrinal development over the past sixty years are wrong largely owing to a failure to analyze the broader picture. For example, Campbell disrupts the common view that President John F. Kennedy was the driving force behind the adoption of COIN doctrine in 1962. Campbell asserts that Kennedy's emphasis on COIN came several years after top Army leaders began attempting to correct the shortfalls of the pentomic division structure and the doctrine of the mid-1950s.

Similarly, Campbell disputes the notion General William C. Westmoreland foolishly tried to fight an insurgency using conventional means in Vietnam. Rather, Campbell shows Westmoreland was well aware of COIN methods but chose conventional tactics because the greatest threat he faced came from conventional forces. Additionally, the dominant threat during this period

remained the Soviet Union, which meant COIN remained largely absent from Army doctrine.

In his post-Vietnam case study, Campbell argues the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s was not a rejection of the COIN doctrine of Vietnam. Rather, the author asserts the Army remained focused on the greater threat posed by the Soviets throughout the Vietnam War, thus the elimination of COIN in the 1976 edition of FM (Field Manual) 100-5, *Operations*, was not as drastic a shift as is commonly argued. Overall Campbell shows there is a "high degree of doctrinal continuity between U.S. Army doctrine before, during, and after Vietnam" (p. 162).

In another challenge to the common narrative, Campbell asserts the 1991 Persian Gulf War was not "confirmation of the wisdom of AirLand Battle doctrine" which subsequently blinded Army leaders from recognizing any need for change after the war (p. 200). Rather, the author shows that General Frederick M. Franks and other Army leaders who were charged with doctrinal development after the conflict were cautious when interpreting lessons from the war. In fact, despite the overwhelming success of the doctrine used in the Gulf War, Franks recommended significant changes to doctrine while producing the 1993 version of *Operations*.

In the final case study, Campbell examines the 2008 edition of FM 3-0, *Operations*, and answers the question serving as the inspiration for the book. Namely, why did the U.S. Army embrace COIN during the Global War on Terrorism when it had sharply turned against such doctrine following the debacle in Vietnam? Many people see Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld as a strong civilian forcing changes during this period, but Campbell argues "civilian intervention did not drive the process of doctrinal change" (p. 212). Campbell maintains the Army began reconsidering COIN doctrine in the early post-Cold War era. He highlights that President George W. Bush did not publicly advocate for COIN doctrine until December

2006, the same month FM 3–24, *Counterinsurgency*, was published. Two years later, the 2008 edition of FM 3–0, *Operations*, codified this doctrinal shift by making COIN a significant feature in the new manual.


In his lengthy conclusion, Campbell provides an overview of more recent doctrinal development and reveals the implications his theory has on civil-military relations, military innovation, and national security policy. Overall, Campbell expertly reveals that a broader perspective on doctrinal development uncovers a much weaker influence by civilians than previously believed. Additionally, he shows a continuity of thought among senior military leaders who drove the process of doctrinal development throughout his period of study. He skillfully tells how senior officers used a military realist mindset to temper the urge to act on bureaucratic interests or in an overly aggressive manner.

Anyone interested in civil-military relations or political science theories of doctrinal change should certainly read this book. Most importantly, top civilian officials with influence over the military should study this book to gain a better understanding of the mentality of senior military officers. Indeed, Campbell asserts that if top civilian officials understood that senior military officers were motivated by a military realist mindset rather than narrow bureaucratic interests (as is often believed), then civil-military strife could be lessened. In the final analysis, Campbell's work is expertly researched, exhaustively defended, and an insightfully novel piece of scholarship.

---

**MAJ. JEB S. GRAYDON** is an active duty Armor officer currently assigned to Fort Hood, Texas. He holds a master's degree in history from the University of North Georgia and a master's in military art and science from the Command and General Staff College.

---



## WAR NARRATIVES: SHAPING BELIEFS, BLURRING TRUTHS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

BY CALEB S. CAGE

Texas A&M University Press, 2019  
Pp. xvi, 129. \$35

REVIEW BY NICHOLAS J. SCHLOSSER

In 2002, as the administration of President George W. Bush was planning for war with Iraq, a senior presidential adviser criticized *New York Times* reporter Ronald S. “Ron” Suskind for living in, “the reality based community.” The adviser went on to declare, “That’s not the way the world really works anymore. We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.”<sup>1</sup> The chilling assertion cuts to the heart of why chronicling the events of the Global War on Terrorism is such a challenging task for historians. Many of the accounts of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are defined by the particular narrative, or “reality,” authors, analysts, and commentators embrace. This problem is the core issue explored in Caleb S. Cage’s book, *War Narratives*.

Cage’s book examines how mutually contradictory narratives have shaped the historiography of the Global War on Terrorism. He asserts the central dilemma posed by these often antagonistic accounts is that they “have led many to simply embrace conclusions that align with their own political and cultural worldviews, instead of investigating the causes and realities of these wars more deeply” (p. 3). To make his case, Cage paints on a broad canvas and covers a wide range of topics.

These include the wars’ causes, the outbreak of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, American attempts to defeat those insurgencies, and the tension between nonfictional and fictional accounts of the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Each of Cage’s chapters considers a specific debate and then examines the individual books and authors on either side of the discourse. For example, the second chapter, “The Deciders: The War of Choice of Narrative” assesses the assertion that the Bush administration chose to go to war in Iraq, as opposed to being drawn into it. As Cage notes, this debate has wide-ranging implications, as the narrative of choice “allows those who embrace it to assign blame to the president for every aspect of the calamitous war in Iraq that followed his decision made in isolation” (p. 25). Focusing on Richard N. Haass’ *War of Necessity, War of Choice* (New York, 2009) and Douglas J. Feith’s *War and Decision*, (New York, 2008) Cage considers a number of themes and questions arising from this period of the Iraq War. These include the level to which President Bush was engaged with the decision-making process, whether the administration believed going to war with Iraq was a foregone conclusion, and the legislative branch’s diminished role in determining where and how the executive branch could use military force.

Cage adopts a similar approach through his book. A chapter on the U.S. failure to prepare for a postwar occupation of Iraq examines memoirs by those tasked with the reconstruction mission and compares it to the assessments made by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. His account of the “surge narrative” analyzes the debate between authors who contend the 2007 surge of forces was the decisive factor driving down violence in Iraq—such as Peter R. Mansoor and Kimberly E. Kagan—and those who believe other factors were more critical, the most prominent of whom are Gian P. Gentile and Douglas Porch.

Among Cage’s most effective and intriguing chapters are the ones that explore veterans’ experiences. Throughout the book, the author makes efforts to place veterans at the center of the history of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On a number of occasions, he reminds his readers that the task of actually fighting the Global War on Terrorism has been carried out by a mere fraction of the

American population. Critically, he points out, this small number all volunteered and chose to fight.

Cage's examination of veterans' narratives culminates with a chapter titled, "On Chickens--t." The author defines this term as:

The superfluous tasks that senior officers require of their underlings during wartime boredom, the trivialities of rank structures foisted on them in the name of military discipline, the infuriating injustices that seem to occur so easily when the two are matched with personal insecurities (p. 91).

Although Cage contends that "chickens--t" is a perennial master narrative that shapes and explains the veteran experience across different time periods, he also argues it needs to be updated and qualified by scholars to better explain the current conflicts. Unlike the soldiers of World War II and Vietnam, Cage notes, today's warfighters have all volunteered to serve in the military. The use of a professional force, coupled with political leaders' efforts to maintain domestic normalcy, has created a widening chasm between soldiers and civilians that has reshaped how warfighters understand their time at war. The author starkly concludes that "because they are a generation that volunteered for their service, enduring it does not make them heroes and its does not make them victims" (p. 102).

Cage convincingly argues that historians need to reconsider what veterans went through during America's recent wars. That said, his contention that "the most trustworthy perspectives from these wars have come from fiction written by both veterans of these wars and civilians," is highly problematic (p. 5). Cage demonstrates a clear preference for the accounts of veterans over those of analysts and historians. Throughout his book, the author makes a convincing argument that too many scholars have allowed their personal political biases to shape how they interpret the events of the Global War on Terrorism. However, his claim that fictional accounts of the conflict are somehow more "trustworthy" than nonfiction studies only compounds the basic problem that afflicts the literature about the entire war: scholars, journalists, novelists, and polemicists have all been so preoccupied with exploring the significance of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that they have tended to ignore or take

for granted that we know what actually happened during the conflicts.


The problem with asking whether an experience or an account is more "trustworthy" or authentic than another account is that the answer is inherently subjective and unprovable. In light of the fact that at least some of the architects of the Iraq War were convinced they could shape events to fit a preconceived reality, it is imperative for scholars to jettison questions about authenticity and embrace a more rigorous approach to chronicling the events of both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Historians of the Global War on Terrorism need to focus more attention on what can be empirically proven as fact before they begin to explore the significance and broader meanings of the conflict.

Cage's book stands as a broad and comprehensive survey of the historiography of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars as it existed at the time of publication. As his study attests, the historiography of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is a curious mixture of scholarly histories, journalistic accounts, polemics, psychological studies, and even novels. Cage is strongest when individually assessing each of these works and honing in on their salient themes and assertions. Scholars looking for a comprehensive summary of the most important scholarship on the Global War on Terrorism will be well served here. His clear prose and analysis of the existing works on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is comprehensive, enlightening, and a welcome addition to a growing historiography.

## NOTE

1. Ron Suskind, "Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush," *New York Times*, 17 Oct 2004.

**NICHOLAS J. SCHLOSSER** is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), where he is currently working on the U.S. Army's official history of the Iraq Surge Campaign of 2007–2008. His most recent publications are *The Surge, 2007–2008* (CMH, 2017)—part of the U.S. Army Campaigns in Iraq brochure series—and *Cold War on the Airwaves: The American Propaganda Campaign against East Germany* (Champaign, Ill., 2015). He received his doctorate in history from the University of Maryland in 2008.



## WINNING WESTEROS: HOW GAME OF THRONES EXPLAINS MODERN MILITARY CONFLICT

EDITED BY MAX BROOKS, JOHN AMBLE, M. L. CAVANAUGH, AND JAYM GATES

Potomac Books, 2019

Pp. xi, 282. \$29.95

REVIEW BY JAMIE L. H. GOODALL

*When you play the game of thrones, you win or you die. There is no middle ground.<sup>1</sup>*

—Cersei Lannister

Set in the fictional realm of Westeros, the *Game of Thrones* television series follows the web of complex alliances and conflicts between noble families in the Seven Kingdoms vying for control of the Iron Throne. Based on the books in George R. R. Martin's *A Song of Ice and Fire* series, the show introduces those who are laying claim to the Iron Throne and those trying to earn their independence from it. In *Winning Westeros: How Game of Thrones Explains Modern Military Conflict*, the editors Max Brooks, John Amble, M. L. Cavanaugh, and Jaym Gates bring together more than thirty of today's top military and strategic experts to examine how the series reflects modern-day strategy and real-life warfare.

According to the editors, each chapter of *Winning Westeros* is meant to be a relatable, out-of-the-box way to examine modern military conflict. The book is broken into four sections of six to nine chapters each. Part I illustrates the nature of people and

war, from the unlikely survival of Tyrion Lannister to the role of women in combat. The second part focuses on technology's role in conflict with dragons as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the influence of sea power on Westeros. Part III examines combat and war such as siege warfare in the Seven Kingdoms and the psychological weapons of war. The fourth part concludes with strategy and war from the Red Wedding to the White Walkers. With thirty chapters, the book is a modest 275 pages in length, yet packs a punch when it comes to storytelling and level of detail.

One of the highlights of Part I: People and War is Kelsey Cipolla's "From Brienne of Tarth to Lyanna Mormont: Shifting Attitudes about Women in Combat." Cipolla is a writer and editor whose work has covered everything from fashion to social issues. In her essay, Cipolla notes that there is no shortage of women who attempt to undermine misogynistic culture. From Yara Greyjoy as commander of the Iron Islands' fleet to Arya Stark as a lethal assassin, women are powerful figures in *Game of Thrones*. But, she argues, the experience of Brienne of Tarth most acutely represents the typical experience of women in combat. Brienne, being solidly built and towering over the men around her, defies the gender norms, particularly for a woman of noble birth. She attempts to occupy a traditionally male role as a member of Renly Baratheon's Kingsguard, where she is mocked, threatened, and abused for her defiance. Women in the United States who have pursued careers in the military can easily identify with Brienne, having faced "a steep uphill climb, both in society and within the military" (p. 48). Much like Brienne, who overcame gender bias to serve in the army against the White Walkers, women in the U.S. military are fighting against gender discrimination. Former Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta rescinded the direct combat exclusion role on women in January 2013, opening all combat roles to women by December 2015. More than 300,000 positions suddenly became possible for women. In 2015, Capt. Shaye L. Haver and Kristen M. Griest became the first women to graduate from U.S. Army Ranger School and Marina A. Hierl became the first woman to graduate from the U.S. Marines Corps' Infantry Officer Course.

In Part II: Technology and War, Magnus F. Nordenman looks at the most vexing problem for national security policy-

makers and military leaders: WMD. In his essay "WMD in Westeros and Beyond," Nordenman, a writer, speaker, and noted NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and maritime affairs expert, examines why WMD remain an attractive option to some despite the risks associated. According to Nordenman, *Game of Thrones* has something to teach us about "the power, uses, and risks associated with WMD, on and off the battlefield" (p. 89). Both the wildfire created by the Alchemists' Guild in King's Landing and Daenerys Targaryen's dragons fit the U.S. military's description of WMD, specifically in terms of their ability to cause widespread destruction or mass casualties. And the "contenders of Westeros think about the use of WMD in much the same way as the war waging states of World War I did, as well as the way in which current dictators, fearful of losing power to either popular uprising or by intervention from the outside, do" (p. 89).

When it comes to Part III: Combat and War, Gregory S. Drobny's brilliant piece "Shock and Chaos: Psychological Weapons of War in Westeros and Our World" addresses the following questions: How would our warriors respond to chaos? How would they react if they encountered a previously unforeseen and unknown threat on the field of battle (p. 148)? According to Drobny, the more intimately a commander understands his soldiers, the easier it is to answer these questions. He equates Daenerys Targaryen's army of the Unsullied with those soldiers of ancient Sparta or Nazi Germany. This archetype of the warrior as a stone-cold killer resonates because it speaks "to our timeless connection to war and, at an even deeper level, internal conflict" (p. 149). These soldiers are special for two key reasons: their loyalty and their sense of being set apart from the rest. Loyalty stems from an individual's heart while otherness can help soldiers form a cohesive bond necessary on the battlefield. Commanders who learn from these insights, balancing the "tightrope of discipline, loyalty, and individual creativity become true leaders," and have the ability to meet the chaos that come their way.

Finally, in Part IV: Strategy and War, Theresa Hitchens introduces us to "The Red Wedding and the Power of Norms." Hitchens, a senior research associate for the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, demonstrates how the Red Wedding is a notorious example of deadly political and

military deception. It also elucidates "how violations of norms can exact economic, political, and strategic costs" (p. 219). Norms of behavior can be implemented via "customary international law" or "soft law," but they can also be translated into "legally binding accords via international law and bilateral or multilateral treaties" (p. 220). According to Hitchens, the "long-standing normative prohibitions against deception as a means of military strategy for killing or capturing enemies remain in place today," particularly in the Geneva Conventions (p. 221). We see this violation of norms in Westeros when Lord Walder Frey massacres Robb Stark and his wife, their unborn child, and Stark's mother Lady Catelyn Stark, as well as all of Robb's loyal soldiers-at-arms. Norms are "foundational element of international relations, as well as military practices" (p. 225), so states must be wary about easily discarding said norms.


As the subtitle suggests, *Winning Westeros* is a tightly woven array of fascinating parallels between the fictional realm of Westeros and modern military conflict. Although it would have been nice to have an introduction tying each of these chapters and sections together, the epilogue does a nice job of bringing everything together in the end. The book is engaging and the essays make for a fun read by simplifying modern military conflict in a way that a general audience can appreciate. The book should prove riveting to anyone interested in the history and theory behind modern military conflict.

## NOTE

1. George R. R. Martin, *A Game of Thrones* (New York: Bantam Spectra, 1996), p. 488.

**JAMIE L. H. GOODALL** is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. She holds a Ph.D. in history from the Ohio State University with a focus on early American, military, and Atlantic world history. Her most recent publication, *Pirates of the Chesapeake Bay: From the Colonial Era to the Oyster Wars* (Mount Pleasant, S.C., 2020), examines the role of pirates and privateers in the Delmarva region.





## HUNTER LIGGETT: A SOLDIER'S GENERAL

BY MICHAEL E. SHAY

Texas A&M University Press, 2019

Pp. xvi, 204. \$40

REVIEW BY TIMOTHY A. WILLGING

For much of the twentieth century, American involvement in the First World War was largely ignored by military historians. Only in the past several decades have historians turned their attention to the United States' role in the war and how it redefined America's role on the global stage. In this first biography of Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett, Michael E. Shay, a retired jurist and author of *The Yankee Division in the First World War: In the Highest Tradition* (College Station, Tex., 2008), sheds light on one of the most consequential, if marginalized, Americans to emerge from the war.

A good biography informs the reader not only about its subject, but also about the period in which the individual lived. In many ways, Hunter Liggett's early career was not particularly remarkable. In describing this period of Liggett's life, however, Shay also provides valuable insight into a significant transitional period in the history of the U.S. Army. The Army that Liggett joined upon graduating from West Point in 1879 was essentially a frontier constabulary. Liggett served in multiple posts throughout the West, though he only saw action in one skirmish with local native tribes in 1880. Through Liggett's experiences in the West, Shay reveals

glimpses of the monotony of frontier garrison duties. As the United States moved inexorably toward great power status around the turn of the century, however, the Army found itself committed to major overseas operations for the first time and was forced to address new challenges. Although Liggett did not see combat during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars, he experienced many of the issues that plagued all American troops in those conflicts, such as hostile climates and disease. Relating Liggett's service in these conflicts to his later World War I experiences, Shay astutely observes that the most important lesson that Liggett drew from this period was how to handle citizen-soldiers and mold them into an efficient fighting force.

Shay is at his most effective in discussing Hunter Liggett's dedication to soldiering and his role in helping to inculcate a culture of professionalism within the Army. The author depicts Liggett as reflecting the Army's increasing emphasis on professionalism, largely driven by the reforms instituted by Elihu Root, Secretary of War under Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. While serving as a battalion commander at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Liggett strove to master his profession through self-study of military history. Additionally, Liggett took advantage of the opportunity to audit courses from the Army's School of the Line and Staff School. Although Liggett certainly possessed a driving ambition common among senior military officers, Shay observes that Liggett also employed his keen intellect to the good of the service. While heading the Army War College, as well as in subsequent assignments, Liggett was an advocate of the staff ride as a tool to aid the professional development of officers. That the staff ride remains an important element of professional military education today is, in large part, a testament to Liggett's efforts to enhance the Army's professionalism more than a century ago.

Shay clearly admires the leadership style displayed by Liggett. The author portrays a quiet officer who accepted the positive and negative traits of those he worked with, allowing his subordinates to adapt to their jobs while providing subtle coaching. Shay contrasts Liggett's style with the more demanding style of his American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) commander,


General John J. Pershing. Pershing "led by fear or the promise of reward," whereas Liggett was respected for his knowledge, kindness, and for exhibiting genuine concern for those under his command (p. 155). Shay's description of Liggett's talent for leadership and complete dedication to his profession makes it easy to understand why both his peers and his allies regarded him as one of the most effective AEF commanders.

Though Shay successfully fleshes out the details of Liggett's career, *A Soldier's General* is not without flaw. In the preface to this work, Shay argues that while Pershing is credited with building the AEF, "Liggett made it work" (p. xiii). It is unfortunate, therefore, that the defining moment of Liggett's career, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive and his eventual command of First Army, does not receive the detailed attention one may reasonably expect from this biography. Shay's treatment of this momentous period amounts to a mere twelve pages, with Liggett's time commanding First Army accounting for less than six pages. Although Shay observes that Liggett made some critical changes upon taking over First Army, such as increasing the amount of artillery support available to division commanders, the work is lacking in detail regarding this crucial period. Similarly, it mentions only in passing Liggett's efforts to improve coordination between artillery and infantry, measures that improved the effectiveness of First Army's assaults. Furthermore, Liggett's exhaustive and detailed planning for the resumption of the First Army's offensive on 1 November 1918, receives only sparse attention from the author. Shay effectively illustrates Liggett's preparation for high-level command, but those readers expecting an in-depth description of Liggett's role in the conclusion of World War I are likely to be disappointed.

Despite this missed opportunity, Shay deserves credit for his contribution to the historical record. This work is exceptionally well-researched and written, and it is grounded in extensive research in primary sources, including Liggett's official service record and the personal memoirs of Liggett and his contemporaries. Scholars and popular authors alike will find value in consulting Shay's bibliography at the start of their projects. Although it is not a

comprehensive biography, Shay's work is nevertheless a good first attempt at giving this prominent American commander long-overdue credit. This easily read biography will appeal to casual readers and professional historians alike, particularly those interested in officer professional development between the Civil War and World War I.

**TIMOTHY A. WILLING** served for seven years in the Regular Army as a field artillery and military intelligence officer, including two deployments in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He currently serves in the District of Columbia Army National Guard and is a DoD civilian. He earned his bachelor of arts in history from Radford University, a master of arts in diplomacy from Norwich University, and is pursuing a master of arts in military history, also from Norwich University.



## CAPTIVES OF LIBERTY: PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE POLITICS OF VENGEANCE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

BY T. COLE JONES

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019  
Pp. ix, 321. \$39.95

REVIEW BY GREGORY J. W. URWIN

Americans have long viewed the armed conflict that gave birth to the United States through rose-tinted glasses. They may concede the bloody and brutal character of several pitched battles that punctuated the War of Independence, but they overlook the eight years of vicious civil war that incited

both sides to commit heinous atrocities. A trickle of relatively obscure monographs has dared to wrestle with the dark side of the Revolutionary War, and that line of research reached a critical mass with the publication of Holger Hoock's blockbuster, *Scars of Independence: America's Violent Birth* (New York, 2017). Hoock grabbed the attention of both professional historians and general readers by emphasizing the political and military violence inherent in the War of Independence and the dehumanizing effects of the violence on both sides. He also detailed how Americans deleted the uglier aspects from the narrative of their country's founding, leaving the inspiring myth that continues to thrive in countless books and documentaries.

*Captives of Liberty: Prisoners of War and the Politics of Vengeance in the American Revolution* places its author, T. Cole Jones, an assistant professor at Purdue University, in the same intellectual camp as Hoock. Jones derived his book from a doctoral dissertation that he defended at Johns Hopkins University three years before *Scars of Independence* saw print. Although there is no doubting the independent origins of *Captives of Liberty*, Jones uncannily echoes Hoock's overriding themes and even his conclusions about history and memory.

Whereas Hoock examined the Revolutionary War in a broad sense, Jones focuses on prisoners of war (POWs) and their treatment by the opposing sides. Jones' scope is narrower, but that does not prevent him from connecting with big-picture ideas. He describes *Captives of Liberty* as a "story about the violence of war, the rules societies make to control it, and what happens when they abandon those restrictions" (p. 1). As Jones argues, the young United States ended up repudiating the Enlightenment standards extolled by the Declaration of Independence, opting to prosecute a struggle fueled by ruthless revolutionary zeal and a thirst for vengeance.

After a decade of colonial resistance to British tax policies exploded into an open uprising in April 1775, the leading colonial malcontents expected to fight a war whose excesses would be restrained by prevailing European norms. In British eyes, however, their bellicose American cousins had become rebels, undeserving of treatment as honorable combatants. Reports circulated of redcoats and Hessians refusing quarter to some of General George Washington's troops and of the confinement of captured

Continentalists in fetid jails and prison ships at New York.

Despite alleged British barbarity, Continental authorities strove to place their cause on the moral high ground by treating captives taken by their forces in a humane fashion. When Washington captured more than 800 Hessian soldiers in his celebrated surprise attack on Trenton, New Jersey, on 26 December 1776, he ordered that they be treated humanely not only for propaganda purposes, but to encourage them to desert and even join the Continental cause.

Rebel leaders also exercised a certain degree of leniency in handling Loyalists in the conflict's early stages. That changed, however, when the arrival of large British forces turned the disaffected population into a potentially dangerous counter-revolutionary threat. As Jones puts it, state governments criminalized fidelity to the British cause, subjecting Loyalists to draconian legal penalties. Throughout the war, militiamen and partisan bands summarily executed Americans captured while bearing arms for the king. Washington, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, and other Continental Army commanders deplored such merciless conduct, but there was little they could do about it. Because the Continental Congress could not impose its will on the thirteen states, what passed for the newborn republic's central government failed to establish a monopoly over the application of violence. This lack of control fostered what Jones calls the democratization of war, which permitted a variety of lower-level actors to turn the fight for liberty into a quest for vengeance. The fact that Loyalists often repaid their persecutors in the same coin accelerated the Revolutionary War's downward spiral into savagery.

Although the men who thought they were directing the Revolution strove to maintain a posture of righteousness, they succumbed to the temptation to violate the rules of war. When Maj. Gen. Horatio L. Gates accepted the surrender of Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne and nearly 6,000 enemy troops at Saratoga in October 1777, he offered the defeated a generous convention—a treaty to cease hostilities rather than an abject capitulation. Under Gates' terms, the "Convention Army" would march to Boston to await transportation back to the British Isles with the provision that its personnel would not return to North America for the remainder of the war. Realizing that the British could replace Burgoyne's lost army by simply


transferring an equivalent number of soldiers from other parts of the empire to the American theater, Congress repudiated the convention. Burgoyne returned home on parole, but his subordinates had to endure a series of grueling marches to a succession of poorly constructed and provisioned detention centers. By the war's end, the Convention Army lost 85 percent of its numbers to exposure, malnutrition, disease, and desertion.

Even after General Sir Henry Clinton captured a Rebel army at Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1780, Congress decided retaining Burgoyne's troops in captivity would benefit the Patriot cause more than liberating its own men to fight again. Because speedily exchanging POWs was the surest way to preserve their health and lives, the founders of the United States chose to deliberately sacrifice their own helpless soldiers rather than risk strengthening the British. Jones does not seem to fully appreciate the cruel irony in this situation, but it supports his general thrust. History would repeat itself eighty years later. As Charles W. Sanders Jr. demonstrates in *While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of the Civil War* (Baton Rouge, 2005), both the Union and the Confederacy would turn their POWs into pawns in a merciless game of retaliation and attrition aimed at exhausting the enemy's will and manpower resources.

*Captives of Liberty* is not one of those feel-good histories of the Revolution that fly off the shelves at American bookstores. Jones has penned a disturbing book, to be sure, but it is also an important one. Although the author exhibits an occasional tendency to posit sweeping assertions with little or no basis in fact, his conclusions rest largely on a research base impressive in both its depth and breadth. Thanks to Jones' unblinking perspective, and that of Hooch's as well, conscientious historians will find it difficult to deny that whatever constitutes American exceptionalism incorporated deplorable elements from the very beginning.

---

**GREGORY J. W. URWIN**, a professor of history at Temple University and a former president of the Society for Military History, has published on Civil War racial atrocities and Japanese-held POWs in World War II. He is currently writing a book titled *Victory in Defeat: The British Invasions of Virginia, 1781*.



## A REPUBLIC IN THE RANKS: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

BY ZACHERY A. FRY

University of North Carolina Press, 2020  
Pp. xiii, 319. \$45

REVIEW BY CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

In a truly impressive debut effort, Zachery A. Fry adds to the growing corpus of studies of American Civil War junior and field grade officers. This burgeoning subfield of Civil War history is a necessary corrective to the traditional general officer–centric lens used by historians to analyze the war. Fry, a professor of military history with the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, joins Andrew S. Bledsoe, Lesley J. Gordon, Susannah J. Ural, Jonathan W. White, and a number of other Civil War historians who give voice to the rank and file of Civil War armies, and in doing so enrich our understanding of these people as human beings, Americans, and soldiers.

The particular focus of *A Republic in the Ranks* is the political activity of line officers in the Army of the Potomac, the Union's primary field army in the war's Eastern Theater. Fry argues the war experience was a "political education" for all soldiers, and the army's junior officer corps—here defined as lieutenants, captains, majors, and colonels—imbued the Army of the Potomac with a pro-Republican political outlook that contributed directly to Abraham Lincoln's victory in the 1864 presidential election.

This is not a battle history of the Army of the Potomac. Rather, it examines four critical

postbattle junctures in the army's life, from the summer of 1862 to the presidential election in the fall of 1864, during which intensive political activity took place in the army's ranks. Historians like James M. McPherson have already established that as a group, Civil War soldiers were educated, literate, and generally politically engaged. Fry mines soldier correspondence with the home front, hometown newspapers, and political patrons to show the interplay at union level between Democratic and Republican sympathies.

In detailed analysis of four episodes, Fry describes the army's political journey toward the 1864 presidential election. The antebellum Regular Army, which provided many of the Army of the Potomac's initial crop of senior officers, was notably conservative in its political leanings, and generally supported Democratic policies and politicians. Thus, this political story is also a story of the movement of the Union cause from a limited war, in which armies respected civilian property and rights (including the institution of slavery in the South), to a "hard war" that saw the abolition of slavery as a war measure. Abraham Lincoln's Republican Party, supported by the abolitionist bloc in the North, shaped these war aims and this transition during the course of the war. Politically active line officers with Republican leanings were a consistent factor in this transition, as evidenced by a number of unit proclamations of loyalty to the Union cause and the Lincoln administration.

This political transition began at Harrison's Landing, Virginia, in the aftermath of the Seven Days Battles, as the army had several weeks of inactivity to assess the events of the spring and summer. The army's commander, General George B. McClellan, steps onto the stage of the narrative as the unquestioned leader of the army's conservative Democratic faction. The next phase of the army's political evolution occurred as the army licked its wounds after the Battle of Antietam. Factionalism in the army continued to harden, as officers with Democratic leanings saw McClellan as a savior and railed against administration policies, while Republican officers decried McClellan's failure to pursue and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan's removal from command shortly afterward provoked impassioned debates on both sides of this question. Fry does a superb job of painting a picture of the entire army's political activity, from private soldiers to generals. After the Battle of Gettysburg the next July, Democratic officers saw General


George G. Meade, the victor in that battle, as their protector and leader in fighting a rearguard action against increasingly vocal Republican elements in the army. In reality, Meade was always an apolitical figure whose personnel decisions, especially regarding his corps and division commanders, were perceived as political moves. In the fall of 1863, a sizable groundswell of support for McClellan moved for a formal endorsement of his service and a monetary gift; an individual's position on this testimonial became a political loyalty test in the army, and it proved far too controversial to proceed. The ultimate outcome of the political victory of Republicanism in the Army of the Potomac became clear in the overwhelming soldier vote for Abraham Lincoln's reelection in 1864.

Fry's detailed research and statistical analysis of the soldier vote in 1864 sustains his overall argument about the army's ongoing political education. He very fairly attributes some of this sentiment to the army's nonpartisan endorsement of its leadership in 1863–1864 (all the way to Lincoln), a sense of solidarity in shared sacrifice in battle, and a resounding belief that Democrats wished to see the war effort fail and the Confederacy break away. The true turning point in the army's relationship with General McClellan is seen to be McClellan's 1863 endorsement of George W. Woodward, an outspoken critic of Lincoln and the war effort, for governor of Pennsylvania. For the single largest state contingent within the Army of the Potomac, this was a deal-breaker.

Finally, Fry is careful not to overreach in his conclusions on the effect of the army's political activity on its battlefield performance. Although there may have been political motives in a variety of leadership decisions up and down the chain of command, partisan arguments in camp and in the newspapers did not spill over into campaigns and battles. This is a useful discussion for soldiers currently serving, in that it shows how the American soldier of the Civil War era embraced a growing level of professionalism in the nineteenth century. This deeply researched, compellingly written book belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in the American Civil War.

**CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.**, a retired Army colonel, is the executive director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is a former military history instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He served as an Apache helicopter pilot

in Iraq, and commanded an attack helicopter battalion in Afghanistan. He is the coeditor of the Army War College's *Guide to the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign* (Lawrence, Kans., 2014).



## THE UNION ASSAULTS AT VICKSBURG: GRANT ATTACKS PEMBERTON, MAY 17–22, 1863

BY TIMOTHY B. SMITH

University Press of Kansas, 2020

Pp. xx, 483. \$34.95

REVIEW BY MARK L. BRADLEY

A former National Park Service ranger, author Timothy B. Smith teaches at the University of Tennessee at Martin and has written numerous books on Civil War campaigns and battles. His latest effort focuses on Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's two futile assaults in May 1863 against Confederate Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton's heavily fortified line defending Vicksburg, Mississippi. The stakes were high: the fall of Vicksburg would split the Confederacy in two and close the Mississippi River to Southern shipping.

Smith opens with a description of the Confederates' fortification of Vicksburg under the direction of the talented engineer, Capt. Samuel H. Lockett. The work stretched through the summer and fall of 1862. "It was indeed a formidable line," Smith notes, adding that nature enhanced the man-made obstructions with "steep ridges and ravines" that crisscrossed the terrain surrounding Vicksburg (p.

25). By the time that Grant's Army of the Tennessee began its advance on the "Gibraltar of the Confederacy," Pemberton's defenses were ready.

But Grant soon discovered that reaching Vicksburg was a daunting challenge in itself. From November 1862 to April 1863, he made six failed attempts to do just that, evidence of his persistence in the face of obstacles that would have overwhelmed a lesser leader. On 30 April and 1 May, his perseverance finally paid off when his army crossed the Mississippi River at Bruinsburg thirty-five miles south of Vicksburg, much to the Confederates' surprise. In making his move, Grant had help in the form of several diversions, including a cavalry raid led by Col. Benjamin H. Grierson, which distracted the Confederates for several critical days. As a result, the Federals at last stood on the same side of the Mississippi as Vicksburg.

Grant next marched northeast with the intention of swinging west to engage Pemberton at Vicksburg. But a sharp fight with a Confederate brigade at Raymond on 12 May alerted Grant to the presence of a much larger force under General Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson, the Mississippi state capital. On the fourteenth, Grant drove off Johnston and entered the city. After ordering Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's XV Corps to destroy Jackson's manufacturing and transportation facilities, Grant began heading west toward Vicksburg. On 16 May, he defeated the Confederates at Champion Hill and routed them at the Big Black River on the following day. The two losses cost Pemberton dearly in casualties and abandoned artillery, and demoralized the survivors, but at least they were protected by Lockett's strong fortifications.

As he settled into his Vicksburg defenses, Pemberton received conflicting instructions from General Johnston, his immediate superior, and President Jefferson F. Davis, the Confederate commander in chief. Contrary to some historians, Smith argues that Johnston was "smart" to counsel Pemberton to "leave the trap that Vicksburg was becoming," as opposed to Davis, who urged him to hold Vicksburg at all costs (p. 45). In the end, Pemberton elected to remain at Vicksburg, calling it "the most important point in the Confederacy" (p. 74).

Smith devotes two chapters to the Union assault of 19 May, in which Grant sought to catch the demoralized Confederates off-balance. Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair's XV


Corps division drew the unenviable task of attacking the Confederate Stockade Redan. The Federals had to make their way across broken terrain under withering fire, only to be stopped short by the massive earthworks. In the process, Blair's division suffered 613 casualties. Neither of Grant's other two corps—the XIII under Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand or the XVII under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson—arrived in time to support Blair's assault. As a protégé of Grant and Sherman, McPherson received little blame for his slowness, leaving McClernand to bear the brunt of the criticism for failing to support Blair. As a political general, McClernand was a convenient scapegoat of the West Pointers Grant and Sherman. Smith notes that Blair's repulse filled the Confederate defenders with confidence that they could hurl back the next Union onslaught.

Smith's account of Grant's much larger assault of 22 May, in which all three Union corps were involved, requires a half dozen chapters. The second attack was better planned and executed than the first, but the Confederates inflicted over 4,000 casualties in repulsing the Federals. Grant praised the assault as "gallant in the extreme," but conceded that "the enemy's position was too strong" (p. 343). Smith, however, states that "there seemed to be plenty of fault to go around" within the Union high command, for the failed assault (p. 355). By 22 May, the rift between Grant and McClernand had widened so much that the political general's ouster from the Army of the Tennessee became a mere question of time.

To no one's surprise, the two failed assaults led Grant to lay siege to Vicksburg, resulting in the fall of the city and the surrender of Pemberton's command on the Fourth of July. Smith notes that the strategic implications of the six-week delay were "enormous" (p. 370). Grant had hoped to accomplish more—such as pacifying the entire state of Mississippi—but the siege had robbed him of the time to do so. Smith even speculates that the fall of Vicksburg on 22 May might have induced President Davis to veto General Robert E. Lee's second invasion of the north, resulting in no Battle of Gettysburg. Regardless, the loss of Vicksburg was a severe blow to the Confederate war effort, and it bolstered Grant's reputation as the Union Army's finest commander. Readers with an interest in the Vicksburg

Campaign will find this study well worth their time.

**MARK L. BRADLEY** is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is currently writing the official Army history of logistical support in the Vietnam War.



## ROSEBUD, JUNE 17, 1876: PRELUDE TO THE LITTLE BIG HORN

BY PAUL L. HEDREN

University of Oklahoma Press, 2019  
Pp. xxi, 468. \$34.95

REVIEW BY FRANK L. KALESNIK

Although overshadowed by the more infamous battle of the Little Big Horn, the engagement between Brig. Gen. George R. Crook's Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition and a force of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors at Rosebud Creek in southeastern Montana a week before was, in fact, a larger battle. Indeed, it was the largest battle of not only the Great Sioux War, but of all the Indian Wars of the post-Civil War period. Crook's force numbered approximately 1,300 soldiers, civilians, and scouts from allied local tribes. The Sioux and Cheyenne numbers vary in estimates from 1,000 to more than twice that number, with the tide of battle ebbing and flowing over several miles. In spite of the large number of combatants involved, known casualties were small, with nine soldiers killed and thirteen of their foes left dead on the field

after the battle. The limited number of known fatalities notwithstanding, the Battle of the Rosebud was a significant action that influenced the outcome of the Little Big Horn fight eight days later.

Retired National Park Service historian Paul L. Hedren, author of several books on the Sioux War, is well qualified to describe the fight on the Rosebud. His previous book, *Powder River: Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War* (Norman, Okla., 2016), covers a failed attempt by troops not directly led by Crook but under his command to attack what was assumed to be a Sioux village in March 1876. The defenders were, in fact, Cheyenne. The unprovoked assault led directly to the Cheyenne joining with the Sioux to preserve their traditional lifestyle in defiance of a government ultimatum to return to their reservations. The Army next initiated a summer campaign involving three columns led by Col. John Gibbon, Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, and General Crook converging on the presumed location of the alleged "hostiles" in southeastern Montana. Crook's force, called the Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition, and its fight with the Sioux and Cheyenne on 17 June 1876, is the subject of Hedren's latest book, and it is a story well and thoughtfully told.

On the morning of 17 June, Crook's command halted on the banks of Rosebud Creek in southeastern Montana, where the troops brewed coffee and their general played whist. Suddenly, Crow and Shoshone scouts acting as Crook's eyes and ears sped into camp warning of the approach of large numbers of warriors. The result was a confused action Hedren describes in considerable detail. Fortunately, the text includes excellent maps, which enable the reader to follow the narrative easily. An "interlude" describing the battlefield precedes the chapters covering the engagement, explaining the terrain well.

Crook hoped to locate and attack the enemy village. By capturing and destroying it, he felt, the Sioux and Cheyenne would be compelled to return to their reservations. He ordered the easternmost part of his force to do this, with the rest of the command to follow. However, their foes were consummate light cavalry, whose skirmishing led Crook to disperse his force to occupy ridges and hills along his front and flanks. As the cavalry pursued the attackers, they fell back, always looking to cut off and annihilate any group of soldiers foolish enough to stray too far from their parent command. When Crook tried to

regroup his force, the canny warriors pursued withdrawing troops, picking off stragglers unlucky enough to get caught.

At the end of the day, Crook held the battlefield while the Sioux and Cheyenne returned to their village. His Crow and Shoshone scouts chose to return to their villages as well, dashing any hopes Crook had of pursuing them. Crook withdrew to his camp in Wyoming, where he remained, awaiting reinforcements and supplies, particularly ammunition (estimates vary, but his force may have expended up to 25,000 rounds). Both sides claimed victory, but in truth, the Sioux and Cheyenne won. Additional warriors joined their growing encampment, now on the banks of the Little Big Horn, where they defeated Custer on 25 June.

The departure of Crook's Crow and Shoshone scouts was probably the decisive factor determining the outcome of this campaign. Just as the Army hoped to locate and attack the Sioux and Cheyenne encampment, the scouts feared their traditional foes would do the same thing to them while they were absent from their families. Also, the three Army columns operated independently of each other; Crook did not know what

happened to Custer until a courier from Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, brought the news on 10 July. Crook subsequently justified his passivity after the Rosebud battle in a report to General Philip H. Sheridan dated 25 September 1876:

At the fight on the Rosebud, June 17, the number of our troops was less than one thousand and within eight days after that the same Indians we there fought met and defeated a column of troops nearly the same size as ours, killing and wounding over three hundred, including the gallant commander, General Custer himself. I invite attention to the fact that in this engagement my troops beat these Indians on a field of their own choosing, and drove them in utter route from it, as far as the proper care of my wounded and prudence would justify. Subsequent events proved beyond dispute what would have been the fate of the command had the pursuit been continued beyond what judgment dictated (p. 358).

Hedren's thorough study of the Battle of the Rosebud provides enough detail to enable the reader to draw his own informed conclusions

about the outcome and significance of this understudied battle. This reviewer hopes this book is the second of a trilogy that will conclude with an equally insightful look at the Little Big Horn. It is highly recommended to military historians, those with an interest in the American West, and Native American history (of which the author makes good and respectful use). *Rosebud* is an outstanding book about an important but overlooked battle that deserves the recognition Hedren gives it.

**DR. FRANK L. KALESNIK** earned his bachelor's degree in history at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and his master's degree and doctorate in American history at Florida State University. He taught at VMI and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and was a command historian for both the Air Force and Marine Corps. He also served twenty-two years as an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve. He was formerly the chief historian of the Marine Corps History Division in Quantico, Virginia.



## ARMY HISTORY ONLINE

The Center of Military History now makes all issues of Army History available to the public on its Web site. Each new publication will appear shortly after the issue is printed. Issues may be viewed or downloaded at no cost in Adobe® PDF format. An index page of the issues may be found at [www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/issues\\_complete\\_guide.html](http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/issues_complete_guide.html).





Jon T. Hoffman

## CAREER PROGRAM 61 UPDATE

Career Program (CP) 61 (Historians, Museum Personnel, and Archivists) was already in excellent shape when I joined the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) as the chief historian in 2016. Our program manager at the time, Edward C. Clarke, routinely showed great initiative in making it better, and especially in obtaining additional money for education, training, and professional development. Although some other career programs failed to use their allotted budget, we always put every dollar we could get to good use. There often was unused money due to the hurdles CP managers had to leap over to spend it—a small, understaffed office at Headquarters, Department of the Army, had to approve and process all actions, and they required considerable paperwork and lead time. The setup was far from ideal, but CP-61 was diligent in making it work.

When Michael W. DeYoung took over for Ed, he maintained that high level of performance. He continued to pursue an initiative that devolved the approval and budget execution process from the central office to those career programs willing to take on the added burden. When that approach came to fruition, it allowed CP-61 to be even more responsive to our customers. Mike was able to turn around requests for funding in a matter of days. Regrettably, that new authority and flexibility arrived at roughly the same time that the Secretary of the Army began scrutinizing the budget for dollars he could devote to modernization and reform. One of the bill payers became the overall career programs budget. As a result, CP-61 was no longer able to obtain unused money to increase its spending, and instead our authorized budgets began to decrease. Our available money declined from \$324,000 in fiscal year (FY) 2017 to \$316,000 in FY 2018 and then just \$243,000 in FY 2019. It was cut to \$173,000 in FY 2020, though owing to COVID travel restrictions and related disruptions, it was only able to spend \$21,000.

Earlier this year, the Army Staff began pursuing a new initiative that would centralize nearly every aspect of the career program effort. The idea developed out of the Army People Strategy, with the goal of improving talent recruitment, management, and development. The proposal moved rapidly, and on 1 October 2020 the Army Civilian Career Management Activity (ACCMA) came into being under the Civilian Human Resources Agency.

The new activity took over all career program billets to form a centralized bureaucracy. Not only will ACCMA again process and approve all requests for funding for education and training, it will also assume much of the responsibility for acquiring new apprentices, as well as nearly all other aspects of managing the career programs. In theory, it will operate more efficiently, as it will have groups dedicated to particular tasks such as budget execution, recruiting, and so forth, and it will be much larger than the old centralized office. But it also has programmed for an increase in staff above the existing number of billets that had been dedicated to career programs.

Although ACCMA is now in operation, many details remain to be worked out. One immediate change was the organizational transfer of Mike DeYoung from CMH to ACCMA, though his office remains collocated with us for the time being. Another is the drastic cut to the CP-61 budget. Although Mike requested \$318,000 for the current fiscal year, the program will receive just \$21,000! To be fair, that is partly driven by the overall budget squeeze triggered by the pandemic, but also partly by an emphasis on STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) that are widely seen as critical to the future of the Army. But it is obvious that historians, museum personnel, and archivists will have almost no opportunities for education and training in the coming year.

The management and policy structure is also undergoing major change. Up to this point, each career program fell under a functional chief (Charles R. Bowery Jr. for CP-61) and a functional chief's representative (myself). Now the career programs are grouped into career fields, each to be headed by a functional chief, while each career program will have a functional adviser (the new title reflecting a more limited role in decision making). CP-61 has been grouped with the training and education career programs.

Time will tell what the long-term impacts will be on the CP-61 workforce.





# ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

Headquarters, Department of the Army  
Approved for public release Distribution is unlimited—Distribution A

PIN: 207935-000