Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1979


Intelligence, Automation, and Communications

The commander and his staff, at any level, may be compared to the human brain. The staff resembles the cognitive, analytical part of the brain; the commander, the decision making part. Neither staff nor commander can function effectively without the timely receipt and transmission of information. Intelligence collectors and analysts receive, process, and communicate vital information to the staff. After conferring with his staff, the commander communicates command and control decisions to his fighting forces. Along with the intelligence network, telecommunications is an important part of an Army unit.


Since the early 1960’s, the Department of Defense has gradually increased its interest in strategic military intelligence. The Army correspondingly has expanded its efforts in the area of tactical intelligence. Following publication of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study in 1975, the Army decentralized its intelligence structure to provide more tactical intelligence support directly to subordinates, especially to commanders in the field.

In 1976 Congress directed the separation of tactical intelligence functions from the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). This assured accelerated development of intelligence systems better suited to the needs of the tactical commanders. The Department of Defense responded in fiscal year 1979 by removing the tactical aspects of cryptology and electronic warfare from the NFIP. While placing the director of the National Security Agency (NSA) in charge of the new Tactical Cryptological Program, the Department of Defense drafted proposals to integrate the functions of electronic warfare and tactical intelligence into units providing direct support to theater echelons and below. The Army subsequently submitted copies of the proposals to the German Army for their consideration and emulation to create greater interoperability between the ground forces of the two powers.

During implementation of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS), the Army encountered problems with strategic materiel developed by NSA. The much more rapid NSA


materiel and development cycle was inconsistent with the Army’s life cycle model which allowed the lead time necessary for programming adequate personnel and training support. A December 1978 Memorandum of Understanding addressed the problems and established procedures which aligned the materiel acquisition policies and mission requirements of both agencies. The Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is preparing a pamphlet that will describe the responsibilities of the NSA system acquisition and logistic managers and will explain INSCOM and other Army major command relationships and participation in the development, fielding, and life cycle support for NSA-developed items.

National intelligence agencies also collaborated with Army intelligence in meeting the intelligence needs of tactical commanders whose units would deploy in the initial stages of a crisis without benefit of maps, weather data, target area intelligence, and other information: After meeting with representatives from the Air Force and national intelligence agencies, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), in July 1979, distributed procedures for crisis management to all CONUS units for testing in December. Crisis management and reorganization of tactical intelligence support was also a concern for the U.S. Army Special Security Group (USASSG) Headquarters where the staff identified key actions to be taken and functions to be continued during the eve or outbreak of war.

Upon establishment of the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) in March 1979, the Special Security Office (SSO), Hawaii, an element of USASSG’s Special Security Command, FORSCOM, was redesignated the Special Security Command, WESTCOM. This was in keeping with the Army policy of providing SSO support directly to major commands. In a related development, the USASSG decentralized responsibility for contractor support to individual SSO’s. The new contractor support program began on 1 January 1979 and involved twenty-five SSO’s and four Special Security Commands.

Developments in tactical intelligence readiness training since 1976 also reflected the Army’s emphasis on responsive tactical intelligence support. In early 1979 ACSI established Project REDTRAIN to produce better qualified intelligence personnel and more adequate intelligence information for operational planning. INSCOM administers the program and conducts readiness training at national and unit levels for members of the active Army, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard. Pleased with the quality of reservists trained at the three Intelligence Training


Army Area Schools, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) cancelled plans to consolidate the schools in a year-round reserve component training operation at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Army intelligence reviewed intelligence training programs, expanding the successful while curtailing or eliminating marginal programs. The Opposing Force Program (OPFOR) conducted by FORSCOM, with support from TRADOC and the Department of the Army, proved to be highly successful. Having helped every division to field a company-size or larger unit to play the role of the enemy in training exercises, FORSCOM sought to establish opposing force detachments at the brigade level, and two battalion opposing force detachments were established at the U.S. Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Overseas, U.S. Army, Europe, fielded a detachment-size opposing force unit and provided opposing force training at the 7th Army Training Center. The Eighth Army in Korea planned a similar, but more modest program. Meanwhile, FORSCOM enhanced the realism of training by providing updated manuals on enemy tactics and by obtaining enemy weapons.

The warrant officer terrain analysis technician program, established in early 1979, will begin in 1980. The program will train warrant officers in terrain analysis and in the evaluation of the impact of weather upon the terrain and weapons systems. Billets were authorized for new warrant officers for terrain detachments at corps and division levels, the Defense Mapping School, and the Engineer School. The Army also planned to reclassify thirty-five active and ten reserve spaces for the new military occupational specialty and to train twelve new warrant officers annually for the next three fiscal years at the Defense Mapping School.

In contrast, the meteorological observer program came under considerable criticism. During the previous two fiscal years, the Army Audit Agency charged that the program was poorly managed and recommended that the Army phase out meteorological observers and transfer their functions to civilians. A special task force from the office of the Vice Chief of Staff concurred with that recommendation but the U.S. Army Development and Readiness Command dissented and proposed that meteorological specialists be replaced by artillery ballistic meteorological observers. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition is to consider both proposals and forward a recommendation to the Vice Chief of Staff.

The Army System for Standard Intelligence Support Ter-


minals (ASSIST) was established in 1973 to improve Army intelligence data handling systems by standardizing both computer hardware and software, internetting computers, providing access to national intelligence data bases, and achieving compatibility between Army and Department of Defense computerized command and control systems. During the past year, receipt of various types of computer software—programs, program languages, graphics—at several ASSIST sites permitted additional access to computer systems of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Computer software from the Army Standard Plotter System enhanced the flexibility and capability of the graphic display of intelligence data. ASSIST participants also received new computers, terminals with a graphics capability, and other equipment designed to enhance computer capability.

To provide automated intelligence data to commanders on the move, the Army has acquired the initial series of mobile computer complexes of the Intelligence Information Subsystem.

Each complex consists of commercial data processing equipment mounted on five-ton Army trucks capable of moving with support units to field locations to provide rapid automated intelligence support. The complexes are of two types: mobile intelligence centers and mobile remote intelligence terminals. Each center includes data base storage and communications switching capabilities. The terminals provide intelligence analysts at support echelons with facilities that permit ready access, not only to the mobile intelligence center, but through them to data bases and other analysts in Europe and in the U.S. The Army delivered the first of the new mobile computer complexes to U.S. Army, Europe, in June 1979.

Despite technological breakthroughs in intelligence collection and strong criticism from Congress during the turbulent years of civil rights and antiwar activism, Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) continued to play a crucial role in the Army intelligence program. Congressional criticism was derived from public concern that Army intelligence agents had exceeded the limit of constitutionality when assisting police and national intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance of U.S. civilians. Members of Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence continue to scrutinize HUMINT. However, adherence to restrictions and pursuit of justifiable missions has enabled HUMINT to respond to this criticism, and has obtained approximately the same resources this fiscal year as it did in the previous two. To counteract the erosive effects of inflation, Army intelligence is


preparing a long-range master plan to conserve and more fully employ its limited human resources over the next five years. During the year, HUMINT satisfied most of the tactical intelligence requirements commanders imposed. However, the lack of adequately trained linguists may limit tactical intelligence support in the future. Emergency funding of certain language programs, such as intermediate and advanced language training for the 66th Military Intelligence Group in USAREUR averted any immediate crisis, and a comprehensive long-range plan for overseas language training to meet future needs is being devised.

The exchange of military officer students and military attaches is practiced among nations enjoying normal diplomatic relations. To a limited extent, such programs permit the participants to scrutinize each other’s decision making capability. This fiscal year, the Army trained ninety student officers in foreign area programs in twenty-three countries. Although political events forced the Army to terminate overseas training in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Taiwan, and Iran, the Army established two new schools for China area studies in Singapore and Hong Kong. The Foreign Liaison Directorate of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI) continued to provide contact between the Army and foreign military attaches. During the year, the directorate accredited 558 foreign national personnel, including attaches from the People’s Republic of China and Somalia, to conduct business directly with the Army but withdrew accreditation of the attaches from Taiwan and Iran.

Whether generated by computers, agents, analysts, students, or military attaches, the staggering amount of intelligence information produced requires the protection of an elaborate classification system. In the past, however, users often evaded their responsibility to classify such information or failed to declassify items no longer requiring protection. This resulted in far too much information being denied unnecessarily to people without a security clearance.

In order to protect vital defense information while making other information available to the public, the President issued Executive Order 12065. It replaces Executive Order 11652 and makes obsolete the Advanced Declassification Schedule, the General Declassification Schedule, and all markings related thereto. Executive Order 12065 also made changes regarding the authority, criteria, and duration for classification.

Within the Army, Executive Order 12065 permits the delegation of authority to classify TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL only to those subordinate officials with a frequent


need to exercise such authority. The Secretary of the Army alone delegates authority to classify TOP SECRET, but the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence may delegate authority concerning the classification of SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL. The executive order further stipulates that such delegation will be held to an absolute minimum and will not be given to persons who merely reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information.

The executive order provides specific guidance on the types of information requiring classification in the interest of national security: (1) military plans, weapons, or operations; (2) information provided by foreign governments pursuant to written joint agreements requiring confidentiality; (3) intelligence activities, sources, or methods; (4) foreign relations or activities of the U.S.; (5) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security; and (6) U.S. government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities.

Perhaps the most significant provision of the executive order is the duration of classification. At the time of classification for SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL, a date is designated, being no more than six years later for automatic declassification. TOP SECRET material may be classified for more than six years, but no more than twenty, and information provided by foreign governments may be protected for up to thirty years.

The Army significantly improved its support of field commanders during the current fiscal year by redistributing tactical intelligence specialists and computer systems to the lowest echelons and by augmenting successful tactical intelligence training programs. At the same time, the Army implemented a policy of maximum disclosure with regard to programs and information no longer requiring protection. Continued emphasis will be placed on improved tactical intelligence support and security measures.

Automation and Communications

In recent years the Army’s telecommunications structure experienced a metamorphosis paralleling that of the Army’s intelligence organization. While some of the responsibility for strategic telecommunications passed from the Army to the Department of Defense (DOD), the Army retained and strengthened its role in tactical telecommunications. During fiscal year 1979, the Army continued participation in three DOD-sponsored programs: the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC), the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), and the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control System


(JINTACCS). These programs are designed to modernize communications equipment for more compatibility with that of our allies and to develop standards for the interoperability of tactical command and control systems.

Under the TRI-TAC program, each service is developing items of telecommunications equipment to be used by all the services in the 1980’s. The Department of Defense tasked the Army with the responsibility of developing several key items: automatic switches, digital group multiplexers, net radio interface units, mobile subscriber equipment, modular record traffic terminals, and short-range wide-band radios.

At the heart of the TRI-TAC system, automatic switches make possible the speedy and reliable transmission of tactical command and control messages, data, and voice communications. Private contractors continued to develop and test the AN/TTC-39 circuit switch for interoperability with other TRI-TAC equipment. Meanwhile, the Army tested and evaluated the AN/TYC-39 message switch. Preliminary results indicated satisfactory performance.

To provide large capacity radio systems with several channels of communication on the same frequency, the Army designed and built prototypes of digital group multiplex equipment and two related assemblages, the AN/TRC-173 and the AN/TRC-174. Testing and evaluation of all three items has begun.

Army commanders control tactical forces primarily by means of combat net radios. Under the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Subsystem (SINCGARS), the Army evolved a secure, jam-resistant family of VHF-FM radios suitable for joint use and compatible with the radios of the NATO ground forces. To permit wire subscribers to communicate through a switchboard to radio subscribers, the Army also developed a basic net radio interface analog device. Following satisfactory testing at the Joint Test Facility, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the Army distributed the new devices to selected units for field testing.

The Vice Chief of Staff designated mobile subscriber equipment as a major program in 1977. In February 1978 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans formed a special task force to outline initial program data requirements and ways of harmonizing the new equipment with that of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. An agreement in principle has been signed between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany to examine the possible cooperative development and production of mobile subscriber equipment.

The modular record traffic terminal and the short-range


wide-band radio are other key items still in development and testing. During fiscal year 1979, the Army continued to test and evaluate two components of the modular record traffic terminal that had been produced the previous year—the single subscriber terminal and the modular tactical communications center. At the same time, ITT engineers successfully modified the AN/GRC-144 radio for short-range wide-band capability.

In testifying before the House Appropriations Hearings in April 1979, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence, Dr. Gerald P. Dineen, emphasized the necessity for security to parallel the breakthroughs in communications technology:

With increasing reliance on rapid high-capacity communications to support command decision-making and precision force control, it is more than ever critical that we protect our systems against unauthorized access and exploitation by hostile intelligence activities and communications deception.

By providing voice security for tactical radio nets down to the battalion level, the new Vinson cryptographic devices met a portion of the need outlined by Dr. Dineen. The Army has distributed initial production models of this new device to U.S. Army, Europe. During exercise CONSTANT ENFORCER last summer, V Corps reported that use of the device was “extremely successful” and that the equipment was “fully accepted and appreciated” by commanders at all levels.

Like TRI-TAC, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) represented another interservice tactical communications program. Through JTIDS, the Department of Defense sought establishment of a communications loop system with air, ship, and ground terminals. Charged with responsibility for ground terminals, the Army continued to provide research and develop funds for a manpack-size terminal capable of distributing secure high speed digital and voice communications to the tactical commander during combat.

In 1979, the Department of Defense authorized the development of a cross between JTIDS and the Position Location and Reporting System (PLRS) to provide an Army Data Distribution System (ADDS). The PLRS portion of the system would offer such capabilities as location and navigation information, unique identification, and digital data message exchange. PLRS equipment includes master units for use in vans and portable units that can be employed in manpacks, in land vehicles, or on board aircraft.

Under the auspices of the Tactical Air Control Systems/


Tactical Air Defense Systems (TACS/TADS), a joint program in which the Navy acted as executive agent for the JCS, the Army worked on the AN/TSQ-73, a command and control system for missiles, commonly known as “Missile Minder.” The Army corrected deficiencies in radar used in conjunction with the Missile Minders and implemented procedures for combined use of the system with the Air Force. After deploying the Missile Minders to Europe in September 1979, the Army immediately began distributing them to CONUS units. In two field exercises involving the AN/TSQ-73’s, the 11th Air Defense Group, Fort Bliss, Texas, successfully exchanged information with a compatible Air Force system.

The third interservice program bore the acronym JINTACCS (Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control System). Interoperability has become a key word in recent years because systems that are incompatible could result in a loss of command and control, especially for the tactical commanders. Within the TRI-TAC, JTIDS, and TACS/TADS programs, the Army emphasized the development of new equipment for common usage between the services. In JINTACCS, the Army, acting as the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s executive agent, coordinated the efforts of the services, NSA and DIA, in developing the standards required to achieve the interoperability of tactical command and control systems.

In 1979 the Army published various JINTACCS Technical Interface Design Plans (TIDP’s) for air and amphibious operations and continued work on other TIDP’s for operations control and fire support. Compatibility and interoperability testing in the area of general intelligence began at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, where a test center had been established. In related activities, JINTACCS was expanded to include support for centralized, coordinated U.S. involvement in NATO interoperability efforts.

At the strategic level of military telecommunications, the Department of Defense established the National Military Command System with lines of communication running from Washington to unified and specified command posts around the world. At the nation’s capital, the Army established the Washington Area Wide-band System to connect several local Defense Communications System user terminals. With facilities leased from Western Union, the Washington Area Wide-band System provides users high data transmission rates capable of combining several voice channels into one. Operational since early 1979, the system will enroll new users as additional terminal facilities become available.


U.S. Army, Europe, contributed to three DOD-sponsored telecommunications programs: the European Telephone System, the Defense Communications System, and the Defense Satellite Communications System. Designed to handle USAREUR’s routine message traffic and to alert combat forces for deployment, the European Telephone System depended upon obsolete switching equipment to provide reliable voice communications. In a memorandum signed with the German Ministry of Post and Telecommunications in November 1978, the Army agreed to purchase twenty-two electronic digital telephone switches to modernize the European Telephone System.

The Army also began conversion of the Defense Communication System’s mainline transmission network in Europe from an obsolete analog formation to a modern, all-encrypted, high speed digital mode. To be completed in four stages by 1986, the mainline system, known as the Digital European Backbone, will extend from northern Italy through Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. In each country the Army will link up the mainline system with the tributary tactical communications links of USAREUR’s subordinate commands.

Superhigh frequency satellites comprise the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). Designed primarily for strategic communications, the satellites also satisfy many tactical requirements of U.S. and allied ground forces. In June 1979 the Department of Defense approved plans for the Defense Satellite Communications System to augment second generation satellites already in orbit with the more powerful and sophisticated third generation models. A third generation DSCS prototype was launched in June and plans call for launching another in early 1980. A series of production line satellites will take permanent orbits later.

The Army took several steps to construct or renovate satellite ground stations and related subsystems. It constructed three additional gateway stations; began procurement of medium satellite terminals (AN/GSC-39) to replace the outmoded AN/TSC-54’s and AN/MSC-46’s; developed a computerized and automated subsystem for controlling satellites in orbit; deployed twenty-three digital communications subsystems; and contracted for antijamming equipment. The Army also coordinated with the ground forces of NATO for interoperable use of the satellite system. Agreements reached should be validated by the JCS in early 1980 and implemented shortly thereafter.

In the Ground Mobile Forces Program, the Department of Defense employed ultrahigh frequency satellites to provide all


services with fleet broadcast, ship-to-shore, and shore-to-ship tactical communications. In early 1978 the Department of Defense began substituting the Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM) for the outmoded satellites of the Gap Filler program in operation since 1976. Launching of FLTSATCOM satellites will continue through the early 1980’s.

Tactical application of communications satellites involved development of ground terminals. In November 1978 the Army began production of specially designed ground terminals capable of linking satellites directly to ground units, yet portable enough to be carried by vehicle or manpack under the highly fluid conditions of combat. The Army scheduled distribution of the new terminals to brigade and higher echelons of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force to begin in 1981. In anticipation of receiving the new ground terminals and other advanced telecommunications equipment, USAREUR began work on the Nuclear Forces Communications Support Improvement Plan to integrate the new technology with command and control of U.S. and NATO ground troops. Concurrent with the production of satellite ground terminals, the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System moved from the design phase to full scale engineering development. Under NAVSTAR twenty-four satellites will provide worldwide position and navigation information to a three-dimensional accuracy of less than ten meters.

In recognition of the close interrelationship between the technologies of communications and automation, the Army, in October 1978, created the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation and Communications (ACSAC). The new office produced the Study of Management-Automation and Communications, generating new regulations and a new model life cycle for the management of the Army’s automated data handling processes.

The Study of Management also recommended consolidation of technology and automation organizations throughout the Army, a recommendation that meshed with the national policy of saving manpower and cutting costs to fight inflation. During the past two fiscal years, the Army consolidated the facilities of the Defense Special Security Communications System with those of the General Services Telecommunications Centers at twenty sites worldwide and plan to consolidate at least twenty-five additional sites for a combined savings of nearly 100 military personnel spaces and up to $2.5 million annually.

The Secretary of Defense directed similar consolidation at


the joint level. Within the Pentagon, the message centers of the JCS and the Navy will join the combined message center of the Army and the Air Force in late 1979 at a total savings of $2.4 million.

The main computer system of the Pentagon became operational in January 1979. When fully completed, the system will permit reception and transmission of messages between the Army and the Air Force Telecommunications Center and the Marine Corps and Navy Personnel Telecommunications Center in the Arlington Annex. The main computer system will further provide message storage and retrieval for the JCS Message Centers of both the Pentagon and Fort Ritchie. However, manpower shortages and delays in equipment delivery have postponed completion of the main computer system from April 1981 until March 1982.

In 1979, the Army continued development of several computer-oriented management information systems. These systems supply the data required for solution of the highly complex problems inherent in force structuring. The Army adopted a new technique for documentation of the Vertical Force Development Management Information System (VFDMIS), designed to enhance its capability to meet both wartime and peacetime management requirements. This technique, called structured analysis, was the third to be tested by the VFDMIS development team. The two previous methods had failed to produce the desired results. Flow charts produced by structured analysis will define force management functions and processes and will provide a graphic representation of their interdependence. By the end of fiscal year 1979, the U.S. Army Communications Command had completed the communications engineering design plan for the communications network, an important step in the preparation of the first test of VFDMIS, scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 1981.

At Headquarters, Department of the Army, work continued on the Force Development Integrated Management System (FORDIMS), which, like VFDMIS, is designed to provide data to support force structuring, as well as information pertinent to manpower management. By the close of fiscal year 1979, two of the three subsystems of FORDIMS—Program Budget and Force Structure—were approximately 50 percent completed (the third is the Authorization Subsystem). The goal is to have FORDIMS fully functional by the second quarter of fiscal year 1981.

When VFDMIS and FORDIMS become operational, they


will, in addition to their primary function, provide a source of information for the Structure and Composition System (SACS), which supplies lists of personnel and equipment requirements for current and planned units of the Army. These lists are used in planning acquisition and distribution of equipment and in personnel procurement, training, and distribution. In a one-year study completed in August 1979, General Research Corporation investigated the feasibility of putting into an online configuration all or part of SACS. The recommendations made (including those on accuracy and timeliness) of the data input and output of the system will be used to improve SACS’s ultimate performance.

The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) continued to expand during the year. This system supplies data on organization, personnel, and equipment to support units in performance of their assigned missions. The Vertical TAADS (VTAADS), providing documentation for major commands and agencies, was extended to the U.S. Military Academy, Western Command, and to the U.S. Army Computer Systems Command, bringing the total to fifteen commands using VTAADS. In addition to the original extension plan for the Installation TAADS (ITAADS) which is completed, one additional site, the Harry Diamond Laboratory, was added. This brought the number of ITAADS users to forty-eight. The Army is considering the extension of VTAADS to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the extension of ITAADS to four sites within U.S. Army, Europe—the Seventh Army and the U.S. Army Communications Command activities in CONUS, Europe, Japan, and Korea. Korea is the first expansion of ITAADS overseas.

Other aspects of the Army’s progress in the area of automation information are covered elsewhere, particularly in Chapters 3, 9, and 10.

During the past year, the familiar themes of innovation, security, interoperability, and consolidation again prevailed in the related fields of communications and automation. Cognizant of the Army’s primary role in enhancing the tactical commanders’ command and control, Army staff, Army field agencies, and private contractors joined to develop or distribute a variety of devices that enhanced communications and greater compatibility with the systems of other services without sacrificing necessary security. The Army also participated in several DOD-sponsored strategic programs by installing systems or components for use above the theater level. In many cases strategic programs conferred immediate benefits to tactical commanders. To cut the


costs of modernizing both tactical and strategic systems, the Army consolidated its computers and message centers at scores of sites throughout the world and with those of other services at the Pentagon.



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