Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1981


Force Development, Doctrine, and Training

Army efforts to mold men, units, and materiel into combat forces capable of meeting U.S. Defense needs received a boost during fiscal year 1981 as a new administration moved to increase military spending to levels commensurate with arming and maintaining a military establishment second to none. The additional support sharpened debate, both within the Army and without, regarding the size and content of Army combat and support forces, the Army's ability to assimilate advanced weapons systems, the adequacy of training, the role of reserve components, and the adequacy of mobilization planning and procedures. These were but a few of the factors that figured in the force development process during the past year.

Force Development

The Army made no major changes in the existing 24-division (16 active and 8 reserve component) structure, but did make a number of adjustments within the structure, some of which are noted in Chapters 2 and 8. It considered organizing two additional divisions in the reserve components and adding an active brigade to the 24th Infantry Division, one of two active Army divisions having a National Guard roundout brigade as part of its organization. But the Army expanded neither its active nor its reserve forces and gave first priority to improving the readiness and modernization of the 24-division structure.

The Total Army Analysis (TAA) conducted during 1981 established the initial force structure used in developing the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal years 19841988, including nondivisional and tactical support requirements and essential support force requirements. For the first time TDA (tables of distribution and allowances) units were included, and units required to support mobilization were identified. The Force Development Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), worked on revising Army Regulation 71-11, improving the TAA process, and placing the analysis on a biennial cycle.

Improvements in the TAA were part of a larger effort to strengthen the link between planning and programming aspects of the Army Planning, Programming, Executing, and Budgeting


System (PPEBS). In the past, planners have emphasized the development of combat forces to accomplish approved strategic requirements based on worldwide threats and have given little consideration to support forces, materiel, and training base requirements to sustain the combat elements. Programmers, on the other hand, had to deal with such down-to-earth factors as resource limits and budgetary constraints. As a result, planning guidance had little influence on program development.

Recent changes to the PPEBS have improved the link between planning and programming. Now planners develop and recommend macro force alternatives which describe operational and support forces in terms of structure, readiness, modernization, and sustainability. They weigh each alternative against projected resources to determine feasibility and recommend priorities for the allocation of available resources.

In developing macro force alternatives, guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the senior Army leadership is considered in conjunction with an assessment of current force capabilities and resource constraints. Force alternatives, including operational and support forces, are developed. These forces are described by building blocks:

Chart showing building blocks of force capabilities and force alternatives

Each building block is examined in terms of NATO missions (both forces deployed and CONUS based), Northeast Asia (for-


ward deployed and CONUS based), and rapid deployment. Resources associated with each of the building blocks are fixed in terms of fiscal obligation, authority, and manpower. These blocks and associated resources are categorized in terms of force structure, readiness, modernization, and sustainability.

In force structuring, the numbers of active and reserve component division increments, nondivisional combat increments, tactical support increments, cadre divisions, and roundout brigades are considered. In building readiness, authorized levels of organization in terms of manning and equipping the operational and support forces, equipment levels associated with POMCUS, and manning and fiscal enhancements to the training and doctrine base are examined. For modernization, the procurement of more up-to-date equipment and the associated manpower needed to implement Army 86 structures are studied. The need for high technology development and testing for light and heavy divisions is addressed, and sustaining levels of war reserve stocks and the ratio of tactical support increments to division increments (tail-to-tooth ratios) are considered.

Alternatives are constructed in which the quantitative and qualitative aspects of structure, readiness, modernization, and sustainability are varied. To determine feasibility, mission postures are set, and the costs of these alternatives are compared with current and projected levels of fiscal obligation authority and manpower ceilings. The selection of the- alternative which will be the basis for the Army Plan is a detailed process that includes briefings and discussions with the principals in both the Army secretariat and the staff. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff make the final decisions.

The Army Plan is the implementation memorandum for the Secretary of the Army's and Chief of Staff's planning guidance to programmers. It considers the decisions made on the major issues associated with the allocation of constrained resources to the macro force alternatives. Both operational forces and the support base are addressed. Facilities are also given prominent attention. Planning guidance is provided in four categories: readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure. The initial plan is scheduled for publication in December 1981 and will be the basis for the development of the Army Program Objective Memorandum and the Extended Planning Annex FY 84-98.

Phase II of the study for Improving the Definition of the Army Objective Force Methodology (IDOFOR), an important part of the Army's effort to develop a more effective force development process-described in the previous summary-was


carried out during the past year. IDOFOR II focused on providing a methodology for a non-NATO scenario, as well as for NATO, and the development of a risk assessment and acquisition strategy capability. This latter effort produced a methodology to examine production capability, personnel availability, and funding estimates and to recommend annual acquisition and retention objectives for critical equipment systems. Phase II also expanded development of the capability to design alternative forces within projected manpower and fiscal constraints for the period under review. This capability included the examination of other possible designs for force additions as well as the evaluation of various alternative forces. IDOFOR II methodology will be integrated into other Army force development studies, such as the joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) Analysis and the macro analysis of force alternatives. This effort, termed IDOFOR III, will be conducted in fiscal year 1982.

The Army uses or has under development several automated management information systems to aid the force development process. There were a number of noteworthy happenings during the year concerning these systems.

The use of The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) continued to increase. Two new posts, Fort Drum, New York, and the Army Research Armament and Development Command, Dover, New Jersey, received the installation subsystem (ITAADS). This addition brought the number of installations covered to fifty-seven. Vertical TAADS, the subsystem used at major commands, is operational at seventeen locations. Headquarters, Department of the Army, processed 20,484 TAADS documents during the year.

Even as the use of TAADS expanded, the Army continued work on the Force Development Integrated Management System (FORDIMS), which will replace TAADS, the Army Force Program (AFP), and the Civilian Budget System (CBS). The Authorization Subsystem (replacement for TAADS) is currently operational. Testing of the Program and Budgeting Subsystem (replacement for AFP and CBS) started in March 1981. Completed tests on the Force Structure Subsystem (FSS), which was designed to support discrete guidance tracking, showed that a more flexible, less demanding form of guidance tracking was necessary. A general officer in-process review (IPR); conducted in December 1980, decided to discontinue work on the FSS and discrete guidance tracking and called for development of detailed specifications for a transition method of guidance tracking. Specifications for the transition system were completed in February


1981, and the U.S. Army Management Systems Support Agency (USAMSSA) began development. Work was temporarily halted in June 1981 so that all FORDIMS programming resources could be used to complete other testing. Development of guidance tracking is scheduled to resume early in fiscal year 1982.

Work on the Vertical Force Development Management Information System (VFDMIS) continued to accelerate during the past year. The Army won approval of equipment procurement for the system in the amount of $7.8 million covering fiscal years 1984-1986. A system product manager was designated in July 1981, and staffing of the product manager's office was begun. Automated Sciences Group, Inc., received a contract for design and program work and General Research Corporation obtained a contract to assist the product manager with functional requirements. Following a system review late in the fiscal year, the product manager sought the assistance of the Intelligence and Security Command in determining how to provide users who had unclassified remote terminals with access to a classified data base; he also enlisted the aid of the Communications Command in calculating equipment requirements.

Development of the Force Management Decision System (FMDS) began in August 1981. In September, functional requirements were developed and forwarded to USAMSSA for evaluation. FMDS will assist force managers and force integration system officers on the Army staff in conducting impact analysis for changes in force structure and asset conditions.

An improvement to the Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS), to provide management data dealing with pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS), was completed during the reporting period. It provides requisitioning authority to Combat Equipment Group, Europe, and enables the Army staff and the Depot Systems Command to manage POMCUS at varying levels of detail from individual sets to complete division sets. Furthermore, the POMCUS addition to LOGSACS reflects equipment changes caused by force modernization actions indicated in the Program Objective Memorandum.

In a related action, General Research Corporation worked on a contract it received in September 1980 to improve LOGSACS's Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP). The BOIP determines the equipment changes by unit that are required to support the fielding of new weapons systems, or the introduction of equipment items to augment or upgrade the Army's mission capabilities. The improvement, which is scheduled for completion early in fiscal


year 1982, will give to materiel procurement and distribution planners the requirements on a time-phased basis for fielding each new or improved item.

An improved BOIP will ease the strain of distributing increased quantities of weapons that come into the Army's inventory as a result of long-term modernization efforts. One such weapon, the Stinger man-portable air defense system, achieved initial operational capability in February 1981 with the 11th Armored Cavalry in Germany. The Stinger was the first new air defense system the Army had fielded since the mid-1960s. Production and deployment of Stinger to Europe was on schedule. Another system, the Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV), is an M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier that has been modified to carry an armored TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missile launcher mounted on a powered cupola. The ITV provides armor and armored cavalry units with a long-range antitank capability. It would be routinely employed from concealed defilade positions that expose only the sights and launchers. Targets would be engaged from 2,000 to 3,000 meters to exploit TOW's range advantage. Distribution of ITVs to Europe began in February 1980 and will be completed in February 1982. Fielding in the continental United States will continue through October 1982.

The Army signed a contract with Litton Data Systems on 16 October 1980 for the purchase of forty-three Tactical Fire Direction Systems (TACFIRE), successfully concluding an intensive effort to restart the program that Congress had stopped during deliberations on the fiscal year 1980 budget. A contract for the final twenty-three sets required to outfit all active Army units was signed on 29 July 1981. During the year the Army received twenty-three sets ordered under previous contracts; final deliveries were in April 1981. Because of the break in the program, deliveries will not be resumed until the summer of 1982. Meanwhile, the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), FORSCOM, and the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), USAREUR, became operational TACFIRE units-the 1st in May 1981, and the 8th the following August. TACFIRE equipment was shipped to the 41st Field Artillery Brigade in September 1981.

The Army's plan to obtain 7,340 M60A3 tanks with thermal tank sights-1,741 from new production and 5,599 through conversion of older M60 series tanks-moved forward. By the close of the reporting period, 1,741 new M60A3s and 1,164 conversions had been funded. The number of new tanks produced reached 1,561; of these, 1,260 have been shipped to USAREUR,


which had first priority in distributing M60A3 with subsequent issue to FORSCOM units. Conversion of M60A1 tanks to an M60A3 configuration began in July 1981 at the Anniston Army Depot, and a similar program will get under way involving 458 vehicles at the Mainz Army Depot early in fiscal year 1982. An ODCSOPS proposal to convert M60A2 tanks to M60A3s did not mesh with production line scheduling and was discarded. Earlier plans to convert the 105-mm.-gun-equipped M60A2s with an M48A5 turret (the converted vehicle was designated the M48A7) were held in abeyance as DARCOM evaluated a new ODCSOPS proposal to make them over to armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLBs) and combat engineer vehicles (CEVs).

The sophistication and complexity of technologically advanced systems entering the Army's weapons arsenal has caused concern within the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding how much combat support structure would be required to sustain U.S. forces in the early days of a NATO Warsaw Pact conflict. The result of this concern was the Combat to Support Balance Study (CSBS), a sixteen-volume report published in September 1980 which showed the effects that various assumptions regarding workload, productivity, and the amount of host nation support would have on the size of combat service support forces. The study has served as an effective management tool for decision makers in determining appropriate levels, mixes, and phases of support for programmed Army combat forces in Europe. Following Chief of Staff approval, ODSCOPS, ODCSLOG, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Combat Analysis Agency (CAA) began carrying out the forty-nine specific actions contained in the study's implementation plan. The Force Management Directorate, ODCSOPS, is monitoring and coordinating the effort, which is proceeding on schedule.

Host nation support (HNS), an important element in the CSBS, is essential in satisfying shortfalls in the Army's ability to meet combat support and combat service support requirements of forward deployed and deploying U.S. Forces Over the past year the Army has continued HNS initiatives in the areas of policy guidance, doctrine formulation, and combat support and combat service support negotiations. Army HNS policies, procedures, and responsibilities were laid out for the first time in Army Regulation 570-9, published in January 1981. One month later, an interagency HNS Working Group was formed under the auspices and general guidance of the HNS Advisory Group of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The group's broad objective is to


develop Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) support requirements and obtain host nation support for RDF contingencies. The first priority will be to acquire host nation support for the near-term RDF; the second priority is to acquire this support for future expansion of the RDF and to develop a strategy for entering HNS negotiations with certain Southwest Asia countries.

Negotiations for expanded host nation support for forward deployed and reinforcing forces continued. The signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Germany is expected soon, and work on detailed agreements covering military support, civil support, and reinforcement exercises is to begin in January 1982. A considerable portion of the support will be provided by German military units. The United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg reviewed U.S. host nation support requirements presented to them in September 1980. HNS statements of principle have been signed with all of the countries except the Netherlands. They have agreed to provide the requested support. Detailed requirements will be set down in lines of communications (LOC) agreements. Efforts to obtain LOC agreements with nations of the NATO northern and southern regions continued. Umbrella, general, and technical agreements have been signed with Denmark, Norway, and Italy.

Since 1976, TRADOC has been involved in designing an objective heavy division for the mid-1980s and beyond. More recently, complementary efforts have been initiated to redesign the light division, the corps, echelons above corps, and contingency corps. Collectively, these several design initiatives are referred to as Army 86. The process by which these initiatives and other near-term redesigns of various Army elements, including the Rapid Deployment Force, are incorporated into the force structure constitutes the Army 90 Transition Plan.

In May 1981, Army 90 transition planning objectives were prepared to integrate approved organizational conversions into the force structure requirements process; to develop organizational conversions down to unit identification code (UIC) level of detail for active and reserve components; and to develop UIC conversions which accommodate all relevant factors, including systems modernization, doctrine, training, manpower, logistic support, facilities and construction, tactical support, stationing, and operational readiness. The objectives also envisaged publication of an annual transition plan to document organizational conversions over the program years, to institutionalize the planning process and management structure for guiding and directing the transition process, and to provide necessary resource man-


agement information on approved organizational conversions to major commands as soon as possible. ODCSOPS serves as the lead Army staff proponent for Army 90 Transition Plan development; the Transition Planning Implementation Group (TPIG), Requirements Directorate, has overall responsibility. In July 1981, major commands were provided with guidance needed to develop a detailed Army 90 Transition Plan to be forwarded to the Army staff by 15 January 1982. One of the key features of the plan was that similar heavy division active units were to convert to the new designs during six-month periods starting in the last part of fiscal year 1983; conversions of reserve components other than roundout units would start one year later.

The 9th Infantry Division's High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) program, reported on last year, is an important element in fielding a, strategically deployable, lean, hard-hitting, and sustainable high technology light division by 1985. During the past year, operational and organizational (O&O) tests began for the brigade engineer company, the antiarmor company, and the mortar platoon. Allied involvement in the HTTB program increased during 1981 with New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada assigning special project officers to the HTTB. Other countries have given briefings on concepts and equipment that are possible candidates for O&O testing. At the request of the Army Chief of Staff, a Defense Science Board Task Force, headed by Dr. Eugene Fubini, began a study to determine how technology could be integrated into the High Technology Light Division.

As noted in last year's report, ODCSOPS is sponsoring a comprehensive Casualty Estimation Study (CES) to develop a reliable methodology for estimating wartime casualties. The Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) is responsible for Part I of the study, which pertains to short-term improvements in theater-level casualty estimates under conventional warfare conditions. Part II of the study is being done by the Army Models Improvement Program (AMIP) Office of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. The AMIP office will develop detailed methodology for Army wartime casualty estimation in two categories: (1) conventional plus chemical and (2) conventional, chemical and nuclear. The CAA should complete Part I of the study in December 1981. The remainder of the study will then be accomplished by the AMIP, with developmental work continuing through calendar year 1982.

The Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structuring of the Army (ARCSA) III study, which was conducted by the U.S.


Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, beginning in February 1977, developed the current aviation force structure. Based on study results, the Army Chief of Staff approved an aviation force structure consisting of 48 attack helicopter companies, 38 air cavalry troops, 46 combat support aviation companies, and 32 medium helicopter companies. Implementation of ARCSA III continued during the year with the inactivation of an aviation battalion and four separate companies, two of which were divisional support companies. In turn, two combat aviation battalions were activated, one at Fort Hood and the other at Fort Riley, while a combat aviation company was activated to support the brigade at Fort Benning. A follow-up study, ARCSA IV, which is scheduled to begin in April 1982, will be the basis for future aviation structure and planning. It will consider all Army 90 designs that have a major impact on the aviation force structure.

Concepts and Doctrine

Force designs coming from the Army 86 studies reflect ideas embodied in the Airland Battle, an evolving concept that describes current thinking on what is needed to win on the battlefield of the 1980s, especially in Western Europe. It envisages the integration of conventional, nuclear, chemical, and electronic means and the extension of the battlefield to bring the full potential of U.S. air and land forces to bear on the enemy's second echelon forces as well as on his assault forces. The concept of an extended battlefield with emphasis on maneuvering, disrupting enemy follow-up forces, and seizing the initiative by attacking, as well as defeating enemy assault elements, goes considerably beyond current doctrine for the use of corps and divisions. As the fiscal year closed, TRADOC and the Command and General Staff College were working on a major revision of Field Manual 1005, "Operations," to incorporate the Airland Battle concept.

While the Army revamped its combat doctrine around concepts that incorporated the use of conventional, chemical, and nuclear means to meet the threat posed by Warsaw Pact forces, little progress was made during the past year to limit or ban chemical and nuclear weapons.

Since 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union have held twelve rounds of talks to reach a joint proposal for presentation before the United Nations Committee on Disarmament that would form the basis for negotiation of a multilateral chemical arms control treaty. The U.S. objective has been to obtain a comprehensive agreement banning the production, possession,


transfer, and use of chemical weapons. Progress in the bilateral discussions has lagged because of disagreement over verification, declaration of stocks and facilities, and when the ban would take effect. The Reagan administration put off the thirteenth round of U.S.-USSR talks pending reassessment of arms control policy and strategy. Delays in holding bilateral talks and the lack of progress in the discussions held to date will intensify pressure on the Committee on Disarmament's Warfare Working Group, which was established in 1980 to define chemical weapons control issues, to begin negotiation of a treaty.

Work on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) lay dormant during 1981; the only work being accomplished was the development of a study entitled "Basic Considerations for U.S. SALT Policy." During the year, focus shifted from SALT talks to arms control negotiations as NATO's long-range theater nuclear force modernization decision of December 1979 received public and political attention, primarily from the Europeans. Encouraged by Soviet propaganda, intense pressure was brought to bear on the United States to commence the arms-control side of the two-track 1979 modernization decision. Continuous consultation with the alliance, through the NATO Special Consultative Group, was affected by delays in developing the U.S. negotiating position. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in New York on 23-26 September 1981 and announced that arms-control negotiations would open in Geneva on 30 November 1981.

Almost six years of study and work came to fruition in July 1981 with the publication of Field Manual 9-6, "Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations." It describes basic ammunition doctrine for the Army and is the product of the Munitions Systems Support Structure (MS3) Study, which was begun in 1975 by the U.S. Army Missile and Munitions Center and School. The manual establishes doctrine for ammunition transfer points (ATP) in the brigade trains of divisions and separate brigades, replaces the direct support and general support conventional ammunition company with separate direct support (DS) and general support (GS) units, combines existing DS and GS special ammunition companies into a DS-GS unit, improves the man to machine ratio to provide for increased efficiency, and incorporates the throughput of ammunition into doctrine. During the Total Army Analysis (TAA) for fiscal years 1984-1988, all active and reserve component conventional ammunition units were scheduled for conversion to the new MS3 tables of organization and equipment. The conversions were spread


throughout the program years. Special ammunition companies are listed in the extended planning annex, pending receipt of major command advice concerning program timing.

Mobilization planning and testing continued to be a major concern within the Army and throughout the Department of Defense. PROUD SPIRIT, a command post exercise sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), began on 6 November 1980 and lasted until 18 November. The Army's participation, referred to as MOBEX 80 and to relate it to the previous biennial exercises MOBEX 76 and MOBEX 78-continued until 26 November. MOBEX 80 tested the Army's critical mobilization and deployment procedures and provided the first opportunity to apply recommendations contained in the Army Command and Control Study-82, which stemmed from concerns of the Army and of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the reserve component command structure was excessively layered and redundant. Particular attention was given to procedures and systems which had been deficient in previous exercises: the new Army Mobilization and Planning System (AMOPS), Army command and control, Army participation in the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS), and the Army wartime asset redistribution planning and management systems.

MOBEX 80 was most successful in providing valuable mobilization and deployment experience to many command and staff personnel throughout the Army. The training function, verifying capabilities, and identifying training deficiencies are primary objectives of the MOBEX series. And while no new major problems surfaced, results clearly showed that problems and deficiencies uncovered during MOBEX 76 and 78 had not been resolved, particularly in the areas of command and control, ammunition and equipment shortfalls, filler requirements, and the ability of industry to resupply basic items required to sustain the combat forces.

The Army formed the Mobilization Review Committee and the General Officer Mobilization Review Group to ensure that action would be taken to remedy shortcomings that hampered the Army's ability to meet mobilization and deployment requirements. The first committee reviews and monitors remedial action projects (RAPS), makes decisions regarding the sufficiency of proposed corrections, and recommends actions to the General Officer Mobilization Review Group on major issues. The other group acts on the recommendations and directs measures to be taken on these issues. Both bodies include representatives from the Army staff and major commands. An Army staff proponent


for each RAP submits quarterly updates to the review committee on the status of corrective actions.

In Exercise PROUD SPIRIT-MOBEX 80, the need resurfaced for a clear definition of essential information required for management of crisis situations and execution of mobilization and deployment by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). At the Four Star Mobilization Conference held on 31 January 1981 and chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans was directed to coordinate the review of information requirements for the purpose of streamlining reporting procedures to provide only essential information to HQDA. The Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate of ODCSOPS initiated three parallel efforts. The first involved a review of data elements currently available to HQDA from automated data processing systems accessible through the Worldwide Military Command and Control System to extract only essential data elements in crisis situations. The second was a user survey of selected reports sponsored by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify nonessential reporting requirements and to streamline the joint Reporting Structure, particularly for wartime information needs. The third effort was to identify critical information requirements for crisis management regardless of the capabilities of currently automated systems. The three efforts focused on efficiently using automated data sources and providing instructions for manual reporting where necessary, while guiding the development of automation improvements.

As a result of an analysis of information needs, use of transaction processing, and coordination with Forces Command, a reduction of 67 percent has been achieved in the data required by HQDA to monitor the status of force mobilization. Similar coordination with the joint Deployment Agency has resulted in a 74-percent reduction of data needed by HQDA to monitor the status of force deployment.

Army staff analysis of data coming through the joint Reporting Structure has focused on the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) as having the greatest potential for reduction of reporting requirements. For example, more than half of the data currently required from Army units to compile the report is not considered essential by the Army staff for wartime management. Further refinement and subsequent modification of joint reporting instructions will be undertaken in the coming fiscal year.

Critical information requirements by the Army staff for crisis


management were coordinated for publication in Volumes III and IV of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). These documents will establish the requirement, unconstrained by limitations in current automated reporting systems, as a baseline for future improvements. Additionally, the U.S. Army Command and Control Support Agency is developing an integrated data base and necessary programs to support the HQDA Crisis Management Team within the current capability of automated systems.

AMOPS, described in some detail in last year's summary, is an integrated, short-range, capability planning system which supports Army participation in joint operations and deployment. It replaces the Army Capabilities Plan and HQDA Mobilization Standard Operating Procedures. Principal planning documents produced by the system are the HQDA Mobilization Plan and the major command mobilization plans, which collectively form the Army Mobilization Plan. Volume I of AMOPS, "Systems Description, Responsibilities, and Procedures," and Volume III, "Mobilization and Deployment Planning Guidance," were published during fiscal year 1981. Volume II, "Strategic Employment of Army Forces," and Volume IV, "HQDA Crisis Action SOP," should be out in the coming year. With the publication of Volume III, AR 135-300, "Mobilization of Reserve Component Units and Individuals," became redundant and was rescinded.

On 8 May 1981 the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the joint Planning and Execution Steering Committee to allow the JCS to oversee the joint planning, mobilization, execution, and deployment process. The committee, chaired by the Director of Operations, OJCS, consists of general and flag officer representatives from the joint staff and the services. The Army also provided a full-time action officer as a member of the joint working group which assisted the committee in assessing deficiencies, formulating objectives, and putting together recommendations for corrective action.

The committee identified a number of major deficiencies: the current contingency planning process was regionally oriented and not based on real capabilities; it did not support deliberate planning and crisis response requirements and contained no option developing capability for the JCS and the National Command Authority; deployment planning did not provide for meaningful collection of information at appropriate command levels; and deployment execution was not flexible.

Action through the end of the fiscal year focused on developing a model for a new joint process which would be both a


planning and an execution tool. It would support the application and direction of military force with the responsiveness and flexibility required by the National Command Authority; allow changes of direction and graduated application of force; give the capability to determine combat support and combat service support forces, materiel and transportation requirements, and shortfalls; and provide for the assessment of the total force's ability to meet national military strategy in the near term.

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the military departments, developed plans for allocating among the services the 100,000 ready reservists that the President could order to active duty without declaring a national emergency, as provided for by Public Law 96-584, which the President signed on 23 December 1980. Before the new law went into effect the number of reservists who could be called was limited to 50,000. The Army allocated its portion to the major commands to meet premobilization requirements for minor contingencies or as a prelude to a declaration of mobilization.

The importance of industrial support and the condition of the training base received a great deal of attention during MOBEX 80 and throughout the remainder of fiscal year 1981.

In November 1980, ODCSRDA hosted chief executives from various industries to hear their views on what actions the Army should take to enhance the responsiveness of the industrial base and the effectiveness of planning with industry.

The conferees noted that significant improvement in industrial preparedness depended upon a clear national policy citing the need for an industrial base responsive to national security interests and that war reserve stocks should be increased to a level compatible with the ability of the base to meet sustaining requirements. Associated with war reserve stocks was the need to identify production constraints and to pace items, with the view of stockpiling those components or items which have long lead-times.

There was general agreement that both the private and Army owned industrial base should be modernized to ensure adequate industrial production in an emergency situation. State-of-the-art manufacturing, technology, greater attention to product quality, and increased capital buildup through such actions as tax incentives, improved contract and profit policies, and direct government investment would be necessary to modernize the industrial base: Failure to modernize and improve productivity would result in continued deterioration of manufacturing capability and responsiveness.


The conferees also observed that increased use of standard commercial components, particularly in technologies which were advancing more quickly than others, would increase emergency availability of military hardware and should also reduce the cost.

A second conference was held in May 1981 to continue the dialogue with key industry leaders, to inform members of the new administration concerning industrial base issues and problems, and to present a DOD Action Plan for Improvement of Industrial Preparedness. The DOD plan evolved from the MOBEX-80 industrial program and other recent studies, including the House Armed Services Committee report issued in December 1980 entitled "The Ailing Defense Industrial Base, Unready for Crisis." The plan was structured around three key elements: (1) national resource base-overcoming near-term materiel shortages and lead-time problems, improving critical raw material self sufficiency, obtaining enough skilled labor, and improving productivity; (2) defense acquisition process-improving stability of Army procurement, creating a more attractive environment for the defense contractor, and improving equipment productivity; and (3) industrial preparedness-achieving more consistency in defense programs and funding, creating an organizational and legislative environment conducive to industrial preparedness, planning, and mobilization, and maintaining a responsive defense industrial base. The Army participated with representatives from the other military services on a Department of Defense task force organized to coordinate implementation of the DOD Action Plan.

ODCSRDA initiated a study within the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA) during fiscal year 1981 to determine what must be done in order for the industrial base to double end-item production of nine critical materiel items in six to twelve months. A crucial objective was to identify systemic problems that inhibited the accelerated delivery of end-items. In this regard the Army expects to identify affordable investment opportunities to eliminate bottlenecks in the production process, and to take advantage of those opportunities during the normal budget process or when increased periods of tension make a show of resolve necessary. The study results are due in the first quarter of fiscal year 1982.

The Army also made a major effort to budget for future acquisition of individual clothing and equipment and major end items of equipment that were essential to support the mobilization training base. The shortage of equipment available to support mobilization expansion is the principal constraint upon the potential capability of the mobilization base to accept the 133,000


new soldiers for training during the first month of mobilization as required under current plans. To help alleviate equipment shortages, the Army refurbished a significant number of M-14 rifles during 1981. These are available as back-up support to the training base upon mobilization.

Mobilization planning has revealed that facilities available for the training base will also be insufficient, particularly in the areas of trainee billeting and training ranges support. Funding has been requested for the purpose of selecting specific locations at installations for the expansion of facilities upon mobilization, and for mobilization construction planning.

An automated planning system for management of the mobilization training base has been under development for two years. In the later part of fiscal year 1981, the first Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOBARPRINT) was produced from this system. This document provides guidance to help reception stations, training centers, and service schools meet projected post-mobilization requirements for trained manpower.

During fiscal year 1981 the Office of the Chief of Engineers took several actions which stressed the importance of planning and positioned resources to support a full mobilization and deployment.

The Office of the Chief of Engineers, together with the CONUS major commands, identified construction needs for the first ninety days of a full mobilization. Subsequent requirements for the construction program from M-day to M plus 180 will be defined during the annual update of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The fiscal year 1983-1987 POM contains funding for advance planning and design, including development of standard plans for required facilities as well as site adaptations of these plans to facilitate early construction requirements. In a related action, the Civil Works Appropriations Committee provided funds in the fiscal year 1982-1987 time frame to make better use of Corps civil works assets in support of military construction in case of mobilization or a national defense emergency.

In other actions the Corps began to streamline procedures consistent with emergency laws, policies, and organizations; prepared legislative proposals in support of the Corps mobilization mission, which were under review by higher headquarters; and defined the basic concepts for an automated Mobilization Stationing System (MSS) that will provide mobilization planners with a means to gather information quickly and easily on key force structures and facilities.

In 1980, the Secretary of Defense directed development of


the Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System (CMCHS) to supplement CONUS military health services in the event of a large-scale conflict overseas. Each surgeon general is responsible for the operation of his service's portion of the program in accordance with policy set by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).

Hospital commanders, representing the Department of Defense as CMCHS coordinators, solicited local civilian hospitals, executed written agreements with hospitals selected for participation, and prepared local operations plans and tested them periodically. The DOD goal is 50,000 beds from accredited general medical and surgical hospitals. As of 30 September 1981, agreements totaling about one-half of the goal had been completed.

During the past year the Army acted to improve systems and procedures for accessioning and utilizing reserve component personnel and retirees upon mobilization.

The Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS), which was described in detail in last year's report, was developed to correct a MOBEX-76 deficiency. The concept received limited testing during MOBEX 78, was adopted by the Army in 1979, and was implemented in October 1980. MOBPERS was fully tested in MOBEX 80, and the concept of pre-positioning reserve component personnel data (unit and IRR) using MOBPERS procedures and the accessioning of reserve component personnel into the active Army through the Standard Installation Division Personnel System-War Time (SIDPERS-WT) was successfully demonstrated. Problems were encountered, primarily discrepancies in source documents and data errors, but none surfaced that would invalidate MOBPERS. Data source coordination problems were resolved, and progress was made toward correcting errors. In addition, several modifications were installed to- improve the mobilization process.

The Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC) conducted a mobilization exercise in August 1981 to evaluate improvements made to MOBPERS since MOBEX 80. The test also evaluated Western Union mailgram procedures, the accuracy of the personnel data of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the automated data processing capabilities at the Emergency Relocation Site (ERS) and analyzed the- adequacy of existing mobilization plans. Evaluation of the test results will be completed early in fiscal year 1982.

The Mobilization Personnel Structure and Composition System (MOBPERSACS) was revised and expanded in fiscal year 1981 to display wartime personnel requirements as reflected by


data of The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) submitted by major commands. MOBPERSACS also shows selected TDA units that are needed in time of war, MTOE units at wartime strength, and mobilization station arrival data and mobilization command. The Army staff, Military Personnel Center, and RCPAC use MOBPERSACS for mobilization exercises and for project training requirements, promotions, and distribution of the mobilization forces, including the IRR.

For the past several years the Army has been testing a pilot program that preassigns soldiers leaving active duty and entering the IRR to specific mobilization stations and unit assignments in case they are recalled to active duty during a mobilization. Because of the high turnover rate within the IRR, the geographical instability of IRR members, and the frequency of organizational and stationing changes of units that would get the preassigned reservists, the limited benefits of the Mobilization Preassignment Program did not outweigh the difficulties involved in terms of cost and management; therefore, the program was dropped in favor of predesignating IRR members under MOBPERS.

The problems encountered with the pilot Mobilization Preassignment Program did not deter RCPAC from initiating the Overseas Preassignment Program (OPP) during the first quarter of fiscal year 1981. The program covers IRR members who reside in USAREUR's geographic area. All preassignments are made to the 21st Replacement Battalion, which will then reassign members to meet requirements at the time of mobilization. By the close of fiscal year 1981, approximately 1,500 preassignment orders had been issued. The extensive turbulence of the overseas IRR population has meant that many orders have had to be rescinded only a short time after they had been issued. Experience has shown that at any given time only between 300 and 400 individuals hold effective orders preassigning them to the 21st Replacement Battalion. Presently a manual operation, plans call for the eventual automation of the OPP and its expansion to other overseas theaters.

In the spring of 1980 the Secretary of Defense directed the military services to put into operation by 1 October 1980 an Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) program which would preassign individual reservists in peacetime to active force units and organizations where they would train for wartime jobs. Goals of the new program were to improve the pretrained individual manpower posture of the services, to eliminate reporting delays and the need for orientation or post-mobilization training, to bring IMA participants into the Selected Reserve where they


would be subject to active service under the President's authority to call up as many as 100,000 selected reservists without declaring a national emergency, and to increase the involvement of gaining organizations through peacetime training and administration. DOD Directive 1215-6 permitted the Army to transfer mobilization designees from the IRR to the Selected Reserve for participation in the IMA program, effective I October 1982. With the exception of membership in the Selected Reserve, the IMA program closely paralleled the Mobilization Designee (MOBDES) program, which had existed since 1948. The Army chose to build the new program around the old one.

The status of MOBDES assignments at the close of the last two fiscal years is shown below. The net gain in participants and authorized positions registered in fiscal year 1981, combined with the participant-gain-to-loss ratio of three to one maintained throughout the year, indicates the present vitality and future growth potential of the MOBDES-IMA program.


MOBDES-IMA Assignments

(FY 81-30 Sep 81)

   Officer    Enlisted    Total
Authorized Positions  
Assigned Members  
(FY 80-30 Sep 80)
   Officer    Enlisted    Total
Authorized Positions  
Assigned Members  

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Letter 601-82-2, which established the involuntary Retiree Preassignment and Recall Program and provided the policies, procedures, and responsibilities for its implementation, was published on 28 August 1981. The Army continued to review mobilization tables of distribution and allowances to determine what positions could be filled by retirees. By the end of the fiscal year, 185,532 such positions had been documented in the requirements base.

An audit of the retirees available for preassignment against mobilization requirements was completed during fiscal year 1981. The total number of qualified (by age and health) retirees was approximately 250,000. Of that number, approximately 176,000 were from the Regular Army and 74,000 were from the reserve components. Comparison of assets and requirements by grade, skill, and location resulted in 95,087 matches with Regular Army


retirees. They will receive preassignment orders by tae end of calendar year 1982.

HQDA Letter 601--81-2 also provided for a voluntary preassignment program. The effectiveness of a. voluntary approach was indicated in October 1980 when retirees were asked to volunteer for duty with the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) in the event of mobilization. Almost immediately, 1,500 volunteered. By July 1981; over 2,500 retires had volunteered and received preassignment orders for the sixty-seven AFEES stations in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. The program has been well received and is currently 94 percent filled.

Training and Schooling

Inadequate resources continued to hamper the Army's performance of its training mission during fiscal year 1981. Reporting on the situation to a congressional committee in April 1981, Army Chief of Staff General E. C. Meyer noted that the additional resources needed to fully support the training base amounted to approximately $428 million, 9,400 military positions, and 11,600 civilian positions. A good start was made in correcting the situation by halting the seven-year decline in the number of personnel authorized in the training base; but additional resources were still needed, particularly in the areas of base operations support, initial entry training, and officer training and education programs. Lace in the fiscal year HQDA ODCSOPS Training Directorate initiated a study to determine more precisely the resources required for the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) training base.

In an effort to improve the management of training resources, the Chief of Staff directed The Inspector General to examine the relationship between training proficiency and training resources. Consequently, The Inspector General Agency now conducts training management inspections on a worldwide basis covering both active and reserve components, inspectors report on the adequacy and implementation of training policy and programs, the availability and rise of training resources, the development and use of training procedures, and the readiness of units to perform assigned missions.

The expansion of basic training (BT) and the common skills portion of one-station unit training (OSUT) by ninety-seven course hours was partially implemented at Fort Knox and Port Leonard Wood on 5 January 1981. A TRADOC evaluation per-


formed in May and June indicated that the expansion of enlisted initial entry training (IET) was producing a more highly motivated soldier who was significantly more skilled in combat survival. Plans moved forward to carry out the IET expansion throughout the Army early in fiscal year 1982.

IET has been affected by Project COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, Training), a test to determine the Army's ability to support a unit replacement system that would reduce turbulence, improve stability, and enhance the cohesion and readiness of units. COHORT is based on the four phases of the replacement unit life cycle: IET, stateside tour, deployment and tours outside CONUS (selected units), and termination and replacement. The twenty companies participating in COHORT include six mechanized, six light infantry, and three armor companies and five artillery batteries. TRADOC will conduct IET for ten of the units in OSUT at Forts Benning, Sill, and Knox. IET for the remaining units will consist of basic training at Fort Knox and advanced individual training (AIT) at either the 1st Infantry (Mechanized), 4th Infantry (Mechanized), or 7th Infantry Divisions. As part of the 36-month life cycle, seven companies will deploy to Germany from the 1st and 4th Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions for their last eighteen months, and four from the 7th Infantry Division will deploy to Korea for their last twelve months. The remaining nine companies will complete their life cycles by remaining with the 1st, 4th, and 7th Divisions. All twenty COHORT units will be terminated upon completion of the 36-month life cycle, and soldiers who enlisted for three years will be reassigned. Eighteen of the twenty COHORT units were formed in 1981; the other two will be organized in fiscal year 1982.

A cyclical surge in accessions in the summer of 1981 that exceeded the capability of TRADOC's infantry OSUT instructor and cadre was met by utilizing elements of USAR training divisions to augment TRADOC resources. One USAR company was used at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and two USAR companies were put into service at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. This measure was so successful in meeting the surge load that there was no need to burden FORSCOM, which was already strained by its support of reserve component summer unit training and ROTC summer camps. It also provided USAR training division units with an opportunity to perform their mobilization missions. Plans were well under way as the fiscal year ended to expand the scope of USAR training division augmentation to fifteen companies in the summer of 1982.


Implementation of recommendations of the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) continued during the year. The first Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) class of 117 students graduated on 6 June 1981. The school's mission is to train officers of the active and reserve components to function as staff officers with the army in the field. Phase I of the CAS3 course is a 142-hour nonresident program that focuses primarily on staff functions. It will be presented in residence at Fort Leavenworth through fiscal year 1982 for validation before being offered on a nonresident basis to officers who attend the school in fiscal year 1983 and later. Phase I culminates with a qualification examination, which the officer must pass before proceeding to the resident phase. Phase II is the resident TDY program which requires officers to apply their skills and knowledge in a staff environment. The resident phase lasts nine weeks and will be conducted at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

In September 1980 TRADOC's commanding general directed an examination of the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course for Combat Arms (BNCOC), which was at the time designed to produce a weapons and equipment expert who was competent in skill-level-three tasks in a specific combat arms military occupational specialty, to ensure that hard-hitting squad leaders, tank commanders, and section leaders were turned out. The examination led to recommendations which were approved in September 1981 for implementation beginning in fiscal year 1982. The revised BNCOC training program places greater emphasis on graduating specialists who are prepared to lead, train and direct the men under their command. The new course provides a 24-hour-a-day NCO academy environment. Trainer workshop instruction under the Battalion Training Management System will be expanded to include classes on methods of instruction and presentation of classes. Diagnostic tests will be used to identify weak students who require additional training as well as to select students who have demonstrated competency to serve as assistant instructors. A standard policy for determining graduation requirements will also be implemented.

During fiscal year 1981, the Army fielded Skill Qualification Tests (SQTs) for 613 of 1,145 MOS (military occupational specialty) skill levels. Scores on tests rose from 61 percent passing in fiscal year 1980 to 89 percent passing this year. The Army published new policy guidelines for implementing the SQT program within the reserve components. Despite changes begun in early 1980 and fully implemented by the end of fiscal year 1981,


the SQT program continued to experience growth pains. User units were particularly critical of the program's administrative costs, while Army studies showed that the tests resulted in "event-oriented" or surge training. A GAO (General Accounting Office) audit initiated in the spring of 1981 focused on these problems. The results of the audit should be available early in fiscal year 1982.

A significant achievement during the reporting period was the publication of common task soldier's manuals for skill levels one through four. These manuals set standards and conditions for tasks applicable to all soldiers and help to eliminate confusion.

A new program entitled Common Military Training (CMT) has been published in Army Regulation 350-1. CMT centralizes the management of Department of the Army training requirements and limits subjects to those that are absolutely essential. The program should reduce the multitude of training requirements levied on the field by Army staff agencies, which have tended to diffuse the Army's training priorities contained in Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs) and soldier's manuals.

In October 1980 the Army instituted a new, simple three item physical fitness test (pushups, situps, and a two-mile run) with standards adjusted for the physiological differences between men and women. Since no equipment is required, personnel can now be tested who could not before. More frequent testing can be conducted as well. Initial assessments show that 85 percent of the men and women in the Army are able to pass the test. About 5 percent of the soldiers tested reach the maximum score, indicating that the standards are challenging. The reserve components will phase in the new test over a two-year period.

A new fitness program for personnel over age forty is linked to an innovative system of cardiovascular screening. By using statistics available from the American Heart Association, the Army identifies personnel at risk of cardiovascular disease and prescribes additional medical evaluations. Although this program increases the load on the medical system, it will ultimately produce cost savings by identifying personnel with heart disease before a heart attack, since preventive treatment is less expensive than recovery care. The over-forty program is not yet available to the reserve components because of limited medical resources to conduct the necessary screening.

The Army continued development of the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. Following Fort Irwin's reactivation as a FORSCOM installation on 1 July 1981, the 197th


Infantry Brigade conducted an extended training period (thirty days) to check out thoroughly NTC support functions, equipment, and tactical scenarios. In August 1981 construction of the new live-fire range was completed. The range has automated targets which can simulate attacking or defending enemy forces while friendly forces maneuver and engage with live fire. A total of six battalion task forces (three brigade rotations) trained at the NTC in fiscal year 1981. Brigade rotations will increase to eight in fiscal year 1982, nine in fiscal year 1983, and twelve in fiscal year 1984.

The Army's budget request for fiscal year 1982 included $29 million to acquire approximately 244,000 acres of land for maneuver training for the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The training area, known as the Pinon Canyon, is located in southeastern Colorado, about 155 miles from Fort Carson. The project generated considerable political interest and debate. Congress held special hearings on the issues. In May 1981, the House Appropriations Committee started an investigation of the proposed acquisition. The final report, completed in July 1981, generally supported the project as being necessary, justified, and feasible.

Conduct of Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) training for NATO and CONUS-based forces remained limited during fiscal year 1981 because of a lack of training facilities. Construction was begun, however, on the Army's first new MOUT training facility at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This facility should be completed by the summer of 1982 and will serve as a prototype for future construction in FORSCOM, USAREUR, and WESTCOM. By 1986 all major commands are scheduled to have facilities for MOUT training that will provide the experimental training necessary for validation of doctrine, individual and unit performance criteria, and necessary combat developments and testing.

Specialized training in the active Army during the past year included U.S. and Allied small unit exchanges and unilateral exchanges with Canada and the United Kingdom; the presentation of on-the job and observed training to 100 individuals from fifteen foreign countries; and the continued revitalization of competitive marksmanship in both training and competition. Twelve FORSCOM infantry battalions participated in the three-week jungle Orientation course conducted by the U.S. Army Jungle Warfare Training Center at Fort Sherman in the Republic of Panama. Four infantry companies and 1,200 soldiers assigned to FORSCOM major combat units conducted Arctic Orientation Training at the U.S. Army Northern Warfare Training Center,


Fort Greely, Alaska. Four other FORSCOM units-infantry battalions--also conducted Arctic Orientation Training. They trained at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, under the Rotational Battalion Combat Team Program. Three other brigades conducted cold weather training at Fort Drum, New York.

Exercising, training, and deploying the Army Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF-A) received increased emphasis during the year. In October 1980, BRIGHT STAR 81 demonstrated rapid deployment and joint and combined readiness of selected RDF-A units. Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and a reinforced battalion of the 101st Airborne Division deployed to Egypt to evaluate command and control, increase cooperation with the host nation, familiarize personnel with desert environments, evaluate standard operating procedures, and test selected logistical and communications concepts. RDF-A forces also participated in Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81 and in the BRIEF REPLY communication exercise.

In other exercises, Army forces participated in eight JCS directed and thirty-seven JCS-coordinated exercises at a cost of $51 million in fiscal year 1981. These included two JCS-directed command post exercises; two major field training exercises (TEAM SPIRIT 81 and SOLID SHIELD 81); as well as large-scale USCIN-CRED field training exercises in the continental United States. LOGEX 81, conducted at Fort Pickett, Virginia, during the period 9-22 August 1981, was geared to the command and staff problems of combat support and combat service support (CS-CSS). The exercise featured an isolated U.S. corps as a 3 1/3-division force with a full complement of support units in a Central Europe scenario during a sixty-day unconventional war. Approximately 3,300 individual players from 110 active Army and reserve component units, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Central Army Group, Southern Command, and USAREUR participated in the exercise.

The Training Management Control System (TMACS), which was described in last year's historical summary, made progress during the year. In September 1981, the Pulau Electronics Corporation received a contract to provide the 199 computer units that will be required (FORSCOM 101, USAREUR 63, TRADOC 15, EUSA 13, and WESTCOM 7). Pulau will conduct operator and programmer training at Headquarters, FORSCOM, using two of the portable desk-top computer units in October 1981. Five units each will be delivered to Fort Hood and Fort Carson in November 1981 to conduct field testing of the revised software. Sixteen computers are scheduled for delivery to Fort Leav-


enworth in late December for major command training sessions, and the remaining computers (171) will be delivered to the field during 1982 in accordance with major command requirements.



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