Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1981
Intelligence, Automation, and Communications
The technological revolution of the decades since the Second World War has increasingly automated both military intelligence activities and signal communications, to say nothing of other aspects of the military scene. While automation thus serves both intelligence and communications, the two are especially linked with automation because of their basic need to transmit military information speedily and securely. By fiscal year 1981, the process of automation was proceeding at an accelerated pace in keeping with the Army's efforts to modernize its equipment. As one might expect, given the long lead-time required to field the new electronic systems, much of the Army's modernization of its intelligence gathering and signal communications during the reporting year is a history of research, development, and acquisition programs. During the year, there were also some organizational changes. In intelligence matters there was much attention to training, particularly in languages, which reflected the continuing worldwide scope of the Army's responsibilities. Several of the new systems were joint in nature, with the Army responsible, for example, for the ground stations of global satellite systems. This, too, was a mark of the continuing concurrence of joint- and single service operations.
The Army continued during the reporting year with its plans to begin reorganizing military intelligence units in the reserve components in fiscal year 1982. At the same time, the Army continued to carry out the recommendations of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study of 1975 concerning the reorganization of certain active units at the corps level and below. Accordingly, in June and September 1981, the Army combined several tactical military intelligence and Army Security Agency units to form military intelligence (MI) battalions in support of the 2d, 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions, respectively. To form these new battalions, the reorganizations combined the 2d Military Intelligence Company and the 329th Army Security Agency Company (Division Support) into the new 102d MI Battalion, the 3d MI Company and the 851st ASA Company into
the 103d MI Battalion, the 8th MI Company and the 415th ASA Company into the 108th MI Battalion, and the 24th MI Company and the 853d ASA Company into the 124th MI Battalion. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command assembled a special study team, with representatives from all Army major commands, to determine both peacetime and wartime intelligence requirements in echelons above corps. The team was expected to report by the end of December 1981.
Effective 1 April 1981, the Army transferred the Current Intelligence Division of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, an activity of the Intelligence and Security Command, to the U.S. Army Intelligence Operations Detachment, a field operating agency of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, where it had been lodged for operational control since 24 October 1980. The mission of the Current Intelligence Division was to aid the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence by providing and interpreting current intelligence from all sources for the Army secretariat, the Army staff, and the major Army commands. Considerations that influenced the return of the division to the control of the assistant chief were increased reporting requirements stemming from a rise in intelligence tensions, the Army staff's need for a reporting capability of its own, and a desire to reduce the responsibilities of the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center.
In order to retain civilian personnel in critical overseas positions during times of national emergency, including persons performing key intelligence services, the Department of Defense proposed certain policy changes, which were pending at the end of fiscal year 1981. The proposed changes would require certain civilians to join the Selected Reserves as a condition of employment, would extend coverage of the Uniform Code of Military justice to key civilians during periods of emergency, and would permit overseas commanders to require civilians holding designated positions to remain in place during mobilization or hostilities. The proponents of these changes believed that they would have a far-reaching, positive effect on the readiness of overseas units.
A personnel action pending at the end of fiscal year 1980 concerned whether or not to phase out meteorological observers (military occupational specialty 93E) and replace them with civilians, as had been urged in the plan presented by a task force set up to recommend improvements in the management of Army meteorological activities. This proposal interested military intelligence authorities, because commanders are necessarily as con-
cerned with the weather as they are with the terrain on which they might have to fight or with the number of opposing enemy forces. Because the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) had urged that meteorological observers be replaced by artillery ballistics observers (MOS 93F) rather than by civilians, who were in short supply, the task force's plan was not approved by the Vice Chief of Staff until July 1981. In order to secure its approval the staff dropped the recommendation regarding the meteorological observers, leaving the responsibility for resolving this matter to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development; and Acquisition. The solution reached by the interested parties, with some compromise before the end of the reporting year, was to begin replacing most of the meteorological observers with civilians in fiscal year 1983, eventually leaving only a few of these observers with military status.
During the past year the Army staff has given high priority to the training of signal intelligence personnel in a continuing effort to correct the problems associated with this training, problems that arose from the difficulty of making peacetime training meaningful. Inasmuch as most of the active and reserve military intelligence specialists are in combat intelligence units that support tactical forces in echelons up to and including corps, their peacetime training has generally been conducted under conditions far different from those they would encounter in wartime operations. Such a situation not only adversely affects individual and unit readiness, but also fosters job dissatisfaction and a low reenlistment rate. To deal with this matter, the Army in January 1980 issued a revision of its regulation on Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (AR 350-3), which directed an expansion of the readiness program to include all intelligence disciplines in the reserve components as well as in the active forces. The purpose of the program was to improve both individual and unit skills necessary for combat intelligence. To do this, the training of personnel against real targets was emphasized in order to make training realistic and to counter dissatisfaction stemming from the artificiality of traditional peacetime training.
Opportunities for maintaining or improving individual skills provided by the readiness program included post-apprentice technical courses, self-study foreign language texts and tapes, participation in so-called live environment intelligence operations, and specialized operational training conducted by strategic and national intelligence agencies, all supplemented by educational centers, language laboratories, and foreign language courses. To make training more realistic and practical, the readiness program
provided during the past year for the acquisition of limited quantities of commercial equipment in lieu of military equipment not yet in sufficient supply for regular use. In one activity, intelligence specialists used normal tactical equipment to process raw data gathered by sensor-collecting devices, the data sometimes being transmitted to tactical units at or near their garrisons. This activity combined so-called in-unit and live environment training of a practical kind.
To improve training of communications or signal intelligence personnel, officials designed, as an aspect of the readiness training program, the so-called TROJAN projects to provide live signal intelligence training at two installations of the U.S. Army Forces Command. Funding for these projects is for fiscal years 19831987, which includes funds for expanding them and for establishing a project at another installation. Also funded for these years is a TROJAN project for Europe, for which U.S. Army, Europe, urged additional funding for fiscal year 1982.
To provide for improved intelligence training for the reserve components, Forces Command began to establish two consolidated training facilities, one at Fort Shelling, Minnesota, and one at Austin, Texas. Each of these facilities was to train reserve intelligence personnel in its general area. Both were to offer live training opportunities including training afforded by the TROJAN projects.
In fiscal year 1981, nearly 1,400 enlisted and warrant officer specialists participated in live environment or specialized operational training provided by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and national intelligence agencies. That was a 55-percent increase in participation over the previous fiscal year. Of the participants, 40 percent were linguists. Virtually all intelligence personnel in the active forces and many in the reserve components participated in intelligence activities within their units during the year. Officials responsible for the readiness training program believed that the measures taken during the past year not only increased individual proficiency and unit readiness, but also contributed to the contingency planning of tactical units receiving intelligence support.
As might be expected, language training was of particular importance to the Army, which during the fiscal year launched a substantial program for improving its linguistic capability for intelligence purposes. Although the results of its efforts would not be very fruitful for some time, fiscal year 1981 witnessed increased awareness and improvement in the management and training of linguists.
To capitalize for the first time on the number of persons in large urban areas speaking their native foreign tongues, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command sent out four teams of linguists, each to a different city-Pittsburgh, Boston, Sacramento, and Santa Ana. By the end of the year these teams were able to visit forty-five schools. The Army, working through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), sought to develop a career management field for linguists that was geared to a language instead of the awkward system that was keyed to a technical skill, such as voice interceptor. If such a career field were developed, it would be possible to improve and maintain language skills directly as a principal object of management rather than as something incidental to the skill. TRADOC, therefore, set about preparing new descriptions of career fields 96 and 98 (military intelligence and electronic warfare cryptological operations) with a view to converting them, to linguistic career management fields.
Another problem with maintaining language skills was that speakers of some languages that would be needed in certain contingencies were scattered throughout the force structure, thus making skill maintenance training difficult. To overcome this problem, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command began work on a language organization to which these specialists could be brought for training.
To provide special incentives for linguists-who heretofore could receive only a. selective reenlistment bonus, which had proven inadequate for retaining linguists with much needed skills-the Army proposed skill shortage pay, which the fiscal yeah 1982 defense appropriation bill authorized along with combat arms pay. Another matter that impinged on morale and efficiency was the policy requiring short, unaccompanied tours in Korea, which resulted in repetitive overseas assignments and family turmoil anal provided little time for the linguist to become familiar with his work. To correct this situation, the Army permitted selected linguists, going to certain locations in Korea, to serve two-year tours with their families accompanying them. Since the inception of this plan in the summer of 1981, fifteen selected linguist have gone to Korea.
Still another, infringement on morale and efficiency was the practice of training tactical intelligence units in the continental United States by using recorded, dated intercepts. Informal surveys, demonstrating that working in art actual intelligence situation resulted in greater job satisfaction than working in a sterile environment, led the Army to establish training programs with real intelligence missions at two locations within the United
States. U.S. Army, Europe, planned to establish a similar program in fiscal year 1982.
Previously, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, in addition to acting as executive agent for the Defense Foreign Language Program, had served as the Army Service Program Manager for linguists. In November 1980, the Service Program Manager function was transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
Refresher-maintenance and intermediate language training within the Army is limited by the resources of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) and by the availability of soldiers due for training. On the other hand, language training through other federal agencies and at U.S. and foreign academic institutions is more economical, both in time and money, for soldiers who otherwise would have to move. Recognizing this fact, the Army developed new programs to make use of these options. Furthermore, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command took steps during the year to establish the Foreign Language Training Center, Europe (FLTCE), in Munich, Germany.
In order for field commanders to maintain language proficiency within their units on a day-to-day basis, the Army included funds in its fiscal year 1982 budget to provide diagnostic tools for determining deficiencies in language skills, remedial training for improving these skills, and performance tests for measuring their development. In further support of these objectives, the amended fiscal year 1982 budget included $1.2 million for the Defense Language Institute's Foreign Language Center for nonresident language training materials and course design and development. The Army also planned to start language proficiency sustainment courses in fiscal year 1982 for German, Arabic, Korean, and Chinese.
A common deficiency of language training materials heretofore had been that they often lacked spontaneity and were out of date in terms of actual linguistic usage. To help this situation, fiscal year 1982 funds will permit the Army to use video tapes of foreign television broadcasts in language training. In a related development, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1981, the Army authorized intelligence personnel to intercept foreign language transmissions during field training exercises. Previously, regulations had forbidden such use of foreign transmissions; as a result, linguists in training were exposed only to English language traffic.
The overseas program provided training for 125 students in
thirty countries during fiscal year 1981. Also during this year the Army established new training sites in Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Indonesia, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, and Sudan, and it initiated negotiations to begin training in the People's Republic of China and in Malawi in Sub-Saharan Africa. To accommodate the expansion of this overseas program, the Army had to increase its training budget.
In another overseas intelligence training activity, the Army and Air Force sent a technical assistance team of four people (three from the Army and one from the Air Force) to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to help the Saudi Arabian forces organize and operate a joint intelligence school. The main purpose of this school was to provide training in tactical intelligence and imagery interpretation. During the period April-July 1981, the team set up and conducted one tactical intelligence course and partially organized another in imagery interpretation. There were problems getting the necessary equipment for the latter course, but the team expected it to begin on 15 December 1981, early in the new fiscal year.
Imagery interpretation is an important aspect of intelligence training, dealing as it does with the recognition, identification, location, description, and analysis of objects, activities, and terrain represented electronically or on film or through other media. To improve Army capabilities in this field, a joint working group made up of representatives from OACSI, TRADOC, USA-ICS, and INSCOM drafted the U.S. Army Air Intelligence and Imagery Plan during the summer and fall of 1981, but did not have it quite ready for approval by the end of the fiscal year. The study from which the plan resulted reviewed current air intelligence and imagery training and recommended changes relating to the Mobile Army Ground Imagery Interpretation Center and several imagery systems that had been recently introduced.
Before 1975, the Army had limited its technical training of tactical signal intelligence units to ways that proved unsatisfactory, either because they did not provide day-to-day tactical training or because related requirements took up the time needed for maintaining technical skills. As time went by, technological advances in communications and automation made alternative ways of training signal intelligence soldiers more efficient and cost effective.
In 1980, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command conducted a worldwide evaluation of the technical health of U.S. signal intelligence units, which indicated the need for new and effective training. Because of new technology and training needs,
U.S. Army, Europe, laid down a requirement for a signal intelligence electronic warfare training simulator that would make use of new technology by tying both jammers and information collectors with emitter signals controlled from a single location. This equipment would pit the trainee against a simulated but nevertheless realistic signal intelligence problem. In planning for the year immediately ahead, the Army staff looked to the procurement of these tactical simulators in fiscal years 1983-1987 for all active and reserve combat electronic warfare intelligence units. The Army regards these units as very important because, of their ability, when fully trained and equipped with signal intelligence and direction-finding equipment, to locate an enemy electronically and then to destroy the electronics upon which he depends for exercising his tactical doctrine.
Human intelligence (HUMINT in the jargon of the trade) is intelligence gathered directly by humans, as distinguished from intelligence collected by electronic, photographic, or other physical "nonhuman" means. In September 1981, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Assistant Chief` of Staff for Intelligence approved a draft statement of policies and procedures in the field of human intelligence. Among other things, the statement set forth the various ways in which human intelligence organizations in echelons above corps could meet the needs of tactical commanders, and vice versa. Of particular importance was the draft's validation of the need of corps commanders for an organic long-range surveillance ability. If approved by the Army Electronic Warfare Intelligence Committee in 1982 as expected, the statement would help shape the future human intelligence force structure.
Executive Order 11905, issued by President Gerald R. Ford on 18 February 1976, and Executive Order 12036, issued by President Jimmy Carter on 24 January 1978, which built on experience with the Ford order, laid down exacting guidelines for conducting U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As President Carter stated when issuing his order:
Our intelligence agencies have a critical role to play in collecting and analyzing information important to our national security interests and, on occasion, acting in direct support of major foreign policy objectives. It is equally important, however, that the methods employed by these agencies meet constitutional standards protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons and are in full compliance with the law.
Executive Order 12036 authorized the military services to conduct counterintelligence activities in coordination with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) inside the United States and with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) outside the nation's borders in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General. Both presidential orders required the executive departments and agencies to bring their directives and regulations into conformity with the new guidelines.
On 10 January 1977, in the wake of Executive Order 11905, the Army rescinded Army Regulation 381-150 of 26 July 1971, a broad rather than detailed guide to the Army's collection of intelligence by human means. Delay by the Department of Defense in implementing the new presidential requirements caused further delay down the line. Department of Defense Directive 5250.1 and Regulation 5240.1-R, which deal with the policies and procedures pertaining to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, did not come out until November 1979; and 5240.2, which pertains to the assignment of counterintelligence responsibilities to military departments, was not issued until 18 December 1979. Consequently, the Army could not replace AR 381150 with 381-100 and could not issue AR 381-10 and 381-20 until still later.
On 1 August 1981 the Army put out Army Regulation 381100 on collecting human intelligence, with an effective date of 1 September 1981. The number of the regulation was changed because the number of a rescinded regulation cannot be used for five years. Without guidelines of its own or of the Department of Defense, the Army operated on the basis of national guidelines in the field of human intelligence during the period 1977 to 1981 as, in the final analysis, it always did and still does.
Army Regulation 381-10, on Army intelligence activities as a whole, was almost ready for publication at the end of fiscal year 1981. Following publication of Department of Defense Directive 5240.2, the Army prepared a revision of Army Regulation 38120 of 10 September 1975 on counterintelligence operations. This revision implemented 5240.2 and would be ready for publication early in calendar year 1982. For the record, the new 381-10 used the number of a 1967 regulation, on channels of communication with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that had been superseded by 381-20 of 1975. The new revision included the old delimitations agreement of 1949 between the intelligence agencies of the military services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which formed a part of 381-20 of 1975, as revised in 1979.
Counterintelligence support to Army operational security
programs had a high priority for at least five years preceding the reporting year. Emphasis with respect to counterintelligence support of operational security, however, has changed since the mid1970s, from a determination of what may have been compromised in units and installations to an emphasis on giving advice and assistance in security matters. It is hoped that this new approach will prevent the loss of sensitive information rather than merely document such a loss, as sometimes happened in the past.
Major accomplishments in counterintelligence support of operational security during the past fiscal year were in two broad areas: there was a marked increase in senior-level support of the operational security program in general and of counterintelligence support in particular; and there was a shift in priorities from counterintelligence support of the Army in general to support of research, development, test, and evaluation activities within the continental United States, which became the premier counterintelligence priority. At year's end this counterintelligence support to research and its related activities was expected to continue, with emphasis on early identification of sensitive programs in order to support them throughout their course.
Intelligence support of the Army continued to depend a great deal upon automated data processing. An example of computer use in the reporting year was the success of the Intelligence Information Subsystem (a part of the Intelligence Data Handling System), which the Army had fielded in 1979 as its first mobile all-source automated means of intelligence support. In field exercises the subsystem supported both the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the Central Army Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
In the case of the Intelligence Data Handling System, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence carried out its management responsibilities in various ways. It upgraded existing minicomputers of the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM), the Intelligence Threat Analysis Center, the Foreign Science and Technology Center, and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). It also took steps to install at existing sites such additional peripheral equipment as tape and disk drives, multiplexers, terminals, printers, and printer-plotters. At year's end there was a telecommunications satellite link between Korea and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, in Hawaii; a minicomputer was being installed at Arlington Hall Station to link the Intelligence Security Command and the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon; the Naval Photo Interpretation Center was installing a cathode ray tube to put the Photo Center on-line with
the Army Operations Center; and the Army had committed funds to upgrade the Analyst Intelligence Display and Orientation System in Germany. Also at year's end the Army Threat and Intelligence Production System was in the definition and design phase; and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command had agreed to the extension of its jurisdiction to include the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System and the Army's Intelligence Data Handling System.
Extensive computerization of the Army's intelligence function can also be seen in the continuation of Project ASSIST (Army System for Standard Intelligence Support Terminals), under which it released to the field new automatic data programming, designated Version 4.1, and then proceeded with the development of Version 5.0. This latter version, when developed, will simplify the access of intelligence analysts to large data bases at remote computer sites. As the year ended, the International Nickel Company (INCO, Inc.) was under a multiyear contract to carry on the work under Project ASSIST in the areas of maintenance and improvement, technical support for intelligence installations outside the continental United States, personnel training, and administration, including required reporting of contract status. INCO, Inc.'s work covered simplification of machine instructions, modification of Bunker Ramo Company's Model 1569, provision of an information exchange with Datanet 355, a computer security system, programming for linkage with the Defense Intelligence Agency's on-line system, as well as other technical services. Other developments under Project ASSIST included the upgrading of major computer equipment at Headquarters, European Command, which involved the replacement of several minicomputers, and increasing computer and message capacity by the use of a wideband circuit and multiplexer at both EUCOM and USAREUR headquarters.
In the control and analysis of signal intelligence by automated data processing before 1980, each of the military services pursued its own course. As might be expected, this led to considerable duplication of effort and increased costs. In an attempt to develop a more efficient approach, the National Security Agency brought the services together early in 1980 and directed them to identify their signal control and analysis needs and to eliminate duplication. The services approved a joint statement of requirements which they submitted for approval by the National Security Agency in August 1981.
The Army not only pushed forward on several intelligence fronts during the past fiscal year but, as the Department of De-
fense executive agent, also opened, on 15 December 1980, a new remote triservice intelligence facility in a huge three-story underground structure adjacent to Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Air Base at Kunia, on Central Oahu, Hawaii. Before opening the facility, which represented a significant advance in intelligence operations in the area, the Army had to renovate part of the third floor of the structure that housed it. At the end of the fiscal year expansion of the new facility was in progress as plans continued for renovating the remainder of the third floor, part of the second floor, and a major part of the first floor. The structure had been built after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as an underground parking facility for military aircraft.
Military intelligence personnel had representatives in several groups, including the Operations Subcommittee and the Imagery Planning Subcommittee of the Committee on Imagery Reconnaissance and Exploitation, which was reorganized to provide a more timely response to the requirements of the intelligence community. Managing the current collection and exploitation needs of imagery intelligence was the responsibility of the Operations Subcommittee; reviewing long-range requirements for collection and exploitation, for the purpose of making recommendations to the parent committee, was the responsibility of the Imagery Planning Subcommittee. Army representation in another working group led to the lifting of limitations on the timely and widespread dissemination of overhead imagery. The group expected to publish the first section of its findings in late 1981 or early 1982.
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence participated in the departmental management of the Army's Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program, which provided for the development of connections between Army tactical organizations and national intelligence sources. An important occurrence in these matters was the redeployment of the digital imagery testbed - a prototype or experimental system for receiving imagery from various sensors to use in the timely exploitation of imagery-from Europe to its future home with the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Before its redeployment to the XVIII Airborne, the testbed, in a very successful demonstration, supported CERTAIN RAMPART, a field training exercise of the VII Corps; REFORGER, the annual mobility exercise; and Exercise SHOCKWAVE of the U.S. European Command. This action provided both contingency support for REFORGER and training that was useful in developing the Tactical Imagery Exploitation System.
The Army also sent a representative to help revise the Joint Chiefs of Staff Test Plan to Assess the Capabilities of National Intelligence Systems to Support Tactical Requirements. The revision allowed the unified and specified commands and services to recommend exercises as vehicles for special projects and, of particular importance, to add teeth and flexibility to the old document by establishing a procedure through which the joint Chiefs could take corrective action. The Imagery Intelligence Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, as the staff agency primarily responsible for Army actions under the revised document, coordinated Army personnel, communications, and funding for special project CONSTANT HORIZON, the vehicle for which was ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81, a command post exercise of Combined Forces Command in Korea. CONSTANT HORIZON proved to be a milestone in the improvement of national intelligence support in the Korean theater.
The Imagery Intelligence Division was also the agency primarily responsible for the Army's participation in the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program. This was a major functional program which had been established within the tactical and other related intelligence activities of the Department of Defense to improve satellite reconnaissance support of operational forces. The division responded to planning, programming, and budgetary matters arising under this program in coordination with the Vice Chief, the Chief of Staff, the Undersecretary, and the Secretary of the Army.
The National Security Agency annually awards its director's trophy to the tactical and mobile military cryptologic collector that contributed the most significant signal intelligence data during the previous calendar year. Although the Army did not win this award for 1980, its nominee-the 372d Army Security Agency Company, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Oahu, Hawaii-won the runner-up trophy, which the director presented during ceremonies at Fort Meade, Maryland.
In order to consolidate management of command, control, communications, and computers under one head, as previously planned, the Army staff established, effective 1 October 1981, the office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, C4, and assigned these functions to him. He would also have membership on certain key committees of Headquarters, Department of the Army. The staff placed this important
new office in Operations and Plans, because the functions involved were important to operations.
Specific legislation (Public Law 89-306) and regulations provided the authority and procedures for acquiring automated data processing equipment along with its necessary programming and maintenance. The body of applicable regulations included Federal Property Management Regulations, Federal Procurement Regulations, Defense Acquisition Regulations (together with Army supplements), and Army Regulations. Army Regulation 18-1, "Army Automation Management," 15 August 1980, set forth basic policies and responsibilities and delegated authority for managing Army automation. This regulation and others in the same series established policies and procedures for most automation in the Army. During the past year the Army published a number of technical bulletins on various aspects of automation management. One of these, technical Bulletin 18-1009 "Army Automation Life Cycle Management," 15 August 1981, provided a systematic and disciplined approach to the management of the entire life cycle of automated data processing projects. These regulations and bulletins, based on Department of Defense Directives 5100.40 and 7920.1, together with Instruction 7920.2, covered the use of computers for logistical and other general purposes. They were not concerned with so-called embedded computers-such as those built into weapons systems, those used by the Corps of Engineers in carrying out its civil works responsibilities, or those used by activities financed through unappropriated funds-all of which were handled separately.
Among the provisions of Army Regulation 18-1 were descriptions of the classes of automated data processing equipment as well as costs and acquisition authority. Acquisition authority not delegated to heads of Army staff agencies and major commanders remained under the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Financial Management. In these cases, the U.S. Army Computer Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency was responsible for actual acquisition.
Logistical planning anticipated an accelerated effort in the next decade to improve the operational capability of the Army's field forces by introducing complex automated data processing of even the "embedded" kind, which forms an integral part of communications equipment and weapons systems, as well as the self-contained kind. To accomplish these purposes, the Army formulated and published Department of the Army Letter 700-81-1, "Logistic Support Policy for Automatic Data Processing Equipment," 30 April 1981, which, with any revisions that might be
required, would provide needed guidance for the foreseeable future.
In logistical planning in the field, both functional and individual systems automation plans, as part of the Army Automation Planning, Programming, and Evaluation System, played important roles in obtaining recognition for automated systems as integral parts of the comparable DOD evaluation system. In July 1981, the Office of the Deputy Chief for Logistics submitted to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation and Communications four functional and sixteen individual plans, about the same number that had been submitted during fiscal year 1980.
Procurement of automated data processing equipment received substantial attention during the past year at most of the sites in the Base Operating System, together with other selected sites, as well as at European area communications sites. Of the first category there were approximately forty-seven sites in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama that had obsolescent IBM 360 computers. The obsolescent equipment at these places, which provided the Army with nontactical administrative, logistical, and financial processing, was completely saturated, thus becoming difficult to maintain and inadequate for mobilization. To deal with this situation the Army staff and selected major commands jointly developed the high-priority Vertical Installation Automation Baseline (VIABLE) Project, which laid down a procurement schedule through fiscal year 1984. Army proponents of this project were confident that it would alleviate the problems caused by failing equipment and would enable the Army to obtain new equipment, at low operating costs, through open and competitive bidding.
Management of the project was according to the guidelines set forth in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109, which encourages the use of industrial solutions to problems faced by government agencies. This policy required early involvement of the automated data processing industry in the acquisition program. After extensive review of the project within the government, industrial proposals for projects were the responsibility, first, of the VIABLE Source Selection Evaluation Board and, finally, of the In-Process Review Board, which reported, with its recommendations, to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Financial Management. The evolution was in two phases: one phase evaluated concepts and possible solutions as well as compliance with requirements;
the other was an actual demonstration. As the year ended, the project was in the second, or testing, phase.
In the case of the European area communications sites during the past year, the Army replaced all fixed International Business Machine (IBM) 360 computers with automated data processing equipment from that company's 4300 Series. It also made improvements in the mobile equipment by upgrading the 360/30 computers of the division-level combined services support system in the 8th Infantry Division to a 360/40 central processing unit. This upgrading was done in August 1981 by leasing government owned equipment, which brought about at least a 25-percent improvement in processing time. As the year ended, there were plans to upgrade similarly the 360/30 equipment of the other three divisions and of the three separate brigades of U.S. Army, Europe. Also at that time, there was $14 million in the Army's fiscal year 1982 budget for five so-called Interim Theater Automatic Data Processing Service Center systems. These would be mobile systems using equipment of the 4300 Series and would be located in the 200th Theater Army Maintenance Command at Zweibruecken, the 21st Support Command at Kaiserslautern, the 7th Medical Command at Karlsruhe, the 1st Personnel Command at Schwetzinger, and the 4th Transportation Command at Oberursel. The new systems were not expected to be in place, however, until the last quarter of 1983, but once established they would be able to meet wartime needs.
In the case of the fifty-one nondivisional direct support and general support sites in Europe, the Army had, by the end of the fiscal year, all but completed replacement of the National Cash Register 500 equipment with that of the Decentralized Automated Service Support System. This system was Honeywell's Level 6 computer, with certain specialized features, mounted in a mobile 35-foot semitrailer, which figured prominently in a plan to replace equipment in the higher echelons of the Army in Europe.
This plan was the Army Combat Service Support Automation and Communications Transition Plan, FY 81-88, which at first was called simply the Combat Service Support Transition Plan. The U.S. Army Logistics Center developed it with assistance from the Soldier Support Center, the U.S. Army Signal School, and the Health Services Command; the plan was expected to be integrated into the Army Command and Control Master Plan by early 1983. As submitted to the Combined Army Development Agency and distributed in September 1981, the transition plan would provide a procedure for eventually replacing existing au-
tomated data processing systems in field combat support units with two basic types of computer equipment.
One type of equipment was an expanded version of the Decentralized Automated Service Support System (DAS3), designed to meet the data processing needs of combat service support units at divisional, corps, and theater levels of operation; the other type was the similar Division Level Data Entry Device. The expanded version of the Decentralized Automated Service Support System was intended to replace the mobile IBM 360/30 computers and the UNIVAC 1005 computers in divisions of both the active Army and the reserve components and also to replace the SPECTRA 70-15 computers at the ports. The plan helped users to define requirements for developing, testing, fielding, and integrating combat service support and automated communications for all Army organizational levels in the field. In addition, it was a guide to those concerned with combat service support automated communications to help bring about a system that would be interoperable with the Battlefield Automated System, as provided in the Army Battlefield Interface Concept.
To meet the needs of field commanders for automatic and precise information on the location of friendly forces, the Army and the other military services developed a program that, following a series of tests, could be operational by 1988. The Army's name for the proposed program, the Army Data Distribution System, was much shorter than the combined name of the parts that formed the whole: the Position Location Reporting Systems, a combined Army-Marine Corps program; and the joint Tactical Information Distribution System, an Air Force, Navy, and Army program. The full name of the composite system came from putting these two names together and adding the word hybrid. In its own shorthand, however, the military referred to it as PJH. The Position Location Reporting System of the Army and Marine Corps would serve soldiers on foot, in surface vehicles, or in aircraft by giving them their own location as well as that of friendly units or other similar information. It would use a master station, an alternate master station, and units in manpacks, vehicles, and aircraft. The proponents of this system completed the second phase of its developmental testing at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in September 1981, and at the end of the year they were completing the second phase of its operational testing at Fort Hood, Texas. With an Army review scheduled for September 1982, the Army expected the system to be ready in 1986.
The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, the other part of the composite system, was a triservice program to develop
a digital data information distribution system that would provide secure communications for navigation and identification. Through this system, information would be distributed at high speed. Its management was through a joint program office, with the Air Force as the lead service.
The composite system was developed to satisfy the need for communications able to support existing and programmed automated systems for maneuver control, air defense, fire support, intelligence electronics warfare, and combat service support. It is a computer-based system providing real-time, secure data communications, identification, and position location and reporting information to the tactical forces with rapid response times, resistance to jamming, security, and low levels of mutual interference with users of voice communications.
Another system in its early stages was the Theater Army Medical Management Information System. This was a complete system designed to provide operational support and command and control information regarding medical resources on the battlefield. Intended for use by major commands in a war zone, it could also be used by subordinate commands, hospitals, and medical reserve units. Within the overall structure there were subsystems concerned with medical logistics, medical regulating, patient accounting and reporting, and whole blood management. In its final form the system would have both manual and automated features and would be used to acquire, process, and disseminate information that would assist tactical and medical commanders in managing their medical resources. It would also connect with the Army Standard Supply System to exchange logistical information, with the Army Personnel System to exchange personnel and accounting casualty reporting information, and with the Combat Service Support Command and Control System to exchange command and control information. Initially the system would use the Honeywell Level 6 computer of the Decentralized Automated Service Support System in the medical supply optical and maintenance units and at the medical command levels; the Division Level Data Device, an IBM Series I computer, was envisioned at all treatment facilities and command and control units. Eventually both would be replaced by military computers.
The Academy of Health Sciences and the Office of the Surgeon General developed a product manager's charter for this system before the end of the fiscal year, at which time it was awaiting approval by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Financial Management. As envisioned, the system would use extensive telecommunications and
mobile equipment that would not require environmental conditioning to operate. At year's end, preliminary contract work was expected to get under way in fiscal year 1982.
Since communications have become highly automated in recent years, the decision as to whether some subjects should be grouped under automation or communications is often purely arbitrary. However, in some cases the subjects fall naturally into one category or the other, as is the case with communications for tactical nuclear forces. As the executive agent for communications supporting tactical nuclear forces in Europe, the Army continued to develop and implement a series of projects to upgrade existing facilities. It expanded the voice conference system of the U.S. European Command and added a secure record capability; procured and installed new high-frequency radios for the EUCOM special purpose network, known as the Cemetery Net; completed the final testing of new satellite communications in preparation for deployment to Europe in fiscal year 1982; and continued a new program to develop improved, high-frequency radios for mobile forces. The new radios permit easier operations, higher reliability, and increased maintainability. These radios are being developed in such a way as to allow for future modifications of a frequency-hopping capability which offers better protection and significantly improved resistance to jamming.
In another effort to upgrade military communications in Europe, the Department of Defense secured approval from the Federal Republic of Germany, in a 1978 memorandum of understanding with its Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, to procure 112 electronic digital telephone switches for use in modernizing the European Telephone System (ETS) network. The Army procured nineteen of these switches in fiscal year 1981 to add to the six obtained the previous year. The acquisition of equipment for such a large network must be accomplished over several years. At year's end, one switch had been cut over and was operational in Garlstedt.
By means of the Telecommunications Plan for the Improvement of Communications in Korea, the United States launched an ambitious effort to improve its military communications in the Republic of Korea. This project would be accomplished by integrating U.S. communications with those of Korea, thereby establishing a highly protected, high-quality communications system capable of supporting the military forces of both countries
under normal, crisis, and wartime conditions. The plan, dated in 1980, was approved by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1981. The Army would be the lead military service in carrying out this plan and, accordingly, turned to the U.S. Army Communications Command at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to undertake the work. By the end of the fiscal year the work had been funded, and preliminary engineering such as site and route surveys for cable trunks and technical control equipment was under way in Korea.
To manage its far-flung commitments, the United States operated the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, in support of which the Army continued to expand its automated data processing capabilities. This system provided an automated means for exchanging command and control information that supported decision making at the highest military levels. The medium for coordinating the decision-making effort was a subsystem in the form of an intercomputer network connecting the information systems that served planning, logistics, intelligence, readiness and mobilization management, deployment, and support of forces. The Army improved the capacity of the network to deploy and support forces by extending its connections to east and west coast ports through the command and control facilities of the Military Traffic Management Command. The Army improved its support of this system by upgrading the automated data processing equipment at Headquarters, Department of the Army, and at other key facilities to provide increased data storage, better processing, and additional local and remote terminals. In supporting the reconfiguration of the intercomputer network, begun during the last half of the fiscal year, the Army tried to improve reliability and performance by upgrading transmission rates of selected circuits, rerouting other circuits, and activating additional ones. The scheduled date for completing this reconfiguration was June 1982. In July 1981, the Army began surveys at the command headquarters of worldwide command and control sites to determine future information needs in the functional areas of nuclear operations, resource and unit monitoring, and conventional planning and execution for the period after 1985. The survey results, in part, will help determine the Worldwide Command and Control Information System that will replace the present worldwide system.
Another advanced military communications system of the period was the NAVSTAR (Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging) Global Positioning System, which would provide accurate three-dimensional position information to its users anywhere on
or near earth. This system consists of a space segment, made up of eighteen satellites; a control segment, formed by control and monitor stations within the continental United States; .and a user segment, composed of a manpack and a surface vehicle or an aircraft. Its development was a DOD program in which all services participated. Designated a major system, it was under a joint program office with the Air Force as the lead service. At year's end there were six satellites in orbit which could provide position information to the model user equipment sets located worldwide. Full-scale engineering and development contracts had been awarded in June 1979 to the competing contractors-Rockwell International/Collins and Magnavox. The Army would use the system with manpack, vehicular, and airborne sets to update and complement other position-navigation sets planned for the Army. Target dates for achieving operational status were 1987 for two dimensional positioning, or limited capability, and 1988 for three-dimensional positioning, or full capability.
During fiscal year 1981, the Army, as the executive agent, continued to meet its responsibilities for the ground equipment of the Defense Satellite Communications and the Tactical Satellite Communications System. These were closely related projects concerning both strategic and tactical communications, with the Army developing the ground equipment, the Air Force developing and launching the space system, and the Navy developing systems unique to its own needs. In such systems, the satellite serves as a relay station between two terminals; therefore, terrain is much less a consideration than it is in ordinary terrestrial systems.
In carrying out its responsibilities under the Defense Satellite Communications System, which would provide secure point-to-point long-haul communications, the Army, in fiscal year 1981 took possession of four medium satellite ground terminals and anticipated the installation of seventeen more in fiscal years 1982 and 1983. These terminals were of a model known by its joint nomenclature AN/GSC-39. Also during the year, the Army secured the authority to procure twenty-two new satellite terminals, which would lead to the replacement of the old terminals (known as AN/MSC-46 and AN/TSC-54) dating from 1962-1964. The Army obtained six new transportable terminals (Model AN/TSC-86) during the fiscal year and expected to deliver them to the field the following year. The Army also fielded the first shipment of Model AN/USC-28 jam-resistant equipment and planned to deliver and install an additional forty-eight sets worldwide in the next year. By installing six digital communications
subsystems during the reporting year, the Army increased to forty-nine the number of such units deployed.
The Army awarded a contract to develop connecting links with Defense Satellite Communications System control, which would lead to a later procurement contract. There were numerous joint actions approved during fiscal year 1981 to increase the capability and flexibility of the system in support of both the new Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and its Army component. Developmental efforts begun in fiscal year 1981 would provide the system with an extremely high frequency capability by 1990. With award of the terminal contract and related support contracts in fiscal year 1982, the high-frequency modernization program would carry the system into the next century. Meanwhile, to guarantee the continuity of its work, the Army projected future construction and personnel requirements and initiated the necessary planning, programming, and budgeting.
The program for developing the Tactical Satellite Communications System has two phases, initial and-objective. In the initial phase, the Army would field two single-channel systems in the ultra high frequency range and one multichannel system in the super high range. The single-channel Special Communication System, or AN/MSC-64 as it was designated, was in full-scale production in fiscal year 1981, with a scheduled completion date of 1983; it would provide secure command and control communications from the National Command Authority to various special units all over the world. At the end of the fiscal year, the Army awarded a production contract for the second of the single channel systems, AN/PSC-3, a man-portable system for Ranger and Special Forces units. The Multi-Channel Initial System, or AN/TSC-85A and 93A, would provide communications down to brigade level. Its procurement was to end in 1983. Following its procurement and delivery in the field, low-rate multiplexers and jam-resistant features would be added.
In the second, or objective, phase of this project, the Army would field one single-channel and one multichannel system. The first, called the Single Channel Objective Tactical Terminal, an extremely high frequency system, was in an advanced state of development at year's end. Its fielding would depend upon the availability of a satellite suited to its range. At the end of the year the Multi-Channel Objective System, which would also operate in the extremely high frequency range, was still in the concept validation stage.
Another joint communications effort was made in support of the joint Tactical Communications Program which, when all its
subsystems are integrated, will provide a large-scale, automatic, and secure digital system. Subsystems for which the Army was responsible included the AN/TTC-39 circuit switch and AN/ TTC-39 message switch, on which General Telephone Electric Sylvania began production during fiscal year 1981 under a contract calling for six of the circuit switches and eighteen of the message switches. The Army also had charge of the Single Subscriber Terminal, for which Singer Librascope won a full-scale development contract in 1980. Not only did Singer Librascope keep production on schedule during the year, but it proposed a cost-effective value engineering change that would reduce complexity and costs throughout the life cycle of the equipment. Under this joint program the Army also had responsibility for the equipment and assemblages of the Digital Group Multiplexer, which it decided to produce in fiscal year 1981. There were problems with some proposed Army subsystems, which were still unresolved at the end of the year, including a Canadian protest in one case.
Experience with the Automated Tactical Frequency Engineering System, an Army undertaking, was to influence future concept development efforts associated with the joint Tactical Communications System. This latter system was standardized for operating across all services for both voice and record traffic; it would use various kinds of equipment, including secure and non-secure telephones, multichannel radios, teletype, and facsimile equipment. The Automated Tactical Frequency Engineering System was a project initiated by the U.S. Army Communications Electronics Command and begun in 1980 to define, develop, and evaluate automated tactical communications-electronics planning and engineering capabilities. The Army field-tested the system and, during the reporting period, installed one terminal at the Department of Defense Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center and another with the 5th Signal Command.
Still another very important joint program in which the Army had a role was that of supporting the joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program. In May 1981, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, conducted an operational effectiveness demonstration of the intelligence segment of this system as part of joint exercise SOLID SHIELD '81. Specifically tested in the exchange of intelligence information among service operational facilities were message standards that had been developed for JINTACCS. Under direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, development of message standards, known as Tactical Digital Information Link J, continued for the joint Tactical
Information Distribution System; during the past year, the service and defense agencies reached agreement on a schedule for further work in this area. Also continuing through 1981 was installation of the joint Interface Test System of JINTACCS. Once the system has been installed at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, configuration management testing, which in 1981 was done at the Navy's testing facility at San Diego, will be moved to Fort Monmouth.
In the area of combined operations, JINTACCS continued to support U.S. delegations to seventeen bodies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with direct technical assistance in developing command. And control system standards for interoperability. Efforts were successful in preparing a program for the interoperability of artillery automatic data processing systems; at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible parties surveyed the requirements to support the development of standards for interoperability with the command and control systems of our Pacific allies.
The Maneuver Control System is being developed to aid operations officers at upper and lower levels of command in the control of the tactical maneuver force. Work on this system began in 1980 with the deployment to Europe of a baseline system using tactical computer systems and terminals. Initially deployed with three tactical computer terminals, the fielded prototype system grew to seventeen computer terminals and three computer systems. Operational programming and functional capabilities grew as the entire program evolved and benefited from continuous feedback by field users.
Of basic importance in the Army's efforts to modernize communications was its research and development program for equipping infantry, armor, field artillery, and aviation units with radios to replace frequency-modulated equipment that not only was difficult to maintain, but also could not efficiently pass on digital data from other command and control systems. The vehicle for this effort was the Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio Subsystem, which would be both resistant to jamming and capable of being secured for voice transmission. After an extensive review of this program during the reporting period, the Army concluded that it should be continued as planned despite a $13-million shortfall in funding as well as other considerations. In particular, this decision involved maintaining the current schedule for the basic radio within available funds, as well as reprogramming within congressional limitations and transferring funds from other projects. Under this plan the Army would develop the basic receiver-
transmitter module of all three contractors for the manpack and vehicular sets, together with their electronic counter-countermeasure modules, and would defer the effort of all three contractors on some or all of their proposed refinements-the aircraft receiver-transmitter subsystem, the communications security unit, and the securable remote-control unit. Finally, in September 1981, the Army and the contractors agreed upon new contracts reflecting the new conditions.
A major concern of military communications is security. During fiscal year 1981 the Army took action to secure all frequency modulated radio nets from theater to battalion levels. At the year's end this effort was well under way, but problems arose because of the incompatibility of the new VINSON communications security equipment with the widely used NESTOR equipment. To solve this problem the Army decided to distribute the VINSON equipment in such a way as to put the greatest possible distance between the two sets of equipment.
At every level of military activity, as in society at large, things are vastly more complex now than in the simpler past of only a few decades ago. This is certainly true in both military intelligence and signal communications, as well as in the steady improvement of the automated systems that transmit their information from soldiers to command posts and to headquarters in the field and at home, or wherever required, sometimes on the other side of the earth. Because the systems are so complex, much time is required from conception, authorization, research, development, testing, evaluation, and production to regular field use. Training personnel and units also takes time. Consequently, the Army systems that were only in the early stages of their life cycles during the reporting period would not be fielded and fully operational for several years. Training also would not be accomplished overnight either in languages, for example, or in the use of new equipment not yet fielded. The new undertakings would go forward, however, as the Army maintained the old and pursued the unending process of keeping its personnel, organization, and equipment ready for any contingency in matters of intelligence, automation, and signal communications, as in all other areas of its concern.
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Last updated 17 September 2004