Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter II:

French North Africa Puts Civilian Control to the Test

At the time of operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, the most important civil affairs issue seemed to be the politically dramatic problem of the Darlan Deal and the apparent compromise of political principle which it involved. Many were unfavorably impressed by the military role in this issue, which seemed to place the Army on the side of political opportunism if not of worse. The public was not in a position to know the imperative reasons which led to the temporary acceptance of a Vichy statesman as collaborator. The public also could not know that the decision to use Darlan grew out of what was originally a civilian decision -that of the President- to accept whatever administration U.S. forces found in French North Africa, and that General Eisenhower's recommendation regarding Darlan was approved by the State Department's representative on the spot, and later by both the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

In any case, when the TORCH operation is considered from the point of view of its place in the general development of American civil affairs policy, the Darlan issue, which effected no lasting change in the political principles underlying this policy, does not seem the most important matter at all. What is most important is the fact, little noticed at the outset, that TORCH put the theory of civilian control to its first test and resulted in certain conclusions which affected all later civil affairs planning. TO be sure, in French North Africa there was neither military government nor, in the narrower sense, even civil affairs; the ordinary administration of civil affairs was left to Admiral Darlan's government except for certain rights which could be exercised in emergencies. But there was a many-sided Allied economic program, to say nothing of political issues, for which the Allies could not escape responsibility, and thus the Allied program involved difficult problems which it seems impossible to characterize by any other name than civil affairs. It entailed the setting up of control machinery, and as the documents of this chapter reveal, this machinery was established on the principle of primary civilian responsibility. They indicate further the great difficulties encountered not only in linking together the many civilian agencies concerned but also in so integrating the civilian setup with the military that the principle of the theater commander's paramount authority was not violated.

More important still are the implications of the documents as regards the operational consequences of adopting the principle of civilian responsibility. It appears that instead of relieving General Eisenhower of responsibility and concern over the economic and political problems which arose, the civilian setup actually interfered with his freedom of action. To be sure,


only the most serious of these problems could receive his special attention, and it remains to consider whether the more routine matters of civilian supply and economic assistance or exploitation, which in their aggregate were also important, were handled with satisfaction. One should not, indeed, consider that the limited evidence presented here permits a definitive judgment on the performance of the civilian agencies. The documents have not been selected for that purpose but merely to show the contemporary opinions both of military and civilian authorities, which, whether just or unjust, exercised an influence on civil affairs preparations for future areas of operations. With regard to the question of objective evaluation, it need only be stated that while a number of spectators and participants spoke as though the performance was an utter fiasco, the bulk of the evidence indicates that this was a great exaggeration; the errors lay more in Washington than with the civilian agencies in the theater; and, whatever the errors, they were not of such a character that they could not be remedied in time to prevent serious injury to military operations. The documents do show plainly that not only the military authorities concerned, but also some of the civilian authorities, considered that civilian control had not been satisfactory. This conclusion was the more impressive because civilian control had been tested under the most favorable conditions-in a friendly country, with local authorities assuming the burden of actual civil administration. Moreover, the troubles were not attributed to civilians as individuals, most of whom had put forth admirable efforts, but rather to a system. While the absence of sufficient organizational preparation seems also to have been a contributing factor, yet military men considered the essential error to have been the attempt to divorce the control of civil affairs from military organization even though every civil affairs problem is bound up with military operations. Some leading War Department authorities decided as the result of the TORCH experience that they could not safely acquiesce in its pattern of control in future operations, least of all those in enemy areas. Executives of the civilian agencies were also disturbed but they felt that the difficulties of French North Africa could be obviated by effecting a much better co-ordination of civilian agencies than had thus far obtained. They overlooked the fact that they were recognizing the principle of undivided authority only in a limited degree, and that if this principle was carried to its logical conclusion it would mean the acceptance of the theater commander's control through an administration of purely military character.



[Memo, Gen George C. Marshall for President Roosevelt, 3 Sep 42, OPD files, 381, TORCH, sec. 1]

The success of the TORCH operation is critically dependent upon the reactions of the authorities, inhabitants and troops of North Africa. With this in mind, General Eisenhower has on his staff a Civil Administrative Section to co-ordinate the civil and political matters in immediate relation to the operation. He urgently requests that men from the State Department be released to serve on this body .... 1


In all these matters it is understood that you will take personal direction of this phase of the TORCH operation, but it will be necessary for General Eisenhower to be in immediate control and fully aware of the details. The men referred to in their relation to General Eisenhower will be in a position somewhat analogous to that of a Military Attaché to an Ambassador. They would exercise their functions under General Eisenhower, but as State Department officials they would be in a position to act when desirable through our diplomatic agencies and representatives in the area.
I believe it is your desire that the War Department should undertake to carry out this operation in all respects, but the political and civil phase of the plan could be facilitated by the aid of the State Department. The Civil Administrative Section was created to insure the complete co-ordination of military and civil preparations in connection with the operation and to effect the civil administration of that area. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Sep 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 8213]

I have gone over Murphy's directive very carefully.2  I hesitate to raise an issue which may cause you any embarrassment, particularly after our intimate and successful conversations here with Murphy as I have the utmost confidence in his judgment and discretion and I know that I will be able to work with him in perfect harmony. However, as I am responsible for the success of the operations I feel that it is essential that final authority in all matters in that theater rest in me, subject only to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the President, with Murphy as my operating executive and advisor for civil affairs. This is in accordance with my understanding of the President's intentions through oral messages delivered to me by Harriman, and I believe the directive should clearly set forth this relationship. Prior to the commencement of the special operation it is essential that Murphy have status as the President's personal representative in that area. There is a possibility that unless the directive is revised as indicated, there may develop in the minds of the French officials, after my arrival, the idea that there is division of authority between the American civil and military officials. I am sure that Murphy will agree with the foregoing and with the necessity of presenting the French with a clean-cut and single authority.3


[Directive (rev), Roosevelt to Murphy, Chief Civil Administrator, AFHQ, 22 Sep 42, in William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947), White House Papers, pp. 315-16]

1. Upon the occupation of French North Africa by American military force, you will act as the Operating Executive head of the Civil Affairs Section and Advisor for Civil Affairs under General Eisenhower. . . .4
2. You will work in close co-operation with General Eisenhower . . . in the preparation and execution of plans of a civil and political nature for the occupation of French North Africa by American Military Forces.
3. You will at an early date contact personally and through your Psychological Warfare and other assistants those French nationals whom you consider reliable, and give them the following information:
Information having been received from a reliable source that the Germans and Italians are planning an intervention in French North Africa, the United States contemplates sending at an


early date a sufficient number of American troops to land in that area with the purpose of preventing occupation by the Axis and of preserving French Sovereignty in Algeria, and the French administrations in Morocco and Tunisia.
No change in the existing French Civil Administration is contemplated by the United States.
Any resistance to an American landing will, of course, have to be put down by force of arms.
The American forces will provide equipment as rapidly as possible for those French troops who join in denying access to French North Africa to our common enemies.
Money, in addition to that provided by French sources, will be made available for additional expense incurred through co-operation with American forces.
The American Government will guarantee salaries and allowances, death benefits and pensions of those French and other military, naval and civilian officials who join with the American expeditionary forces.
The proposed expedition will be American, under American command, and it will not include any of the forces of General [Charles] de Gaulle. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AFHQ GO 4, 11 Oct 42, 5  OPD files, 381 TORCH, sec. 1]

1b. It is expected that all governmental officials, officers and employees of the local government in all of its branches, and who are trustworthy, will remain in office, and that all officials and employees of the civil administration, civilian public services and facilities, will carry on their normal duties.

3a. The principle upon which all relations with the civilian authorities is to be based, is that regardless of resistance, the French are friendly and are to be maintained in their government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AFHQ GO 5, 12 Oct 42, OPD files, 381, TORCH, sec. 1]

1. The purpose of a civil affairs section is to assist the Commander to which it is assigned to carry out the policy of the Commanding General, namely: To maintain and control for the Commanding General the civil governments of the territories of French North Africa as soon as military control of those territories is secured; to retain the existing form or forms of government in the territories under control, and to retain the civil governments and their officials and employees in their present positions, insofar as they are willing to continue in office, and as is consistent with the military mission and the policy of the Commanding General; to supplant those persons not in accord with the war aims of the United States, and its supporting ally [Great Britain], with other capable and efficient local personnel; or with military personnel in the event there is hostile action on the part of the armed forces of the territories to be occupied or by the inhabitants after the control is secured.6  ♦ ♦ ♦

3a. The Commanding General will be the Military Governor of all territory in French North Africa controlled by the United States and its supporting ally.7   ♦ ♦ ♦

19b. The salaries, wages and pensions, pension rights and all other benefits and emoluments of all French and native governmental, territorial, municipal and other sub-divisional districts, and regional officials and employees, and all Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, will be guaranteed by the United States of America, as long as they remain in their present positions carrying on their normal duties in a manner satisfactory to the military governor of the territory or the area occupied, and do nothing by word or deed that can in any way be construed as disrespectful to the United States or its supporting ally, or to their personnel and property.


[FM 27-5, 1940]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ Economy of effort. Every man engaged in military government is withdrawn either from the combatant forces or from productive labor at home. All plans and practices should be adopted with a view of reducing to the minimum consistent with the proper functioning of military government the number of the personnel of our Army employed in that government and the amount of work required of them.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[AFHQ GO 5, 12 Oct 42, OPD files, 381, TORCH, sec. 1]

6d. Plans and practices will be adopted with a view of reducing to the minimum consistent with the proper functioning of military administration, the number of the personnel from the armed forces employed in that administration. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Oct 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 7296]

 ♦ ♦ ♦  Giraud to be recognized as our principal collaborator on the French side, with the proposal that he accept the position immediately of French governor of all French North Africa, responsible for all French civil and military affairs, and whose position will be supported and protected by the Allied forces. Giraud to be requested to make proper contacts with Darlan and to accept him as Commander in Chief of French military and/or Naval Forces in North Africa or in some similar position that will be attractive to Darlan. In this way the French Forces could cooperate immediately, under the general direction of the Allied Commander in Chief. 8


[Memo, Matthews, Asst Chief, Civil Affairs (CA) Administration, AFHQ, for DCofS, AFHQ, 22 Oct 44; Civilian Supply: A History of the Civilian Supply Branch, International Division, ASF (2 vols. text and 3 vols. documentary supplement), prepared by International Division, ASF, documentary supplement 1. Hereafter cited as ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS, MS in OCMH.]

The measure of support to our [North Africa] Operation and the United Nations cause on the part of the population, both French and native, of North Africa, will depend in no small part on the amount of badly needed consumer goods we can put into the area in the early days. While the first convoys must necessarily be filled with military equipment and supplies, it has been suggested that approximately 500 tons of such items could be stowed in odd corners of early ships.9   ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Brig Gen John R. Deane, Secy, CCS, to the Secy of State, 12 Nov 42, WDCSA [War Department Chief of Staff, U.S. Army] files, 386, Africa 1942]

 ♦ ♦ ♦  At a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 30 October it was agreed that General Eisenhower should be informed that he would concern himself with economic policies only to the extent that they affect his operations and that further action in this regard would be handled by the appropriate civil departments of the United States and the United Kingdom.  ♦ ♦ ♦



[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 14 Nov 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 6267] 10

 ♦ ♦ ♦  Can well understand some bewilderment in London and Washington with the turn that negotiations with French North Africans have taken. The actual state of existing sentiment here does not agree even remotely with some of prior calculations. The following salient facts are pertinent and it is extremely important that no precipitate action at home upset such equilibrium as we have been able to establish.
Foremost is the fact that the name of Marshal [Henri] Pétain is something to conjure with here. Everyone from highest to lowest attempts to create the impression that he lives and acts under the shadow of the Marshal's figure. The


Civil Governors, Military leaders and Naval Commanders will agree on only one man as having an obvious right to assume the Marshal's mantle in North Africa. That man is Darlan. Even the Kingpin [Giraud], who had been our most trusted adviser and staunchest friend since early conferences succeeded in bringing him down to earth, clearly recognizes this overpowering consideration and has drastically modified his own ambitions and intentions accordingly. The resistance we met initially was offered because all ranks believed this to be the Marshal's wish and for this reason the Kingpin is deemed to have been guilty of at least a touch of treachery in urging nonresistance to our landing. The Kingpin himself understands and appears to have some sympathy for this universal attitude. All concerned profess themselves to be ready to go along with us provided Darlan tells them to do so, but they are absolutely not willing to follow anyone else. For example, [Vice] Admiral [Jean-Pierre] Estéva in Tunis says he will obey Darlan, while Nogués stopped fighting in Morocco by Darlan's order. Recognition of Darlan's position in this respect cannot be escaped.

The gist of the current agreement is that the French group will do what it can immediately to assist us in taking Tunisia. The group will organize French North Africa for effective cooperation and will begin reorganization, under Kingpin, of selected military forces for active participation in the war. . .

Our hope of early conquest of Tunisia and of gaining here a supporting and organized population can not possibly be realized unless there is accepted a general agreement along the lines which we have just concluded with Darlan and his Admirals, with the Kingpin, with [Gen. Auguste Paul] Nogues, who controls the tribes in Morocco, with [Gen. Alphonse] Juin and others. The Kingpin is now so fully aware of his inability to do anything by himself, even with Allied moral and military support, that he has cheerfully accepted the post of Military Chief in the Darlan group. He fully agrees also that his own name should not be mentioned in connection with this movement for a period of several days. Without a strong French government of some kind here we would be forced to undertake complete military occupation. The cost in time and resources would be tremendous. In Morocco alone [Major] General [George S.] Patton [Jr.] calculates that it would require sixty thousand Allied troops to hold the tribes quiet, and in view of the effect that any tribal disturbance would have on Spain, you can see what a problem we are up against.

The Kingpin is honest and will watch Darlan. Moreover, Murphy, who has (lone a grand job, will, as head of my Civil Affairs Section, practically live in Darlan's pocket. [W. H. B.] Mack [British head of the Political Section, AFHQ] and other capable men will co-operate with him. I realized that there may be a feeling at home that we have been sold a bill of goods, but I assure you that these agreements have been arrived at only after incessant examination of the important factors and with the determination to get on with military objectives against the Axis and to advance the interest of the Allies in winning this war. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Admiral William D. Leahy, CofS to CinC, to Roosevelt, 15 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

General Eisenhower's message relating to arrangements made with Darlan, Nogues, Giraud, and [Gen. Yves] Châtel in North Africa has been forwarded to you. I do not believe that we have sufficient information here to issue detailed instructions to him. The arrangements he has made represent probably the only practical course at the moment when his interest is necessarily focused on the vast importance of a hurried conquest of Tunisia, the possible acquisition of the French fleet at Toulon, and the avoidance of a necessity for large reinforcements in order to hold his present position. ♦ ♦ ♦

. . . I consider it necessary that General Eisenhower and his advisers in Africa should be given a free hand in this matter.
General Marshall is in full agreement.


[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 19 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 7505]

Attention is invited . . . to the fact that this agreement is merely one between a Commander in the field and a Commission which is exercising ordinary civil and military functions in the theater in which he is operating.11  Its terms are intended only to facilitate the operations of the Allied Forces brought here, although, naturally,


accomplishment of this purpose involves certain economic and transportation features. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 20 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 8525]

We entered this theater with a knowledge that we would have to deal with North African civil affairs through the existing civil organization covering all North Africa. We did not set up any official. We merely required the existing officials to agree upon a form of central commission through which we could deal. I attempted to force Giraud upon them as head but he collapsed under me. He himself finally admitted that he could not do it because he could not control the situation except on the basis of a huge military support which I could not possibly afford. As a result of the agreements we have made we have secured an opportunity to press our concentration toward the east for battle in Tunisia without worrying about the rear. At every principal port we would be badly handicapped without the assistance cheerfully rendered us now by French military, naval and civil groups. What I am trying to point out is that even if we should only have passive resistance, our operations would be sadly slowed up and our position badly weakened. We have these advantages through the influence of the entire group through which we have worked. I have conferred incessantly with many individuals at various points in the theater, and every British and American officer that I have seen is convinced that any early attempt to upset the present arrangement will result disastrously for us. I hope it can be generally understood that the arrangement we have is one made for practical military purposes and should not be attacked as long as it works at its present efficiency and until the objects for which this army was directed to invade Africa have been attained. If the arrangement we have made is broken up now both governments must be prepared for extensive occupation of this country. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Agreement signed between Lt Gen Mark W. Clark, representing the CinC, AEF, and Admiral Francois Darlan, High Cmsr in French North Africa, 22 Nov 42, CAD files, 371, N. Africa (8-27-42) (1) ] 12


The forces of the United States and their supporting Allies have landed in French North Africa for the purpose of preventing the domination of this territory by German and Italian forces and their Allies and for carrying on the war for the defeat of the Axis powers.
By a common agreement among leading French officials in French North Africa, a High Commissioner in French Africa has been established in the person of Admiral of the Fleet Francois Darlan.
It has been agreed by all French elements concerned and United States military authorities that French forces will aid and support the forces of the United States and their Allies to expel from the soil of Africa the common enemy, to liberate France and to restore integrally the French Empire. In order that this high purpose may be accomplished, and to make appropriate arrangements for the presence in North Africa of large forces of the United States and its Allies, the following agreement is entered into at Algiers this twenty-second day of November 1942.


There shall be the closest co-operation between the Commander in Chief of the French Land, Sea and Air Forces and the Commanding General, United States Army and supporting forces to accomplish the purpose set forth above.


French governmental personnel will continue in the performance of their functions with loyalty to the purpose of the forces under the command of the Commanding General, United States Army and supporting forces. Such government personnel will take such measures as are necessary for the, maintenance of order and public administrative services throughout the territory in consultation with the Commanding General of the United States Army.


In North Africa areas deemed by the Commanding General, United States Army, to be of importance or useful to the purpose set forth in the preamble hereof, from time to time, may be declared by him to be military areas under his control whereupon the maintenance of order and administrative and public services in such areas shall come under the direct control of such Commanding General. The French authorities will be promptly notified in the event that such a step becomes necessary.



If the internal situation at any time be such as in his opinion to endanger his lines of communication or threaten disorder the Commanding General, United States Army will inform the French authorities of such danger and the French authorities will undertake, in concert with him, such administrative and other measures as may be necessary for the protection of the military interests of the forces under his command and supporting forces.


The Commanding General, United States Army, will appoint such military, naval, air and economic and branch Missions as he may deem requisite to regulate, in liaison with such agency or agencies as the local authorities will institute for this purpose, the application of the present accord.


There shall be immediately appointed a joint Economic Commission which will be charged with the study of the economic needs of French North Africa. The Commission will suggest such measures as may seem appropriate to it regarding exportation and importation, as well as for the increase of agricultural and industrial production, as well as for the establishment of economic stability, and the creation of prosperity in French North African territories.


A joint censorship commission shall be established. It will extend its action to the press, radio broadcasts, telecommunications, postal services and all public means for the dissemination of information and shall operate in full conformity with the common purpose set forth in the preamble thereof. The French members of the Commission will be appointed by the High Commissioner. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Lt Col Bernard Bernstein, former Financial Adviser, North African Econ Bd, for Brig Gen Arthur H. Carter, Chief of Finance, SOS, 10 Feb 43, OUSW files, A49-94, Misc and Sub, MG]

A.7. One of the reasons given for permitting the French authorities to run their own governmental affairs was that we did not have the organization to do it ourselves, and therefore we had to let the French do it in order not to interfere with our military effort. In a sense we were fortunate that we did not have to undertake a full military government in North Africa. With the inadequate organization that existed in the field and in Washington, such an undertaking probably could not have been successfully discharged. All phases of military government and civil affairs are likely to be far more complicated and require more immediate and comprehensive action when we go into Europe than was or might have been the case in North Africa. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Ltr, CCS to Secy of State Cordell Hull, 12 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

About two weeks ago the Combined Chiefs of Staff received a proposal from the British Chiefs of Staff regarding certain economic measures to be taken in North Africa upon our occupation of that country. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Combined Chiefs of Staff . . . agreed to recommend to the appropriate civil departments of the United States and the United Kingdom that they maintain close collaboration in respect to the economic policies to be adopted in North Africa. This letter is to inform you accordingly.
In order that any policies adopted may be considered on a combined basis it is suggested that you initiate conversations with Washington representatives of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare in the near future.13


[Ltr, Roosevelt to Hull, 18 Nov 42, ASF, ID, Hist of Civilian Supply (Civ Sup), Documentary Supplement (DS 7)]

I am reverting to our conversation the other day


concerning the economic, political and fiscal questions which were developing in the wake of the advancing American armies in North Africa. While our conversation related especially to developments in that particular area, it is very apparent the same or similar problems will develop throughout the world as the scene changes. While it is a Mediterranean question today, it will later be extended to Pacific and to other areas.
Consequently, the policies of our Government will develop towards dependent and independent peoples under the relevant parts of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.
All this concerns foreign relations and international co-operation in the immediate present and after the war, and involves both political and economic elements.
As the conduct of these affairs lies in your hands, you have my full authority to designate to serve under you a person to whom you will look to carry out our policies.
You, yourself, have full authority to secure the co-operation of persons in your Department and can make such transfers as you deem necessary.14
You are hereby authorized to draw upon any of the other departments or agencies of the Government for any assistance that may be needed.
I consider that full co-operation and co-ordination is not only important but is necessary to the proper fulfillment of our objectives in the field of foreign relations.


[Paraphrase of Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 24 Nov 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

Under the general supervision of the State Department, the Lend-Lease Administration has been charged by the President with providing food and other essentials for all occupied territories.15  Civil activities in occupied areas have been made the responsibility of the State Department. That department's designated representative will act as the Commanding General's civil adviser, but when civil activities affect or are affected by military operations he will be subject to your decisions. As per its cables to Murphy of 13 November, the State Department, pursuant to the Presidential directive, is now sending an administrative expert and highly qualified representatives of Department of Agriculture, War Shipping Administration, Lend-Lease, Treasury Department, and Board of Economic Warfare, who will work under Murphy. It will be requested of the State Department that a USCC [United States Commercial Company] representative be sent. A survey should be made after these experts arrive to develop definite program and procedures including channels of communication which you approve and to determine additional staffs. The responsibility for decisions that must be made in the field to co-ordinate efforts of British and our representatives must rest with you.
To co-ordinate War Department interest in these activities and to represent you in these matters a separate section is being established under [Lt. Gen. Brehon B.] Somervell, which will maintain constant liaison with the Department of State, and through it with other interested agencies of the Government. Is this arrangement, finally established here with interested agencies, satisfactory to you? 16


[Memo, Secy's, CCS, approved by CCS, 27 Nov 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

It is recommended that the secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff be authorized to refer questions of detail relating to civil, economic, and financial matters, which are referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by General Eisenhower, directly to the Committee of Combined Boards.17


Further, that in order to expedite action, the secretariat be authorized to communicate the decisions of civil agencies concerned directly to General Eisenhower without reference to the combined Chiefs of Staff if in their opinion the action taken will have no adverse effect on General Eisenhower's military operations. It would, of course, be understood that political questions involving important matters of government policy would not be included within the scope of these arrangements.


[Memo for Red, 4 Dec 42, Capt Arthur E. Palmer, ASF, ID, on Discussions of 3 December with Representatives of Office of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA), ASF, OUSW files, Civ Sup, DS-11]

3d. It was feared that the Army would deliberately and unnecessarily omit Lend-Lease cargo from shipment and would replace it by similar cargo procured by the Army or would not replace it at all.18  In this connection OLLA and State are frankly worried that if the Army provides the civilian supplies it will obtain first possession of them in North Africa and will thus have a dominant position. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Col John B. Franks, Dir, International Aid Div, ASF,19  for CofS, SOS, 17 Dec 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1) ]

1. As instructed, this office has followed closely the course of the procedures now under development in Washington for handling problems relating to civilian supply in conquered countries, with particular reference at this time to North Africa. The procedure is now becoming sufficiently well defined to be the subject of an interim report. It is still, however, in a state of changing development.20

2. Committees: The following committees have been organized in Washington for dealing with these problems.

    1. Committee of Combined Boards called C.O.B.
This Committee has been established at the instance of the State Department to handle Combined (i.e., matters of interest to the British as well as to the United States) civilian economic matters regarding North Africa. This Committee is intended to be the focal point for all nonmilitary requirements for North Africa, whether prepared in North Africa, Washington or London, and is to recommend action to be taken thereon. Representation is drawn from the State Department, the British Embassy, and the executive secretaries of CPRB [Combined Production and Resources Board], CRMB [Combined Raw Materials Board], CSAB [Combined Shipping Adjustment Board], and CFB [Combined Food Board]. Part of the secretariat of this committee is furnished by the secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, consisting of a representative from the office of General Deane (Colonel Hammond) and a representative from the office of Brigadier Dykes.
It is the stated intention of this Board to have communications from North Africa on civilian matters sent directly from General Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.  ♦ ♦ ♦

    2. Combined Requirements Group
This Committee has both U.S. and British membership and acts in effect as a subcommittee of the C.O.B., which is outlined above. It was organized at the instance of Mr. Tom [K.] Finletter of the State Department, with the concurrence of the C.O.B., and is to act under direction of the State Department. It has been charged with the limited duty of passing on and approving civilian requirements for North Africa, and reporting them to the C.O.B. for its action. This Committee has been merged with a similar committee which was appointed for the same purpose by Mr. Paul Appleby, Director of the Office of Foreign Territories of the State Department, and Mr. Appleby now serves as its Chairman.
It is not clear that a committee of this prominence will concern itself only with screening of requirements, and the demarcation of jurisdiction between this Committee and the C.O.B., mentioned above, and the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee, mentioned below, can not be considered as finally determined. ♦ ♦ ♦

    3. Interdepartmental Advisory Committee
This Committee has only U.S. representation on the main committee, but may have also British representation on some or all of its sub


committees. It has been established as an advisory committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Appleby, Director of the Office of Foreign Territories of the State Department.
The stated purpose of this Committee is "Implementation of the Economic and Social aspects of the North African Program." 21  Consequently, its jurisdiction appears to be broader than the jurisdiction of the Combined Requirements Group referred to next above.
The relationship between this Committee and the other Committees is not yet definitive, but it now appears that all U.S. interests will meet in this group to handle problems relating to all civilian matters in North Africa. ♦ ♦ ♦

    4. Public Health
This is presently being handled by Governor Lehman's office, acting in concert with Lend-Lease and the Red Cross. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 18 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 6349]

Following message under date of December 15 furnished you from the President: "I am today appointing Mr. Murphy to be my personal representative in North Africa with the rank of Minister. He will continue on General Eisenhower's staff in his present capacity as Civil Affairs Officer until such a time as consultation with the War Department suggests a change." 22


[AG AFHQ Ltr, 1 Dec 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

1. The Department of State has been charged by the President of the United States with the responsibility for the development and execution of a plan for the economic support of North Africa, subject to military exigencies.

2. a. The North African Economic Board (NAEB) is hereby set up to carry this plan into effect. Initially, since the requirements of military operations are dominant, the Board shall consist of both military and civil representatives as follows: 23

The Joint Chairman:
Civil: Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Administrator.
Military: Maj. Gen. H. M. Gale, Chief Administrative Officer, Allied Force Headquarters.
Executive Vice-Chairman (to be designated by the Joint Chairman).
Heads of Sections of the Boards Executive.
Representatives of:

Civil Affairs Section, AFHQ

together with such other persons as the Chairman of the Board may from time to time designate.

9. a. The functions of NAEB shall be:
(1) The supply of essential materials to the civil population and to vital utilities and industries. This function will involve a continuing examination of needs and such participation in distribution as may prove desirable.
(2) The purchase both of strategic materials which are immediately required in the United Nations war effort and, in reasonable quantities, of other products, the production and normal markets for which have been disturbed. This function will involve not only purchase and export but storage of the latter type of produce for future sale or use in eventual United Nations operations.
(3) The handling of currency and financial problems. This function will involve a survey of the whole financial situation and the establishment of whatever controls may prove necessary, as well as the examination of the files of Axis firms and of government documents, with a view towards obtaining information concerning persons engaging in undesirable commercial and financial transactions and enemy plans and activities.
(4) Initially in accordance with military requirements the maintenance, repair and expansion of vital transportation facilities, including railroads, port facilities and automotive transport.


This function will involve a careful survey of needs and advice and assistance in operation.
(5) The maintenance of public health. This function will involve an estimate of needed supplies and advice as to their utilization. The function will involve co-ordination with the Red Cross and other relief agencies.
(6) Expansion of the production of finished articles, foodstuffs, and other materials needed by the civil population, by our armed forces, or elsewhere in the United Nations. This function will involve a survey of the pertinent industries, the supply of needed equipment and advice and assistance in its installation and use. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Implementation of the Econ and Social Aspect of the North African Program, attached to Min of the Mtg of the Interdepartmental Comm. of the OFT, 22 Dec 42, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-8]

The responsibility for implementing the economic and social program shall be centralized in the Office of Foreign Territories [OFT] which shall operate as follows:

1. Recommendations concerning the policies and methods to be followed in dealing with the supply, purchase and distribution of materials will be submitted by the Civil Affairs Officer to the Office of Foreign Territories.
2. The Combined boards in Washington shall be asked by the Office of Foreign Territories (a) to consider the recommendations of the Civil Affairs Staff as to the materials required in North Africa and to determine the amounts of such materials to be sent to that area as well as the sources from which they are to be obtained; (b) to designate materials required from North Africa and to decide as to their disposition; (c) to designate materials the production of which in North Africa should be expanded and appropriate sources of equipment required for this production; (d) to assign shipping for the movement of these materials.
3. There shall be established by the Office of Foreign Territories an operating committee or committees to examine the recommendations of the Civil Affairs Officer in regard to questions of supply, purchase and distribution; to request the appropriate instructions from the Combined Boards and other authorities; and to carry out through the appropriate United States and other agencies the decisions agreed upon. This committee or committees shall include representatives of State, Lend-Lease, B.E.W. [Board of Economic Warfare], and the appropriate foreign representatives. Representatives of the Combined Boards shall be members of the operating committee or committees concerned with (a) the purchase of materials in North Africa, and (b) supply of goods to be sent to North Africa. The operating committee of the Combined Boards may be utilized to arrange for the allocation of strategic materials in accordance with the decisions of the Combined Board. The various United States and other agencies represented on the committee shall be asked to perform the operational functions necessary to implement other agreed-upon decisions.
4. There shall be established by the Office of Foreign Territories a procedure for examining recommendations submitted by the Civil Affairs Officer and for establishing programs with respect to financial and commercial control matters including currency, exchange control, trading with the enemy control, enemy property control, and such control of local commercial and financial transactions as is necessary to prevent Axis firms in North Africa from being able to engage in such transactions. This procedure will involve regular consultation, perhaps through the creation of a committee, perhaps through simple liaison arrangements with War and Treasury Departments of this Government and with any interested foreign representatives. Censorship and communications are regarded at this stage as military in character and must be handled by the military.
5. Questions involving relief, public health and rehabilitation will be the responsibility of the Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. Appropriate liaison and exchange of information will be maintained between the Director and the Office of Foreign Territories in order that matters of common interest, including the co-ordination of relief and rehabilitation supply requests with other supply programs, may receive the required attention in both offices. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AFHQ GO 4, 7 Jan 43, ACC (Allied Control Commission) files, 10000/134/11]

1. Announcement is made of the establishment of a Political and Economic Council for the purpose of advising the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, on political and economic matters and additionally for the purpose of co-ordinating and guiding the work of the various experts, American and British, in North Africa.


2. The Council will consist of a representative of the Commander in Chief, a representative of the Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, and Mr. Harold [M.] Macmillan, as full members. 24  Such other members as are designated will attend council meetings as required.  ♦ ♦ ♦

6. The Council will deal with the wide aspect and range of political and economic problems which arise from time to time and such other matters as the Commander in Chief may refer to it for consideration.


[AFHQ Staff Memo 13, 10 Feb 43, G-5, AFHQ, MTO, HS files, Civil Affairs Office (CAO-44)]

As soon as the military situation permits, the conduct of political and economic relations with the French Authorities in North Africa will pass into normal civilian channels. In order that this may be accomplished gradually, the following transition arrangements will be put into effect:

a. The American Minister [Murphy], as Chief Civil Administrator, Allied Force, is charged with the direction of political and economic affairs as a member of the staff of the Commander in Chief. In order that there may be complete Anglo-American unity of purpose and policy in regard to these matters, the British Minister [Macmillan] has been invited to associate himself closely with Mr. Murphy in the exercise of this function. Mr. Macmillan has accepted this invitation.
For the purposes of insuring that civil administration is in accord with military requirements, the Political and Economic Council set up by General Order No 4 of 7 January 1943, will remain in being. (The Council will meet as required.)
c. The Ministers will be assisted by a Secretariat which shall act as a Joint Secretariat to co-ordinate the work of the Ministers and the Boards or sections concerned.
d. The particular functions in question are:
    (1) Conduct of relations with the French authorities on political and economic questions as distinguished from military questions.
    (2) Direction of all activities of NAEB subject to dominant military requirements. Any necessary readjustment of the existing machinery will be carried out in consultation with the CAO [Civil Affairs Officer].
    (3) Direction of all activities of North African Shipping Board subject to dominant military requirements. Any necessary readjustment of the existing machinery will be carried out in consultation with naval and military authorities concerned.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, International Aid Div, 24 Apr 43, AFS, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

15. b. CCNA (Combined Committee for North and West Africa). 25  This committee consists of representatives of Lend-Lease, State, B.E.W., Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Army, Agriculture, Combined Shipping Adjustments Board and the British Embassy. It goes over and answers all cables from NAEB, assigning action to the appropriate agency and discussing the action taken or proposed, and the consequent cable answers. It handles about two hundred cables a month. . . . The Secretariat of the committee is furnished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff....

c. CCNA (U.S. Members only). This committee meets upon call . . . in Mr. Finletter's office to discuss problems of interest only to American agencies. Only one representative from each agency is permitted to attend, and he is supposed to be prepared to speak on behalf of this agency....

d. Tunisia Committee. The name of this committee is perhaps misleading since it is intended by the State Department that this committee shall be a focal point for discussion of plans for all areas that are apt to be occupied by military action....

e. CCNA (Section II-Fiscal and Economic matters). These meetings are devoted to fiscal or economic matters which are attended by the Fiscal Division, ASF, and by the Civil Affairs Division. The committee picture is in a constant state of change at the present and is supplemented by various working subcommittees.



[Memo, Secy's, CCS, approved by CCS, 27 Nov 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

Under the leadership of the State Department, the Committee of the Combined Boards has been set up in Washington to handle combined civilian economic matters regarding North Africa .. . [above, Sec. 3]

Until the situation stabilizes in North Africa, civil and military matters will, of necessity, be closely interwoven and to some extent cut across each other. Civil matters in North Africa will be handled by the Civil Affairs Section of General Eisenhower's staff, and the channel of communications will be from General Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As the situation settles down, it is probable that the U.S. and U.K. Governments will establish some agency in North Africa which will take over many of the duties of the Civil Affairs Section of General Eisenhower's staff, and, similarly, the civil agencies in Washington will be able to act progressively more and more independently from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

During the initial stages, however, and until the situation settles down, it is believed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be kept informed constantly of the actions taken by the Committee of Combined Boards which is being set up. In order to accomplish this, arrangements have been made whereby the secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will provide part of the secretariat necessary for the Committee of Combined Boards. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg 609, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 1492]

Mr. Murphy has received, through this office, two messages from the State Department which outline State Department plans for sending to North Africa a mission of economic and other experts to assist Murphy in his difficult tasks.... There is an acute need for such a body because the success of future operations from this base will depend very largely upon the speed with which the economy of this country is rehabilitated, at least to the point of sustaining a majority of the population above the starvation level. However, there is an implication in these messages that while Murphy is expected to remain a Staff

Officer of mine, he would in another capacity be independently responsible to the State Department. This intent may not exist but the matter is so important that I must invite your immediate attention to it.

No one could be more anxious than General Clark and myself to rid ourselves completely of all problems other than purely military, but the fact remains that, at this moment and until North Africa is made thoroughly secure, in which process the capture of Tunisia will be an important incident, everything done here directly affects the military situation. Therefore, the body of experts mentioned should be sent at the earliest possible date to report to Murphy who should, for the time being, have the single status of head of my civil affairs section. ♦ ♦ ♦

The purpose of this message is to request your aid in assuring, for the moment, that single-handed responsibility is maintained here, while the State Department may be assured that its staff of experts, through my civil affairs section, will receive every possible assistance and support in carrying on the work which is so vital to the future of successful military operations in and from this region.

Mr. Murphy and his assistants are in complete accord with the conclusions above presented.


[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Nov 42, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 9420]

I want to assure you that the State Department is working in closest co-operation with the War Department in supporting your operations in North Africa. . . . Your number 609, November 26 [above] and this reply have been read by the Secretary of State. Mr. Hull is in complete agreement with the contents of this message.  ♦ ♦ ♦  

As long as military operations in North Africa require it, Murphy will remain a member of your staff and be directly subordinate to you in all respects. The State Department had this in mind in sending its instructions to Murphy. 26  When


the military situation permits, and the time of arrival of this condition cannot be forecast now, the State Department desires to relieve you of the responsibility for civil matters. When that time arrives Murphy will begin operating directly under the State Department, but in closest cooperation with the military commander in North Africa. The War Department is in complete agreement with this plan, but as stated above it cannot be executed until the military situation is stabilized to a point permitting it. The final divorcement of civil matters from your control will be based on a recommendation from you at the time that the military situation permits such action. There may also be a transition period during which you might wish to divest yourself of certain responsibilities and the civilian group under Murphy's direction will be able to undertake them as you see fit and in accordance with your judgment. (This last sentence was drafted by Mr. Hull personally.) ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for the Dir, ID, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

13. In the initial phases of the organization in Washington on the North African problem no provision was made for direct War Department representation on any of the organizations concerned. The only military representation provided was that which resulted from having half of the secretariat of the Washington committee composed of Army representatives (one U.S., one U.K.) of the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Consequently, there was no direct relationship between the Washington committee and the War Department. As a necessary result there was no co-ordination of War Department communications and those through other channels. War Department communications on the subject were received from Allied Force Headquarters; Combined Chiefs of Staff cables on the same subject were received by the Civilian Committee, and some State Department cables on the subject were also turned over to the Civilian Committee. Consequently neither group knew whether action proposed by it duplicated or merely supplemented action of the other group. It soon became evident that the Washington State Department committee for civil affairs could not properly handle the problem without the help of proper representation from the War Department. It was accordingly arranged in January that the Assistant Secretary of War, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, and the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, should be represented on the Washington committee. By informal delegation the responsibilities of these three offices were discharged by the International Division until the creation of the Civil Affairs Division . . . . 27


[ID Agenda, Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 12 Dec 42, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. 1]

15. The question of consignment of civilian goods has arisen. The civilian agencies wished to have them consigned to Murphy; the War Department wished to have them consigned to General Eisenhower. The matter was referred to General Eisenhower by cable, with State and Lend-Lease agreeing to abide by his answer. The answer, received yesterday, requested all goods to be consigned to General Eisenhower. A supplemental cable indicates that this is to be accomplished as to "non-common" stores, by consignment to the North African Economic Council, as a subdivision of General Eisenhower's staff.


[ID Agenda, Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 12 Dec 42]

1. Responsibility for civilian supply for conquered territories, including places such as North Africa, has been delegated by the President to Lend-Lease, acting through the State Department. Such responsibility does not, however, encroach upon the responsibilities of the commanding


generals of the theaters in question, and shall be at all times subordinate to him while the situation in the theater is purely under the commanding general on matters which affect or are affected by military operations.

7. Since all ships that can be placed on the North African run are, and for some time will be, needed for military equipment, civilian supplies can be sent only as filler cargo unless displacement of military cargo is ordered by General Eisenhower. This fact is not yet fully appreciated by the civilian agencies in Washington.

9. Under present conditions, priority of military versus civilian cargo, and priority within civilian cargo, is in effect a command decision to be made by General Eisenhower and OPD. The other agencies of the War Department have the functions of:
(a) Implementing such decisions.
(b) Referring requests for civilian cargo, together with analysis of possible treatment, for decision.
(c) Relating conduct of civilian agencies to the main problem.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Col Charles W. Rooth, Asst Civ Admr, AFHQ, for Murphy, Chief CA Admr, AFHQ, 29 Nov 42, CAD files, HUSKY Plan]

Should the decision be made that the Civil Administration in French Africa be a function of the State Department 100 percent, then it is suggested that all trained Civil Affairs officers be segregated and organized into a planning group for the next tactical operation and the subsequent administration of Military Government. It is extremely important that these trained officers be accessible for such planning with a minimum disruption to any local civil administration.28


[Memo, Rooth for the Exec Vice Chairman, NAEB, 6 Jan 43, CAD files, HUSKY Plan, Exec Off file]

2. a. Are Civil Affairs officers to continue checking the unloading of ships?  ♦ ♦ ♦

[Memo, Bernstein, Financial Adviser, NAEB, for Carter, Chief of Finance, SOS, 10 Feb 43, OUSW files, A49-94, Misc and Sub, MG]

A. 8.... Many of the Civil Affairs officers have had little opportunity to do useful work since their arrival in North Africa and they have had a sense of uselessness. Furthermore, at Oran and Casablanca, especially after the creation of the Mediterranean Base Section and the Atlantic Base Section, the commanding army officers were increasingly disregarding the Civil Affairs officers and using other military units to handle such matters as the civilian supply and exports.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, unsigned for ASW McCloy, Based on Conversations With Persons Interested in Civil Affairs in Algiers, 19 Mar 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

The problem of getting the goods away from the ships and the docks to the warehouses (where the French take delivery and issue receipts) has been largely handled by the Army up to the present time and it has been decided that this job will be handled by the Army, so as to insure that the docks will be cleared promptly. NAEB is not equipped or staffed to handle this job, and if it had to assume responsibility for it, could only accomplish the task by borrowing men and equipment from the Army or by pushing the French to do the physical work.



[Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

. . . The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.


[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 986]

The President desires that when the "agreement" you refer to is completed, it be issued by you and French parties concerned as a "Joint announcement" rather than as an "agreement," ref-


erence your number 1010 2 December.29
The President does not wish the words "French Imperial Federation" included in such "Joint announcement."
The foregoing is based on the premise that no act of ours can recognize any particular government setup, except such provisional one as is locally necessary for the prosecution of military operations....


[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 1629]

Repeatedly Boisson [Governor General of French West Africa] said to me, "I want to put everything I have at the disposal of the United Nations under the leadership of the United States. But it is impossible for me to return to French West Africa, announcing such an intention and secure an enthusiastic reaction unless I can show that the United Nations and particularly England are taking obvious steps immediately to treat us as friends. Raids, propaganda and unauthorized flights must stop at once and I must be able to say that any of our people held prisoner by any part of the United Nations are to be freed at once." 30

My point in all this is that it is necessary for us here to preserve the attitude that we are treating with a friend rather than an enemy. With us this whole problem is cold-blooded military necessity; we do not show weakness as you can see from the nature of the rights and privileges accorded us by the French in original agreement. But I feel it is a mistake to demand co-operation and a friendly attitude on the one hand and on the other to act like we have here a conquering army which enforces its will by threat and views with intense suspicion every proposal of these people. . . . Frequently some detail can be exchanged for a big advantage and that is what we are trying to get when we ask for the full use of French West Africa. . . 31


[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 7 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 2210]

The following memorandum from the President is quoted for your information:

There is a real desire here and in England that a statement be issued by the appropriate authority indicating that civil restrictions imposed on the population in North Africa by the Vichy Government have been withdrawn, including the freeing of political prisoners, the abolition of the ban against labor unions and the lifting of restrictions against the Jews.

I think that such a statement, if it could be made, would be very helpful, but I hesitate to do this without Eisenhower knowing about it and getting his views. Would you be good enough to get an expression from Eisenhower on this point and indication from him as to the effect of a statement such as I have indicated on the Moslems and the Arabs? 32

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3437]

I am strongly in favor of President's plan. Three weeks ago I began working on the suggested lines and progress has been made in securing liberalization in many directions. . .

Upon receipt of your message, the subject was again discussed with Darlan, with the view of giving publicity not only to accomplishments but to announced aims. He is particularly grateful to the President for realizing and mentioning the fact there is a local Jew-Moslem problem that is full of explosive possibilities unless carefully handled. He is in favor of a public announcement that aligns him definitely on the side of liberal government and opposed to the Axis and what it stands for. I believe that the place and methods of issue of the statement can probably be decided better by appropriate authority at home than we can here. . . 33


[Msg, JCS to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3524]

We have been disturbed by reports received during the last few days from North Africa via Europe about conditions in French Morocco and Algeria. These reports, which come from independent and reliable sources, all paint the same picture of the results which follow from our inability in existing circumstances to exercise control over the local French authorities in internal administrative matters.

These reports state "That the S.O.L. and kindred Fascist organizations continue their activities and victimize our former French sympathizers some of whom have not yet been released from prison. The first reaction of these organizations to the Allied landing was rightly one of fear but it seems that they have now taken courage to regroup themselves and continue their activities. Well-known German sympathizers who had been ousted have been reinstated. Not only have our enemies been thus encouraged but our friends have been correspondingly confused and cast down. There have been cases of French soldiers being punished for desertion because they tried to support the Allied Forces during the landing. ♦ ♦ ♦

It is desired that you talk these reports over with Murphy and submit your comments and advice on all phases of this message at the earliest practicable date. It is suggested that you take such corrective steps as are practicable. 34


[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 22 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 9542]

It is true as ever that complete military occupation of this territory by the Allied forces should be undertaken only as a final and inescapable measure. We are trying to make a system work here which is admittedly full of defects from every standpoint, both at home and here. We know that many petty and even some prominent officials all over North Africa are either straddling the fence or are actually antagonistic. In this diverse population there is no general enthusiasm in support of the war and there is no question that various reverses to us would be intensified in effect because of trouble in the rear and in the interior, which the civil administration might not be strong enough to control completely. This factor merely increases the tasks normally involved in a military operation, so you can understand how earnestly we are seeking to prevent internal friction, at least until the difficult problem in Tunisia can be solved. ♦ ♦ ♦

I have carefully kept my relationships with Darlan on a military basis, and he clearly understands this. But our military situation has continued to be such as to make all of these civil matters an essential part of active operations. They have been a great burden but I understand that measures are under way whereby as quickly as possible civil and military matters may be even reasonably well separated and I can be relieved of direct responsibility for most of these things. I will be delighted. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 22 Dec 42, OPD files, Item 36a, Exec 12]

I think you should delegate your international diplomatic problems to your subordinates and give your complete attention to the battle in Tunisia and the protection of the Straits of Gibraltar. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq Fifth Army, Red of Events and Documents, 9 Nov25 Dec 42, Fifth Army Opn Rpts, OPD 105-11.5 09140)]

Algiers, December 24, 1942-Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, High French Commissioner in French North Africa, is assassinated today!

The enigmatic French politician-sailor is shot through the face and chest as he is entering his office. at the Summer Palace following a late lunch. The assassin is a 22-year-old University student who is arrested immediately. By midnight it still has not been learned if the murder was instigated by the Axis or some political clique or what, exactly, was the assassin's motive. His true name has not been learned.  ♦ ♦ ♦

General Clark personally is shocked by Admiral Darlan's death. Darlan had fulfilled his many obligations and promises to Allied officers. There had been no indication that Darlan was not


sincere. Repercussions of the Admiral's death can lead almost anywhere. What will the DeGaullists do? What perverted tangent will Axis propaganda take? Who can fill the void caused through Darlan's death? General Clark doesn't look for any serious unrest, but he thinks a few groups "may take advantage of the opportunity to cause disorder." As he looks at the dead French leader, the General thinks of two statements Darlan made to him at the luncheon yesterday: "Tomorrow the Axis press will say I gave this luncheon for you because you had a gun pointed at me." "I'd like to turn this thing over to General Giraud. He likes it here and I don't." ♦ ♦ ♦

Late in the evening, General Clark gets in touch with General Eisenhower by telephone. The Commander in Chief will return to Algiers tomorrow. General Giraud is going to fly back from the front. General Eisenhower later radios General Clark: "You were quite right in absolutely rejecting Noguès. Consider Kingpin (Giraud) only possibility." Later, a radio comes from Washington saying that President Roosevelt "desires that no announcement be made reference Darlan's successor."


[Jt Msg, Eisenhower to CCS and Murphy to Secy of State, 26 Dec 42, Exec 5, Item 4, CM-IN 11073]

Immediately after Darlan's death last evening General [Jean Marie] Bergeret, Deputy High Commissioner asked me to call for a discussion of the situation resulting from Darlan's passing. . . . Bergeret was in a state of indecision as to the procedure to be followed but he thought that it would be necessary to follow that established in a secret ordinance . . . said to have been signed by Darlan on 2 December 1942.. . . This document in essence provides that in case of inability or absence of the High Commissioner his functions would be assumed by General Noguès, Resident General in French Morocco, but if the inability was of long duration within a period of one month the Imperial Council would definitely exercise the functions of High Commissioner. . . . He asked my personal opinion and I told him unequivocally that I felt that General Giraud is the only possible choice, that I felt that General Noguès would be unacceptable, and that furthermore I felt that now is the time of breaking with the notion that legality as provided by Vichy legislation is necessary to assure the functioning of a regime established in North Africa for the prosecution of the common war effort. 35


[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jan 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 2173]

We have learned that in some quarters at home there . . . is an apparent conviction that we are in North Africa as an occupying powerful, conquering army fully capable of carrying out our military missions and, if need be, of controlling the population by force. . . . As a result of this conviction it appears to be assumed that we are in position to deal with the French on the basis of giving orders and compelling compliance. I am writing this message for your exclusive and confidential information with the request that when opportunity arises you do what you can to correct or soften this view at least to the extent that during the ensuing critical weeks we do not receive any arbitrary instructions which might precipitate a military crisis. I know that you fully understand the essentials of our military situation and, therefore, are aware of the extent to which we are dependent upon active co-operation of the French. From the very beginning, this whole task would have been an easy one for us here, both militarily and politically, if we had been content merely to seize ports and solidify our own bases and pacify the country. We did not take the easy, safe course, and I know you have always agreed that the decision to rush ahead although risky was fully justified. Even yet I think we gained tremendously by that decision, in spite of political difficulties that all have had their roots in the extent to which we have exposed our rear to sabotage and disruption. We must always face the fact that it will be many weeks yet before we can perform the military tasks in front of us and still be strong enough to impose our will arbitrarily upon the local French.

Ever since 9 November we have, in full conformity with the spirit and letter of our original instructions, attempted to secure active French co-operation on the basis of friendship and have made our military dispositions on a continuation of such a relationship. I will be prompt in report-


ing to you personally when the time arrives that we are strong enough in front and rear to disregard, if so ordered, French and other viewpoints. The immediate effect of non-cooperation now would be catastrophic and, if anything we should be instructed to do might result in non-cooperation, we must have ample time in which to readjust dispositions much more conservatively than at present. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Eisenhower to Elmer Davis, Dir, OWI, 24 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 11349]

. . . But what no American critic seems to understand is that there is a great paucity of qualified men to fill the highly specialized posts in the civilian administration of Morocco and Algiers. America further fails to consider the importance of a continuing orderly civil administration to our military operations. Abrupt, sweeping or radical changes, bringing into office little known or unqualified administrators, could create serious difficulties for us. This is particularly true where the administration is connected with Arab affairs. Thus after two years of German pressure and propaganda, it is obvious that we could not find Frenchmen in positions of influence or power in this area, who would satisfy the democratic feelings of America. But what America fails to understand is that amongst Vichy appointed or Vichy approved officials here there still exist some Frenchmen who are bitterly Anti-Axis. It is not possible quickly and easily to determine beyond question which are the French officials who merely change their coats with the shift of the wind and which are those who can be counted upon to co-operate fully against the Germans. We have tried to work with the existing administrative machinery, judging not on the basis of prejudice or past political affiliations in France, but upon a practical basis of how each French official proves himself in action over a reasonable period of time. Admiral Darlan offered to discharge any official for whom we could offer a substitute acceptable to the Allies and to the American and British press, provided only that he be qualified and also acceptable to the local population. No useful suggestions were forthcoming. Any Gaullist was considered as impossible, being regarded as too extreme by the leaders of the French armed forces.

The present criticism on the part of the American press centers around Peyrouton's appointment. This case provides a typical example of the limited alternative which had been open to us. We could have retained Châtel with his heritage of weakness and political harlotry. Or we could have insisted upon a Gaullist candidate to which the French military leaders would have been completely opposed. Or we could accept the appointment of Peyrouton, a man of known administrative ability with experience in dealing with such intricate North African problems as that of the Arabs.

Contrary to the reaction in America, [Marcel] Peyrouton's appointment has caused no outcry here. It has been well received to all appearances. He is generally regarded as strongly anti-German and his antagonism to Laval is well-known. The State Department consented to Peyrouton coming here and knew of his intended appointment. The only active dissatisfaction may be presumed to be among the Gaullists and left wing groups which in North Africa however plentiful do not constitute an organized body capable of running a government. . . .


[Msg, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, to Marshall, 6 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3980]

Murphy has just shown me a draft of a message to the Secretary of State suggesting for the President's consideration that Giraud's visit to the United States affords an appropriate occasion to announce the recognition by the United States of the French Committee of National Liberation [FCNL] as the body which is collectively responsible for the representation of French interests until such time as a national government is established. 36  General Eisenhower concurs in this recommendation and our particular interest lies in the fact that once this recognition is afforded and representation of the British and American Governments is established here, we will be able to shift many of the political problems which now embarrass an encumber us to the shoulders of the customary representation. . . .



[Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 396, Africa, 1942]

This morning I received your telegram [28 Nov 42, in Section 4] concerning the functions of the State Department in developing the economy of this particular theater. I agree with every word of it and I can assure you that no trouble whatsoever will occur in the execution of the plan. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 9 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 4195]

. . . I am concerned at the present economic situation in North Africa and its possible influence on military operations and urge that steps to alleviate it shall be initiated immediately.... I cannot over emphasize adverse political effect of not meeting minimum needs of civilian population where it is possible to do so in view of public assurances in United States which have been given prominence in the press here. . .


[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 10 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 4698]

. . . These tonnages are entirely inadequate to meet civil and French military needs. The civil needs are so closely tied up with success of the military campaign, that unless there is a general readjustment of shipping to increase the tonnages received here I shall be compelled to decide between reducing the size of the total forces or causing disaffection with the French by failing to supply essentials which they are expecting to receive. 37


[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 26 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 11940 ]

... I agree with civil experts that urgent local needs at present require approximate monthly civilian supply shipments of 30,000 tons and am convinced that any reduction in this figure would be dangerous from political and military standpoints.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 29 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 12697]

We agree that on crop figures there should be heavy quantities of wheat hoarded by Arabs especially in Morocco. As explained . . . there are two policies advised here to effect dehoarding: A: Substantial and early shipment of grain and B: importation of consumer goods. French estimate grain requirement civilian needs only was two eight zero thousand tons up to end of May. Our view however was that forty thousand tons quickly shipped and widely publicized and accompanied by consumer goods would effect dehoarding. In view of shipping and port clearance difficulties we have necessarily had to reduce our wheat figure. This accounts for reduction monthly demand ... to ten thousand tons only. We have gravest doubt however whether this quantity plus consumers goods will in fact effect our policy but proposed division of requirements in our opinion best compromise possible.


[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 5 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 2397]

... I sincerely hope that experience in shipping to North Africa will parallel that in other theaters and that it will be possible to meet the civil needs without infringing on my military requirements. The following policy must be adhered to at least until the urgent military needs are met: No tonnage should be used for other than military supplies except that which can be made available by reduction of ballast and use of


broken stowage not utilized for military supplies. The tonnage of any ships which are added to the present convoy limitations may be used exclusively for civil and French rearmament shipments.38


[Msg, AFHQ to OLLA, 7 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, 4638]

As set forth in our summaries of civilian requirements stockings, nail polish and other items not on our requirements list, should be cut off in view of the more urgent items. 39   ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 27 Feb 43, CAD files, 200, N. Africa (2-27-43) (1)]

Personnel problem outlined McCloy's 2663, February 24, 40  recognized here as urgent. Civil agencies cannot find male stenographic help. All clerical help difficult to obtain. Executive personnel being obtained by each agency. After consultation with State Department and other agencies appropriate solution for immediate problems appears to be to make available from here a limited number of enlisted men capable of stenographic or clerical work and junior officers trained for administrative work. . . . These men would report to you and could be detailed by you to the State Department to be used to complete NAEB field organization. In due course they would probably be replaced by civilian personnel when available. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Franks, Dir, ID, for Dir, Distribution Div, SOS, 3 5 Mar 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-21]

5. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration had considerable difficulty in meeting . . . requirements on the initial convoys to North Africa due in large part to the short notice upon which they were asked to make these goods available. 41  The Office of Lend-Lease Administration at once purchased existing stocks of French materials in this country and undertook steps to make available as quickly as possible the additional items needed. However, one of the early convoys upon which appropriate shipping space for the 30,000 ton program was made available, was due to sail before Lend-Lease could make available sufficient cargo to meet General Eisenhower's request. Accordingly, at a general discussion on this subject in New York City on 5 January 1943, called for the purpose of discussing an appropriate stockpile program to meet shipping needs, it was recommended that supplementary "insurance" stockpiles for this purpose be created by the Army, and it was decided that the New York Port should draw on port reserves to make up the necessary shipments for the convoy then in question. . .
Since the loading of the ships was then proceeding, this decision was put into effect forthwith and a statement with respect thereto was submitted to the Office of the Quartermaster General on 6 January 1943.

6. On 23 January 1943 a meeting was held at which . . . it was concluded that in lieu of established Army stockpile as an insurance measure for the above purpose, it would be better to follow the procedure where necessary of drawing on port stocks. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 16 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 5732]

2. . . . the Combined Boards here are somewhat concerned lest the import requirements of North Africa be stated to Washington more in terms of normal pre-war needs than in terms of the situation as it exists today. The impression we get . . . is that you intend to work out the import requirements on the basis of certificates of necessity, and we welcome this. Nevertheless, we think it is important to emphasize that it would only cause disappointment and difficulty if, in compiling the first estimates to be screened in North Africa, the impression should be gained by the French that anything like pre-war normal imports would be possible. . . . There will be other areas requiring support which have been much more severely affected by the war than North Africa. Therefore to set too high a standard there would not only cause disappointment


in that area but resentment elsewhere at a later stage.42


[Memo, Maj. Arthur E. Palmer, Jr., Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, International Aid Div, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

22. The supply functions of ASF with respect to areas such as North Africa would be divided roughly into two aspects. First as to North and West Africa itself, since the prime responsibility for availability of supply is that of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, it is the duty of the International Division to be informed as to the needs for civilian supplies in these areas insofar as such needs are of interest to the military, and the manner and extent to which such needs are being met by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. Since this type of problem is a new one to the Office of Lend-Lease Administration the matter is an organizational phase in that office and the work of keeping currently posted on progress is considerably greater than should be the case in the future. Nevertheless, there are instances in which assistance can be rendered to Lend-Lease with its procuring problems and should be in order to make sure that the military requirements are met. . .

23. In addition to this general duty with respect to the present arrangement, the International Division also acts as a focal point in instances where the War Department is asked by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration to act as a procuring agency for items needed for civilian supply for North or West Africa. This occurs only in instances where the War Department is the sole procuring agency except in cases of emergency. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie, Asst Chief of Transportation, for Dir, International Aid Div, 22 Jul 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. III]

1. . . . As the situation stands at present, our docks are practically clear of Lend-Lease cargo and none has been made available to us for Convoys 14 and 15 . . .

2. Cables from Eisenhower indicate that he holds the Army responsible for any movement of these supplies, but obviously we are at the mercy of the supplier in this instance. Frankly, we feel that we are being given the run around in this matter and feel that Mr. [Edward R.] Stettinius, Jr. [Director, Lend-Lease Administration] should be made cognizant of the situation. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Memo, M. S. McDougal, OLLA, for Oscar Cox, OLLA, 19 Nov 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

This is to report a conference with Col. Jesse I. Miller . . . of the Provost Marshal General's Office . . .
Col. Miller is very much concerned about two problems: (1) The absence of any high policy or integrated planning for how the peoples of occupied countries are to be fed, etc.; (2) the failure of his office in efforts to establish effective liaison with Lend-Lease.

1. The Provost Marshal General's Office is charged with the responsibilities of training personnel for military government and of making long-range plans (surveys, tentative programs, etc.) for the government of occupied areas. Yet that office does not now know who is to be charged with the task of feeding people in occupied territories. Is it to be the Army, or the Red Cross, or Lend-Lease, or some new organization which is to be tagged? Decision should not be postponed for improvisation each time some new territory is taken. Some agency should be charged in advance for all areas, with the duty of training personnel, making detailed preparations of all kinds, etc. Presumably (according to Col. Miller) the commanding officer will direct the policy of distribution; but he will not be able to do the detailed administration. ("Something's got to be done, and be done right away.")


[Pers Views of CA Sec. AFHQ, Recent Information From North Africa, 28 Dec 42, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

Distribution. . . . Taking the pool as a whole (Army barter goods, lend-lease goods, and British goods mixed together), it has been unanimously agreed in NAEB to divide the goods into four parts, the first of which will comprise the great majority:

1. Goods to be distributed through normal civilian channels.
2. Selected goods to be given as a gift to hospitals, charitable institutions and extremely needy groups.
3. Goods to be sold through U.S. Army-operated "company stores," to dock workers, airport workers and other special groups working for the Allied armies. . .
4. Goods to be accumulated as an emergency stockpile for use in Tunisia. All of these distributions will be under NAEB supervision.


[Msg, Hull to Eisenhower and Murphy, AFHQ, 1 Jan 43, ASF, ID files, 014, N. Africa, vol. II]

In compliance with the responsibility placed by the President upon Governor Lehman as Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, relief and rehabilitation operations are to be conducted under his direction. 43  ♦ ♦ ♦

[Statement of Lehman before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 9 Feb 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-543 (1)]

Mr. Lehman: . . . So far as concerns the goods used by the Army in its operations, that, of course, will be under Army direction and the direction will be American.
Senator [Harold] Burton: And this American personnel that distributes the relief directly, do they wear Army uniforms, Navy uniforms, or civilian clothing?. . .
Mr. Lehman: Of course those who distribute relief can't personally give it out; so they are using, to a great extent, local personnel.
Senator Burton: Local civilian personnel?
Mr. Lehman: Local civilian personnel. The Red Cross is co-operating, and their representatives are in the Red Cross uniform. Our men o who will go over there will be in civilian clothes. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, American Consul at Constantine, Algeria, to Secy of State, 30 Dec 42, CAD files, 400, N. Africa (12-30 42) (1)]

It is apparent that the economic situation facing the Allied troops upon their entry into Tunisia, which unfortunately seems to be delayed in spite of the favorable conditions which existed there at the beginning, will be disastrous and will require immediate action. Such action should be undertaken directly by the Allied forces themselves, as it is probable that the French Administration will be so shattered by the present occupation that some time will be necessary to re-establish it.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, ACofS, OPD, for CG, SOS, 8 Jan 43, CAD files, 400, N. Africa (12-30 42) (1)]

2. Recent reports from General Eisenhower indicate that operational logistical problems of increasing seriousness now exist. My view is that it is essential that all military and civilian activities operate under the unified and supreme control of the theater commander, to insure that such activities will not complicate, but actively assist the accomplishment of the military mission. General Eisenhower should have final decision on all these matters including the amount and character of civilian aid, and control of the priorities and methods of its shipment, unloading, local transportation, distribution, payment diversion. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Notes on Mtg in Dept of State between Representatives of Civ Agencies and WD, 19 Feb 43, CAD files, 014, Tunisia (2-2-43) (1)]

Mr. [Luther] Gulick [OFRRO]: The OFRRO has been studying the problems of relief and rehabilitation which would be necessary in Tunisia. (He outlined some of the problems.) I assume that the initial operation of the program would be that of the Army, and in the next phase that of the French and the North African Economic Board.
Mr. [Thomas K.] Finletter [Director of the OFT] : Has the Army plans for handling these civil affairs and the initial period in Tunisia?


Colonel Haskell: There is no information of that here. It is a job to be done on the ground and the War Department is not keen on planning from this side. However, Eisenhower will be sent a cable asking his plans, stating that the belief here is that he should be planning for conduct of civil affairs in the initial stages, and asking if he agrees.
Mr. Finletter: I then understand that the initial chaotic phase will be an Army problem. (Everybody present agrees.) 44  But we here want to know Eisenhower's plans; not the details but the broad outlines. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 Feb 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 8356]

State Department, Governor Lehman, Lend-Lease, and Board of Economic Warfare desire War Department views as to the United States agency to be responsible for planning operation civilian relief repair and restoration economy in Tunisia when occupied.

Our view is that these activities during the initial stages of occupation will be so intimately linked to military operations transport and supply in this area that
1. They should be definitely the sole responsibility of the military
2. Administered by military personnel and services
3. Advance planned by you on the ground.
State Department and above-cited civilian agencies are now of same opinion and would plan to relieve the military of such of these affairs as soon and in such degree as in your judgment is prudent. In the meantime they offer to place all information and such detailed plans which they have assembled here at your disposal. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAD Memo for Red 13 Mar 43, 45  CAD files, 014, Tunisia (2-2-43) (1) ]

1. By exchange of cables between the War Department and General Eisenhower, it has been established that civil supply and civil affairs in Tunisia upon its recovery will be, for an initial period, a direct and sole military responsibility. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. Consequently it is a military function to supply the necessary materials and personnel for discharging this responsibility, and in addition the materiel and personnel for continuing these operations until such time as military and other relevant circumstances permit the Theater Commander to delegate this responsibility to agencies of this government or the French or both. No other way can be relied upon for assuring the availability of appropriate supplies (shipped and procured on military priority), properly constructed and packaged and marked for use under combat conditions. It is doubtful that other governmental agencies should be required to assume this responsibility.


[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 18 Mar 43, OPD files, 014.1 Civil Govt, sec. 1]

Final determination by War Department and United States governmental agencies is that planning and initial stages of operation of civilian relief in Tunisia will be strictly military responsibility. . .
Procurement and other support this phase of operation will be handled here by War Department and not through Committee of Combined Boards. . . 46


[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 27 Mar 43, CAD Msg files, CMIN 14509]

Initial stages and planning of operation of civilian relief in Tunisia by Tunisian detachments a military responsibility. It is being directed by the Civil Affairs Section of this headquarters. The North African Economic Board is included in that section as is the representative of OFRRO. These agencies act jointly in the Tunisian operation.47


[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy, Chief, Civ Admin, AFHQ, to Dept of State, 10 Apr 43, CAD files, 014, Tunisia (2-2-43) (1)]

The War Department is in charge of relief work in reoccupied Tunisia and a detachment of Army officers and civilians with headquarters at Lekef [Le Kef] and representatives with the 8th [Eighth] Army are at the present time operating under my direction, in liaison with French civilian administration and co-operating with the latter on civilian relief. This detachment includes representatives of the Lend-Lease Administration, State Department and OFRRO.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Lt Col Harvey S. Gerry, CO, Tunisian Det, Rpt to Murphy, Chief, Civ Admin, AFHQ, 10 Jun 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

V. Food and Civilian Supplies

Food and other civilian supplies that were shipped into Tunisia were divided between Lend-Lease goods and Tunisian stockpile supplies. We, at first, maintained control of the stockpile goods but at a very early date most of these sup. plies were also turned over to the French, for distribution subject to our control. Supplies were located at various strategic points around Le Kef, Souk-El-Arba, Tebessa and other towns with the idea that needed food and clothing would be rushed in as soon as an area was liberated. Certain supplies were immediately brought in on our trucks but the bulk of the supplies were to be brought in by the French. The French distribution system did not work and as late as 1 June only a few carloads of supplies had arrived for the Médenine, Gabès, Sfax, Kairouan and Sousse areas. Supplies for the Tunis area, however, did arrive close to schedule.

When it became apparent that the distribution system by train planned by the French was not working, steps were immediately taken to obtain trucks which the French could use to bring supplies into the various areas and to distribute such supplies locally within these areas....



[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Dec 42, OPD files, Exec 10, Item 36a, CM-OUT 968]

. . . Mayor [Fiorello H.] LaGuardia has had some conversation with the President in regard to organization and control of propaganda activities in your area in view of possible developments upon termination of present activity. The idea is that he with a small staff with proper language qualifications should be assigned to you as part of your staff primarily for the co-ordination of various activities now engaged in some phases of propaganda and psychological warfare. This scheme if approved, developed and executed would place the co-ordination of these activities in the hands of a man with the necessary background and knowledge of local conditions. It might be a decided asset to you and at the same time relieve other members of your staff of the annoyance, confusion and loss of time attendant upon the activities of a number of semi-independent civilian agencies now in your area or about to descend upon you such as FCC, OWI, BEW, Red Cross, etc. It might also result in a decrease in the tendency to inject at this time a growing number of civilian agencies who want to have a finger in the pie.

Prior to taking any action in the premises your reaction first to the acceptability of Mayor LaGuardia as a member of your staff, and second, reaction to the principle of placing all American civilian agencies in the area under one man on your staff is desired.

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, Item 36a, Exec 10, CM-IN 1675]

Do not consider it advisable at this time further to complicate my staff problems and procedure by drafting of Mayor LaGuardia. No individual regardless of personal qualifications could serve at this time as head of my civil affairs section except a man that has lived through the hectic experiences of the past few weeks. Murphy's broad experience precludes any thought of placing him in a subordinate position.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Lt Col Frederick B. Wiener, DJAG, for the JAG, 7 Dec 42, OPD files, 014.1, Civil Govt, sec. 1]

1. Late Saturday afternoon Major J. [Joseph] M. Scammel, C.M.P., came from The Provost Marshal General's Office to see whether I knew of any precedents which might be of assistance in the following situation:
It appears that the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare are toying with the idea of taking control of civil affairs in North Africa out of General Eisenhower's hands [see AFHQ Memo 13, 10 Feb 43, section 3 above.] The Provost Marshal General was interested in finding instances in our history where civilians had been given such control, with a view to demonstrating from actual instances that it was a mistake to make any such transfer.

3. I said that I did not know of any such instances because it had been the almost unvarying American practice to leave control of civil affairs in the hands of the military for a very long time. . .

6. While therefore there were very few precedents of divided control, it would seem to me that on principle there was every reason not to remove civil affairs from the jurisdiction of the military commanders while hostilities were still in progress. I could see no compelling reason indicating why the State Department or the Board of Economic Warfare were better fitted for the task than was the Army. The State Department was not an operating agency and dealt only with the relations between sovereign states. The Board of Economic Warfare was not an operating agency and its functions were limited to a relatively narrow field. On the other hand, the Army had had experience in doing the thousand and one things that a government must do; it fed men, it housed them, it guarded their health, it operated camps larger than many cities, and it maintained courts and dispensed justice. By any functional standard the Army was infinitely better qualified to administer a local government by reason of experience and practice than either of the other two agencies, and experience indicated that, in any event, such control must be left to the military authorities as long as hostilities continued.


[Memo, Miller, for Greenbaum, OUSW, 21 Dec 42, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. 1]

(a) Civilian agencies have the entirely proper and useful function of assembling, outside the theater, and laying down in it the necessary supplies and material for civilian use. Distribution or other handling, after arrival in the theater, should be under the absolute control and direction of the theater commander during any period of military necessity. Military necessity is a matter of fact, not a matter of law or international politics. From this point of view, the activities of COB seem to be sound, provided General Eisenhower is left in supreme command in the theater.

(b) The formulation of long-view political, social and economic policies is properly the function of civilian agencies of the government; their "implementation," during any period of military necessity, is the function of the military command. The implications of the asserted purposes of the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee are, therefore, fraught with great danger.


[Memo, Maj Gen George V. Strong, ACofS, G-2, for the COB, 23 Dec 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

1. Enclosed herewith is a letter from Mayor LaGuardia outlining a plan for propaganda and civil affairs in connection with the next phase of operations in the Mediterranean.

3. Basically this plan is a matter of control, coordination and execution of propaganda, subversive activity, espionage and counterespionage, and other nonmilitary activities including civil affairs, in the theater, except those of the State Department, under a Staff Officer of the Commanding General. It has the advantage of being a single military setup rather than having these affairs handled by a number of separate civilian agencies. Its disadvantage is that it runs counter to some of the activities assigned to OWI and OSS.

4. It is recommended that this be forwarded to Admiral Leahy in order that the desires of the President in the premises might be made known.


[Memo, Leahy for Deane, Secy, JCS, 24 Dec 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

The President says he will delay any action on this for a long time.


[Memo (unsigned), for McCloy based on conversations with persons interested in Civil Affairs in Algiers, 19 Mar 43, p. 10, CAD files, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

... NAEB needs an experienced businessman to administer it and a good executive secretariat to pull it together. If possible, the "separate agency" idea should be minimized, and all civilian employees (whether Relief, BEW, Lend-Lease or what have you, and their British counterparts, if any), should be employees of NAEB. NAEB should be able to use any of its staff on any job for which need arises. There is some overlapping between the functions of several of the divisions of NAEB 48


[Memo, Somervell, CG, ASF, for McCloy, 3 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Civil Govt, sec. 1]

1. Reference is made to your note to me of March 29, and its inclosure consisting of ... notes dated March 19 giving a resume of certain organizations for handling civil affairs in the North African Theater.

2. I have had these notes studied in my office, and submit the following comments and recommendations:
    a. Joint Economic and Political Council
While the JEAPC [Joint Economic and Political Council] is divided into two sections, one political and one economic, Mr. Murphy is the American representative on both. It will be noted that the British representative on the political side is from their Foreign Office, while their representative on the economic side is from their Military Supply Group. Obviously, this is an advantageous arrangement, for the British. During military operations, economic matters must be decided by their military rather than by their political import. Mr. Murphy as a representative of the State Department must necessarily be largely guided in his actions by his political views, which may be at variance with military necessity. I am very definitely of the view that the economic side of the picture should be completely disassociated from the political. Mr. Murphy should act as a political adviser to the Theater Commander in conjunction with his British opposite. Certainly, the Theater Commander will take this advice into consideration in making decisions with respect to the economy in North Africa. However, the reports reaching him, and the policies with respect to the economy in North Africa should not be drawn up with the political question dominant. It is believed that the Economic and Political Councils should be separated entirely, and that a Staff Officer experienced in supply should replace Mr. Murphy on the North African Economic Board if this Board is continued.

    b. North Africa Economic Board
I believe that the North Africa Economic Board should be abolished and its functions taken over by appropriate Staff Divisions on the Theater Command Staff. . . . Basically, there might be three such divisions: (1) A General Purchasing Agency to replace the military section with both British and American purchasing agents; (2) A Civilian Supply Section which would control both imports and exports; (3) A Fiscal Section, and (4) if necessary, a Relief Section. These sections should all be handled by Staff Officers, and the representatives of the civilian agencies should be assigned as advisors during the initial occupation and while military operations are still under way. As the military move out, these officers should be prepared to take over and carry on. The initial staff should be provided from military personnel to be replaced later by appropriate civilian administrative and clerical assistants as these assistants can be brought into the area. ♦ ♦ ♦

General Comments on NAEB -The general comments on NAEB spring definitely from lack of advance planning, failure to establish firm policies, and the many divisions of responsibility which result from so many of its representatives reporting indirectly to so many different agencies in Washington or London before being willing to expound their positions. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. Recommendations
I would strongly recommend that the Acting Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, together with representatives of the Operations Division, WDGS, and of the Army


Service Forces, specially selected for the purpose, be formed into an ad hoc committee to prepare a sound joint organization, and a guide manual to be presented for United Kingdom agreement so that this may be promulgated and issued as a directive to all Theater Commanders. The time for preparation of such a guide is limited now, and early action is needed.


[Memo, Col Julius C. Holmes, Chief, MGS [Military Government Section], AFHQ, for Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, to Apr 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

(2-b) The recommendation that the North African Economic Board be abolished is not, I believe, in conformity with General Eisenhower's policy.49  He has indicated that as rapidly as the military situation permits, he wants to have civil activities, both political and economic, separated from the military. Under his instructions, some progress has been made in that direction already. I believe that one reason which prompts this attitude on General Eisenhower's part is that North Africa is not enemy-occupied territory and is rapidly assuming the status of an ally, if not as yet an admitted member of the United Nations.
General Somervell's memorandum seems to cover two general subjects, that is, the existing situation in North Africa, and plans which should be made for future operations. It is of course recognized that a different policy must be pursued and different machinery set up to take care of the situation in enemy territory. I think that General Eisenhower would agree that the administration of enemy-occupied territory should be handled entirely by the military, and this is in conformity with plans with which you are familiar.

[Memo (unsigned), for Dir of CAD, 13 Apr 43, 50  CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

2.... It seems clear that the organization of the NAEB was a mistake and that all matters handled by it should have been handled by appropriate sections of the staff. If experts from other branches of the government were needed they should have been commissioned for the purpose. However, it may be doubted whether it would be wise to disturb this situation at the present time. Any attempt to do so would almost certainly bring on protracted arguments with other branches of the government. And the attempt might be ultimately unsuccessful. It would seem wiser to stand pat on the present situation in North Africa and to make certain, in the case of the next occupied territory, that the whole matter be handled by the military. It will be psychologically and politically easier to prevent the establishing of another NAEB in the next occupied territory than it would be to abolish the present board. "Possession is nine points of the law." There are many vested interests that would almost certainly resist the abolition of the present board. And if these should succeed in saving the NAEB they would then be in position to argue -that the principle had been settled and might thereby be able to bring about the establishment of such boards for other areas.51  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Capt Palmer, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for the Dir, ID, ASF, 16 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS22]

7. The best information available to date indicates that the only important civilian supply problem for North Africa is the problem of fulfilling a stated requirement of approximately 10,000 tons a month of industrial materials. This material is in short supply in this country and presents a real procurement problem. It is stated by civilian authorities in North Africa to be essential to the economy of the country. The problem of providing food is a very simple problem and, to some extent, the same may be said of clothing and other miscellaneous materials.

8. On the basis of all available evidence it is not possible to come to the conclusion that Lend-Lease may be able to discharge with any degree


of success its supply responsibilities as to industrial materials. Lend-Lease states that the matter is well in hand and that substantial deliveries will be expected in the near future and may be expected to continue at a satisfactory rate.

9. Although this may well be the case, all available evidence points to a contrary conclusion.

10. Analysis shows that the North African .Economic Board has requested 50,400 tons of critical industrial material for delivery by 30 June 1943. Lend-Lease has filed requisitions for approximately 29,700 tons of such material, has obtained deliveries of 1,250 tons, has shipped 9,300 tons to North Africa, and expects to have 2,700 tons at ports of export by 30 April 1943

11. In response to repeated attempts to obtain detailed information as to forecasts of delivery schedules, no information has been provided other than oral assurance that "everything is under control."

12. The basic difficulty to be faced is that Lend-Lease has never been organized as a procuring agency and is not now staffed to perform such a duty. It was created after the main foreign countries had already established large and capable purchasing missions in this country. Consequently, it has operated in only a general staff capacity. Similarly, Treasury Procurement, the operating agency for most of the purchasing in question, has at all times had available the assistance of the foreign purchasing missions and there is no evidence that it is a properly qualified operating agency to undertake the difficult procurement problem.

13. In view of the foregoing the conclusion seems inevitable that only a small percentage of the critical industrial materials stated to be needed in North Africa will be furnished in the absence of a drastic change in the present operation. There are several possible solutions. One is to strengthen Lend-Lease and Treasury Procurement in such a way that they are capable of truly discharging their responsibility. Another is to establish a strong French Purchasing Mission to provide the assistance which is normally provided in the case of most foreign governments. A third possible solution is to have General Eisenhower requisition through G-4 of the War Department all materials, the supply of which is truly important in North Africa.52


[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, ID, ASF, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

... matters of civil supply were not properly organized and to date are still in an unsatisfactory state of initial organization. As a direct result, the exports from the United States to North Africa for the purpose of supporting the civilian economy have not included appropriate materials. Exports to date have consisted of large quantities of wheat, flour, sugar, tea and soap, with some cotton cloth and varied industrial materials included. The requirements for the area, it now appears, would have been much more satisfactorily met had the exports consisted of industrial items in large quantities and cotton cloth and spare parts of automotive equipment to re-establish the internal transportation which is the most vital problem now facing the population. Consequently a rich food producing area is importing food for its cities, and to some extent food is piling up at the ports rather than being distributed.  ♦ ♦ ♦



[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Dec 42, OPD files, Item 36A, Exec 10, CM-IN 1672]

I hope you will keep track of the various agencies which you say will soon be sending representatives like locusts to descend upon me and convince them that the whole should be organized in the states into a single unit under a man like LaGuardia 53  The idea of a single staff authority over the whole gang is eminently sound and I want them all to understand it before coming here.


[Memo, James E. Webb, Dir of Bur of the Budget, for Roosevelt, 6 Feb 43, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

North Africa, the first sizable relief problem encountered, provides a warning signal of impending breakdown in our international operations.
Under its original Executive Order, the Board of Economic Warfare was given broad powers for post-war international economic planning.... It is still responsible presumably for procurement and development of North African raw materials, and for stockpiling goods in foreign areas for relief purposes. At present it has a mission in North Africa.
When North Africa was invaded, the Lend-Lease Administration was directed to procure, finance, and distribute relief goods, and to meet all other civilian requirements, OLLA has accordingly begun to staff itself for the relief job.
The State Department then received a directive to co-ordinate the activities of all civilian agencies operating in North Africa.
Meanwhile, the War Department is maintaining a school to train officers to administer reoccupied territories in the wake of our armed forces. In North Africa military expediency had dictated, as it must, the direction of our economic operations.
TO sum up: BEW plans, hopes to rehabilitate, and may develop; Lend-Lease plans, procures, finances, and distributes; the Department of State plans and attempts to direct; the Army plans, administers, and directs;-all with respect to the same geographical area.
Much more is needed here than the mere addition of another authority with broad vague powers of "co-ordination and integration." 54  It is the confusion in the basic war jobs-the multiplicity of operating agencies-which complicates the task. ♦ ♦ ♦

[Memo, Dir of Bur of the Budget for Roosevelt, 3 Mar 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

3. In reviewing 1944 budget estimates and current proposals for allocations of funds for missions to be sent to North Africa by Lend-Lease, BEW and OFRRO, I find even more striking cases of duplications in the proposed programs of these agencies than I had heretofore suspected. Each agency is mobilizing an almost identical corps of industrial, agricultural, transportation, construction, economic, and foreign trade experts to be sent to North Africa; and programs for other areas are in the making.

4. The Army is gravely concerned over the task of dealing with a large array of civilian agencies here, in North Africa, and on new fronts. . . . Issuance of the OFRRO order as now written would further difficulty.

5. The State Department has taken some positive measures to correlate economic operations and policy in occupied areas, as for example the establishment of an interdepartmental committee in Washington and the North African Economic Board. But . . . current methods leave large gaps in harmonizing these operations and they fail to tie economic programs together closely enough with the propaganda and political-diplomatic programs. Deficiencies in the internal organization of the State Department and the number of separate agencies to be co-ordinated offered serious obstacles.

6. Current disunity and competition among American agencies play into the hands of the enemy and confuse our allies. A unified front in dealing with the British, the French in North Africa, and others is lacking. The Axis propaganda machine is making the most of the conflict of American agencies.
When the several agencies with foreign economic programs all go up to Congress in support of their 1944 budget and describe virtually identical programs and types of operations to be carried on both in Washington and overseas, the Administration will be subject to heavy criticisms. Moreover, Congressional reaction might be such as to endanger the whole foreign economic program by refusing to appropriate for important segments and by airing the whole situation in public, to the detriment of the program both at home and abroad.

Recommended Steps:

1. Assign to the State Department (not to OFRRO) [See Chapter IV, Section 3] the responsibility for co-ordinating the war programs of American civilian agencies abroad....

2. Establish adequate and properly organized facilities within the State Department for coordinating foreign economic, propaganda, and political policies and for guiding the policies and


programs of civilian agencies abroad (e.g., North African Economic Board).

3. Organize OFRRO, Lend-Lease, BEW, and perhaps certain RFC agencies and parts of CIAA [Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs] as consistent parts of a single agency, somewhat in the form of the National Housing Agency. This would immediately clear up any of the difficulties cited above and would bring into manageable dimensions the job of the State Department in harmonizing American civilian, military, other national and United Nations organizations without its having to sit on a fox's lair of competing American agencies. With a consolidated economic agency, the separate and competing missions of American agencies could be replaced by an integrated staff headed by an operating official working under the direction of the State Department. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Capt Donald McLean, CAD, for Actg Dir, CAD, on a meeting with Thomas K. Finletter, Spec Asst to the Secy of State, 3 Apr 43, CAD files, 334, CCNA (3-2-43) (1)]

3. Mr. Finletter then stated that he was becoming increasingly concerned over the possibility that problems involving the civilian economy of occupied areas might be as badly handled in new areas as they had been in North Africa.55  He said they thought the question should be investigated by all the agencies with a view toward developing an integrated program....

4. For the purpose of stimulating thought on the subject, Mr. Finletter suggested that skeleton staffs be set up in Washington to consider proposed areas, with the end in view that the group which had been working on a given area in Washington would assume responsibility of the same nature in those areas as soon as the Commanding General authorized their assumption of responsibilities. Although the specific question did not arise, Mr. Finletter was assuming the possibility that the NAEB pattern would be followed in all areas. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Maj Palmer, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, ID, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

12. . . . The delegation of . . . duties in Washington has not been focalized in a satisfactory manner. The State Department in Washington purports to act on such affairs under a letter from the President rather than under the request from the War Department. In addition, the State Department acts as chairman of an informal committee which in turn was charged with certain duties with respect to civilian affairs in North Africa in CCS 126 [COB]. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration, which has assumed the responsibility for providing necessary civilian supplies to the area, purports to act under a directive received from the President rather than under a directive from the State Department or from the War Department, either of which could have been proper procedure. . . . The result of the foregoing is that none of the agencies in Washington are responsible to any of the direct participants in the operation and their only common meeting ground is the informal State Department committee in which they participate and from which they can withdraw without weakening their responsibility with respect to North African affairs.


[Memo, Lt Comdr Perry R. Taylor, USNR, for Deane, CCS Secretariat, 7 May 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

Several indications are now appearing that the CCNA activities might develop into mere formalities. Matters requiring decision by COB can not be determined by CCNA and there is an increasing trend on the part of the individual U.S. agencies to return to the pre-COB system, where each agency carries on what it considers its business without any reference to other agencies. Duplication and lack of co-ordination are the obvious results. It is believed that the principal cause for this trend has been the inability or unwillingness of the State Department to give adequate leadership to the necessary co-ordination among the U.S. agencies.
. . . There appear to be two courses; one, that the military urge the State Department to take the leadership insofar as French Africa is concerned, and two, that the military provide this leadership itself. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Maj Gen John H. Hilldring, circa Jun 43, CAD files, 321, (1-1-43) (1)]

 ♦ ♦ ♦  In consultation with State Department yesterday afternoon, I agreed that a subcommittee appointed by Secretary Hull would have greater legal standing than one appointed by the Secretary of War. My consent to this arrangement was not without consideration for the fact that present excellent relationship between War Department and State Department would be enhanced by this arrangement, and would be severely strained if not damaged, if I barged ahead with my original plan.
Please prepare a letter for the Secretary of War's signature requesting that he appoint under the authority cited a subcommittee on military government. . . .


[Min, Mtg of WD Gen Council, 14 Jun 43, OPD files, 334.8, Gen Council]

General Eisenhower has experienced much difficulty with various civilian agencies operating within his theater because of absence of definite understanding concerning the jurisdiction of these agencies. Settlement of such jurisdictions should be made before these units go overseas. Bureau of the Budget is now attempting to set up machinery to accomplish this, and last week the President directed the Secretary of State to designate one of his assistant secretaries to co-ordinate with all such agencies ....56

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