Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1969

II.

Operational Readiness

The Army's operational mission involves the readiness, deployment, and utilization of U.S. ground forces. To carry it out the Army must develop strategic concepts and plans, insure the operational readiness of forces, establish priorities for their distribution worldwide, and supervise their commitment in support of national policies. In fiscal year 1969 this over-all task was shaped by the Army's million-and-a-half strength, its heavy contribution to the war in Vietnam, and its worldwide deployment.

The Pacific and the Far East

The area of the U.S. Army, Pacific, embraces Hawaii, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Command strength continued to rise as a result of the war. During the year, operational forces in the Pacific reached a level of nine combat divisions, six combat units of brigade size, five corps or equivalent headquarters, and a multitude of support elements ranging from a missile command and air defense brigades in Korea to engineer, military police, signal, and aviation brigades in Vietnam.

Army strength in Vietnam rose during fiscal year 1969 from 355,000 to about 361,000. Deployed to the combat theater were the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), four artillery battalions, an aviation battalion, and numerous support units. Forty-three Reserve Component units, including two artillery battalions, an engineer battalion, a ranger company, and various combat service support units, were deployed to Vietnam during the period June-December 1968. Within the combat zone, an additional corps headquarters, the XXIV, was activated in August 1968 to facilitate command and control of forces in the Republic of Vietnam's northern provinces. At the divisional level, the 101st Airborne Division was reorganized into an airmobile division, the second of its type in the U.S. Army; the 23d Infantry Division (Americal) was restructured along the lines of the other infantry divisions in Vietnam, its three brigades—the 11th,196th, and 198th—retaining their numerical designation; and the 9th Infantry Division was reorganized so that one brigade achieved a riverine configuration.

The Army's standardization program, designed to provide more firepower and improved combat effectiveness, was extended in the war zone to combat support units and was in the process, as the year closed, of being extended to combat service support units to foster economies in critical personnel skills and materiel.

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On the battlefield, U.S. Army forces operated in all areas of the Republic of Vietnam during the fiscal year and in three major roles: containment operations along the demilitarized zone and the Cambodian and Laotian borders to prevent enemy incursions into South Vietnam; offensive operations against enemy main forces and their base areas; and support operations to further the Republic of Vietnam's pacification program. Offensive and containment operations constituted the primary roles. These operations compelled the enemy to rely heavily on border sanctuaries and kept the bulk of his main forces away from population centers, while pacification activities furthered population security and helped the Republic of Vietnam government extend its protection into new rural areas.

Friendly forces maintained the initiative over enemy main forces, capitalizing on superior firepower and mobility. Wide-ranging spoiling attacks, capture of supply caches, and penetrations of base areas kept the enemy off balance, although he continued to demonstrate an ability to mount co-ordinated countrywide attacks. His casualties continued to run substantially above those of the allies.

Increasing enemy concentration in the areas west and north of Saigon necessitated a readjustment of friendly forces. Reduced activity in the I Corps area in the north permitted the shift of some elements to the threatened area. To the south of the capital city, an Army-Navy team continued to conduct operations along the many waterways in the Mekong Delta. Mobile riverine forces penetrated areas previously thought to be inaccessible, denying the enemy important sanctuaries and helping to restore government control over an important food-producing region.

The Army was also deeply involved in the program to improve and modernize the Republic of Vietnam armed forces, preparing them to assume an expanding and eventually a major share of the war. Issue of the M-16 rifle and the M-60 machine gun enhanced the confidence, morale, and effectiveness of the Vietnamese forces. Army advisory teams in all 44 of the country's provinces concentrated on improving the Republic of Vietnam Army and Regional and Popular Forces units. The over-all expansion of indigenous armed forces aims at a balanced structure of combat and logistical units capable of coping with insurgents.

As the year ended there were important indications, on several levels, of progress in the modernization program, the war, and U.S. participation. It was possible, first of all, to reduce the number of advisers assigned to some of the regular Republic of Vietnam Army units. Secondly, those units were able to assume an expanding role in independent operations. And finally, the President of the United States in the closing month of

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the year announced an early withdrawal of some U.S. troops, the first force reduction of the war.

An 11,000-man division of Thai Army troops completed its deployment to Vietnam early in calendar year 1969, moving to bases in the III Corps Tactical Zone and replacing a previously committed Thai regiment. The U.S. Army advisory contingent—instructors, logisticians, repairmen—that helped prepare the division for Vietnam was phased out as the fiscal year closed. The Thai Army will train the division's replacements at the Kanchanaburi training center in Thailand, built by the U.S. Army.

Communist insurgency in Thailand continued during 1969, especially among hill tribes in the north. Government counterinsurgency programs progressed slowly but steadily in the northeastern and central regions of the country.

In Korea, the U.S. commitment continued, with Eighth Army elements deployed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with Republic of Korea forces. The I Corps (Group), the 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions, the 4th Missile Command, and the 38th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense) joined Republic of Korea Army forces in measures to defend the nation. The I Corps defended the western avenues of approach into South Korea with the 2d Infantry Division deployed along the DMZ and the 7th Infantry Division in reserve. Units regularly conducted combat training and held frequent exercises to test and maintain combat readiness, while the U.S. Military Advisory Group helped the Republic of Korea's Army to develop and maintain its forces.

Hostile actions by North Korea along the DMZ and elsewhere in the Republic of Korea continued as a part of the long-term objective of reunifying Korea under Communist rule. A high proportion of provocations has been directed against the U.S. 2d Division, apparently part of a deliberate attempt to bolster North Korean claims that DMZ tension is attributable to the presence of U.S. forces.

Elsewhere in the Far East-Pacific region, U.S. Army deployment in Japan and on Okinawa remained generally stable. On Okinawa, in addition to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, and Headquarters, IX Corps, the principal Army forces consisted of the 2d Logistical Command, the 30th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense), the 7th Psychological Operations Group, the 1st Special Forces Group, and the 97th Civil Affairs Group.

In Japan, the U.S. Army headquarters at Camp Zama continued to provide logistical support to U.S. and allied forces in the Far East, including military assistance, depot operations, procurement, and hospital facilities. The command operated 2,750 hospital beds for battle casualties from Vietnam.

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Europe, the Middle East, and Africa

U.S. Army, Europe, maintains a powerful armored-mechanized nuclear-supported force that is a keystone of North Atlantic Treaty Organization land defense in central Europe. Among the major forces are 2 armored divisions, 2 1/3 mechanized infantry divisions, and 2 armored cavalry regiments. Support includes nuclear-capable artillery units.

In December 1968 the Secretary of Defense approved an Army plan to streamline the command, control, and logistic organization of Army forces in Europe. As the fiscal year closed, changes were in progress to replace the 7th Army Support Command with two corps support commands, redesignate the Communications Zone as the Theater Army Support Command, establish a single automated inventory control center for the theater, and streamline command relationships with NATO.

The redeployment of Army units from Europe, begun in April 1968, was completed in September 1968 under a plan that reduced Army strength there by about 28,000 men. The two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 3d Armored Cavalry, and combat and service support units returned to the United States remain committed to NATO, and selected organizational equipment was stored upon their departure against a time of future need. With this equipment prepositioned, the units can be flown to the theater and take the field expeditiously in a period of crisis. To test the procedure, over 12,000 of these troops were flown back to Germany to participate, during January and February 1969, in Exercise Reforger. A successful operation with realistic training under winter conditions, the exercise took on added significance in the light of developments in Eastern Europe during the period.

Under the guise of military "exercises," the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact nations invaded Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. Their deployment placed large and mobile Soviet forces farther to the west than at any time in recent years, placed Soviet divisions closer to U.S. Army forces, and in general altered the military balance in Europe. The forward positioning of Soviet forces with the corresponding extension of their lines of communication significantly improved their ability to attack with little or no warning.

The rapidity and secrecy with which the Warsaw Pact forces deployed brings into challenge the premise that there would be sufficient time to mobilize and deploy large ground forces; the advantages of having forces in being and deployed according to plan are obvious.

The United States, in concert with its NATO allies, responded to the Czechoslovakian situation by taking measures to improve the treaty

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organization's military posture. The NATO ministers, meeting in November 1968, affirmed that the "quality, effectiveness, and deployment" of NATO forces would be improved. In response to the Czechoslovakian crisis and as a display of the U.S. Army's deployment capability, the timetable for Exercise Reforger was accelerated. Additional resources were also allocated to European-based elements and those scheduled to reinforce them in order to raise the level of preparedness.

During fiscal year 1969 the United States and Spain negotiated for a renewal of the agreement under which U.S. armed forces are granted base rights on Spanish territory. United States use of these bases assumed increased importance as a result of France's military withdrawal from NATO and the growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. The U.S. Army's modest participation in the base rights agreement consists chiefly of military assistance grants and sales designed to improve the capabilities of the Spanish Army.

Alaska and Latin America

The U.S. Army, Alaska, continued as the Army component of the unified Alaskan Command charged with providing Alaska's ground defense. The tactical forces are positioned in two general locations—about half are north of the Alaskan Range in the Fort Wainwright-Eielson Air Force Base complex near Fairbanks and are assigned to or support the 171st Mechanized Infantry Brigade; the remainder are in the Fort Richardson-Elmendorf Air Force Base complex near Anchorage in the south, where they are assigned to or support the 172d Mechanized Infantry Brigade. Each brigade has two maneuver battalions and a battalion of artillery.

Alaska affords a fine natural training area with virgin land, muskeg, woods, mountains, lakes and rivers, and cold weather. The wide variety and range of geographic and meteorological conditions contributes to the development of well-conditioned and versatile forces. Two Alaskan-trained infantry battalions sent to Vietnam were rated among the best-prepared units to enter the war there, despite environmental differences.

Headquartered in the Panama Canal Zone, the U.S. Army Forces, Southern Command, continued as the Army component of the unified U.S. Southern Command. The 193d Infantry Brigade was the major tactical unit, with organic mechanized and infantry battalions, a field artillery battery, an engineer company, and an aviation company. Other units include the 8th Special Farces Group (Airborne), the 4th Missile Battalion of the 517th Artillery, the 470th Intelligence Group, the 3d Civil Affairs Group, the U.S. Army School of the Americas, the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, and the Atlantic Area Installation Command. Command of all active elements of U.S. Army Forces, Southern Com-

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mand, in Puerto Rico is scheduled to be transferred to the U.S. Continental Army Command and administered by Third U.S. Army effective July 1, 1969. All preparations for this transfer of responsibility were accomplished within the fiscal year.

The Southern Command's functions are varied, ranging from actual participation in the defense and security of U.S. personnel and property in the Canal Zone to assistance to Latin American countries engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Through the U.S. Army School of the Americas, mobile training teams, and Army sections of military groups in 17 countries, U.S. Army personnel provided valuable guidance and professional military assistance and advice to the armed forces of Latin American nations.

Continental United States

The U.S. Army Air Defense Command, a component of the combined U.S.-Canadian Air Defense Force, is the Army's only continental U.S. command assigned an operational alert mission and deployed on tactical sites. The command's six air defense brigades and eight groups, with NIKE-HERCULES and HAWK fire units, defend 25 industrial and population centers in 14 states on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

During fiscal year 1969 all Air Defense Command units met prescribed training requirements, and 72 percent attained the highest possible rating for mission performance. Improved operational capability was confirmed in the annual service practice missile firing at Fort Bliss, Texas, and by generally higher unit scores earned in tactical evaluations.

There were several reductions in antibomber and area defenses during the year. Thirteen NIKE-HERCULES fire units and 2 headquarters were inactivated in the first half of the fiscal year and another 17 fire units and 5 headquarters were scheduled for inactivation and declared nonoperational by year-end.

Army Readiness

The continuing program to improve the Army's readiness has proceeded concurrently with and been conditioned by the over-all buildup, the war, and the modernization program for Vietnamese forces. The status of major units improved slightly during the year as the result of close management of their personnel, training, and equipment. There was some decline in the readiness of support units, both in the active Army and the Reserve Components, because of war requirements. Diversions of equipment from active Army and Reserve Component units, delays in planned replacements, and levies on war reserve stocks were necessary to meet the expanding requirements connected with Vietnamese force improvement and modernization.

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With the leveling off of the U.S. Army commitment in Vietnam, marked by the last scheduled deployment of a maneuver battalion in July 1968, and the anticipated assumption by Vietnamese forces of an increasing role on the battlefield, attention turned to the considerations of stabilization and, in the longer view, redeployment. The Strategic Army Force (STRAF) was strengthened with the activation and assignment to the 82d Airborne Division of a brigade to replace the one deployed to Vietnam. The STRAF was thus enlarged to 4 1/3 divisions. The 76 mobilized Reserve Component units completed their training and 43 were deployed to Southeast Asia and 33 assigned to the STRAF as operationally ready units. The assignment of combat veterans to elements of the Strategic Reserve enhanced readiness, and the adjustment in Vietnam also had a calming effect on personnel turbulence in U.S. Army, Europe.

In June 1969 the Army operations center (AOC) was moved into a new facility in the basement of the Pentagon. The new complex houses all of the elements of the center, including the U.S. Army Command and Control Support Detachment and the Civil Disturbance Watch Team of the Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations. Parts of the AOC were formerly spread throughout the Pentagon and in other external locations. The consolidation will provide a capability for more effective, efficient, and timely crisis management at departmental headquarters. Improved communications provide more flexibility for coping with both domestic and international crises.

The AOC was the hub of staff activity on four separate occasions in fiscal year 1969. In the presidential election campaign of 1968 the center's co-ordinated Army resources supporting the Secret Service in its role of protecting the President and Vice President of the United States and all candidates for those offices, right through to completion of the inaugural ceremonies. The Army provided explosive ordnance disposal personnel, regular troop units (see below), helicopters, radios, sentry dog teams, and other kinds of equipment and personnel.

In a worldwide command post exercise in October 1968, the AOC provided essential command, control, and administrative direction for the Army Staff during exercise play.

The coup d'etat in Panama in October 1968 produced an international situation in which the center supported the Army Staff with accurate and current information through briefings, maps, charts, and other displays.

On the domestic scene, the Army operations center during the winter and early spring of 1969 monitored the military assistance provided to civil authorities in connection with disastrous floods in southern California and the northern states of the Midwest. Beginning in late Feb-

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ruary 1969, the center was the Department of Defense focal point for military participation in Operation Forecast, a massive flood prevention effort co-ordinated by the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

In the past year the Operations Center System almost doubled the size of its data base, adding several new reporting systems and related files. The most significant of these are the Unit Identification Code Registration and Deployment Reporting System. These and other information systems required the augmentation of center equipment.

The Deployment Reporting System has opened an entirely new area in the processes of planning and analysis. The system is designed to provide information required for contingency planning, mobility planning, strategic studies, feasibility estimates, operational plan package reviews, and movement capability studies. It was initiated as a joint planning automatic data processing system in March 1969 and when fully operational will permit rapid evaluation of operational plans and the Army's capability to execute them.

Civil Disturbances

In anticipation of civil disturbances during the Democratic National Convention in August 1968, an active Army task force of three brigades, totaling 6,277 troops, was prepositioned on August 26 in the Chicago, Illinois, area, to be available on call. The force was not used and by August 30 began returning to home stations. The estimated cost of the operation was $1.324 million. Unlike 1968, federal troops were not required in fiscal year 1969 to assist civil authorities in situations of civil disturbance. In response to 35 requests, riot control materiel such as protective masks and vests, CS grenades, and communications equipment was loaned to civil law enforcement agencies and National Guard elements from 12 states and the District of Columbia.

Despite the quieter year, plans for possible disturbances in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other possessions or territories were completed and co-ordinated with the jurisdictions and the other military services, and civil disturbance training was conducted by all Army components.

Civil Affairs, Civic Action, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces

The major civil affairs and civic action commitments and responsibilities in oversea areas remained in Southeast Asia and Latin America during fiscal year 1969. In Vietnam, the U.S. Army continued to support that country's pacification program. The Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) of the Military

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Assistance Command provided single manager direction over all U.S. civil and military support there.

CORDS supports activities that promote security in villages and hamlets, neutralization of the Viet Cong infrastructure, defection by the enemy, care and resettlement of refugees, and community organization and self-government. CORDS agencies are engaged in programs to improve agriculture, education, and medical care; public safety; road and utilities systems; facilities of various kinds; and numerous other civic enterprises to promote the welfare of the people and repair the ravages of war.

Army civil affairs units and civic action support contributed to the over-all pacification program. Three civil affairs companies and four platoons operated in the field during the year, chiefly at province and district levels, conducting water surveys, hiring laborers, providing medical and dental care, rendering assistance to refugees, constructing schools and sanitary facilities, and providing agricultural and foreign claims advice.

Eight military surgical teams worked in provincial hospitals, supporting the Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Public Health by providing medical care for civilians; furnishing advice and assistance in public health and sanitation; and training Vietnamese personnel in medical care, public health, and sanitation. Two engineer construction advisory detachments supported the Vietnamese government's rural development program, one providing assistance in repairing dwellings and constructing roads, schools, and dispensaries, the other in constructing water systems. The detachments also provided the rural population with technical assistance in well-drilling, sewer construction, and construction techniques for self-help projects.

Senior U.S. Army advisers, specially selected and trained, worked with the chiefs of the 44 South Vietnamese provinces, and mobile advisory teams composed of two officers and three noncommissioned officers, specially trained in infantry weapon and medical aid skills, assisted in the training and deployment of Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces, whose contribution to local security relieves Vietnamese regular forces for offensive operations.

The so-called Chieu Hoi program, under which enemy personnel are encouraged to defect, continued to score successes. Since the program was launched in 1963, over 100,000 of the enemy have rallied to the government of the Republic of Vietnam, some 30,000 during the past year, largely in response to the efforts of psychological operations units.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the 539th Engineer Construction Advisory Detachment operated in Thailand, supporting rural development

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projects and helping the Royal Thai Army maintain and operate road-building equipment and conduct training. The 97th Civil Affairs Group on Okinawa also deployed mobile training teams to Thailand, and provided a team to South Korea and assistance in Okinawa. The 97th Civil Affairs Group, a component of the Special Action Force, Asia, trains indigenous forces to organize and conduct civic action programs that will strengthen the economic, social, and political conditions in host countries.

In Latin America the 3d Civil Affairs Group, stationed in the Panama Canal Zone, provided veterinary instruction in Bolivia, supply management instruction in Argentina, well-drilling instruction in Paraguay, and surveys of water resources in Panama. The Latin American program has improved co-ordination among governmental agencies in the host countries, leading to concerted planning to attain common goals.

Army psychological operations forces were deployed around the world during fiscal year 1969. One group, with three battalions, was stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and served as the training, rotational, and augmentation base for deployed units. This group supported the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance at the home station.

Another psychological operations group composed of four tactical battalions was deployed in Vietnam to support the Military Assistance Command there. The units carried out air and ground loudspeaker missions; printed and distributed leaflets, safe conduct passes, posters, news sheets, and other materials; made radio and television broadcasts and provided audio-visual services; trained Vietnamese psychological operations units; and supported refugee, public safety, and Vietnamese public information programs.

Another psychological operations group with one battalion and a strategic detachment was located on Okinawa and supplied support detachments in Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Japan. Its principal activity was to provide backup printing support to the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, radio broadcasting and leaflet support to the United Nations Command in Korea, and psychological operations intelligence support to major elements of the Pacific Command. It produced magazines, posters, almanacs, calendars, newspapers, and other psychological materials for distribution to the Korean armed forces and civilian sources in the Republic of Korea, conducted much of the active psychological operations program that involves cold war missions in Korea, and provided radio and visual production support for U.S. psychological operations in the Ryukyu Islands, where a monthly magazine and radio programs are produced that constitute important means of communications for the High Commissioner.

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One psychological operations company helped the Royal Thai armed forces develop and execute their PSYOP (psychological operations) program. U.S. Army commanders in Europe and Panama were each supported by one PSYOP battalion.

U.S. Special Forces also supported U.S. Army stability operations during the year and helped develop, organize, train, equip, and direct indigenous forces to conduct unconventional warfare. During the 1969 fiscal year, units continued their missions in Germany, Panama, Okinawa, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. The majority of the 10th Special Forces Group was redeployed from Germany to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, in September 1968, and the augmentation detachment assigned to the 46th Special Forces Company in Thailand to assist in training the Thai division staging for Vietnam completed its mission.

The 5th Special Forces Group continued to manage the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program in Vietnam, under which indigenous irregulars have been trained to deny the enemy the use of infiltration routes along the Laotian and Cambodian borders. The group also conducted a wide range of stability operations, such as rural construction, civic action, tactical training, and psychological operations. Other units operated in Thailand, on Okinawa, in Panama, and at the training base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, assisting host nations and maintaining their special capabilities in this field.

Strategic Mobility

Strategic mobility—the capability to deploy and sustain operational forces anywhere in the world to support national objectives—is one of the elements of national defense that contributes to deterrence. It is based on force deployability, prepositioned materiel, airlift, and sealift. The deployability of Strategic Reserve divisions improved substantially during the year, although there was an increase in deployability times at year-end.

The readiness of Strategic Reserve divisions improved substantially during the year just completed, as noted above, while the concept of prepositioning materiel was demonstrated effectively by the Reforger exercise in Europe, where additional facilities for controlled humidity storage were under construction. Although the level of prepositioning has been depressed by war requirements, plans have been made to reconstitute stocks as resources become available.

The Army continues to support a strategic airlift force of six squadrons of C-5A aircraft, together with an appropriate mix of C-141 and Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft, and supports an improvement in the American flagship posture, and the procurement of fast deployment

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logistics ships, whose authorization and funding were deferred in the 1969 budget.

Communications-Electronics

Over the past several years it became increasingly apparent that the responsiveness of the worldwide communications system could be seriously jeopardized in a time of crisis unless communications discipline was markedly improved. Among the problems were a large volume of high precedence messages, an excessive number of personnel authorized to release messages, excessively long messages, and the use of electrical transmission means for routine purposes. To improve communications discipline, a message monitoring system was established Army-wide in fiscal year 1969, supported by a reporting requirement and departmental analysis. The results were so favorable that the program will be continued and expanded in 1970.

Consolidation, compatibility, and standardization continue to be important considerations in the communications field, and there were a number of developments along these lines in the past year. In July 1968, for example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed that communications centers and message centers be consolidated into telecommunications centers serving all geographically collocated subscribers. This will be accomplished gradually without disrupting communications operations. As a part of the action, it was directed that communications centers and message centers be consolidated under a single manager—the communications-electronics officer. Under other programs, significant progress was made regarding the compatibility and standardization of communications systems and equipment.

With an ever-increasing number of communication electronic devices competing for nearly the same frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum, the Army in 1964 undertook to develop automated procedures that would assist field commanders to make frequency assignments rapidly. Separate studies of radio teletype, tactical voice radio, and radio relay communications networks have produced frequency assignment procedures that will operate on automatic data processing equipment. Field tests in the U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army environment have demonstrated that the procedures can be applied by tactical communications personnel and that effective frequency assignments can be made in less time under the new method. The procedures will be incorporated in training courses and integrated in Army tactical units throughout the world.

To take advantage of technological advances in the audio-visual field and make them available in Army combat training, information display, safety, and other areas of application, an Army-wide study on audio-visual activities was made during the year. Organization and management

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programs were reviewed and actions will follow on numerous recommendations.

Civil Defense

The strategic objective of our general nuclear war forces is to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States. If deterrence fails and such a war should occur, the problem and the challenge of civil defense, a vital part of the national defense system, is to limit damage to our people, resources, and institutions. Repeated damage-limiting studies clearly demonstrate the necessity of a nationwide fallout shelter program.

Since 1961, the Office of Civil Defense has concentrated on the development of the nationwide fallout shelter system. By the end of fiscal year 1969, approximately 192.5 million fallout shelter spaces, with a protection factor (Pf) of 40 or better, had been located through various surveys. Pf expresses the relation between the amounts of radiation that would be received by an unprotected person and a person inside the shelter. An unprotected person would receive 40 times more radiation than the person inside a shelter with a Pf of 40.

The National Fallout Shelter Survey, conducted for the Office of Civil Defense by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Navy Facilities Engineering Command, identifies dual-use space (that which has a peacetime day-to-day use) in existing structures. At the close of the year, this survey had located 195,751 facilities with public fallout-protected space for 188.2 million people. About 119.7 million of these spaces were licensed, 105.1 million marked with shelter signs, and 58.5 million stocked with federal supplies sufficient to sustain occupants for 14 days or, if shelter areas were filled to their rated capacities, 96.6 million occupants for 8 days.

Civil defense works on a day-to-day basis with all 50 state governments and with the governments of thousands of local jurisdictions, and it receives support from over 300 national organizations and thousands of community leaders and individuals.

The Office of Civil Defense, with the assistance of universities, institutes, and professional societies, has qualified more than 18,000 architects and engineers in the technology of fallout shelter design and analysis. These architects and engineers know how to design buildings to increase inherent fallout protection at little or no additional cost. The Office of Civil Defense also offers professional advisory services to architects and their clients. Many of the fallout shelter spaces added to the nation's expanding shelter inventory are attributable to public and private developers, industrial firms, and others, who use these professional advisory services and apply the principles of radiation shielding in their construction programs.

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During the year, the Direct Mail Shelter Development System (DMSDS) was expanded and is now functioning in 38 states. It is essentially a systematic procedure for contacting and encouraging architects and owners of proposed buildings to use design techniques that provide fallout protection. By the end of fiscal year 1969, the DMSDS had processed 11,000 projects in 38 states. Architects for 4,100 projects responded, 37 percent of the project mailing. Approximately 36 percent of those responding requested technical assistance. Results to date indicate that 400 building projects valued at a total of more than $512 million would yield 248 thousand shelter spaces with architect acceptance of DMSDS advice. The cost to the building owner would be approximately $7.15 per shelter space, representing about 0.3 percent of the total valuation of the building projects. Based on these results, arrangements have been made to expand the DMSDS program to 43 states at the beginning of fiscal year 1970.

In addition, the Home Fallout Protection Survey had been completed in 28 states. This survey was conducted by interview or mail questionnaire. In the completed areas 87 percent of the contacted householders responded to the survey. Completed surveys revealed that homes with basements provide significant fallout protection for 30 million people. Nearly all of those not having the national standard of 40 Pf could be readily upgraded to that standard.

Another important aspect of the shelter program, community shelter planning (CSP), continued to expand during the fiscal year. CSP is designed to develop procedures in local communities for making efficient use of the best available protection against radioactive fallout and to provide information to the public on where to go and what to do in the event of an attack. CSP also identifies in geographic detail the unfilled requirements for fallout shelter. At the end of the fiscal year, CSP projects completed or in progress covered 1,409 counties with a total population of 88 million people.

To help assure the effective use of shelters and the conduct of recovery operations, the development of the following civil defense emergency operations systems was continued: (1) a nationwide warning system to alert people to impending attack and to have them take shelter; (2) communications systems to keep people informed and to direct emergency operations; (3) nationwide radiological monitoring and reporting systems to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information on fallout; and (4) a damage assessment system to provide guidance for preattack planning and postattack operations.

Emergency operating centers (EOC's) are needed at the seat of government at all levels for effective executive direction and control in

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any widespread emergency. These EOC's are fallout-protected centers, planned, staffed, equipped, and provided with communications and warning capability for key officials to use in directing emergency operations. There are 3,099 state and local EOC's established or in the process of being established.

Actions are being taken to tie these EOC's to the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). This is a system managed by the Federal Communications Commission in co-operation with the commercial broadcast industry to provide the public promptly with official information in an attack emergency. As part of this system, OCD is providing a broadcast station protection program for fallout protection, emergency power where needed, and radio program links connecting EOC's to key EBS stations. This will make it possible for key stations to stay on the air in a fallout environment. By the end of the fiscal year, 617 radio stations were included in this program.

All states and more than 4,400 local governments participating in the civil defense program submitted annual program papers, one of the requirements for eligibility to receive federal civil defense assistance. Federal assistance includes technical guidance, training and education, and surplus property donations, as well as financial assistance.

Other civil defense supporting activities included research to develop an improved technical basis for program direction and guidance; warehousing and control of emergency supplies; prepositioning of emergency public information to inform the public of actions to take in an emergency; community service activities to gain the participation of industry, national organizations, professional associations, institutions, and agencies; and liaison with other elements of the federal government and with civil defense authorities of friendly countries.

The Army has primary service responsibility for military support of civil defense functions within the continental United States, and all services recognize the need for a strong civil defense program. The services represent a major source of assistance to civil defense because of their organization, specialized equipment, disciplined manpower, and long experience in dealing with emergencies.

State adjutants general, when federalized as state area commanders, exercise operational employment over military units made available for postattack military support of civil defense missions within each state. The Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command, and the continental U.S. (CONUS) Army commanders exercise preattack military support of civil defense planning guidance over the CONUS-based adjutants general while in a state status. In Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, similar preattack and postattack arrangements are the responsibility of the appropriate unified command.

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The Army, with DOD approval, is authorized to establish reinforcement training units (RTU's) with members drawn from the Individual Ready Reserve. Members earn retirement point credit for participation in civil defense training. RTU's are authorized to perform preattack planning and training in either civil defense or military support of civil defense. RTU's are not intended to be postattack operational units.

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