Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1971

IV.

Force Development

Force development in modern times is much more formal than it was in the formative period of the nation when George Washington took command of "a mixed multitude of people" and set about to develop a continental army. Today's Army operates from a series of detailed, orderly, and habitual procedures that relate to force planning and structure, organizational and operational concepts and doctrine, manpower allocation, training and schooling, and materiel requirements, among other things.

The contraction of the Army has had an understandable impact on force development. Within a period of two years the Army has been reduced by six divisions and almost 400,000 men. With 13 2/3 division forces in the active establishment at the close of the fiscal year, the Army was below the pre-Vietnam level of 16 1/3 divisions. The sharply reduced level of active forces thus placed a mounting responsibility upon the Reserve Components and a premium upon their levels of readiness. Reduction of active forces has increased the likelihood that Reserve Component units will have to be mobilized in case of emergency. Conceivably they could be called with as little as a week's notice and be deployed in an operational role sooner than they have been in the past. The Reserve Components will also have to be prepared to provide some nondivisional combat and combat support units for initial support of active Army divisions in the first sixty days of combat as a result of the loss of these types of active Army units in the current demobilization.

In addition to reductions in active Army over-all strength and units, there was a 15 percent reduction in the size of selected headquarters. On September 14, 1970, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to make such cuts against June 30, 1969, strength. In the Army the action involved headquarters with total military and civilian strengths of 27,255, requiring a reduction of 4,087 personnel in the fiscal year. In line with the need to reduce overhead costs consistent with reductions in the over-all size of the Army, the departmental headquarters programed manpower requirements in headquarters activities even below the prescribed level. The Army was able to meet and exceed the Defense Department goal with no disruption of essential mission activities.

Volunteer Army

Against the background set out in the introduction to this report,

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the Secretary of the Army on October 31, 1970, issued a charter to the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA), delineating his mission, authority, and responsibilities and designating an organization to implement them. The Modern Volunteer Army Program was designed to create conditions that would enhance the effectiveness of the Army, reduce reliance on the draft, raise the number and quality of enlistments and re-enlistments, increase service attractiveness and career motivation, and make provisions for a standby draft to meet emergencies.

In December 1970 the Chief of Staff announced a number of policy changes that represented a sharp break with tradition and demonstrated faith in the soldier's maturity and sense of responsibility. A number of time-honored practices were eliminated, including bed check and the requirement to sign in and out. Unnecessary formations were discontinued, a five-day workweek was instituted where possible, and beer was made available for sale in barracks and with the evening meal in mess halls. None of the changes interfered with training or combat missions, and none appeared to have harmed discipline; by the close of the year there were numerous indications that they had improved morale and efficiency.

Funds for the Modern Volunteer Army Program were limited in fiscal year 1971. The first priority on their use was for action to increase combat arms enlistments. As the MVA program got under way, enlistments in the infantry, armor, and artillery branches averaged about 300 a month against a requirement for 7,000. After an extensive radio and television campaign, an expansion of the recruiting force, and initiation of new and attractive enlistment options, combat arms enlistments jumped to about 4,000 per month. Although this figure is still short of the requirement, the actions appear to be working.

Congress responded favorably to the need for substantial pay increases for enlisted personnel with less than two years of service. Still needed are pay differentials for soldiers in the combat arms who qualify initially in combat arms skills and meet the high professional standards envisioned in zero draft goals.

Equally important as pay is professionalism, and experiments in improved approaches to training were conducted at four posts during the year. As some individuals learn faster than others, training is being paced at Fort Ord, California (for basic training), and Fort Benning, Georgia (for junior officers and noncommissioned officers), to the trainee's ability to meet the challenge. This approach was also instituted in unit training at Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Although complete evaluation was not possible by year's end, early indications were sufficiently favorable to support plans to expand the procedure to all combat training centers and schools in fiscal year

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1972 and throughout the Army in 1973.

Many soldiers are interrupted in their military jobs to perform kitchen police, gardening, and sanitation duties. To keep the soldier at his primary duty, civilians are to be hired to perform these housekeeping services. Subject to the availability of funds, the limited progress made in this area in fiscal year 1971 will be expanded in 1972, leading to full civilianization of housekeeping services throughout the Army by the end of fiscal year 1973.

In other moves to improve the quality of military life, barracks renovation was under way to provide more privacy and higher living standards for the soldier in troop housing. In family housing, quarters were being leased at Fort Carson on an experimental basis, and additional resources were being sought to overcome a backlog in deferred family housing maintenance. A lot of attention was centered on improving Army guest house facilities worldwide.

Food service was another area where change was taking place. Short-order mess operations were being phased in around the world, with soldier acceptance rated high. Commissaries were being improved and store hours extended. Innovations were being tested in the transportation field, including improved bus service and movement of household goods. And the Army command's Maintenance Management Inspection was eliminated and replaced with an assist-and-instruct program.

Finally, the recruiting service was expanded both in personnel and stations, and this expansion will be continued in 1972. More leased housing was provided for recruiters, and assignments and proficiency pay were stabilized. A radio and television recruiting campaign was successful, confirming the belief that paid advertising is essential to a zero draft and to the establishment of an all-volunteer Army.

Training and Schooling

Withdrawals from Vietnam and the reduction in over-all Army strength led to changes in Army manpower programs and a continued reduction in the number of new soldiers to be trained. Thus training capacity was reduced in turn; the training centers at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Huachuca, Arizona, were closed, and training center operations were reduced at Fort Gordon, Georgia; Fort McClellan, Alabama; Fort Bliss, Texas; and Fort Lewis, Washington. Input to basic combat training at Fort Bragg was terminated in July 1970. Although the 410 remaining basic combat training companies operated for the rest of the year, additional reductions were in prospect for 1972.

Unit training readiness declined generally in fiscal year 1971 as a

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result of funding limitations, personnel turnover and shortages, and imbalances in occupational specialties. Installation support requirements were also contributing factors. Although some funds were received to ease training restrictions, they were not enough to permit division-level field training exercises for most divisions on an annual basis. Reinforcing units for Europe based in the continental United States received priority attention. As the Army adjusts to force reductions and as personnel and funding levels stabilize, unit training readiness should improve.

Exercise funds were limited in fiscal year 1971 to $15 million, the same as the authorization for fiscal year 1970 when a European reinforcing exercise (Reforger) was not held. Reforger II was conducted in the fall of 1970 at a cost of $4.9 million. The net result of the congressional action on exercise funds was to reduce by 33 percent the amount available for other fiscal year exercises.

Exercises in the United States were limited to the 82d Airborne Division and the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). Because of funding constraints, exercises in Europe were limited in scope, duration, and size. For a fourth consecutive year, U.S. Army, Europe, did not conduct division exercises considered essential to the proper training and combat readiness of forces. Brigade and smaller unit exercises were conducted locally and were limited in scope.

During the fiscal year the United States Army Intelligence School and Center began a move from Fort Holabird, Maryland, to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to be completed by October 1971. The use of Fort Huachuca will permit a necessary expansion of facilities and will provide an area in which to conduct field training. Management economies will result from the concentration of activities at a single installation, the collocation of several mutually supporting activities, and the eventual closeout of Fort Holabird.

As the downward trend of Southeast Asia operations eased the demand for E-5 and E-6 noncommissioned officers and specialists, the Army turned its attention to the long-range development of noncommissioned officers. The Noncommissioned Officer Education System was established as a three-level program to formalize and upgrade the education and professional development of enlisted careerists. Basic, advanced, and senior courses were structured to enhance progressively the military education and professional development of noncommissioned officers at appropriate points in their careers. Selected basic level courses were begun during the last half of the fiscal year and full implementation of the basic and advanced levels is planned for fiscal year 1972. The senior level course is still in the planning stage.

Two new military adviser training courses were established during fiscal year 1971 at the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina: Military Assistance Security Adviser and

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Military Assistance Programer Adviser. The Military Assistance Officer Command and Staff course was extended from nineteen to twenty-two weeks to provide more time for case and regional studies and individual research. This program is now limited to prospective members of the Military Assistance Officer Program.

Aviation training continued at a high level during the year. Over 4,609 active Army aviators were trained, in addition to 151 pilots from the Marine Corps, 244 from the Reserve Components, 18 from the Air Force, and 60 from foreign military units, as well as 960 from the Vietnamese Air Force.

The Army made increased use of civilian educational institutions in fiscal year 1971. Over 11,000 personnel participated in full-time schooling during the year. They studied in 160 academic disciplines at 360 colleges and universities in the United States and overseas. Over 200,000 personnel participated in off-duty study and earned over 50,000 high school diplomas, 300 undergraduate degrees, and 200 graduate degrees.

The Reserve Officers' Training Corps continued to be the largest and most economical source of second lieutenants for both the U.S. Army Reserve and the Regular Army. During fiscal year 1971, 11 new educational institutions established ROTC courses, while 5 schools discontinued their programs. The new institutions, coupled with the 15 added in fiscal year 1969, raised the number of ROTC units to 286, the highest number in the history of the program. There were 30 active applications pending at year's end from institutions desiring ROTC units.

Opening enrollments decreased 33 percent from 1970, partly because 10 institutions were converting the basic ROTC course from a required to an elective status, and because the residual impact of similar action by 39 institutions in the previous year was still being felt. Much of the decline, however, was attributable to student disenchantment with government policies, reduced draft calls, and dissident activities on campus. The frequency of dissident acts aimed at ROTC during the 1970-71 school year was about a third of that in the previous school year.

The Army awarded 819 four-year scholarships to selected high school graduates, and these plus two- and three-year types to be awarded in the summer of 1971 will keep Army scholarships at the authorized ceiling of 5,500. A legislative proposal was introduced in Congress to raise the authorized ceiling to about 10,000. A new instructional program, implemented early in the fiscal year, offers a more flexible curriculum and has helped offset much of the faculty-administration criticism that the Department of the Army was dictating what was taught in the college. Furthermore, a vigorous recruiting campaign

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was begun to attract more members of minority groups to the ROTC program.

Junior ROTC was conducted in 585 high schools with a total enrollment of 99,113 students. Another 28 National Defense Cadet Corps schools operated with an enrollment of 3,785. The junior program will be expanded to 650 units.

Under the Officer Candidate School program, 2,809 officers were commissioned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Benning, Georgia. A 14-week branch immaterial course (as opposed to the current 23-week course) was also being tested at Fort Benning. It will be evaluated in July 1972.

Missile Systems

When the President's decision to proceed with the limited deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, designated as Safeguard, was announced on March 14, 1969, three basic objectives were set forth: protection of U.S. land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union; defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade; and protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source. At that time, the President also stated that "this program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of technical developments, the threat, and the diplomatic context, including any talks on arms limitations," so as to "insure that we are doing as much as necessary, but no more than required by the threat existing at that time."

The deployment requested by the President in early 1969 and approved by the Congress late that year called for the installation of Safeguard sites in two Minuteman fields—Grand Forks, North Dakota, and Malmstrom, Montana. The method of proceeding beyond this first step (Phase 1) would be dependent on future annual reviews.

The Modified Phase 2 Safeguard program for fiscal year 1971, approved by Congress in late 1970, consisted of continuing construction of the two Phase 1 sites at Grand Forks and Malmstrom and adding two additional Sprint remote launch sites at each location; deploying a third site in the Minuteman fields near Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri; and accomplishing advanced site preparation (but not initiating construction) of a fourth site for defense of the Minuteman fields near Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming.

This year a complete and comprehensive review of Safeguard was again conducted in accordance with the President's commitment of March 14, 1969. The review reached several conclusions: that development, production, and construction progress of Safeguard had been

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satisfactory; that while there had been an unexplained slowdown in the deployment of current Soviet ICBM systems, tests of modifications of several missiles (SS9, SS11, SS13) continued, and even at present missile deployment levels, qualitative force improvements such as Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV's) could pose a threat to the survival of U.S. land-based ICBM's; that the continued deployment of Soviet Y-class submarines and the testing of a new long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile could pose a threat to the U.S. strategic bomber force; that the People's Republic of China, in an effort to develop its own ICBM system, had made progress in that direction, and that the initial system could be ready as early as 1973, with the mid-1970s a more likely time; and that although there was progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), results of the negotiations were not conclusive enough to allow a basic change of plans for Safeguard.

During this year, the research and development portion of the Safeguard program progressed satisfactorily. At Meck Island on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific, the prototype missile site radar (MSR) became operational in September 1968. It met or bettered most of its design objectives, and no serious deficiencies have been found. In March 1968, checkout of the MSR data processing system was initiated, and the system was operational as a multiprocessor early in 1969. In July 1969, tracking of local targets was accomplished with the initial software, and in December 1969, two ICBM's, launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, were successfully tracked.

While the MSR was being built and tested, a limited engineering development model of the perimeter acquisition radar (PAR) was constructed and activated at the General Electric Plant in Syracuse, New York, in 1969. No serious technical problems were encountered in its development. In December 1969, the Spartan interceptor successfully completed development testing at Kwajalein Island. Sprint development testing was completed in August 1970, and system tests with Sprint began soon after. As of June 30, 1971, fifteen system tests had been conducted (thirteen of these involved the firing of Sprint or Spartan missiles, and two involved only MSR tracking of an ICBM-launched test target). There were two unsuccessful tests and one partly successful test; the remaining twelve were completely successful. With the exception of an unsuccessful test on June 26, 1971, the causes of troubles were diagnosed and corrective action was taken. Study to determine the reason for the unsuccessful June 26 test was under way. There were five successful tests involving Spartan, one a salvo of two missiles guided simultaneously by the MSR and its data processor. There were also five successful tests involving Sprint, one a similar salvo launch of two Sprint missiles. Future system tests will be against more sophisticated ICBM-

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launched test targets as well as additional targets boosted by Polaris missiles.

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has carried on its warhead testing satisfactorily. Tests of weapon features were conducted, and some weapon output measurements were made. Warhead sections with instrumented simulated warheads (no nuclear material) were flight-tested on both Sprint and Spartan missiles. Preparations were under way for further underground warhead tests and additional flight tests of certain warhead components as part of the system tests.

A summary of the year's construction status for the first two Safeguard sites at Grand Forks and Malmstrom is shown in the following table

Design release for approximately 90 percent of all Safeguard hardware items has been made. All of the ground equipment, including the radar and associated computers and ancillary equipment for Grand Forks and Malmstrom but excluding site test and maintenance data system equipment, is being procured. Tactical software packages for Grand Forks are being manufactured. Production of the Spartan and Sprint missiles to be deployed at the first site is under way. Engineering for the Whiteman Air Force Base site is in progress. Site survey is complete for the potential Warren site.

Construction of the first Safeguard site near Grand Forks was proceeding satisfactorily. Award of the next construction contract for Malmstrom was withheld pending negotiation in accordance with Executive Order 11588 to reduce labor costs, which were in excess of government estimates. Schedules for the first site, Grand Forks, remained unaffected, but the Malmstrom schedule slipped pending award of the construction contract.

Over-all, there were no technical problems that would affect a decision to continue Safeguard deployment in fiscal year 1972.

In the year's Safeguard review, developments in the threat from other nations were carefully evaluated. The Soviets have built up their ICBM forces at a rapid rate during the past five years and, as of the end of 1970, had some 1,440 operational launchers. In April 1971, intelligence sources reported that the Soviets had started a new ICBM silo construction program. The new silos were unlike any other previously constructed, and it was not known what their purpose was or how many would be built.

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The implications of these trends were still unclear. In any case, by mid-1972 the Soviets were expected to have over 1,500 operational ICBM launchers. Beyond 1972, projections concerning Soviet ICBM launchers and re-entry vehicles were less firm. Regardless of the direction in which the Soviets proceed, a key question will remain—that of the degree of missile accuracy. If the accuracy could be substantially improved, the projected Soviet SS9 missile force could pose a serious threat to the future survival of Minuteman silos.

In addition, the Soviet ICBM threat was augmented by a substantial nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile submarine fleet, which is presently a fast-growing element of the threat. At the current production rate of seven to eight such vessels per year, the Soviet Union could have by 1974 an operational force of Y-class submarines comparable in size to the current U.S. Polaris force. A longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile was also under active development, but deployment could not be estimated.

As for the strategic nuclear threat from the People's Republic of China, progress toward achieving an ICBM capability was continuing. Assessments indicated that the Chinese could attain an initial ICBM operational capability within three years after flight-testing commenced. The start of testing has not yet been confirmed, but a reduced range test of an ICBM may have occurred in late 1970. Thus, the earliest possible date for deployment would be 1973, but a year or two later is a more likely date. Significant numbers of ICBM's probably could not be deployed until late in the decade, according to the best projections.

Shortly after the United States announced in 1967 that it was to deploy the Sentinel system, the Soviets agreed to arms talks. Although progress was made in the subsequent SALT talks, the Soviet threat to the U.S. land-based strategic retaliatory forces continued to grow. Pending a formal agreement on strategic arms limitations between the United States and the Soviet Union, Safeguard proceeded on a measured program to provide for the defense of the U.S. strategic land-based system.

As the President announced two years ago, the deployment of Safeguard depended on the evolution of the Soviet and Chinese threats and on the outcome of SALT. As determined in the annual review, threat developments dictated continuation toward full Safeguard deployment pending the results of SALT.

In March 1971 the Secretary of Defense asked the Congress for authorization to implement the following proposed Safeguard program through fiscal year 1972: continue construction at Grand Forks and Malmstrom; in 1971, start construction at the Whiteman site (already authorized in the fiscal year 1971 budget) ; and take steps toward deployment of a fourth site at either Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming

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or Washington, D.C. The details of engineering, initial hardware procurement, contract bidding, and construction awards continued at Warren, along with site survey and engineering at Washington, D.C. These measures would be carried out simultaneously to provide the President maximum time to decide which location is best for deployment of a fourth site without causing unnecessary delays. Under the fiscal year 1972 request, deployment would be limited to one of the two locations.

This program would sustain progress toward U.S. strategic objectives and extend the defense of Minuteman, pending a satisfactory agreement in SALT. Additionally, the program would maintain the capability to provide for defense of the National Command Authority (NCA) as part of one option in the U.S. SALT position, and would preserve the option for deployment of area defense against small attacks at some future time. However, no funds were requested for area-only sites this year.

This program should also contribute to progress in SALT. The Soviets had indicated particular concern over a U.S. area ABM defense, but the proposed program does not request authorization for additional area defense sites beyond those which already protect Minuteman and NCA. The United States had indicated a willingness to modify its long-range plans for Safeguard if a strategically acceptable arms control agreement with the Soviet Union could be reached. By opening the option to deploy a defense of Washington, the United States is also responsive to the developments in SALT where the possibility of limiting the ABM part of an agreement to an NCA defense was discussed.

In essence, the fiscal year 1972 Safeguard program proposal continues to reflect the President's basic premise, namely, continued development at a measured, orderly, and sufficient pace, subject to review and modification as circumstances dictate.

A continuing analysis of Safeguard's capabilities indicated that while the system could cope with the threat to Minuteman for which it was designed, it would need augmentation if the threat grew beyond the ability of the presently planned Safeguard deployment. Accordingly, it was decided to initiate a program of prototype development which could augment Safeguard during the last half of this decade. This program was designated as Hardsite Defense. Rather than expanding the defense by using costly Safeguard MSR's, it would use smaller and less expensive radars to provide a cost effective augmentation to Safeguard. Budgeting for the Hardsite Defense prototype program is $65 million for fiscal year 1972.

Of the $3.7 billion authorized and approved for Safeguard through 1971, $3.3 billion had been obligated but only $2.3 billion was expended as of June 30, 1971.

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Total Department of Defense acquisition costs were estimated to be $6.2 billion for the currently approved three-site program (including advanced preparation for a fourth site) and $13.7 billion for the completion of the full twelve-site Safeguard deployment, if the fastest possible schedule were to be adopted for the fiscal year 1972 budget. These estimates included an increase of $0.3 billion over last spring's $5.9 billion estimate for the currently approved three-site deployment and an increase of $3 billion over last spring's $10.7 billion estimate for the full twelve-site deployment. These increases of $0.3 billion and $3 billion resulted from a further stretch-out over last year's schedule ($0.1 billion for the three-site and $0.7 billion for the full twelve-site deployment) ; from added inflation factors (the inclusion of projected price level increases through deployment completion versus constant December 1969 dollar levels used for last year's estimate—$0.6 billion for the three-site and $1.9 billion for the twelve-site deployment) ; and from revised configuration and cost estimates (a net decrease of $0.4 billion for the three-site and net increase of $0.4 billion for the twelve-site deployment). An additional $2.5 billion in Department of Defense acquisition costs will be required after fiscal year 1971 to complete the currently approved three-site deployment and an additional $10 billion to complete the full twelve-site deployment, assuming adoption in fiscal year 1972 of an accelerated schedule.

These costs do not include an estimated $0.9 billion for nuclear warheads for the three-site or $1.2 billion for the twelve-site deployment that would be borne by the Atomic Energy Commission. The above expenditures are also exclusive of operating costs, which, for the period after completion of the deployment, are estimated to be $135 million annually for the currently approved three-site deployment and $375 million annually for the twelve-site deployment. These cost estimates, moreover, did not include certain indirect costs which were budgeted elsewhere, such as national range support, family housing, and certain Army-wide costs for hospitalization, maintenance of the Army training base, and base operations support.

Of the $1.381 billion requested in fiscal year 1972, the bulk of the funds ($1.248 billion) will be necessary for the continuation of the previously authorized sites at Grand Forks, Malmstrom, and Whiteman; $114 million is needed to carry through the work at the Warren Air Force Base site, involving advance procurement of hardware items and award of the construction contract for the major technical facilities. A lesser amount—$19 million—is required for advance preparation activities in the vicinity of Washington, D.C.

At the beginning of 1971, Congress initiated a program to provide funds for community assistance to areas affected by the impact of Safeguard installations in Montana and North Dakota. Federal depart-

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ments having responsibility for administering the public laws under which communities may request funds were contacted by the Safeguard System Office, and memoranda of understanding were negotiated for processing such requests with the Departments of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture and with the Public Health Service of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. As of June 30, 1971, a total of 70 impact assistance requests had been received for evaluation on an individual basis: 24 had been approved, 19 had been disapproved, and 27 were pending. Requests for apportionment of $7 million of the $11.8 million appropriated for such purposes were approved by the Office of Management and Budget in response to requests for assistance from affected communities in North Dakota and Montana.

Finally, during the year, congressional critics of Safeguard argued, as they had in the past, that the system would not give effective protection commensurate with its cost. In addition, critics continued to contend that deployment would have a deleterious effect on SALT. On the other hand, congressional supporters pointed to the orderly progress of the system's limited deployment, held that it added credibility to the U.S. deterrent, and saw the ABM program as leverage for use during SALT negotiations.

Various developments took place with other weapons systems during fiscal year 1971. Activations of Chaparral-Vulcan battalions continued, with six deployed in the period. SAM-D development moved ahead, nearing completion of the four-year advanced development program and ready to enter engineering development phases in the second quarter of fiscal year 1972. Deployment of the TOW antitank missile system to U.S. Army, Europe, was begun in October 1970; engineering development was completed on the Lance, and the first production contract was awarded.

Army Aviation

During the past year several aviation organizations, which had not heretofore been branch oriented, were assigned to a specific branch which assumed responsibility and became the proponent for their livelihood. Experience in Vietnam and various studies revealed that the most effective use of Army aviation results when the branch center team that is responsible for a given aircraft system actively participates in the functions that cause the "aviation" to take on the character of the branch. The armor community, for example, can look with pride upon the accomplishments of air cavalry in Vietnam.

Two rules are followed in assigning the units: aviation units are assigned to a branch based on the functions performed by the branch,

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for example, assault helicopter companies to the infantry since the troops which conduct combat assaults are principally infantry; and aviation units are assigned to a branch based on the primary orientation of the parent unit, for example, the artillery aviation section of an artillery group to the artillery branch. In some cases, aviation units serve a general support function which cannot be identified with a specific branch. These units continue to be the responsibility of the nonbranch aviation community at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

In the helicopter field, a program was approved in fiscal year 1971 to develop an antitank capability for the AH-1G Cobra. A limited number of Cobras will be fitted with the TOW missile to provide the earliest possible aerial antitank capability for U.S. forces in Europe. When and as the advanced attack helicopter (AAH) becomes available, the TOW-equipped Cobra will serve as a companion vehicle for less demanding tasks in units whose primary mission is reconnaissance and surveillance. The Army's future gunship force will contain the most effective possible mix of AAH's, Cobra-TOW'S, and conventional Cobras.

The fourth year procurement of a five-year fixed price, multiyear contract for the OH-58A light observation helicopter was conducted during fiscal year 1971. Test and evaluation were completed early in 1971, and during the year the craft was introduced into Southeast Asia, Korea, and Europe.

The U.S. Army Board for Aircraft Accident Research found that in all major aircraft accidents where survival is possible, 44 percent of injuries and 72 percent of fatalities are caused by fires after the crash. Against this background, the Army established a twofold program: to provide a reliable fuel system, able to withstand a crash, that will reduce or eliminate the incidence of aircraft fires resulting from fuel spillage during severe but survivable crash impacts, and to improve the ballistic protection of the aircraft fuel system.

Such a system was first fielded in the new UH-1H helicopter on April 8, 1970. A refit program for older UH-1 D/H craft was begun in September 1970. The system is a combination of fuel system design, impact-resistant materials, and self-sealing fuel tanks, coupled with breakaway or flexible fuel lines. The system will be installed in nearly all Army helicopters by fiscal year 1975. As of the close of the year, there had been no thermal injuries or fatalities in impact-survivable crashes involving aircraft equipped with the new fuel systems.

Ground Systems

There were several developments in ground systems during the year. The M-551 General Sheridan armored reconnaissance airborne assault

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vehicle, equipped with the Shillelagh missile, replaced all M-60 tanks in armored cavalry platoons in U.S. Army, Europe, thus enhancing the ability of U.S. units there to accomplish their mission. Also in Europe, U.S. Army units assigned to NATO began to receive the M16A1 rifle.

Tube artillery modernization was another area of progress. A totally new concept utilizing "soft recoil" for the 105-mm. howitzer was in advanced development, and improvements in the self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer extended its range. A new towed 155-mm. howitzer advanced into engineering development; its features included helicopter-transportable weight coupled with a significant increase in range.

Doctrine, Concepts, and Organization

In 1969 a Modern Army Selected Systems Test, Evaluation, and Review (MASSTER) activity was established at Fort Hood, Texas, to examine ways of expediting the integration of surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation equipment into the Army in the field, with emphasis on operational testing of equipment and organizations with a Southeast Asia orientation. Since that time, attention has turned to developing capabilities to meet requirements of various kinds in a variety of geographical areas, and the test role has been expanded. The Fort Hood activity now designs and conducts field tests related to doctrine, concepts, organization, and equipment—a mission especially applicable to the evaluation of the new triple capable (TRICAP) division.

The TRICAP division consists of a division base with an air cavalry combat brigade, an armored brigade, and an airmobile brigade. The division concept and the air cavalry combat brigade element will be evaluated concurrently in fiscal year 1972, with test units provided by the 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP). The evaluations will take account of the evolution and progress in many equipment developments, ranging from an attack helicopter to automatic data processing hardware for improved command and control. Within the air cavalry combat brigade, the tank-killing helicopter will play a major role; the value of a 150-knot antitank battalion is readily apparent. Tests will develop in detail the organization and doctrine of the brigade in conjunction with the power of the companion armored brigade and the mobility of the associated airmobile infantry brigade. The results will be applied in the development of the entire TRICAP division.

In June 1970 the Army began a program to improve command and control capabilities through an integrated battlefield control system. The objective was to provide a fully integrated tactical command and control system, matched to similar systems in the other services, to be used by the Army in the field in the post-1976 period. Concurrent with this

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development, the Army reviewed the management of its development of tactical automatic data processing systems. In recognition of the need for systems relationship, commonality, compatibility, and interoperability, not only between Army systems but between Army and other service tactical data systems, a single project manager for Army Tactical Data Systems was designated, thus centralizing at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, the responsibility in this field and collocating it with the Army's tactical communications system developments there. The project manager will be responsible initially for the Army's Tactical Fire Direction System, Air Defense Control and Coordination System, and Tactical Operational System.

The process of matching unit organization, staffing, and equipment to unit mission is a never-ending one. As missions change, increasing in scope, size, and complexity, new and more sophisticated equipment comes into play, and personnel changes are required. Equipment requirements must be constantly reviewed and authorization documents regularly validated to insure that military units with unique and special missions have the best possible balance in personnel and equipment to carry out their missions. This is the purpose of the Equipment Survey Program.

The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) is a primary source of information for planning budgets, procuring equipment, and determining personnel requirements. Minor inaccuracies in unit documents become major problems at Department of the Army headquarters where all unit requirements are consolidated in TAADS. The purpose of the Equipment Survey Program is to insure that the TAADS data base reflects equipment actually required by units, and that outdated equipment is removed from authorization and issue lists.

Surveys were conducted during the fiscal year in twenty-seven units, resulting in a total of $61 million in equipment changes: $18 million in additions and $43 million in deletions, a net reduction of $25 million in equipment authorizations. The trend is expected to continue as approximately 2,000 units are surveyed.

Chemical Warfare and Biological Research

Following President Nixon's ban, announced in fiscal year 1970, of all types of biological warfare, the Army prepared plans for disposing of stocks stored at various locations. Public Law 91-190, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, required the preparation of an environmental impact statement covering disposal operations, and its review by federal, state, and local authorities. Both the disposal plan and the environmental impact statement were reviewed by the Army Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Health,

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Education, and Welfare. After subsequent approval by the Council on Environmental Quality, the environmental impact statement was reviewed by the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, the Environmental Protection Agency, and each state where disposal would be conducted. Disposal would involve antipersonnel material at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, and anticrop material at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado, Beale Air Force Base in California, and Fort Detrick in Maryland.

Disposal of antipersonnel agents and weapons was begun on May 17, 1971. Disposal of anticrop material was delayed by the review process, but would probably begin in the summer of 1971, extending over the course of a full year at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, six months at Fort Detrick, and three months at Beale Air Force Base.

Meanwhile, the disposal at sea of obsolete chemical munitions was completed in August 1970 without incident. Stocks of munitions encased in concrete vaults were shipped by rail from Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky, to Sunny Point Ocean Terminal, North Carolina. There they were loaded on a vessel hulk, towed to sea, and sunk in more than 16,000 feet of water. Operation Chase, as it was called, went smoothly, with no transportation or ecological problems, as had been feared by many citizens. More than 3,000 letters of protest or inquiry were received by government officials and answered by the Department of the Army. As an alternative to sea dump for disposal of obsolete and unserviceable chemical munitions, the Army has developed comprehensive plans and technology for safe disposal of this material on land—plans which will have inconsequential or no impact on the environment.

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