Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1989



Together with comprehensive, rigorous, realistic training, effective logistical support constitutes the peacetime foundation of readiness. In wartime effective logistical support is vital to sustain combat power and ensure success on the battlefield. Logistical support in the Army falls into several categories — manning (to include feeding and clothing), arming, fueling, repairing, and transporting the force. The Army's capacity to perform its logistical functions rests on the proficiency of its logistical manpower, the responsiveness and scope of its logistical infrastructure, and adequate funding for logistical operations and modernization. The Army's logistical infrastructure embraces HQDA, MACOMs and their subordinate elements, thousands of active and reserve component combat service support units, and a large civilian work force. It likewise consists of reserve stocks strategically positioned, a suitably funded industrial base, and a host of cooperative international arrangements to share logistical burdens. Logistical effectiveness requires both an adequate force structure compatible with current doctrine and sufficient strategic lift.

The Army's peacetime logistical base consisted primarily of active component combat service support units that conducted normal supply and maintenance missions, a civilian work force to man the sustaining base, and the large reservoir of support units in the reserve components. During FY 1989 the Army took numerous steps to increase its logistical capabilities that ranged from modifying the division support base of light infantry divisions to use of RC heavy equipment maintenance companies to reduce the maintenance backlogs in Europe. It entailed ongoing changes in the Army's acquisition process and application of state-of-the-art computerized information and command and control systems to improve logistical management at every echelon. At the same time, the l logistical base had numerous shortcomings. The readiness of RC CAPSTONE units and the reliability of host nation support during wartime were questioned. America's production base lacked the capacity to support large-scale industrial mobilization. Strategic air and sealift fell short of requirements for rapid reinforcement of US forces in Europe according to NATO plans.

Logistical support must be compatible with tactical and strategic doctrine, force structure, and technological advances. The range of forces — heavy, light, mixes of heavy and light, combined arms, special operations — suggested the magnitude and complexity of the Army 's logistical mission. Prominent among the questions under discussion in FY 1989 was logistical support in light infantry divisions and for mixed heavy/light forces. T h e Army was studying ways to improve logistical activities at echelons above d divisions and corps (EAD/EAC) for the fluid battlefield of AirLand Battle doctrine. Most MACOM commanders believed the conceptual models for EAD and EAC support operations contained in the Logistical C2 Concept Study prepared by the Army Logistics Center (ALC), Fort Lee, Virginia, warranted additional testing and evaluation because the models posed a risk of force structure turbulence. Another catalyst for change in logistical concepts was rapid technological advance. Force modernization often altered the transport of supply, induced changes in maintenance procedures, and affected service support personnel training. Logistics management at every echelon has been profoundly influenced by computerized information management systems and tactical data networks. The computerization of logistical management, however, offered opportunities to the Army to manage and maintain logistical functions in the face of reduced funding.

The influence of computers and automation was apparent in Army-wide management systems such as HQDA's Logistical Data Network (LOGNET); the Army Standard Information Management System (ASIMS), formerly the Vertical Installation Automation Baseline (VIABLE); and the Logistics Applications of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS). LOGMARS, which used identification markings similar to the code bars familiar to most consumers, kept track of production, distribution, expenditure, and accountability of Army ammunition in FY 1989. LOGMARS enabled the Army to assuage congressional concern about the security of Army ammunition stocks. Congress urged the Army to make wider use of LOGMARS in other logistical operations. In FY 1989 the Army pursued integration of its logistical management systems with national and joint systems. This effort extended to the Unit Level Logistical System (ULLS). ULLS automated the management of a unit's Prescribed Load List (PLL) and the functions of The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS). ULLS prototypes were fielded to seven divisions in FY 1989 for evaluation. Based on Army recommendations of 5 May 1989, OSD approved a two-stage fielding plan to install an improved version of the ULLS, ULLS-II, to all MACOMs. Upon completion of the first phase, it was anticipated that 12,586 ULLS-IIs would be in operation. In the second stage, scheduled to begin in FY 1993, ULLS would be converted to Army Command and Control System (ACCS) common hardware and software.


The Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS), a two-person, portable microcomputer system, was the primary workstation for CSS operations from battalion to division. TACCS supported personnel, supply maintenance, medical, ammunition, and transportation missions. Approximately 10,200 TACCS had been distributed to active and reserve component units through FY 1989. Congress stipulated that half of the TACCS procured in FY 1988 and FY 1989 had to be distributed to the reserves. Systems such as ULLS, TACCS, and ASIMS were building blocks toward the goal of systems integration in the Army. ASIMS provided base operations information support to forty-seven Army bases, or distributed processing centers, and five regional data centers in CONUS. It enhanced productivity in such functional areas as personnel, finance, and logistics management and operations. In FY 1989 the Army expanded ASIMS to fourteen bases in Germany. The US Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) used new technology and methodologies, such as "surround technology," to develop systems to integrate information from disparate systems. The USAISC, for example, engineered a system that made lessons learned created by Army commands, the National Training Center, and DOD agencies directly available to the Army Materiel Command.

The Army's expanding use of computer-generated information and management systems reflected a management philosophy that stressed centralized management and decentralized execution. The Army also sought to apply cost savings techniques and management policies that simplified organization and procedures and increased productivity. In FY 1989 these efforts ranged from the Army Regulation Reduction Program to the Commercial Activities (CA) Program. The former, a program managed by the Office of the Director of Information for Command, Control, Communication, and Computers, aimed to delete one-third of Army regulations by rescinding obsolete, revising out-of-date, and consolidating related regulations. By the end of FY 1989 the Army attained 77 percent of its goal of eliminating 382 regulations. Consistent with cost-effectiveness and readiness requirements, the Army relied on private sector products and services through its CA program, and logistical functions comprised about 57 percent of them.

Executive Order 12615, of November 1987, required HQDA to increase the number of positions subject to annual comparison with similar private sector jobs to at least 3 percent of the Army 's civilian work force. In FY 1989, MACOMs and the U.S. Army Troop Support Agency identified more than nine hundred civilian logistical spaces in the United States for cost comparison to private industry under the CA program. These positions ranged from base operations support to commissary warehouse functions. Prominent among other management improvement programs was the Value


Engineering (VE) Program, whose goal was control and reduction of procurement costs, particularly spare parts. Under a directive from DOD, the Army prepared to adopt Total Quality Management (TQM), a comprehensive and disciplined management methodology to improve organizational effectiveness. TQM focused on total employee involvement to increase quality, reduce costs, and enhance customer satisfaction. It had particular relevance to the Army 's acquisition process.

International and Cooperative Logistics

For nearly two decades the Army has participated in the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Program and, more recently, in the NATO Cooperative Test Program, both administered by DOD. American participation in the second program was authorized by an amendment to the FY 1987 Defense Appropriations Act. Their aims were to foster collaborative development and production of military arms and equipment common to all NATO forces to drive down RDA costs and eliminate duplication of effort. In FY 1989 Congress appropriated $150 million for American participation in NATO cooperative R&D projects. These projects must be enumerated in DOD's Five Year Defense Plan. They are funded by DOD for two years and then funding is assumed by an appropriate armed service. The Army participated in twenty-one coproduction projects valued at $20.23 billion in FY 1989. Joined by other NATO nations, the United States also helped draft a Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS), which sought to align long-range plans for weapons development and procurement with force goals.

At the start of FY 1989 the Army was engaged in NATO cooperative projects that included the multinational 155-mm. Autonomous Precision Guided Munitions (APGM), the Airborne Radar Demonstration System, the Laser Standoff Chemical Detector, the Combat Vehicle Command and Control System, and electrooptic countermeasures. Ten items manufactured by NATO members were in various stages of comparative testing. Thirteen additional items were being assessed by the Foreign We a p o n s E valuation Program for equipment produced by friendly non-NATO nations. During FY 1989 the Army received or was awaiting OSD approval for four new cooperative R&D projects — a handheld All Agent Biological Chemical Detector, the NBC Reconnaissance System, Electromagnetic/Electrothermal Gun Technology, and Next Generation Artillery Armament System. All Army projects were adequately funded to complete their development, and HQDA instructed MACOMs to consider the NATO programs as useful methods to pursue the acquisition review process.

The APGM program involved a consortium of twenty contractors from eight nations. Referred to as a "smart bullet," the APGM is a termi-


nally guided munition capable of being launched from an aircraft, tank, or artillery gun. When West Germany reduced its funding, NATO members made new financial arrangements in December 1989 that facilitated proceeding to the feasibility phase of APGM testing. This project was managed by the Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. If development is successful, the APGM artillery-fired round will replace the Copperhead later in the 1990s. The NATO Future Main Battle Tank (MBT) project began in 1984, having superseded the aborted U.S.-German tank project, the MBT-70, which was dropped in favor of independent development because of rising costs and incompatible specifications. Seven or more types of battle tanks were deployed in NATO in FY 1989 and presented innumerable interoperability problems. The concept for a Future MBT, tentatively formulated in FY 1989, did not necessarily imply adoption of the same tank. It was intended that future MBTs could be rearmed, refueled, and repaired with common components at any depot in Western Europe.

Coproduction was an important aspect of international logistics. T h e United States and Israel reached a cooperative agreement in FY 1989 on developing a theater missile defense test bed for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to counter the short-range ballistic missile threat. The U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command managed this three-year developmental program valued at $53 million. A similar agreement made by the United States with the United Kingdom remained in effect in FY 1989. The M1A1 Tank Coproduction Memorandum of Understanding, signed 1 November 1988 between Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Egyptian Field Marshal Abu Ghazala, allowed Egypt to develop local production of this tank. Under the pact, the US company General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) would design the production line, install plant equipment, and give technical assistance so that Egypt could assemble 540 tanks from GDLS-produced kits. The United States would provide critical tank components such as special armor, power packs, and fire control but transfer to Egypt the technology to enable it to produce high-usage items such as road wheels and tracks. Egypt in turn had the option to purchase fifteen tanks. The project had important security assistance implications and was regarded as a model for future programs in other Middle East countries. On 13 June 1989, OSD approved an Army proposal to export the M1A2 tank for coproduction or coassembly on a case-by-case basis. Some sensitive items would be provided as end items to the customer by the Army, while certain advanced navigational components whose production was controlled by another federal agency would not be exported.

Two of the Army's most important international logistical programs in FY 1989 were the Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Program and


the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). Both programs bridged combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) shortfalls among Army forces stationed overseas and also in areas of possible contingency operations that have austere logistical infrastructures. T h e WHNS program was essential to sustain combat activities in Europe, especially the planned ten divisions in ten days force. This support was acute to maintain advanced lines of communication in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The WHNS agreement between the United States and West Germany provided 100 German reserve units to support USAREUR with transportation, ammunition and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) supply, casualty evacuation, engineer support, maintenance, and security. All 100 units were activated by FY 1989 but were not fully manned or equipped. Regarded by the United States as a model of allied burden sharing, the U.S.-Germany WHNS agreement was underwritten in FY 1989 by $133.36 million of US Army funds and reflected an increase of nearly $41 million over FY 1988. This West German support equated to approximately fifty-thousand US Army personnel.

The Army also participated in a WHNS program with South Korea that involved construction projects in that country to strengthen the readiness and warfighting capabilities of American forces. For its part, South Korea furnished paramilitary and civilian support in CS/CSS areas, provided Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA), and the Korean Service Corps during peace and war. South Korean contributions equalled about twelve thousand Army troops. Through LOGCAP, the Army awarded civil contracts in peacetime to meet critical wartime CS/CSS shortfalls. The most extensive LOGCAP during FY 1989 was carried out by the Third US Army (TUSA) for POL support in Southwest Asia. TUSA was also soliciting contracts for ship unloading and engineer support there that would equate to more than eight thousand US Army personnel. USAREUR undertook LOGCAP planning to support its northern and southern flanks, and WESTCOM prepared LOGCAPs for the Aleutians and Guam.

Supply, Maintenance, Transportation, and Fuel

The Army central supply and maintenance program, or Program 7, supported the daily operation of major Army supply and rebuild depots and materiel readiness commands. It provided logistical support to training, sustainment, modernization, and quality of life programs. Training and sustainment were supported by spare parts, ammunition, and depot maintenance. Quality of life was supported by commissaries, post exchanges, and an orderly supply system. Funds for this program for the


fiscal year totaled $5.335 billion. Program 7 was divided into three categories: Central Supply (7S); Transportation (7T); and Depot Maintenance (7M). Central Supply supported the Army's wholesale supply system and second destination transportation for movement of supplies from production or depots to Army consumers. The $2.913 billion allotted to Program 7 in FY 1989 represented a 7 percent decline in buying power from FY 1988. If shortfalls continued, they could impair the Army's responsiveness with wholesale supply support, cause backlogs for spare parts, and reduce the shipment of prepositioned materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS), ammunition, and war reserves.

The high volume of ammunition expenditures expected by modern armor, infantry, and artillery units in AirLand Battle was expected to place exceptional demands on ammunition supply and distribution systems. The Army projected that daily wartime consumption by a NATO corps would be about 15,750 short tons, 80 percent of which would be artillery ammunition. The Palletized Loading System (PLS), adopted in FY 1989, promised to improve the Army 's Maneuver Oriented Ammunition Distribution System (MOADS). MOADS reduced ammunition handling at intermediate supply points by creating and distributing combat-configured loads (CCL). The PLS used a truck-trailer combination with demountable cargo beds. Each trailer could carry 16.5 short tons, and ammunition could be loaded or unloaded in only eight minutes with an onboard hydraulic system. Ammunition flatracks, carrying palletized CCLs, could then deliver their loads to division ammunition transfer points or directly to artillery units.

The Army's FY 1989 budget for materiel maintenance was in excess of $2.2 billion. The gap between funded and unfunded requirements dropped in FY 1989 to $381 million from $421 million in the previous year. To support maintenance operations as well as stocking war reserves, Congress appropriated $1.557 billion to purchase spare parts. These items ranged from nuts and bolts to aircraft and tank engines. Funded at $2.422 billion in FY 1989, depot maintenance (7M) paid for costs associated with depot overhaul, repair, rebuilding, upgrade, and conversion of Army equipment and also maintenance support activities such as maintenance training, engineering, and publications. End-item (aircraft and vehicle) maintenance received only 63 percent of what was needed. Priority was accorded to secondary items (engines, transmissions) that contributed to near-term readiness and OPTEMPO and was funded at 100 percent of requirements. Maintenance support was funded at approximately 56 percent of requirements. The end-item maintenance backlog, $141 million in FY 1987, could reach a half-billion in FY 1991.

The GAO questioned the Army 's extensive use of civilians to maintain military equipment in stateside depots and installations in a report released


in the summer of 1989. They found that this arrangement detracted from Army readiness by preventing soldiers from acquiring needed wartime skills. The GAO also reported that some Army mechanics in general support maintenance units did not spend sufficient time working on high priority equipment, such as M1 tanks, and performed too many low-level maintenance tasks more common to direct support maintenance companies. Reasons specified by GAO for this situation included a lack of diagnostic equipment and tools in some heavy equipment maintenance companies, inexperienced mechanics, and poor evaluation of individual and unit proficiency through MOS skill qualification tests. In its rejoinder, the Army made several observations. GAO examples were not representative of the entire Army, and many deficiencies were corrected before the GAO published its findings. Moreover, Army spokesmen contended, the Army 's materiel condition status reports on major items of equipment depicted a more favorable portrait of equipment maintenance and readiness than the G AO. The status of missile systems and artillery weapons exceeded the Army 's goal of 90 percent materiel readiness throughout FY 1989. T h e materiel readiness of tanks and combat vehicles ranged between 86 and 89 percent. Strategic air and sealift were vital concerns to the Army, but the Army relied on the Air Force and Navy for these services. During FY 1989, through mobility studies such as the Revised Intertheater Mobility Study (RIMS), the Army iterated shortcomings in this area. RIMS, for example,  identified deficiencies in offloading men and cargo from Navy ships in areas without adequate ports or controlled by the enemy. The Army, moreover, was assigned the mission of Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS), and an Army-Navy memorandum of agreement on strategic mobility provided that the two services coordinate to preclude duplication of effort. Funding for LOTS in FY 1989 totaled $69 million, an increase of $8 million over FY 1988, and was devoted to procurement of special landing craft. T h e Army was acquiring the LAMP-H (lighter, amphibian, heavy lift) to off load heavy equipment such as M1 tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, but a prototype had not been tested. In the meantime, the Army had fielded two companies of Logistic Air Cushion Vehicles at Fort Story, Virginia; accepted four Logistics Support Vehicles (LSVs) from the contractor; and in late FY 1989 took delivery of a new 2000 Class Landing Craft Utility (LCU) for above-board transfer of cargo from deep-draft vessels. The Army found a similar Navy craft, Landing Craft, Air Cushion ( L C AC), unsuitable for the LOTS mission, since the LCAC must be loaded from within a Navy "wet well" ship and cannot be used when cargo has to be loaded from above. The Army also lacked sufficient tugboats to maneuver ocean vessels for LOTS operations.

In FY 1989 the Army used 0.24 percent of national energy consumption. The cost to the Army in FY 1989 for POL, electricity, natural


gas, coal, and other energy sources was $1.25 billion, a drop of $3 million from FY 1988. This savings was accomplished despite an increase in the unit cost of POL products between FY 1988 and FY 1989. Three-fourths of the energy used by the Army went for operating fixed plants and facilities; the remaining 25 percent was applied to vehicles and aircraft. By type of energy, 42 percent was POL, 20 percent electricity, 22 percent natural gas, 10 percent coal, and 6 percent other thermal sources. The Army 's FY 1989 bill for seventeen million barrels of POL was $458 million. The Army was committed to several fuel conservation programs that ranged from developing non-gasoline-powered systems overseas to the more mundane conservation efforts of lowering thermostats and turning off appliances when not in use. Of the thirty-three Federal Energy Efficiency Awards presented by the Department of Energy for excellence in energy efficiency and management in October 1988, ten were made to the Army, including a special recognition for USAREUR's European Energy Program.

Recent legislation that deregulated the distribution of natural gas gave the Army an opportunity to procure natural gas competitively to lower utility costs at Army installations in the continental United States. The Engineering and Housing Support Center of the Corps of Engineers helped installation managers draw up contracts and identify areas of potential savings. Studies suggested that the Army could save nearly $3 million annually and apply the savings to reduce the backlog of installation maintenance and repair.

Construction, Installation Management, Base Realignments, and Closings

The FY 1989 Military Construction, Army (MCA), program supported force structure and modernization initiatives, provided funds to comply with statutory and regulatory environmental requirements, allowed only the most essential improvements in facilities, and deferred the replacement and revitalization of existing facilities. For FY 1989 MCA spending totaled $1.182 billion, compared to $1.318 billion in FY 1988.

Many construction projects undertaken or completed in FY 1989 supported the demands of major force structure changes. An example was completion of the new headquarters for the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, at Fort Drum, New York, in FY 1989. It was part of an extensive construction program at Fort Drum for the 10,000-man light infantry division, activated in 1984, that included housing for approximately fifteen thousand soldiers and dependents. The brigade complex encompassed 500,000 square feet of offices and training and housing facilities for the headquarters complement and three battalions. Total construction costs to


rehabilitate Fort Drum for the 10th Mountain Division were expected to reach $1.3 billion, far in excess of $743 million, the Reagan administration's original estimate. Other construction in progress included facilities for the division's support command, combat aviation brigade, artillery, other brigade and division elements, family housing, and troop and community recreational facilities. Of the two thousand base-housing units planned, nearly one thousand were completed by December 1988. Housing construction was to be finished early in 1990 at a projected cost of $147.5 million. Under the 801 program, the Army contracted for about two thousand privately constructed off-post housing units for Fort Drum that would be leased to the Army for twenty years.

In FY 1989 the Army obligated $1.873 billion for facilities maintenance and repair, excluding $597 million for maintenance and repair of Army family housing. This amount applied to active and reserve components against a total facilities backlog of maintenance and repair (BMAR) that exceeded $2.5 billion, exclusive of the deferred maintenance and repair for Army family housing. Spending for the construction of Army family housing in FY 1989 was approximately $215 million. Nearly $228 million was obligated to lease housing units in the United States and overseas. Like other Army facilities, family housing had a backlog of deferred maintenance and repairs that reached $692 million in FY 1989.

Congress was particularly concerned about the Army 's growing backlog of maintenance and repair and the revitalization of existing bases. In January 1989 the Army completed a comprehensive study for Congress that underscored the magnitude of the backlog and offered funding guidance to redress the condition for a five-year period that began with the FY 1992 budget. Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) are composed of four functional accounts: utilities, maintenance and repair, minor construction (under $200,000), and engineer support. Annual recurring requirements (ARR) were dollars needed to finance the operation and maintenance of Army real property according to established engineering standards. Aggregate spending for RPMA in FY 1989 totaled $3.096 billion, an increase from $2.820 billion in FY 1988. The value of the BMAR projects, however, reached $2.545 billion, and budget projections envisioned substantial increases in the BMAR during the next several fiscal years.

With an estimated replacement value of $175 billion in FY 1989, installations and facilities were fundamental to every facet of Army operations. To improve the management of base operations, the Army participated in test programs that gave local commanders greater latitude over the expenditure of funds. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Fort Riley, Kansas, were among six installations selected by DOD to participate in its Unified Budget Test. Post commanders were given authority to shift a percentage of appropriated funds between budget accounts and to retain


funds saved by economy measures for other uses. Existing regulations prohibited an installation commander from retaining unexpended funds; those funds reverted to a higher command to cover shortfalls in the same account at another installation. In the experiment, commanders shifted money to improve training, for maintenance and repairs, and for other purposes. During the first year of the test the Army reported a 3 percent increase in readiness at the two participating posts. The Army's "Model Base" Program that allowed CONUS base commanders to shift money between community activities accounts to improve them and enhance the quality of life was disapproved by Congress in FY 1989. Members of Congress believed the program's benefits were intangible and duplicated other programs.

Base realignments and closings continued as a major issue in FY 1989. On 3 May 1988, the Secretary of Defense chartered the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure to consider consolidating or closing underutilized or unneeded DOD bases. The Army supported the commission with a task force that provided information on 1,253 installations — current capacity, cost of base operations, current and future mission requirements, and the impact of selected realignment and closure scenarios on the Army. In October 1988 Congress enacted legislation that gave the commission power to detach its recommendations from the political wrangling that often undermined efforts to close installations. Upon receipt of the commission's list, the Secretary of Defense had sixteen days in which to accept or reject the entire list. If the Secretary approved the list, Congress then had forty-five days to accept or reject the entire list. If Congress rejected the commission's recommendations, its decision was subject to a presidential veto.

On 29 December 1988, the commission recommended closure or realignment of personnel and missions at 145 installations, 86 of which were to be closed fully, 5 to be closed in part, and 54 to experience an increase or decrease in units or activities. Army installations that were affected by this measure are listed in Table 9. The commission estimated an annual savings of $700 million. During a period of six years, the commission calculated savings that would range from $1.7 to $2.6 billion. These estimates did not include the cost of environmental cleanup and presumed the sale of installation properties. Congress enacted an amendment to the Military Construction Bill in late July 1989 that barred the closing of any base unless the costs associated with shutting it down were recoverable in six years. The Secretary of Defense approved the commission's recommendations and submitted them to Congress on 5 January 1989. Anticipating congressional approval, DOD also requested Congress to capitalize a special fund of $300 million for FY 1990 to cover the costs of closings and relocations.


TABLE 9 — Base Realignments and Closures
(Based on Public Law 100-526)

Fort Douglas, Utah Tacony Warehouse, Pennsylvania
Cameron Station, Virginia Hamilton Army Airfield, California
Presidio of San Francisco, California Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana
Coosa River Annex, Alabama Nike Philadelphia 41/43, New Jersey
Navajo Depot Activity, Arizona Fort Wingate, New Mexico
Nike Kansas City 30, Missouri Nike Aberdeen, Maryland
Cape St. George, Florida Bennett Army National Guard Facility, Colorado
Lexington-Bluegrass Depot, Kentucky US Army Reserve Center, Gaithersburg, Maryland
Pontiac Storage, Michigan Fort Des Moines, Iowa
Alabama Army Ammunition Plant, Alabama Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana
New Orleans Military Ocean Terminal, Louisiana 52 Housing Sites (various locations)
Army Materiel Technology Laboratory, Massachusetts ...
Kapalama Military Reservation, Hawaii
Realignments Out
Fort Dix, New Jersey Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
Fort Jackson, South Carolina Fort Bliss, Texas
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana Umatilla Army Depot, Oregon
Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado Fort Meade, Maryland
Fort Holabird, Maryland Fort Devens, Massachusetts
Fort Huachuca, Arizona Fort Belvoir, Virginia
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey  
Realignments In
Fort Knox, Kentucky Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri *
Fort Jackson, South Carolina * Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana *
Fort Lee, Virginia Fort Carson, Colorado
Fort Belvoir, Virginia * Fort Detrick, Maryland
Tobyhanna Depot, Pennsylvania Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Letterkenney Depot, Pennsylvania Detroit Arsenal, Michigan
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona
Tooele Army Depot, Utah Red River Army Depot, Texas
Fort Huachuca, Arizona* Sierra Army Depot, California



Realignments In (Continued)
Anniston Army Depot, Alabama Fort Devens, Massachusetts *
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii Fort Lewis, Washington
Fort Myer, Virginia Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
Fort McCoy, Wisconsin Fort Ord, California
Oakland Army Base, California Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC
Fort Bragg, North Carolina Fort Gordon, Georgia
Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center, Colorado Fort Drum, New York
Los Alamitos Army Reserve Center, California Sacramento Army Depot, California
Fort Sill, Oklahoma Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Fort Benning, Georgia Fort Shafter, Hawaii
Camp Parks, California Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Savanna Army Depot, Illinois Bluegrass Army Depot, Kentucky
Fort Irwin, California Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Nevada
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey * Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia Natick Research, Development, and Evaluation Center, Massachusetts
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland Harry Diamond Laboratory, Maryland
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico  

*Posts listed under both the out and in columns are losing and gaining functions or personnel.


Congress asked the GAO to analyze the commission's findings. In a preliminary report in March 1989, the GAO contended that the commission overstated probable savings and underestimated environmental cleanup costs. Despite these reservations, the House Armed Services Committee approved the commission's proposals on 14 March 1989. Congress directed that medical personnel from hospitals and clinics at bases to be closed be reassigned to alleviate medical shortages at other bases and thus reduce CHAMPUS costs. As part of the FY 1989 Military Construction Authorization Act, Congress chartered a new multiagency body, the Commission on Alternative Utilization of Military Facilities, to identify excess military sites suitable for drug treatment centers or other uses. On 18 April 1989, the House of Representatives defeated a resolution to disapprove the Base Closure Act, making the commission's recommendations, made in accordance with Public Law 100-526 of 24 October 1988, legally binding on DOD. The House's action empowered DOD to complete all realignments and base closings between January


1990 and September 1995. The Director of Management of the Army Staff organized a task force to manage implementation of the realignments and closing of Army installations.

Immediately upon the law's enactment, the State of Illinois filed suit in US District Court, Central District of Illinois. It claimed that the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act were unconstitutional and that the Secretary of Defense's approval of the base closure recommendations violated the Administrative Procedure Act. While general in nature, the suit specifically requested an injunction to stop closure of Fort Sheridan, Illinois. The court, however, denied the state's request. By the end of FY 1989 little progress had been made to realize the commission's goals except for planning efforts.

Subsistence and Clothing

Advances in food technology were changing the way the Army preserved, prepared, packaged, and distributed food, but the goal of providing nutritious, palatable food, or subsistence, remained a major objective. Subsistence support has adjusted to changing concepts of combat and alterations of force structure. In December 1987 the Army established a task force to evaluate current and future field rations in order to meet the needs of the AirLand Battlefield through the year 2008. After testing the Army Combat Field Feeding System (CFFS) in FY 1988, the system was approved by the Vice Chief of Staff in May. Designed by the Army's Troop Support Command (TROSCOM), CFFS, the core of the Army Field Feeding System (AFFS), incorporated a modular field kitchen, a sanitation center, a mobile kitchen trailer, a mounted ration heating device, and a flameless ration heater. It could support more mobile forces with prepackaged hot meals to supplement canned rations. An objective of the AFFS was to centralize feeding at battalions and thus reduce the number of cooks, food service specialists, and mobile kitchens needed to support maneuver elements. The AFFS reduced the number of cooks in a maneuver battalion from 24 to 6 and the number of food service specialists in the Army by 3,500.

Implementation of the new field feeding plan depended on adoption of a new operational ration composed of Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs), prepackaged individual meals that could be heated and served in the field, and T-Rations. The MRE consisted of shelf-stable ingredients configured in disposable packs sufficient to serve thirty-six meals. With the T-Ration which would replace the B-Ration, the Army expected to furnish units in the field one hot meal each day. Several problems delayed implementation of the AFFS in FY 1988, but by FY 1989 all stateside d divisions had converted to the AFFS and USAREUR was proceeding to


adopt it. There were problems with the quality of the MRE and T- Rations . Soldiers found that the MRE tray packs cooled rapidly upon being o p e n e d, often were hard to open, and a regimen of prepackaged and processed foods grew tiresome. The use of MRE in areas where water was scarce was also problematic.

In early FY 1989 the Chief of Staff charged TRADOC to fix the AFFS. The Quartermaster School sought to validate the utility of the new rations, MRE, the high mobility kitchen, and the high production bakery unit. Army food technicians, meanwhile, searched for ways to keep food warm, to improve the variety of meals, and to prepare food with a minimum of water. The Vice Chief of Staff halted further reductions in the number of cooks to enable units to prepare more freshly cooked meals in the field. The reassessment suggested that the number of cooks originally slated for elimination was excessive and additional field kitchen equipment and a more varied diet were needed. Cooks were to be restored to the TOEs of divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments. In addition to retaining a mobile kitchen trailer, one company kitchen was authorized for every two companies in all heavy divisions beginning in FY 1990.

During FY 1989 the Army also worked on unique rations for extreme climates and special units. The Ration, Lightweight 30 Day (RLW 30), was prepared for special operations forces. A lightweight, high-density ration of 2,100 calories, the RLW 30 weighed under a pound and occupied less than forty-five cubic inches of space. It became a standard item in the Army inventory at the end of FY 1989. The Ration, Cold Weather, or RCW, developed at the Army Natick R&D Center, underwent field evaluation in FY 1989. As DOD's executive agent for the food research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program, the Army used its Joint Service Food System Technology Program to develop food service systems for air, naval, and space operations. Examples included a prototype food service system for the Air Force Rail Garrison Mobile Missile system and a plastic package recycling system that would allow the Navy to comply with the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.

Providing potable water to troops was another critical logistical mission. TROSCOM was developing 3,000-gallon water purification units to replace or supplement the Army's 600-gallon units. Both of these purifiers used a reverse osmosis process that forced water through fiber filters that removed impurities and salt. The 3,000-gallon units were to be distributed in FY 1990 for corps support.

Commenting on the Army uniform and the appearance of Army members, General Vuono pointedly stated, "Our soldiers are better than they look." In the summer of 1988 General Vuono ordered a study of the mate-


rials and designs of Army uniforms for the next century. ODCSLOG studied the design of garrison dress, service, and utility uniforms, while ODCSPER surveyed soldier opinion regarding styles and concepts of Army uniforms for the twenty-first century. Based on earlier survey s , TROSCOM introduced several new items of clothing in FY 1989-a new light jacket with a knit collar, a double-breasted and belted trench coat, and modified green dress shirts. The Army also tested the Marine Corps all-weather coat for male and female officers. TROSCOM was developing new outdoor gear from gloves to boots and items for special climatic or terrain conditions. The Army was pursuing improved chemical and ballistic protection and ways to lighten the soldier's load.

Congress stipulated in the FY 1989 Defense Appropriations Conference Report that the Army procure $50 million of the Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS). The Army had given high priority to other clothing and individual equipment items, such as the new Individual Tactical Load Bearing Vest and the Field Pack, Large with Internal Frame. On 8 February 1989, the Under Secretary of the Army informed Congress that the Army would limit purchases of ECWCS in FY 1989 to $15 million, but would reprogram an additional $10 to $15 million for ECWCS during the remainder of the fiscal year from other accounts.

Chemical Weapons Destruction

The Army was obligated to destroy unitary chemical weapons by 1994 according to FY 1986 DOD Authorization Act (PL 99-145), but the deadline was extended to 1997 in the FY 1989 DOD Authorization Act (PL 100-456). During FY 1989 the Army continued to destroy stocks of chemical weapons at sites in the continental United States and the Pacific and to remove chemical weapons from West Germany. A May 1986 bilateral agreement between President Reagan and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stipulated that US chemical munitions stored in Germany would be removed and destroyed elsewhere. The Army recommended onsite disposal of its unitary chemical stockpile of nerve gas, hallucinogenic agents, and mustard gas at eight storage sites in the United States: Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky; Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado; Tooele Army Depot, Utah; and Umatilla Depot Activity, Oregon. Officials at three facilities — Aberdeen, Lexington, and Newport — did not favor on-site disposal. In March 1988 the Army submitted a disposal plan to Congress for an estimated price of $3.2 billion. The first stateside disposal operation began at Pine Bluff Arsenal,


Arkansas, confined to weapons that contained the hallucinogenic B2 agent, and disposal continued throughout FY 1989.

The destruction of weapons at Pine Bluff Arsenal was carried out by disassembly and incineration. With the support of DOD and Congress, the Army planned to construct a new full-scale chemical disposal facility on the Johnston Atoll in the Kwajalein Islands in the Pacific. D e s t ruction of unitary chemical munitions at Johnston Atoll would use the cryofracture method rather than disassembly and incineration. T h e first full-scale cryofracture disposal facility in the continental United States was constructed at the Tooele Army Depot in FY 1989, with a supporting training facility at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Congress authorized $16.3 million in FY 1989 for cryofracture research and development and the Army planned to conduct an Operational Verification Test ( OVT) of cryofracture and disassembly technologies at Tooele in late FY 1989 before replicating either technology at other sites in the United States. Congress provided DOD $237.5 million in FY 1989 for destruction of chemical weapons, and $58 million of it was allocated to the Army. Completion of a cryofracture facility at Tooele Army Depot was made uncertain when DOD deleted funds for the cryofracture program in its FY 1990 budget, despite congressional pressure on the Army to accelerate its chemical weapons destruction program.

The Army was the lead DOD agency for planning the removal of US chemical weapons from Europe. The USAREUR staff negotiated with the German and other allied governments regarding various issues — transportation, security, legal, and command and control. ODCSOPS was the point of contact between the Joint Staff and West German technical experts. Removal planning envisioned overland movement by modified military vans and shipment by sea to Johnston Atoll for storage and subsequent destruction. The Army envisioned continuous monitoring of the transit process with arrangements for emergency response and medical contingency measures. The Secretary of Defense stipulated that 10 percent of the unitary chemical weapon stockpile in West Germany be retained as a deterrent and for contingency purposes until adequate binary chemical munitions became available.


The logistical concepts and programs highlighted in this chapter illustrate the Army's efforts to improve logistical management and operations. Many managerial concepts and techniques adopted by the Army are similar to those used in the civilian corporate and industrial sectors. The influence of the Army's doctrine and tactics on logistics was manifest in field operations, in the combat service support structure, in the relations


between active and reserve components, and in the ongoing modernization of Army forces. Logistical operations were also affected by fiscal constraints, changes in the strategic environment, technological advances, and other agents of change in the Army. Research and development programs were the service's cutting edge for continuous modernization of the Army. While seeking to identify and exploit technologies that will enhance the technological advantages of Army forces in the performance of their missions, research and development programs also have the potential to change doctrine, to restructure and redesign forces, to modify training, and to influence the way the Army supports itself. The Army's mandate for the 1990s is to do better with less. That mandate applied as well to all aspects of Army logistics. Its fulfillment will rest in part on the successful application of managerial systems, structural reforms, and research and development undertaken by the Army in FY 1989.


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