Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1989

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Modernization: Research, Development, and Acquisition

Introduction

Modernization is a continual process, driven by such factors as evolving doctrine, threat assessment, and emerging technologies. The development, production, and fielding of the latest weapons and equipment is essential for the Army to fulfill its strategic roles. Most modernization programs under way in FY 1989 began in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some programs have been subsumed or replaced by more comprehensive modernization plans, while others have been canceled because of excessive cost or fell victim to changing budgetary priorities that resulted in their cancellation or reduction. Long neglected because of the Vietnam War and the subsequent contraction of military spending, modernization was spurred by doctrinal innovation and a studied effort to harness emerging technologies. In the mid-1970s the Army decided to maintain a relatively constant active component strength to conserve manpower costs and to increase funding for weapons modernization. The more hospitable fiscal climate of the early 1980s brought to fruition several major weapons systems: the M1 Abrams tank, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter, the Patriot Missile System, and the Hellfire missile.

During the early 1980s the pace of modernization quickened, and the Army planned to both upgrade and modernize its total force and used a guiding principle that units first to fight were the first to modernize. Equipment displaced in this process would be reallocated to later deploying units. Modernization in the 1980s was increasingly guided by AirLand Battle doctrine and functional areas such as aviation, armor and antiarmor, fire support, forward air defense, and combat support and combat service support. Modernization was developed using a family concept under which closely related individual projects were consolidated into a single plan. Such plans enabled Army and DOD planners to discern how indi-

vidual projects fit into a comprehensive warfighting concept for each functional or mission area. The first of these plans, the Army Aviation Modernization Plan (AAMP), was approved in 1983. Other plans followed that reflected the priority that the Army accorded to modernizing its heavy forces. The Armored Family of Vehicles (AFV) Task Force, created in 1986, formulated a blueprint for modernizing armored forces that used two common chassis, heavy and medium, that obviated the production of other models, reduced testing, enhanced production efficiencies, reduced repair parts costs, and promoted common training.

Almost concurrently, the Army's Armor/Anti-Armor (A 3 ) Special Task Force concluded that, while the nuclear threat to NATO had subsided, the conventional threat posed by the Warsaw Pact armored forces was greater than had been estimated. The task force recommended an ambitious modernization program to enhance the lethality and survivability of armored vehicles and an accelerated effort to develop more effective medium and heavy antitank weapons. The Army adopted the Armor/Anti-Armor Modernization Plan in May 1989. In January 1989 General Vuono approved the Fire Support Modernization Plan, and four months later he endorsed the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization Plan. Throughout FY 1989, however, nearly every modernization plan was carefully scrutinized by the Army, DOD, and Congress. The momentum that the Army's modernization efforts gained in the mid-1980s slackened in FY 1989, and questions grew regarding purpose and priorities. The Congressional Military Reform Caucus, an informal bipartisan group of legislators who explore alternative defense policies, foresaw a reduction of American global military commitments and the strong possibility of a future trade-off between modernization and force structure. The caucus agreed on the urgency of improving American conventional ground forces because of reductions of strategic forces and improvements in Soviet armor forces. The credibility of deterrence depended as much on the equipment and weapons provided American ground forces as it did on their numbers, while modernization of conventional forces was also essential to enhance America's capacity to project military power overseas.

Modernization, with its emphasis on the application of new technologies, weapons specifications, and performance, tends to overshadow the human dimension. The Army's total systems approach toward weapon performance seeks to integrate soldier performance and reliability with weapons capabilities to enhance the total system. A major step, the Army's Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Program established in 1986, highlights the importance of training, system safety, health hazards, and human engineering factors in the design and development of new equipment. For example, MANPRINT has succeeded in identifying desirable system design changes in the Block II

version of the M1 tank and in the Forward Air Defense System.

MAN-PRINT has contributed to lower training, operational, and maintenance costs by reducing the size of crews and identifying design changes that have minimized retraining and the fashioning of new tools. MANPRINT is supplemented by two other programs, FOOTPRINT and CROSSWALK, that help the Army analyze new materiel systems in terms of MOS requirements necessary to train, operate, and sustain a particular piece of equipment. On 29 March 1989, Army's Acquisition Executive Policy Memorandum 89-2 approved MANPRINT's role in the solicitation and source selection processes for the acquisition and modification of major Army systems. MANPRINT supported DOD's Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Safety (MPTS) program, which also was formally incorporated into the Defense Systems Acquisition Process.

The Acquisition Process

Following the 1986 study of military procurement by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Army began a reorganization of HQDA and adopted a three-tiered acquisition management chain in mid-1987. This chain consisted of the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), Program Executive Officers (PEOs), and Project or Product Managers (PMs). These three positions were responsible for developing, procuring, and fielding new weapons systems. In the process, the Army merged the Off ice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ODCSRDA) into the Off ice of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASA [RDA]). The DCSRDA became Military Deputy to the ASA (RDA) and served as the bridge to the Army S t a ff. At the start of FY 1989 the Under Secretary of the Army, Michael P. W. Stone, was the AAE. Reporting to Stone were the PEOs, who were  responsible for cost and performance of specific acquisition programs. Project and product managers in turn reported to their respective PEOs. By December 1989 Stone further streamlined the Army's acquisition system by eliminating eight of twenty-five PEOs/PMs and consolidating eight PO positions into four.

The Report of the Defense Management Review, submitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President in July 1989, endorsed the recommendation of the Packard Commission to create a corps of dedicated acquisition officers. During FY 1989 the Army inaugurated measures to create a corps of about 1,350 military and civilian acquisition specialists. In January 1989 the Army aired guidelines for a Materiel Acquisition Management (MAM) program by which the Army Materiel Command

The military portion of the MAM was approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army near the end of FY 1989. Secretary of Defense Cheney also endorsed the Packard Commission's recommendation that each service devise a similar career program for civilian acquisition specialists, the eventual goal being the merger of military and civilian specialists into a combined program. The Army Management Review Task Force recommended that the military program be the model for the civilian acquisition specialist career program. The parallel civilian program was approved by General Vuono on 13 October 1989 for implementation during FY 1990. In reforming its acquisition procedures and organization, the Army acted in the spirit and intent of Congress and DOD. Its efforts were closely scrutinized by Congress throughout FY 1989, and Congress generally approved. Some critics, however, felt that excessive bureaucratic layers remained and that the PEO chain was not properly honored.

Claims of bidding irregularities in the award of a contract to the Italian arms manufacturer Beretta SpA in 1984 for production of a new 9-mm. automatic handgun, the M9, prompted Congress to direct the Army to reopen competitive testing and bidding before purchasing additional M9s. Congress was concerned about the reliability of the pistols already delivered to the Army by Beretta, USA, the American subsidiary of the Italian parent company. Metal fatigue cracks first detected in the pistol's slide mechanism were radiating to other parts of the weapon. In tests conducted by the Navy, the pistol's aluminum frame was susceptible to rapid corrosion. On 28 April 1989, Beretta, USA, delivered 500 new production models of the M9 with a new slide capture device. In addition, during April and May the Army received 17,000 kits to modify more than 140,000 M9s already issued to the Army and the other armed services. On 22 May, following completion of the congressionally mandated competition for renewal of the M9 contract, the Army awarded a three-year contract to Beretta, USA. The performance of the Beretta M9 pistol, the Army

believed, remained significantly better than models submitted by two competitors. Under the new contract the Army would purchase an additional 56,705 M9 handguns at a cost of $9.9 million, bringing the number of pistols on order to almost 378,000.

The Army experienced problems with other contractors during FY 1989. The Scott Aviation Company delivered only 1,000 of a promised 5,000 M40 protective masks by the start of FY 1989. Delivery of night-vision devices and components for artillery shells by other producers also fell behind production schedules. The BMY Company of York, Pennsylvania, failed to comply with the terms of a production contract, causing significant delays in outfitting units with new five-ton trucks. BMY was also several months behind in the production of the Armored Combat Earthmover and several weeks behind in the delivery of prototypes for the Howitzer Improvement Program. These delays prompted the Army to ask the Defense Logistics Agency to conduct an audit of BMY's contracts to ascertain the reasons for the shortfalls.

Research, Development, and Technological Change

Between 1980 and 1987 the major increase in federal government RDT&E spending occurred in the defense sector, but recent pressures to reduce the budget deficit slowed its growth. By 1989 the United States spent about 2.6 percent of GNP on research and development, a third of which was related to national defense. Army R&D funds increased during recent years, but the amount was the smallest of all the armed services: $5.117 billion in outlays for Army RDT&E.

Army research and development was guided by the Department of the Army Long Range Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan (LRRDAP), based on Army long-range planning guidance. Delineating the Army's research, development, and acquisition (RDA) strategy for FYs 1992-2006, the LRRDAP guided Army Staff agencies and commanders on modernization trends and was the basis for the Field Long Range Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan (FLRRDAP) and the RDA portion of the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM), FYs 1992-1997. The LRRDAP was a bridge between the Army's unconstrained planning environment and the programming phase of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). Planners from the Army Materiel Command, Information Systems Command, and TRADOC met with representatives of MACOMs and Army component commands and program executive officers in late FY 1988 to draft a FLRRDAP. Identification of R&D requirements in the field, geared to battlefield mission and functional areas, was guided by the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS). TRADOC distilled the

cumulative review and analysis of battlefield needs and deficiencies into a battlefield development plan (BDP) that described future warfighting environments and the Army's modernization and combat developments needs for FYs 1992-1997.

Approved in July 1989, BDP-89 found the Army's greatest needs in aviation, close combat, fire support, and intelligence-electronic warfare. The plan served as the basis for the Army Modernization Memorandum and the FLRRDAP that was submitted to HQDA in September 1989. The FLRRDAP recommended a fifteen-year RDA strategy that stressed near-and mid-term R&D to enhance long-term modernization. This approach protected the modernization of heavy forces at the expense of more modest improvements in areas such as air defense and f ire support . Historically, R&D programs have been lengthy enterprises that involved years of experimentation and testing. For example, after twenty-one years of research and testing, the Army's Antimalarial Drug Development Program, performed by the Army Medical Research and Development Command, Fort Detrick, Maryland, received a final distribution license from the Federal Drug Administration for a new drug, magloquinine, that overcame drug-resistant strains of malaria.

The Army has sought to speed up the R&D process. TRADOC's Concept Evaluation Program (CEP) and AMC's Field Assistance in Science and Technology (FAST) program addressed near-term R&D requirements in the most expeditious manner possible and often bypassed normal developmental processes. The CEP and FAST programs tested and evaluated new equipment and training concepts in the field. From these tests and feedback from troops each agency defined new R&D requirements and expedited their solution through the respective chains of command. Because CEP and FAST were similar, they were merged in March 1989 and teams from TRADOC and AMC were subsequently assigned to the commanders of MACOMs and corps. During FY 1989 the Army also sought improvement of the "Achilles heel" of developmental programs- weapons system software management. With an annual investment of about $2.5 billion in software, the Army considered its research and development programs extremely vulnerable to software failures in the developmental cycle. In September 1989 the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency established the Software Test and Evaluation Panel (STEP) to formulate procedures to assess the software in weapon and nonweapon systems throughout the development process to prevent or minimize software failures. In the FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed DOD to prepare a critical technologies plan. DOD's Critical Technologies Plan for the Committees on Armed Services, United States Congress, identified twenty-two technologies essential for the long-term superiority of American weapons systems and helped prioritize the allocation of R&D

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resources and guided industries in focusing their R&D investments. Many of the technologies enumerated in the report applied to future Army weapons systems. During FY 1989 the Army took several steps to strengthen its technology base. The Technology Base Master Plan (TBMP) provided a top-down guidance and focus for Army R&D and modernization. It was closely linked to the Army's modernization plans through the Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrations (ATTDs) that expedited the transfer of technology from the advanced research phase to the developmental stage. The Army hoped to shorten the cycle of testing, developing, and fielding new weapons systems from fifteen to five years by more extensive use of ATTDs. Examples of FY 1989 ATTDs were the Aided Target Recognition/Multisensor Fusion and the Propulsion 21 demonstrations.

Technologies critical to the Army's near-, mid-, and long-term warfighting capabilities were also identified in the Science and Technology Objective Annex of the Army's LRRDAP. The Army also worked closely with high-tech industries through MACOM-sponsored conferences such as the FY 1989 conferences organized by the Army's Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, which pursued current and emerging technologies that might apply to future C 3 systems. The Army has identified thirteen technologies that are closely allied with its five major modernization plans-aviation, heavy forces, fire support, vehicles, and armor/antiarmor. The Technology Base Investment Strategy emphasized research and exploratory development of technology with a potential of high payoff in warfighting capabilities. It included advanced materials/materials processing, advanced signal processing and computing, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, directed-energy weapons, microelectronics, advanced propulsion, robotics, and space technology. Congress authorized $1.161 billion in FY 1989 to support the Army's technology base, divided among support for basic research, evaluation of the feasibility of advanced concepts and technologies, and demonstration tests.

Unmanned Ground and Aerial Vehicles

The development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), formerly called remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), combined computerized remote control, artificial intelligence, robotics, and advanced remote sensing. Some of the Army's earlier efforts, such as the Aquila RPV, were not successful. In response to a congressional mandate, DOD consolidated all UGV acquisition activity into a joint office known as the Marine Corps-Army UGV Joint Project Office (JPO) in November 1988. With a Marine Corps officer designated as pro-

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Each service's UGV requirements were set forth in a Marine Corps-Army memorandum of agreement. The Army's specific requirements were contained in a draft Operational and Organizational (O&O) plan for UGVs prepared by the Infantry School that was under review as FY 1989 ended. A workshop on military uses of robotic vehicles was cosponsored by TRADOC and the American Defense Preparedness Association in May 1989. Determination of military requirements for robotic vehicles has been hampered by the lack of troop experience, but the Army believes UGVs have utility for such close combat missions as cuing weapons, breaching minefields, and performing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. In rear areas, the Army foresaw use of UGVs to perform hazardous tasks such as monitoring sensitive areas and demolishing unexploded ordnance.

The UGV JPO assumed responsibility for two promising UGV projects: the Marine Corps teleoperated vehicle (TOV) and the Army Missile Command's tele-operated mobile all-purpose platform (TMAP). The Army's TMAP was small enough to be carried by a HMMWV and serve as a mount for remote sensors or target acquisition systems. To carry lethal payloads, the UGV JPO was also considering a family of UGVs known as CALEB whose development depended on the success of the TOV and TMAP. The JPO was studying two additional Army-initiated UGV programs — a minefield reconnaissance and detector program (Mirador) and a robotic obstacle-breaching assault tank (ROBAT ) . Pioneered by the AMC's Troop Support Command, Mirador was conceived as a remote-controlled multisensor system to detect metallic and nonmetallic mines. The XM1060 ROBAT, with a tele-operated M60A3 tank for a platform, was configured to clear mine fields and mark cleared lanes and also to detect chemical, biological, and nuclear agents.

Congress eliminated separate service programs for unmanned aerial vehicle programs in late 1988 along with UGVs. Congress reduced RDT&E and procurement funds for UAVs by nearly 50 percent, or to $50.3 million, and directed that service UAV programs be consolidated into a UAV Joint Project Office under the Secretary of Defense. In late 1988 DOD established the Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Project Office and established an executive committee with representatives from

OSD and each service to supervise the JPO. The 1988 OSD Joint UAV Program Master Plan, required by Congress, stressed common technology for air, sea, and land systems. It established four UAV systems: the Short Range (about three hundred kilometers) which corresponded to the Army's original Army Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW)/Deep UAV; the Close Range (thirty to fifty kilometers) which approximated the original Army Close UAV; the Medium Range; and the Endurance UAV systems. In December 1988 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved a Mission Need Statement for the Short Range UAV, based on requirements that HQDA had formulated for the IEW/Deep UAV in FY 1988. The Naval Air Systems Command was designated to consolidate and oversee the development of pilotless aircraft for all services, and the UAV JPO gave the Army UAV Project Manager responsibility for the Short Range UAV.

As proposed by the Army, the Short Range UAV would carry a day/night passive imagery payload and have an operating radius of 150 to 200 kilometers (50 kilometers behind friendly lines and 150 kilometers beyond the forward line of troops [FLOT]) and an endurance of about twenty hours. Designed for the deep battle, it would have surveillance capabilities that provided immediate day/night intelligence collection and dissemination and be compatible with Army data and other UAV systems. To hasten development and limit costs, the UAV JPO purchased the off-the- shelf PIONEER UAV Systems for use by the Marine Corps, Navy, and Army. In March 1989 the Naval Air Systems Command, on behalf of the UAV JPO and the Army UAV Project Manager, released a request for proposals from interested contractors for a Short Range UAV system. Meanwhile, the Army also decided in FY 1989 to end UAV testing at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Lewis, Washington, and to concentrate all UAV testing at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The Army estimated that it would have to acquire eighteen Short Range UAV systems through FY 1996 at a cost of approximately $425 million.

A Close Range UAV system was intended to provide division, armored cavalry regiment, and separate brigade commanders the ability to "see over the next hill." The Army considered a Very Low Cost UAV (less than $10,000 each) transportable in two backpacks and controlled in the same manner as a model airplane. An enclosed television camera could scan a radius of fifteen miles. In January 1989 the UAV Executive Committee approved the purchase and testing of a light, unmanned scout plane for Close Range battlefield surveillance. Close Range systems were scheduled to have a radius of eighty kilometers (thirty kilometers beyond the FLOT), operating time of two hours, and a maximum altitude of fifteen thousand feet. The Marine Corps would also test and use the Close

Directed Energy and Thermal Technologies

Directed energy weapons (DEW) research has been concentrated in strategic systems such as the US Strategic Defense System (SDS). DEW research for tactical systems for radio-frequency (RF)/microwave , charged particle beams, and lasers, however, has recently increased at Army laboratories, notably at the Ballistic Research and the Harry Diamond Laboratories at Adelphi, Maryland. The Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was also examining ways that directed energy could be accommodated in current and future combat operations. Relying on a power supply rather than a finite magazine of ordnance, directed energy weapons had the "deep magazine" that could fire as long as the power source continued. Directed energy technology in weapons exemplified the trend toward "soft kill" weapons that destroyed enemy weaponry by exploiting design weaknesses in enemy systems.

Weapons that utilized radio frequency and microwave technologies had limited promise for the Army because of size and weight limitations of the energy source. The Army's major focus in this field was directed toward electronic countermeasures such as those systems that were small enough to be mounted on large tracked vehicles to jam enemy communications and radars or to destroy the enemy's electronic equipment. This use posed the danger of fratricide by possible destruction of friendly communications equipment through the emission of powerful electronic pulses. This danger could be reduced by highly directional antennas. Still in the conceptual stage in FY 1989 was the tactical application of particle beam technology that also was limited by the size and weight of the needed power source.

Lasers had a more immediate battlefield application than RF/microwave or particle beam weapons. They are used in weapons that can destroy enemy sensor systems, range finders, target designators, aiming devices, position locators, and communication equipment. Laser weapons have shown their highest potential in weapons that destroy or degrade other optical devices such as sensors, cameras, and optical aiming systems. The Army has experimented with the tactical application of lasers for nearly two decades. Prototype weapons systems such as the mobile test unit (MTU) and the Roadrunner, a close-combat laser weapon (C-CLAW), never proved themselves. More successful was Stingray, a

Research and development of high-energy laser (HEL) technology was conducted by several federal agencies, notably the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). In FY 1989 the Army and the other armed services participated with DARPA in research on tactical HEL-the multi-purpose chemical laser (MPCL), the mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL), and the ground-based free electron laser (GBFEL). These projects searched for laser weapons that possessed power sources strong enough to enlarge the tactical application of lasers. Testing of many HEL projects was performed at the HEL Systems Test Facility, located at the Army's White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.

The US Army Strategic Defense Command (USASDC), Huntsville, Alabama, studied the use of lasers with ultrawideband radars that are used to identify and locate incoming missile warheads. Such radars were easily overloaded with peripheral electronic signals. Decoding and processing the signals picked up by the radar requires an extremely fast computer. The Dynetics Corporation was developing for the USASDC an acousto-optic printer in which laser beams and sound waves interact to process random noise signals as they occur.

The most common use of lasers in the Army was in tactical rangefinders, which measured distance by calculating the difference in time between the transmission and reflection of a directed beam of light. Such devices were commonly used on the Abrams main battle tank and by Warsaw Pact armored forces. The AN/GVS-5 rangefinder, currently mounted on the M1 and M1A1 tanks, was scheduled for replacement by a more efficient carbon dioxide model, designated the AN/PVS-6, also known as the MELIOS. As target designators, lasers paint both fixed and small moving targets with a beam more powerful than the one used by rangefinders. Target designators were frequently installed as components of missiles and other projectiles such as the Hellfire and Maverick missiles, the Copperhead 155-mm. artillery round, and the Merlin mortar projectile. The most commonly used version of a ground- or vehicle-mount-ed laser target designator in the Army was the AN/TVQ-2, or Glid. Related to target designators were laser markers. Under development dur-

The Army also employed lasers as aiming lights in aiming devices. With an effective range of about one hundred meters, the AN/PAQ-4 laser aiming system has been mounted on several weapons, including the M16 rifle, the M203 grenade launcher, and the AT-4 antitank missile launcher. Laser aiming systems were more effective when combined with starlight electronic light amplification night-vision equipment. The AN/PAQ-4, for example, emitted an invisible infrared laser-generated beam visible only with the aid of night-vision goggles (NVG) such as the improved AN/PVS-7. Position locators, such as the modular azimuth positioning system (MAPS) in full-scale engineering development by the Army in FY 1989, employed lasers. It utilized a ring laser gyroscope to provide initially derived positioning data; the Army intended to purchase 2,100 MAP systems for vehicles and aircraft. A similar ring laser gyroscope positioning device used in the Army Tactical Missile System proved extremely accurate.

Adaptation of lasers to tactical military communications was the least developed use by the Army. Laser communications had the potential to provide secure point-to-point communication, but they required line-of-sight transmission often difficult to acquire in combat. A more promising application of semiconductor lasers was to drive fiber-optic cable systems that were expected to replace wire systems.

The potential of lasers as a combat multiplier, combined with evidence of the use of laser weapons by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, buttressed the Army's commitment to them. It also spurred development of protective and defensive countermeasures such as laser-protective goggles, laser-resistant sensors, and antilaser missiles to shield or protect both operators and equipment from hostile lasers. Laser technology has aided training and war games, as with the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES). Several factors worked against further development of lasers for military use during FY 1989. Congress expressed concern about hazards to the eye presented by laser devices  like the Stingray and Dazer. In June 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union announced their intent to limit the use of non-eye-safe lasers and barred the jamming of each other's command, control, communications, and intelligence systems.

Thermal imaging technology offered a means to see through a battlefield clouded by darkness, rain, dust, foliage, smoke, or haze. Two promising thermal programs, the short range thermal sight (SRTS) and the thermal weapons sight (TWS), had a direct bearing on improving infantry weapons and were applicable to other tactical weapons. The

light weight, day/night, self-contained passive SRTS was intended for the M16A1/M16A2 rifle, the M203 grenade launcher, and the AT-4 antiarmor weapon. The sight passed several tests by FY 1989, but fielding was not expected for several years. The TWS, a lightweight thermal imaging system, was designed for crew-served automatic weapons and the Stinger antiaircraft missile. It will replace the AN/PVS-4 mounted on the M249 squad automatic weapon, the M60 machine gun, and the M24 sniper weapon.

Armor/Antiarmor

Several factors caused the Army to give its highest priority to modernizing its heavy forces-adoption of the AirLand Battle doctrine, a reevaluation of the Soviet armored threat, and the significant growth of armored capabilities among several regional powers. The Abrams main battle tank is the Army's principal weapons system to close with and destroy the enemy, to exploit success, and to serve as an antitank system. Lethality, mobility, and protection from enemy fires allow armored forces to lead offensive operations by ground forces. The modernization of armor and antiarmor systems is guided by two major Army modernization plans: the Heavy Forces Modernization (HFM) Plan and the Armor/Antiarmor Modernization Plan. The plans evolved from studies undertaken by the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force and the Armor/Antiarmor Special Task Force, respectively. The HFM Plan replaced the earlier Armored Family of Vehicles (AFV) Modernization Plan, which was slow in getting Congress' approval because of its cost and a reluctance by legislators to cancel production of older-model tanks.

The HFM Plan was the Army's blueprint for future heavy forces that could match or exceed the perceived Soviet threat into the 1990s. It included a new version of the Abrams tank (the Block III MBT), an advanced field artillery system, a future infantry fighting vehicle, a combat mobility vehicle, a line-of-sight antitank weapon, and an armored utility vehicle. Army planners intend to incorporate a high degree of commonality among subsystems of its modernization plans and to upgrade systems through interim product improvement changes and to adopt the AFV Task Force idea to use only two chassis, heavy and medium. The Army also envisioned the use of common transmissions, engines, and modular armor. Congress, however, has demanded that the Army provide more detailed analysis of the HFM Plan to develop just two chassis before it fully funds their development. To accelerate full-scale development and to minimize costs, the Army planned to telescope traditional demonstration/validation phases of development with Advanced  Technology Transition Demonstrations.

In FY 1989 the Defense Acquisition Board conditionally approved the Army's plans for the M1A2, or Block II version of the Abrams tank, and authorized limited production. The DAB also asked the Army to clarify the relation of the modifications planned for Block II Abrams with the Block III. For the Block II version, the Army planned to add a commander's independent thermal viewer that allowed the tank commander to search for new targets while the gunner was engaging another, an improved laser range-finder, a thermal viewer for the driver, and enhanced computers and navigational systems. The Army estimated that these improvements would double the number of rounds the tank could fire on target. In August 1989 the DAB authorized full-scale production of the M1A2, but set a limit of $300,000 on upgrades of the M1A1. The cost of the Army's preferred improvement package was $570,000, but by eliminating several modifications the Army reduced the figure to $475,000. The improvements will increase the cost of each M1A2 to approximately $3 million, compared to $2.6 million for the upgraded M1A1. Full production of the M1A2 is expected to begin in FY 1991.

In early 1989 the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved funds for the continued production of the M1A1 and M1A2 models of the

During FY 1989 the Army also evaluated the results of the Abrams Live Fire Test program that investigated the vulnerabilities of the M1 and M1A1 tanks and crews to enemy antitank munitions as part of the Army Test and Evaluation Command's Abrams Battlefield Damage Assessment and Repair program at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. T h e tests demonstrated that the special armor used on the Abrams tank, although not impervious, was adequate, that the compartmentalization of crew and ammunition bays confined damage and reduced casualties, and that the tank's automatic fire suppression system (AFSS) successfully extinguished fuel and hydraulic fires quickly. Among the areas deemed in need of improvement were the tank's electrical system, crew communication, and repair procedures designed to gain maximum self-recovery capability.

The Army adopted a more radical approach for the development of the M1 Block III version of the Abrams tank. Regarded as necessary to combat future Soviet armor, the Army planned to equip the Block III tank with an automatic gun loader; a new high-energy gun and electronic fire control system; advanced target acquisition capabilities; improved chassis, power pack, and suspension; advanced armor protection; and a vehicular information system that would be able to convey vehicle status reports and diagnostic information to the crew. Its automated command and control systems would include a position navigation system that would display unit locations, indicate direction and speed of movement, and locate distant targets for indirect fire. The Army planned to initially field the Block III tank in FY 1998, barring future funding shortfalls and assuming timely development of an advanced power system and the common chassis envisioned in the HFM Plan. Congress, however, was increasingly concerned about the development costs of both the Block II and Block III tanks. The Block III alone was estimated to be about $1 billion.

To enhance command and control of maneuvering armored vehicles, the Army proposed an improved intertank communication system to replace the AN/VIC-1 system developed in the 1960s and used on older

The HFM Plan, if totally fulfilled, would field twenty-eight types of heavy vehicles and eventually replace thirty thousand armored vehicles in the FY 1989 force structure. Budget pressures compelled the Army to reduce its plans and concentrate on six major armored vehicles — the Abrams tank, an antitank vehicle, a future infantry fighting vehicle, the future armored resupply vehicle, an engineer vehicle akin to a battlefield backhoe, and a howitzer. HFM Plan cost estimates were $4.3 billion for a twenty-year period, and about one-third of it was devoted to the Abrams Block III tank. The second most likely armored vehicle to receive start-up funds was the Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) Vehicle. The LOSAT will utilize the same chassis as the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and replace the M981, a version of the M113 troop carrier equipped with a TOW missile, but will have a hypervelocity missile more powerful than the TOW.

FY 1989 was the tenth year of production and the third year for procuring the improved M2A2/M3A2 Bradley fighting vehicle system. By mid-fiscal year the Army's inventory of Bradleys was about 4,300, 48 percent of the total procurement objective of 8,811. The unit production cost for each vehicle in FY 1989 was $1.238 million.

Managed by the Army Tank and Automotive Command in Warren, Michigan, the heavy vehicle modernization program sought to develop a family of new heavy vehicles to support heavy mechanized forces developed by the HFM Plan. At the start of FY 1989 the vehicle that had the highest priority was a Heavy Equipment Transport, a tractor and trailer able to transport the Abrams tank. The Army sought separate bids on the heavy trailer and specified that it be compatible with the proposed tractor. In 1988 Congress had called for competitive tests for an armored recovery vehicle strong enough to retrieve a disabled seventy-ton Abrams M1A1 tank. Congress was also concerned that the M88, the existing armored recovery vehicle, relied on two recovery vehicles in tandem, front and rear, which presented a safety hazard to troops. In March 1989 the Army canceled work on an M88A1E1 model because of a shortage of funds. In a related development, the LAMP-H (lighter, amphibian, heavy lift), with 100 short tons capacity, the only amphibian vessel capable of delivering the Abrams tank from ship to shore, entered its full development phase in December 1989.

Production of the M2A2 Bradley began in May 1988 and continued throughout FY 1989. It featured an antispall liner, improved ammunition

In the meantime, the Army expected to retain the M113 armored personnel carrier until 2020-a life span of almost sixty years. The M113 family included about thirteen thousand troop carriers, as well as M113s configured as mortar carriers, ambulances, command posts, engineer vehicles, antitank vehicles, and smoke-generating vehicles. An improved version, the M113A3, upgraded with a new engine, transmission, suspension, and armor plating, was being fielded in FY 1989 to reserve component units and USAREUR. The Advanced Field Artillery System will also employ the HFM Plan's common heavy chassis for a 155-mm. self-propelled gun with a range of about thirty miles. This vehicle will replace the M109A3 self-propelled howitzer, repeatedly upgraded during past years with new fire control systems and survivability features.

In 1985 a Defense Science Board study group headed by retired General Donn A. Starry, former Army Armor Center commander, warned that the Soviet Union was fast outstripping the United States in the development of armored vehicles, protective armor, and antitank weapons. By FY 1989 the Soviet T-64B and T-80 tanks that faced NATO forces in Germany were refitted with appliques of reactive armor. This development questioned the efficacy of the Army's principal antitank weapons, the TOW missile and the M47 Dragon, a medium-range antiarmor missile introduced in 1973. The Russians also revamped their tanks with more powerful cannons capable of penetrating the protective armor of American tanks. The Army reacted by installing 120-mm. cannon on some earlier models of the M1 tank, by modifying the TOW missile with tandem-charged warheads that could penetrate reactive armor, and by refitting some forward-deployed tanks with modular protective armor.

Early in FY 1989 the Army decided to apply protective reactive armor to its older M60 tanks. Consisting of tile appliques that prevent a projectile's explosive charge from penetrating a tank's underlying armorplate, the reactive armor is placed around the tank's exterior. The appliques are in the shape of a square metal box, 12 by 12 by 2 inches, and contain reactive explosives and armor plates. About ninety-five tiles are applied to each tank, adding almost three thousand pounds to its

gross weight. Refitting the Army's fleet of 8,800 M60s was scheduled to begin in 1990. Researchers at the Army Materials Technology Laboratory in Watertown, Massachusetts, were experimenting with passive-composite armor applique that can shield armored vehicles from shaped-charged munitions and kinetic-energy rounds. This material weighs much less than the metal boxes used on the M60s and can also be used for overhead protection.

A new family of advanced antitank weapons systems (AAWS) had two major developmental programs in progress in FY 1989-the Advanced Antitank Weapons System-Medium (AAWS-M) and the Advanced Antitank Weapons System-Heavy (AAWS-H). The AAWS-M program sought to eventually replace the Dragon missile systems, while the AAWS-H program will replace the TOW antitank missile. A warhead development improvement to the laser-homing Hellfire continued in FY 1989. This program entailed modifying the Hellfire antitank missile mounted on the Apache attack helicopter. Equipped with two, or tandem, warheads, the modified Hellfire had an explosive charge in the first warhead that activated the reactive armor while a subsequent charge propelled the second warhead, which penetrated the armor plate. During FY 1989 the Army also experimented with using the M1 tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle to launch the Hellfire.

The Army Missile Command conducted various tests — portability, force-on-force, countermeasure, warhead, and battlefield tests under obscured or obstructed conditions — on three prototypes of an enhanced Hellfire missile. Until a new heavy antitank missile is developed, the Army planned to use the TOW 2B antitank weapon, more lethal than the basic TOW, as an interim Advanced Missile System-Heavy. The TOW 2B will replace the TOW 2A used on the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and the Cobra attack helicopter.

The Army was pursuing other initiatives as a replacement for the TOW. The most promising approach centered on the development of kinetic energy missiles (KEM), formerly known as hypervelocity missiles (HVM), as an Advanced Missile System-Heavy. Traveling at about five thousand feet per second, the KEM can propel a heavy metal rod through the most advanced protective armor. Together with the Air Force and the Marine Corps, the Army is engaged in predevelopment testing of ground-and air-launched versions of a KEM. During FY 1989 a rocket-powered KEM was tested by the Army Missile Command at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The Army also envisioned mounting the KEM on the medium-weight chassis of the LOSAT weapons system in the mid-1990s.

For several years the Army has sought to replace the M47 Dragon, a man-portable, medium-range antitank missile. Despite an improved

warhead and other changes, the Dragon remained awkward to use. Congress had insisted that the Army test two European weapons for a possible interim replacement — the Franco-German Euromissile Milan 2 and the Swedish Bofors RBS 56. In March 1989, after eight months of testing at Fort Benning, Georgia, by the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency, the Army rejected both European weapons and opted for a second-generation Dragon. Dragon II was as accurate, lighter, and less costly than the European rivals. Congress contended that the Army's tests were not convincing, and DOD's Office of Operational Test and E valuation believed the Swedish Bofors missile was the most effective of the three antitank missiles tested. The Army maintained that Dragon II was the best interim replacement.

The Army invited industry teams to compete for AAWS-M. The Army specified that a new medium antitank weapon had to be man-portable and lethal at a range of two kilometers against the most advanced Soviet tanks. After proof-of-principle demonstrations were concluded in late 1988, the Army, on 9 February 1989, selected a prototype that relied on infrared imaging sensors in the missile to home in on its target. Unlike the Dragon, which required the gunner to guide the missile to its target, the prototype's internal guidance sensors allowed the gunner to take shelter after launching the missile. In April 1989 the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council recommended full-scale development of the missile, and in June the DAB directed the Army to conduct early operational tests. Full production of the new medium antitank weapon, which the Marine Corps will also purchase, was not expected until 1992.

Action occurred on several other antiarmor weapons in FY 1989. The Wide Area Mine (WAM) served as an antitank and antivehicle weapon. Equipped with seismic, acoustic, and infrared sensors, WAM detected, tracked, and destroyed vehicles with its armed warhead. The mine can be emplaced by hand, helicopter, ground vehicle, or the multiple launch rocket system. The Army was also exploring the use of robotic vehicles armed with antitank devices. In the early stages of development, a small robotic vehicle called the Fire Ant can be maneuvered by remote control to destroy targets at a distance of 500 yards. In January 1989 the Army indicated it would end its purchase of the Swedish AT-4 lightweight antiarmor weapon, and it would no longer support research for its proposed replacement, the Multipurpose Individual Munitions (MPIM). Effective against light armored vehicles, personnel carriers, and fortifications, the portable, one-shot AT-4 was ineffective against most Soviet tanks. Reversing an earlier decision to cancel the M72E4 light antiarmor weapon, the Army resumed testing it at the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in September 1989 because of strong pressure from Congress.

Air Defense

Conceived in the mid-1980s, the Army's Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS) is expected to furnish a protective umbrella over combat forces in the forward battle area. Soviet military doctrine has newly emphasized the use of fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters in low-level, close air support roles in the forward battle area and to interdict rear echelon supporting forces. Soviet attack helicopters also pose an anti-armor threat at stand-off range. As a system of systems, FAADS will operate as part of a theater-wide air defense system under a concept that calls for a layered defense against high-, medium-, and low-level air threats. It addresses significant aspects of the AirLand battlefield, protecting forward combat forces from air attack and contributing to the close battle by enhancing the maneuverability of the force, and can be used to protect Army forces against air threats in non-European combat settings. FAADS consists of five complementary systems that are compatible with Air Force air defense assets that provide high- and medium-altitude defense. FAADS development is governed by the three-phased Air Defense Modernization Plan. In the first phase, division air defense units in FORSCOM, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, and the U.S. Army Western Command in the Pacific Theater are being reconfigured to conform to FAADS. The second phase will affect other FORSCOM units, USAREUR, and the National Guard. The third phase will entail the world-wide fielding of FAADS among the active component, all of the National Guard, and war reserve stocks. The estimated cost of the Air Defense Modernization Plan will be about $11 billion.

The Army's acquisition strategy for FAADS has sought to avoid the lengthy and costly research and development cycle for a completely new system by upgrading some existing air defense weapons and selecting commercially produced, nondevelopmental items. The likelihood of substantial reductions in conventional forces in the future, more austere military budgets, and a ceiling of $2.5 billion for FAADS research contributed to this approach. Existing systems that the Air Defense Modernization Plan will utilize are the Patriot, HAWK, Chaparral, and Stinger missiles and the Vulcan gun. The critical developmental effort has centered on the design of a command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) network to unite all elements of FAADS; work began on C³I in 1986, before the acquisition of any associated weapons systems.

FAADS will have five elements. The first is the Air Defense Anti-Tank System (ADATS), the line-of-sight-forward, heavy (LOS-F-H) component of FAADS that has missiles and a 25-mm. cannon mounted on an armored vehicle. It has been designed to protect armor and mechanized infantry forces against enemy aircraft. ADATS has replaced the Sergeant

The Avenger served as the FAADS line-of-sight-rear (LOS-R) weapon to protect the brigade and division rear and corps command post against hostile aircraft. It consisted of eight Stinger missiles, pedestal-mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), together with a .50-caliber machine gun and a fire control system. The Avenger was also slated to provide air defense for light infantry divisions. The system entered low-rate initial production in November 1988. One platoon was fielded in April 1989 for further testing and evaluation. Following the completion of initial tests and evaluation in the summer of 1989, the Army awaited a decision by the Defense Acquisition Board, expected in FY 1990, regarding full-scale procurement.

The Army was experimenting with a fiber-optic guided missile (FOG-M) as its non-line-of-sight (N-LOS) weapon for use by brigades against enemy aircraft and armor either masked by terrain or located at extended ranges. Equipped with a sensor linked by a self-dispensed thin fiber-optic cable to the gunner's station, the gunner can observe the battlefield on a monitor to select an air or ground target. The gunner can then guide the missile to its target or release it for automatic terminal homing. A multiple missile launcher may be mounted on either an MLRS vehicle or a light HMMWV. Designed and tested at the U.S. Army Missile Command's Research, Development, and Engineering Center at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, FOG-M was approved for full-scale development in August 1988. A cost-effectiveness review by DOD of the FOG-M missile caused minor delays in awarding of a full-scale development contract. Plans called for the development of two versions of the FOG-M-one that sought targets by televised images, and a second that used infrared imag-

The HAWK and Patriot missile systems were the Army's major N-LOS air defense weapons. Introduced in the Army in the 1960s, the HAWK system was in Phase III of the HAWK product improvement program in FY 1989. The improved HAWK was distributed to the 2d Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery, starting in January 1989 and was continuing at the end of the fiscal year. Using Automatic Data Link, the modified HAWK batteries enhanced their ability to share target information, thus reducing the time a battery needed to prepare for firing. Fielding of Patriot missile systems continued in FY 1989, with the 3d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery, receiving its authorized missiles.

The heart of FAADS is its automated digital command, control, communications, and intelligence network, which will interconnect all FA A D S elements and be compatible with Air Force air defense command and control systems. The network contains six major subsystems: the air-battle management operation center, the Army airspace command and control liaison officer subsystem, a sensor command and control subsystem, the battery command post subsystem, the platoon command post subsystem, and the fire-unit subsystem. FAADS will also field an array of ground and air sensors and radars to aid target acquisition and selection and for sophisticated dissemination of data. Initial test and evaluation of the hostile identification technology began in March 1989. To disseminate hostile target data, FAADS will use the enhanced position location reporting system network , which is compatible with similar Air Force reporting systems. When fully operational, FAADS can alert any fire unit within twelve seconds after a target is detected and send a fire mission order to appropriate fire units within sixty seconds of target identification. The FAADS C 3 I network will also connect with the Army's Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) and the Army Data Distribution System (ADDS) and thereby inform area commanders on Army air defense operations. Through the ATCCS maneuver control system (MCS), FAADS can disseminate warnings to infantry companies and armored maneuver forces. A prototype of the FAADS C 3 I system was integrated with other elements of FAADS in the spring of 1989, when the Army organized its first FAADS battery at Fort Bliss, Texas.

The Army is enhancing the fifth component of FAADS — its low-level air defense umbrella-through a variety of combined arms initiatives to improve self-protection air defense capabilities. The M242 Bushmaster 25-mm. cannon of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, for example, will be outfitted with an air defense sight. In addition, the AH-64 Apache and OH-58 Kiowa helicopters will be armed with the air-to-air Stinger missile for both air defense and antiarmor capabilities.

Because of the difficulties encountered with the Stinger RMP, the Army also considered developing a complementary laser-guided, surface-to-air missile with a range of six to eight kilometers that would be less susceptible to the infrared countermeasures that had plagued the advanced Stinger. T h e Army also wanted to test a new missile, the Starstreak, being developed by a British manufacturer as either a replacement or an adjunct to the Stinger.

Although each element of FAADS was being developed separately, program management for all five elements was exercised by the air defense program executive officer at the Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Development of the electronic and communication equipment essential to FAADS' command, control, and intelligence network was directly controlled by a PEO at the Army's Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, as part of ATCCS. To ensure that all components of FAADS are deployed on schedule in a synchronized manner, the Army Chief of Staff in November 1988 gave the FAADS PEO complete budgetary control over all elements of the system. While the ATCCS program officer will continue to develop hardware and software for FAADS C 3 I equipment, he will be guided by requirements established by the FAADS PEO.

Air defense program executives in June 1989 projected fielding three of FAADS' five components by 1996-ADATS, Avenger, and FOG-M- but budget constraints threatened to reduce and delay the fielding of FAADS. Congress restricted procurement until the Army obtained various

Army Aviation

Revised in 1988, the Army Aviation Modernization Plan (AAMP) was a thirty-year modernization blueprint for Army aviation. Its main goal was to give the Army a competitive battlefield advantage with fewer but more agile and lethal Army aircraft. During FY 1989 the Defense Resources Board (DRB) reduced funds for AAMP, causing the Army to modify its acquisition goals. For the complete life of the AAMP, the DRB had authorized the purchase of 807 AH-64 Apaches, 2,253 UH-60 Black Hawks, 207 OH-58D Kiowas, 472 CH-47 Chinooks, and 2,096 LHX helicopters. The AAMP provided for specially modified aircraft for special operations forces. It envisioned retiring approximately six thousand Vietnam-era helicopters during a twenty-year period and developing a new armed reconnaissance and attack helicopter, the Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX). Costs of the AAMP were estimated at $38 to $40 billion for the next decade, while funding for research and development and procurement to support the AAMP in FY 1989 amounted to about $3 billion. The estimated cost for each LHX in FY 1989 was $8.2 million, with a multi-year program goal of $7.5 million per aircraft.

The centerpiece of the AAMP is the LHX, slated to replace the older AH-1 Cobra and OH-58D Kiowa helicopters and to complement the AH-64 Apache. With its advanced avionics and weapons systems, the LHX would also be compatible with the Navy A-12 and the Air Force AT F for joint capability. Congress and DOD kept the LHX program under intense scrutiny in FY 1989 because of its cost and to evaluate its relationship to other Army aviation modernization programs. Early in FY 1989 the Secretary of Defense was predisposed to eliminate the LHX, but he relented after strong appeals by the Army leadership. In part, the LHX's rising costs reflected the Army's desire to optimize its capabilities. The Army planned to use the LHX for battlefield reconnaissance and as an attack helicopter against enemy tanks. It also could be used to strike artillery positions behind enemy lines or to engage hostile helicopters in air-to-air com-bat. DOD reduced the Army's request from 4,000 to 2,096 LHXes.

To stay within a preferred 7,500-pound empty weight limit, the Army considered eliminating selected features or including them on a limited number of aircraft. One feature was the Airborne Adverse Weather Weapons System (AAWWS), which had an advanced target acquisition

The AAMP provided for the purchase of helicopters in addition to the LHX and for the modification of certain models for special operations. The UH-60 Black Hawk was being modified to the MH-60K with improved capability in adverse weather and difficult terrain, altered for in-flight refueling, and equipped with infrared radar, a more powerful engine, and advanced communications. The Army planned to procure twenty-three modified MH-60Ks. The Army was also developing a new version of the medium-lift CH-47 Chinook, the MH-47E, for special operations. In FY 1989 the Army upgraded many of its older Chinooks. The CH-47D was receiving new fiberglass rotor blades and a stronger drive system. The Army planned to refurbish 144 Chinooks. The Special Operations Aviation Program called for modifying 17 MH-47Es, 23 MH-60Ks, and 2 Combat Mission Simulators in its first phase. Other modified Chinooks and Black Hawks would be acquired in Phase Two. The heart of special operations aircraft modernization was the Integrated Avionics Subsystem (IAS). It provided advanced navigation systems that allowed special operations helicopters to maneuver at night and under severe terrain and weather conditions. Tests of IAS hardware and software were completed in February 1989.

Two other Army helicopters, the AH-64 Apache and the OH-58 Kiowa , were also targeted for improvements. The Army planned to add two Stinger air-to-air missiles to the Apache, along with radiation-hardened electronics and improved vision and navigational devices. Tests of the Stinger in an air-to-air defense role were conducted in the spring of 1989 at the Yuma Proving G round, Arizona. Beginning in 1992 the Army intended to install a more sophisticated radar on the Apache to detect targets in poor weather and to guide its Hellfire missiles. The improvements for the latter version of the Apache, known as Longbow Apache, had not been fully approved at the end of FY 1989. They were funded for RDT&E, but not for procurement.

The AHIP called for upgrading the OH-58D Kiowa scout helicopter. In addition to replacing its main rotor and engine, the Army intended to install advanced avionics and to arm the OH-58D with Stinger missiles to provide air-to-air combat capability. The Secretary of the Army decided to

During FY 1989 the Army decided to replace the older T-63-A-700 engine used on the OH-58 with the more powerful T-63-A-720 engine. The older engine lacked sufficient horsepower for the OH-58 to perform its missions most effectively, and repair parts were difficult to obtain. In addition to increased power, the T-63-A-720 engine would standardize engines of the entire OH-58 fleet, improve readiness, and reduce support costs. In FY 1989 the Under Secretary of the Army approved sole-source procurement of 652 replacement engines, with delivery expected to begin in September 1989.

The modernization of the SOA during FY 1989 received special attention. The CINCSOC had identified insufficient SOF airlift to insert, resupply, and extract forces as one of the most critical deficiencies of U.S. SOF. Joint Army-Air Force Initiative 17, 22 May 1984, transferred responsibility for SOF rotary-wing airlift support from the Air Force to the Army. In FY 1986 Congress directed DOD to develop a plan to satisfy SOF rotary-wing airlift requirements by the end of FY 1991. The Defense Resources Board noted that funds were not available to meet Congress' deadline. The board proposed resorting to a mix of SO-modified aircraft and conventional military aircraft and a compromise to Initiative 17 that would continue to divide SOF rotary-wing support between the two services. Based on DOD guidance, the Army established program goals of 23 MH-60K and 51 MH-47E helicopters, modified versions of the standard Black Hawk and Chinook helicopters. During FY 1989 DOD released additional funds to double the Army's acquisition of modified Chinooks to thirty-four MH-47E helicopters. Funds allocated to the Army for SOA in FY 1989 included $96.8 million for RDT&E and $120.5 million for procurement, compared with $117.4 million for RDT&E and $63.6 for procurement in FY 1988. Believing that the SOF communications program was underfunded, Congress authorized additional procurement funds in FY 1989 for that program.

The Army also sought ways to reduce detection of its aircraft by enemy radars and sensors and to minimize catastrophic damage from enemy weapons with its Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) program. The

The Army was the leading service in a tri-service effort to develop advanced boresight equipment (ABE) for all DOD aviation weapons systems. A common ABE would not generate economies in the fielding of aviation weapons systems but would enhance close air support in a joint combat environment. Designed by the Army's Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, the ABE concept consisted of gyroscopically stabilized weapons systems and video and digital readout of the relationship between fixed reference lines and aircraft sighting stations, sensors, and weapons. During FY 1989 work on the ABE concept progressed to the advanced development phase, and a test of the ABE concept was conducted using an Army AH-1 helicopter in April 1989. The Army anticipated testing completion and a production decision by FY 1993.

First fielded in 1977, night-vision goggles for both air and ground operations emerged as aviation safety and modernization issues. By the end of FY 1989 the Army had procured 124,000 ground goggles and 6,500 ANVIS, which amounted to 40 percent of the Army's objective for ground goggles and 31 percent for ANVIS. Some contractors had difficulty meeting production schedules. Congress fully funded the procurement of goggles in FY 1989 at $138.1 million, but it insisted that the Secretary of the Army certify the contractor's ability to meet production goals. The Army met this requirement in May 1989.

Field Artillery and Missile Systems

In September 1988 Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono approved a master program for the modernization of Army artillery, the Fire

At a projected cost of $5.6 billion over five years, the Army's Fire Support Modernization Plan was a blueprint to carry out most of the DSB's proposals. The plan embraced near- and long-term modernization programs to upgrade all Army artillery. It would increase lethality and range, install more sophisticated computerized fire control and target acquisition systems, and enhance the Army's ability to conduct AirLand Battle by improving close-range, counterfire, and deep-attack capabilities. An additional goal was to reduce the man-to-weapon ratio. The Lance, for example, has a man-to-weapon ratio of 75 to 1, and an 8-inch howitzer battalion has a ratio of 28 to 1. In their place the Army preferred the MLRS because each launcher has a crew of three.

Modernization of artillery fire control was a key element to compensate for the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority over NATO in artillery pieces, estimated at 7 to 1. The U.S. Army's current artillery fire command and control systems, the Tactical Fire Direction System (TacFire) , employed outdated technology that restricted its use solely to field artillery, had limited mobility, and did not allow a rate of fire fast enough for effective counterfire. To replace TacFire and the Light Tactical Fire Direction System (LTACFIRE), used by the 9th Infantry Division, the Army was developing AFATDS. AFATDS' computerized processing capabilities would improve target selection, help direct the most appropriate

Hardware for AFATDS was being acquired commercially as part of the ATCCS Common Hardware/Software procurement initiative. An evaluation of the AFATDS concept was successfully completed in April 1989. In September 1989 the DAB recommended full-scale development of the AFATDS, and the Marine Corps decided to join the Army in developing the system. The Army expected to begin distributing AFATDS to its light divisions in FY 1992 and to the remainder of the force the next year. The Army hoped to acquire sixty-five complete systems by FY 1994. In the interim, the Army would continue to acquire LTACFIRE for its light infantry divisions.

The Army continued to field artillery fire support equipment in FY 1989. The Fire Support Team Vehicle and Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator were distributed to the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions, the 194th Armored Brigade, and the 197th Infantry Brigade. Fielding of the AN/TMQ-3 Meteorological Data System to the 24th Infantry Division was suspended in late FY 1989 because of a shortage of 5-ton trucks and 100-ampere kits.

During FY 1989 the Army was also upgrading artillery weapons as part of its Howitzer Improvement Program (HIP). HIP was the first modernization program to use the Army streamlined acquisition process that cuts the normal development time from seven or eight to four years. HIP is also a cooperative effort with the government of Israel. Israeli and U.S. howitzers were not identical but had many common design features. The main beneficiary of HIP is the M109A2/A3 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer, an improved version of the M109A1 155-mm. howitzer that was introduced in the 1960s, which was the standard fire support artillery weapon in armored and mechanized infantry units. Under HIP the Army was developing the M109A6, named the Paladin. The improved version featured an advanced automatic fire control system, an on-board computer, and the Modular Azimuth Positioning System that gave the howitzer the ability to "shoot and scoot," thus reducing its vulnerability to counter-fire. The automatic fire control system eliminated the need for surveyed artillery firing points, aiming circles, and landlines. It also improved command and control by allowing artillery commanders to delegate command functions to platoons or fire units. Other features included improved tar-

The Army was also upgrading the M102 105-mm. towed howitzer with a more powerful and durable howitzer. Now called the M119, it will provide light divisions with more effective direct f ire support. During FY 1989 the Army began replacing M101A1 and M102 howitzers with the M119, a lightweight 105-mm. towed howitzer. The M119, with its increased range and lethality, was suitable for direct support battalions of light infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions. It was also the first Army artillery weapon to be evaluated, tested, and type-classified under a concept of buying commercial off-the-shelf items. The first active component unit to receive the M119 was the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California.

Fielding of the M198 155-mm. towed howitzer continued in FY 1989 in accordance with the Army's earlier decision to standardize on the 155- mm. caliber in all field artillery units except the direct support battalions in the light divisions. When completely fielded, the M198 will be the standard weapon in the corps general support battalions. As active component units replaced the older M114A1 155-mm. towed howitzers with the M198, the former will be transferred to reserve component units. The Army also continued to improve the M110A2 self-propelled eight-inch howitzer in FY 1989. This full-tracked heavy artillery weapon was undergoing a product improvement program to strengthen its crew shelter and to provide better protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination; to enhance fire control; to install improved navigational and positioning instrumentation; and to eliminate all vulnerable infrared light emissions to enhance its survivability.

Related to, but independent of, the FSMP was replacement of the 4.2-inch mortar with a 120-mm. mortar in heavy divisions. Two variants of the new mortar were contemplated-towed and carrier-mounted. In 1989 Congress adopted Watervliet Arsenal's proposal to produce the 120-mm. mortar and limited offshore procurement to quantities required to outfit the 9th Infantry Division. The Army then terminated the 120-mm. mortar program in its amended FY 1989 budget request. After a review of a reduced cost structure and consultations with senior commanders, the Army restored a modified 120-mm. mortar program to its FY 1990 budget request. Designated a special interest program by Congress in FY 1989, a revised Mortar Master Plan would be submitted to the Secretary of the Army. The Army's plan called for procurement of 840 mortars to field forward-deployed forces in Europe and Korea and to the 9th Infantry Division .

AirLand Battle deep operations include maneuver actions, supporting fires, and deception directed against enemy forces not directly engaged in

For long- and mid-range artillery fire support, the Army relied primarily on the MLRS. The Terminally Guided Weapon System envisioned the use of a missile with a terminally guided warhead to enhance the lethality and range of the MLRS. To attack the enemy 's second echelon forces up to 100 kilometers behind the front line, the Army planned to expand its production of the Army Tactical Missile System. The ATACMS is a conventional semi-ballistic missile fired from the MLRS launcher (M270); each launcher can carry two ATACMS missiles. The ATACMS Block I carried approximately one thousand antipersonnel or antiequipment bomblets. ATACMS Block II was being designed to attack second echelon arm o r e d elements with antiarmor smart submunitions. Following earlier malfunctions, the ATACMS Block I completed a successful engineering design test flight at White Sands Missile Range in December 1988, and in February 1989 the Army System Acquisition Review Council awarded a low-rate initial production contract for sixty-six missiles. The first test flight for the development testing phase was conducted successfully in March 1989, with a decision on full-rate production expected in 1990. The Army planned to procure about twenty-eight hundred Block I ATACMS. In FY 1989 the ATACMS Block II program was in its proof-of-principle stage for evaluation of its infrared terminally guided submunition.

The Army also was modifying the MLRS to fire short-range, radar-guided, multiple warhead, terminal guidance warhead (TGW) missiles that have a fire-and-forget capability against moving or stationary targets. An MLRS/TGW system was being jointly developed by domestic and European contractors as part of an international antiarmor development program. Its key technological breakthrough was the perfection of a millimeter wave radar that discriminated between military targets and ground clutter. Each of the warhead's three submunitions was equipped with an extremely small antenna that enabled it to locate its target.

The modernization or replacement of the Army's Lance short-range tactical nuclear missiles in Europe had a high priority because of the removal of Pershing missiles from Europe and the limited shelf life of deployed Lance missiles. Army planners envisioned a new missile, the FOTL, with a range of 250 to 270 miles, considerably longer than the 70- mile range of the Lance missile, but within the limits for short-range missiles allowed under the INF Treaty. FOTL would fill the gap created by elimination of the ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles and the range of improved nuclear-capable 155-mm. artillery. NATO planners believed either an air- or ground-launched FOTL would help maintain NATO's nuclear and deterrent credibility and allow the alliance to continue a strategy of flexible response. The West Germans, however, had reservations about the deployment of nuclear missiles on their territory. Late in FY 1988 DOD approved a program acquisition strategy for FOTL. The Army also considered placing second-generation Lance missiles on MLRS launchers. By making the MLRS a conventional/nuclear system, it would be exempted from arms control deliberations and also enhance the survivability of the nuclear-capable Lance.

As the lead agency for modernization of binary chemical weapons, the Army was responsible for production of the 155-mm. GB-2 Binary Chemical Projectile and the Binary Chemical Warhead (BCW) for MLRS. DOD had also nominated the Army to produce a chemical bomb, BIG-EYE, for the Air Force and the Navy. Congress mandated that binary modernization be completed by 1997, but it reduced funds for the 155-mm. projectile and the BCW pilot facility. Production of the 155-mm. chemical binary projectile at the Pine Bluff Arsenal was delayed when the manufacturer of its M20 and M21 canisters fell behind. Development of the MLRS Binary Chemical Warhead was set back about two years when Congress failed to appropriate FY 1989 funds that it had authorized earlier. Delays encountered in binary chemical weapons production threatened to preclude the removal of unitary chemical munitions from West Germany by the end of 1992. It could lead to DOD reconsideration of its policy to retain only a residual 10 percent stock of unitary munitions beyond 1992 and contribute to the added expense of keeping unitary chemical munitions disposal plants open beyond 1992. In mid-FY 1989 the Army contended that its stockpile of unitary chemical weapons was inadequate because the proliferation of chemical munitions in the Third World required the maintenance of a credible chemical deterrent.

The Army also believed that the modernization of artillery-fired atomic projectiles (AFAPs) had fallen behind requirements. In 1985 Congress set a limit on the total number of W-79 8-inch and W-82 155- mm. AFAPs that could be modernized at 925 and also limited the Department of Energy's (DOE) funds for this purpose. Modernization

efforts to date have produced an imbalance of AFAPs. DOE completed production of the W-79, but moved more slowly with the W-82.

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C³I) Systems

Advances in computer technology have affected nearly every aspect of Army weapons and equipment modernization and constitute the foundation for the development of command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. Historically, commanders have sought all possible information about battlefields, and the evolving automation of many battlefield systems has contributed toward this elusive goal. Many of the earlier automated systems were not integrated with one another, and the Army has searched for one all-encompassing system. A major mission of the Computer Engineering Center of the U.S. Army Information System Engineering Command has been to coordinate the work of project managers, contractors, and vendors to standardize components of the Army Information Architecture (AIA).

Guided by the Army Command and Control Master Plan, the Army was developing the Army Tactical Command and Control System, formerly the Army Command and Control System. The goal of the ATCCS was to mesh five battlefield functional command and control (C²) systems for commanders from corps to battalion, and to improve interoperability among Army, joint, and allied C² systems. ATCCS was an integration of five Battlefield Functional Area (BFA) systems-the Maneuver Control System (MCS) for infantry and armored forces; the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control System (FAADC²) for air defense; the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System for fire support; the All Source Analysis System for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and electronic data; and the Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) to manage critical logistical functions. Management for the ATCCS was vested in a PEO at the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Funds for each of the five BFA program areas are controlled by individual program managers for each of the functional modernization programs. A separate program manager for common hardware and software also reported directly to the ATCCS PEO; this PM also coordinated modernization measures with the functional program managers.

ATCCS will also rely on three tactical communication systems: the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), and Army Data Distribution System (ADDS). ADDS was critical to the ATCCS, since it provided the communications path for battlefield command and control systems such

as AFATDS and FAADC². ADDS consisted of two subsystems, the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution system. The former is an Army system based on the joint Army/Marine Corps Position Location Reporting System. JTIDS applied primarily to air defense and provided secure, jam resistant, high volume communications for air defense command and control data. The two systems worked together to supply critical, instantaneous data communication and position, navigation, and identification reporting information to tactical commanders. In developing the ATCCS, the Army sought to reduce the proliferation of unique hardware and software and to procure commercially produced common hardware and software when possible. Hardware options were contemplated for units that ranged in size from hand-held ones to those suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles. A contract for common hardware/software was awarded in August 1988, and initial deliveries began early in FY 1989.

The Maneuver Control System would offer commanders of infantry, armor, and combined arms task forces a computerized tactical decision support system. At brigade, division, and corps, most MCS functions were to be handled by the AN/UYQ-30 tactical computer terminal and the AN/UYQ-43 (V) processor that interacted with other elements of the ATCCS and could extend to battalions. The addition of specialized sub-systems to the MCS, such as West Germany's Combat Vehicle Command and Control System, was expected to enhance the MCS. As a system of systems, the full potential of ATCCS cannot be realized until all other BFA systems are in place and interoperable.

Modernization of intelligence-electronic warfare systems is connected with the modernization of command, control, and communications systems. Several facets of the Army Command and Control Systems will enhance intelligence operations and also benefit from the development of more responsive intelligence systems. For example, a completely fielded ADDS will enable subscribers to locate precisely any unit equipped with an Enhanced Position Location Reporting System User Unit (EPUU) or an EPUU-equipped remote reporting station. With approximately six hundred EPUUs in a division, each EPUU can collect battlefield intelligence. Other modernization efforts will enhance operations by more sophisticated collection and target acquisition, more secure communication and antijamming devices, or other complementary capabilities. The catalysts for the modernization of IEW systems are changes in doctrine, threat, and technology. The most promising technologies are computerization, miniaturization, the processing of digital data, artificial intelligence, infrared and electrical optic techniques, robotics, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

The Army Intelligence Modernization Master Plan and the Theater Intelligence Architecture Plan address the Army's needs while also sup-

Throughout FY 1989 the Army continued to modernize all phases of tactical IEW operations, a responsibility vested in the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and guided by the Army IEW Modernization Plan. Two systems, the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) and the Imagery Processing and Dissemination System, will address two key requirements of the CINCs, intelligence fusion and the dissemination of national imagery. A  labor-intensive activity, intelligence processing is also amenable to quantitative and qualitative improvements provided by computers and appropriate data base software. Advances in collection techniques and communication systems have saturated the processing of intelligence. To develop a joint automated intelligence processing system, DOD established the Joint Tactical Fusion Program (JTFP) Management Office. The Army element of the JTFP was the ASAS, a powerful computer system that can correlate and construct reports from tactical and strategic intelligence. ASAS, a BFA system under ATCCS, is compatible with the Air Force element of the JTFP, the Enemy Situation and Correlation Element.

ASAS users will have ready access to high priority target information from sensors, radars, and other Army, sister service, and national intelligence assets. With this information ASAS will furnish tactical commanders with intelligence pertinent to their specific battlefield situation, the larger operation, and the deep battle. ASAS also helps commanders manage organic IEW assets and assists in providing operational security support. Its major hardware components were its portable work station, the primary user interface to the communications control set that receives and transmits information from multiple sensor systems, and the data processor set that processes intelligence data. To facilitate use of ASAS in the field, the Army was exploring the use of small, mobile, tactical vehicles similar to those tested for the Standard Integrated Command Post Systems in FY 1989. The development of ASAS' hardware has outpaced its software, the most complex software development program ever undertaken by the Army. In FY 1989 TRADOC sponsored an ASAS test in a limited capabilities configuration by the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion, 2d Armored Division, at Fort Hood, Texas, that would continue into FY 1990. It constituted the field portion of the force development and test and evaluation of ASAS' organizational and operational concepts and the adequacy of the emerging hardware and software.

Army doctrine requires that combat net radio systems, area common-user communications systems, and data distribution systems be integrated to provide reliable communication systems and to provide tactical commanders with the most current information. When fully fielded, SINC-GARS will be the Army's principal means of command and control at brigade and lower echelons and will replace the AN/VRC-12 series of radios. The Mobile Subscriber Equipment will provide area communications for divisions and corps. MSE will mesh with the Tri-Service Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) system that will serve EAC and major subordinate commands. TRI-TAC also provides the corps access to theater headquarters and access to systems operated by the Defense Communications System to lower echelon units in the theater. Instantaneous data distribution will be provided by a computer-based communications system, the Army Data Distribution System. The umbrella program for improved Army command, control, and communications at corps and above is the TRI-TAC Block III Communications Upgrade Program, the successor to the Joint Tactical Communications Program, in which a 25-year-old manual switching system will be replaced by MSE equipment between FY 1989 and FY 1994.

The introduction of the Mobile Subscriber Equipment began in FY 1989 and was expected to continue until 1993. Using mobile cellular-type telephones, MSE can transmit and receive voice, data, and facsimile communications throughout the battlefield. MSE consists largely of off-the-shelf equipment "ruggedized" for tactical use. The Army initially planned to acquire MSE equipment for the Total Army force of five corps and twenty-eight divisions, but budget cuts in FY 1989 reduced the plan to twenty-six divisions. As a corps area communication system, the MSE can cover approximately 23,000 square miles and link as many as five divisions with 1,900 mobile and 10,000 fixed terminals. The MSE was successfully tested by the 13th Signal Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas, between February and December 1988. Division commanders and staff found the MSE better for AirLand Battle doctrine than current systems. In December 1988 the Under Secretary of the Army approved production of the MSE with contracts expected to furnish MSE equipment to the III, V, and VII Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps by FY 1992. Fielding of the MSE will entail reorganization of division and corps Signal Corps battalions, retraining of 30,000 signalmen, and reclassification of numerous MOSes. Division signal battalions will be reduced from 625 spaces to less than 500, but the corps signal battalion will increase slightly. Approximately 5,000 communication specialists will be transferred to other functional areas. MSE training will be conducted by the prime contractor at the Signal Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia, and at the Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

At echelons below division, the Army is distributing the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), a family of new tactical radios. As a single-channel, jam resistant, VHF-FM radio system, SINCGARS will be the primary combat net radio. In 1987 SINC-GARS received limited distribution to U.S. Army units in South Korea and the communications training base, and a limited number was also fielded to Army units in Panama in FY 1989. On 5 January 1989, the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council approved acquisition of an additional 13,600 ground SINCGARS, and Congress also authorized 2,400 SINC-GARS for the Navy and Marine Corps. More than 9,000 of these 16,000 sets will have an internal communications security capability that reduces the weight of each set by seven pounds. Radios with this feature will be distributed to units in USAREUR. On 3 April the SINCGARS Program Office awarded a contract for 1,200 Airborne SINCGARS radios. The Army intended to acquire a total of 198,227 ground and 11,070 airborne SINCGARS. During FY 1989 the Army also developed a version of SINCGARS, the Integrated Communications Security/SINCGARS, that had improved communication security. The Army proposed that production start in FY 1991 before the completion of field testing, but DOD questioned this approach because of concern about quality control. Uncertainties also existed regarding what funding levels Congress would approve.

The Army continued to equip squads with the new lightweight radio, the AN/PRC-126, during FY 1989. This new radio was distributed initially to the 82d Airborne Division, the 1st Special Operations Command, infantry units in USAREUR, and USSOUTHCOM. Weighing about three pounds, the AN/PRC-126 can handle communication between small tactical units with a range from 500 meters to a mile and is compatible with SINCGARS. In March 1989 the Army began fielding the AN/PRC-126 radio to the 2d, 7th, and 25th Infantry Divisions. Army-wide fielding of the Lightweight Digital Facsimile A/N/UXC-7 was completed in early FY 1989, for a total of 2,040 machines. Early in 1989 the U.S. Army Signal Center analyzed the service's battlefield communications requirements for Congress. The center extolled the Army's current voice communication systems but reported that in the profuse electronic environment of the Army's Battlefield Automation Systems in the mid-1990s the MSE would need packet switching. In April 1989 an MSE packet switching contract option was signed, with fielding scheduled to start in January 1991.

Communications between allied forces in combined operations usually produce problems that relate to both different languages and incompatible communications systems. Operational coordination between American and West German armor units in NATO exercises, for example, had used radio communication between tanks that relied on commanders'

An important element of IEW modernization is the Combined Arms Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA) System designed to provide Army commanders with target data and intelligence. It consists of common multimission and mission-specific sensors, processors, and data links and communications. The RISTA System concept statement was developed during FY 1989 and presented to TRADOC for review in FY 1990.

One of the Army's goals is to perfect a generic intelligence correlation system that can process information and prepare combat information products derived from different sources-electronic (ELINT), signals, and imagery intelligence. For maneuver and combat aviation brigades and fire support and intelligence units, the Army is developing the common ground station (CGS), which will receive and process data from ground or airborne collection platforms including UAVs and other sources such as the commander's tactical terminal. Ground stations will also have enhanced ground collection capabilities that make each CGS a major IEW node. Vehicle-mounted modules linked to ground and air-based sensor systems will enhance the mobility of intelligence support. CGSs at division, corps, and E AC will link tactical air sensors with the ASAS. At corps and EAC, the CGS can receive data directly from national intelligence systems.

Characteristic of the trend toward use of multisource sensors was the development of MASINT (measurement and signature intelligence) sensors. MASINT sensors will detect potentially hostile emissions from acoustic, chemical, biological, nuclear, and directed energy sources. Like the new generation of communications intelligence (COMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensors, MASINT sensors will have plug-in/ plug-out capabilities. The adoption of common sensors and the CGS concept will reduce the number of intelligence personnel needed for specific collection systems.

During FY 1989 the Army examined several possible configurations for its ground-based common sensor (GBCS) and its airborne sensor systems. For the former the Army considered mounting sensors on the MLRS chassis and distributing eight GBCS systems to each heavy division. Containing both ELINT and COMINT sensors, the GBCS will supplant the AN/TSQ-114 TRAILBLAZER, the AN/MSQ-103A TEAMPACK, and the AN/TRQ-32(V) TEAMMATE systems. The Army, in FY 1989, also improved its ability to detect and collect electronic emissions. It was developing a lightweight man-portable radio direction finding system to replace the AN/PRD-11 RDF system and to outfit its light infantry divisions. For use at EAC, the Army was developing TRACKWOLF (AN/TSQ-152), an interim SIGINT collection system composed of a large, mobile console with high-frequency intercept and direction-finding capabilities.

The Army was also modernizing its aerial electronic collection surveillance and target acquisition capabilities under the program executive officer for IEW, assisted by the Army Aviation Systems Command's program manager for Special Electronic Mission Aircraft. Several fixed- and rotary- wing Army aircraft are specially equipped for surveillance and electronic collection-the RV-1D and OV-1D Mohawk, the RV-12D Guardrail V, and the EH-60, a specially configured Black Hawk helicopter. The OV-1D Mohawk, used in the Vietnam War, was being upgraded by replacing its AN/APS-94 side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) with a system that had higher imagery resolution and improved moving target indicators. Congressional concerns about cost resulted in an Army decision to modify about one-third of its ninety-eight OV-1Ds and to retire the others. The 1989 Intelligence Authorization Act prohibited procurement of more than three aircraft and sensors until the Army presented a plan that assessed the contribution of UAVs and other reconnaissance assets in support of its electronic collection requirements. The Army's newest SIGINT sensor system, the GUARDRAIL Common Sensor, was tested in the United States during FY 1989. Possessing both COMINT and ELINT capabilities, it will replace the AN/ALQ-133 QUICKLOOK II system carried by the RV-11 Mohawk and also will be carried on the RC-12H/K aircraft. The latter's remote relay system can relay SIGINT data collected by satellites to any processing station capable of receiving satellite transmissions. This capability will reduce by half the number of GUARDRAIL systems that would normally be deployed to an operational area.

The Army benefited in FY 1989 from an earlier SEMA effort. The GRISLEY HUNTER, equipped with a forward-looking infrared radar system, an infrared line scanner, and a low-light-level, high-resolution television camera supported the U.S. Southern Command's intelligence collection requirements in Central America during FY 1989.

J S TARS, an Army/Air Force project, will provide division and corps commanders with wide-area surveillance and moving target imagery that locates first and second echelon enemy forces. JSTA R S 's airborne radars, operated by the Air Force, can extend surveillance and target acquisition 100 kilometers beyond the forward edge of the battle area. This rapidly transmitted data will furnish targeting information for fire support systems. In December 1988 DOD approved the Army's part of JSTARS, its ground station module (GSM). Production of the first nine interim GSMs was under way, with fielding anticipated early in 1990. The interim GSMs would access and process imagery acquired by the OV-1D SLAR and JSTARS aircraft. An upgraded ground station, GSM Block 1, was also tested in FY 1989. Unmanned aerial vehicles constituted another airborne intelligence collection platform. The Army planned to evaluate two models: the UAV-Close (formerly UAV-Maneuver) and the UAV- Corps (or UAV-Deep). T h e UAV-Close had electro-optic and infrared sensors and all-weather capabilities and will be linked to a CGS. The UAV-Deep, with a range of 200 kilometers, can gather imagery intelligence for the corps and will be linked to a CGS either directly or by relay via an airborne relay station.

In FY 1989 the Army expressed an urgent operational requirement for a mobile nuclear, biological, chemical reconnaissance system (NBCRS), especially for USAREUR. Studies by the Army Chemical School concluded that a chemical platoon equipped with an NBCRS would have a markedly greater detection capability on a contaminated battlefield than current detection systems. In mid-FY 1988 the Army had decided to fulfill this requirement by adopting the German Superpanzer Fuchs (Fox) and to terminate its XM87 research and development program. Congress, in its FY 1989 Joint Authorization Conference Report, mandated that the Army conduct competitive trials of the German system with ones commercially produced in the United States because Congress believed the program was too large for sole procurement from the Germans. Congress, however, did not appropriate funds for the competitive tests, so the Army held its own NBCRS trials in FY 1989, with the results not expected until FY 1990.

To secure friendly communications and disrupt hostile ones, the Army was improving its electronic countermeasures. The expendable artillery-delivered jammer was in full-scale engineering development along with a hand-emplaced expendable jammer. Together with the current AN/MLQ-34 TAC JAM system, a ground-based electronic countermeasure set, these jammers offered the Army highly deployable tactical jamming capabilities. TAC JAM, already distributed to TRADOC, FORSCOM, and USAREUR, was fielded to forces in Korea during the year. An improved version of TAC JAM, TAC JAM-A, was entering engineering development, and UAV-mounted jammers were also being considered.

Using computers and digital data processing techniques, the Corps of Engineers topographic units have automated the terrain analysis process. The Combat Terrain Information System, with a digital topographic support system, enabled topographic units to analyze, prepare, print, and disseminate multicolor maps and graphics in the field. Using an array of simulators over a given geographical area, the Army's Engineer Topographic Laboratories and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency created a simulation network to prepare digital terrain databases.

Medical Support

The Army's recent need for a new family of field hospitals stemmed from serious deficiencies that were identified in mobilization exercises in the early 1980s. The Defense Resources Board directed the Army in 1984 to accelerate the procurement and fielding of a new generation of equipment to increase medical readiness and efficiency. The Army identified a need for 156 new hospital units, in addition to training-base requirements. To fulfill the mandate, the Army developed the Deployable Medical System (DEPMEDS) family of hospitals, a modular and highly mobile field hospital. DEPMEDS hospitals have seven configurations that range from forward-deployed mobile army surgical hospitals to general hospitals in the communications zone. Each has a different mix of standard modules, such as operating rooms, x-ray suites, and wards, and is equipped with the latest medical technology and climatic controls. Each DEPMEDS hospital has more than four hundred beds, three operating rooms, and a network of tents and collapsible buildings spread over a five-acre area. The hospitals can accommodate the most sophisticated and complex medical procedures in nearly every medical specialty and will handle even the most seriously wounded soldiers. Depending on the volume and nature of the casualties, modules that contain various specialties can be moved and reerected to adapt to rapidly changing battlefield situations.

Of the 156 DEPMEDS hospital sets the Army planned to procure, 16 sets were to be distributed to the active components and 94 to the Army Reserve. Remaining sets will be stored as primary mobilization equipment, designated as Pre-positioned material configured to unit sets (POMCUS) Uncovered Residual Equipment, or supplied to medical regional training sites. By the end of FY 1989 twenty-four sets had been fielded — four to CONUS active component hospitals and twenty to the Army Reserve. Active medical units will receive DEPMEDS sets either at their home stations or as part of POMCUS. Certain Army Reserve hospital units were scheduled to receive Minimum Essential Equipment for Training for DEPMEDS training at their home stations. Because of higher priority funding requirements in FY 1989, the Army recom-

mended deleting 41 of the 156 sets, but the DRB directed the Army to procure all 156 of them. The largest procurement program ever undertaken by the Army Medical Department, DEPMEDS' total cost will approximate $2 billion.

Starting in FY 1989, all Army squads, crews, teams, or elements of equivalent size will have a soldier designated and trained as the Combat Lifesaver. This individual will perform far-forward lifesaving care as a secondary mission when the battle ends. To assist the Combat Lifesaver in performing his mission, the Academy of Health Sciences, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, developed a Medical Equipment Set, Combat Lifesaver, that consists of seventeen first-aid items. Approximately 80,000 sets have been ordered, 38,657 for the active component and the remainder for the reserve components. Fielding began in the spring of 1989, and the bulk of it was expected to occur in FY 1990. The first units to receive the sets were the 6th and 10th Infantry Divisions.

Tactical and Nontactical Wheeled Vehicles

For several years the Army has experienced acute shortages of tactical and general purpose vehicles. The vehicle in shortest supply was the M939A2 Series five-ton truck. The FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act directed the Army to provide a Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization Plan (TWVMP) to Congress that addressed requirements through the late 1990s. Elements included the useful life of the existing fleet, details on proposed procurement and rebuilding efforts, the impact of current acquisition strategies on the domestic production base, and an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of using more than one production source. The Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Study of December 1988 concluded that the Army's truck fleet was outdated and its replacement would boost readiness and lower operation and maintenance costs. On 24 February 1989, the Chief of Staff approved the Army's TWVMP that was submitted to Congress in April. The TWVMP envisioned equipping the Army with a combination of newly designed vehicles and available resources distributed to units on the first-to-fight basis. The plan encompassed a Service Life Extension Program to begin in FY 1993 for 2 1/2-ton vehicles and a program to eliminate vehicles such as the heavy GOER and the 1 1/4-ton GAMA GOAT.

Under the TWVMP the Army will adopt a single vehicle for each of the light, medium, and heavy fleets. For the medium family of vehicles, the Army planned to develop new 2 1/2-ton and 5-ton trucks. Following consideration by the Defense Acquisition Board early in FY 1989, the Army awarded several contracts for competitive prototypes. Congress prohibited the testing of commercial medium tactical trucks, contending

that the commercial production base was inadequate. The Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) was conceived as a heavy  transporter for fuel, ammunition, and cargo. Through FY 1989 the Army expected to procure nearly 11,500 HEMTTs of a 13,139 programmed total. The Army tried to cancel the remaining HEMTTs because of budget constraints and higher priorities and requirements, but Congress denied the request. The Palletized Loading System would give the HEMTT a self-load/unload capability and the potential to decrease the number of vehicles and personnel needed for logistical tasks, to improve the ammunition supply distribution system, and to increase interoperability in NATO. In January 1989 the Army awarded contracts for PLS prototypes to three manufacturers. To avoid any appearance of Army bias in the final source selection, Congress delegated that authority to the Under Secretary of Navy for Acquisition. Prototype testing of the PLS was scheduled for FY 1990.

The Army's Nontactical Vehicle (NTV) Program has been perennially underfunded, and 35 percent of the existing fleet was eligible for retirement in FY 1989. The NTV fleet consisted of commercially designed vehicles that ranged from sedans to trailer trucks used for such missions as training, security, intelligence, criminal investigation, recruiting, medical, sanitation, facilities maintenance, and other missions. The Army's Intelligence Support Command, for example, depended totally on NTVs for OCONUS intelligence gathering missions and felt seriously restricted because of the shortage of funds for NTV replacement. In FY 1989 only $18 million was appropriated for NTV procurement, while there was a requirement for nearly $75 million, according to Army officials. These large budget short falls have caused the aging NTV fleet's operational and maintenance costs to increase, and the cost of leasing commercial vehicles has grown. Tactical vehicles were also being used to perform many administrative missions. In 1986 Congress required all federal agencies to pool vehicles within the General Services Administration's Interagency Fleet Management System for greater economy. To comply with the law, the Army in FY 1989 was transferring its stateside passenger and general purpose fleet and other special purpose vehicles-about 55,000 of them-to GSA.

Engineer Equipment

Two divergent force development trends in the 1980s were the introduction of heavier armored vehicles and the activation of light infantry divisions. The Army has been reexamining its equipment requirements to facilitate cross-country mobility, and transportable tactical bridging is one of them. The development of new bridges included the fabrication of

stronger, longer, and less cumbersome tactical bridges and the development of a light assault bridge for light divisions transportable in a C-130 Hercules. Existing tactical bridges had a capacity of sixty tons, a length of forty-five meters, and required seven trucks for transport and a crew of thirty-three to emplace them. The Army hoped to increase capacity and length to seventy tons and fifty-four meters and to reduce transport and crew to four trucks and eight soldiers. One approach was to replace metal bridges with ones made of lightweight and extremely strong composite materials. New tactical bridges were being designed to use the M1 tank chassis instead of the older M48 chassis.

During FY 1989 the T-9 Model D7-G Production Bulldozer was fielded throughout FORSCOM, but the M916 tractors and M870A1 trailers needed to transport the bulldozer were not available. Fielding of the M9 Armored Combat Earthmover was resumed in FY 1989 after Congress restored funds for its procurement. HQDA also decided to retain rock crusher and quarrying sections in eighteen engineer battalions and postponed the conversion of five combat engineer battalions to airborne status. The Army Troop Support Command continued to field new air-transportable well-drilling rigs to engineer detachments to standardize this item throughout the Army.

Electrical generators have been ubiquitous with Army units in the field, and many of them were commercial models. The Army was developing a new family of tactical generators and tested them at Fort Hood, Texas, during FY 1989. The new generators will be more mobile, reliable, easier to maintain, and quieter, thus obviating the need for noise suppression kits. During a ten-year period the Army expected to buy 86,000 new generators.

Individual Weapons

The Army's Advanced Combat Rifle Program, managed by the Close Combat Armaments Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, underscored the enduring importance of the rifle to close combat. In August 1989 the Army and the Air Force began testing the first of four prototypes of rifles to assess whether improvements in rifle design and technology warranted replacing the M16A2 rifle. The Army wanted a rifle that would significantly improve the average soldier's ability to hit the target under battlefield conditions, or at least to double the number of hits per trigger pull. With the M16A2 the probability of a battlefield hit is 20 percent at 100 meters, 10 percent at 300 meters, and 5 percent at 600 meters. Two American and two European manufacturers submitted prototypes that represented the latest in rifle design, technology, and ammunition. Three of the rifles used 5.56-mm. ammunition, the size currently used by the Army,

and the other used 4.92-mm. ammunition. In addition to conventional ammunition, most of the weapons could fire highly lethal ammunition that included rounds containing flechettes and double bullets. The tests, which were being held at Fort Benning, Georgia, were slated for completion in mid-FY 1990.

Conclusion

The Army's force modernization plans that had evolved, come to fruition, or were approved in FY 1989 served as a disciplined approach to modernizing weapons systems and equipment. Those plans off e r e d Congress and DOD a framework in which to assess Army materiel and budget requirements in major functional areas. The plans helped project costs into the out-years of the developmental process and aided the Army in obtaining level funding to protect major programs from the vagaries of the budget process and to sustain modernization. The adoption of overarching modernization plans also complemented reforms in the Army's acquisition process. Modernization efforts in progress or begun during FY 1989 reflected a decade of developmental initiatives. Their impetus was derived largely from an appreciation of the near and mid-term threat, technological innovation, and the effect of doctrine. A modernization strategy that emphasizes heavy forces reflected America's concern with the Warsaw Pact threat and the imperatives of AirLand Battle doctrine and combined arms operations. By the end of FY 1989 the Army had realized many of its modernization goals for heavy forces and deep combat capabilities with initial and improved versions of the Abrams tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, attack helicopters, and other weapons systems. Budgetary constraints and changing strategic conditions, however, reduced the Army's hopes for many longer-term developments and caused some reductions in near-term modernization programs.

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