Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1990-1991
Organization, Management, and Budget
The dramatic changes in world politics that followed the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union had a direct impact upon Army organization, management, and budget policies. As the United States reassessed its national military strategy, it was readily apparent that the Army's primary mission of defending Western Europe against potential aggression by the Soviet bloc had rapidly become unnecessary. Along with these geopolitical changes, domestic pressures impinged upon the Army's plans, as the weak American economy spurred calls for a peace dividend through drastic reductions in defense spending.
On 23 June 1991, General Gordon R. Sullivan became the thirty-third Chief of Staff of the Army and succeeded General Carl E. Vuono, who had served in the position since 1987. General Sullivan had previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and most recently as Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA). General Dennis J. Reimer succeeded General Sullivan as VCSA.
Few major organizational adjustments occurred within HQDA since implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Significant institutional changes were set in motion, however, in the Army's acquisition management structure during FY 90 and 91 as a consequence of the Defense Management Review. Discussed below are several noteworthy changes that did occur. Effective 1 December 1989, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) was established as a MACOM and as the Army component command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). With headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USASOC was formed from assets of the 1st Special Operations Command and FORSCOM. The new MACOM is responsible for active and reserve component special forces, rangers, Psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs units.
The U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) was established on 15 November 1990 as a field operating agency of the Army Staff with headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. Its mission is to conduct all Army user test and evaluation, except medical. The new command combines several previous organizations: the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) in Alexandria;TRADOC's Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) at Fort Hood, Texas; and the Acquisition and Development of Threat Simulators Activity (ADATS-A) at Fort Bliss, Texas. Consequently, four of TEXCOM's eight test boards were eliminated (Aviation at Fort Rucker, Alabama; Communications and Electronics at Fort Gordon, Georgia; Armor/Engineer at Fort Knox, Kentucky; and Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia), and their functions were transferred to test directorates at Fort Hood. Three other boards (Air Defense Artillery at Fort Bliss, Texas; Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and Intelligence and Security at Fort Huachuca, Arizona) were reduced to test directorates. Only the Airborne/Special Operations board at Fort Bragg remained relatively unaffected. OPTEC has about 2,000 personnel in thirteen locations and an annual budget of approximately $200 million.
On 1 October 1990, the Chief of Staff provisionally established the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) at Fort McPherson, Georgia, as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. The Chief, Army Reserve, became both its commander and the FORSCOM Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Affairs. The new organization gave the USARC command and control over all CONUS-based reserve units, except those that report to USASOC. The Reserve Command assumed control over Fourth Army units on 1 October 1991 (Fourth Army was inactivated on 30 September 1991), and was scheduled to become fully operational by October 1992. Based on the findings of an independent commission, USARC will either remain under FORSCOM or become a separate MACOM.
Given the pressures to reduce costs, the streamlining of the DOD management practices presented a major area of potential budget savings. To that end, the Army addressed the issues raised by the Defense Management Review, originally ordered by President George Bush in February 1989, to improve the defense procurement process and the management of the department. The objectives of that extensive internal evaluation were to implement fully the recommendations made by the Packard Commission in 1986, to improve the performance of defense acquisition systems, and to manage defense resources more effectively.
In July 1989 Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney responded to the executive mandate by submitting his Defense Management Report (DMR) to President Bush. It outlined specific measures that would save approximately $39 billion during the 1991-95 period. In general, Cheney's goals were to centralize policies, procedures, standards, and systems and to decentralize their execution. Ultimately, many functions would be carried out by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to eliminate duplication among the individual services. Since the Army had already begun implementing the recommendations of the Packard Commission, it found itself well-positioned to comply with the report's proposals. The Army established the Army Management Review Task Force to develop initiatives to achieve the recommendations of the DMR. The task force ex a mined numerous proposals, and in October 1989 the Army submitted its report (AMR I) to Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood, Jr. The Army's recommendations became part of the first round of DOD spending reductions, known as DMR I, which took effect during FY 91.
The Army Management Review became the Army's formal structure for implementing the directives of the DMR. To conduct this ongoing process, the Army Management Report Coordination Office succeeded the task force during the fall of 1989. Located within the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army, its purpose was to act as a clearinghouse for DMR information to HQDA staff and to agencies outside the Army. The coordination office would task new initiatives to the Army Staff, monitor and track the execution of initiatives, ensure that the Army leadership was informed of their implementation status, and maintain records of decisions and related implementation plans. In September 1990 the Army Management Report Coordination Office was placed under the operational control of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) was to provide necessary guidance and oversight to achieve the mission.
Before any implementation can begin, the Deputy Secretary of Defense must approve each initiative. Upon receiving his signature, an initiative becomes a DMR Decision, or DMRD, and is assigned a number in the 900 series. The Army Audit Agency reviews each DMRD to ensure that the savings baseline is accurate, the management plan is complete, and the savings goal is reasonable. The actual implementation is left to the affected agency. As a final check, the reported savings are also validated by the Army Audit Agency.
In accordance with DMR I, the Army will implement thirty-eight initiatives that focus on the restructuring of the AMC and improvements in the logistics system. These include streamlining the AMC and its headquarters by eliminating more than 5,200 jobs, cutting transportation costs, and reducing inventories of outmoded items. The Army also initiated savings in
the functional categories of administration; base operations and facility management; automated support and information systems; and finance, procurement, and contract management. Several initiatives relating to the consolidation of various functions-supply depots; financial operations; and research, development, test, and evaluation activities-were deferred for further analysis. The Army's execution of DMR reforms is a long term effort. Under DMR II the Army will implement forty-one initiatives that will cut across nearly all functional areas and MACOMs and will begin in FY 92. Together, the DMR I and DMR II initiatives were expected to save the Department of Defense more than $70 billion through FY 97. The Army estimated that it would save about $23 billion during this period, and would start with approximately $650 million in FY 91.
In addition to the actions taken in accordance with the DMR, the Army leadership endorsed the philosophy of Total Quality Management (TQM) as a strategy to increase quality, productivity, and efficiency throughout the Army. This program focused on total employee involvement in achieving a continuous process of improvement. The Office of the Under Secretary of the Army assumed responsibility for the implementation of TQM in 1990.
In 1986 the President's Packard Commission recommended major changes in national security planning, budgeting, organization, and defense acquisition procedures. In response to the Packard Commission Report and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, in 1987 the Army established a three-tier administrative structure that consisted of the Army acquisition executive, program executive officers, and project/product managers. More changes were needed, however, and further improvement became a principal objective of the Defense Management Review. Consequently, the Army initiated additional measures to streamline acquisition management and shorten the acquisition cycle. The AMC has been particularly affected by changes in the acquisition process. As a result of the DMR, program executive officers now receive funds directly from HQDA instead of AMC. AMC's role has shifted from total responsibility for all major systems to one of support. It continued, however, to be responsible for those programs not managed by program managers. By 1995 AMC will have lost approximately 4,800 personnel.
By implementing management reforms, the Department of Defense sought to improve its purchasing practices. Secretary Cheney aimed to cut bureaucratic red tape and eliminate the days of $600 toilet seats and $200 hammers. A committee of reviewers determined that the profusion of procurement regulations had contributed greatly to contractor delays and the cost of doing business with the government. Many of them, therefore,
were revised or rescinded, and the DOD asked Congress to reduce its reporting requirements.
The recruitment and retention of qualified personnel is essential to improving business-related management in the DOD. The DMR addressed this issue by directing the service secretaries to submit plans for the establishment of a corps of full-time, professional acquisition specialists in each service by 1 October 1989. The Army Acquisition Corps was established in January 1990, and on 1 March 1990 Brig. Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill became its first director. The position is dual, with the incumbent also serving as Assistant Deputy for Systems Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (OASA[RDA]).
Both military and civilian personnel are eligible for positions within the Army Acquisition Corps. When fully implemented, it will consist of approximately 3,000 officers and 1,300 civilians. Officers will gene rally enter at their eighth year of service and civilians at the GS/GM- 13 level from acquisition-related career fields. Under a centralized career management system, the members of the Corps will receive the necessary training and experience to become certified acquisition managers. Only Army Acquisition Corps members will be considered for critical positions with program executive offices, project and product management offices, headquarters staffs, and selected support commands. Military incumbents will have the potential to advance from company grade to flag rank, and a comparable promotion system will prevail for civilian members.
The Army's Strategic Logistics Program involves a comprehensive analysis of logistics requirements for the year 2000 and beyond. The Strategic Logistics Agency was created in July 1990 to manage this program. One of its major objectives is the integration of the Army's retail and wholesale logistics systems. As part of this process, the DMR mandated that depot-reparable items be converted to stock funding. Consequently, MACOMs will pay for new items out of their operating funds instead of receiving them at no cost. Thus, commands were encouraged to repair articles rather than replace them. This procedure is part of the Army's new "users pay for services" philosophy and was scheduled to become effective in January 1992. Ultimately, an objective supply system will use advanced automation to shorten order times and virtually eliminate paperwork.
By 30 June 1990, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force had transferred most of their contract administration services to the Defense Contract Management Command under the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This command worked with the approximately 30,000 contractors who supply the military services with more than 3 million different items.
Because of declining budgets, the Army's management of its manpower and materiel, with a goal of maintaining efficiency with fewer resources, assumed critical importance. The DMR complemented other cost-saving efforts undertaken by the Department of Defense and the Army. The initial BRAC Commission, which released its report in December 1988, and subsequent basing proposals, focused on streamlining the Army's installations to conform to changes in the force (see Chapter 8). Project QUICKSILVER, chartered by the Secretary of the Army in the fall of 1989, recommended reductions in the Army's table of organization and equipment (TOE) structure. An umbrella group of six officers from the Army Staff, known as the Army 2000 Integration/Analysis Team, monitored and coordinated the work of QUICKSILVER's various task forces. The Inspector General's Office also created a team to supervise the Army's reshaping efforts.
The VANGUARD study group, which convened in mid-May 1990, examined ways to trim the Army's table of distribution and allowances (T DA) organizations (HQDA, MACOMs, field operating agencies [FOAs], and installations) that will support the leaner Army of the 1990s. Headed by Maj. Gen. John R. Greenway, VANGUARD conducted the most comprehensive review of the Army's TDA structure since the STEADFAST study of the early 1970s. Composed of approximately 60 civilian and military members, it worked at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for seven months. VANGUARD's goal was to find ways to gain the optimal balance between improved effectiveness and lowest operating and sustainment cost. In the midst of Vanguard's work, however, the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf found the Army expanding once again.
With input from HQDA and the field, VANGUARD developed a vision for the Army of the future. Considerable effort was devoted to examining the MACOMs, with the purpose of both reducing their numbers and realigning their missions. The team's most controversial proposal was establishment of a Services Command with centralized control over all Army installations. Because of widespread MACOM opposition, General Greenway ultimately dropped this concept. VANGUARD concluded that HQDA should be reduced by 20 percent and that the number of field operating agencies should be significantly decreased. Its Zero Based Enlisted Study sought ways to remove soldiers from the TDA force. While all military slots could not be abolished or converted to civilian positions, VANGUARD identified approximately 9,000 slots for elimination. The task force's final report, published in December 1990, contained about 170 initiatives out of more than 500 that were considered. Twenty-one VANGUARD initiatives also became a part of the second round of the Army Management Review (AMR II).
Consequently, the DMR II management initiatives contained a number of recommendations developed by VANGUARD.
In July 1990 Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood approved consolidation of the finance and accounting organizations of the individual services and defense agencies into one office. Consequently, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service was established in November 1990 with its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. The new agency, under the authority of the DOD Comptroller, operated six major finance centers, including the Army Finance and Accounting Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service will eventually consolidate the 250 separate DOD accounting systems and was expected to save approximately $310 million through FY 95. Along with creation of a financial center, Atwood approved several other consolidation studies carried over from DMR I. They included the transfer of all supply depots to the DLA and began with those in the San Francisco Bay area. The DLA also received responsibility from the individual services for the management of more than one million consumable items. A Defense Depot Maintenance Council was also established to review management efficiencies in the maintenance depot system.
In concert with the DMR's emphasis on procurement, the Army, in November 1989, initiated LAB 21, a study that explored improved ways to manage Army laboratories to meet the research and development needs of the next century. In particular, the Army planned to create the Army Research Laboratory to conduct first-rate scientific research. By FY 97 the Army expected to consolidate or convert its forty-two laboratories into twenty-two restructured organizations.
Environmental quality represented an allied concern. The FY 91 Defense Appropriations Act established the Legacy Resource Management Program in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Environment). This program's purpose was to provide integrated stewardship of all DOD natural and cultural resources. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing) represented the Army on the Legacy Steering Committee, composed of members from each armed service. Through improvements in the Army Energy Program (see Chapter 10), the Army sought to better its total environmental conservation effort.
Management: Information Systems
Computers have provided Army managers with a plethora of new management tools. A significant challenge lay in achieving standardization and compatibility among the many hardware and software systems being used by the Army and throughout the Department of Defense. In
addition to the management initiatives discussed above, the DMR cited the streamlining of automation as another way to pare costs. To ensure standardization and quality from the DOD's multiple management information systems, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Corporate Information Management initiative in October 1989. One of the initiative's primary goals was creation of a single departmental automated information system in various business-related areas. A group of specialists from the DOD and private industry was created to propose an information management strategy. Responsibility for implementing the group's recommendations was assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. Corporate Information Management officials approved acquisition of both the Army's Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistic Support (CALS) program and a triservice program called the Joint Uniform Services Technical Information System (JUSTIS), the most advanced electronic publishing technology available.
With the proliferation of computers, the distinction between communications and automation has become increasingly blurred. Since 1984, the Signal Corps has been the Army's information systems manager, responsible for the five subdisciplines of the Information Mission Area: communications, automation, records management, visual information, and printing/publications. The U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, was the major command responsible for centrally managing these functions. The DMR recommended personnel cuts for the USAISC, and 265 civilian and 106 military positions were eliminated by October 1991.
To streamline its automatic data processing, the Army is replacing redundant systems with single ones in each major management functional area. The development, acquisition, and maintenance of these Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) is the responsibility of the program executive officer for STAMIS at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Installation support modules (ISM) is a software modernization program designed to enhance readiness and improve installation management throughout the Army. It will replace unique automated systems and time spent on administrative activities, such as in/out processing and clothing issue. ISM will allow installation commanders to manage daily operations more effectively and cheaply and will interface with other standard Army information systems, such as tactical and strategic ones. Fielding is scheduled to begin during FY 92. The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System-3 (SIDPERS-3) is projected to provide an integrated data base management system for all Army personnel activities. SIDPERS-3 uses the ADA programming language, the successor to COBOL, and will replace the Army's current automated systems-SIDPERS-2, 2.5, and 2.75.
Logistics automation in the Army progressed during FY 90 and 91. For example, the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) will automate the requisition process. The ULLS interfaces with the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) and the Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS). The latter two systems run on the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS). Two thousand of these microcomputers were sent to the Persian Gulf during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and they performed well. By the end of FY 91, approximately 10,000 TACCS units had been fielded to both the active and reserve components. Fielding to all Army divisions of the Logistics Applications of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS), which also runs on TACCS, had been completed by 1990. Fielding continued during 1991 to nondivisional units in both the active and reserve components. This barcode reading, storage, and printing system ties into the SARSS and the SAMS. Other logistics-related automation systems include the Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) and the Standard Property Book System (SPBS). Future improvements in logistics automation are under development as part of the Strategic Logistics Program.
Information processing for combat service support is being further improved through the acquisition of the Corps/Theater ADP Service Center-Phase II System (CTASC-II). Its air-transportable equipment allowed field commanders to make timely and accurate decisions during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The deployment to the Persian Gulf in August 1990 hastened development of the Prisoner of War Information System-2 (PWIS-2). It is part of the Military Police Management Information System (MPMIS), a group of four automation systems designed to improve the collection, storage, and retrieval of information relating to incident reporting, vehicle registration, military prisoners, and enemy prisoners of war.
The Army Standard Information Management System (ASIMS), formerly known as VIABLE, processes sustaining base information for installations throughout CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. Since 1982 the Electronic Data Systems Corporation had operated five regional data centers for the Army in Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas, and California. During 1991 the Army terminated this contract, and the work is now performed at four Army Information Processing Centers at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania; and St. Louis, Missouri. These centers are operated and maintained by the 7th Signal Command. The shift to government- owned and -operated centers is expected to save approximately $20 million annually.
Congress has shown considerable interest in the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) that uses state-of-the-art automation,
telecommunications, distributed data bases, and distributed processing capability to provide timely and accurate information for mobilization and administration purposes. The RCAS will link together 9,800 Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR) units at more than 4,700 locations. It will also be capable of exchanging data with related systems in both the active and reserve components. Fielding of critical elements was scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of FY 92.
FY 85 marked the peak of the Reagan-era increases in defense spending. Since then, defense appropriations have declined in real terms as Congress attempted to reduce the federal deficit. Throughout the years of the Reagan military buildup, however, the Army received a proportionally smaller share of funds than either the Navy or the Air Force. During the late 1980s the Army leadership responded to world events and to existing and projected budget constraints by developing plans to reshape the Army of the 1990s into a smaller and leaner force. The Chief of Staff envisioned that, by 1995, the Army would consist of four corps and twenty divisions twelve active and eight reserve component), the minimum force deemed capable of meeting the Army's share of the nation's global commitments. Careful management of this restructuring was essential to maintain the quality and readiness of the force and prevent a return to the "hollow Army" of the 1970s.
In January 1989 President Ronald Reagan presented the original FY 90 and 91 Department of Defense budget to Congress. His request for FY 90 totaled $305.6 billion and represented a 2 percent real growth increase from the previous year. Congress, faced with the spiraling federal deficit, opposed even this modest rise. In response to the need to hold the deficit below the $110 billion ceiling for FY 90 set by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act, newly inaugurated President George Bush in February 1989 proposed a 1-year freeze in the defense budget. Negotiations between the White House and Congress resulted in a compromise that established the FY 90 defense budget about $10 billion below the Reagan administration's request. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, then a new appointee, submitted a revised budget request in April 1989 that incorporated this reduction and lowered defense spending by 1.2 percent, in real terms, below FY 89. The Army's modified request of $79 billion placed its budget 2.6 percent below that for FY 89 in real terms.
Despite efforts at bipartisan negotiation and compromise, Congress did not reach a budget agreement before the new fiscal year began on 1 October 1989. Consequently, $16.1 billion in automatic across-the-board cuts (known as sequestration) mandated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
TABLE 9-ARMY BUDGET SUMMARY (In billions of dollars)
Operations and Maintenance
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Stock Fund/Industrial Fund
Act went into effect on 16 October. According to the law, half of the cuts must come from the defense budget and the other half from domestic programs. Through a series of continuing resolutions, Congress kept the government running until it finally passed a budget bill. The President signed the Defense Appropriations Act on 21 November and thereby lifted the sequester. For FY 90 Congress authorized $291.4 billion for defense spending. Adjusted to 1991 dollars, this amount equaled $302.9 billion. This total did not include approximately $10 billion allotted to the Energy Department for nuclear weapons and miscellaneous defense-related programs in other agencies. The Army received $77.7 billion, the fifth consecutive annual decline (Table 9).
The Army's smaller budget resulted in force structure reductions and cutbacks in such areas as facilities maintenance and repair. Procurement terminations included the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP) and the Apache attack helicopter after FY 91. The Army agreed to drop the AHIP in order to save the LHX light reconnaissance helicopter, the centerpiece of the aviation modernization program. The armored systems modernization program also escaped the budget axe. A modest amount of growth was preserved for research, development, testing, and evaluation in order to preserve the nation's technology base.
Saving money was not the only impetus behind budgetary decisions; the epochal events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union significantly influenced the budget process for FY 91. While the collapse of communism occurred too late to be reflected in the Pentagon's initial budgetmaking process for the fiscal year, the budget subsequently underwent substantial revision to reflect changing conditions. The Bush administration submitted its revised FY 91 defense budget to Congress on 29 January 1990, the first in fifteen years that proposed reducing defense spending in terms of real buying power. The $295.1 billion request, while
somewhat larger than the appropriation for FY 90, fell short of the amount needed to keep up with inflation. The Army's budget request had been trimmed by $6 billion, down to $76.1 billion.
While the administration had pruned its defense budget request, some lawmakers thought it should be reduced further because of the thawing of the Cold War. Moreover, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act hung over the yearly budget debate as it had done each year since 1985. The debt ceiling mandated for FY 91 totaled $64 billion. After months of discussion, the beginning of the new fiscal year loomed once again without Congress' having passed a budget bill. During a week-long summit in late September at Andrews Air Force Base, White House and congressional leaders reached a budget compromise, but the House of Representatives rejected it the following week. With negotiations at an impasse, time ran out, and the government shut down over the Columbus Day weekend. A subsequent series of stopgap spending measures kept the government afloat until Congress finally hammered out a settlement at the end of October. On 5 November President Bush signed both the Defense Authorization and the Defense Appropriations Acts, which set the Pentagon's budget at $268.2 billion. The figure rose to $288.3 billion, if all defense-related spending in the federal budget were considered.
The 1991 defense appropriation did not cover the cost of U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf war, then estimated at $15 billion for the fiscal year. Those expenses were considered to fall outside the savings targets. Congress provided money in supplemental legislation, but the brunt of the financial burden for the war was largely borne by the allied nations. In the short term at least, the Middle East crisis saved the Army and the rest of the Defense Department from deeper cuts. The FY 91 budget provided the Army with $73 billion, a reduction of roughly 7 percent from the previous year. Some of the shortfall would be met through savings that resulted from the Defense Management Review. In addition, the Army faced significant force reductions that included the inactivation of two active component divisions-the 2d Armored Division and the 9th Infantry Division. The procurement account declined sharply, as its share of the total budget continued to fall. FY 91 also marked the first time that funds for Special Operations Forces (SOF) were removed from the services' accounts and included with defense agencies' appropriations.
The peace dividend remained elusive during FY 90 and 91. Despite the Department of Defense's efforts to save money, such unanticipated events as the Persian Gulf war and the savings and loan bailout devoured the government's projected savings. With the successful conclusion of offensive operations in the Middle East on 28 February 1991, the Army returned to adjusting to the post-Cold War world. Although democracy seemed to be spreading and the threat of a major war abating, there were
many uncertainties associated with the new geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe. Old ethnic tensions resurfaced with the downfall of Communist regimes. Nevertheless, real declines in the Army's budget were expected to continue into the foreseeable future as military and civilian leaders wrestled with the persistently mounting federal deficit.
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Last updated 30 October 2003