Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1992


Force Development

Force development is the process of shaping the Army so that it can perform its assigned missions and meet its congressionally mandated responsibilities for mobilizing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining the land forces of the United States. The Army Vision, articulated by the Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, set as the objective for force development: "A Total Force Trained and Ready to Fight, Serving the Nation at Home and Abroad, A Strategic Force Capable of Decisive Victory." Using that vision and the tenets of the new edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, Army planners during FY 1992 worked to formulate the optimal mix of forces—heavy, light, and special operations—for projecting military power overseas, waging war, and conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Looming over their deliberations, however, was the prospect of further reductions of the Army's strength and budget.

Force Development Strategy

Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM)

As the Army prepared to shape itself for the new world order, it looked to the past for help. In 1941, the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, and his chief trainer, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, had instituted a series of General Headquarters—level maneuvers in Louisiana and the Carolinas that helped prepare the Army for World War II. Faced with the need to shape a smaller post—Cold War force, General Sullivan decided to institute a new Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) to revolutionize the way that the Army handled change and prepared for the future.

In essence, LAM is a process by which the Army leadership manages change. LAM evaluates how the Army trains, fights, and sustains its forces at all levels, providing the Army's senior leadership with a method for assessing policy, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and leader development. Involving all components of the Army, it employs simulations, scheduled maneuvers, and new exercises to test various doctrinal and operational concepts and force designs and to identify key subjects for further investigation across the full range of Army missions. Ideally, it will


enable the Army to assess its ability to execute its roles and missions under the National Military Strategy and help plot its course into the twenty-first century.

On 22 May 1992, the Chief of Staff officially chartered the Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, to organize and conduct LAM. General Sullivan served as the overall director of LAM, and the commanding general of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., became his deputy. The evaluation process called for the army in the field to submit issues of importance to a General Officer Working Group for review and prioritization. This group would present a refined list for the Chief of Staff and other senior leaders of the Army, meeting as the Army's corporate Board of Directors, for study and decision. The board would approve certain proposals for testing by their various proponents within the Army, provide additional funds where necessary, and identify issues needing further investigation within the LAM process. The results of these investigations under the LAM process would be presented to the senior leadership for further discussion and final decision. A unique benefit of LAM will be incorporation of the results and outcomes of these tests into lessons learned and recommended improvements to the Army's war-fighting capability.

The LAM process relies heavily on advanced technology. By harnessing the power of the microprocessor to simulate actions and operations, LAM seeks to overcome the high costs and constraints on land use that restrict the Army's use of field maneuvers. It will use computer simulations to replicate roles and missions, such as a sophisticated counterdrug campaign, a small-scale strike operation, special operations, a full-scale theater operation, or mobilization and deployment. Modern computing and communications technologies will enable the Army to conduct operations in widely separated locations and to capture critical exercise data.

The newly organized TRADOC Battle Laboratories (Battle Labs) will play a critical complementary role in LAM at lower levels, helping to define capabilities, identify requirements, and determine priorities for the force projection Army of the future. Six Battle Labs—Early Entry, Mounted Battlespace, Dismounted Battlespace, Command and Control, Depth and Simultaneous Attack, and Combat Service Support—operate in the same network. As with LAM, the Battle Labs use distributed interactive, live, and virtual simulations as tools to ensure that the Army will employ its resources in ways that provide the greatest payoff on the battlefield.

AirLand Battle

The United States Army grounds itself on doctrine. Doctrine has a critical impact on how the Army organizes, equips, and trains its forces. It also provides a framework for thinking about the future, inspiring new


ideas, technologies, and designs for organization. In General Sullivan's phrase, "Doctrine is the engine of change."

During FY 1992 TRADOC worked on the fourth revision of FM 100-5, Operations, since 1976. As the Army's capstone manual, FM 100-5 lays out the blueprint for the service's conduct of military operations. The latest version will refine the sections on the interaction of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and also the concept of simultaneous, continuous, joint, and combined land combat operations across the depth of the battlefield in all types of weather. The revision will be compatible with Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and will incorporate lessons learned in JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and other recent operations.

The new FM 100-5 follows the broader principles of its earlier editions. The U.S. armed forces, in cooperation with allied forces, will overwhelm the enemy through total control of the air and ground through the synchronized, decisive application of their combat capabilities across the battlefield under all conditions. They would thereby achieve the maximum degree of destructiveness with minimal risk to the lives of friendly troops. As in the past, the revised doctrine bases its approach on the battlefield concepts of early entry, battle command, battle space, depth and simultaneous attack, and combat service support. It seeks to deny the enemy, physically and psychologically, the ability to operate coherently, thereby attaining complete ascendancy on the battlefield. To the Army, this approach represented a new age in warfare.

The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 will make some significant modifications. The new edition will cover more comprehensively mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization. With regard to land combat, it will emphasize greater operational flexibility, enhanced force projection, and incorporation of technological advances. It also will address the full range of military operations from war to operations other than war, as well as the Army's role in multiservice and coalition operations worldwide. The coverage of low intensity conflict doctrine will be expanded to include unconventional operations that employ special operations forces. In short, the new manual will seek to teach Army leaders to apply the principles of decisive victory to operations other than war, as military forces are increasingly committed to diplomatic and humanitarian missions. The Army leadership received briefings on the preliminary draft on 1 September 1992, and at the end of the fiscal year the Army was selecting personnel to prepare the final version.

Force Development

Creation of the Base Force Concept

Changes in the world order, as well as adjustments in the National


Security and National Military Strategies and the decline in resources available for defense, inspired the Base Force. Based in the continental United States, this force could either reinforce forward-deployed units or respond to contingencies in other parts of the world. This new force structure relied heavily on power projection to meet the Army's responsibilities. The Cold War Army had designed its force structure around European-based combat forces that it would reinforce to deter or counter Soviet aggression. The new Army, based in the continental United States, would use tailored force packages to respond to regional and ethnic conflicts around the globe. Designed in 1990, the Base Force was not intended to be a smaller Cold War Army, but a force that could achieve a quick, decisive victory on battlefields anywhere in the world and under virtually any conditions.

To handle the Base Force concept's shift from a focus on Europe to a more global orientation emphasizing multiple and varied regional crises, the Army had a balanced array of forces. It could turn to light infantry for immediate deployment by airlift; airborne, air assault, and special operations forces (SOF)/Ranger units for immediate forced entry; and armored and mechanized units for contingencies demanding heavier units. In addition, Army logistical elements could sustain a fully deployed joint force. The Army's reserve components provided the ability to supplement or to replace active forces, whether to sustain or to prosecute a major war.

Keeping in mind the Army's requirement to complement the forces of the other U.S. Armed services, planners thus designed their power projection force as a mixture of armored, light, and SOF units that could be tailored into efficient force packages to meet various challenges. The Army believed that the minimum force necessary to reinforce forward-deployed forces was five fully structured active Army divisions. According to Army plans, the reinforcing lead brigade must reach the operational area by C+4 (four days after the date deployment begins), the lead division by C+12, two heavy divisions from the continental United States by C+30, and the full five-division corps and associated echelons above corps by C+75. Nine more divisions—three active and six reserve component—would be necessary to reinforce the initial power projection force or respond to a second contingency. To expand beyond these fully structured divisions in a major war, the Army planned to form two partially manned and equipped reserve component cadre divisions.

The new National Military Strategy still demanded the forward presence of Army units in certain parts of the world. Despite the end of the Cold War, planners continued to believe that the security of the United States was linked to European security. Also, as the senior partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States had to maintain a credible military presence in Europe. Under the new concept,


the Army would maintain in Europe an armored corps of two divisions to hold together NATO's multinational formations. These two divisions would provide the base for reinforcing Europe with other American units and also provide the ability to respond to contingencies in or close to Europe. The Army also concluded that it needed a two-division force in Korea to deter North Korea and to demonstrate American commitment to its vital interests in the Pacific region.

Under the Base Force concept, the Army inactivated four divisions and one corps, reducing its strength to pre-Korean War levels. During fiscal years 1990 and 1991 the Army had inactivated the 9th Motorized Division and the 2d Armored Division. After its return from Southwest Asia in 1991, the VII Corps was officially inactivated on 15 April 1992. The 8th Infantry Division had already disappeared from the rolls on 17 January 1992, and the 3d Armored Division followed on 15 August 1992. During FY 1992, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), also lost the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, which the Army planned to reorganize as a light armored cavalry regiment. During the fourteen months prior to May 1992, the V Corps, USAREUR's major combat corps, lost fifty-six battalions and thirty-seven company-size units. The Army thus reduced its end strength in Europe by 72,500 men, close to 200 soldiers per day, during FY 1992.

Among the few units that the Army actually added to the force structure during FY 1992 were special operations forces. The Army activated the 2d Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), on 16 October 1991 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In addition, the Army formed four special operations coordination elements from May through July 1992 to serve as permanent functional staff cells within the corps' G-3 offices.

Strategic Mobility

As the Army transformed itself into a smaller force based in the continental United States, its ability to project power increasingly depended on its ability to deploy quickly by air and sea an appropriate force that was versatile, lethal, and sustainable. Once those forces were overseas, pre-positioned supplies would have to sustain them until the services had established secure air and sea lines of communication. These functions demanded funding, and the Army also had to allocate funds to ensure the rapid movement of Army forces to ports for deployment overseas.

The congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) laid the foundation for strategic mobility requirements and procurement plans for fiscal years 1992-99. Conducted by the Joint Staff, the MRS focused on mobility requirements—airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning—through FY 1999, using a variety of contingency scenarios. Volume I on intertheater mobility was completed by the Joint Staff in January 1992.


Volumes II and III—one for supporting documentation and one for intratheater mobility—were scheduled for publication in FY 1993.

The MRS made a number of proposals to enhance the services' capability for rapid deployment. First, it validated the Department of Defense's (DOD) objective for obtaining 120 C-17 aircraft. Second, it confirmed DOD requirements for the increased readiness and capability of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), which the Maritime Administration of the Department of Transportation maintained for DOD. The planned force would increase from 96 to 142 vessels and include the addition of 18 Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ships. The total of thirty-five RRF RO/ROs would be available for loading on four days' notice. Third, the MRS recommended construction or conversion to military specifications of eleven Large, Medium Speed RO/RO (LMSR) ships to enhance the surge sealift of Military Sealift Command, U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) Navy command. These eleven vessels and the eight Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) already available for sealift would provide a total capacity of 3 million square feet, enough in theory to deploy two heavy divisions from the continental United States in thirty days. They could sail from the U.S. East Coast to Southwest Asia in fifteen days. Fourth, the MRS recommended that the Army expand its floating pre-positioned force from four Army Pre-positioned Materiel (APM) ships to 15 vessels by adding 9 LMSRs and at least 2 container ships. The 9 LMSRs, 2 container ships, and 4 APMs would have a capacity of 2 million square feet, enough to store equipment for a heavy combat brigade, a theater support package, and sustainment for early projection into a theater. The MRS estimated the total cost of this sealift enhancement at $7 billion.

Available funds permitted fulfillment of almost all of the MRS proposals. Between 1990 and 1992, Congress appropriated $2.5 billion for the National Defense Sealift Fund to build or convert ships in U.S. shipyards. These funds would supply about eight LMSRs. The Maritime Administration requested additional funding to purchase the entire recommended RO/RO capability for the Ready Reserve Fleet expansion in 1992. At the end of the fiscal year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was reviewing this proposal.

With the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) serving as its proponent agency, the Army worked to carry out its portion of the MRS. The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP), complementing the MRS, laid out the Army's requirement to project a contingency corps of up to five divisions with accompanying combat and combat service support to any location in the world within seventy-five days. The 1992 ASMP also called for the Army to employ a floating reserve of fifteen ships carrying critical items of equipment. Carrying equipment for an armor heavy brigade and support elements, this reserve would take a strategic position


from which it could support multiple theater commanders.

The Army took a number of steps to implement this program. The ODCSLOG reorganized the Strategic Mobility Division and appointed an Army-wide Council of Colonels to resolve issues and monitor the progress of the ASMP By the end of the fiscal year, the Army was working with USTRANSCOM and its Army component command, Military Traffic Management Command, to define the requirements for four additional ships. Military Sealift Command had contracted for three Lighter Aboard Ships (LASH) and a heavy-lift pre-positioned ship (HLPS). During the fiscal year, the Army loaded the first two LASH ships with munitions, subsistence, chemical clothing, medical items, and water support equipment and anchored them in the port of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. It issued contracts for two other pre-positioned ships. Logisticians planned to purchase and load four more ships during FY 1993.

The Army also devoted considerable attention to the problem of shipping troops to U.S. ports. It allocated funds for rail line upgrades, railcar purchases, port construction, and other improvements in infrastructure within the continental United States to ensure the timely movement of units to ports for strategic sealift. The Department of the Army Program and Review Board approved the Army Strategic Mobility Plan Fiscal Years 94-95 Military Construction, Army (MCA), projects and submitted them to OSD for approval. Some ASMP infrastructure projects were under consideration for potential NATO infrastructure funding, and U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) worked closely on this matter with members of the European Community.

The Army relied heavily on Pre-positioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) to support the timely deployment of its U.S.-based heavy forces to Europe's central region. During the Cold War, the United States had planned to have a total of ten divisions in Europe, including forward-deployed divisions plus those with equipment sets in POMCUS, within ten days of the outbreak of hostilities. With the end of the Cold War, the "ten divisions in ten days" requirement became invalid, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff halted the construction of additional controlled-humidity warehouses until NATO determined the new reinforcement requirements. By the end of the fiscal year, NATO had not done so. Therefore, POMCUS activities included only the return of equipment drawn to support Operation DESERT STORM, the filling of previous shortfalls as units in Europe were inactivated, and the repositioning of materiel to other theaters.

As the Army decreased in size, it enhanced its force projection capability by continuing to transfer pre-positioned materiel from the central region in Europe to southern Italy, Southwest Asia, Korea, and Diego


Garcia. The Army was creating a global system of pre-positioned unit equipment sets for theater commanders to use in crisis response operations. Theater reserve stocks became Army reserve stocks in order to support the Army component commanders of the unified commands.

Airlift was also crucial to the Army's strategic mobility, but the existing fleet of air transports under the Air Force's Military Airlift Command and its successor, Air Mobility Command, could not meet the Army's strategic requirements. The Air Force's development and acquisition of the C-17, which made significant progress during the fiscal year, was expected to provide the Army with the capability to project a light division around the world. Following the delivery of the first test aircraft in FY 1991, the contractor, Boeing, delivered three more in FY 1992. These aircraft flew more than 200 test missions for a total of 600 hours. The Army actively participated in developmental and operational testing for air drop and transport missions. The program was expected to produce 120 aircraft by fiscal year 2001.

Several other programs supported strategic mobility. An interim progress report by the Joint Containerization Working Group on the Army Containerization Master Plan concluded that the Army needed to align its containerization plan with the ASMP and the Total Distribution System. The Army was already revising its container policy in light of lessons learned from DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and logisticians also developed requirements for containers for the Equipment Deployment Storage System and unit deployments. The establishment of "on call" brigades within the heavy divisions sought to ensure the availability of units poised for deployment. In all, the Army committed nearly $2 billion for strategic mobility to project decisive force into any theater.

The Fiscal Year 94-99 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the Army's key planning document for those years, recognized the critical role strategic mobility played in reshaping the Army. It funded the ASMP at $1.887 billion, including such items as railcar procurement, deployment training, containers, outload infrastructure, movement control, and watercraft enhancements. The Army also sent OSD a requirement, which it did not fund, of $1.062 billion for expansion of the afloat pre-positioning program and creation of a West Coast ammunition port.

Force Mix Analysis

During FY 1992, Congress asked DOD for a report on the options for the structure and mix of active and reserve forces in the mid to late 1990s. The RAND Corporation won the contract and was required to submit its report to the Department of Defense by 1 December 1992. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were expected to provide Congress with the results of their review of the report no later than


15 February 1993. At the end of the fiscal year, RAND was examining seven force mixes varying in size from 575,000 active and 466,000 reserve troops to 465,000 active and 635,000 reserve.

Total Army Analysis

The Army based its POM for fiscal years 1994-99 on an active force of 520,000, a reserve force of 567,000, and a civilian workforce of 285,000. POM manpower planning adhered to the four Army resources priorities: maintain a trained and ready Army, keep up the quality of the Total Force, maintain the quality of life, and ensure that the resulting force is sustainable. The 1994-99 POM would follow the systematic overall plan to downsize the Total Army through FY 1996. After that, the Army would emphasize sustainment of personnel levels through continuing to recruit and retain the best soldiers.

In even-numbered years, the Army conducts a Total Army Analysis (TAA), a four-phase process to determine force structure for the POM. During the first phase—force guidance—the Army Staff and the Major Army Commands (MACOM) conduct a detailed review of allocation rules, consumption factors, and support from host nations. This initial phase uses the objective provided by the Army's Force Generation Model and the most recent planning scenarios. The second or quantitative phase identifies the required support forces for specific scenarios. During this phase, the Concepts Analysis Agency conducts a series of logistical, deployment, and combat computer simulations. The final product of this phase is the "design force," the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) force necessary to execute the Defense Department's Defense Planning Guidance. Qualitative analysis, the third phase, consists of a series of panel reviews of issues raised in the first two phases. It examines these issues for both active and reserve components, including Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units. The TAA Force evolves from these discussions. Leadership review comprises the final phase. The Force Program Review, chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff, validates the TAA Force, resolves remaining issues, and submits the TAA to the Chief of Staff for final approval. Upon his approval, the TAA becomes the blueprint for developing the POM.

The current TAA Force analysis was well under way by the end of FY 1992. The Army completed Phase I of the analysis in early September 1992. At the end of the fiscal year, the Concept Analysis Agency's computer modeling was under way with a projected completion date of 30 October 1992. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) directed that the TAA resourcing phases included in the POM contain the following guidance: pay the bills first, take both the TDA


Army and TOE force into account in the competition for resources, and protect the Base Force.

Light Cavalry Regiment

In response to the lessons of DESERT STORM, the Department of the Army in September 1991 directed TRADOC to design a light cavalry regiment. The Chief of Staff had approved the concept and the reorganization of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) using the assets of the 199th Separate Infantry Brigade (Motorized). The 2d would serve as the light cavalry regiment for the XVIII Airborne Corps and also as the Joint Readiness Training Center's operational force. In April 1992, TRADOC prepared two designs for a light cavalry regiment. An interim design envisioned 4,354 troopers in three ground squadrons, one equipped with M1 tanks, one with M113A3 armored personnel carriers, and one with M113 armored personnel carriers with Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire command link-guided (TOW) antitank missile systems. It also called for a regimental aviation squadron containing forty-eight multiple-purpose light helicopters (MPLH).

The Army Staff and FORSCOM expressed concern about the interim design. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), told TRADOC to reduce the light cavalry regiment to less than 4,100 officers and men, to drop the number of helicopters from forty-eight to thirty-six, and to include only one type of gun in the organization for field artillery. The regiment would use High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) with TOW until the Army fielded the armored gun system. The revised design contained 3,922 spaces in two ground squadrons, a reconnaissance squadron, and a regimental aviation squadron.

During the summer the design underwent further alterations. On 7 August 1992, the Chief of Staff approved a transitional design of 4,017 spaces in three ground squadrons with HMMWV TOW and a regimental aviation squadron with thirty-three MPLHs and ten UH-60 helicopters. He also accepted the FY 1995 conversion.


Mobilization Planning Review Update

During FY 1992, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) completed the Integrated Army Mobilization Study (IAMS). IAMS was an extensive effort to identify obstacles to mobilization throughout the Army, to draw up a plan to overcome them, and to develop requirements for the POM for fiscal years 1994-99. The process, which began in February 1991, examined major issues raised by different sections of the Army Staff. These sections drew on lessons from


Operation DESERT STORM and three simulations—Contingency Response, Major Regional Response, and Reconstitution—conducted by the Concepts Analysis Agency. IAMS provided input to both the Army Mobilization Action Plan (AMAP) and the ASMP. TRADOC began the development of Field Manual 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, and Demobilization, the first published document to guide commanders at all levels through the mobilization process. It incorporated many lessons from the Gulf War and from the Army's support for recent contingency operations.

The new Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES), which ODCSOPS developed and fielded in FY 1992, also incorporated many lessons from Operation DESERT STORM and contingency operations. This document, which replaced a mobilization system in use since 1981, provided a single source of information on policies, procedures, guidance, and planning assumptions at all levels of mobilization. It also provided guidance for redeployment, demobilization, recovery, and reconstitution. AMOPES assigned supporting responsibilities to Army commands, agencies, and activities. Functional annexes and appendices applicable to each level of mobilization—Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, partial mobilization, full mobilization, total mobilization, and demobilization—provided additional guidance. For example, a separate legal annex to AMOPES, based on input from the Judge Advocate General and FORSCOM, supplied information on the provision of legal services and advice to forces mobilized or deployed to a theater of operations. The Army published AMOPES in August 1992, and Army planners expected to review and republish it biennially.

Augmentation and Preassignment Programs for Active Medical Personnel

As the executive agent for DOD, the Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, coordinated with other federal agencies the management of the Selective Service System's Health Care Personnel Delivery System, which mobilizes health care personnel in time of war. Army Regulation (AR) 601-142, The Army Medical Department Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS), established criteria for assigning Army Medical Department officers during mobilization. It also delineated organizational and individual responsibilities for equipping and training the PROFIS fillers. During FY 1992, the Office of the Surgeon General completed the PROFIS Functional Description for Health Services Command activities and specifications for the PROFIS User's Manual and Data Base. The office also used a PROFIS Mobilization Exercise database during the relief operation following Hurricane Andrew.


Industrial Mobilization

The end of the Cold War affected industrial mobilization as much as other areas of interest to the Army. To prepare for a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the United States had fielded and sustained relatively large numbers of systems and had pushed modernized weapons into production as quickly as possible. This need for the development, production, and deployment of a large number of modernized weapon systems and munitions—and the resulting requirement for enough industrial capacity to expand their production in a crisis—ended with the demise of the Soviet threat.

As a result, the Department of the Army revised its Critical Items List, a prioritized list of items required to sustain the projected force during a conventional global conflict. This list specified for the Army Materiel Command the materiel that the industrial base would provide on a priority basis within seven months after the start of a war, assuming full mobilization and the need to sustain the total force engaged in a global conflict. Based upon the latest defense guidance, the list for FY 1993 displayed fewer items and emphasized replacement rather than sustainment. As a result of these changes, requirements for the industrial base will be lower, warning time will be longer, and industrial mobilization in the traditional sense will not apply.

In December 1990, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment chartered the Industrial Base Assessment (IBA) to evaluate how well a smaller post-Cold War industrial base could meet Army requirements. The assessment, which was part of the larger Integrated Army Mobilization Study, was prepared jointly by the Logistics Management Institute, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Analytic Sciences Corporation, and the U.S. Army Logistics Evaluation Agency. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics briefed the Secretary of the Army on the results of the review on 1 April 1992, and the Army Mobilization Action Plan incorporated the recommendations. The Secretary of the Army transferred all follow-up actions to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition.

The assessment concluded that the Army could no longer depend on "cold" production lines—plants that would have to start production of war items from scratch—for the manufacture of ammunition or other items to sustain a war effort. The Army would have to depend upon "warm" production lines—lines that had already at least partially converted to war production—to meet requirements for war reserves and sustainment of forces. For items that the industrial base could not supply during a major regional contingency operation, the Army would use war reserves and


POMCUS equipment. In addition, the assessment emphasized a strong linkage between the war reserve stocks and industrial responsiveness.

Of the items listed in maintenance strategies for the industrial base, diazepam auto-injectors and pyridostigmine bromide tablets received considerable attention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff designated Nerve Agent Antidote Kit, Mark I (NAAK), and atropine as "warstopper items." The Department of the Army had purchased large stocks of these items during Operation DESERT STORM and saw no need to obtain significant quantities of auto-injectors for the next one to three years. Nevertheless, the industrial base for these items had to be maintained, especially after Duphar Medical Devices, the company that had produced atropine auto-injectors, informed DOD during FY 1992 that it would no longer accept orders. To meet the potential need for nerve agent antidotes, Health Care Logistics, Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG), and the Defense Personnel Support Center proposed an Industrial Base Maintenance Contract directing the contractor to be ready for immediate production of mobilization requirements for NAAK, atropine, and pralidoxime chloride injection. The contract also required the firm to maintain a product formulation department to produce atropine and diazepam injection solutions as well as pyridostigmine bromide tablets.

Training and Schooling

During FY 1992, Army schools continued to provide soldiers and leaders with the knowledge and skills they needed to accomplish their missions, and unit training continued to prepare units to perform as part of joint and combined arms teams. The Combat Training Centers conducted seventy-six battalion and thirteen division and corps rotations during the fiscal year, and Army units conducted approximately fifty Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises throughout the world. While training programs showed much continuity, external pressures caused changes in the way the Army approached training. Resource and environmental constraints forced the Army to increase its use of simulators and other automated equipment. In addition, unforeseen events required some units to prepare for nontraditional missions such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations.

Individual Training

By Army regulation, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) is responsible for establishing policy to develop and verify military and civilian training requirements for the Total Army. During FY 1992, the Training Plans Branch, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), set and coordinated active Army training requirements for


initial entry training, special qualification identifiers, additional skill identifiers, and functional and transition training covered by almost 3,000 courses under the FY 1995 Annual Structure and Manning Decision Review. Drawing on data collected by the Total Army Centralized Individual Training Solicitation Program, the PERSCOM review confirmed training requirements for the Total Army for the first three years of the POM, translated them into viable training programs, and identified issues requiring resolution at higher levels. After a briefing on the results and the issues, a Council of Colonels matched course requirements with capacity and resources. The review and the findings of the colonels went to the General Officer Steering Committee at the Input to Training In-Process Review. This committee settled unresolved issues and approved the Army Program for Individual Training, a mission and resource document that listed the approved training programs for the first three years of the POM.

As the Army reviewed its training processes, it found a gap in instruction on its own structure and operation. The Army leadership had earlier directed the Inspector General to investigate the management processes that affected major force modernization. Reporting on the FY 1980 to FY 1982 period, the Inspector General found extensive problems in documentation and execution of force modernization and a lack of knowledge at all levels of "how the Army runs." To make the Army Staff familiar with Army procedures, HQDA instituted a mandatory Force Integration Course for its action officers, general officers, and Senior Executive Service personnel. Using the Army War College publication Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice as the course text, the course focused on the principal components of force integration: strategic, operational, and tactical requirements; research and development; force development; resources; personnel; and materiel. Under the direction of the Management Directorate, thirty-four functional area experts from HQDA taught the various blocks of instruction. The action officer course, offered sixteen times at the Humphreys Engineering Center, graduated 640 students. Sixty-seven students graduated from three general officer/Senior Executive Service courses conducted at the Xerox Training Center.

One major item in the Army's agenda for training was the absorption of the Army Personnel Testing Program (APT) within the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) in March 1992. The APT included six categories of personnel tests, and it served as the overseer for over 1,200 Army test control officers. The proper location of this program had been an issue since the Army of Excellence report in FY 1986 recommended its transfer to ACES, which managed, monitored, and evaluated most Army personnel tests. At the time, ACES had refused to accept the additional mission without more resources, but Army Education Centers


in the field already administered such tests as more installations, under pressure from prospective cuts, moved personnel testing under their education services officer. After the U.S. Army Personnel Integration Command merged with PERSCOM, the Chief, Education Division, proposed to absorb the APT program, including its program manager.

During FY 1992, the Army also strengthened the linkage between noncommissioned officer (NCO) education and promotion despite the turbulence created by early release programs and movements of units. In accord with proposals by various Army leadership development studies in the 1980s, the Army in 1989 had instituted an interim system requiring graduation from specified leadership training courses prior to promotion to the grades of sergeant; sergeant, first class; master sergeant; and command sergeant major. After a review of class seats and projected promotions, the Army during FY 1992 decided that the requirement of attendance at the Basic NCO Course prior to promotion to staff sergeant was feasible and approved it, effective 1 October 1992. Other steps in the overall plan were not so easy to implement. In January 1992, the selection board for sergeants major decided that the Army would automatically designate for the Sergeant Major Course any soldier tabbed for promotion to that grade. But the Army concluded that the linkage between promotions to sergeant major and the Sergeants Major Course, as well as that between promotions to sergeant, first class, and the Advanced NCO Course, could not be implemented until FY 1994.

As part of this new emphasis on NCO education, the Self Development Test (SDT) for NCOs replaced the older Skill Qualification Test (SQT), which measured soldier and NCO proficiency in their respective Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). The SDT sought to measure an NCO's leadership, ability at managing training, and MOs-specific knowledge and to distinguish differences in knowledge among NCOs. Unlike the SQT, the SDT did not attempt to predict performance. The Army initiated the SDT trial phase during 1992 and expected to link the SDT to the Enlisted Personnel Management System in FY 1994.

For certain specialties, the Army instituted training to expand the pool of qualified personnel. In January 1990, the Vice Chief of Staff, at the request of the Surgeon General and the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) Regimental Sergeant Major, approved the AMEDD Enlisted Commissioning Program (AECP) to alleviate the shortage of nurses in the Army Nurse Corps. This program provided eligible enlisted personnel with the opportunity to complete a baccalaureate degree in nursing within twenty-four months, become registered nurses, and receive commissions in the Army Nurse Corps. All participants received normal pay and allowances. To date, 293 soldiers have been selected from 854 applicants, and 71 students have graduated. In FY 1992, 56 percent of the 309 appli-


cants and 46 percent of the 100 selectees came from nonmedical MOSs. Those selected represented thirty-three different Moss, ranging from infantry to food service. Of the 193 students in school at the end of the fiscal year, 116 were projected to graduate between December 1992 and the summer of 1993. Only eighteen enrolled students failed to complete the program, resulting in a lower than expected attrition rate of 6 percent.

AMEDD also took steps to expand its training base of military physician assistants and to relocate those specialists within the Army hierarchy. Under the Conference Report on the Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1992, the Department of Defense agreed to establish a system to train physician assistants at Saint Francis College in Loretto, Pennsylvania. Serving as DOD's executive agent for the program, the Army initiated an agreement with the college for a master's degree program in cardiovascular perfusion, emergency medicine, and orthopedics. Under a reorganization plan, physician assistants came under the Army Medical Specialist Corps (AMSC), which detailed an officer to Health Education and Training Division, OTSG, to manage AMSC and Veterinary Corps education and training.

Institutional Training

The Command and Staff College (CSC), the Army's intermediate-level staff college, teaches Army majors the operational art of warfare and prepares them for duty on brigade and higher-level staffs. Approximately 1,000 Army majors annually attend the CSC's various programs. These include the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), other service command and staff colleges, the School of the Americas, and foreign command and staff colleges around the world. The current class attendance levels represent approximately 63 percent of the Army's annual requirements for officers educated at Military Education Level 4 (MEL 4).

During FY 1992, the Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College asked the DCSOPS to conduct a new MEL 4 study to ensure that the Army continued to send the correct number and mix of officers to command and staff colleges. The resulting study kept in mind financial and personnel trade-offs between school and troop duty, Army requirements for MEL 4 officers, and the mix of officers trained through residency at the schools. It also took into account the management principles established by a 1989 study, which recommended that 50 percent of the officers eligible each year be selected for resident instruction at CSC as soon as possible, that "below-the-zone" officers receive automatic selection, and that a master's degree would not qualify an officer for MEL 4 status. The new study examined the selection rate per year group and found that a 50 percent selection rate—approximately 800 officers rather


than the historical level of 1,000 officers—was imprudent, even though it reduced the student account by 200 officers and could save the Army about $2 million.

The Chief of Staff responded to the study's conclusions and essentially reaffirmed the status quo. He decided that the selection rate for 1993-94 would be 57 to 60 percent per year group; that CSC class size would be 905 officers for all schools, including 796 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and 109 at all other schools; and that the class mix would be consistent with the current class mix. Only fifty fewer officers would be selected than before the study. Approximately the same percentage of the annual requirement would receive training through resident instruction. From General Sullivan's perspective, the plan would provide a good bridge to the post-drawdown Army.

Army downsizing posed unique problems for the Specialized Training Management Branch, PERSCOM. Because of the various individual separation programs, more than 15,000 students did not attend scheduled school classes. In anticipation of this situation, the branch overbooked classes and encouraged Army installations to utilize eligible walk-ins to meet its FY 1992 goal.

The Office of The Surgeon General made its own efforts to improve the education of Army medical officers. In April 1992, OTSG submitted to the DCSOPS an AMEDD Leader Development and Combined Arms and Services Staff College (CAS3) proposal under which all AMEDD officers would attend resident officer education courses up to at least Phase I of CAS3. Following Phase I, selected officers would attend Phase II, qualifying them for residence at CGSC. At the close of FY 1992, AMEDD was awaiting a decision from the DCSOPS. The Surgeon General's Office also requested in September 1992 that the AMEDD Center and School develop a Human Resources Managers Course to provide junior officers with an understanding of the functions of personnel staff officers prior to becoming health services personnel managers in any AMEDD unit.

Inspector General training during FY 1992 placed more emphasis on warfighting. The Inspector General's Office conducted its three-week-long inspector course ten times during the fiscal year to support inspectors general throughout the Army. A total of 609 students, including 29 from sister services, graduated from the school, which moved in August 1992 from Humphreys Engineer Center to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Inspector General's annual conference at Fort Belvoir in April 1992 adopted the theme "A Return to the Von Steuben Model" to stress the focus of Army inspectors at all levels on support for the Army's wartime mission. The conference emphasized such issues as force readiness and training to standards.


Training Support

Army training support encompassed the Combat Training Centers, ammunition management, training mission area funding, combined arms tactical trainers, simulations, modernization, and support by special operations forces. The Combat Training Center Program remained the focus of Army tactical unit training. The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, conducted a full schedule of twelve heavy brigade task force and seven light battalion rotations. One rotation involved special operations forces and III Corps headquarters in a contingency operations scenario. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, conducted nine rotations, eight with light brigade task forces and one with the 75th Ranger Regiment. In July 1992, the center changed from rotations of one battalion to two-battalion rotations. In all, the center trained 11 light battalion task forces, 2 Ranger battalions, and 8 special operations forces battalions during the fiscal year. As a result of the Base Realignment and Closure process, the JRTC was scheduled to move to Fort Polk, Louisiana, in 1993.

The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany, assumed greater importance in training the Army's European-based units. With resources available for 231 training days, all maneuver brigades, battalions, and cavalry squadrons in USAREUR managed to rotate through the center during the fiscal year. This achievement was significant, since the Hohenfels Training Area represented the only site in Germany where units could conduct training at the battalion level. Environmental restrictions and popular opposition curtailed military maneuvers elsewhere. German, French, and Spanish units also trained at the center.

The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, completed its first full year of operation during FY 1992, training 5 active component divisions, 3 reserve component divisions, and 3 corps. For the first time, reserve component divisions received full five-day seminars and participated in warfighter exercises. As requested by the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, BCTP linked the V Corps warfighter exercise to the Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) 92 exercise. In addition, the XVIII Airborne Corps carried out a special seminar to help the corps refocus on its contingency mission after the end of Operation DESERT STORM. BCTP also conducted a seminar for the United Kingdom's 3d Armoured Division.

The Army continued to improve its instrumented battlefields at the Combat Training Centers. Objective instrumentation for the CMTC was being developed by Cubic Corporation, which anticipated having an initial system ready by mid-FY 1993. An upgrade of the NTC's instrumen-


tation began during the fiscal year and will continue through the next fiscal year. The Army released the request for proposals for the JRTC's objective instrumentation and expected to award the contract early in FY 1993. Army trainers also began upgrades to the Corps Battle Simulation System, the driver for the BCTP warfighter exercises.

The Army also responded to the increasing cost of procuring training ammunition due to rising ammunition costs, the use of weapon systems that employed expensive ammunition, and the dangers from continuing to draw down war reserve stocks to support training. The Chief of Staff directed the establishment of a task force to review the Standards in Weapons Training (STRAC), war reserve, and industrial base ammunition requirements in relationship to future threats, Army roles and missions, and budget restraints. The objective was to build a munitions procurement program that maintained the Army's readiness while supporting appropriate training strategies. The review pointed out ways to reduce training ammunition requirements by 19 percent from the 1990 STRAC without affecting training readiness. Because the review focused on a training standard rather than historical usage, the revised STRAC actually increased the ammunition budget. The review also produced long-term ammunition savings through the employment of devices and simulators. A major finding of the review highlighted the use of training ammunition as the key to providing tough, realistic training for soldiers and units.

Environmental and political constraints contributed to an $87 million funding increase for Training Mission Area (TMA) programs in the fiscal years 1994-2008 POM. Recognizing the payoff for combat readiness from previous investments in training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations, the MACOMs strongly supported the increase. The General Officer Steering Committee, Council of Colonels, and Action Officer Program Management Reviews began with the current fiscal year and POM planning cycles. The resulting revised version of AR 350-38, Training Device Policy and Management, planned for completion and distribution in FY 1993, will align the Army's policy with guidance in the DOD 5000-series of directives. In addition, a prioritization panel met in May 1992 and developed the Training Mission Area Priority List for the fiscal years 1996-2010 POM process.

The Army continued to seek funding for the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) program. CATT uses networked simulation technology that, in combination with maneuver training in the field, improves collective task training from the crew through battalion echelons. It tests maneuver and synchronization as well as command and control. The Close Combat Tactical Trainer will be the lead CATT program. Two other branch trainers, the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer and the Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer, were in the requirements development


process. The Army may expand this trainer to meet battalion or task force training requirements.

The Army worked on improving its family of simulations during the fiscal year. JANUS (A) was standardized as the battle focused trainer for the Army, and the Army also upgraded the Corps Battle Simulation System, which it plans to link with Combat Service Support Tactical Training Simulation in FY 1993 to support the Louisiana Maneuvers. Some simulations broke new ground during the fiscal year. The Eighth U.S. Army conducted ULCHI FOCUS LENS 92 as the first theater-level simulation exercise. The Department of the Army supported this exercise with funding and helped coordinate the loan of additional hardware from other MACOMs. REFORGER 92, another theater-level operation, represented the first large-scale employment of standard simulation models. It linked the Warrior Preparation Center in Europe to the National Simulation Center, the Battle Simulation Center at Fort Carson, and Air Force and Navy simulations. These two exercises heralded a new era as the commanders in chief (CINCs) became warfighters rather than exercise directors and hosts.

The fiscal year also saw the resurgence of the Department of the Army in the modernization training arena. During fiscal years 1989-91, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) had assumed the lead in New Equipment Training (NET) issues. Program executive officers and program managers (PEO/PM) could now make decisions to fund new requirements for training support. But ignorance of the amount of PEO/PM training support dollars caused confusion within the NET community. This issue remained unresolved pending action by PEOs/PMs to show, by funding elements, what monies were available for training requirements. In May, the Department of the Army Consolidated Training Support Work Group and NET Managers Conference allowed the major materiel developers (AMC, Information Systems Command, and the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Command) and every MACOM except Eighth U.S. Army to discuss the impact of the drawdown on modernization training and to review the numerous NET issues that had been deferred until resolution by the Department of the Army.

In the support of exercises, Army special operations forces played a critical role throughout the fiscal year. They deployed mobile training teams and site surveyors to all theaters on all continents. In addition, Special Forces personnel supported Combat Training Centers and their programs, assisted federal and state drug enforcement agencies, and provided mobile training teams to aid the national counterdrug strategy. Army special operations forces participated in 1 National Training Center rotation, 9 Joint Readiness Training Center rotations, and 12 Battle Command Training Program exercises. Joint Readiness Training Center participation


ranged from A-teams to B-teams with battalion and group operational bases, civil affairs and psychological operations support, and helicopter support. Ranger battalions took part in both National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center rotations.

Unit Training

During FY 1992, the Army made great strides toward a conceptual model, Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS), to integrate components of the Army training system. CATS described a separate strategy for different units, matching training events and associated training resources with the "mission-essential tasks" of the units. Through CATS, trainers believed that each unit should be able to achieve proficiency. By the end of FY 1992, the Army had published CATS for most combat arms units. CATS for combat support and combat service support units remained under study.

Major Exercises

Army exercises in FY 1992 trained commanders, staff, and units to execute plans and apply doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures in a simulated wartime operating environment. The Army participated in unilateral, joint, and combined exercises. Unilateral exercises generally were conducted by the Army at the corps level and below. Most joint and combined exercises were coordinated and sponsored by the Joint Staff or one of the unified commands under the auspices of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Exercise Program, which conducted exercises to train American forces to execute war plans of the warfighting CINCs. The level of Army support for these exercises depended upon the availability of support funds and forces. The Army conducted fewer large-scale field training exercises (FTX) due to political considerations, budget constraints, and reduced force structure. Trainers continued to increase the number of smaller, regionally oriented exercises and pursued the refinement of computer-assisted exercises (CAX).

During FY 1992, the Army participated in several significant CJCS exercises worldwide. Of these, Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), sponsored a large proportion. DISPLAY DETERMINATION is a large-scale joint and combined exercise conducted each October in the Mediterranean to test the capability to resupply and reinforce the NATO Southern Region. In FY 1992, the primary Army units included the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) headquarters and a battalion task force from the South Carolina Army National Guard's 218th Separate Infantry Brigade. CINCEUR also sponsors DRAGON HAMMER, a joint and combined FTX to demonstrate American capability and resolve to rein-


force the NATO Southern Region by air, sea, and rail. The 1992 edition, from 6 to 20 May, involved the V Corps, the SETAF headquarters, and the North Carolina Army National Guard's 30th Separate Infantry Brigade.

As in past years, CINCEUR again sponsored REFORGER, an exercise to test the deployment of forces from the continental United States to Europe. In recent years, CINCEUR has considerably reduced the scope of the maneuver. The 1992 version involved the use of computers to train brigade and higher level headquarters in joint and combined warfare. As part of the maneuver, from 26 September to 9 October in-theater units joined formations from the continental United States for Command Post Exercise (CPX) CERTAIN CARAVAN. This army group-level CPX used advanced computer simulation techniques to train both a Central Army Group-level staff and two multinational NATO corps in a joint environment. The exercise used an Opposition Force (OPFOR) from Fort Leavenworth and the V Corps' Battle Command Training Program. Army units participating in CERTAIN CARAVAN included the V Corps headquarters, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 30th Separate Armored Brigade, and the 7th Infantry Division (Light).

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) also sponsored several major exercises during FY 1992. FUERTES CAMINOS are annual joint and combined engineer construction exercises conducted in several countries in the SOUTHCOM area of operations to contribute to nation building or support a subsequent exercise phase. During the FY 1992 version, active and reserve component engineer units worked on construction projects in Panama, Honduras, and Bolivia. FUERZAS UNIDAS, a series of small-scale CPXs or FTXs in several South American countries, are planned and conducted by SOUTHCOM and the host country using PANTHER (low-intensity conflict), JANUS (platoon/company-level training), and FIRST BATTLE (small unit) simulation models. During FY 1992, FUERZAS UNIDAS exercises took place in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. SAND EAGLE is an FTX sponsored by Commander in Chief, Southern Command, to improve responsiveness in a crisis. The 1992 version took place at Forts Polk, Louisiana, and Stewart, Georgia, between 25 and 28 July 1992 and involved the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, 82d Airborne Division, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 101st Air Assault Division, 10th Mountain Division, and 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Other unified commands also sponsored major exercises. OCEAN VENTURE, a large-scale FTX, was conducted by U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) from 1 to 20 May 1992 in the eastern United States to train USCINCLANT's staff and component commands in planning and conducting joint rapid deployments and tactical operations. The XVIII


Airborne Corps headquarters, 82d Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and 10th Mountain Division represented the Army, which supplied 21,000 of the 47,150 U.S. personnel. INTRINSIC ACTION, an FTX sponsored by U.S. Central Command in Kuwait, started on 22 August 1992 when a battalion task force of the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to conduct small-unit training. ULCHI FOCUS LENS, a large-scale joint and combined CPX conducted by the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, from 17 to 30 August 1992, made extensive use of enhanced computer simulations up to the theater level. Monitored closely by planners working on the Louisiana Maneuvers, the exercise involved the I Corps headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (Light), 6th Infantry Division (Light), 101st Air Assault Division, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and 311th Corps Support Command. RENDEZVOUS, a joint and combined FTX conducted at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, and in Alberta, Canada, sought to improve cooperation between U.S. and Canadian forces. The primary Army participant was the 194th Separate Armored Brigade.

In the post-Cold War era, faced with a new national security strategy and declining resources, the Army faced a challenge in balancing force development, mobilization, and training. Army leaders were committed to maintain readiness at the highest possible level. Through such innovations as the Louisiana Maneuvers, a revised AirLand Battle doctrine, IAMS, AMOPES, and education and training programs, the Army sought to preserve its ability to project power and presence around the globe in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.



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