Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1992


Reserve Forces

Reserve forces are a critical part of the Total Army. The Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) contributed 55 percent of the personnel of the Total Army but represented only 13.8 percent—USAR 4.5, ARNG 9.3—of Total Army funding. The reserve components constituted 52 percent of the Total Army's combat structure, 62 percent of the combat support structure, and 61 percent of the combat service support force structure. As DESERT STORM and other Army operations showed, the reserve components gave the Army the flexibility to carry out diverse missions, but DESERT STORM also revealed areas that needed improvement. After the Gulf War, all components of the Total Army became smaller. As a result of the smaller active component, it will be necessary to mobilize reserve units even sooner, making it even more critical that Reserve and Guard forces be ready and available for mobilization. In FY 1992, the Army planned, tested, and implemented several new programs and made major improvements in the organization, equipment, and training of the reserve components.

Force Structure

The Army reshaped its reserve component force structure according to the mission readiness of specific units and changes in organization planned for fiscal years 1992-95. During FY 1992, the Army increased to four the number of "roundout brigades"—ARNG or USAR brigades which complete or "round out" an active division's force structure. The 218th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (North Carolina) joined the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), and for the first time a reserve combat brigade, the National Guard's 81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Washington), completed the organization of a forward-deployed division, the Korea-based 2d Infantry Division. In addition, USAR and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), were engaged in an ongoing process to activate and reorganize the Troop Program Units (TPU) in accordance with the organizational designs of AirLand Battle and the drawdown. During FY 1993, the USAR planned to activate more than 60 units, inactivate more than 160, and convert at least 200 others.


The Contingency Force Pool (CFP), which the Army based on lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War and post-Cold War downsizing, contained both active and reserve units capable of strategic deployment. Army planners expected the CFP to consist of 59 percent active component, 22 percent ARNG, and 19 percent USAR units. The USAR CFP contained Army Reserve units at the corps level and higher that supported up to 5 1/3 divisions in worldwide contingencies. At the close of the fiscal year, plans for USAR envisioned four force packages for supporting various contingencies. The first would support two divisions and a corps element. Package 2 would support units reinforcing the division and corps base. Package 3 would support the remainder of the corps and the lead theater elements, and package 4 would support the remaining theater elements.

Reserve component units in the CFP faced a lengthy list of requirements. FORSCOM stipulated that all selected reserve component units must meet the requirements of the relevant unified command, that active component units, if available, would deploy first, and that the wartime and peacetime chains of command, if possible, would be the same. Planners also specified that the support organizations based in the continental United States should be located as close as possible to the units they supported, that basic force packages should be retained within operations plans, and that reserve component units should maintain acceptable readiness levels.

Strength and Personnel Management

The efforts of the reserve components to adjust their force structure as part of the Total Army reorganization created some special problems for reserve personnel management. Conversion of units to the Army of Excellence model hampered the promotion of some reservists who were restricted by the geographical location and grade structure of their units. The problem, in short, was that reservists served where they lived, in contrast to active duty personnel, who lived where they served.

During FY 1992, the ARNG faced the daunting task of reducing its strength while simultaneously increasing its quality and maintaining a high standard of readiness. The authorized ARNG end-strength of 431,200—48,324 officers and 382,876 enlisted men—at the end of FY 1992 was nearly 15,000 soldiers fewer than that at the end of FY 1991. The actual assigned strength decreased gradually at first but then dropped rapidly from the end of June to the end of August. In the end, Congress reduced the assigned end-strength at the close of FY 1992 by 25,000 to 426,528, consisting of 47,624 officers and 378,904 enlisted personnel. Of those 25,000 spaces, 19,700 were in combat arms units.

Reductions in ARNG manpower came in several forms. During the year, the ARNG dropped 88,784 soldiers from the rolls. The bulk of the


reduction stemmed from a concerted state effort to remove as many nonperformers as possible, resulting in the release of 72,362 soldiers whose terms of service had not yet expired. But the ARNG was losing capable, qualified soldiers as well. Extensions of enlisted personnel, in particular first-term enlistees, dropped below the programmed objective at the end of FY 1992, a reflection of the perceived uncertainty of career opportunities in the ARNG. Officer Candidate School (OCS) admissions dropped by 206 and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) by 116 from the previous year. The number of minorities in the ARNG decreased by 5,000 from its FY 1991 level to 104,568, or 24.5 percent of assigned strength. African-American representation, which had been declining since FY 1988, showed the biggest loss, declining by 3,104 soldiers. African Americans at the end of FY 1992 constituted 2,997 officers and 63,585 enlisted personnel, or 15.6 percent of the assigned strength. Female strength remained fairly constant. The 3,718 female officers and 28,135 enlisted women in the ARNG represented 7.5 percent of its total strength.

To maintain quality, even in a time of severe cuts the ARNG would have to recruit and retain qualified individuals. The National Guard Bureau and the state adjutants general made enlisted personnel qualifications and readiness a major issue during the fiscal year, working to enlist more high school graduates and personnel with entrance examination scores that would equal the active component's quality goals by FY 1995. By the end of FY 1992, the ARNG had 71,700 accessions against a programmed objective of 65,253. Of these, 29,752 (41.5 percent) had no prior service. In addition, 58,370 enlisted personnel elected to continue with the ARNG. Through the Reserve Component Transition Program, the Army placed 13,395 enlisted soldiers from the active Army in the ARNG.

The quality of recruits in the ARNG was high. During the fiscal year, more than 83 percent of ARNG recruits had a high school diploma. Enlistments in Categories I through IIIA of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) reached 57.7 percent, exceeding the goal by 2.7 percent. Enlistments in Category IV, the lowest category, were only 2.8 percent, significantly lower than the goal of 5 percent.

The quality of warrant officers, as measured by the approval rate, improved during the fiscal year, but the ARNG realized that it would need more applicants to meet its needs. Planners expected recent changes in promotion criteria for W2 and the addition of the CW5 grade to augment recruiting. The ARNG also developed a program to entice enlisted soldiers leaving the active Army into their warrant officer programs.

While the ARNG worked to improve the quality of its enlisted personnel, it also strove to obtain qualified officers. In FY 1992, the issue of new officer commissions exceeded ARNG projections. New lieutenant commissions for the fiscal year reached 1,590, mostly from state, OCS,


ROTC, and direct appointments. Shortages existed in warrant officer and captain grades, but planners believed that the officers and enlisted personnel leaving the active Army would help make up the shortage. The ARNG expected that congressional reinstatement of the assistant professor of military science program at colleges and universities and the extension of the ROTC Reserve Force Duty scholarship program would raise the number of ROTC-commissioned lieutenants. It projected the federal OCS allocation at 175 officers for the following year. On the basis of congressional hearings, Army planners believed that more West Point and ROTC distinguished graduates would enter the ARNG to complete their initial military obligation.

The USAR also endured reductions during FY 1992. At the end of the fiscal year, USAR TPUs had an assigned strength of 275,789, and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) 418,592. The USAR share of the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) numbered 13,146 and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) 13,915 in assigned strength at the end of the fiscal year. Fortunately, the USAR exceeded its recruiting goal, bringing in 53,151 soldiers during the fiscal year.

The USAR leadership understood that the Reserve had to balance the recruitment of first-time soldiers with the retention of experienced personnel. In response, the USAR substantially improved the acquisition, management, and assignment of personnel to TPUs, the IMA Program, and the AGR Program. As some TPUs inactivated, the USAR attempted to place all of their soldiers in other units, although planners realized that they might not be able to meet this goal. To continue their careers, some former TPU personnel would have to join the IRR. The Army would provide transition benefits for those unable or unwilling to enter the IRR.

Veterans of the active Army provided a partial solution to the problem of filling entry-level slots when incumbents received promotions or left units. After a four-year break, the Army, through the Reserve Component Transition Program, placed 14,192 active duty enlisted soldiers in the USAR, a record-breaking 144 percent above the assigned mission. As was the case with former active duty soldiers entering the ARNG, the Voluntary Separation Incentives/Special Separation Benefits and Voluntary Early Transition (VET) Programs played a significant role in these figures. An additional 22,636 soldiers enlisted in the IRR. During the fiscal year, 448 officers and warrant officers joined ARNG and USAR units. The transition program's match rate of duty stations with MOS qualifications improved from slightly over 70 percent to almost 90 percent.

The transition of former active duty soldiers to the USAR, along with other steps taken by the Reserve, all had an impact on personnel quality. During the fiscal year, 98 percent of those individuals joining the USAR


had a high school diploma. This figure, and the corresponding one for the ARNG, represented the highest rate for the reserves since the advent of the all-volunteer Army. Of the new enlistees, 75 percent fell into Categories I-IIIA of the AFQT, and only 0.5 percent in Category IV

One special problem confronting OCAR was the Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program. Individual Mobilization Augmentees, or IMAs, were trained Selected Reserve members who were assigned in advance to active duty, DOD, Selective Service, or Federal Emergency Management Agency positions that had to be filled promptly during mobilization. In April 1992, the OCAR announced a decrease in the number of IMAs from 14,500 to 13,900 during the next two years. ODCSOPS was responsible for allocation of the remaining IMAs within the Army.

During FY 1992, the Deputy Chief, Army Reserve, conducted a functional area assessment (FAA) of the IMA Program. The assessment uncovered a number of problems. In some cases, IMA requirements exceeded current authorizations or end strength. The program needed to establish procedures for allocating, distributing, or prioritizing IMA positions. Slow documentation procedures precluded the timely filling of IMA vacancies by the Army Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), and a lack of incentives made it difficult to attract and retain qualified personnel. Available funding was insufficient to support both active training and professional development education for the IMAs. In addition, IMA soldiers suffered a disproportionate number of problems with personnel support and pay and a shortage of adequate information. The USAR leadership began corrective action, including revision of the regulation governing the IMA Program. The USAR also convinced ODCSOPS to set priorities for IMA requirements, and the Army agreed to fund mandatory professional development. The Army stabilized IMA strength at 13,000 and funding at $30 million.

The USAR planned to continue the IMA Program as an essential part of the overall Selected Reserve. The planners considered nominal out-year growth to support high priority emergency requirements and aimed to continue improving the overall management of the program, including the possible consolidation of IMA personnel management functions at ARPERCEN to enhance overall readiness for mobilization and personnel service support. The changes to the IMA Program should eliminate shortcomings that adversely affected IMAs, that frustrated the agencies to which they were assigned, and that impeded the use of their talents short of a full mobilization.

ROTC received close attention during the fiscal year. The Army managed to obtain the repeal of an FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act provision prohibiting the assignment of AGR officers to ROTC duty,


but Congress still stipulated that the number of AGR officers on ROTC duty could not exceed 200. Based on budget decisions by the Department of the Army and previously mandated manpower reductions, the Army planned to support 250 ROTC units in FY 1993. The Secretary of the Army acted to close twenty-five units for FY 1993, but OSD suspended the plans.

During FY 1992, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed the Joint Staff to expand the existing Junior ROTC (JROTC) program from over 1,400 to 2,900. After extensive coordination with the staffs of OSD and the services, President Bush announced, on 24 August 1992, a Youth Initiatives Program that included the JROTC expansion. The Army's share of this expansion would increase the number of JROTC units to a total of 1,682, including 835 new units inside the United States and 21 new ones abroad. Since the expansion would draw on funds in the FY 1993 appropriations and authorizations acts, no new JROTC units came into existence during FY 1992.

During the fiscal year, the Army instituted commissioning for physician assistants. In implementing the program, the Office of The Surgeon General asked that the Secretary of the Army grant a waiver to allow USAR physician assistants to remain on active duty beyond twenty years so that they could complete ten years of active federal commissioned service and retire as commissioned officers. At the end of FY 1992, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs was reviewing the request.

Equipment and Maintenance

The basic modernization strategy of the Department of the Army was to distribute equipment in stages and to set priorities for units and activities to undergo modernization. The stages reflected training requirements, changing threat priorities, political realities, and other factors related to modernization management. This approach ensured that equipment improvements in the reserve components would parallel and complement those of the active component.

The reserve components made significant progress in modernizing their equipment during the fiscal year. In the ARNG, one armored cavalry regiment and two armored battalions upgraded their M1 Abrams tanks to the M1A1 configuration. Two brigades exchanged their M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles for M2A2s and M3As. One attack helicopter battalion converted from AH-1 Cobras to AH-64 Apaches. Three medium helicopter companies fielded new CH-47 Chinooks. The ARNG fielded a second Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in Oklahoma and a fourth Hawk missile battalion in South Carolina. Signal units received the


new Mobile Subscriber Equipment. Under congressional mandate, the ARNG also received new 5-ton trucks, M198 howitzers, tactical radios, and night vision devices. During the fiscal year, the value of procured equipment in the ARNG rose to $30.5 billion, which equaled a 75 percent equipment fill level.

Modernization had proceeded a long way, but it still had a long way to go. Even with the improvements, the ARNG's units continued to maintain older generations of M101 howitzers, M60A3 tanks, gasoline-powered medium trucks, and Vietnam-era helicopter and medical equipment sets. In addition, the active Army had not returned all of the equipment it borrowed for Operation DESERT STORM. Still, with the modest increase in money for equipment received in FY 1992—7 percent—the number of ARNG units ready with equipment-on-hand (EOH) had increased by more than 2 percent.

During FY 1992, the ARNG leadership introduced a new approach to modernization to support future contingencies. The ARNG adjusted the priorities for equipping units to guarantee that the first to fight, high priority Project STANDARD BEARER units received 100 percent of the authorized level instead of the minimum "C-3" level of the past. Planners expected that this "loading" of selected units, as well as changes in readiness reporting rules, would leave several units short of equipment and thus hurt overall EOH readiness. However, the readiness level would be more realistic and closer to actual resource levels. The ARNG believed that equipment surpluses from force drawdowns, not yet identified at the end of the fiscal year, would greatly benefit the ARNG in ensuing years.

The USAR also carried out a significant amount of equipment modernization. Three aviation companies and one aviation battalion received U-21 aircraft, eliminating the last obsolete piston-driven aircraft. One aviation attack battalion converted from AH-1 Cobras to AH-64 Apache helicopters. The USAR activated two attack helicopter battalions with AH-64 helicopters. Two medium helicopter companies replaced CH-47C model Chinooks with CH-47Ds. Ten M1 Abrams tanks replaced M60s in a training division. Thirteen deployable medical hospital sets were delivered. Thirty-five quartermaster, transportation, and ordnance units converted to new configurations with additional productivity-enhancing equipment. Furthermore, wheeled vehicle modernization continued in all types of units.

Despite improvements in the USAR's EOH readiness through the congressionally mandated Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP) and normal Army distribution, the USAR still lagged substantially behind all other DOD reserve components in the amount of equipment actually on hand. At the close of FY 1992, the USAR had a 69 percent EOH inventory. The USAR was critically short of trucks, tractors, trailers, night vision


devices, aircraft, and equipment for tactical communications, power generation, and construction. The problem was even worse than it appeared since many types of equipment, such as construction equipment, aircraft, watercraft, special purpose equipment, and wheeled vehicles, were approaching the end of their expected service life and would either have to be replaced or entered into service life extension programs.

Training and Readiness

Reserve component training included a variety of proven programs and new initiatives that focused on units, individual leadership, and staff skills. Hands-on activities in support of actual missions provided realistic training, while overseas deployment training provided excellent instruction for the Total Army. The Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan, formalized in 1989, provided the Army with a single strategy to improve reserve training readiness. It identified issues relating to the conduct of realistic and effective training and offered guidance to resolve problems. Lessons from Operation DESERT STORM strongly reinforced the conventional view that training before mobilization was critical to minimizing postmobilization training time.

The Army designed an overseas program to provide reserve units with realistic training in the support of U.S. military commands worldwide. In DESERT STORM after-action reviews, many reserve commanders stated that overseas training was the best preparation for actual deployment. Through overseas training, reserve units became familiar with the terrain and political environment in potential wartime theaters, while providing a forward presence around the world. Overseas training also gave reserve personnel realistic training on mobilization, overseas deployment tasks, and wartime functions. Active component units benefited from the integration of reserve components into their training and the formation of enduring professional relationships among the components.

During FY 1992, 17,225 USAR soldiers trained in fifty-six countries, while the ARNG deployed more than 24,000 troops around the world. Training ranged from major CJCS exercises to engineer and medical readiness exercises around the world. ARNG and USAR engineer and medical units conducted numerous nation assistance missions around the globe both to train and to improve health and infrastructure. Through the International Training Activities Program, ARNG and Air National Guard members deployed overseas as teams organized specifically to conduct mission-oriented training in austere environments. The teams usually included an engineering element, a medical element, and an air transport element. The program differed from other ARNG overseas training in that each deployment was joint. If the engineer element came from the ARNG,


then the medical element had to consist of air guardsmen. In addition, the air crew and aircraft (usually a C-130) that transported the team were an integral part of the mission and remained with the team during the entire period of deployment to provide in-country airlift for the team and the U.S. ambassador. Each deployment was limited to two weeks and focused on projects that the teams could complete within that time frame. The team conducted each deployment in conjunction with host nation military or civilian personnel who actually led the project.

Overseas training augmented available forces within theaters. In USARSO, about 4,000 reserve soldiers, mostly from the Wisconsin ARNG or the 88th U.S. Army Reserve Command, took part in FUERTES CAMINOS 92, providing health care to Panamanians and working on various engineering projects around that country. The Army also instituted a new overseas training activity to assist in the withdrawal of active component units from Europe. In the first year of this program, 1,000 USAR soldiers provided logistical support. Army leaders planned to expand the scope of this program significantly in FY 1993. The Army's goal was to schedule the earliest deploying units for overseas training at least once every three years. Later deploying units would participate every five years.

During the winter of 1991, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, the Army National Guard Bureau instituted a Humanitarian Support Unit Program to make volunteer ARNG units available on 72-hour notice for the support of worldwide humanitarian missions. Of the eighty-nine units nominated by the states, nineteen could deploy in seventy-two hours for a twelve-month period. The remainder would serve as follow-on or expansion units, depending on mission requirements.

Beginning in 1992, the Chief of Staff and the Commander in Chief of FORSCOM, in collaboration with the reserve components, directly promoted the "One Team—One Standard" concept through a major initiative known as BOLD SHIFT. BOLD SHIFT traced its origins to readiness problems within the reserve components during DESERT STORM. The Army had expected most reserve units to be ready for rapid deployment after a short and intensive training session. Many units, however, had lacked leaders with the proper technical skills, and premobilization training often did not prepare a unit to accomplish its Mission Essential Task List. Although most units did quite well in Southwest Asia after receiving proper training, the problem of initial preparedness remained.

BOLD SHIFT consisted of seven interrelated training and readiness programs. First, BOLD SHIFT would consider the demographics and proximity of schools and training areas in the assignment of units to them. Second, it would institute operational readiness exercises (ORE), a key part of the overall design. Modeled after the Air Force's Operational


Readiness Inspection Program, OREs examined a unit's performance of its wartime missions in a more comprehensive way than the regular monthly training sessions. Third, BOLD SHIFT would review and improve training for military occupational specialties. Fourth, it would set achievable levels of premobilization collective training for support units. Fifth, it sought to improve the skills and knowledge of reserve unit leaders by following the qualification requirements of the officer and NCO educational systems. Sixth, it would stress training with wartime chains of command, thus redefining CAPSTONE, a program aligning reserve component units scheduled for Europe with their wartime chain of command; Directed Training Affiliation Programs; and other relationships among active and reserve units for the post-Cold War era. Finally, it would involve increased support of reserve training and readiness requirements. Under the Reserve Training Concept, active units would supply resources and centralized planning, freeing the reserve unit commander from logistical and administrative duties to focus on the actual training.

During the first year of BOLD SHIFT, 291 company-size units participated, and Total Army ORE teams from army headquarters in the continental United States assessed nearly fifty units. The initial pilot program, which included all roundup brigades as well as 35 reserve units from across the country, was expanded by the state adjutants general to 102 high-priority ARNG units from all the states and territories. During the year, Congress increased the number of active Army trainers for BOLD SHIFT. Approximately 1,300 personnel will join Resident Trainer Detachments assigned to certain reserve component units. Officers will concentrate on training, planning, organizing, and assessing battle leaders and staffs while NCOs conduct individual, crew, and squad training. As part of BOLD SHIFT, the Army sent roundup and roundout brigade staffs to the Tactical Commanders Development Course at Fort Leavenworth, and combat, combat support, and combat service support unit staffs attended the Unit Battle Skills Courses. The Battle Command Training Program proved very successful in training senior reserve commanders and their staffs.

Under the Total Army Training Structure, the Army developed concepts and plans to place all reserve component training institutions under the command and control of selected training divisions on a regional basis. Under this plan, the 108th Division (Training) and the U.S. Army Reserve Forces schools in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida would be affiliated with the 81st, 120th, and 121st Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM). The Director, Army National Guard, established Project STANDARD BEARER on 1 November 1991 to strengthen the ARNG's ability to operate with active component units in the post-Cold War era. STANDARD BEARER endeavored to enhance the capability and


readiness of the roundup brigades, roundout brigades, and Contingency Force Pool units. As the ARNG's highest priority units, they would receive resources, training, and validation as "standard bearers" for the entire ARNG. They would use these to achieve and maintain a 95 percent level in MOs-qualified personnel.

The USAR anticipated increased participation in training at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Employment of USAR troops at these centers in the past had been limited to serving in OPFOR and support roles, but in FY 1992, TPUs joined the scheduled training rotation at the JRTC for the first time. The IRR made history when it participated in a three-week light infantry training exercise that included live fire, the first such training scenario for the IRR. This exercise demonstrated the USAR's continuing efforts to provide meaningful training for members of the IRR.


The ARNG considered training for mobilization to be essential for meeting its responsibilities for mobilization and deployment. During the fiscal year, ARNG units took part in more than 890 local mobilization exercises conducted by State Area Command headquarters. The ARNG designed these exercises—along with mobilization and deployment readiness exercises, readiness for mobilization exercises, State Area Command exercises, and emergency mobilization and deployment exercises—to foster unit and individual preparedness. During the fiscal year, the ARNG mobilization and deployment exercise program proved its value in its response to federal and state crises, such as the Los Angeles riots and Hurricanes Andrew, Omar, and Iniki.

In addition to the ARNG exercises, all reserve state headquarters took part in the Department of the Army's mobilization exercise OPTIMAL FOCUS 92. This exercise concentrated on the actual simultaneous mobilization of multiple units to discover flaws in the mobilization and deployment system. All units carried out activities at their home stations to test their ability to move to the mobilization station within seventy-two hours. The Army applied lessons learned in the exercise to all units and activities involved in mobilization and tested them in exercises directed by the JCS and the Department of the Army.

The Army Reserve used several approaches to prepare its units and soldiers for their wartime and contingency roles and to ascertain their current state of readiness. Since the USAR did not have a sufficient budget to train all 60,000 TPU members and 20,000 IRR personnel, it focused training on the mobilization process to maintain the individual soldier's readiness for mobilization and deployment. Other training covered family


support matters, quality of life subjects, and other issues that directly met the needs of soldiers and encouraged retention.

The USAR mission with regard to training base mobilization continued to focus on initial entry training and refresher training for IRRs. During DESERT STORM, elements of the 70th, 80th, 84th, 85th, 98th, 100th, and 108th Training Divisions carried out refresher training. TRADOC reduced the active component training base structure and planned for increased peacetime use of the nine remaining training divisions to conduct year-round initial entry training.

Support to Civil Authorities

The reserve components participated in humanitarian and nation assistance operations at home and abroad. In addition to providing training benefits for personnel and units, these operations greatly aided government agencies and the afflicted. Army reserve component units received acclaim for their compassion and competence in responding to natural disasters and played a major role in hurricane relief operations in Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii, and Guam. In Florida, for example, 794 reservists and 5,703 Florida guardsmen assisted victims of Hurricane Andrew in September 1992.

Active component and USAR soldiers deployed regularly for civil emergencies, but the National Guard remained the primary asset available to the states for this purpose. During the fiscal year, guardsmen responded to 322 emergencies in 51 states and territories, including 4 civil disturbances and 112 natural disasters. The demands on resources increased tremendously compared to the previous year because of the nature of the emergencies. Hurricane Omar, for instance, forced the call-up of nearly the entire Guam National Guard, 240 soldiers, for 4,800 man-days. The National Guard called up more than 10,000 persons for 101,000 man-days during the Los Angeles riots, the largest civil disturbance call in more than twenty years.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve also continued their counterdrug operations as part of the National Drug Control Strategy. Under Title 32, 3,000 ARNG soldiers provided a million man-days of counterdrug efforts in every state, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories. Their activities included marijuana detection and eradication, along with training, aviation, and engineer support as well as inspection of container cargo at ports of entry into the United States. Army guardsmen also participated in several antidrug programs to educate school children about the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse. Most of this assistance took the form of time donated by individual National Guard personnel, who volunteered for active duty special work in addition to normal training


requirements. ARNG counterdrug operations confiscated more than $61 million in cash, eradicated about 83 million marijuana plants, seized more than 5,000 weapons, and resulted in more than 22,000 arrests. Table 2 lists Army National Guard counterdrug seizures by type of drug. In 99 percent of the after-action reports, the senior law enforcement officer present during the operation rated the National Guard's support as excellent. In the view of the ARNG, the results showed that the flow of illicit drugs can be interrupted when adequate resources are available.












Army Reserve units participated in counterdrug operations whenever feasible. Some 1,100 USAR personnel supported federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, especially the U.S. Customs Service. FORSCOM worked with American law enforcement agencies to validate their requests for counterdrug assistance and then coordinated with the U.S. Army Reserve Command to determine if Army Reserve units should be involved. During FY 1992, Army reservists were involved in training law enforcement officials, engineer support, linguistic support, intelligence analysis, and aviation support.

Reserve component personnel involved with Task Force ENGINEER continued to construct and maintain an all-weather road system that gave the U.S. Border Patrol access to the crossing points on the Mexican border used by illegal immigrants. Reserve personnel pointed out to members of the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee that disabled equipment stood idle for long periods of time due to slow receipt of necessary spare parts. The committee concluded that the Army should utilize a nearby truck parts facility and that delegating local purchasing authority to Task Force ENGINEER would increase its productivity.

The reserve components faced many problems from mandated cuts in end strength and budget, but they continued to fulfill their responsibilities in the Total Army. Although most ARNG and USAR units concentrated on routine training, a number of them provided security and humanitarian assistance in the wake of civil unrest and natural disasters. Several units


provided medical and engineering expertise to Third World nations. In response to a demonstrated lack of readiness during the Gulf War, the Army initiated BOLD SHIFT to bolster the preparedness of the reserve components for mobilization and deployment. The reserve components continued to provide the bulk of the Total Army's force structure at a comparatively small percentage of the Total Army budget.


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