Army Ground Forces Study No. 4

Table I

THE ARMY IN TWO WARS

Aggregate Strengths

 

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

 

15 Nov 18 Reported
Actual
Strength

30 Apr 45 Troop Basis Strength (Approximately actual)

Per Cent of
Total Army

Per Cent of
Total Army
less Air

Per Cent of
Total Ground
Combat Forces

 

1918

1945

1918

1945

1918

1945

Excluding Air Forces:

   Divisions

933,862

1,194,569

25.2

14.4

26.6

20.0

56.3

53.5

   Non-divisional Combat
   (less AAA)

726,149

779,882

19.6

9.4

20.7

13.0

43.7

35.0

 

   Ground Combat Forces
   (less AAA)

1,660,011

1,974,451

44.8

23.8

47.3

33.0

100.0

88.5

   Antiaircraft Artillery

259,403

3.1

4.3

11.5

 

   Total Ground Combat Forces

1,660,011

2,233,854

44.8

26.9

47.3

37.3

100.0

100.0

   Non-divisional Service

945,470

1,638,214

25.5

19.8

26.7

27.4

56.9

73.5

   Replacements

454,863

841,715

12.3

10.2

13.0

14.1

27.4

37.8

   Overhead and Miscellaneous

453,793

1,269,709

12.3

15.3

13.0

21.2

27.4

56.9

 
   

   Total Army (less Air)

3,514,137

5,983,492

94.9

72.2

100.0

100.0

   Army Air Forces

190,493

2,307,501

5.1

27.8

 
       

Total Army

3,704,630

8,290,993

100.0

100.0

 

SOURCES:

For 1918: Tables 1, 4 and 14 of “Personnel Statistics Report, A-21, Strength of-the Army as of November 15, 1918,” dated December 5, 1918, Statistics Branch, War Department General Staff. In Army War College Library, UA 24 A 554 P 68150.

For 1945: War Department Troop Basis, 1 May 1945. In Ground AG Records, 320.2 Troop Basis (S). The Troop Basis, after authorizing an aggregate strength of 7,700,000 from 1 July 1943 through 1 April 1945, was raised on 1 May 1945 to cover the actual strength to which the Army had grown.

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NOTE TO TABLE I

CAUTION: While it is believed that the picture given by the accompanying figures is accurate in its general outlines, detailed comparison of figures for the two wars is subject to serious limitations. The strength of the Army was not classified in the same way in 1918 and in 1945. The following may be noted of the categories used in the tables:

Divisions. In principle the triangular divisions of 1945 had a higher percentage of combat personnel than the square divisions of 1918. In practice there was surprisingly little difference. Divisions in the AEF in November 1918 varied greatly, but the average strength of 29 effective divisions was 22,995, of which 76% was in infantry, field artillery and machine gun personnel. (Tables 2 and 14 of the source listed above.) Infantry divisions of 1945 had a T/O strength of 14,037, of which 81% was in infantry and field artillery (machine gunners being carried as infantry in 1945). Armored divisions of 1945 had a T/O strength of 10,670, of which only 63% was in tank units, infantry and field artillery. (T/O’s 7 and 17, 24 January 1945.) Other divisions of 1945 (chiefly airborne) resembled infantry divisions. Weighting for the different types yields 78% combat strength for all divisions in 1945. Hence the proportion of combat strength in divisions of 1918 and 1945 was about the same.

Non-divisional Combat and Non-divisional Service. In these categories in the table the figures for 1945 include organized units only, whereas the figures given in the statistics of 1918 were not explicitly limited to organized units, and probably include some personnel which in 1945 would have been carried as “Overhead and Miscellaneous.”

Antiaircraft Artillery. Refers only to unite in 1945; no such category in 1918.

Replacements and Overhead and Miscellaneous. Principal components of these categories in 1918 and in 1945 are shown on the following page.

Army Air Forces. Figures for the two dates are roughly comparable, the figure for 1918 including not only the Air Service of that period but also personnel classified in 1918 under “Aircraft Production” and Military “Aeronautics”; but since aviation in 1918 drew more heavily on services of the rest of the Army than in 1945, it is probable that the total effort expended in 1918 on aviation should be represented by a higher figure than 190,000 if comparison with 1945 is desired.

INTERPRETATION: Subject to reservations as indicated above, the following may be noted, considering only the Army without the Air Forces:

1. In 1918 almost half the Army was in combat categories, in 1945 only a little over a third. (Cols. V and VI.)

2. Within the category of combat troops, divisions and non-divisional forces (including antiaircraft) were in about the same proportion to each other in the two wars. (Cols. VII and VIII.)

3. Personnel classifiable as replacements numbered somewhat over an eighth of the Army in both wars. (Cols. V and VI.)

4. Personnel in service categories numbered somewhat over a quarter of the Army in both wars. (Cols. V and VI.)

5. Personnel in overhead and miscellaneous categories was proportionately much higher in 1945 than in 1918, approximating respectively one-fifth and one eighth. (Cols. V and VI. ) To some extent this reflects the more accurate accounting methods of 1945, by which overhead and miscellaneous functions were more carefully distinguished from tactical units than in 1918. Analysis of the overhead and miscellaneous category in the two wars appears on the following page. It may be noted that, excluding the Students Army Training Corps of 1918, which was not a form of operating overhead, the figure for 1918 scarcely exceeded 275,000, or one-thirteenth of the strength of the Army.

6. The large figure for overhead and miscellaneous in 1945 explains the relatively low proportion of combat forces, since proportion of replacements and service forces was almost the same in the two wars. (Cols. V and VI.)

7. Replacements, while forming about the same fraction of the Army in the two wars, were in higher ratio to combat forces in 1945 than in 1918, because the ratio of combat forces to the whole Army was lower. (Cols. VII and VIII.) This higher proportion of replacements to combat forces in 1945, plus the fact that they were more fully trained and that the movement of replacements was more systematically conducted, partly explains why units were kept more nearly at authorized strength in 1945 than in 1918.

8. Service troops, while forming about the same fraction of the Army in the two wars, were also in higher ratio to combat forces in 1945 than in 1918. (Cols. VII and VIII.) This reflects the fact that the combat forces of 1945, more highly mechanized and in part more distantly deployed than in 1918, required more service support. It reflects also the fact that overhead and miscellaneous establishments required service facilities. Even if the combat troops of 1945 had received no more service support than those of 1918, the ratio of service to combat troops would have been higher in 1945, because of the need for service troops to support the overhead and miscellaneous establishments.

[36]


ANNEX TO TABLE I

“Replacements” in Table I includes personnel classified in 1918 and in 1945 as:

 

1918
 
1945
AGF
(Arms)
ASF
(Services)
Depot Brigades
196,383
  Replacement Training Centers
298,100
 
29,600
Infantry Replacements
54,666
  Replacement Depots
67,500
 
10,800
Machine Gun Replacements
15,741
  Emergency Replacement Stockage
17,200
 
2,460
Casuals and Unassigned
15,369
  Officer Candidate Schools
5,000
 
6,000
Troops en route to Ports
,250
  Officer Replacement Pools
10,000
 
5,000
Development Battalions
40,760
  Rotational Policy
11,250
 
12,500
Officers Training Schools
59,468
  Casuals in Staging Areas and en route Overseas
61,000
 
16,000
Casuals and Replacements
in Europe
34,970
  Other AGF and ASF
18,000
 
20,950
 
   
 
Total
454,863
  Total AGF and ASF
496,350
 
117,460
             
      Army Specialized Training Program  
16,250
 
      Special Training Units  
11,000
 
      Overseas Replacement Depots and Training Centers  
200,655
 
         
 
      Total  
841,715
 
             
“Overhead and Miscellaneous” in Table I includes personnel classified in 1918 and 1945 as:
1918
 
1945
     
Headquarters of Camps, Etc.
16,205
  Bulk allotments to AGF (131,440 and ASF    (398,467) for zone of interior installations, etc.    (including permanent personnel of replacement    agencies listed above)  
529,907
 
Students Army Training Corps*
175,872
  Reception Centers (Recruits)  
30,000
 
Recruits at Depot and Camps
32,747
  Hospital Population  
415,000
 
Patients in SOS Hospitals
82,013
  War Department Groups  
6,408
 
War Department
2,007
  Theater Overheads  
159,726
 
Unclassified
116,934
  Repatriated Military Personnel  
20,000
 
Other
28,015
  Other  
108,668
 
 
     
 
Total   
453,793
 
Total   
 
1,269,709
 

*Although the ASTP of 1945 and the SATC of 1918 were alike in that their personnel were stationed on college campuses, the ASTP is here classified as “Replacements” because its trainees had had basic military training and were usable for military purposes, and the SATC is classified under “Overhead and Miscellaneous” because its trainees had negligible military experience and were not usable for military purposes without considerable further training.

[37]

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Table II

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Last updated 5 August 2005