Army Ground Forces Study No. 4
Table I
THE ARMY IN TWO WARS
I |
II |
III |
IV |
V |
VI |
VII |
VIII |
|
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
15 Nov 18 Reported |
30 Apr 45 Troop Basis Strength (Approximately actual) |
Per Cent of |
Per Cent of |
Per Cent of |
||||
1918 |
1945 |
1918 |
1945 |
1918 |
1945 |
|||
Excluding Air Forces: |
||||||||
Divisions |
933,862 |
1,194,569 |
25.2 |
14.4 |
26.6 |
20.0 |
56.3 |
53.5 |
Non-divisional Combat |
726,149 |
779,882 |
19.6 |
9.4 |
20.7 |
13.0 |
43.7 |
35.0 |
|
||||||||
Ground Combat Forces |
1,660,011 |
1,974,451 |
44.8 |
23.8 |
47.3 |
33.0 |
100.0 |
88.5 |
Antiaircraft Artillery |
— |
259,403 |
— |
3.1 |
4.3 |
— |
11.5 |
|
|
||||||||
Total Ground Combat Forces |
1,660,011 |
2,233,854 |
44.8 |
26.9 |
47.3 |
37.3 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
Non-divisional Service |
945,470 |
1,638,214 |
25.5 |
19.8 |
26.7 |
27.4 |
56.9 |
73.5 |
Replacements |
454,863 |
841,715 |
12.3 |
10.2 |
13.0 |
14.1 |
27.4 |
37.8 |
Overhead and Miscellaneous |
453,793 |
1,269,709 |
12.3 |
15.3 |
13.0 |
21.2 |
27.4 |
56.9 |
|
||||||||
Total Army (less Air) |
3,514,137 |
5,983,492 |
94.9 |
72.2 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
||
Army Air Forces |
190,493 |
2,307,501 |
5.1 |
27.8 |
||||
|
||||||||
Total Army |
3,704,630 |
8,290,993 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
SOURCES:
For 1918: Tables 1, 4 and 14 of “Personnel Statistics Report, A-21, Strength of-the Army as of November 15, 1918,” dated December 5, 1918, Statistics Branch, War Department General Staff. In Army War College Library, UA 24 A 554 P 68150.
For 1945: War Department Troop Basis, 1 May 1945. In Ground AG Records, 320.2 Troop Basis (S). The Troop Basis, after authorizing an aggregate strength of 7,700,000 from 1 July 1943 through 1 April 1945, was raised on 1 May 1945 to cover the actual strength to which the Army had grown.
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CAUTION: While it is believed that the picture given by the accompanying figures is accurate in its general outlines, detailed comparison of figures for the two wars is subject to serious limitations. The strength of the Army was not classified in the same way in 1918 and in 1945. The following may be noted of the categories used in the tables:
Divisions. In principle the triangular divisions of 1945 had a higher percentage of combat personnel than the square divisions of 1918. In practice there was surprisingly little difference. Divisions in the AEF in November 1918 varied greatly, but the average strength of 29 effective divisions was 22,995, of which 76% was in infantry, field artillery and machine gun personnel. (Tables 2 and 14 of the source listed above.) Infantry divisions of 1945 had a T/O strength of 14,037, of which 81% was in infantry and field artillery (machine gunners being carried as infantry in 1945). Armored divisions of 1945 had a T/O strength of 10,670, of which only 63% was in tank units, infantry and field artillery. (T/O’s 7 and 17, 24 January 1945.) Other divisions of 1945 (chiefly airborne) resembled infantry divisions. Weighting for the different types yields 78% combat strength for all divisions in 1945. Hence the proportion of combat strength in divisions of 1918 and 1945 was about the same.
Non-divisional Combat and Non-divisional Service. In these categories in the table the figures for 1945 include organized units only, whereas the figures given in the statistics of 1918 were not explicitly limited to organized units, and probably include some personnel which in 1945 would have been carried as “Overhead and Miscellaneous.”
Antiaircraft Artillery. Refers only to unite in 1945; no such category in 1918.
Replacements and Overhead and Miscellaneous. Principal components of these categories in 1918 and in 1945 are shown on the following page.
Army Air Forces. Figures for the two dates are roughly comparable, the figure for 1918 including not only the Air Service of that period but also personnel classified in 1918 under “Aircraft Production” and Military “Aeronautics”; but since aviation in 1918 drew more heavily on services of the rest of the Army than in 1945, it is probable that the total effort expended in 1918 on aviation should be represented by a higher figure than 190,000 if comparison with 1945 is desired.
INTERPRETATION: Subject to reservations as indicated above, the following may be noted, considering only the Army without the Air Forces:
1. In 1918 almost half the Army was in combat categories, in 1945 only a little over a third. (Cols. V and VI.)
2. Within the category of combat troops, divisions and non-divisional forces (including antiaircraft) were in about the same proportion to each other in the two wars. (Cols. VII and VIII.)
3. Personnel classifiable as replacements numbered somewhat over an eighth of the Army in both wars. (Cols. V and VI.)
4. Personnel in service categories numbered somewhat over a quarter of the Army in both wars. (Cols. V and VI.)
5. Personnel in overhead and miscellaneous categories was proportionately much higher in 1945 than in 1918, approximating respectively one-fifth and one eighth. (Cols. V and VI. ) To some extent this reflects the more accurate accounting methods of 1945, by which overhead and miscellaneous functions were more carefully distinguished from tactical units than in 1918. Analysis of the overhead and miscellaneous category in the two wars appears on the following page. It may be noted that, excluding the Students Army Training Corps of 1918, which was not a form of operating overhead, the figure for 1918 scarcely exceeded 275,000, or one-thirteenth of the strength of the Army.
6. The large figure for overhead and miscellaneous in 1945 explains the relatively low proportion of combat forces, since proportion of replacements and service forces was almost the same in the two wars. (Cols. V and VI.)
7. Replacements, while forming about the same fraction of the Army in the two wars, were in higher ratio to combat forces in 1945 than in 1918, because the ratio of combat forces to the whole Army was lower. (Cols. VII and VIII.) This higher proportion of replacements to combat forces in 1945, plus the fact that they were more fully trained and that the movement of replacements was more systematically conducted, partly explains why units were kept more nearly at authorized strength in 1945 than in 1918.
8. Service troops, while forming about the same fraction of the Army in the two wars, were also in higher ratio to combat forces in 1945 than in 1918. (Cols. VII and VIII.) This reflects the fact that the combat forces of 1945, more highly mechanized and in part more distantly deployed than in 1918, required more service support. It reflects also the fact that overhead and miscellaneous establishments required service facilities. Even if the combat troops of 1945 had received no more service support than those of 1918, the ratio of service to combat troops would have been higher in 1945, because of the need for service troops to support the overhead and miscellaneous establishments.
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“Replacements” in Table I includes personnel classified in 1918 and in 1945 as:
1918
|
1945
|
AGF
(Arms) |
|
ASF
(Services) |
||
Depot Brigades |
196,383
|
Replacement Training Centers |
298,100
|
29,600
|
||
Infantry Replacements |
54,666
|
Replacement Depots |
67,500
|
10,800
|
||
Machine Gun Replacements |
15,741
|
Emergency Replacement Stockage |
17,200
|
2,460
|
||
Casuals and Unassigned |
15,369
|
Officer Candidate Schools |
5,000
|
6,000
|
||
Troops en route to Ports |
,250
|
Officer Replacement Pools |
10,000
|
5,000
|
||
Development Battalions |
40,760
|
Rotational Policy |
11,250
|
12,500
|
||
Officers Training Schools |
59,468
|
Casuals in Staging Areas and en route Overseas |
61,000
|
16,000
|
||
Casuals and Replacements in Europe |
34,970
|
Other AGF and ASF |
18,000
|
20,950
|
||
|
|
|
||||
Total |
454,863
|
Total AGF and ASF |
496,350
|
117,460
|
||
Army Specialized Training Program |
16,250
|
|||||
Special Training Units |
11,000
|
|||||
Overseas Replacement Depots and Training Centers |
200,655
|
|||||
|
||||||
Total |
841,715
|
|||||
“Overhead and Miscellaneous” in Table I includes personnel
classified in 1918 and 1945 as:
|
||||||
1918
|
1945
|
|||||
Headquarters of Camps, Etc. |
16,205
|
Bulk allotments to AGF (131,440 and ASF (398,467) for zone of interior installations, etc. (including permanent personnel of replacement agencies listed above) |
529,907
|
|||
Students Army Training Corps* |
175,872
|
Reception Centers (Recruits) |
30,000
|
|||
Recruits at Depot and Camps |
32,747
|
Hospital Population |
415,000
|
|||
Patients in SOS Hospitals |
82,013
|
War Department Groups |
6,408
|
|||
War Department |
2,007
|
Theater Overheads |
159,726
|
|||
Unclassified |
116,934
|
Repatriated Military Personnel |
20,000
|
|||
Other |
28,015
|
Other |
108,668
|
|||
|
|
|||||
Total
|
453,793
|
Total
|
1,269,709
|
*Although the ASTP of 1945 and the SATC of 1918 were alike in that their personnel were stationed on college campuses, the ASTP is here classified as “Replacements” because its trainees had had basic military training and were usable for military purposes, and the SATC is classified under “Overhead and Miscellaneous” because its trainees had negligible military experience and were not usable for military purposes without considerable further training.
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Last updated 5 August 2005
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