- Chapter XIV
-
- Manpower and Readjustments
-
- "A war is a confusing
thing," Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, director of Selective
Service, reminded the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1943 in
answer to a query about the "confusion" caused by his
agency's multitudinous changes in its directions to local draft
boards.1 People who were dealing with manpower needs and allocations
in 1943 agreed with him. With the major offensive of the war-the
invasion of the European continent-still an uncertain number of months
off, the conservation and use of manpower to provide maximum
benefits for industry and agriculture as well as for the armed
services were critical topics for discussion in Washington's wartime
agencies throughout 1943. Negro manpower, as a generally underused
part of the national total, appeared in these discussions, both in its
relation to industrial and agricultural manpower and in its relation
to the military services. Expedients had been proposed, tried, and
discarded. New ones were on trial. But no answer to the complex
problems of the equitable use of Negro manpower had been reached.
-
-
- Serious discussion of the
growing manpower shortage had been under way since 1942. National service
legislation to include women, the overaged, and the physically unfit
had been proposed. The Army had passed through its first manpower
crisis in the summer of 1942. Negro units were barely affected by it.
In response to continuing pressures, a greater use of Negro manpower
was planned for the 1943 increase in the strength of the Army. Though
the general outlines for the absorption of a larger proportion of
Negroes had been sketched and approved, the details were still to be
worked out, accepted by the using services, and proved by experience.
-
- The 1943 Troop Basis, approved in
late 1942, was the first which, from the beginning, provided vacancies for
a full 10.6 percent of Negroes in its augmentation of enlisted strength.
The 337,750 Negroes provided in the 3,600,000-man Army planned for 1942
constituted 9.03 percent of the whole. In the 3,933,000-man augmentation
needed to bring the Army up to the 7,533,000-man level authorized for 1943,
416,888, exactly 10.6 percent of the augmentation, were to be Negroes. Including
Negroes already provided, a percentage of 10.02 for the entire Army would
be reached by 31 December 1943. The attempt to employ Negroes in the Army
in proportion to their strength in the population had succeeded, on paper
at least. (Table 9)
- [405]
- (ENLISTED STRENGTHS)
-
Units and Centers |
Mobilized as of 31 Dec 42 |
1943 Augmentation |
Total by 31 Dec 43 |
White |
Negro |
White |
Negro |
White |
Negro |
Total |
4,532,117 |
467,883 |
2,246,233 |
286,767 |
6,778,350 |
754,650 |
Combat Units |
1,820,254 |
86,294 |
842,911 |
64,873 |
2,663,165 |
151,167 |
Service Units a |
578,262 |
148,370 |
263,300 |
90,991 |
841,562 |
239,361 |
AAF and services |
1,190,363 |
109,637 |
810,000 |
90,000 |
2,000,363 |
199,637 |
Overhead b |
363,820 |
65,880 |
64,155 |
9,145 |
427,975 |
75,025 |
RTC's |
238,500 |
27,500 |
44,000 |
6,000 |
282,500 |
33,500 |
OCS's |
72,200 |
800 |
0 |
0 |
72,200 |
800 |
Unassigned |
268,718 |
29,402 |
221,867 |
25,758 |
490,585 |
55,160 |
-
- a Includes AGF services but
excludes AAF services.
- b Includes men in hospitals 60
days or longer, men in replacement depots, men assigned to
headquarters, station complements, and installation
staffs, and men on detached lists.
- Source: Tab C, Incl to AG
320.2 (11-24-42), filed in AG 320.2 (7-14-42) (1) sec. 1.
-
- The 1943 Troop Basis was also
the first based on a fairly firm knowledge of how the armed services
would divide among themselves the total manpower available to them,
for this troop basis was the first to operate under a system whereby
nearly all men entering the armed services came through Selective
Service-the result of a Presidential decision long advocated by the
Army. On 5 December 1942 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order
9279, requiring all the services to recruit through the draft. The
same executive order transferred Selective Service to the War Manpower
Commission. The Navy began inducting its men through the Selective
Service System on 1 February 1943, thereby ending the long standing Army contention that the Navy, by avoiding the use of
Selective Service, was not only taking the cream of white manpower
through special appeals to volunteers but also was avoiding the acceptance of its share of Negro
manpower, thereby leaving in the Selective Service pool of
registered manpower a larger proportion of Negroes to be absorbed by
the Army alone. The War Department could henceforth use the Navy's new
policy to resist Selective Service's and, later, War Manpower's
efforts to force the Army to accept larger numbers of Negroes. The War
Department was also aware that in specific inter service frictions
the issue of Negro manpower might be used advantageously. Late in 1942
and in 1943, for example, there was considerable discussion within the
Army of the Navy's siphoning off some of the best of the nation's
engineering and building trades manpower for its construction
battalions (Seabees) . These units performed functions which, some
portions of the Army felt, were not always properly those of the Navy.
The War Department's Operations Division counseled:
- [406]
- The War Department should
avoid discussion and implied criticism of Navy troop requirements.
Such procedure would invite retaliatory action and would be
detrimental to both services . . . . The Navy has not sought the
assumption of Army responsibilities in the construction of
airfields. Furthermore, the existence of construction battalions and
other Navy shore units of like nature might compel absorption by the
Navy Department of their quota of negro troops.2
-
- Some months passed before the
Navy began to take enough Negroes through Selective Service to affect
the Army's accessions of Negro manpower. Beginning low, the Navy's
share increased until in December 1943 the ratios of the two services
stood: 1.02 Army to 1 Navy white selectee and 1.78 Army to 1 Navy
Negro selectee. By the end of 1944 the Army-Navy ratio of Negroes
being taken was 1 and 1, with the over-all ratio for the year being
approximately 3.3 Army to 2 Navy selectees. This reapportionment of
Negro inductees to both services, with the Navy eventually taking
nearly as many Negroes as the Army, helped reduce, by the end of 1943
the number of Negroes who would otherwise have been earmarked for the
Army by Selective Service. But joint induction alone was not
responsible for the changes in the rates of induction and distribution
affecting the use of Army Negro manpower in the last half of the war.3
-
- Although the 1943 Troop Basis
provided for a full 10.6 percent accession of Negro enlisted men,
with a roughly proportionate distribution to the major commands, the provisions of
this troop basis did not, for several reasons, materialize. During
the discussions of the final form of the troop basis, a number of
objections to various features of it as they affected the distribution
of Negro troops were voiced by the commands and by the branches. These
portended the changes and developments to come during the life of this
troop basis.
-
- Army Ground Forces was
critical of the continued allotment of Negroes to additional divisions
and of G-3's attempts to raise the proportions of Negroes in other
types of ground units. Originally, the two infantry divisions deferred from 1942 and the completed 2d Cavalry Division remained in
the 1843 Troop Basis, providing a total of five Negro divisions.4 Of
the two additional infantry divisions one was scheduled for activation
in March, the other in November 1943. Ground Forces succeeded in
having one of the infantry divisions dropped, substituting for it
non-divisional combat units.5 Although Ground Forces continued to
recommend that the remaining division be dropped, with non-divisional
combat units substituted for it, G-3 would not concur in this
suggestion, commenting:
-
- The 1943 Troop Basis provides
full combat support for only 78 divisions. To organize additional
non-divisional combat units with Negro personnel will further reduce
support already inadequate, since Negro combat units admittedly are
not of the same quality as similar white units. While granting the
questionable worth of Negro divisions, it appears now that we can
- [407]
- better afford to accept an
additional Negro division than to further weaken our combat support
for the remaining white divisions. It is planned to withhold
activation of this division until late in 1943, by which time it is
possible that a more profitable manner to employ Negroes will have
been evolved since this matter is being given continuing study.6
-
- The additional division
remained in the troop basis, scheduled for activation at Fort Huachuca
in December 1943 .7
-
- The services as well objected
to the distribution of Negroes contemplated in the 1943 Troop Basis.
The tentative distribution of Negroes among the services showed the
same imbalance that had prevailed throughout 1942, with the
Quartermaster allotment still higher than that of any other branch.
The Quartermaster General requested a reduction in the number of
Negroes sent to his branch, pleading a shortage of facilities,
difficulty in obtaining adequate leadership, and limited sources of
cadres. The Services of Supply agreed that the "efficiency of the
Quartermaster service as a whole will suffer considerably and [it]
will not be able to maintain its place in the team with the other
services" unless the numbers of Negroes allotted it were reduced.
Services of Supply recommended that Negroes allotted to the
Quartermaster be reduced to 36,000, the corps' training capacity for
the year. The 17,783 men remaining could be assigned elsewhere,
preferably to Army Ground Forces, since the services in combat
support with Ground Forces would have but a 9.3 percentage of Negroes.
G-3, however, would not
sanction this realignments 8
-
- The racial allocations of the
new troop basis were approved by the Acting Chief of Staff, General
McNarney, on 23 January 1943. Then shortages and alterations in
overseas requirements began to affect the shape of both the 1943
Troop Basis as a whole and its racial allocations.
-
-
- At various times before 1943
Selective Service had not delivered Negroes in the numbers
requisitioned, but until the middle of 1943 the Army was usually more
concerned about finding places for all of the Negroes at its disposal
than about shortages. It had placed larger calls on Selective Service
toward the end of 1942 to bring the numbers of Negroes up to the
required ratio by the end of the calendar year. These calls, ranging
up to 50,000 Negroes a month, found some states unprepared to fill
them. At the beginning of 1943, inductions of Negro manpower had not
yet reached a proportionate level.
-
- Early in 1943 the War Manpower
Commission, facing adverse public criticism if single, apparently
physically fit Negro registrants continued to remain uncalled while
white husbands and fathers were being removed from many local
areas and while white workers in critical industries were being
reclassified by their draft boards, informed the War and Navy
Departments that a final decision to take Negroes in larger num-
- [408]
- bers must be made.9 The
commission argued that the completion of Negro percentage quotas was
desirable to reduce the rate of removal of skilled white workers
from the wartime labor market. Replacements for these workers were not
readily available from among civilian Negroes, Chairman Paul V. McNutt
pointed out. Moreover, court action had been instituted to test the
legality of quotas and separate calls in New York where a test case
was in its first stages. The outcome of this case was by no means
certain.10
-
- Secretary Stimson assured the
War Manpower Commission that the War Department's current plans called
for a 10.4 percentage of Negroes by the end of 1943. Stimson reminded
McNutt further that he did not consider "the present method of
induction to be discriminatory in any way," so long as this
percentage ratio was maintained. Making use of the limiting clause
which had given Negroes some qualms in 1940, he further pointed out
that the Selective Service Act provided that no man should be inducted
"unless and until" he was acceptable to the land or naval
forces for training and service and his physical and mental fitness
for such training should have been determined. "While those
colored registrants who are qualified physically, mentally, and
morally under Army standards are acceptable," the Secretary
wrote, "they are acceptable only at a rate at which they can be
properly assimilated.11
-
- While McNutt was certain that
the acceptance of proportionate numbers of Negroes would result in
higher morale among both Negro and white troops, as well as in the
civilian population, he did not agree that the maintenance of racial
quotas would "meet the problem of discrimination in the
administration of the Selective Service and Training Act," nor
did the section cited by Stimson "in any way qualify the plain
mandate that registrants be inducted without discrimination on
account of race or color." Therefore, McNutt informed the
Secretary, as soon as current backlogs of un-inducted Negroes were
absorbed, Selective Service would abandon the policy of calling men
by racial quotas. The War Department should be prepared, after 3l
December 1843, to accept Negroes and whites in the order in which
their names appeared on their local selective service rolls.12
-
- So far as Stimson could see,
there was no practical method of operating inductions on this basis.
The matter was not simply one of separate calls and quotas, the
Secretary told McNutt. When the Army reached its maximum size,
continuing inductions would be based on loss replacement rates.
Since most Negroes would not be in combat zones, loss replacements
for Negro units would be considerably lower than for white units. A
more carefully controlled induction system, aimed at maintaining but
not increasing Negro proportions in the Army, would then have to be
- [409]
- instituted, for otherwise the
Army would be "forced to mix negro and white enlisted personnel
in the same units." Stimson suggested that since he was certain
that McNutt had no desire to "complicate an already difficult
problem," War Manpower's proposal should be withdrawn.13
-
- The War Manpower Commission
did not follow Stimson's suggestion. Certain of the War Department's
General Staff divisions felt that preparations should be made to
counteract future War Manpower attempts to force the War Department to
accept its point of view. But Selective Service, from April on, began
to fall behind in its deliveries of Negro men. So long as requisitions
based on population ratios remained unfilled, part of the Army's
problem of what to do with Negro troops was solved and the answer to
War Manpower Commission criticisms was clear. If outstanding
requisitions should be filled "in a short period, [it] might
prove temporarily embarrassing," G-3 observed in August, adding
"however, considering the screening of Grade V personnel, such
a situation appears unlikely to develop."14 "To build a
record in anticipation of continued Negro shortages and contemplated
WMB [War Manpower Board actions later on"15 was the purpose of
increasing requisitions, making certain that troop basis units
existed, and reporting shortages to McNutt as they occurred.
-
- When the 1943 Troop Basis was revised
on 1 July position vacancies were therefore
retained for approximately 714,000 Negroes, or 10.4 percent of the male
enlisted strength of 6,869,000 expected by 31 December. Monthly calls on
Selective Service were established in numbers believed sufficient to meet
the commitment made by Secretary Stimson to the War Manpower Commission.
These calls provided for the placement of about 349,500 additional men,
amounting to 19 percent of the total Selective Service calls for the year.16
But, by the end of September, Selective Service was short 28,700 Negroes
in its deliveries. Through the same period, separations of Negro personnel
from the Army were abnormally high, totaling 44000.17
-
- Shortages in the delivery of
selectees by Selective Service arose in a number of ways: through
disparities between activations and authorizations for the increase of personnel in the Army; through heavier rejection rates
at local boards and induction stations than expected (which,
therefore, bad not been offset by sufficiently large overcalls) ; and
through changes in over-all war plans and needs. To these reasons for
shortages must be added a number of special circumstances which
affected the delivery and use of Negro selectees to a greater extent
than whites.
-
- The initial overrepresentation
of Negroes in Selective Service Glass I-A dwindled as more and
more white men originally deferred were reclassified. Because of
adjustments and changes in induction methods and standards, the
percentages of Negroes rejected from among those examined at induction
sta-
- [410]
- tions rose steadily during
1943 until, in September, 60.6 percent of all Negro registrants
reporting to induction stations were rejected. The percentage of
rejections declined slightly thereafter, but it did not again go below
November's 56.1 percent. The average Negro rejection rate for the
year was 53 percent, while for whites the average rate for the year
was 33.2 percent.18
-
- The liberalization of literacy
and venereal standards in 1943 should have provided local boards
with many ready men who had previously been rejected, or so the local
boards thought. Negro men previously rejected for illiteracy were now
returned to induction stations in large overcalls. But many of these
men were now rejected again for other causes. Venereals recalled by
the boards were rejected for other disorders, initially undetected or
unrecorded. Many men previously rejected as illiterate were
discovered to be unable to pass the new qualification tests.19
-
- Selective Service, attempting
to counter the effect of increasingly high rejection rates,
advised its state directors in November 1942 to estimate the Negro
gross call (net call plus overcall) at a higher rate than the white
overcall percentage.20 In May 1943, Selective Service instructed its state
directors that though the white gross call could be set at no more
than 140 percent of the white net call, the Negro gross call could be
as large as 200 percent of the Negro net call .21 The 200 percent
gross call for Negroes still did not produce the required number of
inductees. In July Selective Service removed all restrictions on the
size of the Negro overcall, stating that the Negro gross call might be
placed "at whatever percent is necessary to deliver the Negro
net call." 22
The shortages in deliveries continued just the
same.
-
- State directors, urged to fill
their Negro quotas, had their own explanations for their failure to
meet calls: induction stations were not examining Negroes carefully
before rejecting them. "We do have evidence," the state
director for Georgia reported, "that registrants are lined up and
asked if they have previously been to the induction station and, if
so, to hold up their hands; those who hold up their hands are asked to
stand aside and they are generally not given any re-examination of any
consequence and are again rejected." Moreover, the Georgia
director continued:
-
- The rejection rate is
exceedingly high and it is very difficult for Georgia to fill calls
for Negroes-they simply do not want them. For a long while they
rejected the Negroes for urethritis and when we kicked so much about
that they switched to inadequate personality, we kicked about that
and they switched to psychoneurosis. We have been kicking about
psychoneurosis for a couple of months and now they are switching to
other causes for rejections but the
- [411]
- rejection rate, meanwhile is
steadily increasing. The men at the induction stations seem to
have their orders and do not seem to have much discretion in the
matter. The remedy, apparently, must come from top side.
-
- In calling this letter to
Assistant Secretary McCloy's attention, Truman Gibson noted that
"This sentiment is shared by 44 state directors."23
-
- Selective service directors
were not alone in this sentiment. Congressmen and editors, North and
South, addressed themselves to the problem during the discussions of
drafting fathers and drafting women through national service
legislation. Representative Charles E. McKenzie, of Louisiana,
inserted in the Congressional Record his remarks on the subject:
-
- Mr. Speaker, many times before
have I protested the discriminatory manner in which the Selective
Service Act has been interpreted and administered. It is not the fault
of the local boards. Their hands are tied. The fault is here in
Washington where a deliberate attempt is being made to keep Negroes,
single Negroes, out of the service while white fathers are being
drafted. Has it actually come to pass in America where the color of a
man's skin is the basis for his being deferred, even if he is single
and has no dependents. We people of the South are beginning to think
so as evidenced by the following editorial from the Morehouse Enterprise of Bastrop, La . . . . I warn you, gentlemen of the House,
that such discrimination is detrimental to the morale of the Nation.24
-
- "We do not question the
army's need for more men," The Christian Century observed
during the following spring. "But it's surprising that in all the
commotion about needed manpower nothing has been said about making
fuller or better use of Negro citizens." Congress, this magazine
felt, should investigate both the drafting and the use of Negro
manpower before increasing the classes of men to be drafted .25
-
- Shortages in the delivery of Negro
inductees continued to the end of the year. In October, G-3 estimated that
shortages in deliveries, coupled with the abnormally high attrition of 1943,
would result in a total shortage of 88,000 men by the end of the year. These
men were slated for use in planned units in the current troop basis which,
in its October revision, contained only units which were necessary for overseas
deployment by 30 June 1944, all other units having been deferred. "Due
to the smallness of the reserve provided, it will be unwise to defer wholly
the activation of units totaling 88,000 men if Negro fillers cannot be secured,"
G-9 advised. Instead, these units should be filled with any excess white
personnel available. After considering G-1 and Operations Division comments
on its proposal, G-3 recommended that no
- [412]
- further change in calls on
Selective Service be made for the rest of the year calls had
already been sent to Selective Service anyway-with "whatever
shortage [which] may develop being accepted as a cushion against
expected excess deliveries in 1944." New units earmarked for
Negroes that could not be filled with excess whites could be deferred
to absorb Negroes delivered in 1944. When the Army's strength finally
reached 10.4 percent Negro, action could then be taken to restrict
Negro inductions so as to maintain that percentage .26
-
- The mounting shortages in the
delivery of Negro inductees further weakened the impetus toward
proportionate distribution and removed War Manpower's major argument
for halting the use of monthly Negro quotas.27 So long as Army
requisitions for Negro inductions remained higher than Selective
Service's deliveries, the War Manpower Commission could not reasonably
blame the Army for its shortage of proportionate Negro strength.
Actually, no defense against War Manpower action was needed. As a
result of continuing discussions and dissatisfactions with national manpower policies, the Congress restored Selective Service
to its independent status as of 5 December 1943, 28 thus removing the
possibility that War Manpower might order the cessation of inductions
by racial quotas at the end of 1943.
-
- Though nearly II percent of
the men sent to the Army by Selective Service during the war years
were Negroes and though there was a steady
increase in the number of Negroes in the Army, reaching a peak of
702,758 at the end of July 1945, their proportion never reached a 10.4
(or 10.6) percentage goal during the war. The rate of discharge and
the fact that there were avenues of entry to the Army more freely
available to whites than to Negroes kept the Negro percentage below
its population based proportion. Only after the end of the war, when
combat veterans were discharged first and when higher percentages
of Negro enlisted men volunteered to remain in the Army did the
percentage of enlisted strength approach the goal. The percentage of
total strength still lagged behind. (Tables 10, 11, and 12) As
predicted by G-3, the smaller calls of 1944 were generally filled or
overfilled. But in the meantime the shortages of 1943, coupled with
the difficulties of shipping overseas the Negro units then in being,
had worked a profound change in the organization of Negro units.
Shortages had developed not only in Negro but also in white
deliveries. At the same time, requirements for new units, especially
in the services, soared above those originally contemplated in the
1943 Troop Basis. As the armies overseas grew larger, the requirements for service units for their support increased. With
Negro units of several types, combat and non-combat, in the country and
uncalled for by overseas theaters, one answer to the growing need for
service units was clear. Simultaneously the reorganization of nearly
all non-divisional units, combat and non-combat, offered an
opportunity to reexamine the possibilities of providing Negro units
of a more useful and wanted character.
- [413]
- JULY 1940-AUGUST 1945
-
Year |
Inductions |
Enlistments |
ERC Calls |
Aggregate |
Negro |
Total |
Negro |
Total |
Negro |
Total |
Negro |
Total |
Total |
887,724 |
8,096,22 |
30,383 |
1,437,024 |
4,858 |
497,671 |
922,965 |
10,030,927 |
(Percent) |
(10.96) |
(100.0) |
(2.11) |
(100.0) |
(0.97) |
(100.0) |
(9.20) |
(100.0) |
1940 |
1,853 |
19,327 |
6,019 |
356,832 |
0 |
0 |
7,872 |
376,159 |
1941 |
93,399 |
928,998 |
10,367 |
411,832 |
0 |
120 |
103,766 |
1,340,950 |
1942 |
331,616 |
3,122,248 |
13,873 |
655,381 |
386 |
37,942 |
345,875 |
3,815,571 |
1943 |
291,106 |
2,376,312 |
62 |
4,603 |
3,083 |
278,575 |
294,251 |
2,659,490 |
1944 |
110,353 |
987,599 |
36 |
3,385 |
926 |
122,373 |
111,315 |
1,113,357 |
1945 |
59,397 |
661,748 |
26 |
4,991 |
463 |
58,661 |
59,886 |
725,400 |
-
- Source: Adapted from Strength
of the Army, 1 Jan 47, STM-30.
-
-
- Changes in the allocation of
Negro manpower, and consequently in its ultimate employment,
proceeded along two lines. The first was an attempt, supported by
the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War and the Advisory Committee
on Negro Troop Policies, to devise ways and means of extending the
employment of Negro troops to new types of unit and specialist fields.
The second was an attempt, supported by the Chief of Staff and Army
Ground Forces, to shift the emphasis from proportionate employment of
Negroes in all types of units, especially combat types, to their
larger proportionate use in the services, concentrating on needed
labor functions.
-
- The two lines of policy
involving change were not necessarily in conflict, for, at the same
time that a few Negroes went into new types of units, the bulk of
Negro soldiers continued to go into the traditional types of service
units. Combat, technical, and "special" units for which no immediate need could
be foreseen furnished many of the men for new service units. The few
new types of units activated, such as parachute, bombardment, and
engineer construction units, broadened the base of Negro military
experience and continued to move toward the goal that Negroes be
employed in all types of units. The many new service units of
established types satisfied the growing belief that the waste of
Negro manpower could be avoided only by placing the bulk of Negroes in
units which lead a reasonable chance of success in training and of
employment overseas.
-
- The continuing shortages of
manpower in 1943 affected both courses of action. The two were
bolstered by an oral expression of the Chief of Staff's wishes in the
spring of 1943. One morning in late April, after a general survey of
mobilization and training problems with representatives of G-1 and G-3
General Marshall discussed the utilization and training of
Negroes.
- [414]
- DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945
-
Quarter or Month |
Total Negro |
Total Strength of the Army |
Percent of Negro to Total |
Negro Enlisted Personnel |
Total Enlisted Personnel |
Percent of Negro Enlisted to Total Enlisted |
1941 |
December |
99,206 |
1,684,403 |
5.88 |
98,686 |
1,562,256 |
6.32 |
1942 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
March |
143,556 |
2,387,746 |
6.01 |
142,967 |
2,236,547 |
6.39 |
June |
178,708 |
3,074,184 |
5.81 |
178,032 |
2,867,762 |
6.21 |
September |
255,545 |
3,971,016 |
6.44 |
253,952 |
3,673,876 |
6.91 |
December |
399,454 |
5,397,674 |
7.40 |
397,407 |
5,000,275 |
7.95 |
1943 |
March |
504,430 |
6,508,854 |
7.75 |
601,423 |
6,010,032 |
8.34 |
June |
555,176 |
6,993,102 |
7.94 |
551,375 |
6,413,526 |
8.60 |
September |
596,664 |
7,273,784 |
8.20 |
592,160 |
6,622,951 |
8.94 |
December |
633,448 |
7,482,434 |
8.47 |
628,151 |
6,790,754 |
9.25 |
1944 |
March |
671,877 |
7,757,629 |
8.66 |
666,224 |
7,021,758 |
9.49 |
June |
698,911 |
7,992,868 |
8.74 |
692,954 |
7,215,888 |
9.60 |
September |
701,678 |
8,108,129 |
8.65 |
695,874 |
7,293,480 |
9.54 |
December |
691,521 |
8,052,693 |
8.59 |
685,296 |
7,212,210 |
9.50 |
1945 |
March |
694,333 |
8,157,386 |
8.51 |
687,874 |
7,288,292 |
9.44 |
June |
694,818 |
8,266,373 |
8.41 |
687,823 |
7,374,710 |
9.33 |
September |
653,563 |
7,564,514 |
8.64 |
646,352 |
6,679,773 |
9.68 |
December |
372,369 |
4,228,936 |
8.81 |
367,630 |
3,572,577 |
10.29 |
-
- Source: Strength of the Army,
1 Jan 47, STM-30, p. 61.
-
- The G-1 representative
summarized the Chief of Staff's views:
- a. The Chief of Staff wants
the installation at Tuskegee expanded to take on the technical
training of negroes for service units, particularly those kinds
requiring the use of special types of heavy technical equipment.
- b. Utilize more Negroes in
Engineer General Service Regiments and such organizations.
- c. Do not plan on the
activation of more negro combat units than presently scheduled,
possibility of not activating the December Division.
- d. Quit catering to the
negroes desire for
- a proportionate shark of
combat units. Put them where they will best serve the war effort.29
-
- General Marshall's informal proposals,
while not put into effect immediately, were reflected in actions of the
staff divisions from mid-1943 onward.
-
- Screening methods were still
being thought of as one answer to the problem of providing Negro units
for use, but screening also involved the question of
- [415]
- DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945
-
Quarter or Month |
Male Officers |
Enlisted Men |
Nurses |
Dieti- tians |
Phys- ical Thera- pist |
Warrant Officers |
Flight Officers |
WAAC and WAC |
Total |
Officers |
Enlisted |
1941 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
December |
462 |
96,686 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99,206 |
1942 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
March |
534 |
142,967 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
143,556 |
June |
594 |
178,032 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
178,708 |
September |
1,525 |
253,952 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
255,545 |
December |
1,921 |
397,246 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
19 |
161 |
399,454 |
1943 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
March |
2,687 |
498,956 |
165 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
65 |
2,467 |
504,430 |
June |
3,358 |
548,319 |
158 |
4 |
1 |
166 |
9 |
105 |
3,056 |
555,176 |
September |
3,859 |
589,253 |
195 |
8 |
1 |
336 |
0 |
105 |
2,907 |
596,664 |
December |
4,475 |
625,449 |
198 |
9 |
1 |
507 |
4 |
103 |
2,702 |
633,448 |
1944 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
March |
4,690 |
663,164 |
219 |
10 |
2 |
603 |
14 |
115 |
3,060 |
671,877 |
June |
4,949 |
689,565 |
213 |
8 |
2 |
636 |
32 |
117 |
3,389 |
698,911 |
September |
4,728 |
692,229 |
247 |
9 |
2 |
613 |
84 |
121 |
3,645 |
701,678 |
December |
5,027 |
681,376 |
256 |
9 |
6 |
656 |
151 |
120 |
3,920 |
691,521 |
1945 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
March |
5,073 |
684,097 |
336 |
7 |
9 |
685 |
234 |
115 |
3,787 |
694,333 |
June |
5,411 |
684,091 |
464 |
9 |
11 |
682 |
301 |
117 |
3,732 |
694,818 |
September |
5,718 |
642,719 |
466 |
8 |
10 |
592 |
312 |
105 |
3,633 |
653,563 |
December |
3,799 |
366,016 |
318 |
8 |
7 |
306 |
225 |
80 |
1,610 |
372,369 |
-
- Source: Strength of the Army, 1
Jan 46, STM-30, p. 60.
-
- what to do with the men
remaining. To use them in purely maintenance and labor work, as
sometimes suggested, would involve the Army in charges of
discrimination against Negroes. On the other hand, successful
screening to forth units eminently suited for overseas combat use
might, some feared, result in an interpretation that Negro units were
generally "good" and that therefore more should be used in
active theaters. One thing was certain, the Deputy Chief of Staff,
General McNarney, told the members of the General Council: There
- was no use having colored
troops standing by and eating their heads off if they could never be
used overseas. Either the men of lower qualifications who kept units
from becoming efficient must be eliminated or some other use must be
found for Negro troops. The War Department could not justify
maintaining units which could not be shipped overseas.30
- [416]
-
- The first major organizational
change dictated by considerations of manpower economy was the shift
from a fixed to a functional organization of non-divisional units. This
change was Army-wide, but it had special effects on Negro units. As a
result of deliberations culminating in the last weeks of 1942 and the
beginning of 1943, the fixed brigade and regiment and, in the
services, the battalion as well, virtually disappeared from the Army
during 1943. The new organization provided definite advantages for
Negro units so far as their training and potential deployment were
concerned.
-
- Essentially, the change to a
more flexible organization involved the substitution of smaller
for larger units as the fixed organization. The new organization,
the "group," or the flexible battalion, was a device for
grouping interchangeable units under a headquarters which, for
training or operational purposes, might have none or many units
under its control at a given time. Instead of an antiaircraft
artillery regiment organized with a given number of battalions as
prescribed in a table of organization, a group headquarters might
control seven battalions for a specific function and, later, three
battalions for another function. This type of organization was
approved for Army Ground Forces in December 1942 and for Army Service
Forces in January 1943. The process of converting existing units to
the new organization continued throughout the year.
-
- The new organization of units
made possible the institution of many of the reforms in the structure
and use of Negro units which had been
discussed for twenty years. It gave Army Ground Forces a method within
an over-all Army policy to put into practice General McNair's
conviction that "colored troops can be handled more
satisfactorily, and assimilated in a combat force more readily, in
battalion units than in regimental units. Colored battalions can be
attached to white units and given better training than they would
receive if by themselves." 31
It gave the proponents of the
principle that Negro troops could furnish labor while small white
units provided supervision and specialists a chance to try working
combinations of white and Negro troops, who, though working together,
were yet not in the same unit. Negro units which formerly would have
trained and operated alone could now be combined with white units
under the control of a single, lower echelon headquarters.
-
- While it required several
months to reorganize all units into flexible groups, the new
organization had immediate practical benefits to certain units,
especially to those of service types. The companies of the 27th
(quartermaster Regiment, for example, had never been physically close
to their regimental headquarters. By 1943 they were spread all over
the world. These companies could now be placed under headquarters
physically closer to the units supervised. Elements of battalions
had operated in widely separated places. The four companies of the
388th Port Battalion, for example, were assigned to widely distant
stations: Company A to the Middle East, Company B to the New Orleans
Port of
- [417]
- Embarkation, and Companies C
and D to the South Pacific. Re-designated as the 208th, 209th, 210th,
and 211th Port Companies, Transportation Corps, they became in fact
separate and independent.32 They could be attached or
assigned to
any port or other headquarters.
-
- The new system also promised a possible
solution to some of the knottier problems in the employment of larger Negro
units. An overseas area which might not wish a regiment might be willing
to accept a separate battalion. One of the oldest Negro field artillery
regiments was rated satisfactory for combat duty in the summer of 1942,
but there was no possibility of moving it overseas in the immediate future.
Ground Forces was told that unless the regiment moved from its location,
where the nearest firing range was 205 miles away and where only limited
facilities for combined training existed, it would be unable to maintain
a satisfactory training level, aside from the effects of boredom and other
morale difficulties. But there was no other suitable station available for
it within the country and none overseas.33
By November this unit, weakened by cadre losses, higher command problems,
and dimming training objectives, reached the point where it fluctuated between
high and low states of training and morale. Thereupon, Army Ground Forces
recommended that it be redesignated a Quartermaster truck regiment for immediate
use overseas. No theater desired a separate Negro field artillery regiment
overseas at the time but Quartermaster
truck units were urgently needed.34
Neither (G-1 nor G-3 would sanction the conversion of this trained regiment
to service use. "The constant pressure on the War Department to activate
additional colored units in the combat arms and the known plans for the
continued activation of such units makes it undesirable, as a matter of
War Department policy, to convert a combat regiment that has had almost
two years active duty training into a service regiment," G-1 said.
If there was no need for a regiment of its type, G-1 suggested, conversion
to another type of artillery or into two or more separate battalions might
be possible.35
Consequently, upon approval of the flexible group plan, the battalions of
this regiment were among the first to be redesignated and the headquarters
and headquarters battery were among the first to be disbanded.36
-
- Though there was G-3
resistance to the move, the new flexible group system allowed as well
the reduction of the numbers of Negro headquarters requiring
high-ranking officers and exceptionally well-qualified enlisted men.
Army Ground Forces, in January 1943, wished to disband the
headquarters of two antiaircraft regiments, six field artillery
regiments, and the one field artillery brigade. From this personnel,
Army Ground Forces planned to activate an additional 155-mm. gun field
artillery battalion, disbanding one similar white battalion to balance
the troop basis. Later, acting on a request from the Tank
- [418]
- Destroyer Center, Army Ground
Forces requested that Negro group headquarters be eliminated
entirely. "The major purpose in organizing group headquarters
is to obtain a high degree of flexibility," it stated. "In
order to maintain this flexibility, it is believed that group
headquarters companies should be organized with white personnel, to
which could be attached all units, whether with white or Negro
personnel." This could not be done, G-3 decided, for current
policy required that some units of all types be organized with Negro
enlisted men and that opportunities be maintained for Negro promotions up to and including the grade of colonel in each arm and
service "wherein appropriate units exist." That the
organization of all group headquarters with white personnel would
make for a greater degree of flexibility G-3 did not doubt, but
existing Negro headquarters could not be disbanded to organize white
headquarters without subjecting the War Department "to a
justifiable accusation of discrimination." G-3 granted
permission to defer the activation of new group headquarters, since
officers for them were not available. Eventually white headquarters
were substituted for certain of the Negro headquarters remaining in
the troop basis. The result was a material reduction in the number of
Negro group headquarters.37
-
-
- For further personnel savings,
with the object of getting greater use out of available manpower,
surveys of manpower utilization and allocations were constant during
1943 and 1944. Revisions in tables of organization to reduce the
requirements of individual types of units, changes in the troop basis,
conversions of existing units to more urgently needed types,
retraining programs for individuals in preparation for their use in
new or related specialties, and, in certain of the technical services,
the establishment of cellular units of small numbers of highly trained
men who could be supplemented in the field by labor forces from units
of general service types were all developments of the tight manpower
situation. Though not a part of stated policy, renewed insistence
that, wherever it might be done with profit, new units should be
composed of Negro enlisted personnel, thus releasing white personnel
for use in foreign areas or in types of units where successful Negro
service was problematical, was a part of the general trend of the
period.
-
- In the late winter of 1942-43, the Transportation Corps, requiring larger numbers of port
battalions, requested the addition of three port headquarters and
headquarters companies and twelve battalions to the troop basis. The
chief of the Transportation Corps requested that all of these units be
white, but the Operations Division, which had just concluded
unsuccessful attempts to have sanitary companies reorganized for
greater overseas usefulness, reported to G-3 that Negro battalions
could be used at the future destinations of these units. G-3 then
suggested to the Services of
- [419]
- Supply that since this
augmentation would have to be charged against the SOS reserve pool,
other SOS units might be reduced to provide the personnel required
for these new units. G-3 specifically suggested that Negro
sanitary companies or quartermaster service battalions might be used
for this purpose.38
-
- The Transportation Corps still
wished white units only. Services of Supply therefore requested three
white headquarters and headquarters companies and ten white and two
Negro port battalions. The Operations Division recommended approval of
the request but not the racial proportions, whereupon G-3 reversed
these proportions, with Transportation Corps' troop basis increased by
ten Negro and two white port battalions.
-
- Thereafter more and more port units
were formed with Negro personnel. Similarly, most amphibian truck (Dukw)
companies formed after mid-1943 were filled with Negro personnel. When twelve
new Dukw companies were added to the troop basis in the late spring of 1943,
Army Ground Forces and G-3 recommended that they be manned with personnel
from Negro truck units. Despite the protest of the Operations Division,
these and all Dukw companies activated after October 1943 used Negro enlisted
personnel.39
Most men for these units did not come from trained truck units but from
disbanded medical sanitary, military police, and artillery units.
-
- Attempts to open new types of
units to Negroes were not at all successful. The revised 1943 Troop
Basis provided nine Negro quartermaster depot supply companies for
Army Ground Forces. This command, pointing out the difficulty of
getting competent noncommissioned officers, technicians, and cadres
for specialized Negro units when no parent units of the type
existed, requested that they be organized with white personnel
scheduled to go into Army Service Forces service and salvage
collecting units. These units, requiring fewer skills, could be
converted to receive Negroes. G-3 reminded Ground Forces that
provisions for Negro units must be made in "compliance with
law," that new methods of screening personnel at induction
centers would reduce the training problem involved in the scarcity of
noncommissioned officer material, and that 26 percent of Service
Forces as compared with 17.5 percent of Ground Forces personnel was
already Negro. Nevertheless, after advice from G-4, G-3 directed that
the nine companies be activated with white personnel.40 Similarly,
when G-3 suggested informally that Army Service Forces use Negroes
in the future for ordnance tire repair companies, the Ordnance
Department, at a conference on the troop basis, refused to consider
the possibility. These units remained white.41
-
- When Army Ground Forces saved
men from within its own strength by reducing table of organization
require-
- [420]
- ments for many of its units,42
certain of these savings provided additional vacancies for Negroes while
releasing whites for duties considered more exacting. Such a reorganization
was that of the motorized divisions. When fully equipped, motorized divisions
included not only about 3,000 vehicles-nearly three times as many as required
by the new "streamlined" standard infantry divisions-but also
the additional personnel required to operate these vehicles. A major portion
of this personnel was in the divisional troop transport battalion, which
had a headquarters and headquarters detachment and six companies. The four
partially motorized divisions- all of the existing motorized divisions except
the fully motorized 4th- were reorganized as standard infantry divisions
in March 1943.43
Truck units which could be used interchangeably by several divisions, thereby
saving both men and equipment, were activated. Four white battalion headquarters
and headquarters detachments to control twenty-four Negro troop transport
companies were authorized. With the reorganization of the 4th Motorized
as a standard infantry division in June 1943 and the changing of the remaining
five unactivated motorized divisions in the 1943 Troop Basis to standard
infantry, five more white battalion headquarters and headquarters detachments
and thirty more Negro troop transport companies for attachment were provided.44
In addition to an over-all saving of manpower, the net result was to release
actual and allotted white personnel for use in other units with shortages
and to absorb Negroes into units which, had they remained organic to motorized
divisions, would have been white.
-
- This method of saving manpower
by the use of Negroes in positions that would release white soldiers
for combat and for technical duties became more frequent as the
reorganization of 1943 continued. To some extent this developing
policy paralleled the philosophy of manpower use which brought women
soldiers into the Army.
-
-
- Aside from the aspirations of
women to serve fully in the armed forces after the pattern set in the
British and Canadian services, one of the major reasons urged for
the formation of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps in 1942 was the
women could do many noncombatant jobs as well as and even better than
men, thus releasing men for combat service.45 During the hearings on
and public discussions of the proposed corps, the question of the
use of Negro women came up frequently. Some Negro groups wished
- [421]
- the Congress to write into the
new law a protective nondiscriminatory clause similar to that
contained in the Selective Service Act.46 Such an amendment was
proposed in the Senate by Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon for
Senator W. Warren Barbour of New Jersey and accepted. Similar
amendments were proposed by Senators Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado and
James H. Hughes of Delaware. The War Department opposed these
amendments, stating in hearings that Negro units would be formed and
that no amendments would be needed.47 The amendments were not
included in the bill as passed.
-
- When Secretary Stimson
announced on 15 May that Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, of Texas, had been
made
- director of the new corps, Negro groups which had
opposed her
appointment on the ground that her southern background would not
guarantee fair treatment for Negro women proposed that Stimson appoint
as her assistant Mrs. Mary McLeod Bethune, Director of Negro Affairs
in the National Youth Administration.48 But Mrs. Hobby, immediately
after she was sworn in, announced that among the first 400 officer
trainees forty would be Negro women and that at least
two of the first companies would be Negro. Thereupon the National
Negro Council, leader of the opposition to her appointment, withdrew
its objections and stated that Negro women now felt confident that
they would have an equal chance with white women in the new corps.49
-
- Negro women were not thought
of as replacements for Negro men. They were to be used wherever WAAC
units were required. In the process of their use they would, like all
women soldiers, release male manpower for other uses, but the
manpower released did not have to be Negro. It soon developed that,
whether or not protective clauses in the WAAC bill guaranteed a
nondiscriminatory recruiting policy, the WAAC was not going to get a
large number of Negro women. Several forces operated to restrict
applications from Negro women, but one was certainly "an
impression on their part that they will not be well received or
treated on posts where they may be stationed." 50
Reports from
Negro soldiers and from the press on conditions in training camps were
of no help in recruiting women. To overcome their reluctance, the
Military Personnel Division of SOS suggested an intensive recruiting
campaign, conducted through the chief Negro colleges, and the
establishment of a definite policy on the rights and privileges of
Negro women in the service.51
-
- Director Hobby had already
done much to dispel the fear that Negro Waacs
- [422]
- were neither wanted nor
needed. Her first public address after her installation was at Howard
University before members of a college sorority on 6 July 1942. She
spoke of the high qualifications of the applicants for the first
officers' class, explained that the first two Negro WAAC companies,
both commanded by Negro officers, would be stationed at Fort Huachuca
in November, 52
and announced that she was certain that Negro women
would serve faithfully and loyally in all parts of the WAAC.53
-
- The assignment of Negro Waacs to
posts and stations was conditioned by the same considerations that governed
the location of male units: the presence of a military or civilian Negro
population and the willingness of posts and stations to receive them. To
clarify further the position of Negro Waacs within the corps, Military Personnel,
Services of Supply, suggested that the policy of the director of the WAAC
be specifically confirmed by instructing: (1) that there be no discrimination
in the types of duties to which Negro women might be assigned; (2) that
no lowering of standards to meet racial ratios be prescribed and that, therefore,
intensive recruiting among
Negro women be inaugurated; (1) that Negro units be provided on the basis
of 10.6 percent of the over-all strength of the WAAC and that this percentage
be maintained in each type of unit within the WAAC, thereby paralleling
the policy for men in the Army; and (4) that an eminently qualified person,
preferably a Negro WAAC recruiting officer, be sent out to colleges "in
order to secure the proper class of applicants for colored units of the
WAAC." 54
Each of these policies was adopted.
-
- But, by the spring of 1943,
when major manpower problems had begun to assail the Army, there were
still only 2,52 Negro Waacs, representing but 5.7 percent of the
whole. Though the numbers of Negro Waacs increased later, they never
reached 6 percent of the corps. In the manpower discussions of 1943,
Negro Waacs (Women's Army Corps or WAC from July 1943) therefore
played but a small part. Those in the service were occupied in post
headquarters, motor pools, hospitals, and at other duties which did
release men for use elsewhere, but their numbers and the prospects of
their increase were not great enough to influence the solution of
problems brought about by manpower shortages. Nor were their services
of a nature to affect greatly the employment of Negro enlisted men.
Neither in post headquarters nor in motor pools; in message centers
nor in post offices; in hospitals nor in file rooms were they able to
release more than a few Negro enlisted men, for relatively few Negro
soldiers were so employed. Nor could Waacs themselves perform the
duties
- [423]
- which were now proposed for
the bulk of Negro enlisted men to help meet current needs of the Army.55
-
-
- Chief among the current needs
for more manpower were those of Army Service Forces. In 1943 the
demand for additional construction, transportation, communications,
and purely labor units in overseas theaters increased beyond original
expectations. In an attempt to meet these growing requirements ASF, in
the first six months of the year, activated units in excess of the
provisions of the troop basis. These activations created a shortage of
personnel for many service and ground forces units.56
Personnel due
for induction in the last half of 1943 could be used to fill certain
of these units and others yet to be activated. But for some of the
units the overseas need was immediate.
-
- Despite Army Service Forces complaints,
the reserve pool of service units for emergency overseas calls remained
small. On 1 July 1943 ASF units had personnel shortages totaling 70,000
men. Many units activated six months before had not yet been filled. ASF
forecast that, at the scheduled induction rate, it would take two months
to fill existing units if all new men inducted into the Army were used for
this purpose alone. But more units were scheduled for activation in the
next few months. A portion of the incoming men would have to be sent to
replacement training centers to build a supply of loss replacements. Another
portion, under the June 1943 regulations, would go to special training units
where they would remain from one to three months. Unless a drastic revision
of personnel methods and utilization was made, ASF contended, "Only
further aggravation of the existing situation can result." 57
-
- At the same time, Army Ground
Forces was complaining of shortages in its units. In ,June the troop
basis was cut by 500,000 men in an effort to adjust activations to
available manpower. Activations of the twelve divisions scheduled
for the remaining months of the year, including the last Negro
division, were deferred until 1944.58 This
deferment became
permanent, for although it was expected that these and other divisions might be activated in 1944,
actually no further
divisions were activated. The War Department Manpower
("Gasser") Board estimated that 65,000 to 85,000 men could
be transferred from overhead to units. But these excess men, a large
number of whom were Negroes by virtue of the fifteen and over
percentage of Negroes placed in overhead installations, could not be
used to correct Ground Forces shortages since most of the AGF units
with shortages were white and since transferring Negroes to this
command would simply produce an additional excess of Negroes in
existing units. Most Negro units of ground combat types were already
filled and waiting while the Army tried to solve the problem of their
deployment
- [424]
- overseas. Transfer of white
men from Army Service Forces to Army Ground Forces was not recommended
in view of the urgent need for existing service units overseas.59 But
the transfer of white personnel from a less to a more urgently needed
unit and of Negro personnel from an uncommitted Ground Forces to an
immediately needed Service Forces unit was another matter.
-
- The air base security
battalions were a tempting source of personnel for the 12,000 Negro
fillers needed for ASF units. In July, at ASF's request, the War
Department directed Army Ground Forces to disband thirty of these
battalions and their training headquarters.60 Army Ground Forces
was permitted to withdraw cadres and retain training group personnel
from these units for use in amphibian truck companies, troop transport
companies, and truck companies.61 The Army Air and Ground Forces were
also told to form no further Negro combat units except those already
scheduled for activation. In August 1943, the Army Air Forces
disbanded two white and thirteen Negro air base security battalions
and distributed most of their enlisted personnel to units of the Air
Service Command.62 In the same month, Army Service Forces requested
the transfer of 14,500 more Negro enlisted men for use as fillers.63"
Thirty-one battalions-13 antiaircraft, 10 field
- artillery, and 8 tank
destroyer-were stripped of 80 percent of their enlisted men to provide
these fillers.64 These units were left with double cadres so that they
might be refilled and retrained when new inductees became available.
By the end of August Army Service Forces had received, primarily from
within the Army, 60,000 men for new and unfilled units. Half of these
were Negroes.65
-
-
- In the meantime, formal
changes within the troop basis and in the allocations of manpower to
the major commands continued. Unneeded and less useful units not yet
activated in the troop basis were dropped or deferred. Thus, early in
1943, 8o Negro medical sanitary companies, t white and 2 Negro
headquarters and headquarters detachments for ordnance ammunition
battalions, and 3 Negro and 10 white quartermaster laundry companies
were removed from the troop basis. Their
- [425]
- personnel was allotted
elsewhere.66 By late summer the requirements for such defensive
units as antiaircraft artillery were sharply reduced, making both
Negro and white units of this branch eligible for inactivation and
conversion.
-
- For the October 1943 revision
of the troop basis, covering actions to be taken up to the end of the
year, G-.3 recommended that no further Negro combat units, other
than those then active, be provided. Since overseas assignment of
existing combat . units was proving so difficult, G-3 said, additional Negroes should be absorbed in service units. The troop
basis would continue to provide for a full proportionate accession
of Negroes "as evidence of good faith" even though selective
service might be unable to fill the requisitions made upon it. Under
the October revision additional units were scheduled for
inactivation, their personnel to be used elsewhere. For the most
part these were white units of artillery, armored, cavalry, medical,
ordnance, and tank destroyer types, but among them were Negro
chemical, medical, and quartermaster units.67
-
- Under this plan 18 antiaircraft
battalions, 5 barrage balloon battalions, 32 separate antiaircraft batteries,
6 tank battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 2 regiments and 3 battalions of seacoast
artillery, 17 field artillery battalions, and 42 tank destroyer battalions,
all white, were inactivated. Ten white and 6 Negro chemical smoke generator
companies, 11 Negro medical sanitary companies, 18 Negro troop transport
companies, 4 white and 4 Negro
veterinary companies, and 8 white and 7 Negro chemical decontamination companies
were also inactivated. Officers usually went with their units to the new
branches. When AGF attempted to substitute Negro for white officers in units
scheduled for disbandment and conversion for service uses, ASF objected
and tried to get the original officers back when possible. In March 1944
G-3 estimated that by the end of the year a total of 254 combat battalions
would be converted to service units. Not all of these were physical conversions,
for some of these units, although provided, had not been activated. Of the
254 battalions, 43 were Negro and 211 white. The disproportionately high
number of Negro battalions was traceable, G-3 said, to the relatively less
advanced state of training among Negro units.68
-
- The 1944 Troop Basis finally abandoned
the attempt to provide Negro units by set quotas. For 1944 all units, Negro
and white, were to be provided only on the basis of demonstrated and current
needs. "Operational demands forecast to 30 June 1945," G-3 reasoned,
"require the mobilization of a considerable additional number of service
units in which Negroes can profitably be employed (port, ammunition, truck,
service and dump truck companies) . Generally speaking all augmentations
of these types of units have been earmarked for Negro personnel." It
was true that this practice had resulted in an actual decrease in the number
of Negro combat units, G-3 continued, but enough had been retained to continue
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- representation of Negroes in
all arms and services. "With the smaller number of Negro combat
units now provided careful selection of personnel should permit
development of these units to the point where they will have battle
value," G-3 concluded.69
-
- After three years of attempting
to maintain a balance between Negro combat and service troops and among
the Negro units of the branches, G-3 thus gave up the struggle. For the
rest of the war, except for replacements, most Negroes in the Army went
into the services. Conversions, inactivations, and disbandments were the
rule, with actions to change the missions of white and Negro units taking
place both in the theaters and in the zone of interior. Through the inactivation
of surplus units; reduction
in the zone of interior activities, such as interior guard and similar duties
now made less essential by the progress of the war; and by closer control
of theater allotments of personnel, the War Department hoped to reduce the
military strain on national manpower resources.70
The more extensive use of Negro troops in the services, it was expected,
would contribute markedly to these ends. The realignment of Negro personnel
for wider use in purely service units would not, in any event, lessen opportunities
for shipment overseas where manpower was needed most. But, as a matter of
public policy, it made the movement of the remaining combat units overseas
correlatively more pressing.
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