- Chapter XVII
-
- Conversions And Commitments
-
- While the disposition of Negro air
combat units was engaging the attention of the War Department's top echelons,
the course of converting other Negro units, especially from combat to service
troops, continued as part of the larger manpower policy. It soon came into
conflict with the urgings of the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies,
the Inspector General's Office, and the Negro press and public. Each, from
its own point of view, supported the desirability of putting more Negro
combat and supporting units into action. Although plans for the shipment
of certain units were in the making, these units had not left the United
States and, under the policy of secrecy governing the movement of troops
in wartime, plans for their eventual commitment could not be disclosed in
more than a vague and general way. The conversion of combat units in the
United States to service units for future use overseas could not be so readily
concealed, and such conversions reawakened all the old fears of the Negro
public and its supporters; at the same time these conversions rekindled
the concern of people who felt that Negroes should share fully in battlefield
losses in order to preserve population ratios. The stripping of personnel
from certain units started rumors that all Negro ground combat units, and
particularly the 93d Infantry Division, were scheduled for stripping and
eventual disbandment.1
-
-
- The stripped combat units, like
the skeletonized units of the prewar period, became symbols of the failure
to use Negro manpower fully. Within Army Ground Forces there had been
attempts to salvage the stripped units with their double cadres. Some
wished to reduce them further to one cadre each, using the excess cadremen
for Headquarters 5889 in Liberia, about to be changed from white to Negro
personnel, and for quartermaster troop transport companies. Army Ground
Forces G-3 wanted to use excess unassigned Negroes to refill the stripped
units,2,
But, in the fall of 1943 these units' priority on personnel was too low
for immediate filling. Allocations of personnel then operated under rigid
priorities: (1), overseas replacements; (2), alerted units; (3) , unfilled
units; (4) , new units immediately needed; and (5), new activations. Since
Negro fillers were in short supply and since existing requirements for
alerted
- [468]
- service units were higher than for
uncommitted artillery and tank destroyer units, filling the stripped units
was not at the moment feasible. Even so, certain units-one field and two
antiaircraft artillery battalions-were scheduled for refilling and Army
Ground Forces planned to return the others to full strength.3
-
- Of ten stripped field artillery
battalions, eight were eventually refilled, but six of the refilled units
were later converted to engineer combat units. The other two were inactivated.4
Six of eight tank destroyer battalions awaited fillers for several months
while Army Ground Forces requested permission to inactivate them and G-3
insisted that they remain with augmented cadres until the question of refilling
them was settled. All were eventually inactivated.5
-
- The Inspector General in an over-all
survey of the state of Negro units, found in the fall of 1943 that determining
the current status of Negro units had become difficult. Simply identifying
Negro units, with their changing designations, was now a problems 6
By the time The Inspector General's survey was completed in December the
status of many units had already changed. From the evidence, nevertheless,
The Inspector General concluded that the Army no longer had a unified, consistent
policy for the activation, training, and employment of Negro units and that
the lack of a sound policy had resulted in the ineffective use of Negro
units and a corresponding waste of manpower.
-
- Although objecting that the survey
presented "no pertinent information . . . not already known to the
War Department," and that the survey had not taken into consideration
plans and problems in the placement of Negroes in the completed mobilization
program, G-3 admitted that the study was valuable, for it "focusses
attention on the seriousness of the situation and indicates that prompt,
remedial action must be taken." Despite attempts to meet the manpower
commitments made by Secretary Stimson, G-3 declared, failure to employ Negro
combat units overseas had placed the War Department in the unenviable position
of:
- a. Having a backlog of combat units
in the United States as indicated in the Inspector General's survey.
- b. Having to deplete or inactivate
these units to provide personnel for service units to avoid wasting manpower.
- c. Having to answer numerous queries
from negro and other allied organizations without having definite justification
for failure to commit negro units to combat or for placing the preponderance
of negro personnel in service units.
-
- G-3 recommended again: ( I ) that
all available Negro combat units be shipped without delay to active theaters
and ultimately employed on missions for which they were activated and trained;
(2) that when necessary they be used initially on missions other than their
combat missions provided that they retain their combat identity and not
be otherwise disposed of "until they have had an opportunity to prove
themselves in combat, gain their share of battle honors and accept
their share of battle losses"; (3) that pending results of the use
of Negro
- [469]
- combat units in battle no change
be made in combat units provided for 1944; and (4) that the Bureau of Public
Relations "impress upon the nation the great importance of, and need
for, service units in any war, and by suitable press releases stress not
only the service functions but also the combat requirements of service troops
in a war of movement and vertical envelopment and the important contributions
of negro units in connection therewith.7
-
- The G-3 recommendations were approved
in principle by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney,
on 10 January 1944. Similar G-1 proposals calling for the early employment
of Negro troops in combat and for raising morale and improving leadership
were approved on 20 January.8
The G-3 proposal on the immediate shipment of Negro units then went to the
Operations Division for comment and implementation.
-
- The Operations Division observed
that all available combat units, including Negro units, were being and would
continue to be shipped without delay to active theaters. Combat units, both
white and Negro, had been and would continue to be used on service missions
when necessary and, during such diversion from their primary missions, they
would retain their identities. It was expected, the Operations Division
said, that "all combat units eventually will be given the opportunity
to prove themselves in combat, gain their share of battle honors and accept
their share of battle losses," as G-3 proposed. The Operations Division
disclaimed current contemplation of changes in the combat units provided
in the 1944 troop basis, but it invited attention to "the fact that
no troop basis remains firm but must be modified in accordance with a continuously
changing situation." The proportions of Negroes overseas, the Operations
Division demonstrated, had increased markedly; they were now, at the end
of 1943, almost mathematically proportionate to their numbers in the Army.9
Among Negro units, one division was in process of moving and another division,
six tank destroyer battalions, and four field artillery battalions were
on the Operations Division's list for movement by the end of July 1944.
But engineer, signal, ordnance ammunition, engineer ponton, amphibious truck,
chemical smoke generator, troop transport, pack, and quartermaster service
units, which the Operations Division listed among "combat support units
normally employed in the combat zone, theater of operations," made
up the bulk of the Negro units overseas. Despite official War Department
definitions, in the public mind these were no substitutes for the combat
units by which battle achievement was measured. The Operations Division
therefore endorsed the G-3 proposal that the Bureau of Public Relations
emphasize
- [470]
- the importance of service units,
suggesting that it do so under the supervision of G-2. In sending this comment
forward through Operations Division channels, the preparing officer noted:
"I have kept this short purposely. No use of entering into futile controversy.
The WD gives lip service to a policy that is fraught with difficulties.
OPD appears to be in the clear now as we must use everything." 10
-
-
- The Operations Division had just
spent several months working with the "policy that is fraught with
difficulties." This staff division was thoroughly familiar with the
gap between policy and practice. Time and developments in the performance
of the 99th Squadron and not policy had answered the question of the deployment,
if not the use, of additional fighter units and the creation of a new bombardment
group. How to put into practice stated policies on the deployment of more
Negro ground combat units overseas had not been fully worked out. The Operations
Division, nevertheless, went ahead with tentative plans to send the 93d
Division to the Pacific. With three commands in the Pacific, all of whom
required additional strength, one might be willing to use the unit.
-
- At the beginning of 1943, Lt. Gen.
Millard F. Harmon, commanding Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, was
asked to comment on the possibility of using a Negro division. He replied
that although he needed additional divisions he
would prefer white ones because every man transported over great distances
in scarce ships to his area should have maximum effectiveness. If no white
divisions were available, he could use a Negro division for combat and for
garrisoning forward areas, including the Solomons and Bismarcks. Because
of the nature of the war in the Pacific, the highest type of leadership
was needed in the lower echelons of command; for this reason and because
native troops in the area had no native commissioned officers, none but
white officers should be sent with any Negro division.11
In light of divisional officer policies, this last requirement could not
be met.
-
- General Emmons, in Hawaii, was then
asked if a white division from among those in Hawaii might be sent to the
South Pacific if a Negro division replaced it in the defense of the islands.12
Hawaii, at the time, wanted an extra division so that units coming into
the islands to replace those going out to forward areas would not, during
the training and disposition period, leave a gap in island defenses. Though
General Emmons had indicated that a Negro division should not be assigned
the task of garrisoning either populous Oahu or the outlying Hawaiian Islands,
he was requested to draw up plans for the possible use of a Negro division
in the Hawaiian area, both to free a white division for combat and garrison
duties in the South Pacific and to provide employment for a Negro unit.
At a
- [471]
- later date, the Negro unit could
be withdrawn from Hawaii and sent to the South Pacific to garrison rear
areas there.13
-
- The Central Pacific, despite its
continuing objections, was directed in December 1943 to make plans for the
use of the 93d. The theater proposed to deploy it on four less populous
major islands, Kauai, Maui, Hawaii, and Molokai.14
But it was now considered expedient that the 93d get closer to a combat
area than Hawaii if possible. While movement orders directing the unit to
Hawaii were being prepared, the War Department again suggested that the
unit might be useful in the South Pacific where, after jungle training on
Guadalcanal, it might be used as a follow-up division in the northern Solomons-New
Guinea area for operations such as those in progress at Empress Augusta
Bay on Bougainville.15
At the same time the Central Pacific was informed that no proposed location
for the division was final and that it would be fixed in no single location
for the duration of the war 16
-
- General Harmon was willing to take
the 93d if he had to, but his earlier reservations still held. His area
had not expected to receive an additional division during the first six
months of 1944, he told the War Department. With shipping limitations in
the Pacific preventing both
the building of a balanced force and the maintenance of existing units at
maximum effectiveness, any available shipping could better be used to bring
in replacements, service units, and rotation personnel rather, than an unneeded
division. However, if the 93d was sent, it could be used in the manner suggested.
It could relieve first line white divisions for rest and rehabilitation,
making them more speedily available for re-employment.17
With this reluctant acceptance from General Harmon and in view of the continuing
coolness of the Central Pacific, orders were issued, on 2 January 1944,
changing the destination of the 93d Infantry Division from Hawaii to New
Georgia in the Solomon Islands.18
-
- In the same six months, means for
moving two of the remaining separate infantry regiments became available.
The 366th Infantry and 364th Infantry had been scheduled for the European
theater, the former for February 1944 and the latter for March.19
But all the European theater's expected requirements for separate regiments
were canceled.20
Ground Forces urged that the 364th, because of continuing difficulties in
its training locations, be given some other overseas destination. The 364th
was thereupon marked for rotation to
- [472]
- Alaska for March 1944 in place of
the 140th Infantry.21
-
- The 366th Infantry and 372d Infantry,
both of which had been in training and on security duties at their Massachusetts
and New York locations since the spring of 1941, were still un-allotted.
There had been unsuccessful attempts to use these Negro regiments as school
troops. There had been attempts to move the 372d for retraining, since Lt.
Gen. Hugh Drum, commanding the Eastern Defense Command, had reported that
its assignment to guard duty in the New York area was no longer necessary.
With the inadequate training facilities and excessive diversions of the
area, the regiment was faced with a loss of training and morale.22
But the regiment, by the terms of its assignment to New York, could not
be moved without War Department approval. The War Department, in turn, could
not move the regiment without authority from the White House, for the regiment
had been stationed in New York after an agreement between President Roosevelt
and Mayor La Guardia.23
-
- The White House, when queried on
moving the unit, replied through General Watson that there was no objection
to moving it provided that it was replaced by another regiment.24
The 372d therefore remained
on its New York duty. It and the 366th were frequently commented upon publicly
as examples of units activated and trained over a long period of time which
had not been employed overseas.25
-
- The opportunity to move these regiments
came as the result of conversions of other units. In November, the North
African theater, which already had five air base security battalions, requested
eighteen more or their equivalent for the Twelfth Air Force and for the
new Fifteenth Air Force. It suggested that, if necessary, the air base security
disbandment program be revised to provide the theater with units needed
to cope with increasing civilian sabotage and depredations on airfields.
Negro troops for these duties would be highly acceptable and a high priority
for them would be arranged, the theater said.26
-
- But all uncommitted air base security
battalions were now disbanded. G-3 proposed that the 366th and 372d Infantry
Regiments be furnished for this duty instead.27
The Operations Division concurred and recommended again that the War Department
request a White House release for the 372d Infantry. But the recommendation
was returned with the notation "Leave unit there until orders from
(WH) release
- [473]
- it."28
The North African theater was offered the 366th Infantry and accepted it,
whereupon the North African Air Force suggested on its own that an additional
Negro regiment would be quite acceptable in place of the remaining air base
battalions that it needed.29
To this latter suggestion the War Department replied that the additional
Negro regiment was not available, but the 65th (Puerto Rican) Regiment could
be substituted.30
The theater accepted this unit, along with the 367th Infantry Battalion,
offered earlier from Liberia.31
-
- The 366th, already released to Army
Ground Forces for refresher training, was thus scheduled for Italy in February
to serve in lieu of air base security battalions. The 364th was preparing
for Alaska. The 372d remained in New York City. The 93d Division was readying
for the Pacific. Plans for these units and efforts made to utilize them
were not made public. The units, therefore, remained centers of public and
press discussion until they were moved. When at last they were shipped,
it was under circumstances peculiar to them and unique in the deployment
of American military forces in World War II.
-
-
- Not until Chicago's 930th and 931st
Field Artillery Battalions, descendants of the old 8th Illinois Infantry,
were converted to engineer combat battalions in January 1944 was there strong
public and political reaction to the conversion of Negro units. For these
units, this conversion represented the third reorganization since the beginning
of mobilization. The 8th Illinois Infantry was inducted as a field artillery
regiment in January 1941 and reorganized into separate battalions in January
1943- It was easy to conclude that its history of successive reorganizations
indicated that it was unlikely to be used effectively at all. News that
the 2d Cavalry Division was being sent overseas for disbandment had even
greater impact, for two of its regiments were the old and revered 9th and
10th Cavalry. Their hold on the affections and respect of the Negro public
and of many of the older Army officers was surpassed by few other regiments.
Unfavorable reactions to their conversion were expected within the military
establishment. By this time, concern over the fate of Negro units in general
had already been expressed in many quarters. It was currently the subject
of a lively debate with heavily political overtones that eventually affected
the employment of the remaining Negro units.
-
- Representative Hamilton Fish, of
New York, who had spoken often in warm terms of his service in World War
I as an officer of New York's 369th In-
- [474]
- fantry Regiment, wrote to Secretary
Stimson for information on the report that Negro tank destroyer and field
artillery units had been broken up. He wanted to know as well if it was
true that the 24th Infantry had been in the Pacific for nearly two years
performing only labor duties. "I am aware of the fact that military
necessity must control the assignment of personnel in the Army," he
said, "but if the planning of the General Staff were adequate such
actions would not be necessary. In the circumstances, I am still wondering
whether there is not a deliberate plan to keep Negro soldiers out of actual
combat." He then referred to the Selective Service amendment on discrimination
in training which he had sponsored in 1940, saying that "If Negro soldiers
are trained as combat troops but denied service as such, such discrimination
appears to be a violation of my amendment."32
-
- Stimson's reply, dated 19 February
1944, was a lengthy one prepared in the Legislative and Liaison Division.
It detailed the relationship of units to the course of the war, pointing
out that certain defensive units, such as antiaircraft artillery, coast
artillery, and tank destroyers, were no longer needed in the numbers required
earlier and that service units "on a tremendous scale" were now
needed to support a global war waged on many fronts. Both Negro and white
units were being converted and both Negro and white units were being committed
overseas in as balanced proportions as possible. Both Negro and white combat
units were at times employed in labor functions. " I he tact is,"
Fish was told, "there is no defensible reason for not so employing
combat troops when necessary, and the procedure actually is to be encouraged
in order to obtain maximum manpower value. As you know, rarely are all combat
units in an area committed simultaneously. The decision as to when and how
any unit shall be employed rests entirely with the responsible commander."
33
-
- It was not these, but two other
statements in the letter that became the storm center for controversy. In
referring to the 930th and 831st Field Artillery Battalions, the letter
said:
-
- Certain other existing Negro Field
Artillery units are being converted to heavier artillery, but the 930th
and 931st 155 mm.
- Howitzer Battalions have not been
selected for conversion to heavier artillery or retention as Field Artillery
owing to the unsatisfactory records of both units. To have retained these
troops as Field Artillery and concurrently to have converted or stripped
other Negro or white Field Artillery units with substantially higher efficiency
records, would have been an uneconomical use of manpower. The present plan
to convert the units to Combat Engineers is based on similar considerations.
-
- And, on converting combat units
to service units in general, it said:
-
- . . . the War Department's selection
of units to be converted has been based solely on the relative abilities,
capabilities and status of training of the personnel in the units available
for conversion. It so happens that a relatively large percentage of the
Negroes inducted in the Army have fallen within the lower educational classifications,
and many of the Negro units accordingly
- [475]
- have been unable to master efficiently
the techniques of modern weapons. To have committed such units to combat
at the dates of conversion would have endangered operational successes as
well as submitted the personnel to unnecessarily high casualty rates. Our
limitations of manpower and urgent and immediate need for service units
of a type whose mission could be efficiently discharged by the personnel
concerned left no choice but to include Negro troops in conversions such
as those mentioned in your letter.34
-
- These were points of view so universally
accepted within the War Department that exceptions taken to them came as
a surprise. After reading the Stimson letter into the Congressional Record,
Fish told the House that he could not agree with the Secretary's "inference
that colored soldiers' efficiency ratings are so low" that they could
not master modern weapons. Education among Negroes, he declared, had increased
since the first World War; if the four separate regiments of that war could
make good records he did not understand why their descendants could not
now. It seemed strange that French Senegalese and British Indian divisions
could fight superbly, that Russians with low educational standards could
be war heroes, and that Japanese with less education than American Negroes
had made "brave and efficient soldiers" while the War Department
could not do as well with American Negroes. "Any American who is good
enough to wear the uniform of his country, regardless of race, color, or
creed, must be treated equally and be afforded the opportunity to serve,
fight and die in defense of our free institutions, our constitutional form
of government, and for America itself,"
he concluded .35
-
- When he saw a copy of Stimson's
reply to Fish, Truman Gibson predicted to Secretary McCloy that the letter
would "accentuate the greatly increasing criticisms and resulting resentments
which have already reached alarming proportions." Its references to
educational classifications "reduces the War Department policy with
respect to Negroes to very simple terms that cannot be misunderstood."
The letter, if correct, implied considerations which were "particularly
unfortunate" for a public statement. "In what regard," Gibson
asked, "will combat engineer units be held when it is blandly stated
that men too dumb for field artillery for which they have been trained for
three years can be sent into combat engineer battalions?" The letter
would undoubtedly be used for political purposes. Administrative handling
of the reply, Gibson felt, was poor. The letter had not been sent to him
for comment and, so far as he could learn, it had gone neither through the
Advisory Committee nor the McCloy office. "It suggests," he said,
"that in all such cases as the Fish letter that careful consideration
be given the basic policy involved and that in any event the matters be
sent those of us who have some knowledge of the facts." He reiterated
that temporizing solved no problems. After a conference on the disposition
of the 2d Cavalry Division, Gibson had found that the "whole attitude"
was " How did Gibson find out about this?'" He reminded the Assistant
Secretary that "All of these things will be found out
- [476]
- about. As a civilian, I certainly
would not presume to question any decisions based on military necessity.
However, the manner of procedure in the conversion of Negro units leaves
the War Department open to the charge that there are other factors that
are being taken into consideration." 36
-
- Gibson was correct about the effect
of the Stimson letter. As soon as Fish's speech was over, its refrain was
taken up in the Negro press, with "Stimson says Negroes too dumb to
master modern weapons of war" as the main burden of their approach.
Representative William L. Dawson of Chicago, at the time the only
Negro Representative in the House, had already made inquiries about the
converted units, saying of the stripping of the older battalions: "So
far as the public was concerned, it was but a repetition of the attitude
of the Army that has been all too familiar to Negroes. I am well acquainted
with this attitude, having served as an officer in a regiment that fought
during the last war." He, too, was exercised over the political implications
of the letter. "I say to you frankly," he told the Assistant Secretary,
"that the political enemies of the Commander in Chief of our armed
forces are seeking to place responsibility for this un-American attitude
squarely upon his doorstep." 37
While Republican political workers were interpreting conversions to Negroes
as a general Roosevelt administration failure, Democrats blamed the Army
and the War Department, with Representative Dawson telling a group of Negro
Democrats gathered in Washington
for a meeting just after the Fish speech that "the failure to use Negro
Americans to the fullest in this war is the diabolical work of a reactionary
and prejudiced clique within the Military Establishment." 38
-
- Three days later, Dawson, having
received no answer to his original queries, addressed a new series to Assistant
Secretary McCloy, pointing out that since the Fish speech he had received
-
- ...hundreds of communications from
every section of this country, denouncing the statements made by the Secretary
of War, and demanding that I see the President to ask for the removal of
the Secretary of War, or demanding that I immediately introduce a resolution
for a sweeping investigation of the entire military situation with a view
of finding out the sources responsible for the information upon which the
Secretary of War based his letter.39
-
- Dawson now wanted to know what plans
had been made for the use of the Negro officers of "the units which
the War Department letter states have failed so miserably" as well
as information on the service schools attended by these officers and "the
bases from which they were
- [477]
- formally certified for combat service
and who certified them for such service." 40
-
- Before the War Department could
begin to formulate answers to the queries arising out of the Fish-Stimson
letters, news that the 2d Cavalry Division was no longer fully constituted
began to filter out to the public through complaints of men of the 3d Signal
Troop, left behind and converted to signal construction troops when the
remainder of the division, still bearing its combat designation, left for
North Africa. Inquiries about this unit began to reach the War Department.
"I don't know the circumstances of the case, but evidently the men
feel that they are being discriminated against because of their color."
Senator Robert Taft of Ohio wrote to McCloy. "It seemed to me that
perhaps you might like to look into the situation, and if you do obtain
any report, I shall be glad to hear of it." 41
-
- Senator Taft had not mentioned the
conversion of the 2d Cavalry Division, but, as a part of a long and detailed
letter written the day after Taft's, Judge Hastie, now back at his old job
as dean of the Howard Law School, made a logical deduction that any or all
of the old Regular regiments might have shared the fate of the National
Guard regiment. His letter to Stimson, the last of his attempts to influence
the War Department directly, was a detailed summary of his position and
an accurate delineation of the position arrived at by Negroes who
possessed pertinent facts about the
course of the employment of Negro troops. He wrote:
-
- When I read in the Congressional
Record for February 24, 1944 your letter of February 19 to Congressman Hamilton
Fish concerning the conversion of Negro combat units into service units,
my first inclination was publicly to challenge your letter as unfair and
insulting to the Negro soldier, inaccurate and lacking in candor. However,
on reflection I concluded that a man of your integrity and with your sense
of justice could sign such a letter only if, without personal knowledge
of the facts, he had been misled by those who drafted the document. Remembering
too your invitation, at the time of my resignation from your official family,
that I continue to bring to your attention matters of concern to the military
establishment, I determined to place before you in this letter what I believe
to be important and accurate observations with reference to Army policy
and practice in the disposition of Negro combat units.
-
- Hastie began his interpretation
of the problem by listing the Negro combat units existing in 1941 and indicating
what was publicly known of their status in 1944. He then continued:
-
- Despite your assurance to Congressman
Fish "that any implication that the War Department is deliberately
attempting to avoid sending overseas, or to keep out of combat, troops of
the Negro or any other race, is entirely without foundation," the disposition
of these first Negro combat regiments three years after their mobilization,
deserves your further examination. Attention is directed first to the four
Negro regular army regiments, the 24th and 25th Infantry and the 9th and
10th Cavalry, created in 1866 pursuant to Congressional mandate. Their maintenance
in combat status is, I believe, a statutory duty. Yet, one of these regiments,
the 24th Infantry, has been employed as a service unit for
- [478]
- nearly two years. I believe, Mr.
Secretary, that you are entitled to know, and the public is entitled to
know, whether the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 25th Infantry have been committed
to combat missions for which they have been trained or whether they too
have been or are being converted to service units. These four are among
the proudest regiments of our army. On the western plains, in the Philippines,
with Theodore Roosevelt in Cuba, under Pershing in Mexico, they have been
among our finest front line combat troops. Will you inquire, Mr. Secretary,
what their missions are today? What we know about the 24th makes us apprehensive
about the other three.42
-
- The Taft letter, arriving at about
the same time as Hastie's, went to the Legislative and Liaison Division
with the request that, in answer, the matter of the legality of the conversion
of the 9th and 10th Cavalry, both established by statute, be checked.43
The prepared answer avoided mention of the legality of the conversion, but
it did reveal that the entire 2d Cavalry Division was among the units converted
to provide personnel for service units. No definite commitment for a cavalry
division could be foreseen, Senator Taft was told. "Since the Second
Cavalry Division was the only source from which such personnel could be
withdrawn without delaying the war effort, the War Department was compelled
to effect this change in its utilization. Needless to say, the decision
would necessarily have been the same had this Division been composed of
white personnel." McCloy personally added a final paragraph: "We
are taking determined steps
to commit to combat, colored units just as soon as we can. We have some
tactical and training problems that have to be dealt with but I think they
will be solved."44
-
- This first public statement that
the cavalry division had been converted became the standard explanation
for later inquiries.45
When the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People made
on inquiry about the division some weeks later-information on the conversion
reached the public slowly-the letter to Taft was inclosed as explanation
when the association was answered.46
-
- Except for an acknowledgment from
McCloy disavowing interpretations given the Stimson letter, Hastie had gone
unanswered. His letter was not so easy to answer as many others that came
into the Department on the same subject during the period, for Hastie had
surveyed the whole subject of the utilization of Negro troops, placing it
in the moral and ethical setting from which many Negroes viewed developing
Army policies. His interpretation could not be parried, as many were, by
implying that it was based on a misreading of Stimson's
- [479]
- letter, or that, like some correspondents,
his basic information was in error.47
If changing defensive units to types more urgently needed was basic to conversions,
and if Negro field artillery, infantry, and cavalry units were regarded
as defensive units, "this but confirms the belief of many persons that
overseas service was never intended for them, but rather they were intended
from the outset for employment as glorified `home guards,' " Hastie
had pointed out. Since antiaircraft units are mainly defensive and since
more of these than any other ,Negro combat types had found overseas assignments,
there must be other reasons behind the conversion and assignment policies,
he continued. The argument that inferior qualifications and unsatisfactory
training records, "usually relied upon in military circles," were
responsible did not hold up if it was considered that antiaircraft units
had had no better men than the other units. If the Army had been primarily
concerned about the "educational qualifications" of the men in
combat units, during the past three years efforts would have been made to
provide qualified men for these units. Instead, the combat units were denuded
of their best men for cadres for other units, often of service types. "The
truth of the matter is," Hastie continued, "that these original
Negro combat units have been the problem children of the Army for more than
two years, not because they were incompetent, but because no one wanted
them." Antiaircraft units, Hastie thought, constituted a special
category, in that they could be placed in more or less permanent defensive
positions where they need not be integrated with other units for use. "So
the utilization of Negro Antiaircraft units in the theater of operations
was adopted as the device best calculated to confound the critics of Army
policy as to Negro combat troops without basically changing that policy,"
he concluded. There was another category of unit, Hastie said, which had
not been mentioned, the air base security battalions. Their conversion was
difficult to justify because of "the successful, and in at least one
case distinguished, combat performance of such few of these units as fought
in the North African campaign." If Negro infantry and artillery units
needed strengthening, he continued, why were not qualified and trained men
from air base security units sent to them rather than to the services? Then
Hastie commented upon the comparisons between service and combat units suggested
in the Stimson letter and upon the importance of the equitable use of Negro
manpower to the future of race relations within the country:
-
- All of this is said without intention
to reflect upon the necessary and often hazardous functions of the Service
Forces. Indeed, as I have read your letter to Congressman Fish, I have been
struck with the apparent implication there that the Service Forces should
be a dumping ground for the culls of the Ground Forces. Most remarkable
of all is the suggestion that the 189th Field Artillery is being converted
into "combat engineers" because of its "unsatisfactory record."
I believe that I have not been alone in my thought that the functions of
the combat engineers require a measure of skill and intelligence not exceeded
in any other branch of the military service. Certainly, generations of the
- [480]
- "Engineers" at the Military
Academy have so believed.
-
- A final thought. Nothing can do
more to improve the too often unsatisfactory relations between white and
colored soldiers than the sharing of common experience on the field of battle.
This is important now and for the future. The veterans of this war will
be the greatest force for racial good will or for racial enmity in America.
Prejudice and intolerance will have no place in the hearts and minds of
comrades m arms who have fought and bled and conquered shoulder to shoulder.
-
- It is respectfully submitted that
it is time and past time that the matter of utilization of Negro combat
units pass out of the hands of those who deal with this matter as a distasteful
search for compromise born of political necessity, and into the hands of
those who have the will and the understanding to exploit the great combat
potential of the Negro soldier as a valuable asset in the winning of the
war.48
-
- Hastie's letter, tabbed "Urgent,"
went from the administrative assistant to Secretary McCloy, with the note:
"I think it important that this be called to Mr. McCloy's attention.49
Since McCloy had already acknowledged receipt of the copy sent him by Hastie,
and since an answer involved drafts by many hands, the reply remained unprepared
for the Secretary's signature for a month. In the meantime new decisions
had been made, for, as soon as the winds of furor aroused by the Stimson
letter reached the War Department, efforts under way for some months to
solve the problem of the overseas utilization of Negro troops received renewed
emphasis. Even as the Hastie letter was on its way to Stimson, the staff
divisions, at McCloy's request, were drawing up new plans and studies of
the problem and the Advisory Committee was preparing a formal recommendation
on getting more Negroes overseas and into active combat.
-
-
- By the end of February 1944 the
Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies had before it the agreement of
G-1 and G-3 and the three major commands that the shipment of more Negro
units was a desirable procedure. It also had The Inspector General's survey
with its evidence that the overseas Negro troop population was below its
proper proportion and its conclusion that "Units containing Negro personnel
have a history of activation and training, followed by a transfer of personnel
and acquisition of new troops, which has necessitated units starting all
over again, and for many units, this has occurred more than once."50
And it had evidence of mounting and potential distrust of War Department
intentions as shown by press comment and individual correspondence subsequent
to the Fish address. Members of the committee had often suggested ways and
means of shipping more units overseas, but, in the face of manpower shortages,
reports of training unreadiness, and the reluctance of theaters to accept
Negro units so long as white units were available, the committee as a whole
had deferred action. Now, on the last day of February 1944, the committee
met to consider "a formal recommendation to the Secretary of War that
- [481]
- a definite program be worked out
to commit some Negro combat troops to action against the enemy."51
-
- The Operations Division, unrepresented
on the committee, sent Brig. Gen. Carl A. Russell, Deputy Chief, Theater
Group, OPD, to the meeting by request. General Russell declared that the
Operations Division sent overseas what it was offered, according to fitness
and according to theater commanders' wishes. The G-1, General White, observed
that all available personnel had to be used. In the midst of this discussion,
Assistant Secretary McCloy arrived and announced that in a meeting just
concluded with General Marshall and Secretary Stimson, the Secretary had
requested that a definite proposal be presented to the staff, for he wished
the use of Negro troops in combat to be placed upon the record. The War
Department had not been in the habit of "dictating" to theater
commanders, but, the Assistant Secretary said, with G-1 and G-9 agreeing,
there were times when national policy made it necessary to dictate. "This
is such a case," McCloy stated. "Ten percent of our people are
colored and we have to use it. We make a farmer out of a clerk. It is a
vital National Policy to make a military asset out of that part of the population."
With the British using Africans in Burma 52
and with an American-Japanese
unit in Italy, a Negro combat team could be sent overseas and employed,
most committee members felt. After further discussion, the committee formally
advised the Secretary of War:
-
- It is the recommendation of this
Committee that, as soon as possible, colored Infantry, Field Artillery,
and other Combat units be introduced into combat and that if present organizations
or training schedules do not permit such prompt commitment, that steps be
taken to reorganize any existing units or schedules so as to permit the
introduction of qualified colored combat units, as promptly as possible,
into battle.
-
- To the suggestion from General Dalton
of Army Service Forces that the recommendation be made stronger, General
Porter, the G-9, laconically observed, "It would take a directive of
the Chief of Staff to enforce it." 53
-
- In forwarding the recommendation
to Secretary Stimson, McCloy amplified the committee's point of view:
-
- There has been a tendency to allow
the situation to develop where selections are made on the basis of efficiency
with the result that the colored units are discarded for combat service,
but little is done by way of studying new means to put them in shape for
combat service.
-
- With so large a portion of our population
colored, with the example before us of the effective use of colored troops
(of a much lower order of intelligence) by other nations, and with the many
imponderables that are connected with the situation, we must, I think, be
more affirmative about the use of our negro troops. If present
- [482]
- methods do not bring them to combat
efficiency, we should change those methods. That is what this resolution
purports to recommend.
-
- Secretary Stimson penned on the
covering memorandum: "I concur with recommendation-H. L. S."54
-
- G-3, in the meantime, prepared for
Secretary McCloy a comprehensive report of the situation.55
This material was to provide answers for any further queries from the White
House and from other sources. It reviewed and refined existing policies,
extending them in some instances to fit current developments. It reiterated
the policy that the Army would accept and absorb 10.4 percent Negroes in
its male strength, excluding "certain specialized activities such as
the College Training Program and the Office of Strategic Services."
56
Negro personnel accepted would, "to the greatest practicable extent
consistent with military necessity and the abilities of the individuals
concerned, be distributed throughout all arms and services." 57
A corollary to this policy, G-9 said, was that since the Army "cannot
afford the luxury of organizing tactical units which will remain in the
United States for the duration of the war . . . the Army intends that colored
units shall eventually be employed overseas to the greatest extent that
their capabilities permit."
-
- Quoting from field reports, G-3
reviewed again the difficulties in adhering to these policies. Manpower
shortages and the relative preparedness of units had been responsible for
conversions with the exception that in the case of the 2d Cavalry Division
conversion "did not result from deficiencies on its part but rather
on the unfortunate circumstance -insofar as it was concerned-that it was
the only available source of urgently needed personnel. The decision of
the War Department in this case would have been the same had the personnel
of the 2d Cavalry Division been white." As other combat units were
readied for shipment, they would be sent overseas. The War Department had
made the best use of the means at its disposal; it was unfortunate, G-3
concluded, that these means divided along racial lines. But as the end of
the war drew nearer, "people both white and colored-of lower classification
grades will gravitate toward less complicated tasks and conversions must
be made. It is likewise inevitable that units with the furtherest [sic]
advanced training will continue to be the first employed in battle."58
-
- With the addition of data on the
War Department's efforts to raise standards through special training units,
this material in reduced form became the standard public explanation for
War Department policies involving the conversion of Negro units to service
functions. Of the special training units a typical letter remarked: "Very
encouraging results have been obtained to date. In the first six months
of these courses, out of 29,000 Negro trainees approximately 90% were retained
in the Army and assigned to
- [483]
- more advanced training. Many excellent
soldiers have been developed out of men who have initially made a low score
in the Army General Classification." 59
It was not long before an additional note to the effect that "recent
press releases indicate that the 24th Infantry" was engaged in active
combat could be added to these letters.60
-
- On 6 March 1944, Stimson, McCloy,
and representatives of the major agencies concerned discussed the Advisory
Committee's recommendation. Two courses of action were decided upon. In
accordance with the first, a radiogram went to Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon
in the South Pacific expressing the War Department's desire that not less
than one regimental combat team of the 93d Division, then arriving in the
Solomons, be used in combat as soon as possible.61
General Harmon replied that early employment met with both his and Admiral
William F. Halsey's favor and that the War Department would be advised promptly
on the completion of plans for use of the 93d Division.62
The second decision was that out of the 92d Division a regimental combat
team should be selected and intensively trained for shipment to an undetermined
theater of operations at the earliest possible date.
-
- The team would eventually rejoin
its division. All personnel of the division would have an opportunity to
volunteer for duty with the combat team. Officers for this team were to
be selected on the basis of demonstrated qualifications without regard to
race. The team would be trained under the most favorable provisions for
terrain, instruction, equipment, ammunition, and training aids that could
be made available. Ground Forces was directed to inform the War Department
of the earliest date on which such a team could be ready for shipment overseas.63
-
- Thus, McCloy explained to General
Marshall, two methods of committing Negro ground combat troops to battle
would be used: the first, the employment of existing units just as they
were and the other the use of a specially selected team which, later, could
impart its battle experience to the rest of the division. Under this proposal,
both the proponents of introducing Negroes to ground combat through the
use of a "handpicked" unit and those who preferred a normal unit
so that lessons might be drawn from the conduct of a run of the mine organization
would be satisfied .64
-
- The commitment of large Negro ground
combat units thus proceeded under highly sponsored if not ideally planned
conditions. The War Department suggested methods of use to field commanders
and requested continuing reports on their progress. Once the large units
were committed and definitely marked for use, it became relatively simpler
to ship the smaller, supporting com-
- [484]
- bat units, either as separate units
or as support for the larger units, especially in areas whose strength was
declining. The Central Pacific was now willing to take a tank destroyer
unit and General Devers, in June, queried the War Department from Algiers:
"Can you send one or two colored tank battalions with the 92d? We will
be delighted to have them." 65
-
- The commitment of Negro troops to
combat, like their induction into the Army and distribution to units, was
more a function of expediency in response to external circumstances-public
and political pressures and considerations of morale-than a response to
specific need for the units. With certain smaller units this was not the
case, but with the larger units on which so much symbolic attention was
focused and upon which so much administrative and training effort had been
expended, this was specifically the case. The commitment of the bulk of
Negro combat troops therefore followed no integrated plan for their use.
It was rather an implementing of "vital National Policy" more
than a response to military and strategic requirements that finally got
them committed to the theaters.
-
-
- Before any shipment policy could
be carried out, units had to complete their training and be processed for
movement. Final preparation for overseas movement, known as POM, was a formalized
procedure involving alerts, scheduled packing, tests, inspections, and departure
for staging areas where new inspections,
further training, and last adjustments were made.66
In the completion of their training and in their preparations for movement
Negro units faced certain problems met less frequently or not at all by
white units. These often affected the general process of employing Negro
troops.
-
- Most Negro units were small and
relatively isolated "spare parts" which were trained under less
than the fullest supervision. A number of the quartermaster service units,
the medical sanitary units, the aviation squadrons, and the engineer separate
battalions engaged in odd jobs as much as in training. Some "horrible
examples" therefore turned up on The Inspector General's overseas readiness
inspections. When a small Negro unit's training was poor it was likely to
be very poor indeed. No balancing corollary of excellence in other units
was available for contrast. That the personnel of these units had sometimes
been transferred to as many as fourteen units during their training careers,
that certain units had been filled and refilled many times over, and that
the units themselves and then current commanders were often without blame
for the conditions in which the units found themselves after months of nominal
"training," did not alter the fact that these units were not ready
for use.
-
- Shipment delays added to the un-readiness
of units. Some received so many
- [485]
- warning orders that they and their
administrative supervisors forgot the number. "At the end of December
[1943] the job was finished off with bar and rod steel matting, and the
Battalion rallied to meet its fifth (or was it sixth) warning order on January
3rd," one headquarters commented of a Negro unit.67
Others were the victims of generally poor training histories and methods.
The cited records of these units tended to influence negatively the prospects
for ready use of similar units.
-
- Some of the more highly unsatisfactory
units uncovered by The Inspector General's overseas readiness inspections
became examples for presentation to the General Council by General McNarney,
who had a continuing concern with the adequate training of units, especially
the smaller types. One of these was an aviation quartermaster company formed
on 6 September 1942 by the reorganization of a truck company. All enlisted
personnel had received their twelve weeks of basic training, but technical
and unit training was not sufficient for the unit to perform its mission.
No trucks had been assigned. In four months the unit had had only three
days' training with borrowed trucks. It had never participated in combined
exercises or maneuvers, had never worked with a group or any other unit
as a truck company, had never been given any tests by its higher headquarters
to determine its proficiency. Men of the unit had had little practice with
the weapons with which they were armed; crew-served weapons had not been
fired since trucks and machine gun mounts for them were not available
at the unit's station. With the record of neglect in this company General
McNarney compared the record of a similar white quartermaster company, activated
four days later. All personnel had had thirteen weeks of basic training.
Individual technical training was adequate; unit training was complete and
satisfactory. The unit had performed convoy missions for the camp quartermaster.
Though it had never been on maneuvers, it had conducted several night problems
under blackout conditions and had bivouacked in the field for a week. Tests
conducted by its higher headquarters had found the work satisfactory; all
men had fired their weapons and 60 percent had qualified.68
-
- Other units, like the 387th Aviation
Squadron, were declared ready before they had time to come to a point of
efficient training. This unit, activated on 26 March 1943, was declared
ready in July 1943. But many of its replacement fillers had only recently
arrived; fifty of these were not fit for overseas duty. The unit's personnel
had had a minimum of four weeks' basic training; the organization had had
practically no unit training. It had had one night of field bivouac. No
training or field exercises in map reading, camouflage, or chemical warfare
had been given it. Discipline in general in the squadron was poor.69
-
- Some cases of poor preparation were
disclosed on annual inspections. The new commander of the 827th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, then training at the Desert Training Center in attachment to
the 93d Infantry Division, attributed his unit's difficulties in part to
the inade-
- [486]
- quate training young officers had
received at the tank destroyer school and to the failure of former battalion
and company commanders to eliminate inefficient officers and noncommissioned
officers. "Many seem to feel that better replacements are not available
and therefore it is best to keep the majority of the present leaders and
try to train them," he explained. There were other reasons cited for
the battalion's deficiencies:
-
- a. Changes in type of unit from
self propelled M-3s to towed 3 inch to self propelled M-10s.
- b. Use of the Battalion as school
troops from 2 January 1943 to 21 July 1943.
- c. Shortages of equipment in supply
branches. According to the best information available, the battalion has
never been properly equipped with either organization
- or individual equipment.
- d. Poor training in care and maintenance
of equipment.
- e. Lack of coordination of training
by higher T.D. headquarters to produce trained battalions capable of combining
the five essential elements which I consider necessary for a T. D. battalion
to be successful in battle, namely:
- (1) Fire power, both direct and
indirect.
- (2) Movement.
- (3) Reconnaissance.
- (4) Security.
- (5) Radio Communications.
-
- Although this battalion was activated
April 20, 1942, I would rate it as unsatisfactory in all the above essential
elements except direct fire. In my opinion this is due chiefly to failure
to prescribe sufficient field training similar to that which a battalion
will encounter against an armed enemy. Too much time is devoted to basic
training and piecemeal training which does not require units to function
as companies and battalions. As far as I can determine this battalion was
never required to maneuver as part of a larger force and had only two battalion
field exercises before I assumed command. Prior to leaving Camp Hood, no
time on training schedules was allotted to indirect fire although it is
the most important secondary mission of T.D. Units.70
-
- The battalion, scheduled for shipment
to the Central Pacific, was still not ready in February 1944. A white battalion
was substituted at almost the last minute.71
-
- Maneuvers revealed further unreadinesses,
although the record of most small units on maneuvers was satisfactory or
better. Of fifty-seven Negro service units-quartermaster, chemical, and
ordnance-participating in the Sixth Maneuver period in Louisiana in the
winter and spring of 1944, for example, only two were unsatisfactory. One
of these, a railhead company, refused to operate on one occasion because
of poor discipline among its men. It was necessary to withdraw this unit
from the maneuver area and reorganize it. The other, a gasoline supply company,
allowed tankers to return full and half full, through negligence.72
-
- This last unit turned up five months
later as one of The Inspector General's examples of an unready unit. It
was no better then. Activated on 25 August 1943, it got its fillers, described
as "castoffs, consisting of the sick, the lazy, the problem negroes,"
from the 92d Infantry Division. The whole group of 12 2 men
- [487]
- contained only 7 with an Army General
Classification Test score above Class IV. Though at authorized strength
in August 1944, the unit needed replacements for both its first sergeant
and for a platoon sergeant, neither of whom was sufficiently trained to
hold his job. During August, thirty-four men were transferred out for physical
disqualifications. Twenty-eight untrained replacements were received. The
unit had had seven company commanders in a year. The current commander was
not qualified to take the company overseas, but he had been left with the
company because he was the only officer present for duty. This unit, General
McNarney observed, was likely to be more of a handicap than assistance in
a theater; it would need heroic measures, he felt, to get it into shape.73
-
- In some cases, units that had completed
all prescribed training and were adjudged able to perform their missions
in active theaters had only one possible deficiency noted: they had a majority
of their personnel in AGCT Classes IV and V.74
In a few others, confused officer situations, in which officers had too
little experience or were distributed in violation of current officer racial
policies, held up shipment. In one such case, a quartermaster company had
eight officers: a white captain, absent sick; a white first lieutenant,
commanding but not qualified; a second lieutenant, white, with three months'
service, acting as company executive; a second lieutenant, Negro, with five
months' service; and four new
-
- Negro second lieutenants, all fresh
from officer candidate school, assigned to the unit for three days. No assigned
officer was qualified to command. Before this unit could depart, all new
officers of greater experience and qualifications had to be assigned.75
Another small unit was held up until it could be furnished a better racial
balance among officers than its one white officer commanding with all Negro
lieutenants.
-
- It would be expected that the larger
Negro units, considering the circumstances of their activation, the accompanying
lamentations over their desultory training records, and the difficulties
in placing them overseas, would have had longer training periods in the
zone of interior than comparable white units. Yet the three divisions, despite
their quite different training careers, were all shipped overseas at about
the same time as other divisions of their own age and somewhat in advance
of some of their contemporaries.
-
- The 93d Division, activated in May
1942, proceeded overseas in January 1944, while its sister division in point
of time, the 85th, left in December 1943 and the 77th, a month older, left
in March 1944. The bulk of the 92d Division, activated in October 1942,
departed in September 1944, the same month that the 84th Division, activated
at the same time, shipped out. There were still a number of National Guard
as well as older new divisions whose commitment overseas came after a longer
- [488]
- period of training than that of
either the 93d or 92d Division. The 2d Cavalry Division, proceeding overseas
a year after activation, was a special case. After allowances for stripping
and conversions from experimental to standard types of divisions are made
in the cases of a number of other divisions, the Negro divisions proceeded
overseas after what was about a normal training period in point of time.
-
- Despite dire reports and predictions,
the divisions had no particularly spectacular delays in their training careers.
As planned in 1942, the training year of a division started fifteen days
after activation, with seventeen weeks of basic and individual training,
thirteen of unit training, fourteen of combined arms training, and eight
weeks of review and air-mechanized training. Thus, after a year of training,
a division that had not been handicapped by interruptions and stripping
of personnel was about ready to proceed into maneuvers and then overseas.
As both the oldest and the youngest of the Negro divisions, in its two versions
the 2d Cavalry departed farthest from this pattern. The units of this division
were activated at different times, with some of the units still inactive
in 1942. As a result, training within the division proceeded on different
levels. In May 1941, when the white units of the 3d Cavalry Brigade and
the field artillery battalions showed every sign of being ready by mid-July
for inspection of recruit and unit training as called for in mobilization
training plans, the Negro units of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, assembled and
filled more slowly, could only be expected to be prepared for recruit training
inspection, since they would not complete thirteen weeks of initial training
of selectees until 5 July.76
-
- Of the two Negro infantry divisions,
the senior 93d had the more nearly usual training career. It was activated
and trained as a unit at a single post. The younger 92d had the advantage
of continuity of top command. Aside from the Regular Army 25th Infantry
regiment and the 368th Infantry, activated a year before in March 1941,
the 93d Division was filled with selective service men, and even the 25th
and 368th, by the time the division was activated, were practically filled
with new inductees as well. The 92d Division was made up wholly of newly
activated units, with all but its cadre coming directly from reception centers.
The cadre for the 92d Division, furnished on 31 August 1942, consisted of
128 officers and 1,200 enlisted men from the 93d Division, although the
93d had felt that, considering the training problems which it faced, three
months was not enough time to prepare an adequate division cadre. In addition
to the cadre for the 92d, the 93d Division provided cadres for almost every
other type of unit.77
-
- Except for the training problems
common to most Negro units-a preponderance of slow learners, inadequate
leadership in both officer and noncommissioned officer ranks, rapid turnover
of enlisted and officer personnel through routine attrition and transfers
to provide cadres and to rid units of unsatisfactory men, and strained morale
relations-the
- [489]
- divisions proceeded with their training
as prescribed by Army Ground Forces. Portions of the training cycle were
repeated to fix training in the minds of slow learners or of new men arrived
to replace men now discharged 'or transferred. Learning by rote was frequently
used.78
Both units received extensions of phases of their training cycles.
-
- Despite training difficulties, observers
from higher headquarters found the divisions progressing better than many
had expected. General McNair of Army Ground Forces, returning from a west
coast inspection trip in July 1942, reported in the War Council that the
training of the 93d Division appeared to be excellent and as good as that
of some of the older divisions.79
General McNarney, after stopping at Fort Huachuca in October 1942, informed
General McNair that "The 93d Division appeared to be in fine shape
and General Hall doing an excellent job." 80
-
- The divisions went through their
regularly scheduled training tests, passing some with satisfactory results
and repeating others. Both infantry divisions went through the regular training
cycle, with the 93d completing more of it than the 92d or, for that matter,
than most other World War II divisions. The 93d's"D" (Division)
exercises were held in the Huachuca Mountains in March 1943. From April
to June 1943 the 93d participated in Third Army maneuvers in Louisiana,
proceeding from there to the Desert Training Center (California-Arizona
Maneuver Area, "C-AMA"), where in November 1943 it went through
more exercises and participated in IV Corps maneuvers. The 92d Division
had the same training career except that it missed the Desert Training Center
post-maneuver cycle.
-
- Departure for maneuvers was a red
letter day for the divisions. Many smaller Negro units, especially quartermaster
and engineer units, had participated regularly in maneuvers, transporting
troops, maintaining roads, constructing bridges, and, at times, being thrown
into combat exercises when the going became rough.
-
- But no Negro organization as large
as a division, pitted against other divisions, had participated in maneuvers
prior to 1943.81
-
- Before the departure of the 93d
for the Louisiana Maneuver Area, its senior tactical commanders met for
several conferences which emphasized that "the division would undoubtedly
be under careful scrutiny primarily because it is the first Negro division
to participate in maneuvers in World War II" 82
The location of the maneuver area deep in the Texas and Louisiana back country
did not lessen the tension. The division suggested that it be relieved of
the responsibility of furnishing umpires, usually exchanged by participating
units, because the 73 required "must necessarily be comprised largely
of colored lieutenants if company commanders are
- [490]
- to retain command of their organizations
and battalion and higher staffs are to function as normally composed."
83
The division staff visualized that "utilization of colored and white
officers acting respectively as umpires of colored and white divisions operating
against each other may result in the creation of undesirable situations.
It is believed highly desirable that all umpires be white."84
The division furnished umpires under a compromise by which units within
divisions but not the divisions themselves interchanged umpires.85
-
- Most worries about discipline in
the division turned out to be groundless, although the greater care taken
thereby may have influenced the end results favorably. Despite individual
complaints of some citizens of the area, made almost immediately upon arrival
of the 93d, 86
there were no racial disturbances. When the maneuvers closed the mayor of
De Bidder, one of the Louisiana towns on the edge of the maneuver area,
wrote to Secretary Stimson:
-
- . . . to express my thanks and appreciation
of the splendid deportment of the officers and men of the 93d Inf Div. (colored)
during their stay in this area.
-
- We anticipated no trouble before
they came our way, and have given every effort to make their stay pleasant,
cooperating with the officers to give the men every possible entertainment
and recreation.
-
- The troops have been very orderly
and well disciplined, causing
no trouble or apprehension that could encourage criticism-for which we are
thankful.87
-
- Less gratifying to the 93d than
its good discipline and relations with civilian communities was its movement
to the maneuvers. Departure from Fort Huachuca was itself a trial which
revealed weaknesses within the division. Too many units showed command and
disciplinary deficiencies in managing the movement. Clothing and equipment
were often in poor shape or lacking; "very frequently, the organization
commander was ignorant of these facts or had no reasonable explanation."
Often orders were not understood. The loading of the division was hampered
by engineers' lack of knowledge of lashing techniques; much work had to
be done over. Some units therefore took an inordinately long time to load.
One train carried a detail as far as Douglas to complete the lashing of
vehicles. In one technical company, the officers had little knowledge of
what was wrong with their slow, disorganized departure. In another technical
company whose loading was equally slow "the work done by its officers,
when any was done at all, was of a low order." The division's chief
of staff, as commander of the last train, observed the entire process. He
concluded that the division had four very weak units-two of them infantry
regiments-whose staffs must not have been keeping their commanders fully
informed, for "if they were really on the job there could not be such
consistently poor results in certain lines, particularly in the question
of discipline and equip-
- [491]
- ment." A large number of company
commanders were weak, but this was not entirely their fault, for regimental
and battalion commanders were not demanding results. Unit commanders within
the division, the chief of staff concluded, "have either got to get
results or get relieved. They have got to be impressed with the idea that
they must practice what they are supposed to preach and check the functioning
of lower units by constant following up of orders and requiring an exact
compliance with instructions. If they don't they are sunk and so is the
Division .... We cannot carry anybody along-not now."88
-
- In contrast to the inauspicious
omens of the departure from Fort Huachuca, the maneuvers of the 93d Division
against the 85th Division, conducted under the Third Army with , the commander
of the XV Corps, Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, as director, were fairly successful.
These maneuvers themselves, unlike earlier ones, began with a series of
exercises and continued with problems in which the idea of winning and losing
was discarded in favor of solving each problem "slowly, properly, and
correctly." 89
"The maneuver was satisfactory, generally," Headquarters, Army
Ground Forces, observed of one phase, adding that "men of the 93d Division
obviously had received detailed, painstaking instruction, much of which
was not absorbed." 90
Staff and command planning and functioning were often faulty as well. At
the end of the maneuvers, Director Headquarters, as required, rated all
units, with the tooth Battalion considered excellent, the 85th Division
very satisfactory and the 93d, which had received the close attention of
all observers, including some who came to the maneuvers extremely skeptical
about the division's performance, rated unsatisfactory. But most observers
concluded that the division had been well trained. Its Negro officers were
generally considered satisfactory. The men of the division showed no lack
of knowledge, but observers sensed a lack of will to apply that knowledge.
Some of its soldiers felt, observers reported, that this was not their war.
When leadership was good, especially at the noncommissioned level, the 93d
performed well. Otherwise, it "fell apart." 91
But the division showed a steady improvement throughout, progressing from
an unsatisfactory performance of technical duties at the beginning to satisfactory
at the end.
-
- The general feeling was that the
division had performed better than expected.92
Not all of the officers at Director Headquarters felt that it deserved so
low a formal rating as it received. While they admitted that the 85th was
clearly the better trained division, they did not think that its superiority
was so marked as the ratings suggested.93
Both
- [492]
- divisions, AGF determined, needed
additional seasoning. Both left Louisiana for the Desert Training Center
after the conclusion of the maneuvers in June.
-
- The 93d was one of thirteen out
of sixty-four infantry divisions trained in the United States to receive
this "graduate" combined training, for the California-Arizona
Maneuver Area closed in April I 944 for lack of sufficient supporting service
troops in that year of manpower problems.94
When General McNair observed the training activities of the division in
August, some improvements were noted, but some of the older problems, especially
slowness in executing missions and deficiencies in supervision, were still
present.95
-
- In the meantime, the 93d Division's
personnel continued to undergo shifts and changes: enlisted men transferred
out and new ones came in; the numbers of white officers decreased while
the numbers of Negro officers increased. No great change occurred in the
AGCT composition of the division as a result of these transfers. On 31 August
1943, the division's AGCT distribution stood: Class I, 24; Class II, 54I;
Class III, 2,323; Class IV, 5,616, and Class V, 6,919 (including 195 illiterates).96
In the eighteen months between mid-1942 and the end of 1943, the number
of white officers in the division decreased from 634 to 279 and the number
of Negro officers increased from 250 to 575.97
-
- At the close of Army maneuvers in
,July 1943, one infantry battalion was reorganized as a unit with all Negro
officers by transferring officers from other units of the division on recommendation
of unit commanders. This battalion was later reorganized again after it
was observed to have made less progress than expected and after a request
for a young Negro major or lieutenant colonel with a superior rating could
not be filled. Company commanders, with one exception, were first lieutenants;
two additional captains recommended for this battalion were not accepted.
How careful the officer selection was, based on other small unit commanders'
recommendations, cannot be gauged. But several of those recommended and
some accepted for the battalion were later transferred out of the division
as unsuitable or as surplus officers.98
-
- The training of the 93d Division
in Louisiana, successful particularly from the point of view that no serious
disciplinary problems involving racial friction arose during the period,
removed some of the reluctance about committing larger Negro units to maneuver
areas for participation in exercises against white units. Third Army recommended
that for fall maneuvers the 92d Division, scheduled to complete combined
training on 23 October, be included in Maneuver Number 5 (6 December 1943
to 30 January 1944) and that the 2d Cavalry Division, less one
- [493]
- brigade, be ordered to the Desert
Training Center upon completion of its combined training on 4 December 1943.99
Ground Forces at first suggested that the 2d Cavalry Division go instead
to Louisiana, for that area was more suitable to horse cavalry, and that
the 92d, since it was already in Arizona, go to the Desert Training Center.100
Plans for the 2d Cavalry Division were altered by the decision to send it
overseas for disbandment. The 2d Cavalry was, however, considered to have
had excellent training methods. "Constant recital of duties apparently
is producing results and familiarizing individuals with their duties,"
Ground Forces headquarters observed. "Planning, ingenuity, enthusiasm,
military courtesy, and discipline are outstanding. The division commander
appears determined to produce a trained combat unit.101
for The division's 4th Cavalry Brigade, located at Camp Lockett, California,
in the Southern Frontier Land Sector of the Western Defense Command, was
highly commended for its steadiness during the disturbances of the summer
of 1943; squadrons of both its 10th and 28th Cavalry helped control the
giant forest fires of September 1943 in the Cleveland National Forest. "There
is no telling how large these fires might have been had it not been for
the rapid mobilization of your men from Lockett," the supervisor
of the national forest wrote to the
commander of the brigade.102
-
- The 92d Division, following the
93d into Fort Huachuca, completed its training, including its D series,
there. It participated in the Sixth Louisiana Maneuvers from February to
April 1944, receiving a satisfactory rating at their conclusion.103
Most observers, both of training at Fort Huachuca and of the maneuvers,
got the impression that the 92d was as well if not better trained than the
93d.104
It had the advantage of following the 93d Division into maneuvers. Neither
the qualms nor the doubts accompanying the 93d's participation were as largely
present in the 92d's exercises.
-
- Before departing from Louisiana
the 92d got the news that, in accordance with the War Department's decision,
one combat team would begin preparations for overseas movement upon returning
to Fort Huachuca. To the assembled men and officers of the division its
commander, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, concluding his remarks on the last
phase of the maneuvers, announced the decision and tried anew to weld his
unit into a self-respecting whole with a visible mission:
- [494]
- . . . I told this division when
it was a cadre of 1400 men and zoo Officers a year and a half ago that it
had a future, and it has. I have watched it grow, I have watched the reaction
of the men and the Officers. I have seen more reaction in the last two months
come out on the surface than I have ever seen before. I see men salute better,
perform their duties better, have a better idea of their job, and I won't
say more cheerfully, because there has always been cheerfulness, except
in individual cases. The 92d has a high standard of performance. It has
not failed in this maneuver period. It has not failed to meet that standard
.... It has not been but four hours ago that the Army Commander, the Corps
Commander, another Corps Commander of the zest Corps who saw the 365 at
Atterbury, and three other Division Commanders told me the same thing. But
I have told you before that you did not get that sort of stuff-and you don't
get it-out of a book. You get it out of convincing yourself that you can
do it .... Four days ago, I was visited by three Officers from Washington,
with instructions that this Division is slated for combat duty in an active
theater in the near future; that the first element to leave is a combat
team, and that combat team is the 3-7-0! with the 588th following, and engineers,
signal, quartermaster, medical, and other components of that combat team.
Now what does that mean? There is not a man here who does not realize the
importance of it. This is a Colored Division, with both white and Colored
Officers. This is a cohesive military unit. You have just shown it. This
is a unit that the Colored race should be proud of, and they will be before
we are through; and not only the Colored race, but every American who knows
enough to read about his war . . . you must take great satisfaction in the
fact that you are now about to actually prove your worth.105
-
- The 92d Division had transferred
men to the 93d Division, the 2d Cavalry Division, and the 364th Infantry
when these units left the country.106
It now received men from the 372d Infantry and other units in preparation
for its own departure. By May it had an overage both of officers and enlisted
men.107
Overstrength in enlisted men was needed to replace mentally and physically
marginal men, of whom the division still had more than a thousand in August.
Supervision and observation of the division during post-maneuver training
and during the preparation of the 370th Regimental Combat Team for overseas
movement were even closer than for the 93d Division. During the period the
92d was visited and inspected by General Marshall, Under Secretary Patterson,
Maj. Gen. Ray Porter and seventeen members of his G-3 staff, General McNair
and ten officers of his Ground Forces' staff, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas and
three members of his Fourth Army staff, by Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig with
five members of his XXIII Corps staff, and by visiting Mexican generals.108
-
- Most impressions of the 92d and
especially of its command on the eve of departure were favorable. "Almond
has done a fine job," General McNair observed, "and believes that
his division will fight. My own estimate of the value of these troops has
risen as they emerge from the painfully slow process of drumming things
into them. They are, I believe, a better outfit than the
- [495]
- 93d when it left this country, and
their future will be a most interesting contribution as to the value of
negro troops."109
Secretary Patterson observed more guardedly that "The standard of performance
was not as high as in the other divisions visited. General Almond and his
staff have worked hard, however, and deserve a good deal of credit for the
way in which they are handling a difficult job. I doubt that any one could
handle the situation to better advantage."110
-
- These two observations contained
the kernel of representative approaches to the larger Negro units and especially
to the 92d Division: that the major importance of these units was to provide
documentation for the future employment of Negro troops and that their commanders,
considering the difficulties with which they were faced, should be given
all possible credit for doing as well as they did-no one was likely to do
any better. In the subsequent employment of these units both approaches
were to emerge frequently.
-
- In the meantime, Fort Huachuca from
April to August 1944 was the scene of more than ordinary preparations as
the 92d Division transferred men and received replacements, reorganized
units and reclassified officers, dealt with the multitudinous problems of
Fort Huachuca and Fry, entertained and displayed its progress for visiting
dignitaries, dealt with rumors and reports in the Negro press, prepared
a specially selected and constructed advance combat team, and, all the while,
continued the usual training and processing for movement overseas. The War
Department and the Advisory Committee were awaiting with some curiosity
the results of the larger units' assignments and their "contribution
as to the value of negro troops."
- [496]
Endnotes
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