CHAPTER II
The War Plans Division
Between the two world wars the chief activating agent in the system of Army
high command was the War Plans Division of the General Staff. General Pershing
and his principal advisers, notably General Harbord, had recommended integrating
the staff function of strategic planning with that of assisting in the command
of military operations. They proposed to accomplish this result by establishing
a special group of staff officers who had the twofold duty of drawing up
strategic plans in time of peace and of going into the field to help carry them
out in time of war.1 In accord with this plan WPD was constituted as the fifth
division of the General Staff in 1921.
Strategic Planning Agency for the Army
As established, WPD was "charged, in general with those duties of the
War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the
use in the theater of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction
with the naval forces, in the national defense." 2
This definition of responsibility, which survived in Army Regulations until
after the entry of the United States into World War II, brought out the three
main features of WPD's work. First, it had no duties beyond the normal General
Staff type of duties, a limitation which had special meaning in view of the
plans and policies tradition of the General Staff. Second, it nevertheless had
a sphere of responsibility quite different from the rest of the General Staff,
namely the formulation of strategic plans for military operations. Finally,
it was the sole staff agency which represented the Army in interservice strategic
planning.
In elaborating this general assignment of duties, the 1921 Army Regulations also
specifically charged. WPD with the "preparation of plans and policies and
the supervision of activities concerning" three major Army problems which
continued to be part of WPD's staff responsibility until after Pearl Harbor. These
duties were as follows: "[1] Estimate of forces required and times at which
they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use
of troops in the national defense. [2] The initial strategical deployment (plans
and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment to be
the duty of G-3). [3] Actual operations in the theater of war." 3
The first two in-
[29]
volved the broadest kind of military planning that the Army did in peacetime.
The third duty, though virtually dormant during the peacetime years of the
1920's and 1930's, indicated the main direction of WPD's interest. While the
term theater of war included areas potentially as well as actually involved in
warfare, theoretically actual operations would not begin until theaters of
operations had been designated.4 None was so designated until Pearl Harbor
brought a conclusive end to the uneasy 1940-41 period of transition from peace
to war. In the years between the wars, Army officers assumed that a staff for
controlling combat operations in the field would be set up outside the General
Staff by the time hostilities should begin. Nevertheless, in the interim WPD
had a general responsibility for such staff control of operations on behalf of
the high command.
From the beginning WPD's broad responsibilities made its position exceptional.
The G-1, G-3, and G-4 Divisions of the General Staff were each concerned with
devising general plans for some specific aspect of mobilizing men and material
resources in the zone of interior. WPD's activities centered on planning in
general outline the actual operations which the Army would have to conduct in
the field and support from the zone of interior. The G-2 Division, with its
clearly delineated task of collecting and disseminating information about
potential enemies or potential areas of operations, was like WPD in taking a
broad view of warfare. The primary responsibility, however, for translating
this military intelligence into terms of strategic plans for Army operations
did not belong to G-2 but to WPD.
Moreover, WPD was widely recognized as having primary staff interest in
problems related to the defense of overseas bases, which at the outbreak of war
were most likely to become zones of combat. A lecture prepared by WPD officers
in 1925 stated:
It is the accepted theory that the War Plans Division naturally is concerned
mainly with affairs in the Theater of Operations and that the other Divisions
of the War Department General Staff are concerned mainly with affairs in the
Zone of Interior. It is this responsibility for planning for the Theater of
Operations which makes the foreign garrisons of special interest to WPD. At
present all matters of policy concerning our foreign garrisons are referred to
WPD.5
To fulfill responsibilities so closely related to the basic Army
objective—military operations—WPD needed to take account in general of the
war-waging capacity of the Army, which in turn reflected the political and
economic resources and policies of the United States.
WPD devoted itself, when necessary, to studying staff problems that did not
fall into any one of the functional spheres of responsibility of the other
divisions. The successive Chiefs of Staff, beginning in 1921 with General
Pershing, referred many of the most general and most complex studies to it for
final recommendation.6 While the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, under
the President, had the final responsibility for representing the Army in the
spheres of national policy and international relations, WPD drew up plans, made
rec-
[30]
ommendations, and on occasion participated in deliberations in those spheres.
Its officers were staff agents for the Army, particularly for the Chief of
Staff, in joint Army-Navy planning, and they studied closely the military
phases of international negotiations engaged in by the United States between
the wars.7 As a result of all these factors, WPD took its place during the
period between the wars as the part of the Army that looked at Army problems
with a perspective comparable to that of the Chief of Staff himself.8 As World War II
approached, General Marshall placed increasing reliance on this particular
staff division, as chief of which he himself had briefly served in 1938.9
WPD and the GHQ Concept
In addition to its strategic planning activities, WPD as originally conceived
had to be ready to meet its responsibility for providing a nucleus of personnel
for a GHQ in the field should mobilization for war occur.10
The GHQ system was planned by the Harbord Board in accord with the Army's experience
in World War I, it was recommended by General MacArthur in the 1930's, and it
was the Army's approved solution for meeting the extraordinary demands that
would be made on the high command in wartime. It would serve as a field-type
staff agency separate from the General Staff and the technical and administrative
agencies of the War Department. Through it the commanding general of the field
forces would be able to exercise command of Army forces engaged in military
[31]
operations. According to Army doctrine as of 1921, the Chief of Staff probably
would himself serve as commanding general of the field forces and move into the
field in a major theater of operations, presumably overseas or at least outside
the boundaries of the continental United States. The assumption in the 1920's
was that, once there, he would follow General Pershing's precedent of directing
operations in virtual independence of the War Department, which in turn would
devote all energies to the zone of interior functions of mobilizing men and
material resources. Since it was to be hoped that he would either retain his
position as Chief of Staff or be succeeded in that position by the incumbent
Deputy Chief of Staff, friction between the Army in Washington and a general
headquarters overseas could be controlled and minimized.
The Harbord Board particularly desired to integrate responsibility for
high-level planning in peacetime with the direction of operations in time of
war. The subcommittee of the Harbord Board appointed to study the question
agreed: "The War Department is, and of course must remain the President's
agency in deciding the political-strategical aspects of any particular war. But
once these have been decided, the same officers who in peace have prepared the
plans as to the strategical distribution of troops should be the principal
staff officers charged with execution of further operations." 11 Therefore
the Harbord Board provided that the "War Plans Division shall be so
organized as to enable it, in the event of mobilization, to furnish the nucleus
of the general staff personnel for each of the General Staff Divisions required
at the
General Headquarters in the Field." 12 The intent of the Harbord Board plan
was that, in the event of a general mobilization, the War Plans Division
"as a whole would sever its connections with the War Department and go
into the field as the nucleus of G. H. Q." 13
Working on a static conception of political-strategical planning of a kind that
could be settled once and for all at the beginning of a war, the Harbord Board
made no provision for continuous interaction between strategic plans and
military operations. Consequently it left unclear how a close relationship
could be maintained between operations in the field on the one hand and new
developments in War Department and national planning on the other, although new
ideas and policies affecting the course of the fighting were bound to develop
from time to time in the event of a long war. No specific administrative
techniques were devised and set down in writing whereby the commanding general
of the field forces, however unlimited his authority, could in fact keep
strategic plans and military operations in harmony with zone of interior
programs. Relations between GHQ and the General Staff, both of which might be
serving the same man in different but closely interrelated capacities, were
left undefined.
The considerable prestige which WPD soon came to enjoy cast some doubt on the wisdom and feasibility of the 1921 provisions in respect to
WPD and the nucleus of GHQ. The first specific suggestion that WPD would have a
continuing usefulness in time of war, as a General Staff agency to assist the
Chief of Staff in giving strategic direction to Army activities, appeared
somewhat incidentally in a memorandum on per-
[32]
sonnel prepared by the first WPD chief, Col. Briant H. Wells (brigadier general
4 December 1922), in December 1921. In justifying the retention of twelve
officers on duty in WPD, he expressed the opinion that should hostilities
occur, the functions of his Division would increase rapidly rather than
diminish. He foresaw that in such a situation it would "become, under the
Chief of Staff, the strategical directing body of the War Department General
Staff." 14
Whatever their individual theories about establishing a GHQ, Army leaders after
1921 generally agreed that it would be inadvisable to disrupt the work of WPD
in time of national emergency. Both General Wells and Brig. Gen. Stuart
Heintzelman, who in 1923 became the second WPD chief, pointed out to the Chief
of Staff that WPD would have to continue to function in time of war with at
least a part of its trained personnel in order to avoid putting the burden of a
great deal of unfinished business on the other General Staff Divisions at a
particularly critical time. Especially important would be WPD's work in
interservice planning with the Navy. "Furthermore," General
Heintzelman observed, "at the initiation of operations it will be
important that someone thoroughly familiar with plans should be with the War
Department as well as with G. H. Q." 15
Efforts to define the functions to be performed by WPD after the establishment
of GHQ also clearly indicated that the Division would continue to be vitally
needed in time of war. A WPD officer, speaking at the Army War College as early
as 1924, indicated almost precisely the operational
responsibility that OPD was to be given in World War II. He said that in time
of war "there should be some agency in the War Department to see to it
that the point of view of the Theater of Operations is not lost sight of . . .
[War Plans Division] should guard the interests of the Theater of Operations,
anticipate its needs, and make every effort to see that its demands are
met." 16
In 1933 WPD officers prepared a study of the Division's post-mobilization functions.
In their opinion war would bring heavy responsibilities to WPD. It would be a
"primary liaison agency of the War Department" and would provide membership
for the joint Army-Navy boards and committees as well as for any other "governmental
super-agencies, inter-departmental committees, or special War Department committees
which have responsibilities affecting the military strategy of the war."
WPD would "carry through to conclusion any modification of the pertinent
strategic plan," would "keep informed of the progress of the initial
strategical deployment," and would conduct a "survey of possible developments
of the international political and military situations." Upon the basis of
the knowledge gained in all these activities, it would complete "such strategical
plans as the situation required," and revise them or develop new plans "as
a continuing function." The War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, specifically
provided for the continuance of WPD after mobilization. Furthermore, a revision
of Army Regulations 10-15 was then under consideration in order to make them "conform
to the War
[33]
Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, whereby
the duties of the Commanding General of the Field Forces and of the Chief of Staff
in the War Department are to be centered in one head." 17
The revision of Army Regulations 10-15 that appeared in 1936 formally embodied
this latter provision.18
In 1936 Brig. Gen. Walter Krueger, who preceded General Marshall as WPD chief,
summed up the case for WPD as a permanent, that is peacetime and wartime,
General Staff agency with extensive responsibilities. While paying tribute to
the tradition that WPD should not indulge in "interference in the proper
functions of some high command or of some other agency of the War
Department," General Krueger stressed the conviction that, in event of a
major conflict, the Army would need "a group in the General Staff of the
War Department capable of advising the Chief
of Staff on the broad strategical aspects of the war." If WPD were not
used as the agency for this job, he predicted, it should "be one formed by
the Chief of Staff and used by him directly."19 By 1938, although the GHQ
concept remained a basic element in Army planning for war, the indispensability
of some kind of War Plans Division in Washington had become so evident that the
commitment to furnish the nucleus of GHQ meant merely that WPD would supply
three or four officers for the G-3 Division of GHQ.20
War Planning: 1921-40
During the first two years of its existence, WPD established a pattern of work
which persisted for the next twenty years. The officers on the staff prepared
voluminous studies for use at the international conferences on limitation of
armaments, drafted and distributed to other Army agencies' several strategic
plans for the employment of military forces in the case of certain hypothetical
war situations, and represented the Army in joint Army-Navy planning.21
WPD also worked on the basic War Department mobilization plans, but after 1923
primary responsibility for this kind of planning was transferred to G-3. This
transfer resulted in a clarification of WPD's responsibility in line with a
practical distinction which emerged from preliminary discussion of the issue.
Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, then Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, stated:
The War Department Mobilization Plan, the Corps Area Department and Unit plans
all pertain to activities of the Zone of Interior, the mission of these plans
being the mobilization of troops and their prompt preparation for entering the
theater of operations. While the War Plans Division is very much concerned in
the development of these plans, its primary function is that of establishing
the basis for the mobilization, that is to say, the estimate of the troops
required for theaters of operations
[34]
and the times and places for their concentration.22
In this sense war planning as distinct from mobilization planning was the
functional core of all WPD's work throughout the existence of the Division
under that name. Originally this function involved literally the writing of
formal plans describing in considerable detail the missions to be accomplished
and the forces to be employed under some particular military situation. Once
approved by the Chief of Staff, they provided a strategic outline of military
operations to be undertaken by Army commanders whenever the President or the
Chief of Staff should order a particular plan into effect. Later, planning came
to mean, in addition, staff participation in strategic deliberations,
particularly in the interservice and international sphere, which led to formal
command decisions binding on the Army.23
In every kind of planning the objective was to reach an agreement on specific
military operations which would achieve the strategic objective sought and
which would also reflect an intimate appreciation of the Army's mobilization,
organization, equipment, training, supply, and replacement capacities. The
other General Staff Divisions were almost completely occupied with these
matters, and close collaboration with them was essential. In the peacetime
years Army strategy had to be tailored to available resources more often than
the reverse. In many cases, particularly as World War II came closer, G-4, G-3,
or G-1 took
the lead, in accordance with their assigned staff functions, in radically
altering the Army's strategic capabilities by recommending and securing,
through the efforts of the Chief of Staff and his civilian superiors, new
munitions procurement policies, new troop organization schedules, or new
manpower programs for the Army. But WPD always performed the staff function of
defining and developing the strategic factors in these as in all other kinds of
Army planning.
Theoretically, and to a great extent in fact, the main enterprise of WPD during
the 1920's and 1930's was the preparation of the "color" plans. The
philosophy of these early war plans derived from the classic General Staff
ideal of being prepared with detailed military plans for action in any
conceivable emergency. Each emergency situation was given a particular color as
a code name, which usually also applied to the principal nation visualized as
an enemy in that particular situation. The existence of a plan in no way
reflected any real anticipation of hostilities involving the nation or nations
for which the plan was named. In fact, in the peacetime atmosphere of the years
when most of the color plans were drawn up, there was no immediate menace to
the United States. The emergency situations visualized were either highly
improbable or of comparatively minor importance. It is true, of course, that
such situations were the only ones then foreseen as possible causes for a
declaration of war by the Congress or support of a war by the people of the
United States. Even the minor operations contemplated probably would have
strained the resources of the skeleton Army of the years 1921-40.
The keynote of all war planning before 1939 was the strategic concept, required
[35]
by national policy, of defense of the United States by the United States alone
against any and all combinations of foreign powers. Thus of the ten or twelve
color plans current and approved in the years between the wars, the one which
occasioned the most staff work was not, properly speaking, a war plan at all
but instead a "National Position in Readiness" plan called BLUE
(United States).24 Of the others only two called for general mobilization of
the armed forces, and these two represented highly improbable developments in
international affairs, namely a war against RED (British Empire) or against a
coalition of RED and ORANGE (Japan). The most significant plan from a strategic
point of view was the ORANGE plan proper, which visualized a major conflict
that, although primarily naval, would require the mobilization of more than a
million men in the Army. The other war plans provided for actions in
comparatively minor emergencies.25
In all cases the color plans were simple outlines of missions to be
accomplished and Army forces to be mobilized, concentrated, and used in combat
in the event that military operations became necessary under the circumstances
presupposed in any one of the plans. As strategic planning in a broad sense, the
early war plans, with the exception of ORANGE, were virtually meaningless
because they bore so little relation to contemporary international political
and military alignments. They were valuable, however, as abstract exercises in
the technical process of detailed military planning,
providing useful training for the officers who drew them up. By 1940 the color
plans had been largely superseded by the more comprehensive RAINBOW plans,
which provided a variety of military courses of action to meet the real
strategic situation imposed by Axis aggression.26
Making the detailed military calculations needed to draft formal war plans,
regardless of how limited their usefulness as current strategic policy might
be, required painstaking work on the part of the whole General Staff. A
statement on the complex process of war planning was formulated by WPD early in
1940 for use in a course of instruction in war planning given at the Army War
College. It read as follows:
The War Plans Division is not the only war planning agency of our General
Staff. Our entire General Staff is a war planning agency organized on
functional lines: namely Personnel, Military Intelligence, Operations and
Training, Supply, and War Plans. The War Plans Division is in a sense the
keystone division of the General Staff, in so far as war plans are concerned,
since it provides contact with the Navy in formulating Joint Basic war plans,
and is charged with preparing the basic part of the Army Strategic Plans.27
Four representative staff actions of the 1930's that involved WPD were
summarized for the Deputy Chief of Staff's information in September 1936 by
Colonel Krueger (brigadier general 1 October 1936) who had just become division
chief. To illustrate WPD's activities, Colonel Krueger selected two cases
involving the study and resolution of issues that had arisen concerning the
distribution of equipment among several interested Army agencies, a
[36]
third case involving extra-War Department negotiations, for which WPD was
responsible, and a final case of pure war planning. The actions were described
as: (1) replacement of airplanes for overseas departments; (2) pack artillery
in the Hawaiian Department; (3) War Department participation in the development
of civil airways and landing fields in Alaska; and (4) procedure for
co-ordinated action within the General Staff for the development of an Army
strategical plan.
These four cases indicated in what sense WPD was the "keystone division of
the General Staff." In solving the airplane problem, WPD consulted G-3,
G-4, and the Air Corps to reach a compromise that would satisfy the commanding
generals of the Panama Canal, Hawaiian, and Philippine Departments as well as
the GHQ (combatant) Air Force in the United States. In disposing of two
batteries of 75-mm. howitzer pack artillery, WPD had to reconcile the views of
the same three department commanders, the Commanding General, Fourth Army, the
Chief of Field Artillery, the Chief of Ordnance, The Quartermaster General,
G-3, and G-4. The third case was comparatively simple since WPD not only had
general authority to deal with extra-War Department problems, but also in this
instance was explicitly directed by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff
to "formulate the basis for action" upon a request from the Secretary
of Interior for Army Signal Corps assistance in the Alaska airways program.
Nevertheless, WPD consulted the Chief Signal Officer and the Chief of the Air
Corps for technical information, G-1 and G-3 concerning personnel, G-4
concerning funds and equipment, and the Budget Advisory Committee concerning
legislation. Finally, even in drafting a war plan, WPD
worked closely with G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, these divisions drafting sections
in accordance with their functional duties.28
As these four cases indicated, WPD was the "keystone" of the General
Staff only in the sense that it had an interest in almost all kinds of Army
affairs in which the Chief of Staff's authority had to be exercised, and had
primary interest in those issues that most directly affected the Army's
ultimate purpose, military operation. But however active or influential it
might be as a result, the Division worked in accordance with prescribed General
Staff procedures, conferring with all interested agencies, securing their
concurrences to proposed solutions, and centering all activities around the
final memorandum for the Chief of Staff's approval. Nor was the Division unique
in playing such a role of co-ordinator. In staff actions that could be defined
as problems primarily concerning personnel, organization and training, or
procurement and supply, G-1, G-3, and G-4 respectively played similar roles.
Staff Authority
Whatever difference there was between WPD and the other divisions of the General
Staff when it came to exercising delegated authority on behalf of the Chief
of Staff, it enjoyed by virtue of its exceptional knowledge of his ultimate
objectives in the broad sphere of military operations. The heads of all the
divisions had the same discretionary authority. General Staff regulation provided:
"The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, in charge of the divisions of the General
Staff . . . are authorized on matters
[37]
under their supervision to issue instructions in the name of the Secretary of
War and the Chief of Staff." 29 Under this authority, WPD might issue
instructions that had the force of authority in matters bordering between
policy and execution of policy. The Division would first have to be confident
that the case in question should be treated as requiring a secondary action
necessary to carry out approved War Department policy rather than as raising a
new issue for decision by the Chief of Staff. The fact that the Division had
reached this conclusion was bound to influence the other divisions of the
General Staff, who were apt to let the ruling stand.
Nevertheless, WPD's authority to make such decisions was obscure. If any Army
agency, particularly one of the other staff divisions, took exception to the actions
in question, the whole policy had to remain in abeyance until submitted to the
Chief of Staff. The WPD chief thus had no grant of power to co-ordinate the work
of the entire General Staff in the interests of supporting the strategic plans
of the Army. A thorough canvassing of this question took place in 1925, when the
Division chief's authority was subjected to particularly searching inquiry. The
result of the whole study, in which WPD officers took a leading part, was to confirm
the idea that WPD was on a level with, not superior to the other General Staff
Divisions, and that it had to refer all basic policy decisions to the Chief of
Staff rather than to try to coordinate the work of the rest of the General Staff.
The consensus of the General Staff reflected very closely the line taken by WPD:
No additional authority and responsibility should be given to
the Assistant Chief of Staff WPD, with a view to more expeditious and economical
General Staff action. The authority granted by Par. 6, AR 10-15, is ample. In
fact, as indicated below, the full authority granted by this paragraph has never
been exercised by any Chief of the War Plans Division. In my opinion, the Assistant
Chief of Staff, WPD cannot properly and advantageously take final action concerning
any type of cases now referred to the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff
for action. . . .
The following wording of Par. 6, AR 10-15, is suggested as more clearly
expressing what is believed to be real intent of the paragraph, and as in
accordance with the actual practice of the War Plans Division, which is thought
to be correct:
The Deputy Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff in charge of the
divisions of the General Staff hereinafter provided for, are authorized on
matters under their supervision to issue instructions in the name of the
Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff except that basic policies, plans
and projects, and such other matters as may be required by supplementary
instructions issued by the Chief of Staff, shall be submitted for approval by
higher authority.30
This doctrine was invoked in a concrete case at about the same time. The issue was whether or not WPD had to get the
Chief of Staff's approval to annexes and appendices of formal war plans which
had already been approved by the Chief of Staff or whether these supplementary
documents could be prepared by the various staff divisions "under the
direction and coordination of the War Plans Division." 31 The orthodox War
Department opinion was set forth by a distinguished senior officer, Maj. Gen.
Fox Conner, then Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. He categorically asserted:
While it is believed that great differences between the several Divisions of
the General
[38]
Staff will be infrequent these differences will arise from time to time. When
they do arise direction and co-ordination should not be left to the War Plans
Division nor to any other Division of the General Staff. Direction and
coordination as between General Staff Divisions is strictly a function of the
Chief of Staff and any departure from this principle is regrettable from every
point of view.32
By the end of 1939 the Chief of Staff and some of the officers in WPD were beginning
to be disturbed over the limitations of staff procedure at a time of world crisis.
General Marshall observed in a memorandum written shortly after he had assumed
the duties of Chief of Staff: "It occurs to me that the current routine procedure
of the War Department General Staff might have to be materially altered in the
event of a war emergency." 33
Lt. Col. Thomas T. Handy and Lt. Col. Walton H. Walker of WPD, who drafted replies
to this memorandum, stated: "Many questions now presented to the Chief of
Staff do not require a decision by him. They could and should be acted upon by
a division of the General Staff after being properly coordinated with other divisions."
34 Nevertheless, throughout
the period between the wars WPD did not exceed the limits of authority placed
on the General Staff by traditional doctrine. It was not a central staff in co-ordinating
Army-wide activities. It had neither authority nor incentive to act for the Chief
of Staff in the day-to-day process of trying to link staff planning with military
execution or operation of plans by subordinate agencies or commands. In peacetime
such a staff was little needed, or at least the lack of it caused no disasters.
In time of growing emergency the peacetime system put an enormous burden on the
Chief of Staff, his deputies, and the Secretary of the General Staff, the officers
who in their own persons were responsible for achieving coordination among Army
plans and policies.
[39]
Endnotes
Previous Chapter Next Chapter
Return to the
Table of Contents
|
|
Last updated 19 October 2004 |