CHAPTER III
Early Interservice and International Staff Planning
The hurried mobilization of a big Army in 1940 and 1941 in some ways was a simple
task in comparison with planning to use it in a big war, that is, a coalition
war fought by large forces using all kinds of modern weapons and modern systems
of communications. It was clear by the time of the fall of France in mid-1940
that, should the United States be drawn into war, American armed forces would
have to engage in large-scale operations involving the close collaboration of
air, sea, and ground forces with one another and with the armed forces of other
nations. As soon as the United States reached a stage of military preparedness
demanded by the approach of war, General Marshall found that many of his decisions
on Army problems could not be made without reference to similar problems and decisions
in the Navy. In the same way, both Army and Navy planning for the future came
to hinge more and more on the military situation and the actual strategic plans
of potential allies. In other words, nearly all of the most important decisions
that had to be made in anticipating as well as in conducting such military operations
could not be reached by the Army alone but had to be settled on a national or
international plane of authority.
Making and carrying out the many decisions of this kind that materially
affected the U. S. Army entailed a great deal of work
by civilian and military staffs in Washington. Of these, WPD was only one and
in fact one of the smallest. Yet in the Army the immediate influence of WPD
grew steadily during the pre-Pearl Harbor period, if for no other reason,
because its officers had become the principal support of the Chief of Staff in
his strategic planning efforts outside the Army. The character of the impending
conflict increased the importance of this part of WPD's staff work far beyond
anything visualized in the 1920's.
In the process of military planning as of 1941, WPD might on its own initiative
make a study and prepare recommendations bearing on the strategy that the Army
ought to follow in the event of war. It was necessary to secure concurrences from
the four other divisions of the General Staff insofar as their responsibilities
were involved, and obtain the approval of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary
of War. Other agencies inside and outside the War Department, especially the agencies
of the Navy Department, were at the same time making their own plans and recommendations.
Many of these recommendations required early decision, especially those dealing
with the training of troops and the procurement and distribution of munitions.
All of them somehow had to be adjusted and readjusted to one another in order
to formulate a national strategic policy and program, which
[40]
at the same time had to be co-ordinated with the plans of politically
associated foreign powers, especially those of Great Britain. The Secretary of
War and the Chief of Staff were the primary agents for the Army in the planning
of national military policy. Of the War Department staffs which served them in
one way or another and represented them in dealing with other agencies and with
representatives of foreign powers, WPD shared most fully in their knowledge of
strategic probabilities and best reflected their growing preoccupation with the
development of Army units to meet the threat of war.
WPD officers had long maintained a liaison with most of the executive agencies,
particularly with the State and Navy Departments. They sat on several
interdepartmental committees, prepared reports and briefs for the use of the
Chief of Staff in discussions outside the War Department, and when not sitting
on these committees studied the deliberations of those who were working on such
matters. The liaison was most imperfect, viewed in relation to the needs of
World War II as they actually developed, but the principle of liaison existed.
Moreover, the Army planners were able to carry on their work, not in isolation
from conflicting or diverging ideas, but in an intellectual environment shared
with planners in the State and Navy Departments. This association sometimes
simplified, frequently complicated, and always was a conditioning factor in the
Army's strategic planning.
Politico-Military Co-ordination
President Roosevelt, in order to determine national policy with respect to
World War II, co-ordinated the ideas and work of the three agencies principally
concerned—the State, War, and Navy Departments. He conferred with the
three Secretaries of these departments in Cabinet meetings and at special "War
Council" meetings at the White House attended by the Secretaries and the
senior military advisers.1
The President kept the main strands of national policy in his own hands, and
his Cabinet assistants advised him as individuals rather than as a body. In
addition to attending meetings at the White House, Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull
began holding informal weekly conferences in 1940, but this "Committee
of Three" was designed primarily to keep the civilian heads of the three
agencies abreast of one another's and the President's problems rather than to
help solve them.2
In April 1938 a Standing Liaison Committee was formed by the State, War, and Navy
Departments. This committee was suggested by Secretary Hull, and President Roosevelt
heartily approved the idea. In accordance with the President's wishes, the committee
consisted of the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Under
Secretary of State.3
In view of the Chief of Staff's role, WPD had to work on some of the problems
before they reached
[41]
the Standing Liaison Committee, and by 1941 the Division was preparing briefs
on issues about which it was "necessary to refresh the mind of the Chief
of Staff" before liaison meetings.4 General Marshall very strongly
supported the aim, not always but frequently achieved, of "having the
State Department in joint plans so that our foreign policy and military plans
would be in step." 5 National policies and interests involving the State
Department as well as the armed services were usually described as
politico-military affairs, and the committee's jurisdiction could not be
defined more specifically. The Standing Liaison Committee dealt primarily with
political and military relationships in the Western Hemisphere. It continued to
meet until mid-1943, but its influence in general policy planning declined
rapidly after the outbreak of hostilities.6
The President's dominant role in politico-military matters was absolutely
clear. His public speeches, particularly during the early days when anti-Axis
policy was being crystallized, nearly always marked the beginning of new phases
in American diplomacy and military preparedness. The ideas in them often may
have been advanced by almost anyone in his circle of official advisers, but the
decision as to timing and phrasing was the President's own or at least was
influenced only by some one of his personal, more or less anonymous White House
assistants, among whom Harry L. Hopkins was prominent in quasi-military
matters.7 Above all it was the President who had to
calculate the political risks to which he felt he could afford to commit
himself and the U. S. Government by any military action. These risks lay both
in the field of foreign relations and in that of domestic public opinion.
Ultimately the success of any strategic policy depended upon the confidence
which the governments of friendly nations and the people of the United States
placed in the Roosevelt administration.
Although General Marshall and WPD were continually studying military plans in
the strict sense, the Army's besetting problems in the two and one-half years
just before the United States entered the war centered rather in the mobilization
of manpower and the expansion of industrial production. Neither of these subjects
was of primary staff concern to WPD or of sole concern in the Army. They were
political and economic problems of the first magnitude. The Congress had to solve
the first one, as it did by the passage of the Selective Service Act in 1940 and
by its subsequent extension. The President solved or tried to solve the second
by the establishment of a series of executive agencies concerned with munitions
production and economic stabilization. The National Defense Advisory Commission
of 1940; the Office of Production Management created in January 1941, under William
S. Knudsen and Sidney Hillman; and the Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board
set up in August 1941 under Donald Nelson, were the forerunners of the powerful
War Production Board
[42]
finally established 16 January 1942 with Mr. Nelson as chairman.8
WPD had little to do directly with any of these agencies. Procurement was
handled by the Army technical services, particularly the Ordnance Department,
under the guidance of War Department G-4, and the Under (initially called
Assistant) Secretary of War. This civilian official, Robert P. Patterson
throughout Secretary Stimson's tenure, was responsible for "supervision of
the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War
Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provisions for the
mobilization of matériel and industrial organizations essential to wartime
needs." 9 Nevertheless, military requirements recommended by the General
Staff and especially the requirements contemplated in WPD's strategic planning
were basic to industrial mobilization scheduling. Conversely, WPD's specific
military proposals were always limited by the actual level of munitions
production expected.
In like manner, military programs for equipping and training troops depended on
the final distribution of munitions once they were manufactured. Here, too, the
President controlled policy as to the sale of armaments to Great Britain and
other anti-Axis Powers in 1940 and later the distribution of munitions and
other supplies under the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941. At first he worked
through the administrative
machinery of the Treasury Department under Secretary Henry L. Morgenthau and
later through the lend-lease administrative agencies successively headed by Mr.
Hopkins, Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, and Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. The Secretary
and Under Secretary of War, as well as the technical services and the G-4
Division of the General Staff, were deeply concerned with the foreign sales and
lend-lease program.10 WPD officers occasionally became involved in planning the
actual release of specific articles of military equipment, trying to assess the
strategic importance of weapons and their use by foreign powers. Most of the
proceedings in this matter, as in administration of national economic policy,
were carried on outside the War Department.
In advising on military strategy, Army leaders stayed well within the limits set
by the national policy, as announced by the President, of extending aid "short
of war" to countries resisting aggression. Military preparedness, insofar
as it fell within the jurisdiction of the War Department, was correspondingly
restricted. Military leaders could not act on the assumption, which would have
resolved many of their difficulties, that the national policy of the United States
would eventually have to encompass war. With each new development they could only
revise their calculations of the likelihood that the United States would be drawn
into open hostilities in the immediate future and correspondingly revise their
plans for disposing such forces as would have become available for strengthening
the defenses of the Western Hemisphere and outlying bases of the United States.
The basic premise on which WPD, during 1939,
[43]
1940, and 1941, studied the risks of hostile action which the United States
obviously was running, was set down in July 1940: civilian authorities should determine the "what" of national policy,
and professional soldiers should control the "how," the planning and
conduct of military operations.11
As the President put the country more and more on a war footing, the views of
the Army more and more corresponded with, and in turn influenced, national
policy. Increasing popular awareness of the gravity of the crisis caused a steady
trend in the direction of military preparedness. The appointment to office in
mid-1940 of Secretary of War Stimson, well known to be a staunch proponent of
American preparedness and resistance to aggression, marked the seriousness of the situation and helped subsequently to insure a strong cabinet
presentation of the Army's views. At the suggestion of Mr. Hopkins in April
1941, Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, Army elder statesman, and General Marshall
entered into a series of discussions at the White House designed to "begin
the education of the President as to the true strategic situation—this coming
after a period of [the President's] being influenced by the State
Department." Even then, General Marshall noted, Army planners had to
recognize and adjust their thinking to the fact that the President was governed
by public opinion as well as by professional military opinion.12 Whether or not
the State Department approved of the Army's "education" of the
President in early 1941, by the end of November Secretary of State Hull
informed the President, Secretary Stimson, and Secretary Knox that, as a result
of Japanese intransigence, the "safe
guarding of our national security" was "in the hands of the Army and
Navy." 13
Joint Board Machinery
The importance of the more strictly military problems of co-operation between
the War and Navy Departments had been recognized long before the advent of World
War II. In July 1903 the two secretaries established a joint board for "conferring
upon, discussing, and reaching common conclusions regarding all matters calling
for the cooperation of the two services." The initial membership comprised
four Army and four Navy officers designated by name rather than office. The
board took on considerable importance in Army-Navy affairs for a time, particularly
under the sponsorship of President Theodore Roosevelt, but gradually declined
in prominence until in 1914 President Wilson issued oral orders for suspension
of its meetings.14
After World War I the Secretaries of War and Navy reorganized the institution,
formally named the Joint Army-Navy Board but still usually called simply "The
Joint Board," and ordered it to hold meetings to "secure complete cooperation
and co-ordination in all matters and policies involving joint action of the Army
and Navy relative to the national defense." The membership of the Joint Board
was reduced to six in number, designated by office rather than name: the Chief
of Staff, the director of the
[44]
Operations Division (G-3), the director of the War Plans Division, the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the director of
the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations.15 After its
reinstitution the Joint Board remained in operation continuously with mission
unchanged. The composition of the board, however, changed twice. In 1923 the
Deputy Chief of Staff, whose position had been set up by the Harbord
reorganization in 1921, replaced the G-3 representative for the Army. In July
1941, in view of the increasing importance being attached to the air forces of
both services, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air (General Arnold) and the chief
of the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy were added.16 A co-ordinating
secretary for the board was supplied alternately by the two services, the Army
furnishing a WPD plans officer for this position in the immediate pre-Pearl
Harbor period.17
In July 1939 the President put the Joint Board on a new administrative footing
by directing it to exercise its functions under the "direction and
supervision" of the President as Commander in Chief as well as under that
of the two secretaries. The same order transferred to Presidential supervision
the Joint Economy Board, which was concerned with administrative organization;
the Joint Munitions Board, which coordinated the procurement of Army and Navy
munitions and supplies; and the Aeronautical Board, which attempted to adjust
policies on the development of aviation by the two services.18
The Joint Board became increasingly active in 1940 and 1941, making exploratory
studies of almost every aspect of common Army and Navy interest and arriving at
some far-reaching policy decisions in this field. It completed a number
of joint strategic plans which brought together and defined general and
specifically interservice elements in Army and Navy plans for identical
operational situations. With the establishment of the Joint Intelligence
Committee on the eve of Pearl Harbor, the Joint Board system was developing
some of the character of a rudimentary interservice high command.19 For a few
weeks thereafter it attempted to function as such, making operational
recommendations to the President concerning immediate military actions
necessary as a result of the Pearl Harbor attack.
Throughout its existence the Joint Board was not a staff agency but simply a committee
to make recommendations in the interests of interservice cooperation It
[45]
was unlikely to reach conclusions on matters on which the Army and Navy were
diametrically opposed. Its rulings had only the force of the authority which
its members and their civilian department heads chose to exercise independently
in their respective agencies except in the most important or urgent
cases, upon which it was possible to get formal approval by the President. The
Joint Board continued to exist on paper throughout the war, and on occasion it
met to deal with issues that were considered unfinished business left over from
prewar Army-Navy deliberations.20 In theory it merely made a temporary transfer
of its responsibilities when the members of the Joint Board and its subordinate
committees began conducting their business in the parallel system set up under
the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in 1942.21 As long as the board remained
operative, WPD (or OPD) was represented on it by its chief, and acted as the
War Department agency for carrying out Joint Board decisions.22 The existence
of the Joint Board and WPD's connection with its work provided the essential
precedents in Army experience for interservice planning organization and
technique in World War II.
An integral part of the Joint Board organization after 1919 was a Joint Planning
Committee, organized to "investigate, study, and report" on matters
before the board. Originally the committee was intended to consist of three or
more members from WPD and three or more members from the War Plans Division of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.23
After the Joint Planning Committee had dropped far behind in its work because
of the steadily increasing volume of national defense plans that had to be drawn
up in 1939 and 1940, it underwent a reorganization in personnel and in operating
method. In May 1941 the Joint Planning Committee was reduced to two permanent
members, the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, and the director of the Navy War Plans
Division, both of whom also sat as members of the Joint Board. Thus reduced in
size, the committee was authorized to assign work to a new, permanent Joint Strategic
Committee, "composed of at least three members of the Army War Plans Division
and the Navy War Plans Division, whose primary duties would be the study and preparation
of joint basic war and joint operations plans." In addition, whenever it
saw fit, the committee could appoint working committees from the two divisions.
Actually, the reorganization amounted to recognition that the Joint Planning Committee
would be a device whereby the work of the Army and Navy planning staffs could
be utilized and to some extent directed by the Joint Board for interservice co-ordination.24
This approach
[46]
proved sufficiently adaptable to provide the pattern for the planning
committees set up under the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in 1942.
International Military Collaboration
If interservice staff cooperation had its weaknesses in the pre-Pearl Harbor
period, systematic military collaboration on the international plane was even
less in evidence. Coalition warfare has usually been marked by a considerable
reserve between the military staffs of nations perhaps only temporarily allied,
and the United States was not even at war until the end of 1941. Under this
circumstance the degree of liaison established with one power, Great Britain,
was a remarkable achievement. It paved the way for the British-American combined
staff system of World War II, a unique accomplishment in co-operative effort
by the military staffs of two great sovereign powers.
Initially American relations with Great Britain, as with other nations, were
maintained exclusively through diplomatic representatives, with military
attachés functioning primarily as foreign intelligence reporters for the Army.
Special military missions were sent to some of the Latin American countries but
for the most part these dealt with either training technique or intelligence.
In 1941, when lend-lease became a major political and military factor in the
relations of the United States with friendly nations, several missions with
Army members in control were sent to various
countries at war with Germany and Japan. But the President handled lend-lease
under his own authority, and he dispatched civilian personal representatives,
such as Mr. Hopkins, Averell H. Harriman, and Laughlin Currie, as well as
military missions, to supervise initial, basic negotiations with Great Britain,
the Soviet Union, and China, the principal recipients of American assistance.
Until Pearl Harbor, therefore, the Army had very little to do with
international negotiations even when they affected American military plans and
capabilities. Although this circumstance did not necessarily result in the
adoption of policies unwise from a military point of view, it greatly limited
the field in which Army planners were free to recommend strategic policy,
especially Army policy which was interrelated with the distribution of American
munitions.
A special situation existed with regard to British-American military relations,
particularly important because many of the strategic objectives of the two
nations were identical or could be reconciled. The President's sympathetic
semipersonal correspondence with Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill in the
United Kingdom's darkest days, the post-Dunkerque transfer of obsolete American
arms to Great Britain, and the 1940 exchange of American destroyers for bases
leased in British territory in the Western Atlantic, all served to establish an
extraordinarily cordial association between the heads of the two governments in
1940 and 1941.25
In more narrowly military matters, the Army and the Navy began early in 1941 to
take the lead in staff liaison with the British.
[47]
The services were permitted to do so partly as a result of the mutual
British-American political confidence which had been established, and partly
because the President himself wished to avoid any appearance of committing the
United States to a military course of action before Congress had declared war.
Conferences in January, February, and March, generally known as the ABC-1
conversations, were the first of the formal British-American strategic
discussions, and they were conducted under the auspices of the armed services
rather than those of the State Department. American interests were represented
by a committee of U. S. Army and Navy officers, two of whom were WPD
planners.26 Related conversations, specifically concerning the Pacific and the
Far East and including Netherlands as well as British representatives, were
conducted in Singapore on a similar plane, though with less success, by Army and Navy officers on duty in
the Pacific. These international staff conversations did much to give shape to
American strategic thinking in 1941. They were briefed and analyzed for General
Marshall by WPD, which attempted to bring its planning into line with the
military thinking of potential allies either by promoting the U. S. Army point
of view or modifying it in the interests of acceptable compromise.
As a result of the successful conference between the British and U. S. representatives
early in 1941, a method for continuous exchange of staff ideas came into existence.
The United States dispatched observer groups of Army and Navy officers to Great
Britain to provide systematic liaison with the British military leaders in London.
On their part, the British established a staff group in Washington, the British
Joint Staff Mission, to represent the three armed services of Great Britain. Originally
termed simply a military mission but later for purposes of secrecy publicly called
the "Advisors to the British Supply Council in North America," it was
set up in June 1941 under the leadership of Admiral Sir Charles J. C. Little,
Lt. Gen. H. C. B. Wemyss, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris.27
WPD acted as the War Department liaison agency with the British mission in all
matters concerning Army ground or air plans, operations, organization, and supply.28
It coordinated all Army work relevant to British-American discussions and advised
the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War on British studies and recommendations.29
This arrangement for dealing with British-American military affairs in Washington
established the ground work for a system of international staff and command coordination
The extent of cooperation achieved between the two countries under this arrangement
was demonstrated by the August 1941
[48]
conference between the President and the Prime Minister. American officers, including
a WPD planner, and the chiefs of the British armed services discussed common strategy
while the civilian representatives of the two great anti-Axis Powers were agreeing
on the political and social principles, set forth in the "Atlantic Charter."
It was from this working liaison between American and British military staffs
that the Combined Chiefs of Staff structure developed after Pearl Harbor. The
close identification of WPD with the British Joint Staff Mission foreshadowed
the prominent role its successor agency would play in later British-American planning
deliberations.
[49]
Endnotes
Previous Chapter Next Chapter
Return to the
Table of Contents
|
|
Last updated 19 October 2004 |