After more than two years of disputation and negotiation-with civilian agencies, with the British, with nationalistically sensitive governments in exile, and even with hesitant groups in the Army-the jurisdictional claims of the military authorities in civil affairs had all been confirmed. Although there are those who interpret all organizational history as a ceaseless struggle for more power, the probability is that the Army viewed its expanded jurisdiction in civil affairs with as much misgiving as gratification. Increase of responsibility is wholly gratifying in a sphere of a primary interest, but not in that of a secondary interest which may draw too heavily upon resources needed for more important activities. Civil affairs was, undoubtedly, of great importance to the Army, but relative to the tactical mission it was distinctly secondary. And commitments to civil affairs gave rise to misgivings because the exhausting but thankless struggle with the wartime misery of governed peoples-a struggle in which the accumulation of economic, political, and moral commitments could threaten the resources required for victory-was like some swamp from which a would-be rescuer attempts to save another at the distinct risk of becoming bogged down and lost himself.

While without any thought of escaping the obligations imposed by international law, the Army had felt misgivings over the burdens of civil affairs from the beginning and had been, therefore, the more disposed to go along with the President's decision that in North Africa primary responsibility would be given to civilian agencies. It had sought a greater role in civil affairs only when it became clear that this was necessary in the interest of military operations. The misgivings did not cease and were reflected in a care to limit the degree of control asked for. However, it was not until the Army's claims were on the way to general acceptance that caution began to vie strongly with organizational self-assertion. A close study of the trend toward self-limitation is useful not primarily because of the psychological interest of this trend and its refutation of the assumption that the Army's rise to control in civil affairs was due simply to a successful power impulse. What is of chief importance is that, before passing from the study of planning to that of operations, the reader carefully appraise the validity of the Army's advance estimate of its mission. Nothing is of greater moment in the preparations for civil affairs than a correct estimate of the commitment, and in the study of operational experience it will be helpful to consider whether the Army's preconceptions of the scope of its task were confirmed or disproved.

The documents of this chapter, though reflecting in a number of cases hitherto unconsidered administrative issues, have therefore been presented less for their pertinence to organizational history than for their bearing on the Army's belief that its commitment to civil affairs should and

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could be a limited one. This belief was, as will appear, highly venturesome, but it was as much an article of faith in the period of preparations as the doctrine that the Army's role in civil affairs was a substantial one. While the desire for limitation of commitments was expressed in a great variety of issues, all of these can be subsumed under one or the other of two general problems. The first involves the extent to which. the Army could lessen its responsibility by partial delegation and ultimately complete transfer of civil affairs functions to civilian agencies or restored governments (in the special case of the Balkans by requiring the British to assume sole responsibility from the outset). The second involves the degree to which military governors, even during the period wherein they retained complete authority, could curtail their administrative burden by vesting functions or responsibilities in the governed people-whether by using local organs and officials or by leaving certain politico-economic objectives to local decision and initiative.

In both these considerations dealing with the distribution of civil affairs functions there were, in theory, three alternatives: that the Army do as little as possible, that it do as much as possible, and that it undertake something between the two extremes on the basis of some principle permitting compromise between burdensome responsibility and prudent self-interest. Though the emphasis proved to be upon limitation of commitment, yet the degree of limitation was median rather than minimal. The latter would have meant merely the acceptance of such responsibility as was imposed by international law and as could not be performed by any other authority. The idea of minimal commitment was rejected when the military authorities opposed continuation of the arrangement for civil affairs control as practiced in French North Africa. To be sure, it was rejected primarily on the ground of military self-interest, that is, because civil affairs was found to be too closely related to military operations to be delegated during the active phase. On the same ground the Army rejected a maximal commitment, which would have entailed doing entirely with military resources the tasks called for by the most generous interpretation of the needs of the governed. The median commitment accepted was that of limiting the Army's task, in relation both to that of other authorities and to that of the governed, by the principle that military control could no further exceed the minimal commitment in civil affairs than was required by, or compatible with, the interests of the war effort. In accordance with this principle, responsibility was to be accepted only in areas where U.S. forces operated and for only as long as operationally necessary. It was to be mitigated by gradually introducing civilian agencies within the military framework and was not to extend in any degree into posthostilities problems. On the same principle, the governed people were to be drawn upon (as far as was compatible with United Nations political and military interests) for organs of government and local officials, and they were to utilize their local resources to the utmost, aided only to the extent demanded by minimum subsistence needs. As regards issues of political rehabilitation they were to be guided rather through indication that the gates of salvation were open to them than by arduous effort to prevent them from going toward damnation if unfortunately they so chose.

As recorded complaints evidence, certain civilians felt that these limitations on military responsibility for civil affairs placed an undue burden upon nonmilitary agencies which had fewer resources than the Army for carrying it. Some of the critics who at an earlier stage had blamed the

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Army for aiming at too much in civil affairs now blamed it for attempting too little. Whereas the first trend was attributed to overambition, the second was perhaps ascribed less to lack of ambition than to lack of charitable impulse. The statements of some Army authorities do seem rather considerably less than paternalistic, but they are not statements of personal philosophy and inclination. They are merely statements of the implications of a national directive, which, as one of the civil affairs authorities observed, had not established the Army as a welfare organization. While the enunciations of the United Nations and national war aims had been of vaguely generous tone, no change had been made in the Army's mission to warrant the assumption that it could commit the Nation's or its own resources beyond the extent demanded by international law and military expediency. If, for example, food was to be supplied to governed peoples beyond the amount necessary to prevent disease and unrest, the Army had to assume that this supplement would be the responsibility of the civilian agencies, either during or after the period of military responsibility. The best the Army could do would be to end this period as soon as possible; civilian agencies could then see what luck they would have in obtaining Congressional appropriations to finance more lavish programs.

An erroneous assumption could, indeed, be said to underlie most of the Army's efforts to limit its commitments. But that the assumption was an error became apparent only after it had been tested by operational experience. Planners propose, unforeseen events dispose, and, if the history of Allied experiences in military government shows any one thing more clearly than another, it is that military commitments could only to a relatively slight degree be limited to the extent that the planners considered desirable. The Army had, indeed, interpreted its responsibilities more broadly than tradition required, and it had foreseen the difficulty of these responsibilities more clearly than did the civilians who had been inclined to apply peacetime standards to the civil problems of war. But even so the Army erred rather greatly on the side of underestimation. It did not foresee that in all major areas it would be compelled to carry the burden till virtually the conclusion of hostilities, that civilian agencies would be able to share the operative burden only in relatively small measure, that restored governments would cause complications largely offsetting their assistance, that the Army would be compelled to manage civilian relief in nonoperational as as well as operational areas (even in Greece where Americans were caught in the crossfire of contending political factions), and that for years after the conclusion of active hostilities military governors would be unable to extricate themselves from Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. The Army also did not envisage that both liberated and enemy peoples would be found with capacity for self-help largely depleted, that the system of indirect control would require a supervision almost as arduous as actually doing the job, and that the policies toward the governed would have to be fashioned on lines deviating from every traditional principle of limitation-on prodigality rather than economy of effort, on economic standards closer to rehabilitation than to mere relief, and on political principles nearer to radical reform than to conservative noninterference. At first thought this misapprehension of the task that lay ahead may seem to represent only an overoptimistic estimate of the amount of help the Army expected from others. But since it was the enormity of the problems which restricted the aid that others could extend, the miscalculations reflect fundamentally an underestimation of the difficulty and scope of the civil af-

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fairs mission under the unprecedented conditions of World War II, and of the impact which every phase of the mission would make upon military interest.

In turning to the history of military government in Italy, the first and in many ways the most surprising of the major country operations, the reader, with the advantage of hindsight, should try to adopt a fair and objective point of view. This demands, first, that where the civil affairs task appears to have exceeded the planning estimates, that he ask whether the underestimation was not simply due to the unavoidable lack of foreknowledge that in this war civil affairs would advance for the first time from the periphery toward the very center of war problems. Fairness demands also that one place less emphasis upon whether the initial estimate was correct than upon the question whether the military governors were sufficiently flexible and prompt in adapting their policies to unexpected conditions. In favor of their capacity for adequate revision were a number of factors. First, civil affairs authorities were practitioners of the art of war and were accustomed to the unpredictability of events because war is the most unpredictable of all human experiences, the great undoer of the best-laid plans. Second, their major plans were more or less tentative, and even during the period of preparations they had changed these plans as need demanded. Third, they had approached their task in a spirit conducive to a sympathetic re-examination of human needs; for civil affairs was to be regarded, in the words of General Marshall in announcing to the Director of CAD his appointment, as "the most sacred trust of the American people." ¹  This did not require that the attempt to limit the Army's commitments should ever cease-once it did there would be danger that victory, the prerequisite of all lasting benefits, might itself be imperiled. But both humanity and self-interest required keeping in mind that the degree to which commitments could be limited depended not only upon the foresight of planners but also upon unpredictable fortunes of war, which might dictate extending the efforts of governors in behalf of the governed in the interest of both.

1. TURNOVER TO CIVILIANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

CAD CHIEF BELIEVES MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL SUCCEED ONLY IF CIVILIAN AGENCIES TAKE OVER AS SOON AS SITUATION PERMITS
[Min, Mtg in CAD, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337, CAD (4-14-43) (1)]

General Hilldring ... explained the necessity to tie in closely with those civilian agencies in Washington which are concerned with military government matters. He stated that military government will be a success only if it is recognized that these civilian agencies will move into the liberated areas and take over civil affairs functions from the Armed Services as soon as the military situation permits....

CIVILIAN OFFICIAL FEELS ARMY LEADERS ARE NOT SEEKING TO RETAIN JURISDICTION
[Memo, Appleby, Dir, OFT, Dept of State (Undated) apparently in Jun 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

I am assuming that it is understood that military administration is less desirable than civil administration as soon as civil administration is possible. The War Department as a Department has seemed rather clearly to lean to this view, and several actions of the President have indicated that it is his view. The War Department as a whole has taken a rather broad, imaginative view not limited by conventionally military thinking. This surely is true of Mr. McCloy,

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General Marshall and General Eisenhower. But there has never been any actual determination of the general policy I am assuming. And of course "as soon as possible" is a very vague policy. There can hardly be a hard-and-fast, single, general policy. The very first responsibility must be with the military authorities. The transition must be gradual, even if it can in places be rapid, and the military will have to retain a certain authority for a long time, perhaps until the end of the war, perhaps until general political arrangements for government in the respective areas are completed. But the military, except possibly for one school of thinking, will wish to simplify its responsibility as much and as soon as possible, and governmental heads will wish this to be the case for general, political reasons. The military will need to be satisfied that civilian governmental arrangements are adequate. The government similarly will need to be satisfied....

GENERAL HILLDRING CAREFUL TO AVOID SUSPICIONS OF ARMY AMBITIOUSNESS
[Min, 9th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 23 Jul 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43)]

VII . . . .

2. . . . General Hilldring . .. reported that Anglo-American military authorities were close to agreement on all supply matters except the length of the period of military responsibility for supply. He suggested that this was essentially a civilian matter and that CAD had been unwilling to agree to the British proposal for a six months period of military responsibility for supplies for fear that civilians would think that CAD was seeking to extend its control longer than necessary....

SPEED TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN SUPPLY
[Draft of WD Responsibilities, submitted by McCloy to Asst Chief, Div of Admin Mgt, Bur of Budget, 11 Feb 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 4]

That the military should not retain the job of supplying relief and dealing with civil affairs any longer than necessary is a thoroughly established policy of the Government. In this connection a policy statement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff reads in part as follows: "The Administration of civil affairs should be delegated to appropriate civilian departments and agencies just as soon as the military situation permits. This may be accomplished gradually, even though the area is still the subject of military control. The decision as to when and to what extent civilian departments and agencies will assist the military in the administration of civil affairs will be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, upon recommendation of the military commander in the area. Generally, responsibility for the handling of civil affairs should be relinquished by the military as quickly as this can be accomplished without interference with the military purposes of the occupation." ¹

Transition from in military to civilian control. While the Army is assuming for procurement planning purposes that it will be responsible for civilian supply for a period of six months, the duration of military responsibility may be for a longer or shorter time depending upon a number of unpredictable factors. The military may find themselves forced to continue dispensing relief and handling civil affairs for an undesirably long time unless certain steps are taken in advance to pave the way for a shift of this responsibility to civilians. The following points suggest ways for speeding the transition.

1. There must be a high degree of consistency between what the Army plans to do in relief and rehabilitation and actions which civilian agencies plan to take. This requires that the military keep the civilian agencies as completely advised as possible with respect to the conduct of its relief activities during the military period. Although retaining full responsibility during the initial phase, the Army has expressed its desire to receive the advice of civilians on civil affairs. . . .

2. In order to assist the military in discharging its responsibilities and in order to enable the civilian agencies to discharge their responsibilities, the civilian agencies have detailed certain representatives to work with the War Department. This arrangement should be continued.

3. An identity of field personnel between the armed services and operating civilian agencies in the final stages of military responsibility might be an important element in easing the shift of responsibility. The Army might permit a few of its own civil affairs officers to withdraw from active duty but remain in the field as employees of the appropriate civilian agency. (The persons who would be transferred in this manner could be selected in advance.) .. .

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WAR DEPARTMENT WILL NOT BECOME ENTANGLED IN POSTHOSTILITIES PLANNING
[Ltr, SW Patterson to Secy of State, 8 Aug 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

I have your letter of July 31, 1944 advising of the formation of a Liberated Areas Committee and a Combined Liberated Areas Committee, wherein there may be resolved respectively the views of the United States agencies and the combined views of the United States and United Kingdom agencies regarding policies for liberated areas during the post-military period....

I am very glad to designate Major General J. H. Hilldring, Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, as the War Department member of the Liberated Areas Committee. . . .

I . . . desire that the War Department membership on the Liberated Areas Committee be limited as to time to the military period of responsibility for civil affairs, and as to competence to furnishing to the committee appropriate information as to military plans and programs, and to receiving advice and suggestions with respect thereto.

I do not believe it would be wise for the War Department to accept a membership upon the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Primarily the function of the Combined Liberated Areas Committee will be to resolve policy views of His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States in order to achieve a combined policy with respect to liberated areas after the military period. . . . The resolution of the views of the two Governments with respect to policies after military responsibility has ended should, in my opinion, be accomplished through civilian channels....

2. MILITARY COMMANDERS DO NOT MAKE POLITICO-ECONOMIC POLICIES

BASIC POLICIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 17 Jun 42, PMG files, 321.19, MG]

8. The points of major policy inherent in the total [military government] program may be summarized as follows:  ²

a. Military. Military government is essentially an army responsibility, except for political and certain long range economic features.

b. Political. The political policy of military government cannot be determined by the military command. It is inherently the function of the State Department.

c. Economic. Military necessity can control the economic policy of a military government only while such necessity exists. The long view economic policy will presumably be directed either by the State Department or the Board of Economic Warfare, or some other governmental agency. . . .

WAR DEPARTMENT INTERESTED IN ECONOMIC POLICY ONLY IF IT DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE MILITARY SITUATION
[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, PMG, 29 Jan 43, ASF, ID files, 014 Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. II]

The question involved is the determination of an economic policy, namely, the price to be paid in French North and West Africa for commodities purchased by the U.S. or the U.K., the precise question being whether world prices are to be paid or existing price levels maintained.

The announced policy of the War Department is that the function of the Army in any occupation is primarily an administrative one and that the determination of economic policy is basically a matter for civilian agencies of the government. This policy is subject only to the limitation that, if such economic policy shall have any direct impact upon the military situation, the Army reserves the right to object.

At the present stage of the discussion evidenced by the attachment, it does not appear that a determination of the question will have any immediate repercussion on the military situation. Consequently, at this time, this office feels that it has no interest in the form of the reply to be dispatched to the British representative.

EISENHOWER KNOWS LIMITS OF HIS AUTHORITY
[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 15765]

Upon my return from the forward areas, I was astonished to find a telegram from the President stating that he had received a report to the effect that I was preparing on my own authority to give some form of recognition to the French Committee. . . . No such thought has ever en-

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tered my head. While I feel, along with my political assistants, that some kind of limited recognition of the collective body would be helpful here [French North Africa], I have strictly confined my actions in the case to recommendations through proper channels. I am quite well aware of the exclusive authority of the President in such matters, and I am sometimes disturbed that any rumor of such a kind can gain such force or atmosphere of validity as to create an impression that I would step out of my own proper sphere to this extent, or could impel, as in this case, the President himself to send me orders on the subject. I am completely ignorant as to how such a rumor could have started. I hope that at an appropriate time you can make it clear to the President that I have never entertained such a thought for a moment.

1943 MANUAL ENJOINS HANDS--OFF ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICS OF OCCUPIED AREAS
[U.S. Army-Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43]

[Sec. 9] (7) Neither local political personalities nor organized political groups, however sound in sentiment, should have any part in determining the policies of the military government. Civil affairs officers should avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, any local political elements except by directions from higher authority. . . .

WAR DEPARTMENT ACCEPTS STATE DEPARTMENT'S CIVILIAN SUPPLY POLICIES
[Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 29 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-135]

I have read with much interest your letter dated I January in which you express the views of the State Department on some of the policy questions having to do with the furnishing of civilian supplies for areas to be liberated from Axis domination. Since the State Department is the agency of the administrative branch of our Government whose function it is to determine, subject to the authority of the President, the policy of our Government in our dealings with other governments or peoples, it necessarily follows that the State Department should formulate the policy of our Government as to the furnishing of supplies to the liberated areas. Accordingly, the views which you shall express from time to time relative to providing civilian supplies will be accepted by the War Department as the official statement of policy of the administrative branch of the Government on this subject.³  * * *

UNFORTUNATELY IT IS DIFFICULT TO DRAW THE LINE
[Msg, CCS to Gen Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, SAC [Supreme Allied Command], MTO [Mediterranean Theater of Operations], 14 Jul 44, FAN 379]

. . . It is difficult to draw the line between Military and Political subjects....

3. MINIMUM CHANGE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND AUTHORITIES

IDEAL TYPE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
[Prospectus of SMG, March 1942, PMGO files, 352.01 SMG Establishment]

The ideal type of military government is one which, coming into being amid the utter chaos of a civilian population whose armed forces have just been subjected to military defeat, can restore order and stability with dispatch and at the same time integrate the local institutions and psychology of the occupied area and the superimposed military authority with a minimum of change in the former and a maximum of control by the latter. . . .

OSS CRITICIZES PRINCIPLE OF RETAINING THE STATUS QUO
[Memo for Info No. 56, OSS on MG, pp. 5-8 of app. to Memo, Donovan, Dir, OSS, to Deane, Secy, JCS, 12 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-42), sec. 1]

. . . Both [the Army and the Navy Manuals of military government] maintain that in the civil government of occupied territory the law enforced at the time of occupation should as far as possible be applied, and the civil administration in office at the time of occupation, as far as possible retained. No provision is made for a situation in which the legal status quo would be re-

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pugnant to the conquerors or the administrative personnel unacceptable. ♦ ♦ ♦

It is . . . quite certain that any planning for military government, based on the assumption that the legal status quo in the territory occupied should be supported and the existing local personnel utilized, is on dangerously weak foundations. It will not always be easy to define the legal status quo and it may be highly undesirable to support it when it is defined. Shall we, for example, wish to give military sanction to the legal status quo in Nazi Germany, which has ridden rough shod over private property rights and over civil and religious freedom? Shall we want to endorse the Nazi educational system? Even in countries not obviously hostile which are recovered from Nazi domination, the problem of the legal status quo will be hardly less difficult. In France, for example, shall we accept and enforce laws imposed under Nazi domination-anti-Semitic laws, for example? Analogous questions will arise in other countries, some very difficult questions in confused areas like Alsace and Lorraine. They will have to be answered by the military governor with the uncomfortable feeling that the answer he gives, will itself establish a status quo which will tend to perpetuate itself and profoundly influence the pattern of ultimate peace.

The same thing is true with reference to the utilization of the local personnel. In Germany we shall hardly dare to maintain the Nazi administration. In France we shall have to select between conflicting factions. How shall we distinguish between friends and seeming friends? Where shall we find the administrative personnel to run the country? These are not the kinds of problems which can be solved out of military government books. The areas likely to be occupied must be studied intensively, the local personnel must be checked, the realities of the status quo as distinguished from the textbook version of it must be carefully appraised....

1943 MANUAL RESTATES PRINCIPLE OF NONINTERFERENCE
[Army-Navy Manual of MG and. CA, 22 Dec 43]

[Sec. 9] h. . . . Retention of Existing Laws, Customs, and Political Subdivisions. Local officials and inhabitants of an occupied territory are familiar with its laws, customs, and institutions. To avoid confusion and to promote simplicity of administration, it is advisable that local laws, customs, and institutions of government be retained, except where they conflict with the aims of military government or are inimical to its best interests. ⁴  In general, it is unwise to impose upon occupied territory the laws and customs of another people. Any attempted changes or reforms contrary to local custom may result in development of active or passive resistance and thereby handicap the operation of military government. For similar reasons it is advisable, if possible, to retain existing territorial divisions and subdivisions. Laws and customs in one political division of a country may differ widely from those in another and the inhabitants therefore may be accustomed to the decentralization of governmental authority which usually parallels such divisions. . . .

MANUAL CALLS FOR MAXIMUM RETENTION OF SUBORDINATE LOCAL OFFICIALS
[Army-Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43]

[Sec. 9i] (4) ⁵ So far as practicable, subordinate officials and employees of the local government should be retained in their offices and made responsible for the proper discharge of their duties, subject to the direction and supervision of civil affairs personnel. . ⁶

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4. MAXIMUM USE OF INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATION IN NONENEMY COUNTRIES

MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY MAY BE DELEGATED TO THE INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT
[Statement on Liberated Areas, approved by Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill at Quebec Conf, 22 Aug 43, in Notes on Conf With Hull, CofS files, 337, Confs]

(1) The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of their military operations in enemy territory, must assume the major responsibility for the administration of enemy territories by their forces in pursuance of the war against the Axis.

(2) a. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, while continuing to exercise supreme military authority in liberated areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be agreeable to the policy of each government and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with its function of maintaining law and order with such assistance by the Allied authorities as may be necessary, subject always to military requirements.

b. Conversations and arrangements with the governments of those countries have already been in progress for some time on these aspects of the mutual interests involved. .. .

DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AFFAIRS SHOULD BE A FRENCH OFFICER
[Msg, Hilldring to CG, ETO, 11 Oct 43, SHAEF G-5, 10.02, ETOUSA/CA Sec]

Civil Affairs directive on France in final draft approved by the U.S. and the U.K. reads as follows:

The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander from the French contingent or the French Liaison Mission connected with the Military Operations in France.

... Strong feeling here is that as long as final authority reposes in Supreme Commander, Chief Civil Affairs Officer should be French. Any arrangement which does not give leadership to French would unnecessarily initiate and perhaps even provoke French to troublesome counter-activity before and after landing. From purely military point of view we feel such a gesture might help rather than hinder our operations and their connection with resistance movement. . . .

POLICE BURDENS TO BE ENTRUSTED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO INDIGENOUS FORCES
[Memo, ACofS, G-3, to Theater Comdrs, 14 Oct 43, WDCSA files, 014, 1943]

h. . . . It is not the present intention of the War Department to provide occupational Military Police battalions for use in United Nations countries such as France, liberated as a result of military operations. No provision is being made for occupational police battalions in Italy, as it is expected that the carabinieri and Italian Army will be found satisfactory for local security purposes....

DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO BE LEFT TO INDIGENOUS AUTHORITIES
[Min, Mtg held in McCloy's Office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-171]

General Clay stated as the U.S. position, that . . . it was necessary to separate the supplies into those which were to be made available as relief and those which were to be sold for cash. As to the former, supervision within the area would be required to make certain that U.S. assets were not exploited. Less supervision would be required in the event that goods were sold for cash, since the principal U.S. interest would be to make certain that items in short supply in the U.S. were not exploited. Except for distribution in combat zones, it is the War Department intention to make deliveries at ports and to leave internal distribution within liberated countries to the indigenous authorities, subject to the above supervision. .. .

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT WITH NORWAY DELEGATES PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT
[Agreement between CG, ETOUSA, and the Norwegian Govt, 29 Jan 44, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1). For Norwegian Agreement see below, Chapter XXII, Section 1.]

2. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, the military situ-

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ation permits, the Norwegian Government will be notified in order that they may resume the exercise of responsibility for the civil administration, subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the Allied forces, .. .

DEFERENCE TO BELGIAN GOVERNMENT IN CONDUCT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
[Min, Mtg at Norfolk House, II May 44, to Discuss Liaison With SHAEF, SGS files, 014.r, Belgium, vol. I]

2. [Lt.] General [Sir A.E.] Grasett [ACofS, G-5, SHAEF] wished to make it clear that, during the early stages of operations in Belgium, the country would be under military control which was quite a different thing from military government. The agreement between the Belgian and U.S. and British Governments had been drawn up and this would be the basis for SHAEF policy in Belgium. General Eisenhower was most anxious that during the period of operations the Belgian wishes should be met in every way possible. It was General Eisenhower's intention to hand over the control of Belgium to the Belgian Government at the earliest possible moment. For this purpose he was desirous of having the best possible advice and he therefore hoped that the Belgian Government would send him a combined mission. That would be the prime object of the Belgian Liaison Mission accredited to General Eisenhower. . . . He wished to stress that during that period of military control, Supreme Headquarters would work through the Belgian local authorities....

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE WILL NORMALLY BE CONTROLLED BY FRENCH
[Incl "A" to Interim Directive (France), SHAEF to SAC, MTO, on CA in Southern Fr, CCAC 54/2, 14 May 44, ⁷ CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43 ), sec. I ]

I. . . . Except as military necessity may otherwise dictate, you will conform to the guides herein set forth either under ANVIL conditions or under any RANKIN conditions which may develop.

2. Within boundaries established by this Headquarters (HQ), you will have, de facto, supreme responsibility and authority at all times and in all areas to the full extent necessitated by the military situation. However, Military Government will not be established in liberated France. Civil administration in all areas will normally be controlled by the French themselves. In order to secure uniform civil administration SCAEF [Supreme, Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces] will utilize the leadership of French authorities (other than Vichy) in national administration and will maintain communications with you regarding policy and decisions in such matters. If initial recourse to French authorities fails, such executive action as the security of the forces or the success of the military operations may require is authorized. . . .

5. THE ARMY TRIES TO KEEP OUT OF THE BALKANS

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT ONLY WHERE U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS TAKE PLACE
[Determination of War Department Responsibility for Military Government in the Balkans, 15 Sep 43, CAD files, 014, Balkans (9-15-43) (1)]

2. The future status of command responsibility in the Balkans has not yet been clearly established by CCS directive. It has been accepted as a matter of policy by CCAC that the military government of an area shall conform to the character of the military operation, i.e., unless U.S. armed forces participate, the military government in the areas occupied will not be a U.S. responsibility. . . .

5. It is recommended (I) that, unless and until it is planned that U.S. ground forces will be used in an invasion and/or occupation of the Balkans, the CCAC and the War Department be relieved of responsibility for the establishment and ad-

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ministration of military government, including civilian supply, in the areas, (2) That the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff be advised that (I) above is no way to be considered as any limitation of the U.S. State Department's interest or operation in the area or of any restriction upon existing mission of the U.S. forces in the Middle East. (3) That this policy be referred to the CCS for approval of the above recommendations. . . .

PROPOSAL FOR USE OF AMERICAN TROOPS IS DISAPPROVED
[Paraphrase of Msg, Maj Gen Ralph Royce, CG, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME), to CofS, 14 Oct 43, incorporating recommendations of State Dept representative, OPD files, 014.1, sec. II-A]

The Theater Commander should be authorized to employ troops in occupation of these territories where maintenance of law and order is necessary, and that such occupation, which is not the use of troops for warfare, be co-ordinated with British C-in-C. Otherwise American civilians participating in relief work will be either powerless to accomplish political and economic results desired by U.S., or will be entirely dependent upon British forces whose policies may not be entirely in consonance with ours. Therefore responsibility will be assumed on the civil side, which in absence of military support when circumstances demand, will be impossible of accomplishment. . . .

[Msg, JCS to CG, USAFIME, 26 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 11821]

... It is contrary to Joint Chiefs of Staff intention to divert troops from military operations for the purpose of supporting the administration of civilian relief. . . .

WAR DEPARTMENT DISINCLINED To PROCURE RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR BALKANS IF NOT THE SCENE OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS
[Min, Mtg held in McCloy's office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-171]

The U.S. position was set forth by General Clay who stated that the War Department was assuming the same procedures as to requirements and procurement as in other areas. He stated that if there was an approved military operation, supplies would be provided. If there was no approved operation, the War Department would be guided by the advice of the State Department which was being sought....

Sir Frederick [Bovenschen] stated that the British Government contemplated the use of civilian relief agencies in the distribution of relief in the Balkans. He added that he did not consider that UNRRA would be in a position to assume this responsibility in the event of a collapse.

Mr. Acheson, on behalf of the State Department, expressed his firm opposition to this proposal on the grounds that if relief was not to be handled by the military, it should be handled through UNRRA, which was established for the purpose of providing relief to those countries which were not in a position to pay for their supplies. He stated that he thought the Balkans presented an excellent example of an area where UNRRA was prepared to and should perform the type of function which it was organized to discharge and that it would be most unwise to use any other civil relief agencies. General Clay concurred in this view and added that the War Department would be averse to a program to procure and ship supplies to be distributed by civilian relief agencies in the Balkans.⁸

NO AMERICAN TROOPS BUT CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS IF STATE DEPARTMENT INSISTS
[Memo, McCloy for Roosevelt, 31 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-190]

It appears to have been decided that if and when military operations are conducted in Greece and Yugoslavia they will be under the combined command in the Mediterranean [AFHQ] but that American troops will not participate in operations, at least it is most doubtful if Americans will participate. A decision is necessary as to whether these Civil Affairs officers supervising distribution of supplies under the Commander in the field should be solely British or whether they should be, as in other theaters, a combined group. Presumably the ultimate decision rests with the Theater Commander. It is understood that lie would be agreeable to a combined Civil Affairs group if the American Government would consent.

The question is then whether in matters of civil relief for these liberated areas pending the introduction of non-military relief organizations, the American Zone should provide their share of civil affairs officers and men in combination with the British for the distribution in these areas of civilian supplies covering the military period.

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The State Department recommends that such consent be given. The War Department takes the position that this is a matter of national policy rather than a military question but will prepare itself to follow whatever decision is made. Procurement, it is planned, will be on a combined basis. ⁹

U.S. ARMY WILL PARTICIPATE ONLY IN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
[Msg, CAD to CG, NATOUSA, 17 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Balkans (9-15-43) (1), CM-OUT 7582]

U.S. Policies Governing U.S. Army Participation [in Balkans]....

A. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, through the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, will determine requirements and allocate procurement responsibility as between U.S. and U.K. Relief supplies will be shipped to Balkan ports as military supplies.¹⁰

B. UNRRA has been selected by the U.S.-U.K. as the agency of the U.S.-U.K. military authorities in the Balkans to administer relief and rehabilitation operations, i.e., relief services such as public health, welfare, sanitation; distribution of relief supplies; rehabilitation of public utilities, agriculture, industry, and transport as are essential to relief; assistance to displaced persons and refugees, and related matters to relief.

C. U.S. Army participation in the distribution of relief supplies will be limited to approximately 25 officers, and no enlisted men.

D. The detailed planning of estimates will be carried on in the theater by the U.S.-U.K. military authorities, who will submit these estimates for consideration to the CCAC.

The U.S. officers, on a 50-50 U.S.-U.K. basis, should be placed in such top level positions as to make the top direction truly combined insofar as relief and rehabilitation operations, and distribution of relief supplies are concerned.

The U.S. Army will not participate in the administration of civil affairs except insofar as relief and rehabilitation operations are concerned.♦ ♦ ♦

NO U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A COMMITTEE CONCERNED LARGELY WITH PURELY BRITISH INTERESTS
[Msg, Hilldring to CG, USAFIME, 21 May 44, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 40485]

.. . State Department has advised the War Department of formation of Balkan Affairs Committee with relief and operations subcommittee. Terms of reference indicate this to be largely a British Committee having spheres of activity beyond the present U.S. military interest which are limited strictly to relief and rehabilitation in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. State Department is opposed to the present constitution and terms of reference of the BAC [Balkan Affairs Committee] and to the establishment of the subcommittees. Pending further instruction, you will refrain from sitting as a member or observer until issues are clarified by the State Department....

6. CIVILIAN SUPPLIES ONLY FOR THE PREVENTION OF DISEASE AND UNREST

NO IDEA OF REVIVING PREWAR STANDARDS OF LIVING ABROAD
[Memo, Handy, ACofS, OPD, for CG, SOS, 19 Feb 43, OPD files, 400, Africa, sec. 1]

7. Present limitations imposed on military operations by the shortage of shipping and escorts are such that it is unlikely that Theater Commanders will be able to allocate more space for civilian supply than the minimum necessary to maintain local standards of living on a basis somewhat lower than normal pre-war standards. The diversion of shipping from present essential military, lend-lease and war production purposes

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to provide supplies to raise civilian standard of living of foreign areas to United States or even to local pre-war standards would be a disastrous policy at this time....

RELIEF BUT NOT REHABILITATION
[Memo of Discussion at Mtg Between Representatives of the ASF Technical Servs and Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, 18 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43]

It was re-emphasized that the Army cannot concern itself with problems of rehabilitation, however desirable it might be that plans be dovetailed with those of civilian agencies for easing the period of transition ....¹¹

IN GENERAL RELIEF SUPPLIES WILL MEET ONLY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL NEEDS
[Memo, Clay for Maj Gen John C. H. Lee, CG, SOS, ETOUSA, 31 Aug 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vo1. 2]

The activities of ASF with respect to civilian supply planning are based upon the premise that only the minimum essential needs of the population necessary to prevent prejudice to the military operation will be provided. The primary objectives to be attained are to prevent civil unrest which would endanger lines of communication and channels of supply and to prevent disease which would endanger the health of our troops. Planning and advance procurement have been confined to certain basic necessities-a basic ration of food, medical and sanitation supplies, and fuel. It is believed that during the initial phase of occupation, civilian requirements, if any, for other supplies, such as engineer, signal, etc. equipment, may be met by the utilization of organizational equipment of troop units, and that such supplies would be used only to the extent directly necessary for the prosecution of military operations. Although no advance planning or procurement will be done here for more than the basic necessities mentioned above, an actual survey of an area after occupation may result in a need for additional items. Also, in the planning of a particular operation, the theater planning group may determine it necessary to make provision for a limited amount of additional basic necessities. Due consideration would, of course, be given to such recommendations. .. .

CIVILIAN OFFICIAL THINKS MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM TOO NARROW
[Memo, Harold Stein, Import Div, NAEB, for Philip Reed, American Embassy in London, 22 Sep 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. 3 ]

The most notable characteristic of the civilian supply program outlined in the CCS paper [CCS 324/I, Chapter V, Section 4] is its extreme narrowness of scope....

The . . . implicit assumption is that broadening the range of commodities would pamper the populations of liberated areas. Presumably this applies particularly to the inclusion of other consumer goods, most notably clothing. This assumption is made in the face of a known acute clothing shortage throughout the continent. If, as is stated in the CCS paper referred to above, it is intended to enable the liberated populations to participate in the war effort, the people must be sufficiently dressed, and as a mere matter of medical prudence it would appear essential to make some provision for footwear for example, for people in Northern Europe where the winters are both cold and wet. Restricted quantities of other consumer goods, such as pots and pans and matches, are equally important. Careful programming would make due allowance for local supplies and local production possibilities, but the inclusion of some such supplies in the program does not imply pampering-rather it implies sober provision for a minimum level of health, efficiency and security....

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF IO NOVEMBER 1943 NOT INTERPRETED AS CHANGING ARMY'S PROGRAM
[European Relief Report on Supply and Administration in Event of Unconditional Surrender, Rpt of ID to CG, ASF, 13 Nov 43, CAD files, 014, Balkans (11-13-43)]

7. The President's letter [dated 10 November, Chapter IV, Section 6] omits any mention of responsibility on behalf of the Army for procuring supplies for relief. Consequently, it is apparent that no change is intended in the present procedure whereby military procurement of relief supplies is limited to the essential requirements of food, fuel, and medical and sanitary supplies needed in support of a military operation.

In most areas there will no doubt be requirements for industrial and other materials for a more permanent rehabilitation of the economy of the area, sometimes referred to as "reconstruction." It is not envisaged that the President's letter is intended to place upon the Army the responsibility for considering such requirements. This should be the responsibility of an economic

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mission of the Government as part of a longer range program of relief.

[Memo, Handy, ACofS, OPD, for Hilldring, 14 Apr 44, OPD files, 014.1, Security]

SECRETARY OF STATE ASKS WAR DEPARTMENT FOR AN ADEQUATE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION POLICY
[Ltr, Hull to Stimson, 1 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-136]

3. . . . the State Department believes that . . in every liberated area, it is essential that there be prompt and equitable distribution of indigenous food supplies and the importation of such supplemental supplies as may be necessary in order to assure a minimum diet that is nutritionally sound. A more generous diet would be desirable wherever food supplies and shipping permit. So far as may be practicable, food to be imported should be in accordance with the food habits and needs of the different areas, even though this may result in different amounts or a different composition of rations available in different countries.

4. The State Department believes that it is essential not merely to give relief to alleviate suffering, but also to help the peoples of liberated areas to help themselves. This economic assistance should be commenced at the very earliest possible moment consistent with military operations. In addition to the reasons outlined above, the Department feels that this policy will lessen the demoralization attendant upon a people living on relief. Furthermore, to the extent that the peoples can meet their own needs, the demand against shipping and the drain upon supplies from the United States will be lessened....

SECRETARY OF WAR EXPLAINS FINANCIAL AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS UPON ARMY'S SUPPLY PROGRAM ¹²
[Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 29 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-135]

With reference to procurement responsibility, it is well to bear in mind that the War Department has been appropriated no funds, and has been accorded no congressional or executive authority, to procure civilian supplies other than those which are deemed necessary or desirable in support of military operations. Accordingly, the procuring of civilian supplies beyond those for which there is a military need must be a primary responsibility of other Governmental agencies. The procurement programs now being developed by the War Department with the aid of the Foreign Economic Administration, will include all items of every character deemed necessary during the initial period, but the advance procurement to be undertaken by the War Department will cover only food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies, transportation equipment and special utility repair items. It is expected that the Foreign Economic Administration will make appropriate arrangements for the necessary advance procurement of all other supplies and materials included in the procurement program approved by the War Department, and the War Department will actively support the Foreign Economic Administration in obtaining allocations for these items. Moreover, it is understood that the Foreign Economic Administration, in accordance with its character and subject to whatever arrangements may be made between it and the State Department, will be free to program and procure further or additional items which it deems desirable. However it is to be recognized that regardless of the extent of advance programming by the Foreign Economic Administration, the military may have to determine in the light of shipping and transportation limitations what items can be brought into the areas in question during the period of military responsibility.

You place emphasis in your letter on the importance of affording "economic assistance" in addition to furnishing actual relief supplies, The War Department in preparing its estimates of the initial six months' requirements has included food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies, clothing and shoes, transportation equipment and repair items, public utility repair items, and supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture, but so far as concerns other "economic assistance" (such as industrial equipment, machinery, hand tools and raw materials) the schedules of the War Department up to the present time have been largely limited to those items which are designed to effect a reasonably direct reduction in the future burden of relief and rehabilitation.

In your letter you refer to the standards to he applied to the furnishing of actual relief supplies.

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You state that a nutritionally sound minimum diet should be assured and that a more generous diet is desirable wherever food supplies and shipping permit. The standards which you propose are unquestionably desirable. It may, however, be impossible because of limitations in shipping and supply to furnish even subsistence at these standards during the early period, much less "economic assistance." What can be supplied may depend in large measure upon the destruction and scorching inflicted by the retiring enemy. Also I wish to emphasize that political and governmental problems which cannot be resolved by the War Department, as for example the extent to which rationing shall be imposed in this country, may be the determining factors as to the extent and character of relief to be furnished....

EISENHOWER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELIEF IN HIATUS AREAS HAS LIMITATIONS
[Msg, CCS to the SCAEF, 27 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 2080, Sup and Econ Branch]

3. As Supreme Commander, AEF, you will assume responsibility under operations RANKIN and OVERLORD for the initial provision and distribution of relief supplies in all liberated areas under your jurisdiction, whether or not such areas or territories constitute combat zones or lines of communication, subject to the limitations and definitions set forth hereafter:

a. Such distribution must be accomplished without hindrance to the successful completion of the operation, particularly with respect to the logistical and administrative support required to sustain the forces allocated to you for the defeat of Germany.

b. Your responsibility does not extend to such areas and territories as may now or hereafter be decided to be areas which will be occupied by the Armies of the USSR.

c. Your responsibility will not include areas or territories outside the combat zones or lines of communication, if it is determined by you that conditions within such areas or territories are not sufficiently stabilized to warrant the provision of relief supplies therein.

7. THE ARMY IS NO WELFARE ORGANIZATION

WHAT WE WOULD DO IF COLD-BLOODEDLY LOGICAL
[Memo, Somervell, CG, ASF, for McCloy, 13 Apr 43, ABC files, 014 (11-27-42), Sec. I ]

For instance, how ruthless are we going to be in moving into enemy countries? We are speaking now of relief and rehabilitation. Certainly, an Italian Army being driven from Italy will be more effective if it knows that the United States is taking care of the families which it has left behind. Equally certainly would it be more effective if it can force the responsibility for feeding larger portions of its population on us, saving its own resources for its military personnel. Perhaps, if we are really going to be ruthless, we should force populations in large numbers to retire with its armies, making the problem of feeding those armies a more difficult one. German success in France received great support from the difficulties in supply and movement occasioned to the French Army by the large numbers of Belgian and French refugees flying before the advancing German forces. Such a policy will not sound pleasing to American ears. It is the policy required by total war. . . .¹³

CIVILIAN AFFAIRS MILITARY REASONS
[Ltr, Hilldring to Asst Secy of State Acheson, 9 Nov 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43) (1), sec. 3]

The Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy on the field of battle. Its interest and activities in military government and civil affairs administration are incidental to the accomplishment of the military mission. Nevertheless, these activities are of paramount importance, as any lack of a condition of social stability in an occupied area would be prejudicial to the success of the military effort.

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MILITARY NECESSITY IS THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLE
[Army and Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43]

9....

a. Military Necessity. The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the military operation to a successful conclusion. Military necessity is the primary underlying principle for the conduct of military government. So long as the operation continues, it is the duty of the commanding officer to exercise such control and to take such steps in relation to the civil population as will attain the paramount objective.

b. Supremacy of Commanding Officer. It follows the basic principle of military necessity that the theater commander must always have full responsibility for military government.

c. Civil Affairs Jurisdiction. The paramount interest of the combat officer is in military operations. The paramount interest of the civil affairs officer is in dealing with civilian relationships of concern to the commander. Such interest will be expressed in restoring law and order and in returning to the civilian population certain facilities or services and restoring living conditions to normal, insofar as such activities will not lend to interfere with military operations. Whether interference with military operations will result shall be determined by the commanding officer after giving consideration to the recommendations of his combat and civil affairs officers. . . .

MILITARY GOVERNMENT PROMISES UNPOPULARITY BUT FUN
[Ltr, Lt Comdr Malcolm S. MacLean to Marvin McIntyre, White House Secy, 9 Sep. 43, with Incl of Final Draft of 1943 Army-Navy Fld Manual for MG and CA, Roosevelt Memorial Library]

Military government as planned and practiced by the United States is going to be just about as popular on the world front as the Fair Employment Practice Committee is here. Hence, it is tough, and fun. . .. ¹⁴

... The goods which we expect to distribute in Italy are allocated to the Allied Military Government in Italy, which in turn collects from the recipients of those goods as much money as they can pay. That portion which they cannot collect is charged to the Italian Government. The lira [sic] which the Allied Government receives in return for food, it holds and acts as a banker. We use that lira for engineering expenses, to purchase small amounts of supplies, and for pay of our troops.

If we desire to buy some things locally, or use it to pay troops, we go to the Allied Military Government and secure this lira [sic]....

MILITARY GOVERNMENTS TWO OBJECTIVES
[Statement of Hilldring before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 10 May 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-203]

General Hilldring: We have felt for some time that in modern war, particularly when we storm the fortress of Europe, we would have to do some advance planning about what we were going to do with the civilian populations when we got ashore, so that we might accomplish several objectives. One of these objectives is to secure the civilian populations to the maximum extent possible, which is an obligation under international law; and second, to see that the civilian populations do not interfere with military operations in any important particular; and that they are so treated that they will be able to assist the forward movement of our troops to the greatest extent possible. That is the beginning and the end of our involvement in this business.

When neither of those two objectives any longer obtains, in other words, when the battle has gotten far enough ahead so that we can lay down our obligation under international law and so that the populations can no longer interfere with the military purposes of the operation, we intend to turn this work over to such civilian agencies as are designated to take it.... ¹⁵

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Endnotes