UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

Special Studies

CIVIL AFFAIRS:
SOLDIERS BECOME GOVERNORS

by
Harry L. Coles

and

Albert K. Weinberg
 

 

CMH Logo

 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1992

   


Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 62-60068

First Printed 1964-CMH Pub 11-3

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402


UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Stetson Conn, General Editor
 

Advisory Committee
(As of 25 May 1962)

Oron J. Hale
University of Virginia
Lt. Gen. Louis W. Truman
U.S. Continental Army Command
William R. Emerson
Yale University
Maj. Gen. James B. Quill
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Earl Pomeroy
University of Oregon
Brig. Gen. Harry L. Hillyard
 U.S. Army War College
Theodore Ropp
Duke University
Brig. Gen. Harry J. Lemley, Jr.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Bell I. Wiley
Emory University
Col. Vincent J. Esposito
United States Military Academy
C. Vann Woodward
Yale University

 

Office of the Chief of Military History
Brig. Gen. William H. Harris, Chief of Military History

Chief Historian Stetson Conn
Chief, Histories Division Col. Louis G. Mendez, Jr.
Chief, Editorial and Graphics Division Lt. Col. James R. Hillard
Editor in Chief Joseph R. Friedman

 

iii


... to Those Who Served


Foreword

In the midst of the large-scale combat operations of World War II, the Army was called on to occupy, to govern, and to help rehabilitate complex, war-torn countries and economies. Few of its task turned out to be as difficult and challenging as these civil affairs missions.

The present history, consisting for the most part of documentary material, deals primarily with civil administration in Italy, France, and northwest Europe. Its purpose is to illustrate certain basic and generic problems of civil affairs their character, the approaches to their solution, and their impact upon the people who had to deal with them.

Because of the ideological aspect of the struggle and because the United States acted as a member of a coalition of Allies, U.S. military leaders sometimes had to add to their traditional roles as soldiers those of the statesman and the politician. They were beset by the problems of resolving conflicting national interests and of reconciling political idealism and military exigency. On another level-in feeding hungry populations, in tackling intricate financial and economic problems, and in protecting the cultural heritage of a rich and ancient civilization-they had to exercise skills that are also normally considered civilian rather than military.

For its insight into how the Army met its civil affairs mission, for its focus on the vital and continuing problem of the relationship between soldier and civilian-in short, for its graphic analysis of soldiers as governors-this volume will be read with profit in a world where the problems of the soldier have become increasingly political.

Washington, D. C.
25 May 1961
 
WILLIAM H. HARRIS
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Chief of Military History

vii


The Authors

Albert K. Weinberg received his Ph. D. from The Johns Hopkins University and has taught there, in addition to being for a time a member of The Institute for Advanced Study. His principal publication is Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History. During World War II he served, successively, as an analyst in the Civil Affairs Section of the Office of Strategic Services, as Chief of the Reports Division in UNRRA, and as senior editor and later Chief of the Civil Affairs Section in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Harry L. Coles, Professor of History at Ohio State University, received the Ph. D. degree from Vanderbilt. He has been awarded both a Rosenwald Research Fellowship and a Mershon Post-Doctoral Fellowship. He served as an Army Air Forces historian in World War II and was later assigned to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. A contributor to the seven-volume Army Air Forces in World War II, he is also the editor of the recently published Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military.

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Preface

The title of this volume may not convey the precise scope of its contents but the authors could think of no other that would be more suggestive without being overponderous. Broadly speaking the volume deals with U.S. Army and Anglo-American planning and operations in the sphere of relations with civilians in certain liberated and conquered countries in World War II. Although far more than mere difference in nomenclature was involved, the Army manuals generally referred to occupational operations in liberated countries as civil affairs and to those in conquered countries as military government.1 In both types of occupation the range and complexity of the problems to be dealt with were as great as in the whole scope of modern government. In liberated countries the Army needs and Allied aims could be satisfied largely through existing governmental regulations and personnel, but in enemy countries drastic changes in laws, institutions, and administrators were necessary. Whether old or new governmental machinery was used, civil affairs doctrine emphasized the desirability of indirect control. In spite of this emphasis, in areas of military government Allied officers, whether from necessity or impatience, sometimes performed various governmental functions and in any case closely supervised them. In the liberated areas their intervention was far less direct, but, under the paramount authority residing in the theater commander by either the laws of warfare or by international agreement, they advised or assisted the indigenous authorities. Thus, in various senses and degrees, soldiers became governors.

The long and crowded history of Allied civil affairs activities, like the history of tactical activities, may be divided into the operations that took place before and those that took place after the military drive into the main enemy areas-Germany and Japan. The scope of this volume encompasses only the pre-Germany-Japan phase of the war, in which the Army prepared and organized for its tasks, conducted its first belligerent occupation (in Italy), and carried on the liberating occupations in France and northwest Europe preliminary to invasion of Germany. It was in this phase, in short, that the Army initiated and gained maturity in its civil affairs responsibilities. The omission of Germany and Japan may well disappoint some readers insofar as the operations in those countries were the largest and most consequential of the war. But the basic aims and methods took form in the earlier operations, and the occupation of Germany and Japan, however distinctive in some respects, cannot be adequately understood except in the light of what went on before. Moreover, when this project was first undertaken the records of military government in Germany and Japan were still located in those countries for the use of

1. In this volume, as also quite commonly in military usage, "civil affairs" has generally been employed for greater brevity to designate military occupation generically.

ix


historical sections engaged in writing first narratives. In any case it would have been impossible to include all civil affairs operations in this volume without doing far less than justice to any one.

The historiography of civil affairs encounters, indeed, in World War II a documentation unique in broad scope and variety. Though the civil affairs problem was not new in World War II, as the wealth of novels and other popular literature about it might suggest, the Army did go beyond its traditional role in an unprecedented degree and manner. In the American experience military occupations had followed the war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I. World War II differed from these earlier conflicts in that the duration and size of civil affairs operations were much greater, there was a far larger degree of specialization, and soldiers from the very outset found themselves required to handle political problems to an extent never necessary before.

As for size, it has been estimated that Army operations overseas vitally affected the lives of more than 300 million people. At the same time, like all other phases of World War II, civil affairs required more specialization than ever before. In earlier wars a good soldier was generally a jack-of-all-trades. In the Civil War, for example, an artilleryman or the driver of a supply wagon might be temporarily detailed to clearing roads or dispensing relief and would then return to his regular duties. Civil affairs being of limited scope, no special training or indoctrination was considered necessary. In World War II, however, a Civil Affairs Division was created, on a high War Department level, to coordinate all planning as well as training. An extensive recruiting and specialized training program was organized for the first time, and G-5 (civil affairs and military government) staff sections were added at the theater army, corps, and even division levels.

Most important of all, in World War II soldiers became governors in a much broader sense than ever before-so much more than was foreseen that the Army's specialized training proved scant preparation for perhaps the most important phase of their role. They became not merely the administrators of civilian life for the Army's immediate needs but at the same time the executors and at times even, by force of circumstances, the proposers of national and international political policy. This broader role arose from the fact that in World War II the Allies strove to realize from the very beginning of occupation political aims that had usually not been implemented during war or, if during war at all, not until active hostilities had ended. Thus, in enemy countries civil affairs officials were immediately to extirpate totalitarian governmental and economic systems, in liberated countries they were as soon as possible to aid in restoring indigenous systems and authorities, and in both types of countries they were to make an all-out effort to effect gradual transition toward the envisaged postwar national and international order. This unprecedented mission was complicated, moreover, by the fact that occupation was joint rather than zonal as in World War I. Thus British and American military authorities found themselves compelled to take part in reconciling often quite conflicting views on both immediate and long-range goals. Believing that these essentially political tasks called for civilian rather than military aptitudes, the President and his advisers

x


planned initially to entrust the conduct of civil affairs to civilian rather than military agencies as soon as military conditions permitted. But the plan was not carried out, and as matters developed the Army had on its hands for the duration a twofold task which required the soldier to serve military expediency on the one hand and politico-social directives on the other.

The question of why, despite every initial prospect to the contrary, soldiers rather than civilians became and remained governors is indeed an interesting one. To the extent that they could do so without neglecting equally important though less dramatic problems, the authors have attempted to present and to emphasize the materials that suggest the explanation. There is no simple answer and certainly not, it seems to the authors, one so simple as the hypothesis that the Army wanted and strove to capture as broad a role in civil affairs as possible. Materials in Part I, concerned with the preparatory and organizational stage, suggest that the President's eventual decision to entrust the responsibility in the initial phase to the Army was due to civilian unreadiness rather than to any inveterate Army ambition. Portions of Part II make clear the difficulties of fitting civilian agencies, even in later phases of the Italian operation, into the context of battle and a military framework, and indicate reasons for the resultant decision to leave the military authorities in exclusive administrative control. As Part III reveals, despite this experience, Allied authorities, in planning for the liberated countries of northwest Europe, still proposed to delegate civil affairs as far as possible to indigenous civilian authorities, subject only to the Supreme Commander's right to determine how soon a complete delegation was militarily feasible. In Part IV, dealing with operations, it is disclosed that despite this purpose, and despite also the competence of indigenous authorities, conditions during and immediately following hostilities made it necessary for the Allied armies to render these authorities, in matters of civil affairs, substantial assistance.

The problem of the soldier's role in civil affairs was vigorously debated, particularly during the earlier part of these experiences. Some may feel that history should contribute to a solution, but to these authors it does not seem possible to suggest the answer to so complex a question on the basis of history alone, especially since history is subject to different interpretations. Perhaps, however, candor with the reader requires acknowledgment that any initial bias against entrusting largely political responsibilities to soldiers gradually became modified in the course of the authors' studies and thinking. Certainly this change came about partly from the growing suspicion that the soldier's degree of administrative involvement in CA/MG, as also the degree of connection between administration and political influence, are likely to be determined by forces stronger than any political theory. But it came about much more as evidence

seemed to accumulate that at least Anglo-American soldiers, professional or lately civilians, were-or at any rate gradually became-capable of viewing and handling political problems not too differently from civilians. Another consideration was that not only organizational machinery but the attitudes of military and civilian authorities alike ensured civilian control of basic policy, although the capacity of the military leaders for properly interpreting and applying civilian policy would probably have developed more quickly and fully if their

xi


broad role had not been allowed to devolve upon them so unexpectedly and with so little preparation for its more political phases.

To the foregoing need only be added that, in the final view of the authors, the issue of military versus civilian administration was far less important than the issue of military values versus civilian or-more correctly speaking-political values; that it was the latter issue which was at the root of most of the serious difficulties in civil affairs decisions; and that the issue would have presented the same dilemma and probably been decided in much the same fashion even if the President's initial plan for civilian control had been carried out. The dilemma was foreordained when national war aims and pursuant directives imposed ambivalent civil affairs objectives without indicating (as of course they could not have been expected to do) how the conflicts between military interests and political interests were to be resolved. Every politico-social objective undoubtedly coincided to a considerable extent with long-term military interests, but it also conflicted to a greater or lesser degree with immediate military expediency, in which case the civil affairs authority could only try, without sacrificing either competing interest too greatly, to bring the two into the best possible accommodation. The major difference which civilian control would have entailed is probably that civilians would have leaned over backwards lest their decisions seem to impair unduly military interests, whereas the military were always worried lest their decisions have the aspect of unduly impairing political values.

Since civil affairs problems are for the most part solved with pen rather than sword, the civil affairs effort gave rise to an enormous body of documentation, of which only a relatively small part is marked by the aridly formal style characteristic of military intercommunication. This book differs from others in the same series in that documents rather than text have been given the primary role in the presentation of historical developments. In fact, excerpts are generally used since the publication of complete documents would have too greatly foreshortened the range of presentation otherwise considered desirable. These excerpts have been so selected, arranged, and entitled that, in conjunction with the introductory text and footnotes, they might give the reader an insight into the principal historical developments and their interconnections.

The limitations inherent in the documentary method are obvious and the judgment of the authors that in this case the advantages outweighed the disadvantages was predicated on a consideration not applicable to any other phase of the war or volume of this series. Basically it was the fact that the function of civil affairs is unique among military missions in that in this instance the tale of "Arms and the Man" focuses upon the man. This is to say that almost every other phase of war experience is too technical and too difficult to understand without the military historian's art. Civil affairs operations, even though conditioned by war, concern chiefly generic social problems which involve human nature rather than technological factors. Because decisions of civil affairs are made and judged by the same genus of reasoning and moral evaluation that figures in ordinary individual and politico-social problems, the primary sources-in which the reasons of the authorities for acting as they did are often set forth fully and candidly-acquire. greater importance for public, academic, and military understanding and evaluation than in almost any other phase of

xii


war. This view appears to have been first stated not by a civilian but by a distinguished soldier. In April 1946, when the Allied occupation of Italy was drawing to a close, Gen. William D. Morgan, then Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

It is the considered opinion here, after detailed examination and long discussion, that the records of the Allied Commission should be treated differently from records of a purely military nature. . . . Rather than of strictly military interest they will be of permanent primary interest for historical research in Economic, Social, and Political fields as records of an initial effort in Allied Military Government.

The authors reached the decision, not without some misgiving, that it was justifiable to expose not only the formal directives and orders representing the end results of the decision-making process, but also the work papers illustrating the tentative and naturally often disputatious phases of that process. Their misgiving was materially lessened after they submitted their earliest selections of documents to several U.S. Army participants in the events. These men were of the opinion that not only they themselves but the vast majority of their American and British associates would not mind the publication of documents revealing their difficulties, uncertainties, or human limitations provided such publication tended on the whole to give an accurate impression of civil affairs experience. It is the authors' earnest hope that they have achieved this goal.

The decision to publish a history primarily documentary in approach was made the more fortunate perhaps by the appearance of two books in the "Civil Affairs and Military Government" series in the United Kingdom's History of the Second World War, edited by Sir J. R. M. Butler. These are Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-45, by C. R. S. Harris, and Civil Affairs and Military Government North-West Europe, 1944-46, by F. S. V. Donnison. Another textual account would have repeated to some extent the contribution that others have made in quite adequate fashion.

Most of the originals or official copies of the documents contained in this volume are presently located in the Federal Records Center in Alexandria, Virginia, a subordinate element of the National Archives and Records Service of the General Services Administration. Records of the War Department kept in this center and used in this volume include files of the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff (cited as WDCSA), the Secretary of the General Staff (SGS), the G-1 Division of the General Staff, the Operations Division of the General Staff (OPD decimal and message files, and also the ABC files kept by the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD), the Civil Affairs Division (CAD), Army Service Forces (ASF) files (including the files of the International [International Aid] Division), files of the Provost Marshal General's Office (PMGO), and the central War Department file, which was maintained very incompletely during World War II by the Adjutant General's Office (TAGO).

The Federal Records Center in Alexandria also contains many papers of a joint and combined nature that have been used and cited. The War Department collections listed above contain the papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) that have been used. Other record collections in the center that have been drawn upon extensively for the compilation

xiii


of this volume include files of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), and, from the Mediterranean and European theaters, files of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in microfilm, files of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) and Advisory Council Italy, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) files, Seventh U.S. Army G-5 Staff Section Reports, and U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET) General Board Studies.

The concentration of World War II records concerning military government and civil affairs in one repository, the Alexandria Federal Records Center, offers students of these matters a unique opportunity for further research. Not all of the file collections and records used by the authors are as yet available to private scholars, but the bulk of them are, including most of the American records. Of course, students of the subject may need to consult some records elsewhere, as the authors have, including reference materials in the Office of the Chief of Military History. The authors were also fortunate in obtaining a number of interviews with participants, as cited in their work.

It should be noted that except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, asterisks are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

In preparing this volume the authors have incurred so many obligations that it is impossible to make proper acknowledgment to all who have helped. They wish nevertheless to say that they profited from the first narratives prepared by the Historical Section of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, which consisted of Richard M. Welling, Edgar L. Erickson, Edwin J. Hayward, and Henry N. Williams. Harold Epstein was with the project in OCMH in its early stages. Robert W. Komer made available certain papers from the G-5 AFHQ files, and his study, "Civil Affairs in the Mediterranean Theater," made as an Army historian, was of great help. Miss Inez V. Allen, in addition to doing a great deal of checking of footnotes and citations, compiled many of the documents relating to Fine Arts and Archives and other subjects relating to southern France. Col. Alfred C. Bowman, SCAO XIII Corps, Venezia Giulia, read all of the manuscript except that dealing with western Europe. Kent Roberts Greenfield, formerly Chief Historian, Department of the Army, put his extensive knowledge of Italian history and institutions at the disposal of the authors, who are also indebted for his encouragement to undertake the project despite its experimental aspects. Stetson Conn, current Chief Historian, contributed generously of his scholarly and critical abilities during revision of the first draft. David Jaffe, Acting Chief of the Editorial Branch, OCMH, assisted by Mrs. Helen V. Whittington, copy editor, saw the manuscript through its final stages of preparation for the press and exercised great skill and no less patience in an unusually difficult editorial task.

These acknowledgments of assistance are in no way delegation of responsibility for the contents of the volume. The presentation and the interpretation contained herein are the authors' own, and they alone are responsible for faults of commission or omission.

Washington, D. C.
24 May 1962
HARRY L. COLES
ALBERT K. WEINBERG

xiv


Contents

PART ONE  

The Army Must Take on an Uncongenial Task

 

Chapter   

Page
I. SHOULD SOLDIERS BE GOVERNORS?
3
Shall the Nation Again Find Itself Unprepared?
6
A School for Soldiers Is Established in a Civilian Institution
10
Civilian-Military Jockeying for Control
14
The President Says Occupation Is in Most Cases a Civilian Task
21
A Debate Continues Which Will Never End
25
 
 
II. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA PUTS CIVILIAN CONTROL TO THE TEST
30
A Civil Affairs Plan To Minimize Military Responsibility
31
Military Leaders Must Take Responsibility for a Thankless Political Decision
34
Complex Design for Civilian Responsibility Developed
37
Military-Civilian Integration Must Be Achieved
43
Can Eisenhower Now Be Spared Political Problems?
45
Can Military Commanders Be Spared Economic Problems?
50
The Army Must Take Charge of Civilian Relief in the Tunisian Campaign
52
Military Commanders Become Dissatisfied but Decide To Leave African Arrangement Alone
55
North African Experience Points Up Need for Greater Co-ordination of Civilian Agencies
59
 
 
III. THE WAR DEPARTMENT PREPARES FOR A BROADER ROLE
63
The War Department Wants Initial Control in Future Operations
64
Creation of a Civil Affairs Division To Set the War Department's House in Order
66
CAD Takes On Broader Role Than Planned
69
In April 1943 the War Department Takes Charge of Civilian Supply
73
Expansion of Army Training Program Must Have Long Wait for Final Approval
78
Europe's Cultural Heritage Must Be Protected
84

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Chapter    Page
IV. THE ARMY IS ASSIGNED LEADERSHIP IN AN INDEFINITE INITIAL PHASE
91
In Enemy Areas the Army To Have the Initial Burden
95
Acquiescence in CAD's Leadership in Co-ordination of Planning
96
President Still Seeks a Way for Civilian Agencies To Control
98
The Plan for Civilian Agency Operations Is Stalled
102
Difficulties of Civilian Agency Procurement Lead to Extension of Period of Military Responsibility
105
The Army Gets a Presidential Assignment by Default
108
War Department Assumes Leadership in Foreign Economic Co-ordination for the Military Period
111
 
 
V. WASHINGTON OR LONDON?
114
Washington and London Compromise To Create a Combined Civil Affairs Committee
119
London Supports a Rival of the Washington Civil Affairs Committee
125
Americans Fear British Domination of Civilian Supply for European Theater
128
Creation of a Combined Supply Committee and Reconciliation of British and American Supply Policies
131
A Compromise on Locale of Planning-Washington and London
135
 
 
VI. THE ARMY TRIES TO LIMIT ITS COMMITMENTS
139
Turnover to Civilians as Soon as Possible
142
Military Commanders Do Not Make Politico-Economic Policies
144
Minimum Change of Local Institutions and Authorities
145
Maximum Use of Indigenous Administration in Non-enemy Countries
147

The Army Tries To Keep Out of the Balkans

148

Civilian Supplies Only for the Prevention of Disease and Unrest

150

The Army Is No Welfare Organization

153
   
PART TWO  

Soldiers Learn Politics in Italy

 
   
VII. LANNING JOINT MILITARY GOVERNMENT PROVES HIGHLY POLITICAL
157
AFHQ Begins Planning on the Assumption British and American Interests Can Be Pooled
160
Each Country Wants To Be Senior Partner
165
The Problem of the Chain of Command and Communication­ Tactical or Dual?
168
Direct or Indirect Rule?
170
Political Advisers or an Exclusively Military Administration?
174
The CCS Directs a Military Administration and as Much Benevolence as Practicable
176
AFHQ Creates Joint Agencies and Issues Final Instructions
180
   

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Chapter    Page
VIII. THE TEST IN SICILY
188
Mobile Military Government and the Struggle Against Chaos
190
AMGOT Headquarters Takes Over and Revives Provincial Institutions
200
When Fighting Ends More Complex Problems Begin
203
Sicilians Become Somewhat Difficult
208
CAO's Are Entangled by Their Excess of Zeal
211
GCS Keeps the Military Governors on the Job
214
 
 
IX. ITALIAN SURRENDER AND A DESIGN FOR MAXIMUM RETURNS WITH MINIMUM RESPONSIBILITIES
217
The Theater Hopes for Armistice Control but Plans for Military Government
222
The Fall of Mussolini and the Shift of Military Thinking to Armistice Control
224
Italian Surrender and the Establishment of Two Types of Allied Control
226
Eisenhower Recommends Strengthening the Badoglio Government With a View to Cobelligerency
230

The Policy of "Payment by Results" and the Long-Term Armistice

233

Prerequisites of Territorial Transfer and a Control Commission Do Not Materialize

237

The Burdens of Control Become Greater Rather Than Less

240

An Enemy Is Made a Cobelligerent

244

Rise and Fall of Hopes for Early Returns

245
 
 
X. CONTROL AGENCIES ARE EASIER TO CREATE THAN TO CO-ORDINATE
248
Military Government Authority Is Bifurcated and Decentralized
252
Despite Washington's Misgivings Decentralization Continues
253
More Organizations Bring More Problems of Co-ordination
255
Too Many Cooks for the Broth
261
The Military Governor Brings ACC and AMG Together With ACC Co-ordinating
264
ACC Is Streamlined for Greater Co-ordination
266
Anglo-American Unity and Disunity
271
 
 
XI. THEY MUST BE MADE TO STAND ALONE
275
The CAO's Learn To Use Indirect Control
279
AMG Revives Institutions Which Develop Local Government
284
ACC Starts a Job Which Calls for Patience
288
The First Restoration of Territory and Its Difficulties
294
Advisory Help in Restored Areas Must Continue
300
The Government Is Encouraged To Co-ordinate with AMG
303
   

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Chapter    Page
XII. MILITARY NECESSITY DEMANDS RELIEF OF CIVILIAN DISTRESS
306
A Serious Food Shortage Despite the Assumption of Local Self­ Sufficiency
308
Expedients Which Are Tried but Found Wanting
311
Food Imports To Prevent Starvation Become the Number One Priority
313
The Food Shortage Is at Least Alleviated
3316
The Initial Food Experience Teaches Valuable Lessons
319
Epidemic Knows No Nationality
322

Refugees Are a Serious Military Problem

328

The Poor and Sick Are Always With Them

333
 
 
XIII. SOLDIERS BATTLE WITH ECONOMICS
340
Only Limited Economic Assistance Is Planned
344
Allies Find a Serious Degree of Inflation
346
Matters Are Helped Neither by Allowing Nor Disallowing Wage Increases
348
AMG/ACC Now Tries Selective Price Control
350
Improvement Is Sought Through Supervision of the Government's Fiscal Policies
353
The Theater Told To Reduce Import Burden by Increasing Italian Self-Sufficiency
358
Rehabilitation Supply Program: Limited Imports Now To Reduce Imports Later
361
Why the Theater Did Not Do Better in Promoting Economic Revival
364
 
 
XIV. MILITARY EXPEDIENCY IS NOT THE WHOLE STORY
370
Imperium ac Justitia
375
To What Extent Can the Removal of Fascists Be Allowed To Imperil Administrative Effectiveness?
382
Fascist Laws and Institutions Are Gradually Annulled
390
Italian Labor Receives a New Charter of Rights
394
A Primarily Negative but Important Mission in Education
400
The Theater Becomes Increasingly Involved in Displaced Persons Problem
405
Cultural Treasure Gives Pause to Military Expediency
413
 
 
XV. POLITICS WILL NOT WAIT
425
Patience and Impatience Over Issue of Political Change
428
Strange Interlude of Political Courtship
431
A Government of Technical Experts Until Rome Is Taken
433
Under Military Government Politics Must Wait
435
Allied Military Government Finds It More Troublesome To Prohibit Meetings Than To Permit Them
437

It Becomes Increasingly Difficult for Allies To Be Politically Neutral

440
   

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Chapter    Page
XV. POLITICS WILL NOT WAIT - Continued
 

Should One Change Horses in the Middle of a Battle?

442

Soviet Power Politics Will Not Wait

445

The King Agrees To Retire and Badoglio Government Is Broadened

450

Some Matters Will Have To Wait

452
 
 
XVI. ROME IS A TURNING POINT
454
Great Political Possibilities Foreseen in Occupation of Rome
457
First European Capital Is Liberated
458
The King Retires and a New Government Is Formed
464
The Italian Government Comes to Rome and Takes on More Responsibility
467
Italians Take Lead in Defascistization
471
Patience With the Government Is Sometimes Difficult
477
In the Advance Beyond Rome AMG Tries New Expedients
481
Can This Be the Turning Point in Direction of Civilianization?
487
 
 
XVII. A NEW DEAL FOR ITALY
492
It Is Hard for Italians To Remain in Tutelage
495
It Is Hard To Stay Angry With Italians
496
An Anglo-American New Policy and a Rooseveltian New Deal
499
No Way To Ship Flour Without Ships
501
No Way To Broaden Supply Policy Until Resources Are More Plentiful
505
For the Time Being Disappearance of Control Is Only Nominal
506
Harold Macmillan Argues Astutely for a New Directive
508
Anglo-American Disagreements Are Compromised in a New Directive
513
At Long Last Bread Ration Is Increased
518
Controls Are Finally Relaxed
519
Rehabilitation Program Must Wait for Peace and UNRRA
524
 
 
XVIII. SACMED AND THE PARTISANS - ALLIANCE OR MISALLIANCE?
526
Somewhat Puzzling Cobelligerents Behind Enemy's Lines
528
Liberated Partisans Prefer Their Swords to Plowshares
532
Partisan Units To Be Accepted in the Italian Army
535
War Makes Strange Alliances
538
The Government Tries To Protect Its Own Fences
542
After Contract Is Signed-Misgivings and Curtailment of Aid
544
Treat Partisans Right and They'll Behave-Perhaps
546
 
 
XIX. LIBERATION OF THE NORTH AND PROBLEMS NOT SETTLED BY VICTORY
550
A Task of Unprecedented Magnitude Calling for Novel Methods
554
Whirlwind Occupations and Great Expectations
560
The CLN's Get Temporarily Out of Hand
564
   

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Chapter    Page
XIX. LIBERATION OF THE NORTH AND PROBLEMS NOT SETTLED BY VICTORY - Continued
 
French Forces Remain Too Long in Aosta Valley
568
The Nationality Problem in Bolzano
571
Italy's Most Productive Region Is in Danger of Economic Stagnation
575
An Overwhelming Influx of Repatriates Before Facilities Are All Ready
579
AMG Must Stay Overtime
583
 
 
XX. POLITICAL PRINCIPLE VERSUS MILITARY PRAGMATISM IN THE ISSUE OF VENEZIA GIULIA
587
AMG Will Be Used To Uphold the Principle of Peaceful Settlement
590
SACMED Tries To Temper Political Principle With Military Pragmatism
592
SACMED Was Right in Predicting Trouble
595
Military Pragmatism Prevails
600
Yugoslav System Rejected on Good Pragmatic but Doubtful Legal Grounds
603
AMG Gets Local Government Going by Indirection
607
We Expect Release in Seven Months but Must Stay Seven Years
612
 
 
XXI. INTERDEPENDENCE PRECLUDES AN EASY WAY OUT
614
After the Foreign Enemy Is Defeated an Internal Enemy Emerges
619
The Allies Take Steps To Meet Italy's Security Needs
624
The United States Continues Aid as Vital to Postwar Aims
627
With Allied Encouragement Democracy and Republicanism Are Given Their Chance
629
The Prospect of an Early and Satisfactory Settlement Recedes
634
Return of AMG Territory Continues Notwithstanding Obstacles
636
Residual Controls Are Further Curtailed
639
How Soon Can AC Be Closed Down or Civilianized?
642
The Peace Treaty and Subsequent U.S.-Italian Agreements
645
At Long Last Close-Out
647
   
PART THREE  

Soldiers and Statesmen Plan for the Liberated Countries of Western Europe

 

Chapter   

Page
XXII. CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS
653
A Draft Agreement Which Delegates CA to the Norwegian Government as far as Compatible With Military Needs
656
Civil Affairs Agreements Are Consummated
658
British and Americans Finds Themselves at Loggerheads over the De Gaulle Committee
661
   

xx

 

 
Chapter    Page
XXII. CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS - Continued
 
U.S. Nonrecognition of De Gaulle Hampers Civil Affairs Planning for France
665
Both U.S. and U.K. Try Still Other Lines in Effort To Get Together on FCNL
667
 
 
XXIII. ORGANIZATION AND POLICY PROBLEMS IN PLANNING FOR WESTERN EUROPE
671
A Headquarters Organization for Civil Affairs Is Set Up
673
In Final Plans CA Organization in the Field Will Be Under Tactical Commander
677
Basic Policies for Civil Affairs Operations
679
Final Reorganization in SHAEF To Establish Direct SHAEF Control of Country Units
680
Civilian Supply: Military Program
681
British and Americans Argue Over Kind of Currency To Be Used
687
Allies Agree on Currency for France but De Gaulle's Support Is Uncertain
693
 
 
XXIV. PLANNING FOR FRANCE EXTENDS BEYOND D-DAY
697
Organization and Planning for Southern France
700
The Currency Issue Is Still Unsolved After D-Day
707
The Currency Dispute Complicates Operations in the Northern France Beachhead
709
Allies and FCNL Come to Terms
711
   
PART FOUR  

Soldiers Liberate Peoples and Restore Governments

 

Chapter   

Page
XXV. FROM THE BEACHES TO PARIS IN NORTHERN FRANCE
721
Civil Affairs Troops Hit the Beaches in the Assault
722
French Take Initiative in Restoring Civil Administration
726
Cherbourg Is the First Large City To Be Liberated
730
Prospective Supply Crisis in Paris Is Prepared For
738
Paris Is Liberated
742
Troop Spending Raises Question of Anti-Inflationary Measures
745

FCNL Is Recognized as the Provisional Government and a Zone of the Interior Is Created

749
 
 
XXVI. THE TIE-UP WITH DE GAULLE PAYS OFF IN SOUTHERN FRANCE
751
Status of CA Organization on D-Day and Ensuing Changes
753
The First Ten Days
756
The CA Setup Is Put to the Test in Troubled Areas
762

The Liaison Offices Serve as Clearinghouses

767
   

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Chapter    Page
XXVI. THE TIE-UP WITH DE GAULLE PAYS OFF IN SOUTHERN FRANCE - Continued
 

Undesirable Element in FFI Must Be Disarmed

770

Illegal Trafficking in Army Goods Grows to Racket Proportions

772

Transport, Labor, Food-The Most Serious Problems

773

SHAEF Assumes Responsibility

787

Retrospect and Conclusions

789
 
 
XXVII. IN BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG BOTH FIGHTING AND POLITICS RETARD STABILIZATION
797
Organizing and Planning for Belgium and Luxembourg
798
Conditions in Belgium Right After Liberation
801
SHAEF Mission Comes to Belgium
804
Trouble in Disarming Resistance Forces Imperils the Government
805
SHAEF Mission Finds Troubled Conditions in Luxembourg
809
Ardennes Counteroffensive Puts Civil Affairs Personnel to the Test
813
New Government Formed in Belgium
817
Allies Straighten Out Their Representation in Luxembourg
819
 
 
XXVIII. PIECEMEAL LIBERATION OF THE NETHERLANDS AMID SERIOUS CIVILIAN DISTRESS
821
The Planners Assume Complete German Evacuation After Collapse
822
The U.S. Army Liberates Portion of South Holland and Meets Real Problems
823
The Greatest Problem Is Food
826
Dramatic Arrangements To Bring Food Into German-Occupied Holland
830
All Holland Is Now Liberated
832
 
 
XXIX. RETURN TO SELF-RULE IN DENMARK AND NORWAY
835
Allies Find Effective Danish Government in Operation
836
Jurisdictional Niceties Cut Short Dispatch of Relief Supplies to Northern Norway
840
The Underground Restores Indigenous Government in Norway
842
 
 
XXX. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE WAKE OF BATTLE
847
Civilians Become a Serious Problem in France During Rapid Army Advance
848
Delegation of the Problem Does Not Work
851
Allied Authorities Must Take More Responsibility Everywhere
854
The Reception Plan Is Changed in the Last Phase of Hostilities
857
 
 
XXXI. THE PROTECTION OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS AND ART TREASURES
860
"Protect and Respect These Symbols Whenever Possible"
861
   

xxii

 

 
Chapter    Page
XXXI. THE PROTECTION OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS AND ART TREASURES - Continued
 
Less Damage Than Expected In Northern France
867
A Good Job in Southern France Too
871
Art Officers to the Rescue in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway
873
 
 
XXXII. CIVILIAN SUPPLY IS A MAJOR CA PROBLEM TO THE END
877
Delivery Falls Behind During the First Six Months
878
Action Taken as Supply Problem Becomes Critical
884
Pressures for National Import Programs
888
Problem of Terminating the Military Supply Program
892
   

xxiii

 
GLOSSARY  


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Last updated 18 February 2004