Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XXIV:

Planning for France Extends Beyond D-Day

Civil affairs planners faced their supreme challenge in attempting to lay the groundwork for civil administration in France. When D-day dawned General Eisenhower still had no combined directive on this task. He had been acting under a directive approved by the U.S. "highest level," but the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff had so far been unable to agree on a combined policy. Instead of having drawn closer together, the views of the British and Americans had grown farther apart, as had also the views of the President and General de Gaulle. By D-day, in fact, the matter had reached such an impasse that it could be settled only by the heads of government.

Nevertheless, since early in 1944 planning had gone ahead on the assumption that despite nonrecognition De Gaulle would help; lest he be alienated a plan for military government was dropped. Two civil affairs plans were prepared in accordance with the decision to invade southern France in support of the main invasion across the channel. The planning for northern France went on at SHAEF and in 21 Army Group and was closely related with the planning for the countries of northwestern Europe. Since the invasion of southern France was to be under the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, civil affairs preparations for southern France took place in North Africa, at or near AFHQ.

A decision for the "eventual re-entry into Southern France" was taken as early as the First Quebec Conference in August 1943. Conceived of as a movement simultaneous with and ancillary to the main movement across the channel, an outline of the operation was discussed with the Russians at the Teheran Conference in late November. Anxious to encourage the maximum Allied effort on the western front-and possibly with an eye to having a free hand in eastern Europe-the Russians favored the plan strongly. Accordingly, on 8 December SACMED was directed to prepare to invade southern France in support of the main landings in Normandy. The CCS specified that as soon as the forces from the Mediterranean made a junction with those from northern France SHAEF would assume control of all Allied operations in France. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, SACMED, delegated his responsibility for ANVIL (later DRAGOON) to the Commander of Force 163-and at the same time of the U.S. Seventh Army-Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch. Planning began at La Bouzaréa in North Africa on 12 January and continued until the operation was launched, but there was continuing uncertainty until July that the plans would be executed.

Civil affairs as well as operational planning ran into other problems including the necessity for co-operation between SHAEF


and AFHQ, the possibility of German withdrawal or collapse, and ambiguities in the relation with the French Committee of National Liberation. Since the operation was ultimately to pass under control of SHAEF it was essential that policies in the two headquarters be harmonious. From the beginning AFHQ and SHAEF exchanged views by letter and cable. In March 1944 AFHQ sent a mission to SHAEF where it remained until the planning period was nearly over. As manuals and directives were issued at SHAEF these were made available for the guidance of the planners in North Africa and thus a certain harmony of policies was achieved.

In addition to planning for ANVIL both SHAEF and AFHQ were directed to plan for occupation of areas under their jurisdiction under essentially noncombat conditions (Operation RANKIN). In planning both for ANVIL and RANKIN, AFHQ at first assumed that its responsibility would be restricted to the combat zone and line of communications. SHAEF decided, however, that planning should also include the so-called "hiatus areas," outside the area of active operations. Thus an area containing some 12,000,000 people, almost one third of France, had to be taken into consideration, a fact that vitally affected all planning, especially supply.

A third factor that complicated planning was relations with the FCNL.1 In southern France the problem was more serious than elsewhere because greater responsibility was to be given French authorities. SHAEF's interim directive of 14 May stated that extensive reliance should be placed on "French Authorities other than Vichy" for the conduct of civil administration. In practice "French authorities" turned out to mean: (1) the Military Mission to the Seventh Army commanded by General Henri Cochet; (2) M. Raymond Aubrac, the Regional Commissioner for Marseille Region consisting of six departments; and (3) the Preféts, Sous-Preféts, Maires, and other local officials.

Most of the planning was done at Courbet-Maine, a tiny summer resort on the Mediterranean, some forty miles from Algiers. This planning and training organization, for security reasons, was known only as the Civil Affairs Training Center. Other phases of the plans were prepared by the G-5 Section, Seventh Army; still more was done directly at Allied Force Headquarters. Since no clear-cut delineation of responsibilities existed, some degree of confusion resulted.

The worst confusion, however, was in regard to the attitude of De Gaulle, and as late as 5 August-nearly two months after the invasion of northern France-G-5 AFHQ reminded the War Department and the War Office that all of AFHQ's plans for civil affairs depended upon a still unrealized agreement with the French. While working relations with General Henri Cochet, the Military Delegate of the FCNL for southern France, had been excellent, G-5 stated that a definite agreement with the French was "urgently needed now."

Since early in 1944 SHAEF, together with the heads of governments, had been groping toward a solution. While the French Committee in Algiers, for the sake of security, had not been informed of plans for the forthcoming invasion, as the time approached the British felt that the only way to get De Gaulle's co-operation was to ask him to come to London.

When De Gaulle arrived in London on 4 June he was informed of several decisions already taken, including the plans for the employment of civil affairs liaison officers and the proposal to issue supplemental currency. He was also handed the text of an


address prepared by the SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division and was told that he would be expected to read this speech directly after General Eisenhower's message on D-day. De Gaulle was furious. He felt lie had been tricked into coming to London to be confronted with a fait accompli; he objected to parroting a speech that made no reference to the French Committee; but most of all he was aroused by the proposal to issue what he called "counterfeit" or "AMGOT" money. The issuance of currency, he said, was a violation of national sovereignty, a humiliation to which not even the Germans had subjected France. To impress his allies with his extreme displeasure the general at first refused to go on the radio, forbade the use of French liaison officers, and made official protest through diplomatic channels on the use of Allied military currency. After much discussion, he relented sufficiently to permit twenty civil affairs liaison officers to participate in D-day operations, and early on the morning of 6 June he also agreed to go on the radio but only on condition that he prepare his own speech, in which he proposed to tell the French to follow the instructions of their government and their chiefs in battle.

It may seem strange that so technical a matter as currency could have caused so much difficulty. The currency question was, of course, not the main cause but simply the efficient cause of the troubles with the French Committee. The main cause of the impasse that threatened to wreck Anglo-American amity and to seriously embarrass civil administration in France was a conflict of personalities. The two protagonists, Roosevelt and De Gaulle, were strong-willed men, each motivated by principles that he refused to compromise. The sincerity of the President in pressing for free determination cannot be doubted. Neither can the sincerity of De Gaulle, who was deeply concerned about the dignity of his country and its restoration to an honorable position in the family of nations. Naturally enough he was extremely sensitive to anything that suggested an infringement of the sovereignty of France.

The story unfolded in these documents is one of compromise and gradual retreat on both sides. A compromise was precipitated by the action of the governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Luxembourg on 13 June, followed a day later by Poland, in announcing their recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the duly constituted authority of France. The British press, the Foreign Office, and the Cabinet were pressing for recognition of De Gaulle, and the Prime Minister was obliged to ask the House of Commons not to force a debate on the question. Informed that the Prime Minister was unable to dominate the Foreign Office or the Cabinet on the French question, the President gradually receded from his lofty ground and invited De Gaulle to Washington. De Gaulle arrived on 6 July, and was greeted by a 17-gun salute and other honors approximating those reserved for heads of state. Both men made an effort to be affable and, as a result, their representatives were able to work out five memoranda that served as a civil affairs agreement. On 25 August, two and one-half months after the Allied landings, General Eisenhower and General Koenig, Chief of the French Military Mission, signed the agreement on civil administration in France. A revised directive could thus be sent to AFHQ at this point. Even with the signing of the agreement, recognition was not immediately forthcoming but De Gaulle did not insist upon it. The gradual process by which the committee gained recognition is brought out in the concluding documents of Chapter XXV.



[App. H, Brief History of Civil Affairs Headquarters, Undated, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.18, 6th AGp, Jkt I]

On January 21, 1944, the Military Government Section of AFHQ ordered Colonel Harvey S. Gerry to proceed from Caserta where he was stationed to Algiers to commence planning for the invasion of the Southern coast of France. It was originally intended that this operation would take place simultaneously with the invasion of the north. By the middle of February 1944 the following officers had joined Colonel Gerry in Algiers to commence the Civil Affairs planning for this operation: Maj. William L. Batt, Supply; Maj. Robert Bennett, Finance; Maj. Sheldon Elliott, Executive; Lt. Col. Mark DeW. Howe, Legal. They moved their headquarters to [La] Bouzaréa where they formed the Civil Affairs Section of Force 163, which subsequently developed into the Seventh Army. By the middle of March, this group was joined by Maj. Archibald S. Alexander, Supply, and Maj. Frederick K. Graham, Intelligence.

In addition, a number of officers connected with MGS (later G-5) AFHQ, participated in the planning, particularly Lt. Col. Henry Aronson, who set up the training program.

During March arrangements were made for bringing approximately 80 officers and the same number of FM from Italy to Courbet-Maine for training. Maj. Forrest Cranmer set up the camp and training center known as Civil Affairs Training Center. Active training for Civil Affairs in Southern France started at that time and continued until the camp was closed on August 22.

Early in March, Colonel Gerry and Lt. Col. Howe went to G-5, SHAEF, to co-ordinate planning for the two operations. Colonel Gerry remained a month; Lt. Col. Howe remained until early in June. From time to time they were joined by supply experts, including Major Batt and various officers from the Supply Section of G-5, AFHQ.

The difficulties surrounding planning for this operation were largely two-fold:
a. The great uncertainty as to whether or not any French Government would be recognized and whether the French authorities, either locally, or nationally, would be able to handle local government or whether it would be necessary for Allied Civil Affairs officers to handle it.
b. Uncertainty as to whether or not the operation itself would take place.

The first question was never finally decided before the operation started but, after the experience in Normandy, it became clear that the French would largely be able to handle their own affairs and the chief problems would be those of supply.

It was finally decided on or about July I that the operation would take place. At that time the Civil Affairs Group had no organized unit, no table of organization, no authorized equipment, no CA Manual, and only the personnel mentioned above.

Colonel Parkman was then brought into the field, first as Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer and then as Chief of CAHQ [Civil Affairs Headquarters]. The problems mentioned above were gradually solved, first by the creation of the 2678 Civil Affairs Regiment (Overhead) [see below] to hold the personnel for the operation, including those with tactical forces, and then by bringing of 90 officers and approximately 250 men from England where they had been trained for civil affairs work in France.

The operation started on August 15, with the establishment of Civil Affairs Headquarters in Sainte-Maxime on D plus I attached to the VI Corps under Lt. Col. Howe and Major [Lewis H.] Van Dusen. Thereafter, personnel rapidly came in the Headquarters was moved first to Marseille and then to Lyon. The Regiment was assigned to the Seventh Army for the operation and then to the Sixth Army Group on September 15... .

The operation was of an Allied character in that one British officer was employed for approximately every 5 Americans. There were few British enlisted personnel used. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AFHQ Staff Memo (unnumbered), 12 Feb 44, G-5 files, Staff Sec Rpts, 7th Army, 1 Feb-31 Oct 44]

1. There is hereby established a Civil Affairs Unit, Force 163

2. The unit will consist of:
a. Planning Staff
b. Training Center


3. Personnel will be attached to the Unit, both officers and enlisted men, upon approval of competent authority.

4. The Unit will be attached to Headquarters Command, Force 163, for administration and supply.

5. Supplies and equipment are authorized as approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4

6. The Military Government Section, this headquarters, is charged with technical supervision of this Unit.


[Ltr, Force 163 to CinC, AFHQ, 23 Feb 44, G-5 files, Staff Sec Rpts, 7th Army, 1 Feb-31 Oct 44]

1. It is assumed that initially the Commanding General, Force 163, subject to directives from higher headquarters, will be responsible for control of civil affairs during the operation ANVIL [later, DRAGOON] to the line Nice-Dijon-Nevers-Beziers.

2. Based on the above assumption, this headquarters considers a civil affairs unit of approximately 200 officers and 400 enlisted men will be necessary to efficiently administer the indicated area.

4. Personnel for this unit have been partially selected and are currently attached to the Military Government Section, AFHQ, for duty with Force 163. It is proposed that the Civil Affairs Unit for Operation ANVIL be located in the vicinity of Algiers for organization, administration and training.


[Interim Directive, SHAEF to SACMED, 14 May 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(I), sec. 5]

1. This directive is issued to you under the powers conferred by CCS in FAN 318 and is transmitted to you for your guidance in administering civil affairs in the six administrative Regions of which the capital cities are Montpellier, Marseille (excluding Corsica), Clermont-Ferrand and Lyon and in the whole of the Departments of Haute-Garonne, Tarn, Cote d'Or and Doubs. Except as military necessity may otherwise dictate you will conform to the guides herein set forth either under ANVIL conditions or under any RANKIN condition which may develop.

2. Within boundaries established by this Hq, you will have, de facto, supreme responsibility and authority at all times and in all areas to the full extent necessitated by the military situation. . . . Appropriate redelegation of powers to subordinate commanders is further authorized. 1  ♦ ♦ ♦


[ Interim Directive, SACMED to CG, Seventh Army, 5 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43), sec. 5]

3. Until such time as supreme responsibility and authority reverts to SCAEF, you will be responsible to SACMED for such civil affairs activities as are of military concern throughout the whole of the area defined . . . [in SHAEF Interim Directive of 14 May, above] to whatever extent the military situation may necessitate.

4. Civil Affairs will be so administered in Southern France that whenever it is transferred to the immediate command of SCAEF the policies and procedures which have been followed and utilized will, to the greatest extent practicable, conform to those in the rest of liberated France.

5. Military government will not be established in liberated France. Civil administration in all areas will normally be conducted and controlled by the French authorities. If, however, recourse to those authorities on matters of military interest should fail, you will have authority to take such action as the security of the forces under your command and the success of the military operations may require.

6. It is not contemplated that any military enactments prescribing rules of civil conduct, other than any initial Proclamation SACMED may make and such local regulations as subordinate commanders may find it necessary to issue for purposes of security in the areas of combat, will be issued by SACMED, by you, or by your subordinate commanders. For the enactment of such legislation as is necessary for achievement of your objectives, initial recourse shall, therefore, normally be had to the appropriate French authorities.

7. Should it, however, become necessary for subordinate commanders to issue military enactments-save for the local regulations mentioned above-they shall be issued only if:
a. They conform to the general policies established by SCAEF and SACMED;


b. They are of a character and application purely local to the area of the commander's responsibility; and
c. They have been specifically authorized by you, unless military or other exigencies make such authorization impracticable. All military enactments other than those mentioned above will be issued only within policies laid down by SCAEF and on authority of SACMED.

8. Initial recourse shall be had to French tribunals for the punishment of civilians committing offenses of concern to the military forces. No Allied Military courts for the trial of civilians will be established unless an order authorizing such action has been issued by SACMED.

9. The respective Allied services and naval courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied Forces and over all persons of non-French nationality who are employed by or who accompany those Forces and are subject to the naval, military, or air force law of one of the Allied Governments, or British naval courts. Subsequent directives or orders may be issued extending such immunity from jurisdiction of French courts to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments, present in France on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Forces, as may be designated therein.

10. It is the intention of the United Nations that the termination of the Vichy regime shall be complete. The action necessary to secure such termination and to reorganize the governmental services will be taken by the French authorities. Only when military necessity requires the removal or appointment of an official, and the French authorities fail to take necessary action, will you or a subordinate commander having civil affairs responsibility throughout the area of the official's authority order such removal or temporary appointment.

11. Procurement of civil labor, billets, and supplies and use of lands, buildings, transportation, and other services for military needs, will be effected whenever possible through French authorities.

12. Except in areas directly important to military operations you will permit orderly political assemblies and meetings to be conducted to the end that when it is possible for elections to be held, the people may express their free choice.

13. Upon the liberation of any locality you will take all appropriate steps, in accordance with the directives of SCAEF and of this headquarters and in conjunction with the French authorities, for the full utilization of its industrial, natural, and other economic resources for the support of your forces, the needs of United Nations Forces in other areas, and the basic needs of the French people.

14 You will, in co-ordination with this headquarters, prepare phased estimates of and requisitions for civilian supply and relief needs in that portion of liberated France which is your responsibility. These needs will be assessed by an appreciation of the extent to which failure to fulfill civilian claims to relief might interfere with military operations or with broader objectives as defined by SACMED or SCAEF.

15. You will, to the fullest extent consistent with the security of the troops and the prosecution of the war, assist French authorities to secure:
a. The preservation of public health.
b. The restoration of supervision of public services.
c. The maintenance of public order.
d. The supervision of economic institutions, practices and controls including those relating to banking and other financial functions.
e. The regulation of the movements of civilians within the whole of your area, and
f. The protection and preservation of archives, historical monuments and works of art.

16. In carrying out your obligations under this directive you will comply with the broad policies enunciated by SCAEF and SACMED as they may from time to time be transmitted to you by this headquarters in the form of orders, directives, instructions, and otherwise.

17. To aid you in the discharge of your responsibility for civil affairs activities and their coordination throughout Southern France, civil affairs personnel will be provided you for appropriate assignment throughout the area of your responsibility.

18. Civil affairs activities will be conducted through civil affairs personnel in areas affected by military operations and in other areas to the extent that military or administrative considerations necessitate the initiation of relief and other activities. Civil affairs activities will be organized with due regard to the basic principle that extensive reliance will be placed upon French authorities for the conduct of civil administration in all areas. Civil affairs personnel will consequently be so organized and deployed as to be in a position to offer the utmost co-operation and help in making that civil administration successful and effective.

19. In accordance with paragraph 8 of the Interim Directive from SCAEF to SACMED, British personnel will participate in the administration of civil affairs in Southern France. You


are free to determine the numbers in which such personnel will be utilized and to allocate such responsibilities to them as you may deem appropriate.

20. French authorities, in coordination with this headquarters, will make available to you substantial numbers of French civil affairs personnel for assignment to your headquarters, subordinate French and American headquarters, and to such other duties as you may determine. To the fullest extent possible you will utilize the services of such French personnel as an integrated part of your civil affairs organization, giving them responsibilities substantially identical or similar to those of American and British civil affairs personnel serving under your command. In all dealings which you and subordinate commanders may have with French public officials the fullest extent possible use will be made of the French civil affairs personnel.


[GO 50, Hq Seventh Army, 23 Jul 44, G-5 files, Staff Sec Rpts, 7th Army]

Effective this date the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment (Ovhd) is organized in the vicinity of Naples, Italy, with an authorized strength of one hundred (100) officers and one (1) warrant officer and is assigned to Seventh Army.... 2


[GO 50, Hq Seventh Army, 23 Jul 44, G-5 files, Staff Sec Rpts, 7th Army]

1. Announcement is made of the establishment of a General Staff Section of this headquarters to be known as the G-5 Section. This section will assume all the responsibilities and functions incident to supervision and co-ordination of Civil Affairs activities.

2. The G-5 Section, this headquarters, will be composed of an Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, and three assistants to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, and enlisted operating personnel. 3  


[G-5, Sixth AGp, Historical Rpt, 18-31 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 504, 6th AGp Fld Rpts]

♦ ♦ ♦ The original plan was that Colonel H. S. Gerry should be the chief of all civil affairs operations under General Patch in Southern France. All civil affairs personnel was to be organized into a regiment and Colonel Gerry was to be Regimental Commander and Chief Civil Affairs Officer. In the middle of July, however, he was appointed ACofS G-5, Seventh Army, and it was decided at Seventh Army that because of his character as General Staff Officer he could not command responsibility over the civil affairs personnel in the field. Accordingly, Colonel Parkman was named Regimental Commander and Chief Civil Affairs Officer. This meant that Colonel Gerry was vested merely with responsibility for advising General Patch on civil affairs problems and that Colonel Parkman was responsible for all operations, including those within Army areas. Although the division of authority between Colonel Gerry and Colonel Parkman had not substantially unsatisfactory results, the original plan for concentrating all authority in one officer was frustrated by the decision of Seventh Army that the ACofS G-5 could not command the Regiment.

The civil affairs plan of Seventh Army never included the organization of Detachments as such. It was planned to establish the Civil Affairs Headquarters at Marseille at the earliest possible moment, and to have all civil affairs personnel, other than those assigned to tactical units, work out of that Headquarters, being sent to such administrative centers as Regional and Departmental capitals as needed. This plan was carried into effect in operations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CA Circ 1, G-5, Seventh Army, 28 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5 ]

2. Civil Affairs Objectives: In furtherance of the military effort the Commanding General will


seek to obtain the maximum co-operation from the French Authorities and the French people and a minimum of interference with operations against the enemy.

With respect to certain objectives of immediate military interest, he will assist French authorities to secure or, if military necessity requires, himself take steps to secure:
a. The early realization of local resources and manpower to the extent necessary for military requirements.
b. The necessary functioning of civil organizations and public services.
c. The maintenance of public order.
d. The regulation of the movement of civilians within his area.

The Commanding General has other objectives which are important because any failure to deal with them might interfere with the military effort, or with broader aims as defined by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, or the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These include:
a. The provision of essential civilian supplies and relief needs.
b. The restoration and maintenance of health, welfare, and the economy of the liberated areas.
c. The protection of economic institutions, including banks and other financial institutions.
d. The protection and preservation of archives, historical monuments, works of art, and private property.

It will be the object of the civil affairs organization now in process of formation to relieve the Commanding General as much as possible of civil affairs problems.

3. Basis of Plan. To achieve uniformity in civil affairs throughout liberated France, Supreme Hq. Allied Expeditionary Forces, has prepared:
a. Standard Policy and Procedure, Revised 1 May 1944.
b. SHAEF Field Handbook of Civil Affairs.
It is intended to follow the policies established therein and to observe the procedures to the fullest extent practicable. ♦ ♦ ♦

4. The Commanding General. The responsibility for civil affairs direction in Southern France will be under the direction of the Commanding General, Seventh Army. He will exercise direction in all liberated areas until such time as territories to the rear of the Army line come under separate command, when G-5, Allied Force Hq. will coordinate civil affairs activities in the different areas.

5. The Assistant Chief of Staff`, G-5. This officer will be responsible for supervising and coordinating civil affairs operations and keeping the Commanding General fully advised on all matters pertaining to this field.

6. Civil Affairs Headquarters, Seventh Army. At this headquarters there will be a Chief Civil Affairs Officer assisted by administrative assistants and specialist as required.

7. Corps and Division Staffs. The staffs will be comprised of Civil Affairs officers and specialist officers as needed to supervise civilian activities in these areas.

8. Civil Affairs Personnel. All civil affairs personnel (U.S., British and French not otherwise assigned or attached will be held in a pool under Army Headquarters from which they will be allocated as required.

9. Command and Control. Civil affairs officers accompanying forward troops will serve under the commanders of the headquarters in whose areas they are operating and their activities will be co-ordinated by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer. The chain of command will follow the normal channel. . . . However, where not inconsistent with the regular command channels, the technical channel will be authorized....

15. Civil Affairs Officers. A number of these officers trained for field work with combat troops will be mounted on the D-Day and subsequent lifts, with transport and. field equipment, preparatory to entering tons as soon as possible after taken. They will co-operate with the CIC; and PW [Psychological Warfare] as well as other services in a co-ordinated town security plan. They will submit prompt situation reports to their commanding generals.

16. Specialist Officers. Certain specialists, particularly those dealing with civilian supply, finance, public health, public safety, and refugees and welfare, will enter liberated towns with the advance of civil affairs officers where required.

17. Civil Affairs Headquarters. An advance party will land with Army Headquarters and reconnoiter a temporary site to serve as report center for civil affairs personnel and transport subsequently. As soon as the site is located the officer in command will arrange to have all civil affairs officers notified through channels. Civil affairs personnel not assigned to operational units that may arrive subsequently will report to Civil Affairs Headquarters for orders.

18. Civil Affairs Detachments. In addition to the administrative section, there will be established at Civil Affairs Headquarters a number of specialist branches corresponding to the various civil affairs functions to be fulfilled in the liber-


ated areas. 5  Each specialist branch will be under the direction of a Chief, who may also serve as specialist staff officer with Army Headquarters. Detachment personnel may be assigned specific territorial or functional responsibilities, may be utilized to service French authorities and agencies, may be attached for supplementary use to operational military units to meet special problems, or may be assigned to rear area duties. Insofar as practicable, plans for civil affairs operations and the allocation of civil affairs personnel will be kept flexible and integrated closely with Army Headquarters. At such time as the area to the rear of Army Headquarters becomes sufficiently distant as to make an integrated program for civil affairs not feasible, the Commanding General may give the Civil Affairs Headquarters such independence of technical command as he deems necessary. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Admin Instrs 2, G-5, Seventh Army, 24 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5]

3. When operations have advanced sufficiently to indicate its desirability, there will be established a Civil Affairs Headquarters, Seventh Army. The officer in charge of this Headquarters will be known as the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, hereafter designated as CCAO.

4. The above Headquarters staff will consist, in addition to the CCAO, of necessary administrative officers and of 12 special divisions, each in charge of a chief. These divisions will provide:
(a) advice to the CCAO on questions in their specific fields
(b) technical instructions and assistance to civil affairs officers throughout the liberated areas.

For supervision and co-ordination of their work, the divisions will be grouped in four Branches, with a senior officer in charge of each Branch. There will be, in addition, a Public Relations advisor to the CCAO, an Intelligence unit and a Statistics and Reports unit. An Operations Branch will be provided to supervise generally the work of the CAO's in the field and necessary administrative detail will be handled by a Staff Duties Division.

5. The Civil Affairs Hq, when established, will be combined Allied-French Hq. It will comprise all specialists not assigned to Army, Regions, or Base Section and all CAO's and French officers of Administrative Liaison who are held in reserve against operational needs.

6. The functions of CAHQ will be:
(a) to maintain close liaison with the French authorities
(b) in liaison with the French authorities to develop and formulate policies for the conduct of civil affairs throughout the whole of the liberated area
(c) through the CCAO to be responsible to the ACofS, G-5, for the direction and control of civil affairs personnel and their activities in the areas outside of military boundaries, and
(d) to provide such liaison with, or representation on, the SHAEF Mission to the French authorities as may be required. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, G-5, AFHQ, to WD and Br WO, 6 Aug 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (8-3-43)(1), sec. 5]

III. Relationship with the French

6. Negotiations with General [Henri] Cochet at AFHQ
a. By Cable S 53126, dated 5 May, SHAEF authorized AFHQ to begin conversations with the French authorities with instruction to avoid political subjects and to keep the conversations on a military and operational level, seeking to arrive at working agreements. After preliminary conversations between General Cochet, French Military Delegate for the Southern Zone, and the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief Administrative Officer and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, meetings with General Cochet's staff began on 14 June.
b. Through 21 July some 43 meetings were held at the G-5 level. Other interested AFHQ Staff Sections participated from time to time, as well as civilian representatives of FCNL's Commissariats. The conversations have been mutually beneficial and productive of mutual confidence. Informal discussions are continuing at the Army level in which General de Gaulle, as well as General Cochet and [Lt.] General [Alexander M.] Patch, have participated. 6


7. Participation by French Liaison Officers in Civil Affairs Activities
a. As a product of the Cochet conversations, the French authorities stated that they planned to utilize 73 officers and 167 EM/OR for the civil affairs portion of Operation DRAGOON. At that time it was planned to integrate this personnel into the Allied civil affairs organization at various levels, i.e., Army, Groups, Divisions, Base and Administrative Regions. It is now contemplated, however, that French civil affairs officers will be attached to the local civilian governmental authorities, i.e., Prefects, Sous-Prefects, etc., as in Normandy, leaving only a very small group to remain on a liaison basis with Headquarters, Seventh Army.
b. It is understood, however, that when and if the U.S.-French accord is signed, General de Gaulle has given General Cochet his consent to transferring such officers, by direct attachment, to tactical units in accordance with the original integrated plan.
c. The question of French civil affairs officers for civil affairs duties with French divisions and corps is at present a matter for determination by General [Jean] de Lattre de Tassigny, Commanding General, Army "B."
d. It is General Cochet's plan as to French Civil Administrative liaison officers that these officers be divided into two groups; one group to be attached to Allied units under General Patch, the other group to be attached to the French Army under General de Lattre de Tassigny. It has been suggested to G-5, Seventh Army, that Allied officers be in turn attached to the Administrative Liaison Group with Army "B."
e. Two French officers are now attached to G-5 Section, AFHQ, and are performing liaison duties, especially on supply matters. One officer represents General Cochet. The other represents the Commissariat of Supply and Production, the Commissariat of Communications and Merchant Marine, the Commissariat of Social Affairs, and Mr. Monnet, Commissaire en Mission, as well as General Cochet.

8. French Administration of Southern France
a. It has been decided that there will be no civilian delegate for the South of France. General Cochet, as the Military Delegate, has been entrusted by de Gaulle with the sole jurisdiction over the DRAGOON area, and the civilian commissariats will be represented within that area by delegations accredited to General Cochet.

9. Necessity for Settlement of Political Policies
a. No final directive to SACMED concerning the administration of Civil Affairs in Southern France has yet been received. The relationship with the French at the working level has been excellent. A definite agreement providing for the administration of civil affairs and the issuance of currency is, however, urgently needed now.


[Min, Eighth Wkly Staff Conf, G-5 Div, SHAEF, 8 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5 Monographs and Sketches, Negotiations With the French, an. I-A]

♦ ♦ ♦ Grasett: About the French situation. We haven't made much progress. De Gaulle, as you know, arrived on Sunday. The plan was explained to him, and so on, and his attitude has been just a little difficult since he arrived. First of all, the liaison officers. The first news we had was that he disapproved . . . and would allow none of the Civil Affairs liaison officers to go. However, he was approached by Duff Cooper a couple of days ago and he agreed to twenty. I saw Koenig yesterday and told him that twenty was all that was needed the first day, and building up to 89. I explained the whole situation to him and said it was quite incomprehensible to us that the Allied Forces should go back to France unaccompanied by French officers, no matter what the political situation should be-it would be inconceivable. General Eisenhower's one desire is to meet the civil wishes in every way he possibly can, and all our instructions are to that effect. Koenig promised to go to De Gaulle, which he did, and the answer was twenty. When they agreed to 89 they were trained and attached to formations; however, there it is. That is the way I feel about it at the moment. . . . In my view that is not enough and we are now examining what we can do supposing they don't come back and give us more. We are examining officers who joined the British Army in 1940 to see if they are available and whether it would be a breach of contract, whether their lives are in danger as they are under different names, whether we could use them in both U.S. and British Forces. We will also try to collect them on the other side. . . .



[Paraphrase of State Dept, Msg From Algiers (signed Selden Chapin) to Secy of State, 8 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (I), sec. 3, CM-IN 7764]

Accompanied by the British Charge, I called on [Rene] Massigli [French Minister] this afternoon at his request. He seemed to be quite upset and said the Committee had held a special session this morning to discuss the cable from General de Gaulle concerning the omission and Allied Command's use of franc notes. (When Massigli was reading from De Gaulle's cable the expression "counterfeit money" was let slip).

A close paraphrase of the identical note which was delivered to Holman and me which the Committee approved, text of which was cabled to De Gaulle, follows:
"The provisional government of the French Republic has received information that the Allied High Command has put into circulation in the first French territories to be liberated notes which are payable in francs.
"It has astonished the Government that this initiative should have been taken by the Allied Command as it is an initiative which no friendly army has ever undertaken before. The Provisional Government fully realized the practical exigency which requires the military command during the course of operations to dispose of currency. Throughout the whole of the French territories overseas military authorities have always received at once and without limit any funds they have asked for, and the same system should and could have been established in French Metropolitan territories at a time when full sovereignty is about to be acquired by the latter. The Government is prepared to take the necessary dispositions within the framework of the agreement whose conclusion the Government has been seeking for some months from the Allied Governments.

"The Provisional Government cannot grant any legal value to the stamped paper (vignettes) which has been circulated without its consent, since traditionally the right of issuing currency has belonged to the national authority in France alone. Therefore the Gov't makes reservations as to the moral, financial and political consequences which this action may bring about.

"With this feeling the most earnest attention of the U.S. Gov't is drawn to the serious consequences which must result in France under the circumstances which now exist and the inevitable recognition that there is no existing agreement between the French authorities and the Allied Gov'ts. upon which the French interior forces depend and to which they refer." ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg. Murphy to Secy of State, 10 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (1), sec. 3, CM-IN 10677]

Someone in the French Administration, thoroughly trustworthy, who does not want his name known, has informed us that two very bitter cables were received this morning in Algiers from General de Gaulle. . . . De Gaulle insists that he was deceived and forced to come to London to find a fait accompli. The invasion was already prepared. He was even told by the British, very impertinently, that he was expected to speak over the radio on D Day after Eisenhower's speech. De Gaulle refused to . . . speak until the afternoon.

The question of what de Gaulle calls "fake money" . . . is making him furious.

The informant added that General de Gaulle had given permission to his technical liaison officer to go into France with the Allied forces, but he would not allow his administrative liaison to land with the British and Americans, giving the impression in this way that he was party to the Anglo-American decisions in civilian matters. De Gaulle did remark to the French Committee that the military preparations for the invasion were satisfactory, and he showed confidence that the assault would be successful. In one of these two messages de Gaulle tried to convey the impression that Eisenhower is very apologetic over the arrangements for dealing with civilian affairs. He infers that Eisenhower considers himself no politician and that he made none of the current arrangements. . . .


[WD Telecon 546 Between McCloy and Holmes, 10 Jun 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2]

♦ ♦ ♦ Washington: . . . I want to talk about the fiscal situation. We have gotten here, a number of broadcasts from London which seem to be rather hysterical about this currency. We have also seen some communications from the Prime Minister to the President which indicate that he is trying to, at perhaps the price of getting de


Gaulle to approve this currency, to come pretty close to recognition of the provisional government. I think that the President is adamant against taking any steps which would be tantamount to recognition of the committee or of the government. What we are most concerned about for the moment is this: That de Gaulle should not denounce that currency. I assume that by this time the proclamation of General Eisenhower has already been posted in the liberated areas. Is that right?

London: The order went forward for them to be posted yesterday. My estimate is that they were probably put up today.
Washington: . . . It's all right, I think that the French will accept that, the population will accept that, unless de Gaulle denounces it....
London: . . . I don't think there's any danger that he will.... What we did was this.... We held up posting these proclamations to give him an opportunity to get on the band-wagon. We told them that our instructions were to put it up, and that we proposed to put it up, but if they cared to make a supporting proclamation and come along, we'd give them the ball and let them run pretty well down the field. De Gaulle said, I believe that is the fact-we had no direct contact with him from SHAEF, we made it a point not to-but word came back that he was adamant, saying that nobody had any right to issue French currency but Frenchmen. We said, "Well there's no reason why you shouldn't make a supporting declaration, and come ahead and carry out your program, we'll do almost anything you want done on that." And nothing was done, and so we said, "If we don't hear from you by midnight on Thursday, we have to put it up the next day." We had waited as long as we thought we could, the area uncovered was not great, in terms of population, and we thought we were safe in doing that. We played the game as best we could, but we put it up. ♦ ♦ ♦
Washington: What do you intend to do from here? Do you intend to ask de Gaulle again to support the currency? ♦ ♦ ♦
London: . . . What we're going to do, we've told him that we are going to put up our own proclamation and go right ahead with this thing, and we've done that, and we're going to keep on doing it. If any of his people ask to discuss these matters with us further, we're entirely at their disposal. But we, SHAEF, propose to do nothing more in the way of an attempt to persuade him. I don't think we'll have to, because I think the initiative is going to be taken by His Majesty's government, because of the pressure I've just talked about. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Copy of Msg, Prime Minister of the President, No 696, 9 Jun 44, in Memo for Red by McCloy, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (1), sec. 3]

Inasmuch as General Eisenhower has urgent need to make a proclamation announcing the notes to be issued for the troops in France, I want to know your wishes about it. There is reason to expect that General de Gaulle will press for his proclamation to contain the wording "Provisional Government of France" or "of the French Republic" and publish it in the "Official journal of the French Republic," his publication at Algiers, but he is quite ready to make a supporting proclamation. He fights at every point, and we shall naturally strive to convince him to stick to the French Committee of National Liberation. If General de Gaulle does not endorse the issue, the Treasury fears the notes will not have any backing behind them and on the other hand I feel that the proclamation of General Eisenhower will make the governments of Great Britain and the United States separately or jointly responsible to redeem them. In your mind, how does this stand?

There are others that even say that General de Gaulle might denounce the issue as false money. Personally I don't think that he will dare. If I were a French shopkeeper, I should myself think that a note printed in the United States tendered to me by a British or American soldier was well worth having whether de Gaulle endorsed it or not, if General Eisenhower declared the notes legal.

Will you let me know please what is your view in this matter? If we can get de Gaulle to take responsibility for these notes in his capacity as President of the Provisional Government of France, the French nation in that case will ultimately face the problem of redeeming them. Shall we do this? Or shall we wait to fix the ultimate responsibility at the peace settlement and say now that the United States and Great Britain will assume responsibility for these notes?. . .


[Copy of Msg, Prime Minister to the President, No 697, 9 Jun 44]

With further reference to my 696. I saw the specimens of the notes in question and they do not appear to us as very reassuring. Forging them looks very easy. Not a thing is mentioned regarding who is responsible for issuing and redeeming them. They must have some authority behind them.


. . . please look at them and say what should be done. Ought we to allow de Gaulle to obtain new status as his fee for backing them, or should we assume the burden for the time being, improve the issue later on, and make the settlement at the peace table where many accounts will be presented?


[Paraphrase of Msg, President to the Prime Minister, 13 Jun 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2, CM-OUT 50351]

I agree with you that the question of currency is being used as the method of rushing us into recognizing the Committee. I feel the situation regarding currency which your cable mentions is not as serious as the initial view might indicate and considering the angle of the supplementary currency being acceptable, I do not believe it is necessary for de Gaulle to publish his supporting statement concerning this currency. My suggestion is that we notify de Gaulle that: (1) it is our intention that the use of supplemental French franc currency will be continued in precisely the same fashion as arranged and as concurred in by the British Treasury. The members of the French Committee, [Pierre] Mendes-France and Monnet, understood these plans thoroughly. (2) General Eisenhower is authorized to use BMA notes or yellow seal dollars if it should develop that the French people will not accept the supplemental franc currency. Therefore should the French public be incited by de Gaulle not to accept supplementary currency, the Committee will be held entirely responsible for any ill effects caused by using BMA notes and yellow seal dollars in France. One sure result will be that the French franc will depreciate on a sterling and dollar basis on a black market. This will bring to light and stress the weak spots in the monetary system of France. This was one of the main reasons for accepting the French Committee's request that we should not employ British military authority notes and yellow seal dollars as spearhead currency. Additional adverse results would obtain which would be evident to General de Gaulle as well as his advisors.

Concerning the currency, I should definitely not press de Gaulle to issue any statement of a supporting nature. With a clear understanding that he is acting with no concurrence from us and entirely upon his individual accountability, de Gaulle can put his signature on any currency statement in any capacity that he desires....

.... I have seen the franc notes the second time and consider their general appearance satisfactory. Due to the intricate combinations of colors, the experts on counterfeit money at the Bureau of Printing and Engraving tell me they will be very difficult to copy. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Interv- With Brig R. M. H. Lewis, SCAO, 2d Br Army, 26 Nov 44, on Relations With French Civil Authorities in Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 20-B]

♦ ♦ ♦ The first intimation I had of what amounted virtually to a coup d'etat was when I found a French Colonel, stranded by the side of the road near Army Headquarters in a broken down car. When I asked him who he was, he informed me that he was the military commander for the French Military Region [Col. Pierre de Chevigne], and that the Civil Commissioner for the Region of Rouen was in Bayeux. At the same time almost, reports were received that General de Gaulle had landed, addressed a meeting in Bayeux and left a civil commissioner [M. Francois Coulet behind to take charge of the civil administration. My meeting with the French Colonel was very cordial, and he informed .me that M. Coulet wished to pay his respects to the Commanding General. In view of the fact that no official instructions on the subject had been received from London, I did not feel that I could accede to this request, saying in excuse that the General was fully occupied with the conduct of operations. I did, however, request that M. Coulet should come and see me, or alternatively that I would be pleased to go and see him.

A report was sent to London, but no answer, nor guidance was sent to me on this matter. Having found out that the Civil Commissioner was acceptable to the French, and that his first act was to dismiss M. Rochat, the Sous-Prefect of Bayeux, suspected of Nazi sympathies, I decided that I should accept him as the de facto civil


civil authority for the Region of Rouen. I then arranged a meeting with M. Coulet, which was very cordial. I explained that my task was purely a military one to work for the furtherance of military operations, and that any supplies handed over to the French were given with the intention of avoiding any civil interference in operations. Furthermore I was accepting him in the 2 1 Army area without prejudice to any later instructions I might receive from London. Except that M. Coulet took exception to the phrase "without prejudice," the meeting passed off very amicably and satisfactory personnel [sic] relationships were established. This cordiality was cemented by an invitation to M. Coulet, the Military Regional Commissioner and certain of their staffs to dinner in A mess.

I found M. Coulet, presumably on instructions of General de Gaulle, intensely suspicious of our intentions towards the civil population. He had been sent over with the primary object of asserting the sovereignty of France. He was so suspicious that we intended to follow AMGOT methods that he avoided the use of "Civil Affairs" in any communications for some time. Deeds and personal relationships could alone break down the suspicion. As a first step, I gave a copy of 2nd Army General Instructions to my Senior French Liaison Officer to read through, and to let me know whether there were any instructions in it in any way derogatory to the French Government and to let M. Coulet know the results of his perusal. It took about a week before M. Coulet was fully convinced of our good intentions, and thereafter he and his civil administration could not have been more co-operative. It was always necessary, however, to avoid any suggestions of infringing the rights of French Sovereignty. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Interv With Brig R. M. H. Lewis, SCAO, 2d Br Army, 26 Nov 44, on Mtg With Coulet, 27 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 20-B]

♦ ♦ ♦ Only on one occasion did M. Coulet cause a crisis, and I personally think it was meant as a test case on his part. It was in fact overruled by French higher authority; but it caused me considerable anxiety at the time.

I received a telephone call at midnight (26 June) to say that M. Coulet had ordered a meeting of all tax collectors for 0900 hours the following day to tell them that they were not to accept Allied Military Currency in settlement of taxes. I arranged for a postponement of this meeting until I could interview M. Coulet, and went to see him with my SOI (Finance) and the SCAO, FUSA, at 0900 hours next morning. My object was to ensure that a crisis of this nature in Allied-French relationships should not be precipitated by the actions of a minor official before reference could be made to higher authority. The meeting was a solemn assembly with the French fully represented. M. Coulet took the attitude that he was the French representative on the spot, that Allied Military currency was not accepted by General de Gaulle as legal tender and could not therefore be accepted in France in payment of taxes. I maintained that if the contemplated instructions were issued, M. Coulet would be going back on the Free French declaration that they would not do anything to discountenance the currency, though they might not fully accept it. In view of the fact that the currency was already in the hands of the Allied troops, his actions might have a grave effect on operations and therefore such a matter should only be dealt with on a governmental level. Talking went on all morning with due ceremony and withdrawals for discussion, until eventually M. Coulet agreed to the suggestion of the SCAO, FUSA, and myself that he should hold his hand until time had been allowed for reference to be made to London. French and British representatives were accordingly flown off during the afternoon, with the result already mentioned that M. Coulet's attitude was not supported by General Koenig. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Agreement Reached at Conf Held in the Office of Rgn1 Cmsr, M. Coulet, at Bayeux, 0900, 27 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 56]

1. We accept the sending of the cipher telegram via London for transmission to Algiers subject to permission by the C-in-C and provided that cipher communications have now been reopened. During negotiations and subject to agreement by the C-in-C, cipher communication is to be permitted on financial matters only between General Koenig and M. Coulet and vice-versa.

2. We accept the dispatch of Comdt de Courcel by air if permitted by the C-in-C, by first dispatch boat if facilities cannot be made available, and will send a signal to Army Group to facilitate his return.

3. We accept as a temporary measure to avoid any disturbance of the financial position until instructions from higher authority can be received that any special currency collected in taxes during negotiations will be redeemed in Bank


of France notes. This acceptance is subject to complete secrecy in transaction and is not to be taken as any admission on our part that the special currency is now acceptable legal tender.

4. On the part of the Regional Commissioner he will not only take no action tending to discredit but will prevent any such action which will tend to discredit this currency and will accept it in payment of taxes.

5. The agreement will hold good until mid night 30 June 1944 and can be extended as may be agreed before that time.

6. Spoke Commander-in-Chief 1415 hours 27 June. He would not permit cipher. Agreed to Comdt de Courcel returning by air. . . . All other correspondence through Second Army HQ not cipher. M. Coulet informed. Comdt de Courcel left from London by air 1800 hours.


[Min, Weekly Staff Conf, G-5, SHAEF, 29 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 1-A]

♦ ♦ ♦ Grasett: [After reporting, with approval, the Lewis-Coulet conversation and agreements, Grasett continued] . . . Another little thing has occurred. Koenig has written asking that French troops be paid in metropolitan not supplementary francs. Koenig will be informed that this is impossible at 3:30 this afternoon. If he becomes intransigent our financial experts will find means of persuasion-such as issuing gold seal dollars or pounds at 500 instead of 200 francs. Again we can demand that supplies must be paid for in dollars or gold. We intend to tell Koenig to send an immediate telegram to Coulet that he must continue to accept supplementary francs and that after tomorrow night we will not redeem them in metropolitan francs. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Gen Holmes, SHAEF, to Hilldring, 30 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 58]

2. The matter [of accepting supplementary francs in payment of taxes] has been taken up with General Koenig, who has agreed to instruct Coulet that supplemental francs are to be accepted for all purposes pending ultimate arrangements concerning currency between the U.S./ UK Governments and the French Authorities. The temporary arrangement for the exchange of supplemental francs will not be continued after 30th June.



[Msg, Mil Attaché in London to WD, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (I), sec. 3, CM-IN 9694]

British press continues demand for agreement with French National Committee on civil affairs administration. The Times in leading editorial today repeats arguments that de Gaulle organization has a good or better claim to recognition than other exile governments, that no alternative authority exists, and that present situation jeopardizes French military aid. Issuance invasion currency without prior agreement criticized in several papers. Behind British concern over present situation is desire for strong and friendly France after war and fear that current policy will embitter Frenchmen toward their liberators.


[Msg, Gen Holmes to Hilldring, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (I) , sec. 3, CM-IN 10353]

The distinct impression is being given by the British Press that the supplemental franc issue is exclusively an American affair, and that the United States is solely responsible for the currency's employment. It is even inferred that these franc notes are in the possession of only American troops. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that a statement be issued in Washington that this currency is being used by the Allied Forces pursuant to instructions to the Supreme Commander given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which body can act only with the approval of both governments.


[Msg, Gen Holmes to McCloy, 18 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(I), sec. 3, CM-IN 14937]

The following is a tentative estimate of the French situation after conversations with [Robert A.] Lovett. De Gaulle left on the evening of 16 to return to Algiers. Before his departure arrangements were made for conversations to begin


on Monday, 19 June, between [Pierre] Vienot and 4 assistants representing the FCNL and 5 British representatives headed by the JAG, War Office, including Foreign Office and Treasury. These negotiations are to produce an agreement for the civil administration of France, and it is understood that if the British and French come to a satisfactory understanding, both will bend their best efforts to obtain the concurrence of the United States. The French will want to begin discussions on the basis of their memorandum to Murphy and Macmillan of September 7. The British will decline to negotiate on this basis as the memorandum is modeled on agreements reached in 1914-1918 with a recognized French Government. Am informed that British will insist on negotiating with the committee as such and not as the provisional Government of France. They will submit a draft with suitable modifications along the lines of the civil AEF agreement with Belgium.

I believe that the British are prepared to go as far as in their opinion the position of the President will permit. It is thought that they are fully aware that the President will not accord recognition as a provisional government and will not consent to the FCNL being the issuing authority for currency. I am not sure what their reaction will be to the committee's certain insistence that no other French group is to be concerned with civil administration in France. Arrangements have been made which it is believed will permit us to keep you currently informed of the progress of these negotiations.

At the time of his visit to Normandy de Gaulle was well received and with some enthusiasm. However, there are indications that he was somewhat disappointed in the warmth of his reception. Before leaving London he had a conversation with Eden which is reported to have been the most satisfactory talk anyone had had with him for a long time. It is reported that he stated that he would not insist on recognition as the situation required practical solution. It is also reported that with reference to the special issue of currency he said only that the matter must be settled speedily.

It is hoped that Monday or Tuesday we shall be able to send you a copy of the British draft agreement. . . .


[Msg, McCloy to Holmes, 19 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (I), sec. 3, CM-OUT 53476]

Think it most unwise to work out a British-French agreement which will be presented to the United States behind the "bended efforts" of the other two. Why cannot we start from a directive to Eisenhower somewhat along the lines of the existing unilateral one as modified by cable on subject from highest level to which General Marshall referred in his telephone conversation with Stimson. This directive should be agreed upon between the United States and the British and then submitted to the French. I very much fear that the concept of an agreement is definitely not the approach which has been firmly adhered to on this side. Certainly not an agreement entered into by anyone other than Eisenhower pursuant to a combined directive. Please inform Bovenschen of our views. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Prime Minister to the President, No. 709, 21 Jun 44, Incl to a Memo of Lt. 0. S. Collins, USNR, The White House, for the Secy of the Treasury, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(I), sec. 4]

. . . You may be right in thinking for the moment that the situation about the notes is not critical [message President to Prime Minister, 13 June, Section 2, above]. However it is not a comfortable situation and as we go forward it is bound to get worse. I believe we should study whether there is a basis for an agreement with the committee, provided there is nothing given away which you and we do not want to give away.

No indication of the authority by whom they are issued is given on the notes. We shall be morally responsible for seeing that they are honored unless we reach an understanding with the French Committee. Under the mutual aid arrangement which we are making with the other European Allies, they will bear the cost of civil administration and of services and supplies to our soldiers in their respective countries. However the French would contribute no mutual aid to the American and British armies of liberation if we should become responsible for the whole of the military notes issued in France.

Therefore we shall see whether a basis of agreement exists by discussion between the French officials and our officials. I will let you know the result. I am not thinking of the position of the French Committee in this whole matter.


[Msg, Gen Holmes to McCloy, 23 Jun 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(I), sec. 4, CM-IN 19245]

Events have progressed so far that it would only be possible to reorient the negotiations along the


line of your W-53476 [19 June, above] on the very highest level. The British Government is committed to negotiate directly with the French and have been so engaged since Monday.... The negotiations are really under the personal control of Eden. Bovenschen has extremely limited influence on them, and it would be profitless to discuss these matters with him. . . . I have informally conveyed the views expressed in your telegram to Charles Peake, British Political Officer of SHAEF, who confirmed also informally my estimate of Bovenschen's position in the matter and also that any change in the present method of approach was highly unlikely and could be accomplished only at the highest level. I am told by both Peake and Winant that the United States was notified of the British Government's intention to undertake these negotiations.

I had been promised a copy of the original draft which the British offered to the French but I was told yesterday that Eden had objected saying that as soon as anything approaching a final form is reached he himself will communicate it to the United States Government. Through a confidential source I have been able to see a copy of this draft which is modeled on the agreement with Belgium; the Delegate as provided in the ordinance of the French Committee of National Liberation of March 1944 substantially replacing the military mission provided in the Belgian agreement. It is specified that the agreement shall be in the form of an exchange of notes between the British Government and the French Committee of National Liberation, not the Provisional Government of France. It provides the same general authority for the Supreme Allied Commander as in the case of Belgium and stipulates that the French Committee of National Liberation will conduct civil administration until such time as the provisional government is formed. Financial questions are not mentioned except to state that separate financial agreements will be made. It is understood that this is being discussed between the French and British Treasury officials. Although I have no details, I am assured that the discussions thus far have gone forward in a friendly and satisfactory manner. Good British sources continue to emphasize the changed and reasonable attitude of de Gaulle particularly in his conversation with Eden just prior to departure for Algiers. Eden said he noted that de Gaulle had not asked for recognition of the Committee as the Provisional Government and he assumed that this was not a main issue. To this de Gaulle assented.

Eden took de Gaulle to task for the tone of the Algiers press with regard to the United States and British governments and de Gaulle promised to obtain an improvement. De Gaulle said that he was in doubt about the timing of his visit to the United States but Eden urged him to make the visit in accordance with the invitation.

It should be borne in mind that relations with the French have almost become a major domestic political issue here. The Prime Minister is under great pressure from the cabinet led by the Foreign Office and from Parliament as well as the press for outright recognition of the Committee as the provisional government of France. He succeeded in postponing debate on the subject in Commons but will probably not be able to do so for any extended period of time. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Copy of Msg, President to the Prime Minister, 23 Jun 44 in Memo, Leahy to Secy of State, same date, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 4 ]

♦ ♦ ♦ We are informed by your Embassy that the Government of Great Britain is planning discussion with the Committee of National Liberation prior to de Gaulle's visit with the thought of "being helpful to the Washington conversations."

I hope you will not make arrangements with the Committee prior to giving me an opportunity to comment thereon.

I should not like to be faced with a fait accompli when de Gaulle arrives in Washington.


[Text of the Prime Minister's Msg to the President, No. 713, 25 Jun 44, Taken From a Memo of James Dunn, Dept of State, 29 Jun 44, for McCloy, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(I), sec. 4]

The conversations now proceeding with M. Vienot, the de Gaullist Ambassador in London, are on an unofficial level only, de Gaulle having declared himself unwilling to send any of his Committee members unless the U.S. were represented also.

The object of the conversations is to discover a basis that we might accept for operation of civil affairs in liberated areas of France in regard to which both the U.S. Government and we ourselves have agreed that French Committee of National Liberation should take the leadership. But these people have no power to conclude any agreement. Their work will be submitted to the Foreign Secretary and to me and, at the same time, before any agreement is made with the French Committee and before His Majesty's Government have pronounced on the result of their


works or intimated to the French Committee their decision, we shall consult with you and impart to you our views.

There is, of course, no question of recognition of a provisional government being raised at this end. You will certainly not be faced by His Majesty's Government with any fait accompli. I hope these assurances will be fully satisfactory to you.


[Msg, Gen Holmes for Gen Walter Smith, 7 Jul 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(0, sec. 4, CM-OUT 62443]

... The following memorandum initialed by the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Acting Secretary of War was submitted to the President this morning:

"We should like to suggest to you a fresh approach to the French situation.

"This new approach would be to deal with the French Committee as the `Civil Authority,' `Administrative Authority,' `De Facto Authority,' or `French authority' and to reach agreements on civil affairs administration along the lines of those reached with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. These agreements, reconciled in the CCS, were signed on behalf of the United States by General Eisenhower as the U.S. Theater Commander and on behalf of Great Britain by the British Foreign Secretary. The agreements with the French authority would be based on the following principles:

"1. The agreements should be essentially practical and temporary pending the selection of a French Government by the free choice of the French people. The agreed arrangements would be based on the acceptance of the French Committee as the authority which should assume leadership and responsibility for the administration of civil affairs during the period of liberation. However, the continuing status of the Committee must be based on the support which it has of the majority of Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France. The agreements would be designed to avoid prejudicing the right of the French people to choose their own government and would be so drawn as to avoid any expression of preference or political support for the Committee.

"2. The agreements must be such as will give the Supreme Commander the full authority he needs for the unimpeded conduct of military operations.

"3. With respect to currency the French committee would become the issuing authority for the supplemental Franc currency, with appropriate safeguards so as not to prejudice in any way our military operations....

If this meets with your approval, the matter will be referred to the CCS to take the necessary action."

The President approved in principle with the stipulation that he see the text of the agreement before it is referred to the CCS. He approved the use of the term "De Facto Authority" in the first paragraph.

Have completed a redraft of the British-French civil administration agreement in conformity with the above memorandum and to specify more clearly the authority of the Supreme Commander. Shall submit this draft to the President for his approval before it goes to CCS, where the CCAC will reconcile the draft in order that there will be identical British and American texts. This is the same procedure as followed for Belgium, Holland and Norway and will permit of the British signing on a governmental level and General Eisenhower signing for the United States.

Consider a satisfactory settlement of the entire French situation now probable, especially as the President has approved the proposal that the French Committee should become the issuing authority for supplemental currency. Shall keep you informed on progress.


[Msg, President to the Prime Minister, 10 Jul 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(I), sec. 4, CM-OUT 63059]

. .. In reply to your telegram of June 25 I am prepared to accept the Committee as the de facto authority for civil administration in France provided two things are made clear. First, complete authority to be reserved to Eisenhower to do what he feels necessary to conduct effective military operations and second, that French people be given opportunity to make free choice of their own government. I have asked officials here to take British drafts as a base and modify them to insure these points and they will shortly be in touch with your people here. Suggest you authorize your political and military officials here to work out details immediately with our officials for final clearance through CCS. General de Gaulle is leaving behind officials qualified to deal with this matter. I urge that no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared. The visit has gone off very well.


[Msg, Hilldring and Gen Holmes to Gen Walter Smith, 11 Jul 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (I), sec. 4, CM-OUT 64500]

. . The revision of the Anglo-French draft has received the approval of the President, and it was gone over this morning with General Macready, McLean of the Embassy, and Wing Commander Birley. They indicated general agreement, but stated that the changes would have to be referred to London. . . . It was agreed that the U.S. representatives should begin discussions with the French at once, and that an endeavor should be made to get general French agreement before the revised draft is submitted to London. In his last conversation with de Gaulle, the President discussed in general the terms of the agreements with special reference to the clear definition of the Supreme Commander's authority, and reports that de Gaulle was in agreement. . . . De Gaulle and his party left very much pleased and relieved. It is felt that it will not be difficult now to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the French question. ♦ ♦ ♦


[WD Telecon 836, 16 Aug 44, Between Hilldring in Washington and Gen Holmes in London, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (I), sec. 5]

Holmes: We learned from British Foreign Office sources that the agreement would not be ready for a signature today or tomorrow. Then the question came up of when, and in what circumstances, the two agreements, that is British and American, were to be signed because there was a proposal that Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, probably accompanied by Mr. Winant and Massigli, could (although that isn't sure) take a trip over to France. . . . Then it came up that Massigli and Eden were to sign for the British and that General Koenig presumably has been designated to sign with General Eisenhower for the United States.
That is correct.
Gen. Eisenhower didn't like that very much. He thought that it was putting the United States in rather an unfavorable position if this fairly junior French general were designated to sign with the United States, whereas the Foreign Minister, Massigli, signed for Great Britain. .. . I was instructed to call you and see whether or not arrangements for Koenig and General Eisenhower to sign were firm or whether or not it couldn't be changed.
There are two points here: One is that Mr. McCloy feels, and I agree, that it is not in consonance with the attitude of the State Dept. to have Winant on this in any capacity. ♦ ♦ ♦
All right. I will arrange that he will not go. ♦ ♦ ♦
Hilldring: . . . Now
the other point: . . . from the very beginning the President has been saying that Eisenhower is going to sign for the United States.... He expects Eisenhower to do the signing. . . . the French have not been any too happy about even General Eisenhower's signing. . . . they feel that . . . they are not getting everything that they should be getting. ♦ ♦ ♦

This has got to be on a military level. We don't want any government-to-government business on this thing. We don't want to tell, we must not tell the French that Eisenhower is signing for the United States Government. He is signing by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is one of the points that the French have objected to. They did not want him to sign at the direction of or as the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They want his instructions to say that he is authorized by the U.S. Government to sign, and that has delayed the negotiations for several days. We had to . . . explain again that there were solid governmental reasons why he couldn't sign as the agent of the United States. It made it look like a treaty and we didn't want to go through the treaty procedure. He is being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do it, and it doesn't say anything about the U.S. Government.

Holmes: They have accepted that now?
Yes. . . . Can it be arranged so that there will be a simultaneous signing of this thing?
Yes. We have arranged that it will be signed by both parties on the same day. . . . 7


[Dir, CAD, Report Submitted to JCS on Administration of Civil Affairs in France (JCS-1004), 16 Aug 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2]

3. The President of the United States has authorized the War Department to deal with the French Committee of National Liberation as the


de facto authority for liberated areas of France and has authorized representatives of the War Department, State Department, and Treasury Department to institute negotiations with the representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation with a view to reaching an agreement relating to the administration of civil affairs in liberated areas of France.

4. Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), representing General Eisenhower, took part in the earlier discussions instituted pursuant to this authorization at which the basic policies were set. Since his return to SHAEF, General Holmes has been kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.

5. As a result of these negotiations, a series of draft agreements dealing with arrangements for civil administration in liberated areas of continental France have been drawn up which have been concurred in by Mr. John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War; Mr. Daniel Bell, the Under Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, Department of State; and Major General J. H. Hilldring, Director of the Civil Affairs Division, as well as representatives of the British Government and representatives of the French Committee for National Liberation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCS to SHAEF, 23 Aug 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2, CM-OUT 85383]

"1. As a result of the discussions between American, British and French representatives, agreement has been reached on the practical arrangements for Civil Affairs Administration in continental France.

"2. This agreement is recorded in memoranda Nos. 1 to 5 inclusive:
No. I. Relating to administrative and jurisdictional questions.
No. II. Relating to currency.
No. III. Relating to property in continental France
No. IV. Relating to publicity arrangements.
No. V. Relating to the distribution of relief supplies for the civil population in continental France.

These memoranda are being forwarded by air courier. 8

"3. You should act in accordance with the terms of these memoranda in all matters which concern the civil administration of France. .. . Memoranda 1, 3,4.,5, became operative when put into effect for the British by the Foreign Secretary and when transmitted for the United States by the CG, USAF, ETO, to the Chief of the French Military Mission. Memorandum No. 2 becomes operative when put into effect for the British by the Foreign Secretary and when transmitted by SCAEF to the Chief of the French Military Mission.

"4. In connection with your rights and powers to use or requisition war materials and other property, information has come to hand that the Germans customarily requisition all useable supplies in any area before abandoning it. In exercising your right to use such supplies you should, so far as military necessity permits, give the greatest consideration to the economic interests of the civilian population and, where possible, leave at the disposal of the French authorities such transport material, food supplies and building materials as have been requisitioned by the German Armies or handed over to them under duress, and which are not needed by you in connection with military operations."


[Rev Directive, SHAEF to SACMED, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civil Admin]

1. This directive is issued to you under authority conferred by CCS in FAN 318 and is transmitted to you for your guidance in administering civil affairs within the area south and east of the outer boundaries of the following departments: Doubs, Cote d'Or, Saône-et-Loire, Allier, Puy-de-Dome, Cantal, Aveyron, Tarn, Haute Garonne. It supersedes all previous directives on France issued to you by Supreme Commander, AEF.

2. As a result of discussions between American, British and French representatives, agreement has been reached on the practical arrangements for Civil Affairs Administration in Continental France. This agreement is recorded in Memoranda I to V. . . . [See preceding document. ]

3. You should act in accordance with the terms of these memoranda in all matters which concern the civil administration of France. Although the designation "Supreme Allied Commander" as used in these memoranda refers to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, you will interpret it as referring to the Supreme Allied


Commander, Mediterranean Theater, for your area of responsibility outlined in paragraph I, above.

4. In connection with your rights and powers to use or requisition war materials and other property, information has come to hand indicating that the Germans customarily requisition all usable supplies in any area before abandoning it. In exercising your right to use such supplies you should, so far as military necessity permits, give the greatest consideration to the economic interests of the civilian population and, where possible, leave at the disposal of the French authorities such transport material, food supplies and building materials as have been requisitioned by the German armies or handed over to them under duress, and which are not needed by you in connection with military operations.

5. You are authorized to make appropriate redelegation to subordinate commanders of the authority granted you under the terms of this directive.


[Memorandum No. I, Relating to Administrative and Jurisdictional Questions, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2 ]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. In areas in which military operations take place the Supreme Allied Commander will possess the necessary authority to ensure that all measure are taken which in his judgment are essential for the successful conduct of his operations. Arrangements designed to carry out this purpose are set forth in the following Articles.

2. (i) Liberated French continental territory will be divided into two zones: a forward zone and an interior zone.
(ii) The forward zone will consist of the areas affected by active military operations; the boundary between the forward zone and the interior zone will be fixed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (iv) below.
(iii) The interior zone will include all other regions in the liberated territory, whether or not they have previously formed part of the forward zone. In certain cases, having regard to the exigencies of operations, military zones may be created within the interior zone in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 (ii) below.
(iv) The Delegate referred to in Article 3 below will effect the delimitation of the zones in accordance with French law in such manner as to meet the requirements stated by the Supreme Allied Commander.

3. (i) In accordance with Article I of the Ordonnance made by the French Committee of National Liberation on the 14th March, 1944, a Delegate will be appointed for the present theatre of operations. Other Delegates may be appointed in accordance with the development of operations.
(ii) The Delegate will have at his disposal an administrative organization, a Military Delegate and Liaison Officers for administrative duties. The Delegate's task will be in particular to centralize and facilitate relations between the Allied Military Command and the French authorities.
(iii) When the powers conferred on the Delegate by French law are transferred to higher French authorities, it will be for those authorities to execute the obligations of the Delegate under this agreement.

4. In the forward zone:
(i) The Delegate will take, in accordance with French law, the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander to give effect to the provisions of Article 1, and in particular will issue regulations and make appointments in and removals from the public services.
(ii) In emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority is in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander under paragraph (i) of this Article, the latter may, as a temporary and exceptional measure, take such measures as are required by military necessity.
(iii) At the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, the French Military Delegate will take such action under his powers under the State of Siege in accordance with French law as may be necessary.

5. (i) In the interior zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility therefore, including the powers under the State of Siege, will be entirely a matter for the French authorities. Special arrangements will be made between the competent French authorities and the Supreme Allied Commander at the latter's


request in order that all measures may be taken which the latter considers necessary for the conduct of military operations.

(ii) Moreover, in accordance with Article 2 (iii) and (iv), certain portions of the interior zone (known as military zones) may be subjected to a special regime on account of their vital military importance; for example ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes and troop concentration areas. In such zones, the Supreme Allied Commander is given the right to take, or to cause the services in charge of installations of military importance to take, all measures considered by him to be necessary for the conduct of operations and, in particular, to assure the security and efficient operation of such installations. Consistent with these provisions, the conduct of the territorial administration and the responsibility therefor will nevertheless be solely a matter for the French authorities. ♦ ♦ ♦


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