If the difficulties inherent in military government always tend to bring about an ironic discrepancy between initial aims and actual accomplishments, one should be especially prepared for this in cases where, as in the Allied occupation of Italy, the occupants set for themselves aims that are unusually high. The CCS directive to the Allied Commander in Chief implied, and the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 spelled out, the high aim of restoring Italy eventually to the partnership of free nations and of restoring to it as soon as practicable free and democratic institutions. Actually, the conditions of war delayed inevitably-or at least so it seemed to Allied authorities-any substantial return of political freedom, except in the negative sense of elimination of Fascist laws, organizations, and leaders. The aim which was long concentrated upon, especially in the earlier period of occupation, was merely restoration of the ability of Italians to stand as much as possible on their own, administratively. This was indeed a prerequisite for the development of self-governing capacity in a democratic sense. The rehabilitation of Italian administrative ability was, however, dictated more immediately by the fact that the Allies did not have enough trained personnel for administering Italy themselves. It was imperative to make Italians able to do it in such manner as would satisfy at the same time both Allied military needs and Italian elementary civil needs. This task did not prove easy to accomplish, in part for reasons which have an ironic aspect. While transfer of responsibility was both in Italian and in Allied interest, there were more than a few Italians who were reluctant to take on responsibility and there were some Allied officials who were almost equally reluctant to delegate it. In some cases and contexts, higher Allied authority had to remind CAO's that the Italians must be made to stand alone.

The present chapter deals with the earlier effort to rehabilitate Italian self government, in the sense solely of developing administrative competence (the more political phases of the preparation for freedom and democracy being taken up in other chapters). The effort even in this limited sense had so many aspects that an adequate understanding is possible only through study of the documents; all that can be attempted by way of introduction is to outline briefly its general scope and its component phases, to suggest approximately the degree of success or failure, and to indicate a few of the more important factors which determined the outcome. It should be stated first that delegation of responsibility was even more important in its application to Italian central government than to Italian local government and that the concentration of the earliest efforts on local government (indicated in the sequence of the documents) reflected only the fact that relations with the Badoglio government did not become possible till

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more than two months after the invasion of Sicily opened the Italian operation.

The documents concerned with local government illustrate first the efforts to put into successful operation the policy of indirect control, which, as already noted in the documents on the opening phase in Sicily (Chapter VIII), could only be very partially applied until after the combat had died down and replacements had been secured for those Fascist officials who had either fled or by reason of their hostile or otherwise unsuitable character had to be immediately dismissed. Since the system of indirect control meant that Allied officers would leave the direct performance of all civil functions to Italians and would limit themselves to supervision, it could work satisfactorily only if all civil posts were manned by Italians with a reasonable degree of administrative competence. To recognize this is also to understand the difficulty which was experienced by the CAO's in making the system work even after replacements for dismissed officials had been obtained. That Italians in many cases were far from adequate did not at all warrant the inference drawn by some that the Italian as such is not a good administrator. In the pre-Fascist era Italian administration was far more successful than Mussolini gave the world to understand in his aspersions against the democratic system he destroyed; it was in fact the system he introduced which, in its centralizing and anti-individualist tendencies, left Italians, particularly in the more rural areas, less fit for administrative tasks. They were weakened not only in the capacity to comprehend administrative problems but also in the moral fiber required to assume the risks of decision and action. Under

Fascist rule the only safe course was to await orders from above, and it was natural for officials so indoctrinated to imagine that under the Allies too it was much more prudent to be passive than to make decisions which might seem wrong to Allied officers if not also to the officials' fellow-citizens. In the face of administrative catatonia, inefficiency, or petty corruption, many Allied officers were tempted to do the job themselves-until they reminded themselves or were reminded by higher authority that while this course might be the easier in any one case, it would lead, in the aggregate, to an impossible burden. Even the task of supervision strained the relatively few CAO's, and was doubtless one of the reasons why they put more and more effort into implementing the Allied policy of re-establishing the pre Fascist advisory organs of local government and economic cooperation, and, in addition, created communal committees to help cope with such social problems as the reopening of schools. This revival of pre-Fascist institutions (illustrated in the second group of documents dealing with local government) was certainly a gesture in the direction of democracy, but it was not, in its appointive rather than elective basis, democracy, and it served most immediately to draw segments of the citizenry into the counseling and watching of Italian local officials and thus to relieve the CAO's of full responsibility.

However far Italian proficiency in local government might have developed-and considerable progress had been made in even the first few months-the Italian territory under AMG after invasion of the mainland was so great that even the task of supervision, embracing as it did extensive rear as well as combat zones, would soon have become impossible had not the Allies prepared for turning most of it over to a central government. The job of developing Badoglio's government so that it could assume this task in all rear zones rather than merely in the four provinces of King's Italy did not get really under way (for the Allied Military Mission assisted only in especially vital functions) until,

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after the Italian declaration of war, when the Allies decided definitely to support it. The Government was, at the outset, altogether too weak an affair to take on more territory than it already had, and the possibility of transferring additional territory depended not only upon sufficient increments in ministries and personnel, but also upon such help as ACC was activated to give it. But, to the unpaternalistic British at least, it appeared that there was a wrong as well as a right way to help, and, from the overcomplex and overstaffed way ACC looked to them at the outset, they very much feared that ACC would descend upon Brindisi in such large numbers and with such overzealousness that instead of being helped the Italians would be smothered and debilitated. Fortunately, the few accommodations available at Brindisi made it imperative to reduce the ACC liaison detachment to a small number, and if the warning of AC Headquarters against overpaternalism was not itself sufficient deterrent, Badoglio himself gave further warning. He made it clear almost at once that he hoped and expected that ACC personnel would not intrude into every petty matter but would limit themselves to those major issues where advice was appropriate and needed. in the common interest. This stand asserted Italian national pride, but the truth is that AC officials could have considered correctly that their help was needed in almost everything. The situation initially was discouraging, not only in the absence of enough Italians but also in the lack of initiative of those who were on hand. Real progress did not begin until Badoglio, having definitely failed in his efforts to build up a cabinet representative of all major parties (see Chapter XV), decided, with both Italian and Allied approval, to organize merely a temporary government of technical experts who would be replaced when Rome was reached. Even after this decision had been implemented there supervened further delay so far as concerned territorial transfer. Badoglio badly wanted the increased prestige this would give him, but he indeed tended to discourage rather than urge early transfer, for he knew that taking on too much before he was ready would in the end only discredit him.

Near the end of November both he and AC believed he would be ready in another month, but the transfer did not take place on 2o December as planned. This time the delay was due to the fact that the Allies themselves were not ready, in the sense that they could not agree among themselves on the legal method of transfer. That AFHQ and the U.S. War Department debated for almost two months on this question may seem, at first thought, to suggest that once delegation of authority was possible they had inhibitions against it comparable to those of authorities on a lower level. The inhibitions were not, however, analogous, except to the extent that even the highest authorities preferred also to delegate authority only with a very minimum of risk despite the fact that in the matter of delegation versus avoidance of risk one cannot eat one's cake and have it too. But the danger that was feared in this case was not Italian inefficiency but the undue curtailment of rights which seemed essential to the prosecution of the war. Both AFHQ and the War Department wished to avoid such curtailment but they differed with each other on how best to avoid it. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex legal issue one may say that the difference between the two was basically one of premises in respect to the question whether adding to the Italian Government's scope

of administration entailed return of sovereignty and of the rights which the Armistice gave the Allies in occupied as distinguished from originally unoccupied territory. AFHQ believed that such transfer was legally unavoidable, whereas the

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War Department considered that the rights vested by the Armistice in the Allies enabled them to require the Government to do anything anywhere in Italy they wished without changing the status of any territory from occupied to unoccupied. Thus AFHQ proposed to safeguard such rights as the Allies wished to continue enjoying by requiring Badoglio to enter into an agreement reserving those rights to the Allies-an agreement to be kept secret lest it injure Badoglio's prestige with Italians. On the other hand, the War Department, fearing that the secret agreement detracted from Allied rights insofar as it implied a restoration of Italian sovereignty in the territory transferred, wished to have merely a proclamation that the Italian Government entered the new territory without any detraction whatsoever from previous Allied rights there, and would administer it not as sovereign but as agent of the Control Commission. From a purely practical standpoint it may not seem that the War Department was accomplishing anything specific by its greater caution, since at a certain point it admitted that a secret agreement might be desirable and that the one AFHQ had drawn up contained all Allied rights which needed to be reserved-except the purely academic right of continuing legally to be occupant. At any rate, the War Department gave in after AFHQ informed it that Badoglio would probably resign rather than accept a public proclamation that in the transferred territory the Allies would continue to be occupants. The CCS authorized AFHQ to proceed with its original plan except as modified in minor respects; on 9 February, finally, the Allies transferred to the Government Sicily, Sardinia, and all mainland territory south of the borders of Bari Salerno provinces, the only exceptions being certain Italian islands needed for military purposes.

How much the new dispensation would ease the Allied administrative burden depended upon both the Allies and the Italians-upon the Allies insofar as they would be willing to forego the considerable supervision permissible to them even in unoccupied territory, and upon the Italians insofar as they would so effectively assume responsibility as to make it seem unnecessary to the Allies to continue close supervision. At first the outlook was none too promising in either respect. As for the Italian Government, even Italians openly avowed a distrust in the readiness at this stage to administer with sufficient efficiency. As for the Allies, they decided to continue their regional organizations in an advisory capacity, to exercise close supervision over those functions which affected vital Allied interests, and to refrain from immediately reducing Allied personnel at all; indeed, further, they soon added to their supervisory rights by requiring of Badoglio that he submit all senior appointments for Allied approval. When, in the fall of 1944, the Allies announced the New Policy of further relaxing controls, nearly all this seemed retrospectively to be continued paternalism. On the other hand, if it was such there were mitigating circumstances: Italians had at this earlier stage still not become administratively mature, they were without the administrative resources that would become available only with the capture of Rome, and they were so far aware of their incomplete readiness themselves that they tended to ask for the continuation rather than the withdrawal of substantial Allied assistance.

As is indicated by the concluding sections of documents, concerned with the sequel to the first territorial restoration, Allied civil affairs authorities did confine themselves in the new territory to advice, while the Italians performed their broadened task without any fiasco even if with-

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out any brilliance. Further, the Italian Government  and AMG both contributed to a greater coordination of civil affairs in Italy-the Government through adopting AMG by adopting the principles of new Italian legislation in military government territory. Italians were at least on the way toward standing substantially on  their own and the Allies were learning to let them alone.

1. THE CAO'S LEARN TO USE INDIRECT CONTROL

IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANGLO-SAXON OFFICIALS TO SUPERVISE ITALIAN OFFICIALS
[Rodd, SCAO, Enna Province, Rpt to AMGOT Hq, 5 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

2. For so many years now Italian public officials have become so accustomed to shelve responsibility that they have to be forced by threats to assume it. For every action taken they expected an initialed approval by the next man higher up until Rome and Party mandarins were reached. In some cases, and in the beginning, there may have been other motives for their reluctance. Some felt that by doing the minimum required of them and abiding by the strict letter of their instructions, they could escape the charge of cooperation with the enemy in the event of a change in the fortune of war, and yet retain their jobs. It was in this latter belief that they proved most immediately mistaken.

3. It was also not without difficulty that my staff could be persuaded to leave Italian officials alone in the execution of the tasks assigned to them. Inefficiency and petty corruption jangled Anglo-Saxon nerves and susceptibilities, while the limited experience of the officers did not afford them a nice Judgment of the limits within which these would have to be tolerated. There were frequent appeals from the population itself for the redress of grievances or the exercise of the paramount influence of the Allied authority. These were often unjustified, often still dishonest, but occasionally required action. The manner in which intervention or pressure was used had to be carefully watched and was, on my direction, left to myself or one of the more experienced and preferably Italian speaking staff, lest the dignity of the offending Italian became irretrievably undermined.

The third stumbling block for a self reliant Italian bureaucracy is the very large volume of minute direction and detailed inquisition which flows out of AMGOT Headquarters in Palermo. Often the Italian official cannot understand what is expected of him and, as often as not, the departmental officer in the province is in the same boat. He is driven, however, to the conclusion that the inquisition may easily be followed by reproof and that the directives are evidence of a mistrust of his own methods (and is probably justified, in this belief). [See Chapter VII, Section 4, and Chapter VIII, Section 5, on indirect control.]

IT'S WELL TO LOOK OUTSIDE THE CIVIL SERVICE
[Rgn I, Sicily Admin Instrs 4, 30 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/141/4]

4. The selection of officials outside the civil service, although an emergency measure, is warmly recommended, for the choice of public spirited men with personality and universally accepted probity should not only enable the system of indirect rule to be greatly extended, but also infuse into the organs of local government a fresh vitality which is so abundantly needed. ♦ ♦ ♦

AT ALL ODDS THE CIVIL POLICE MUST BE GOTTEN INTO SHAPE
[Hq, AMG, Palermo, Rpt  for Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

(29) The Regional Public Safety Division [Region I, Sicily] came into being at a time when the crime rate and general civil disturbances were on the increase and when the morale of the civil police agencies was at a low ebb as a result of insufficient wages, a rising cost of living, loss of prestige resulting from military occupation and interference with civil police functions, and other attendant circumstances.

(30) One of the basic problems-that of insufficient salaries-was partially solved by General Order No. 14 which granted the adjustment upward of all wages of State employees and, so far as the ordinary rank and file of the police

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organizations was concerned, had the effect of a 70% increase. Even this, however, considering the actual economic conditions existing in the Island, could not be said to produce a wage scale that was really commensurate with the conditions of employment and the duties rendered, or expected to be rendered, by the Police.

(31) The question of increasing the bread ration of the police forces was considered but it was felt that this would probably aggravate the existing discontent, cause prejudice against the police, and bring on pressure from other sources for similar special consideration. Hence, the police continued only to draw the same allowance as all other citizens.

(32) Other general conditions affecting the efficiency of the police were the lack of materials-cloth, leather, etc.-for the replacement of worn-out uniforms and equipment, and lack of mobility, since most means of transportation and, more important, the control over spare parts and tires, were in the hands of the military or of AMG. In order to alleviate the situation the following measures were adopted:
(a) A request was sent through channels to AFHQ for a supply of cloth that could be made into uniforms.
(b) Members of the Carabinieri, Publica Sicurezza and Guardia di Finanza were given priority on the purchasing of any remaining boots or other equipment from the "Unione Militare," through the Property Controller. (c) Provincial Supply Officers were requested to make available any local stocks of leather for the repair or manufacture of shoes for the police. (d) Requisitioning of private motorcycles, cars and trucks for the use of the Carabinieri was ordered. ♦ ♦ ♦

SHIFTING OF RESPONSIBILITY IN SICILY MAKES FURTHER HEADWAY
[Col Spofford, former CofS, Hq AMG, Oct 45, Spofford Rpt, P. 33]

(b) Owing to the shortage of military government personnel and the difficulties of communication generally, it was decided to set up a number of regional Italian agencies to control the appropriate provincial Italian agencies throughout Sicily. This was done in the fields of labor, public welfare, civilian supply, banking, and postal services and prisons. It was believed that upon the transfer of territory a regional commissioner would be appointed to Sicily so that provincial authorities would be responsible to him and not directly to the national government on the mainland with whom they could not communicate.
(c) Early in November the process of withdrawing CAO's and CAPO's from the communes to the provincial capitals was begun. This process of withdrawal was gradual and enabled the communal authorities, particularly the podestas, better to assume the responsibility which they would have to discharge after the transfer of territory. This process had been completed well before February 11.
(d) Every effort was made to impress upon the people the fact that it was their responsibility to govern themselves. Italians who came into the national and provincial headquarters seeking assistance were routed by experienced enlisted men to the appropriate Italian agency and few if any complaints were received by Allied officials except through Italian channels. Provincial orders were frequently issued over the name of the Italian prefect, the order also indicating that it had been approved by the Allied Military Government. In these and other ways efforts were made to push forward the Italian officials so that the people would look upon them and not the Allied Military Government as the proper organs to which to turn in matters of Government. Experience has proved that the above were steps taken in the right direction.♦ ♦ ♦

CONDITIONS ON THE MAINLAND COMPEL EARLY RELIANCE UPON ITALIAN OFFICIALS
[Rpt, Col Spofford, Oct 45, Spofford Rpt, p. 23]

(b) Owing to the large number of small communes spread over a large area and the small number of large cities it was not practical to assign CAO's to particular communes. All CAPO's worked out of provincial headquarters covering an average of twenty communes apiece after the whole territory was occupied.
(c) Since there was little disruption of administration caused by war damage, Cosenza and Reggio being the only towns which were badly hit, and since Marshal Badoglio had already removed the Fascist prefects and replaced them with new non-Fascists, there was nothing to prevent the administration from continuing as theretofore. Accordingly, banks and courts were permitted to remain open if they were already open when the CAO entered the town. This practice proved to be entirely sound and perhaps if it

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had been carried out in those parts of Sicily where there had been little fighting it would have taken a much shorter time to restore the normal life of the areas. ♦ ♦ ♦

CLOSE SUPERVISION BUT NOT OPERATION OF ADMINISTRATION IN NAPLES PROVINCE
[Lt Col James T. Kincaid, SCAO, Naples Province, Report on Activities in Rgn III, 7 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/129/168]

3a. When Naples Province was activated on 23 September 1943, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer instructed all officers assigned to him that actual operation of Italian Government functions would not be undertaken but that close supervision and direction would be maintained with responsibility established. This was stated as an underlying principle and foundation of military government but actual operation was also a physical impossibility due to an acute shortage of both officers and enlisted personnel. The soundness of this instruction was repeatedly emphasized as the occupied portion of Naples Province was extended; for example only one officer was available for assignment in an area covering 27 communes with a combined population of 500,000. It is not felt that operation of Italian Government divisions and departments is to be desired and it is recommended that the policy of supervision and direction with established responsibility be maintained in all future relations. For adequate control and supervision at least twice the officer personnel and three times the enlisted personnel available to this Province should be made available to meet similar conditions that arise in the future. ♦ ♦ ♦

LOCAL OFFICIALS GREATLY FACILITATE ESTABLISHMENT OF AMG IN NAPLES
[Col Hume, SCAO, Rgn III, Rpt, Allied Military Government Region III (Fifth Army), 9 September-15 December 1943 [hereafter cited as Hume Rpt, 9 Sep-15 Dec 43] ACC files, 10000/129/167]

♦ ♦ ♦ It having been learned that a member of Marshal Badoglio's government was in Naples the officers of the Allied Military Government called upon him in the Prefettura. This official, Hon. Leopoldo Piccardi, is Minister of Labor, Commerce, and Industry....

After talking with the heads of the city government, the chiefs of the several police forces operating in the city were called into conference to be given instructions. They were told of our plans for military government of the city, with particular emphasis on the duties of the police. They all assured us of immediate and complete cooperation, and this we received. We gave each policeman accepted for service an armband identifying him as a representative of the Allied Military Government civilian police service. We made it clear that we expected all members of each of the police forces to give his best service to us, and that we would not accept any excuse that a particular type of work was to be given exclusively to any one police organization. ♦ ♦ ♦

Each special staff office (Public Health and Welfare, Economics and Supply, Finance, etc.) called. into conference their parallel Italian officials and directed them to carry on their duties under our supervision. These officers directed these departments of government and constantly made checks to make certain that their orders were carried out. ♦ ♦ ♦

The nature of the position of the Civil Affairs Officer in Naples and the Campania is such that he has met personally nearly all of the important military, civil, religious, and cultural leaders....
During the first week of our occupation contact with the Italians in official position was maintained largely through Signor Leopoldo Piccardi. Piccardi, as the only member of Marshal Badoglio's government actually present, and as it was impossible to communicate with the Marshal or any of his other representatives, was willing to act for his chief in matters of interest to us. His co-operation was unfailing, and did much to assist us in the difficult period of establishing Allied Military Government. The Prefect of Naples, Domenico Soprano, was intensely unpopular on account of his having co-operated with the Germans, particularly in regard to requiring Italians to serve in German labor battalions. It was thought necessary that Soprano be removed. This was done by Piccardi. ♦ ♦ ♦

NAPLES' BANKS ARE SHOWN HOW TO REOPEN SUCCESSFULLY
[Hume Rpt, Allied MG Rgn III (Fifth Army), 9 Sep15 Dec 43]

The bankers were instructed to put their best tellers on the job, to have plenty of money in sight and to do everything possible to instill confidence on the part of the public in the banks. A news article was prepared . . . for publication in the "Risorgimento" (a local newspaper pub-

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lished under the supervision of the P.W.B. [Psychological Warfare Branch]) announcing the opening of the banks and stressing the fact that the public would have a place to deposit their funds in safety, in a further effort to give the public confidence in their banks. A deposit of L. 600,000 was made by AMFA . . . in the Banca d'Italia for the expressly stated purpose of advancing funds, if necessary, to other banks to cover their cash requirements for reopening. Emergency credit loans totaling L. 425,000,000 were granted by the Banca d'Italia to the other banks in Naples city under a credit agreement arranged by the C.F.O., by which bank guarantees thereunder the obligations of all others proportionately to the ratio of its deposits to the deposits of all. By this arrangement, which incidentally was new to Italian bankers, it was not necessary for AMG to make any advances to the banks individually. ♦ ♦ ♦

The banks in Naples city were opened without limitations on withdrawals and the moratorium lifted in Naples City on 30 October....

OTHER ITALIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE ALSO PUT ON THEIR FEET AGAIN
[Financial Div, AMGOT Hq, Monthly Report on AMG Administration for October 1943, Spofford Rpt, ex. X-3-B]

13. An important development during the month in the banking field was the issuance of General Order No. 10, effective 12 October. By this order the provisions of Proclamation No. 5 closing banks and other financial institutions were rescinded, and such banks and institutions were permitted to resume their normal functions without any restrictions as to deposit withdrawals and other obligations to customers, except in the case of the Bank of Italy. The latter was permitted to engage only in (a) Royal Treasury operations, (b) transfers from free credit balances at the request of individuals or persons, (c) payment of its "vaglio cambiari." The requirement that a representative of the AMG be present at the initial opening of safe deposit boxes and at the releasing of articles in safe custody was maintained. By the same General Order, the moratorium established by Proclamation No. 5 was terminated, except as to the Bank of Italy's obligations toward banks and other financial institutions and as to their obligations to the Bank of Italy.

14. The banks are now restored to normal functioning, including the paying of their assegni circolari (circular checks) and vaglia cambiari (also a form of circular checks issued by Banco di Sicilia), but there still remains the question of resumption of service on the government debt, which constitutes a large portion of the assets of all banks. The credits made available to the banks by AMFA will continue outstanding. Not only was no increase in these credit lines necessary, but on the contrary the use of AMFA credit is only a small percentage of the total available. Of total credits of 1,700,000,000 lire, the banks were using at the end of the month only 380,000,000 lire. Following the publication of General Order No. 10, the CFO and AMFA jointly sent to all the banks a letter amending the existing credit agreements by eliminating the previous requirement that cash loaned by AMFA must be used only for payment of withdrawals by depositors; the same letter admonished the banks that in their loaning operations they must exercise caution and avoid speculative loans. The banks are required to furnish to the CFO end-of-the-month balance sheets. ♦ ♦ ♦

ITALIAN BANK OFFICIALS ARE SOMETIMES USED CONTRARY TO REGULATIONS
[Observations and Recommendations, Property Custodian, AMG Rgn III, in MacLean, Liaison, MGS, AFHQ, 17 Jan 44, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

2. a. The section on property custodianship in the volume of AMGOT Rules and Regulations . . . was found in practice to be more honored in the breach than in the observance. Its theory was found neither to jibe with common sense and efficient practice nor to cover most of the problems met.¹

c. They advise the use of the principle of indirect control in functioning of the office since direct control demands a large number of personnel and keeps the controller's eye on detail rather than on large operations and policy. They advise adequate personnel for indirect control which they have not had....

d. . . . All detail in the Naples area was assigned [by Italian Sequestrators] to the Bank of Naples Trust and Accounting Departments. They collected rents, appointed caretakers, arranged for repairs, kept records, and kept and rendered all accounts. The AMG Custodian of

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Property continued this system and found that it worked well. He advises that in future occupations where similar systems are in force, they be retained as otherwise the Navy or Army Civil Affairs will be under necessity of furnishing many officers and enlisted men for property control.

WHEN ARMY AND PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES DO NOT COINCIDE, ITALIAN OFFICIALS MUST BE ACCOMMODATED
[AMG 15th AGp Admin Instrs No. 4, 12 Dec 43, ACC files, 10700/151/2.]

1. With the establishment of Regions in the immediate rear of Army boundaries it becomes necessary to make provision for the indirect government of Provinces and Communes where part of the Province or Commune is in one Region or Army area, and the remainder is in another Region or Army area.

2. The boundaries of Army areas are fixed, wherever possible, to coincide with the boundaries of Italian administrative Provinces or Communes, but military requirements often make this impossible. AMG must, therefore, be organized in such a manner that the wishes of the C.G. or G.O.C. in an area are fully met and also in such a manner that the division of authority between Army areas does not hinder the functions of Italian local government in divided Provinces and Communes.

3. Where a Province or Commune is partly in one Region or Army area and partly in another Region or Army area, the Prefect or Podesta of that Province or Commune will be allowed to exercise his administration over the whole Province or Commune from the usual place of government, or, if such place is not in occupied territory, from the most convenient place for the purpose.

WITH SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED OFFICIALS ONE CANNOT BE TOO SQUEAMISH
[CAO, Monteodorisio, Rpt to SCAO, Chieti Province, 16 Jan 44]

♦ ♦ ♦ The proper administration of governmental affairs is slowly, but surely, being effected. We have been greatly hampered in this work by lack of reliable personnel who have the requisite knowledge of governmental functions. While on this subject it might be well to mention that I have heard rumors that the present Sindaco was a big gambler, unreliable, and not the proper person for the office. There may be some truth in the rumor but, so far, I have been unable to verify it. And, as he is an intelligent person, knows the commune and the people who live here very well, puts forth conscientious effort, I hesitate to recommend any change because I would be unable to find any one in this commune, with anything like his ability, who could replace him. ♦ ♦ ♦

ITALIAN INITIATIVE STILL LEAVES SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED
[ Hq ACC, Rpt for Mar 44 ]

5. Efforts during March to improve the administration of Italian agencies were concentrated largely on attempts to instill initiative into local officials and to get them to assume greater responsibility. Frustration of this objective was encountered in two major aspects: The incompetence of several key officials for whom immediate replacements were not available and the inadequacy of procedure and organization to accomplish a satisfactory job. In spite of this, considerable progress was made in preparing the Italian administrative machine for the assumption of responsibility. ♦ ♦ ♦

PATIENT SUPPORT OF ITALIAN POLICE PAYS DIVIDENDS
[Lt Col Walter Doherty, Chief of Public Safety, AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for May 44, ACC files, 10000/143/320]

4. a. It is remarkable the transformation in the appreciation of the C.C.R.R. [Carabinieri Raeli, the National Police force which formed a part of the Italian Army]. In the early days of the occupation of Italy this body of men were accused of being corrupt and useless generally as civil policemen. By tactful usage, support and combined use with Military Police of the Allied Forces their worth is now deemed invaluable. So much so that there is a general clamor for more and still more C.C.R.R.♦ ♦ ♦

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2. AMG REVIVES INSTITUTIONS WHICH DEVELOP LOCAL GOVERNMENT

THE FIRST STEP IN POLITICAL REVIVAL IS TO ALLOW CRITICISM OF AMGOT 
[Rennell, Rpt to GOCinC, 15th AGp, 21 Aug 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (1)]

4. I have directed INC generally speaking to allow "Sicilia Liberata" considerable freedom in editorial notes and articles in conformity with my directions regarding freedom of speech and press. Some of these comments have from time to time taken the form of mild criticism of AMGOT orders and provisions. One of these, commenting on the difficulty of paying taxes as prescribed by AMGOT orders with absence of banking facilities aroused the ire of my Financial division. I informed my Finance Officers and also told the editors that I took no exception to such comments which were both justified and healthy. The two editors were distinctly surprised and are, I think, still wondering what has happened. I asked them to take certain lines in their comment to the public which they will do: I want them in particular to warn the public not to expect too much too quickly and to offer constructive criticism to AMGOT: ♦ ♦ ♦

AMGOT OFFICIAL SUGGESTS SETTING UP SMALL COMMUNAL COUNCILS
[Directive, Rodd to All Concerned, 6 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

♦ ♦ ♦  I think it is . . . desirable that, with the fatherly blessing if not the official approval of AMGOT which cannot make constitutional changes yet, a small council be set up in each commune to assist the mayor, take some of the responsibility off his shoulders and explain the necessity of unpopular measures to their constituents. The councils may vary from three to nine in membership. C.A.O.'s need not consult me before setting them up but should be guided by the following suggestions:

(a) Representatives from a number of different classes and interests should be included.
(b) Consult the priests and the doctor, though you need not necessarily follow their recommendations.
(c) Try and get one of the more intelligent small farmers on to the council.
(d) The schoolmaster often makes a useful member and acts as liaison officer with mothers of large families.

COMMITTEES FOR OPENING SICILIAN SCHOOLS WILL BE FORMED ALSO
[Directive, AMGOT Hq to SCAO's, 14 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/144/30]

Before the schools can be opened much spadework will have to be done. It is necessary to estimate the extent of the damage to school buildings, and what buildings are available, and to work out systems for excluding pro-Fascist teachers and text books.

At the outset, therefore, committees are to be formed in each province.
The following will inform S.C.A.O.'s of the guiding principles to be observed in forming these committees. (As a reminder, it should be pointed out that these committees are not concerned with Church Schools.)

The committees should include approved representatives of the Provincial Educational authority (Provveditorato agli studi). In order, however, to begin developing a democratic tradition, the deliberations should not rest solely in the hands of these officials, who have in the past been completely under centralized control. Half the committee should consist of other, and purely provincial, interests. Among these are such as representatives of the universities, the more important schools and colleges, private schools, and societies and organizations concerned with educational and cultural problems. ♦ ♦ ♦

PRE-FASCIST LOCAL ORGANS AND DEMOCRATIC TITLES ARE REVIVED
[Sicily, Rgn I, Admin Instrs 4, 30 Oct 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. IV, J-1 ]

1. In order to restore Provincial and Municipal Administration to a pre-Fascist level and in the interests of uniformity the following instructions are laid down for immediate application in each individual province.

2. When the post of Prefect is vacant and a suitable civil service career official of the necessary grade and qualifications is not available an Acting Prefect must be nominated who, besides the requisite capabilities, should have a suitable political background. The same principle applies if a vacancy exists for a Vice-Prefect and no suitable career official is available to fill the appointment.

3. In both instances nominations, supported by information for guidance, are to be submitted to

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the Regional Civil Affairs Officer for transmission through channels for approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. The organs of local government which are to be revived in consultation with the Prefect are the following:
    Consiglio di prefettura which is composed of the Prefect or his substitute, who presides, and two senior Councillors of the Prefecture. Its powers and functions are regulated by specific laws and the Prefect may request the opinion of the Council on any matter. Included in its functions is the approval of accounts of communes and charitable institutions.
    Giunta Provincials Amministrativa: The formation and functions of this body are regulated by a series of laws and regulations which date from 1865. It is composed of ten members with the Prefect or his substitute as President, and includes from the Prefecture, two Consiglieri, a Deputy Prefect-Inspector and the Chief Accountant. The remaining members are chosen from experts in legal, administrative or technical affairs, nominated by the Prefect and approved by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer acting for AMG. Deputazione Provinciale: Replaces the Rettorato. The Deputazione consists of a President and unpaid members nominated by the Prefect and approved by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer on behalf of AMGOT. The President is also head of Provincial Administration....

7. Communal Administration is to be regulated in the following manner:
    Sindachi: In place of Podesti the democratic title of sindaco (mayor) must be universally adopted. As it is not possible to apply the electoral system at the present time, new appointments or changes where necessary will be made by the Prefect who will issue the regular decree after consideration of any nominations submitted by Senior Civil Affairs Officers.
    Segretario Comunale: (Town Clerk) :-This official is a civil servant and cannot be appointed mayor, nor be lightly dismissed. The Prefect has full power to effect transfers, retirements, and appointments of Town Clerks and changes should be effected only through him under the standing procedure which must be closely followed. Giunta Comunale: Normally this body would be selected by the consiglio comunale from amongst its own members duly elected by public ballot. Under present emergency conditions, the Giunta Comunale is to be nominated by the mayor with the concurrence of Senior Civil Affairs Officers or local Civil Affairs Officers and the appointments confirmed by the Provincial Prefect. ♦ ♦ ♦

8. In the selection of the members of the above agencies, consideration should be given to various shades of political opinion, excluding extremists, and labor and agriculture must be adequately represented.

9. It will be found that local officials are fully conversant with the legislation and procedure in regard to local government bodies, and can act upon Senior Civil Affairs Officers' directives for the rapid execution of this order.

10. In conformity with the above, from now onwards, all Provincial and Communal Decrees and Orders must be issued in the name of the Prefect or local Mayor respectively and bear only the "VISTO" of the Senior Civil Affairs Officer concerned. ²

TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ISSUED FOR APPOINTING FUNCTIONARIES
[Sicily Rgn Official Order 25, I t Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/141/4]

Whereas the Unified Text of Municipal and Provincial laws approved by Royal decree of 3 March 1934, no. 385, concerning the composition and functions of the Provincial and Municipal administrations, do not conform to the new political situation, necessary changes have to be made. Bearing in mind the Unified Text of Municipal and Provincial laws approved by Royal decree of 3 February 1915, no. 148, as those which better respond to liberal and democratic ideas, and Whereas it is not possible at present to hold administrative elections which would mean applying in full the Unified Text of the law of 3 February 1915 no. 148;

Considering', therefore, the necessity of issuing temporary regulations in order that the Communal and Provincial Administrations may function, since those rules contained in above mentioned Unified Text cannot be applied;

Considering that the Unified Text of 1915 contains regulations which consent exceptionally the substitution of the Council of Aldermen to Town Council and the Provincial Delegation to Provincial Council, at the present moment they may be given general terms;

Whereas, therefore, exceptionally, and as a temporary measure it is only necessary to issue regulations for the appointment of Mayors, Council of Aldermen, President of the Provincial Administration and of the Provincial Delegation;

In virtue of the power conferred on me, I, Charles Poletti, Lt. Colonel, Regional Civil Affairs Officer,

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Order

1. The Mayor is appointed by the Prefect subject to approval of the Allied Military Government.
2. The Council of Aldermen is appointed by the Prefect, subject to the authorization of the Allied Military Government.
3. Each Province has a President and a Provincial Deputation.
4. The President is the head of the Provincial Administration and President of the Provincial Delegation.
5. The President is appointed by the Prefect subject to the approval of the Allied Military Government.
6. The members of the Provincial Delegation are appointed by the Prefect subject to approval by the Allied Military Government.
7. Until such time as the Town and Provincial Councils are constituted the Town Council will be substituted by the Council of Aldermen and the Provincial Council by the Provincial Delegation who will retain all the other powers attributed to them by the aforementioned Unified Text of Municipal and Provincial laws of 1915.
8. To the grounds for ineligibility established by the Unified Text of 1915 are added the following: No one is eligible to the office of Mayor, Alderman, President of the provincial administration and delegation, or Provincial Delegate, if they have held an office in the Fascist Party.
9. All other regulations of the Unified Text of the Provincial and Communal laws approved by Royal decree of 3 February 1915, no. 148, remain in force provided they are not in contrast with the present order or with special rulings issued or to be issued by the Allied Military Government.
10. In the application of the dispositions contained in the above articles, and for doubtful cases of a general character rulings will be issued by the Allied Military Government.

REPRESENTATIVE COMMERCIAL CHAMBERS ARE ESTABLISHED IN SICILY
[Sicily Rgn Official Order 44, 7 Dec 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. IV, J-2]

♦ ♦ ♦  Art. 1) There is instituted the Union of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture of Sicily, which will have its headquarters in Palermo.
Art. 2) The union (of the Sicilian Chambers) is a public agency which has the function of representing, co-ordinating and guarding the economic interests of the commerce, industry, labor and agriculture of the entire Region, and assuring and promoting its development in the field of national economy. Furthermore, it is a consultant agency of the administration of the State for all questions concerning commerce, industry, labor and agriculture.
Art. 3) The organs of the union are the Permanent Committee of the Presidents, and the General Council of the Sicilian Chambers.³  . . .

PROGRESS ON MAINLAND IS SLOWER
[AMG Hq, Report for December 43 on AMG Administration, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

21. Local government in Region II has progressed more slowly [than in Sicily] in part due to the fact that the territory is sparsely settled and communication is poor. Catanzaro was the only province which had a giunta or similar body on which the citizenry were presented. The giuntas in the other provinces consisted of office holders sitting ex-officio. Progress in Reggio, due to the fighting and the distance separating it from regional headquarters, and in Salerno, which is loaded down with troops and was the scene of much destruction, has been slow.

DEMOCRACY CANNOT BE RESTORED WHILE A WAR IS ON
[Memo, Benson, Officer Comdg, AMG, Eighth Army, for AMG, 15th AGp, 25 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1097]

♦ ♦ ♦  There is undoubtedly a feeling of dissatisfaction amongst the people particularly in the back areas that the "political choice" which they have been promised is not eventuating as quickly as they hoped. This feeling is accentuated probably by the fact that the form of government which we are using is still totalitarian in fact, though we profess that it is not in theory. For example, the Prefect is still the dominating figure in the province and his decision as regards appointments of podestas are those which are and should be listened to. You will therefore find that a violently anti-Communist prefect will be influenced in his appointments by his political views, which is inevitable until such time as elections can be held. This is impossible in an operational zone, particularly as elections in this country will almost certainly lead to serious demonstrations.

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BUT INFORMAL COMMUNAL COUNCILS CREATE A BETTER FEELING
[Capt M. S. McGaw, CAO, Vasto, Rpt to SCAO, Chieti Province, 12 Feb 44, ACC files, 10507/115/23]

♦ ♦ ♦ a better understanding of the problems between the military and the civilians is afforded by meetings of the AMG officials with the Sindaco and his committee of citizens. A great improvement in feeling between the various groups concerned has resulted. ♦ ♦ ♦

COUNCILS MUST BE SET UP WITH CIRCUMSPECTION
[Memo, Capt C.G.R. Williams, Interior Subcom, to Dir, Interior Subcom, 10 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/141/2]

1. After Lieutenant Lewis' lecture today, on the Giunta Municipale today [sic], Lord William W. B. Stansgate [Vice President, Administration Section, ACC] raised a general discussion. Among other things he asked if any of the officers present had actual experience of setting up such a body and how they had proceeded.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Morton (A) said that when he was a forward CAO, Fifth Army he had set up a similar body in the Commune of Sessa, on the Garigliano. He felt the need of an advisory Committee to be composed of the leading citizens, regardless of their political views so long as they were men of integrity. He first got the Sindaco and the Segretario Communale to suggest some names. He then got these men to suggest others. He also got the opinion of each man upon the others who had been proposed. He took the ten who were most highly thought of and constituted them his advisory Committee. This process took him a week. He first had this ten "vetted" by FSS and the CCRR. He found the Committee very helpful. He does not know if his successor continued it. ♦ ♦ ♦

THE PRE-FASCIST CITY COUNCILS ARE REVIVED IN NAPLES PROVINCE
[Msg. Mason-MacFarlane to State Dept, 13 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

... In conformity with a regional order of the Allied Military Government, dated 15 March 1944 providing for a gradual restoration of local self-government abolished under the Fascist regime, a council of aldermen representing "the various political tendencies of the community, Labor, Agriculture, Industry, and the Professions" was installed in Naples on 12 May. The council will act in an advisory capacity to the mayor of Naples, Gustavo Ingresso. Its members were appointed by the Prefect of Naples Province, Francesco Selvaggi, with the approval of the Allied Military Government. It is pointed out that the establishment of the Neapolitan City Council is merely one of a series of similar councils established in other parts of the three provinces of AMG Region III.

DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT A PRIMARY DUTY OF ALLIED OFFICIALS
[Min of Remarks by Lush at Conf of RC's, 31 May 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

♦ ♦ ♦  Brigadier Lush said that he had noted in the reports given by Regional Commissioners at the previous day's meeting very little reference to the progress of local government. He asked Regional Commissioners to remember that the development of local government, the only basis of sound administration, was the primary duty of Regional Commissioners. The economic problems would be often more obvious and clearly most important but they should not be allowed to exclude attention to the administrative side of Regional work. ♦ ♦ ♦

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER TWENTY YEARS
[Memo, History of Local Government Sub-Commission, by Capt Ralph R. Temple, Actg Dir, Local Govt Subcom, 30 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/141/470]

♦ ♦ ♦ To appreciate the nature of the work of the Subcommission, it is necessary to have in mind that, under the Fascist regime, previously existing democratically elected bodies, which functioned somewhat on the lines of the British and American system, were abolished. ''

One of the first things that had to be done, therefore, was to abolish this system which did not countenance interference with the executive by any other body and replace it with one which restored as much of pre-Fascist democratic rule as war conditions warranted. [For offices and agencies to be restored, see Instrs No. 4, 30 October 1943, above.]

♦ ♦ ♦ For the first time in over 20 years, the man in the street played a part in the destiny of his town or province, without fear of reprisals. The office of the Prefect was retained as was the position of mayor, the democratic pre-Fascist title of "Sindaco" being revived to replace the Fascist one of "Podesta." ♦ ♦ ♦

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3. ACC STARTS A JOB WHICH CALLS FOR PATIENCE

LET'S NOT ENCUMBER THEM WITH TOO MANY SUPERVISORS
[Ltr, Maxwell, Deputy Chief, MGS, to Macmillan, Br Resident Minister, 16 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/36]

♦ ♦ ♦ All three Generals from their separate points of view are equally anxious about the proposals made in recent telegrams from Military Government Section for the constitution of the Allied Commission. From the political point of view, I feel bound to sound two notes of warning. First, any large army of experts here in the period before Rome is reached or a proper government formed will either do nothing useful or, if they are active, will overwhelm the present administration.⁴  As General Taylor has indicated in his telegrams from here, what are wanted are a top-notch man or two and one or two assistants who will stay here permanently and inspire and sustain such governmental machine as exists. Secondly, in the period after Rome has been reached and a broad based government, we hope, got going, I doubt if an Armistice Commission of some six hundred officers will be found to be a workable proposition. Certainly, it is more than doubtful whether prominent anti-Fascists will agree to serve for any length of time in a government which will in effect only be a colonial administration. Won't they say that they have not waited over 20 years to be pushed about by graduates from Tizi Ouzou? On this point we come back to General Alexander's aphorism: "Have we come to free or to enslave Europe?" May we not find it more profitable from the military as well as political point of view to choose the former? ♦ ♦ ♦

GETTING ACC STARTED EVEN MODESTLY IS NOT EASY
[Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM, to Eisenhower, 28 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/4]

This is a short report of progress up to date.

1. Getting the Commission started. The principal difficulties to be overcome are:
a. The fact that the Italians have no central government organization in being here with which the experts on the various subcommissions can usefully deal.
b. The fact that it will be necessary to arrange for adequate telegraph and telephone communications for the Italian administration if it is to function smoothly.

As regards accommodating the Commission here we have made several reconnaissances and it will be quite possible to fit them in between Brindisi and Lecce which is quite sufficiently near at hand.

I have explained exactly what we want to do to Badoglio, [Guido] Jung and Piccardi. They are all out to help and co-operate and naturally appreciate the prospect of taking over the administration of Southern Italy south of the northern boundary of the Prefectures of Salerno, Potenza and Bari.

I have impressed upon them the urgency of calling at once to Brindisi all the best available experts to get a proper central administration running and to provide qualified executives with whom the branches of our Commission will be able to function.

The main difficulty in getting the existing Italian Government to function fully and properly at the moment is not so much the problem of broadening the basis and increasing the numbers of the ministers but the fact that Badoglio and the King are obviously inclined to think that it is not worthwhile making any great efforts until we get to Rome which they still imagine will happen in the near future.

I talked about this to General Alex[ ander ] who did not in the meantime wish me to pass on his views on the subject to Badoglio. On the other hand unless I can make it clear to Badoglio that there is at least a strong possibility that in the present campaign we may not reach Rome I very much doubt his really getting down to it and producing here the central government adminis-

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tration which will be essential if the Italians are to take control of Italy south of our forward Army areas. ♦ ♦ ♦

I am most anxious to get the Commission started as soon as practicable but as I have already explained it will be difficult to do this usefully until the Italians get better organized in Brindisi and until I can get the communications problem solved. I am taking November 12th as my target date so that everyone will have a definite date to which to work. In the meantime, I am not communicating this date to the Italians as it may well be that, particularly on the legal side in respect of the transfer from AMGOT to Italian plus Commission control, there may be unforeseen difficulties. ♦ ♦ ♦

You will see from all the above that the problem is none too easy and exactly how much of the Commission will be able to function usefully remains to be seen. That the entire Commission, the establishment of which was based on the assumption that we would be working with a full Italian Government machine installed in Rome, can be usefully employed in the meantime is at least extremely doubtful.

I have discussed the question of making the handing over of control to the Italians from AMGOT conditional upon a broadening of the Government by Badoglio with Murphy and Macmillan and they agree with me that this is hardly necessary. If I am to get this show running reasonably soon and smoothly I want to work to as early a target date as may be practicable and we do definitely know that Badoglio is clearly doing his best to broaden the basis of his Government on the lines we desire. ♦ ♦ ♦

ACC IS INSTRUCTED ON OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES
[Directive, AFHQ to Joyce, 1 Nov 43, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

12. Measures are now being taken to bring the Allied Control Commission into operation at the seat of the Italian Government, and to develop the Italian Government to the point where territory at present under Allied Military Government may be placed under its administration. This will involve the following steps:
a. A small party, composed of officers from certain of the Subcommissions, has been dispatched to Brindisi. This group joining with the members of the military mission will be organized into the advance command post of the Allied Control Commission. Through these representatives the Commission will establish contact with the Italian Government and begin the preliminary examination of immediately pressing questions. One task will he to commence planning for the transfer of territory to Italian administration, which will, however, be subject to the guidance and supervision of the Allied Control Commission.
b. . . . Headquarters Allied Military Government at Palermo, now under command of this Headquarters, will be transferred to your command. When you are prepared to have Headquarters AMG brought under command you will notify this Headquarters.
c. The Italian Government will continue broadening its political composition and strengthening its administration structure.
d. When it is determined that the Italian governmental system is in condition, politically and administratively, to be entrusted with the responsibility, the transfer of areas will be undertaken, on order from AFHQ. When you consider that the time has arrived for such transfer, in part or in whole, you will advise this Headquarters.

16. Certain considerations should be observed in order that no precedent may be created prejudicial to the United Nations or the Allied Control Commission. Long-range commitments should be avoided except on instructions from the Allied Commander in Chief. You are acting through and upon the Italian Government, and are not yourself assuming the government of the liberated territory. Allied officers should not allow themselves to be drawn into any discussions as to whether the Italian Government is legally competent to do what is required of it. It is a domestic question, in which in general we are not interested, by what particular measures the Italian authorities give effect to our demands. It is for them to decide upon the appropriate form of internal action and prepare draft documents. Major documents should be submitted to the Commission, in order that errors and implications prejudicial to the United Nations may be detected. In proper cases you would consult this Headquarters before concurring. The representatives of the Allied Governments should not thrust the Italian authorities aside and frame their measures for them, but should have control over important acts before they are taken.

17. The operations of the Allied Nations throughout Italian territory must be free from any restraint, regulation, taxation, public charge

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or other impediment. No Italian Court shall be allowed, without the consent of the Allied Commander in Chief, to exercise jurisdiction over any member of the Allied Forces or person accompanying such forces, or over any officials of one of the Allied Nations. If complaint is made to you of the conduct of any member of the Allied Forces you should call upon the complainant to substantiate the charge with a statement of particulars, in order that any disciplinary action found necessary may be taken.

18. The members of the Commission, whether acting officially or otherwise, should maintain a correct attitude toward members of Italian Government, neither autocratic on the one hand nor familiar on the other. They should bear in mind that the provisional arrangements between the Allied Governments and that of Marshal Badoglio are dictated by war needs and are not to stand in the way of the Italian people, after the elimination of Fascism and the eviction of the German Forces, having a government of their free democratic choice. In the meantime it is important that there be built up an anti-Fascist Government on the broadest base possible. It is desirable that all healthy elements which can deliver some good be rallied to the common effort. The success of the plan to entrust the Italian authorities with the administration of Italian territory under supervision of the Allied Commission is dependent upon the development of an Italian Government on whose intentions and ability the Allied Governments can rely.

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE TOLD OF THE LIMITS OF ITS JURISDICTION
[Ltr, Joyce, Deputy President, ACC, to Marshal Badoglio, 18 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/63]

Two reports, one from the Headquarters, 15th Army Group and one from Allied Military Government in Naples, indicate that certain appointments are being made in territory under the jurisdiction of the Military Governor without prior consultation with the Allied authorities. It is clear that there has been some misunderstanding in this respect, since insofar as territory administered by the Allied Military Government is concerned, the General Officer Commanding in Chief is the Military Governor and is responsible for the administration and for officials engaged in the administration. ♦ ♦ ♦

I should be grateful if Your Excellency will issue the necessary instructions to prevent any such moves being carried out without prior consultation with the appropriate Allied Authorities.⁵

IF ONLY THEY'D GET DOWN TO WORK
[Min of Conf Between the Italian Under Secy for Education and the Education Advisers of ACC, 25 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/999]

I. What were his plans for the Ministry? Answer: First of all he said that none were formulated. But later he made the points: that his purpose would be to re-establish the honest character of education, to get rid of Fascist influence, and to return to where education would have been had Fascism not intervened.

IIA. How soon would he have a ministry capable of taking over the educational administration now being carried on from Palermo? First answer: Only when he reached Rome. Second answer: Nothing definite could be given before Wednesday, I December, when he would have had a chance to consult with the Marshal.
He was asked to make his answers under two headings-How soon, etc., from now, and how soon after the move to Sorrento. ⁶

IIB. After further conversation he was asked to give at hazard a date, without binding himself until he had had time (until next Wednesday) to consult the Marshal, when he would have a Ministry. Answer: 25 December. His further talk on this point showed, however, that he did not mean a working Ministry, but an assemblage who would begin to plan with him. ITC. On being further pressed to clear this point, he said that the whole matter was a vicious circle. He could not get his Ministry together until they had control of the territory, but they could not have control of the territory until they had a working Ministry! He then asked that we continue to run education until Rome was taken (despite the return of the King to power) in order to give him the opportunity of making a working administration. He was told that he must not assume that this request would be agreed to by us.♦ ♦ ♦

When asked what were his plans for the internal working organization of the Ministry,

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he was unable to answer effectively. It seemed to us that he had given no adequate thought to the matter. He asked our advice, in the light of our experience, and he promised to give a more considered opinion on Wednesday, 1 December. ♦ ♦ ♦

He left us with the impression that his mind was not clear, and that he was anxious to have help from us, and that he had no sense of urgency. He stated that for 20 years he had been out of public life as an anti-Fascist, and had only come back now as a patriot to serve his King and country.

DON'T SUPERVISE US BEYOND ALL REASON
[Transl of Ltr, Badoglio to Joyce, 28 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/36]

♦ ♦ ♦ It . . . seems to me that intervention on the part of the [ACC] sections should be limited to questions of general interest, and not to supervise the daily and current routine. If in order to transfer a clerk or pay a salary or admonish a lazy employee we are to be under the control of the section, 1 believe utter confusion will result. ♦ ♦ ♦

NEITHER BRINDISI NOR SALERNO AFFORDS ADEQUATE FACILITIES
[Memo, Rennell, 3 Dec 43. ACC files, 10000/136/62]

♦ ♦ ♦ Much of the difficulties which have arisen sprang from the remoteness and squalor of Brindisi. General [Mason-] MacFarlane had recognized from the outset the necessity of moving the Italian Government from Brindisi; General Joyce accepted this doctrine. But much time was wasted by everyone concerned waiting for Rome to fall. Naples, where the dissident democrats like Sforza had congregated, was vetoed by the consideration that Naples had to remain an AMG area until another port on the west coast could take its place as a main supply base since it was not possible to allow Naples to be taken over by any such vapid and synthetic Italian Government as could be maintained at this stage. . . . Eventually with end of December, [it was decided] to move the Italian Government and the Commission to Salerno. Much time must, however, elapse before the move can be effected owing to the delay in clearing accommodations and making available adequate communication facilities.

[Transl of Ltr, Vito Reali, Minister of the Interior, o Col. Cyril B. Spicer, Dir, Interior Subconi Sec, 15 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/141/470]

I beg to inform you by this letter that, in consequence of the present lack of space, there is no possibility of preparing even one room which can be used eventually as an office for the Liaison Officer of the Interior Subcommission.

IN SOME SPHERES NOTABLE PROGRESS Is GRADUALLY MADE
[Agriculture Subcom, ACC, Rpt for Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/109/825]

The Subcommission is . . . pressing forward with the work started last November with the Ministry, then located in and confined to Apulia, King's Italy, to replace the top-heavy and cumbersome group of corporate organizations in Agriculture which grew up under the Fascist system and which were the basis of all production and distribution control of Italian Agriculture, with a simplified, straight line organization, manned by men technically trained and with administrative responsibility, running down from the Minister through the Compartments, Provinces, and the Communes.

Many of the confederations, Ente Economici and syndicates which formed the basis of Italian agriculture have been abolished or have become inactive in the regions formerly under AMG control.

After a thorough study of the whole Italian organization in Agriculture under the Fascist regime by members of this Subcommission in cooperation with those officials responsible for the agricultural set-up under the Badoglio Government it was decided that the system of vertical Enti's and syndicates, each separate and distinct with many officials 'and employees and with taxing power as well as certain political functions, would be eliminated and these organizations returned to the principle of an educational and service institution for farmers. Early in December 1943 a broad outline of the plan for the new setup of the Ministry was worked out with the then Minister, Tanasso Siciliani. . . . Some progress was being made on this reorganization but there was hesitancy upon the part of the Minister to take, especially in Apulia which was then the only portion of Italy under the Italian Government, the drastic steps necessary to abolish the maze of Enti's and organizations and eliminate the large body of personnel employed by them.♦ ♦ ♦

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[Hq ACC, Rpt for May 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

27. . . . Following close on the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and the announcement of the programme for collecting wheat and barley last month, activity has been intensified through the Subcommission and the Ministry of Agriculture to develop the necessary directives which will make possible the implementation of the collection decree, for the general co-ordination and broad supervision of the collection program. Reports from the field indicate that the Communal and Provincial Committees in most provinces are functioning and declarations are being completed....

IN OTHER SPHERES ACC CAN ONLY MAKE THE BEST OF A BAD SYSTEM
[Finance Subcom, ACC, Interim Rpt, 11 Jan 44, Spofford Rpt, ex. 4-R]

4. The Italian Ministry of Finance strongly believes that it is politically impossible at this time to make the basic changes which are necessary in the existing tax-structure and tax-collection machinery. So far, our main task in the revenue field has been to get the most out of the present tax system. This has meant re-building revenue staffs, securing the necessary paper and printing facilities, and making minor changes in the existing tax structure... ⁷

[Finance Subcom, ACC, Final Rept. 16 May 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

8. . . . Once territory reverted from AMG to the Italian Government, the Allied Commission adopted the policy of advising the Italian Government but not of enforcing orders. For example, one of the earliest policy problems to confront the Finance Subcommission arose, in November 1943, at Brindisi, when the Italian Government presented its first statement of proposed expenditures. The Chief of Staff of ALCOM [Allied Commission, Italy] ruled at that time that the Italian Government would not be ordered to reduce certain expenditures, and from then on the Italian Government had complete budgetary freedom. ⁸

[Ltr, Labor Subcom, ACC, to Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor, 14 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/146/19]

1. This Memorandum is submitted as a statement of the present working relationship of the Labor Subcommission with the Ministry. If the Ministry is not in full agreement with the statements made herein, it is requested that a prompt report be made in order that a complete accord may be reached.

2. As a matter of policy, it is understood that the Ministry will not make any changes in laws, decrees, ordinances or policies affecting labor or labor organizations, and will not make any major personnel changes or any changes in personnel appointed by Allied Military authorities without prior approval of the Labor Subcommission. In addition, the Ministry will keep the Subcommission advised of any labor shortages, disputes, or programs which may affect work being performed for the Allied Military Forces, or which may affect labor policy in areas now under direct control of the Allied Military Forces.

To facilitate the clearance of these matters, a Liaison Officer for the Labor Subcommission is stationed at ACC Rear Headquarters, and will visit the Ministry regularly each day.

IN QUANTITY IF NOT ALWAYS IN QUALITY BADOGLIO'S CIVIL SERVICE GROWS
[Finance Subcom, ACC, Rpt for Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/105/175]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Ministry now has a staff of approximately 100. The size of the staff is slowly growing, but the capacity of the persons employed shows little improvement. As a result of the inadequacy and incapacity of personnel, most financial problems must be handled by the Minister himself. ⁹  ♦ ♦ ♦

A LARGE PANOPLY OF SUBCOMMISSIONS ENTERS INTO ACTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT
[ACC Rpt to Advisory Council for Italy, Functions of the ACC and Its Relations With the Italian Government, ¹⁰  25 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/268]

Interior Subcommission

Supervises the working, defascistisation and reorganization of the internal administration of

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Italy (i.e., the Ministry of Interior and provincial and communal authorities). It also arranges for the preparation and dispatch of teams of senior Italian officials to reorganize the administration of newly, liberated provinces and is in almost daily contact with the Ministry of Interior on these matters.

Is concerned with the Italian Police, Prisons, Fire and Civil Defense Services. In Regions and Army areas it is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the efficient functioning of these Services. At Headquarters, liaison is maintained with:
Minister of Interior on Civil Police, Fire, Civil Defense and control of civilian movement. Minister of justice on Prisons and Prosecutions. Minister of Communications on registration and licensing of vehicles.
Royal Carabinieri and Royal Finance Guards on Police.
Allied Force (P.M. [Provost Marshal] and Security Section) on Police and Security matters.

Is responsible for all phases of the care of health of the Italian public and the prevention or control of outbreaks of epidemics or diseases of all kinds: it supervises the work of the Italian Health Officials and the reorganization of medical and welfare services: it advises as to diet scales: organizes the supply and distribution of medical supplies, the manufacture of medicines and the production of sera and vaccines. It is also concerned with the prevention and control of the diseases of animals. For these purposes it consults frequently with the appropriate Health and Veterinary Officers of the Ministry of the Interior.

Advises the Chief Commissioner, his staff and Subcommissions on Legal matters; prepares proclamations, general orders and directives implementing Italian legislation; operates and supervises the Allied Military Courts; supervises the administration of justice by Italian courts; peruses, criticises and negotiates amendments of such Italian legislation as may affect the work of ACC; maintains liaison with the Italian Minister of Justice for these purposes.

Purges text books and personnel of Fascism, restores schools and academies to routine operation to return them as normal as possible to the Italian Government. Maintains liaison with the Minister of Public Instruction on epuration, appointments and transfers to the senior posts in both Universities and Schools and revision and printing of books for the schools.

So far as operations allow protects and preserves the art, monuments, objects, etc., of Italy and renders first aid to those monuments damaged by the passage of war. It collects information with regard to the displacement of works of art either through wartime dispersal, enemy theft or illegal sale. It co-operates with the Italian Ministry of Public Instruction and with the President of the Pontifical Commission for Sacred Art.

Protects and controls the property and assets in Italy owned by nationals of the United Nations and France, and under certain conditions it may take charge of abandoned property, property of enemy states and of the Italian Government (including semi statal and Fascist organizations). Liaison in these matters is maintained with the Italian Ministries of the Treasury, Finance and Corporations.

Formulate policies and plans for revival of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, to secure maximum production of these industries and provide administrative supervision of operations of Italian Ministry of Agriculture.

Advising and assisting appropriate organizations and agencies of Italian Government on administering and reviving the commercial economy of the country. Administering control of prices of all non-subsistence commodities and rationing and control of goods, etc. on short supply. Responsible for exports.

Initiates and develops in conjunction with Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Treasury, Bank of Italy, Social Insurance Institutions, etc., policies, plans and procedures for restoration and maintenance of ordered financial and economic conditions, stabilized currency, and anti-inflation measures. Controls Italian Financial Institutions.

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Maintains records as to Italian indebtedness to Allied Nations and vice versa.

Advises and directs, and exercises administrative supervision over Italian Government on equitable food distribution by price controls and rationing systems and controlling distribution of essential imported foodstuffs and local food supplies.

Formulates recommendations as to policies and plans concerning Italian industrial production, re-activation of normal exporting industries and rehabilitation of essential industries. Maintaining close liaison with Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labour and supervises execution by Italian Government of instructions from A.C.C.

Supervises the policy, organization and administration of all labour activities and exercising controls essential to the needs of the Allied war effort. Advising Italian Government on revision of Italian Labour legislation, formation of free association of employers and employees and for arbitration between them. Supervises all activities of labour exchanges.

Assumes responsibility from Armed Forces for reconstruction and maintenance of roads and bridges, maintenance and repair of power plants, pumping installations, etc. Through Italian agencies arranges for rehabilitation, reconstruction or repair of public works, public utilities (electricity, gas, water, etc.). Advises and exercises supervision over Ministry of Public Works.

Co-ordinates in conjunction with the competent authorities and G-4 Movements and Transportation Subcommission matters referring to the use of all Italian vessels in the movement of service or civilian cargoes. Supervises the working of the Italian ship operating committee known as Cogena. Liaison with the Mediterranean Shipping Board.

Arranges with MRS [Military Railway Service] rail transport to meet essential civil needs in areas under Army control. In other areas exercises supervisory and advisory duties to insure maximum use of limited rail and road facilities. Planning and liaison with Italian Ministry of Communications on future needs and policy of shipping in coastal waters and inland waterways. In conjunction with Italian Government, control and distribution of coal.

4. THE FIRST RESTORATION OF TERRITORY AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES CAUSE POSTPONEMENT OF TERRITORIAL TRANSFER ¹¹
[Memo, Rennell for GOCinC, 15th AGp, 8 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/945]

♦ ♦ ♦ at the end of October, a decision was reached by A.F.H.Q. to bring the Allied Commission of Control into existence and to hand over, with effect from the 10th November, the rear areas in toto to the King of Italy [see above ch. X, sec. 3 ] .

At a date subsequent to this decision, it appeared that Marshal Badoglio had not found it possible to form a broad based Italian government, as the Italian government had undertaken to do. It appeared that the principal obstacle to the formation of such a government was the continued existence of the present King of Italy on the throne. Up to the time of writing no decision on the subject has been reached, but in view of the political difficulties encountered by Marshal Badoglio it was decided in the course of the first week in November that the territory administered by the Military Governor in the rear of the southern boundaries of the Fifth and Eighth Armies should not be handed over to the King of Italy, but that nevertheless the Allied Commission of Control should be brought into existence. ♦ ♦ ♦

SETTLEMENT OF POLITICAL CRISIS REVIVES PLAN FOR TERRITORIAL TRANSFER
[Min of a Mtg of ACC officials, 12 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/36]

... General Holmes suggested that as a matter of general policy it should be accomplished as quickly and as safely as possible stating that he

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thought that there was a lot to be gained in many ways by turning this territory back to the Italians. He stressed two qualifying points; namely, the Political and Administrative requirements.... It was understood that Badoglio could get .. . technicians together within a week's time. Then, a week after that we should be able to turn over the territory. We will have to provide some facilities for the Italian Government; also lines of communication. The latter should not constitute a burden on us. . . . General Joyce stated that the territory should be turned over just as quickly as possible as it would bolster this ad interim Government and more than anything else, it would be an earnest showing before the world on the part of the Allied powers and draw attention to the policy of putting them on their own. Also, it was conceded to be the only way these officials could carry on; namely, by learning to do by doing. ♦ ♦ ♦

BADOGLIO PREDICTS EARLY READINESS FOR THE TRANSFER
[Transl of Msg, Badoglio to Joyce, Actg Deputy President, ACC, 26 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

During the meeting in Malta with General Eisenhower, he mentioned to me that as soon as my government would be completed and in condition to function all liberated provinces would be put under Italian jurisdiction, leaving only under direct Anglo-American control those provinces in the zone of operations.

I believe that in about two weeks, when the Commission sections will be working smoothly with the separate Italian Ministries, we shall be able to say that the functioning of the Government is completely normal and such as to guarantee a good administration.
The transfer of these provinces under our direct control may then be established between the 10th and 15th of December.
Allow me to say that a statement on this subject emanating from Anglo-American sources would have the great value of cutting off all rumors issued by enemy propaganda, especially in regard to Sicily. ♦ ♦ ♦

PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES ENTAIL FURTHER POSTPONEMENT
[Note, Brig R. E. Gueterbock, Vice CofS, ACC, on visit to Brindisi, 27 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

Contact was made with the Italian government. From discussions it was apparent that the earliest date for handing over territory is 20 December 1943. The principal limiting factors are accommodation, provision of communications and setting up Italian governmental machinery. ♦ ♦ ♦

THE CCS IS ASKED TO APPROVE THE PROPOSED METHOD OF TRANSFER
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Nov 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-OUT 9018]

It is proposed to restore all occupied territory south of the northerly boundary of Salerno, Potenza and Bari provinces, including Sicily but excluding Pantelleria, Lampedusa and Linosa, to Italian jurisdiction during the first week in December. In restoring this territory to Italian Sovereignty certain formal steps are being taken to preserve various rights needed by the military forces in such territories for the effective prosecution of the war, and to insure the recognition by Italian Government of the validity of the acts of the Allied Military Government. Three documents have been prepared to accomplish these purposes.

The first is a proposed secret document to be signed by General Alexander as Military Governor, transferring the territories to the Italian Crown upon certain terms and conditions therein set forth. The document also extends these rights to all other Italian territory not at present occupied by Allied Forces, which has been liberated and is now under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, so as to include Apulia and Sardinia. The rights in question are in addition to and without prejudice to rights reserved under the existing Armistice terms in occupied territory. This document also provides for the inclusion of the maintenance cost of Allied Troops or other personnel within the area restored as occupation costs.

The second is a short proclamation to be published by the Military Governor announcing the termination of Military Government and of all proclamations and orders issued thereunder and formally transferring the territory to the Crown of Italy, subject to all rights of the Allied Commander in Chief and the Allied Control Commission. This document does not list the particular rights reserved.

The third is a proclamation and decree to be issued by the King of Italy simultaneously with the issuance of document B. By this document the King assumes the powers of Government in the restored territory and declares that all proclamations, orders, sentences and other official acts of the Allied Military Government will be recognized as valid in Italian courts, and calls on the Italian people to co-operate with the Allied Forces in driving Germans out of Italy.

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In addition to the above documents, further technical decrees to be executed by the King are in course of preparation. Their purpose is to continue in force certain provisions of proclamations and general orders issued by the Allied Military Government, such as wage and price regulations, etc., so as to prevent a lapse between the date of restoration and the time the Italian Government may act upon such subjects itself. They are what is commonly known as "transitory legislation." Approval of the foregoing is sought.

WHY AFHQ THOUGHT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT MUST PRECEDE TRANSFER
[Memo, Col G. R. Upjohn, Deputy CLO, ACC, undated but probably in Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

♦ ♦ ♦ On the handover to the Italian Government the position changes overnight. All powers and duties of the Military Governor come to an end save insofar as the same may be preserved by agreement. Thus in the absence of agreement,. the regulations made and the special offences created by the Military Governor cease to be of force or effect and his military courts have no further jurisdiction; his currency ceases to be legal tender and his moratorium and price control comes to an end. He no longer has any powers of requisition and possibly his troops do not enjoy extra-territorial rights although this last point is of some controversy. Again his supervision of education comes to an end and the schools may forthwith revert to their former teachings and practices and he withdraws from properties of which he has taken custody. Furthermore, although International Law validates the acts of the Military Governor in occupied territory during the time of occupation, it gives no continuing validity to the consequences of such acts after the cessation of occupation, e.g. contracts entered into during the occupation cannot necessarily be sued on afterwards, sentences imposed by Allied Courts do not have to be recognized by the Italian Government and therefore prisoners incarcerated for the full term of their sentences.

The above presents the position in the absence of agreement. Where there is agreement between the parties then the position is in my view accurately summed up by saying that the powers, rights and duties of the military forces in the territory formerly occupied by them are governed entirely by the agreement reached between the parties, that is in the present case the Armistice Terms.

These Terms confer on the Allied Commander in Chief very broad powers in unoccupied territory and provide the charter of our status in such territory. While the Terms do not deal in detail with our powers, rights and duties in unoccupied territory, the powers conferred by the Terms are sufficiently wide in my view to form the basis for a series of detailed agreements which for the reasons appearing . . . must be essentials of any transfer of territory to the Italian Government.

CCAO IS MORE CHEERFUL ABOUT THE TRANSFER THAN SOME ITALIANS
[Memo, Rennell, CCAO 15th AGp, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Badoglio government is quite adequate to govern, with only light guidance, the i9 provinces which are in hand. They are at least as competent to do so as most of the officers who have been sent out to staff the A.C.C. or to provide A.M.G. personnel for regions yet to be occupied. ♦ ♦ ♦

[Msg, MGS, AFHQ, to Hq ACC, 12 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/63]

Advised by Poletti that at recent meeting Prefects Region I, all incumbents except one career Prefect expressed view that they would be unable to continue in office after turn over if oath to the King was required. Similar attitude said to be taken by considerable number of Sindacos and other officials appointed by AMG. This general reaction stems from fact that King associated with Fascism in minds of these officials. Poletti believes feeling sincere and for most part not dominated by partisan considerations.¹²

ADVISORY COUNCIL APPROVES THE TRANSFER WITH POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
[Ltr, Murphy, U.S. Member, Advisory Council for Italy, to Gen. Smith, CofS, AFHQ, 15 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

Reference is made to your letter of I December 1943, in which you communicated the request of the Commander in Chief for an expression of opinion by the Advisory Council for Italy with respect to the question whether the proposed transfer of presently occupied Italian territory to the control of Marshal Badoglio's Government would, at this time, be interpreted as a gesture of confidence and support of the present head of the House of Savoy. If in the opinion of the Council this action would be so interpreted, it

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was further requested whether it would be desirable to delay the transfer of the authority over presently occupied areas in Italy until the Italian Government is established in Rome on the broad basis which has been indicated would be acceptable to our Governments.

After the deliberation of this question, the Advisory Council unanimously decided officially to recommend to the Commander in Chief that all Italian occupied territories south of the line Salerno-Bari and including Sicily and Sardinia be transferred to Italian administration, subject to the guidance and instructions of the Allied Control Commission. This recommendation was made with the understanding that the transfer be subject to two conditions, namely: (1) that the administration, central and local, will be carried on by officials of proven good faith and Allied sympathies; and (2) that the transfer involves no commitment to Marshal Badoglio's Government after the capture of Rome.

The Council agreed that the transfer might at the outset appear to reflect new and additional support of the present Italian Government and the House of Savoy, but was unanimously of the opinion that the two conditions set forth immediately above would adequately correct any such tendency.

The Council agreed on a further recommendation to the Commander in Chief in the following terms

"The Advisory Council for Italy recommends to the Commander in Chief that a specific directive be issued to the Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission that in exercising the functions of control he should be guided insofar as military necessity permits by the terms of the declaration regarding Italy made at the Moscow Conference, with particular reference to the second of the measures set out in that declaration."

It will be recalled that the text of the second measure here referred to is as follows:

"2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti Fascist political groups."

THE CCS WISHES NO COMPROMISE OF RIGHTS OR TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY
[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 9 Dec 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3624]

In restoring territories mentioned to Italian jurisdiction [see above, Eisenhower to CCS, 30. November] it is important that no rights under terms of surrender be compromised by any agreement with the Italian Government or any representative thereof. . . . It is believed that the surrender terms, in particular paragraph 10 of short terms [Chapter IX, Section 3] and paragraphs 22, 36 and 42 of long terms [Chapter IX, Section 5], are sufficiently broad in scope to give you authority to direct the Italian Government to do anything which you might feel necessary for it to do, without the necessity of a secret agreement as proposed in your document number 1.... In view of these factors, and since we are not transferring "sovereignty" or "territory," but rather administration of territories, the proposed secret document is considered inadvisable and should not be entered into. ♦ ♦ ♦

As regards proclamations, decrees and technical decrees to be issued by the Italians, these should be in the name of the Italian Government rather than of the King if this is in accordance with constitutional processes. Proclamation and decree mentioned in your fourth paragraph should refer to assumption of administration of government rather than to assumption of "powers" of government. It is important in connection with all proposed documents that Royalty, Crown and King be not emphasized.♦ ♦ ♦

[Paper of CCAC cited in Msg, Hilldring to Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, 18 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91, CM-IN 10937)

♦ ♦ ♦ Consideration has been given to the documents prepared in connection with the proposed transfer of governmental administrative functions from AMG to Italian Government. It is apparent that these documents were prepared under the impression that full administration of the territory was to be restored to Italian sovereignty; thus giving up the rights of an occupying power. Under no circumstances should any governmental powers be surrendered to the Italian Government which would have the effect of changing the character of the areas involved from occupied territory to non-occupied territory within the meaning of Article 2 1 of the Long Terms. It is suggested that this objective might be accomplished by a proclamation issued by General Eisenhower or General Joyce stating that the powers of government heretofore vested in the Military Governor are hereby transferred to the Allied Control Commission to be exercised by it through the Italian Government and its duly authorized representatives. ¹³  ♦ ♦ ♦

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[NAF 587, Gen Wilson, CINC AF, to CCS, 13 Jan 44, AFHQ Msg files, CM-OUT 3776]

1. Your FAN 315 of 5, January was fully discussed this morning with General Mason-MacFarlane, General W. B. Smith and Mr. Macmillan.¹⁴  All agreed that to present such documents at this time may well be regarded by Badoglio as amounting to a breach of the understandings we have reached with him. The repeated insistence upon the expression "Occupied Territory" added to the long and elaborate reservations may seem to be taking away with one hand even more than is being given with the other.

2. Badoglio's regime is being very hard pressed by internal political ambitions and by external criticism. For this reason it is quite likely, and General [Mason]-MacFarlane from his experience, thinks more than likely, that Badoglio will refuse the transfer on these terms; in such an event the chance of obtaining a more amenable alternative Government would appear small. A keen-sighted Royalist might advise the King to do the same. We should then be in a serious predicament since our plans have been laid upon the assumption that there will be early transfer of territory and that the control commission will come into early and effective operation.♦ ♦ ♦

THE CCS DECIDES TO LET AFHQ EXERCISE POLITICAL DISCRETION
[Msg, CCS to Gen Wilson, 23 Jan 44, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 13664]

You are hereby authorized to proceed as outlined in your NAF 587 [above] in regard to the transfer of the responsibility for administration to the Italian Government.

RIGHT ARE RESERVED BY ALLIES IN THE RESTORED TERRITORY
[Secret Agreement Between Alexander, GOCinC ACMF, and Badoglio, 9 Feb 44, CCS Memo 199, ABC files, 014, HORRIFIED, Govt, sees.1-4]

♦ ♦ ♦ Territory Restored: That portion of the Mainland of Italy south of the northern boundaries of the Provinces of Salerno, Potenza and Bari, and Sicily and adjacent Islands (but not Pantelleria or Lampedusa or Linosa).

Terms of Restoration: Without prejudice to any rights, powers and immunities of the United Nations under the Armistice terms heretofore granted to the Italian government, all of which remain in full force and effect throughout all Italian territory, there is hereby reserved to the United Nations and to the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces and to such officers or other representatives, including the Allied Control Commission, as he may designate, the rights, powers and immunities described below, in any part of the said territory and in all other Italian territory which has been liberated from German domination and is now under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, hereinafter referred to as "the Unoccupied Territory":

1. There will be made available to the Allied Forces such facilities, utilities and installations as may be required by the Allied Commander in Chief or his agents for such disposition, use or operation as may be determined.

2. The right to maintain and quarter troops in such parts of the Unoccupied Territory as they may see fit.

3. The right to hold or require the Italian Government to hold in custody prisoners of war and civilian internees as may be directed by the Allied Commander in Chief.

4. The right to declare any area to be a Military Zone and to exercise therein the rights of an occupying power or enforce such other controls as may be determined by the Allied Commander in Chief.

5. The right to convene Allied Military Tribunals for the trial of any person violating any order or regulation issued by the Allied Military Authorities and of any person otherwise doing any act hostile to the Allied Forces or any member thereof in any part of the Unoccupied Territory, and to inflict such punishment upon such person as such tribunals may direct.

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6. The right to conduct and carry on to ultimate conclusion the trial by Allied Military Tribunals of any person charged with an offense heretofore committed and cognizable under any proclamation or order heretofore issued by or on behalf of the Allied Military Governor.

7. Any official in the Unoccupied Territory previously appointed by the Allied Military Government may only be removed by the Italian Government with the consent of the Allied Commander in Chief.

8. The right to requisition private and public property and services.

9. The right to reoccupy the whole or any part of the Unoccupied Territory at any time or to take such other steps or exercise such other powers in any part of such territory as may from time to time be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war.

10. The rights to import and export and to control and supervise the distribution to the civilian population of such civilian supplies as the Allied Forces may determine without the payment of any impost, tax, charge, or duty of any kind whatsoever either to the Italian Government or to any of its political sub-divisions or agencies except as may from time to time be agreed by the Allied Commander in Chief.

11. The right to engage in such operations and import and export such military or other supplies or property of any nature as may be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war free from the imposition of any imposts, tax, charge or duty of any kind whatsoever by the Italian Government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.

12. Any official or other representative or, in respect of any activities for official account, any agency of the United Nations, civilian or military, may enter and remain within the Unoccupied Territory free from the imposition of any import, tax, charge or duty of any kind whatsoever by the Italian Government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.

13. No member of the Allied Forces or any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, shall be brought to trial in any Italian court for any cause whatsoever either civil or criminal without the consent of the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces.

14. All expenses and costs arising from the maintenance of Allied Troops or other personnel within the Unoccupied Territory will be chargeable to the Italian Government as a part of the costs of occupation.

15. Proclamations or Decrees to carry out the purposes set forth in Document ' D,' annexed hereto, and made a part of these terms and conditions, will be issued by the Italian Government at the time of transfer of the territory.¹⁵

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER BUT VALIDATES AMG ACTS
[Proclamation by Italian Government to the Italian People, 9 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. Military government by the Allied Forces in the territory restored has terminated;

2. All powers of government and jurisdiction in the territory restored and over its inhabitants, and final administrative responsibility, subject only to the rights therein reserved to the United Nations, are vested in the government of Italy, and all persons in the territory except members of the Allied Forces and other representatives and agents of any of the United Nations are hereby declared to be subject to the laws and decrees of the government of Italy;

3. All Proclamations and Orders heretofore issued by the Military Governor or under his authority in the said territory and which have been terminated therein by the Military Governor as upon its restoration, are hereby recognized by the Italian government as having been validly and legally issued and are declared to be of the same legal effect as if they had been issued by the Italian government in accordance with Italian law, and they will be so recognized by all Italian courts and officials.

4. All acts done by any member of the Allied Forces in pursuance of such Proclamations or Orders, and all official action of any nature taken by the Allied Military Government in pursuance thereof including all appointments to and removal from any office, public or private, are hereby recognized by the Italian government as legal, valid and binding, and will be so recognized by all Italian courts and officials.

5. All sentences imposed by Allied Military Courts are hereby recognized by the Italian government as valid and legal and of the same effect as if imposed by an Italian court and will be so recognized by all Italian courts and Italian officials unless set aside or modified by or with the consent of the United Nations.♦ ♦ ♦

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AN ITALY WHICH SHALL GROW IN STRENGTH AND STATURE
[Announcement of the Territorial Restoration by Gen Wilson, 10 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/132/324]

3. When the Allied Forces first occupied the territory of metropolitan Italy, military operation and the best interests of the civil population made military government a necessity. It was a military necessity that order should be established and maintained among the civil population behind the lines so that our troops could continue their fighting under the most favourable conditions. It was a human necessity that the men, women and children in the occupied territory should be assisted so far as conditions allowed in recovering from the misery and devastation which warfare had imposed on their homes and lands. Accordingly, Allied Military Government was established on the basis of international law. It was conducted with humanity and justice.

II. For the reasons given at the beginning of this announcement [i.e. in par. 31, it will be necessary for Allied Military Government to continue to function in the combat zone. But it is also foreseen that as our armies advance and normal conditions are restored in the territory progressively occupied, future transfers will be effected. The situation now in the making will make it possible for these future transfers to be made to an Italy which has grown in strength and stature. We look to the Italian people to translate this possibility into a firm reality and to work together toward the common victory. Nothing must stand in its way for it is the indispensable condition of the freedom of all mankind.

MARSHAL BADOGLIO SOUNDS A FANFARE
[Msg, Badoglio to Italian Legations Abroad, 15 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

... Nearly all liberated Italy was restored by the Allies to Italian administration on II February. This is a first step toward renewed unity of the country and at same time indication and proof of restored confidence. The Royal Government will spare no effort to reorganize the unitarian life of the country, to further its rebirth, and to carry on the war of liberation with utmost energy.

THE POPULATION SEEMS LESS JUBILANT
[Msg, Hq ACMF to Chief Cmsr, ACC, 20 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

People generally apathetic and more concerned with living conditions. Preference for the continuation of AMG or at least for Allied Control for some considerable time is expressed in all regions and both army areas. This is due to fear that Italian leaders are not capable of governing....

5. ADVISORY HELP IN RESTORED AREAS MUST CONTINUE

MORE STRESS NOW ON HELPING THEM WALK ALONE
[Ltr, Exec Cmsr, ACC, to RC's and SCAO's 12 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

2. Regional control in these [restored] areas will continue but henceforth will be of an advisory nature. The Italian Government, through its various ministries, will be advised and controlled by Headquarters, Allied Control Commission. Regional Commissioners will be informed of the nature of advice given and will endeavor to ensure, in cooperation with the Italian authorities, that this is carried out in every aspect of government in the Regions.

4. The administration . . . will need all the assistance and advice which can be put at its disposal. . . . Initially, doubtless, inefficiency in administration may be anticipated. But Regional officers must do everything in their power to up hold the authority of the Italian officials and to abstain from any executive action themselves. They must be careful in their dealings with Italian officials and the Italian public and in their speech with all and sundry, including other Allied officers, not to bring the administration into contempt, even when its officials seem guilty of inefficiency, corruption and worse. They must help to sort things out and must report any case of bad administration immediately. Regardless of politics it is the duty of Regional officers to put whatever Italian administration may be in office on its feet and to keep it there.

5. In the initial stages of advisory control considerable numbers of Allied officers will be maintained in the Regions. The tendering of advice, however, is more likely to be successful if it emanates from a few key men in touch with senior officials of the Italian administration than if every Italian official is bolstered up by the pres-

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ence of an Allied officer. The Italians must learn to stand on their own legs. It is the policy of the Chief Commissioner, therefore, to reduce the numbers in Regions substantially as soon as may prove possible and Regional Commissioners should plan to this end.¹⁶  ♦ ♦ ♦

THE INTERIOR SUBCOMMISSION WILL ADVISE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE RESTORED AREAS
[Revision of Nov 43 Directive of Interior Subcom, 12 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/141/470]

The recreation of an efficient and honest administration of the country's internal affairs to be carried out by the Ministry of the Interior having regard to the general functions of the Allied Control Commission and in particular to ( I) the abolition of the Fascist system (2) the enforcement of the Armistice terms and of the surrender agreements or other arrangements relating thereto.

I. (1) To review as and when deemed necessary all appointments made to and the conditions of service under the Central, Provincial, and Communal administration.
(2) To determine whether the organization and control of services which function under the Ministry are adequate for and in accordance with the purposes and conditions of A, above.
(3) To ensure, where there is departure from or failure to observe such conditions that the necessary steps are taken to effect compliance therewith.

II. To ensure that an efficient system of Provincial and Communal administration is organized and conducted in such form as is necessary to give effect to A, above, together with any amendments or alterations of such system which may be required for that purpose.

III. To secure uniformity throughout all areas in regard to the system of local government referred to in II above.

IV. To take all necessary action in regard to the financial policies and plans of local government agencies insofar as they concern the Ministry.

V. To ensure that the Ministry of Interior adopts an impartial and proper relationship with regard to religious bodies and to secure the just administration of government funds connected therewith.

VI. To consider and report on applications for the release of such Italian prisoners of war as are necessary and required for specific work connected with Communal, Provincial, Regional, or Allied Control Commission Administration.

RIGHTS IN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY WILL BE EXERCISED WITH RESTRAINT
[Allied Admin Insurs 6, 15 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/109/586]

The Allied Forces have retained the power and right to requisition private and public property and services in Italian Government Territory this right must be exercised sparingly and only for reasons of genuine military necessity. This right will be exercised through the Italian authorities....

As the Proclamation of the Military Governor ceases to operate in Italian Government Territory, all crimes will normally be tried under Italian law and in Italian Courts. The Allied Forces, however, have reserved to themselves the right to hold Allied Military Courts in Italian Government Territory for the trial of civilians who commit acts seriously hostile to the Allied Forces and to punish them in accordance with the Italian Penal Codes.

The reservation of this right is not intended to encourage the trial of civilian offenders by Allied Courts, but is to enable them to deal with the most serious offences against Allied personnel or property which cannot be dealt with by the Italian Courts. . . .

Consequent on reservation of the power to try such offenders there is reserved to the Allied Forces the power to arrest persons who are believed to have committed such offences. High ranking Italian officials and officers of the Italian

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Armed Forces should, however, only be arrested in collaboration with the appropriate Italian official (e.g. the Prefect or the Commanding Officer of the officer concerned). ♦ ♦ ♦

AMG MUST CONTINUE FISCAL CONTROL IN THE RESTORED TERRITORY
[Finance Subcom, ACC, Rpt for Mar 44]

C. 7(a) During the latter half of February and the month of March, there existed in that portion of King's Italy which was formerly AMG Regions I and II dual authorities in the field of budgetary control. This resulted from the fact that such territory had been placed on 11 February under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, which could not at that time assume control of fiscal operations. By agreement AMG continued to function in the area until 31 March 1944. . . . The assistance of AMG during March was requested by the Italian Government, but resulted in the case of at least one province in the issuance of "authorities to spend" by both AMG and the Italian Government. ♦ ♦ ♦

AN OPPORTUNISTIC GOVERNMENT MINISTER MUST BE STOPPED FROM UNDOING THINGS
[Lt Col Spicer, Rpt for Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/109/ 617]

♦ ♦ ♦ After almost daily contact with .. . the Minister of the Interior since his arrival here, I come to the conclusion that he is chiefly concerned insofar as the administration of local government is concerned, in reinstating his "career officials" who were deposed by AMG and in endeavouring to remove certain AMG appointees whom he does not approve because they are either, in his opinion, not sufficiently high grade in career to hold such posts, or because they are not "King's men."
He is shrewd, and I have found him helpful in many matters, but in my judgment, he is not a difficult man to read. I am convinced, moreover, that he has begun to see the red light, and I do not think he will pursue his former course much further, although he was at the outset indubitably embarked on this policy. ♦ ♦ ♦

IT IS DECIDED SENIOR APPOINTMENTS SHOULD RECEIVE ACC'S PRIOR APPROVAL
[Ltr, MacFarlane to Badoglio, 10 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/93]

Recent events over certain appointments have shown that it is clearly desirable for us to have a mutually satisfactory arrangement to prevent misunderstandings and subsequent difficulties which it is in all our interests to avoid. I would suggest, therefore, that it should be agreed that you will let me know before any appointment to the Government is actually announced. Equally, I should be glad if you will impress upon all the members of your Government that they should, in turn, consult the appropriate authorities in the Allied Control Commission before making any senior appointments in their own departments either at the seat of the Italian Government or in those provinces under Italian jurisdiction.

[Ltr, Badoglio to Mason-MacFarlane, 13 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/93]

After having worked with me for quite some time, you know that it is my absolute decision to proceed in any matter in full accord with the Allied Control Commission over which you preside.

With regard to this, at next Thursday's Council of Ministers, I shall give definite orders to the effect that no government appointment be made without previous agreement with the Commission.¹⁷

AFTER TWO MONTHS THE SITUATION STILL CALLS FOR PATIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
[Hq, ACC, Rpt for Mar 44]

2. In the areas handed over to the Italian Government, Regional and Provincial Commissioners are taking stock of the situation and feeling their way slowly in the change from Executive to Advisory status. The new relationship between the Italian Government, the people and themselves needs delicate adjustment because the people still rely in many cases on the American and British officials who have been in charge of their affairs since the invasion last Autumn and in many cases remain the same individuals. The numbers are being very substantially reduced but this adjustment is a delicate one and time must be allowed for the people so long benumbed and muzzled by Fascist officialdom to realize that they have in fact regained their freedom....

3. Meanwhile, the administration is suffering from certain inherent disabilities consequent on the character of the Italian people and the nature

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of our occupation. A Prefect cannot do so much as an Allied Governor, yet the natural normal tempo of Italian Government (in peace time) cannot be permitted without serious detriment to the war effort. This is where constant adjustment is necessary and if progress may seem slow it should be remembered that pressure on the Italian Government is only applied when absolute military necessity demands. [Min, Remarks by Brig. Lush at Conf of RC, 14 April 1944 in ACC files, 10000/101/443]

LATER REFLECTIONS OF THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER OF SICILY ON THE POLICY OF TRANSFER
[Memo Prepared by Poletti, former RC, Sicily, for McCloy at Suggestion of Hilldring, 16 Nov 45, MTO, HS files]

3. Our experience in Italy shows that Military Government in certain areas in Italy was terminated far too early. It was an unsound decision to end Military Government in Sicily in February 1944 and go through the hollow gesture of transferring the administration of that Island to an Italian Government when it consisted of only Marshal Badoglio and two and one half stenographers. The result wiped out in large measure the good work previously done by Military Government and also created situations, the effects of which are still being felt in Sicily two years later.

4. Military Government, our experience indicates, is the most effective vehicle to administer occupied territory. Military Government is far superior to hybrid organizations which operate on a basis of merely giving advice and of exercising supervisory functions. The intelligent administration of Military Government demands the use of the people of the country to the fullest as public officials and moreover, the gradual shifting to them of the duties of government. This can be done without losing efficiency because in the last analysis the authority, and sole authority, still rests with Military Government. As soon as Army officers are in an area only as advisors, the job in large measure collapses. In other words, Military Government should be kept in an area as long as the Army wishes to have any responsibility for the administration of the people. It should not undertake to discharge its responsibility and to protect its interests through civilian agencies or through military personnel operating not with authority, but only with the power to give advice and supervise.

6. THE GOVERNMENT IS ENCOURAGED TO CO-ORDINATE WITH AMG

GOVERNMENT WILL BE ASKED TO MAKE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIFORM WITH AMG TERRITORY
[Memo, Spicer for Vice President, Admin Sec, ACC, 24 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/141/2]

2. In the first place, it must be recorded that the position of local government in the AMG period was covered in Sicily by the issue of a Regional Order issued by the then RCAO, Lieutenant Colonel Poletti. This was accomplished by the Administrative Instructions and has been operating successfully through Region I [sec. 2, above]. The position in Region II has unfortunately not made such progress, and as far as can be ascertained, a similar order drafted at this Headquarters and approved by an officer of the Legal Subcommission, was not signed and issued, nor had, to any serious extent, the Administrative Instructions been carried out in that province.

4. The question that requires decision, therefore seems to me to be whether, as in the territories now taken over by the Royal Italian Government, or in the territories to be taken over by them in the future, they should be guided on the basis of the local government as set up and operating in Region I, which was instituted and carried through successfully by Lieutenant Colonel Poletti, and whether indeed the system as now applied and operating in Region I can be continued without the full consent of the Royal Italian Government, and if that consent is not forthcoming, what action, if any, can be taken.

6. . . . It would appear to me that Allied Control Commission's policy in regard to all territories coming under either its administration or executive control should be, insofar as possible, uniform, and it would be ill-advised to institute local government in occupied Italy (as opposed to restored Italy) which differed materially in its organization. Such a policy can only lead to misunderstanding and would certainly not result in smooth working in regard to further handovers which, I believe, is the policy of the Allied Control Commission.

10. My recommendations are, therefore that, (I) The Minister of Interior should be requested to arrange publication of a decree by the Royal Italian Government corresponding to the attached

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Region I order, provided the Chief Commissioner and his Vice President are in agreement. (2) If there are any departures or alterations of a major nature, that arrangements are made by this Subcommission with the Minister to have them brought to our notice, when the Legal Officer's views will be obtained. (3) When finally agreed upon, the decree shall be promulgated both in Royal Italy, and in occupied territory-in the latter case under the signature of the Chief Commissioner or Executive Commissioner. [See below, Directive of 25 July 1944]

THE PRE-FASCIST SYSTEM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT WILL PREVAIL THROUGHOUT LIBERATED ITALY
[ACC Exec Memo No. 39, Jul 44 (first revision of May Memo), ACC files, 10000/136/17]

1. The present position with regard to the organization of Italian Provincial and Communal Administration in Italian Government Territory and Military Government Territory (with the exception of Fifth and Eighth Army AMG area) is as follows

A. In Italian Government Territory local government is now regulated by Royal Decree No. III, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale on 22 April 1944. All Regional Orders dealing with the reorganization of local government ceased automatically to be effective in any territory on the date on which such territory was restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. B. In Military Government Territory (with the exception of Fifth and Eighth Army AMG areas) Royal Decree No. III was made applicable by virtue of the Executive Commissioner's endorsement published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of 10 May 1944. The actual operation of the Royal Decree dates from the time a copy of the Gazzetta Ufficiale is actually handed to the Prefect by the Allied Control Commission, or by such other method as it may authorize in the future.

2. With a view to uniformity and continuity of the same pattern of local government throughout Italy, those of the provisions of the Royal Decree No. III outlined in Schedule "A," as can be applied to Fifth and Eighth Army AMG areas shall be so applied as soon as possible. It should be noted, however, that Royal Decree No. III is a transitory measure, passed as a war emergency gap pending the restoration of elections.¹⁸

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION WILL BE MADE OPERATIVE IN AMG REGIONS ALSO
[Directive, ACC Hq to All Concerned, 25 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/141/2]

1. Italian legislation in Italy Government territory is promulgated by publication of Decrees in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of the Kingdom. In order to ensure the continuity of the Italian legal system over as much of Italian territory as is compatible with Allied Military interests and for the purpose of extending appropriate Italian legislation to Military Government Territory the procedure of implementation which has been applied in the past will now be followed in the newly liberated provinces of Military Government Territory administered under Regional Commissioners.

2. The legislation. enacted by the Italian Government in Brindisi and Salerno and published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale-Special Series No. 1/B to 6/B and 1 to 39 in force in Italian Government Territory has been collected and reprinted in book form. In accordance with the principle set out above it is now proposed to render the bulk of this legislation operative in the provinces of Military Government Territory by an endorsement of the Executive Commission, ACC. Such endorsement, reproduced on each copy of the reprinted collection, provides that all laws contained in the reprint shall become operative in Military Government Territory with the exception of certain enumerated decrees which have been reproduced for information only.¹⁹

THE DIVISION BETWEEN AMG AND GOVERNMENT TERRITORY HAS GRADUALLY BEEN BRIDGED
[Memo, Lush for G-5, AFHQ, 29 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/74]

7. The policy of the Allied Control Commission in the last six months has been gradually to bridge the division between Allied Military Government territory and Italian Government territory. We have evolved a process by which legislation in many cases is identical and we have aimed at similarity of principles and procedure,

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diverging from that policy only in the case of  operational necessity. There can be no doubt as to the beneficial results of this co-ordination to the military  forces, the civil population, and the Italian Government when it comes to take over more territory. ♦ ♦ ♦

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Endnotes

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