Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds (♦) are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XXI:

Interdependence Precludes an Easy Way Out

The posthostilities occupation of Italy lasted more than two and a half years longer than the military campaign itself. No one, least of all the military commanders, foresaw or desired that the Allies would be forced to delay their exit so long. The explanation of the delay involves a factor more political than military. Clearly, it was impossible for the Allies to withdraw from Italy until the victors had agreed among themselves on the terms of peace. It is also clear that by the end of the war both the United States and Great Britain had a keen sense of what Assistant Secretary of War McCloy termed "a long-term interest" in Italy, or a recognition of interdependence between Italy and the Allies in the now emerging conflict between the West and the police states. This development made it seem inadvisable to agree forthwith to the very severe terms which both the Soviet and Yugoslavia soon showed it was their intention to impose upon Italy. Not to have tried hard and long to mitigate the severity would have alienated Italy. To be sure, as regards the main issue, the disposition of Venezia Giulia, the Yugoslavs had the upper hand by reason of already occupying much of the area with not unformidable military resources. But the Italians, keenly sensitive in their national pride and desire for equitable treatment, felt that they had done too much for the Allied war effort to be dealt with at the peace settlement as an enemy country. Not only was it evident that such treatment would alienate them from the Allies, it would also, though quite illogically, make the Italians susceptible to the contention by radical politicians that they would henceforth have more to gain if they aligned themselves with the very countries which had made the harshest demands. Prospects for the success of such appeals were further increased by the bitter experience of the preceding years, which had not only fertilized the soil of Italy for the growth of communism but had already brought it extensively into being.

Such, then, were the serious difficulties confronting the Allies when they began the first of their abortive peace conferences with the other major belligerents, a few months after the end of hostilities. But one must go on to note that the Allies themselves seem to have contributed to the coming into existence of these difficulties by wartime decisions which served immediate expediency rather than long-term Allied or Italian interests. The need for a long-term Allied policy toward Italy was the theme of a lengthy memorandum by the Chief Commissioner of ACC, which he circulated, shortly after the fighting ceased, for the purpose of evoking announcement on high levels of the content of such policy. Admiral Stone's main contention was that while the Allies' long-term interest lay in active aid to Italy to

[614]

prevent its communist orientation, no long-term policy toward Italy had as yet been either acted upon or formulated. He did not attempt to illustrate this by references to the past, but had not diplomacy forbidden, he could have pointed out that in several crucial issues Allied authorities had gone counter to the advice of AC as to long-term interest, with consequences which had led to the difficulties of the current situation. If Yugoslavia already had a broad foothold in Venezia Giulia it was because the Allies had decided at the last moment to avoid a military showdown with Tito and had thus sacrificed the political principle of negotiated boundaries which AC favored. If Italian national pride was now so injured that it had unreasonable expectations of the Allies at the peace conference, it was largely because the Allies had not, as AC and the Americans suggested, included in the New Policy, as replacement of the harsh Armistice, a preliminary peace treaty which would both have appeased Italian pride and given the Italians the sense of being more on their own. If the extreme left parties now had the ear of the masses, it was partly because the Allies, despite AC warnings about communist leadership of the Northern CLNAI, had allowed SACMED to enter into a virtual alliance with the committee, thereby forcing the Government itself to overcome its hesitations and enter a relationship which further built up the CLNAI's political importance. Evaluation of these decisions with the benefit of hindsight is hardly fair-the point is that following a policy based on short-term expediency had led to unfortunate consequences. These consequences could not have been overlooked by the Chief Commissioner, and in fact he wrote his memorandum against the immediate background of a political crisis which had just been forced by the CLNAI. Bonomi, on realizing that he would have to yield to a more radical government, avowed to Admiral Stone his fear that if the immediately succeeding government was headed by a Socialist the government after that would be communist. In fact Bonomi yielded his office not to a Socialist but to a member of the most moderate of the three left-wing CLNAI parties, the Action Party. But Ferruccio Parri, the new Prime Minister, leaned sufficiently to the left to be acceptable to the Communists and Socialists as well as to the more moderate parties represented in his cabinet, and in his first public statement after taking office he acknowledged by clear implication the ascendancy of the CLNAI political forces.

Although it could well have seemed too late to remedy a bad situation with such deep roots in the past, the Chief Commissioner still had hopes for the future provided the Allies now adopted a policy of broad and active aid to Italy and implemented it by specific military, economic, and political measures which he outlined. His memorandum was either sent, or taken by Acting SACMED (on a trip to the United States), to numerous influential quarters. Nearly four months later the Chief Commissioner recorded his feeling that he was still in the dark on Allied policy. He could have added that none of his proposed measures had been adopted.

A fair appraisal of the situation, how ever, must note that Allied authorities in fact now shared Admiral Stone's main objectives and had indicated this in emphatic even if vague public statements. They had, moreover, already initiated measures for aiding Italy which seemed more practicable than those which the Chief Commissioner had suggested. But in considering what was done for or about Italy from the close of hostilities to the end of the occupation, one will have to study the documentation alertly with the aim of noting its explicit or implicit indication of two points of view almost throughout. Although both

[615]

points of view envisaged aid to Italy as a long-term Allied interest, one tended toward the all-out aid favored by the Chief Commissioner, the other inclined toward the older view that Italy could be helped sufficiently by a degree of aid which did not exceed the limits of short-term expediency. The latter view was supported by strong considerations-the fact that the war with Japan was still on, that both the United States and Great Britain were war weary and strained after victory over Japan had been won, and the fact that Italy was only one and by no means the most vital of the props needed in support of Allied postwar aims.

For the first illustration of the continuing dilemma one may turn briefly to the question of Allied security measures for Italy. All concerned agreed that adequate military forces were needed if both the government and AMG were to have unchallenged authority, but the question of what should be provided received conflicting answers according to whether the focus was on Italy alone or on all Allied needs. Admiral Stone had recommended five Allied divisions (exclusive of Venezia Giulia) but SACMED, who doubtless knew better what he was likely to get, asked only for a minimum of two divisions for Venezia Giulia, a mobile reserve to be drawn on if needed in Italy, and higher ceilings for the Italian Army and Carabinieri. The CCS did not feel able to grant him a mobile reserve specifically set aside for Italy. Neither the government nor AMG rested easy but the Yugoslavs were reassured because they could press territorial demands without the deterrent of a nearby large Allied force.

Nor could anything better be managed in the equally important question of economic aid to prevent civilian unrest. The Chief Commissioner had asked for an economic advisory organization, an annual quota of coal sufficient for all Italian industry, and increased credits for Italian purchases. Soon afterward it was uncertain how Italy would continue to get even the limited aid it had been receiving under the military supply program. Linked by American policy entirely to military operations, the program was to be closed with August loadings on the assumption that UNRRA should take over. But UNRRA actually was not ready to take over, and at the last moment FEA had to fill in the breach. When UNRRA did start, in 1946, it was only with a program more limited even than that of the military, and the years 1946 and  1947 were as stringent in food supply as any that the Italians had yet experienced.

Mistakes were not always outside the theater. AC had always believed that the best insurance against Italian radicalism was the development of a liberal democracy. This was difficult as long as war lasted but with the close of hostilities there was a better opportunity. However, for some reason the restrictions on political activity in AMG territory were not promptly lifted, with the result that an AMG officer arrested Pietro Nenni for making a political speech without a permit and thus gave one of Italy's most influential leaders little reason for kind feelings toward the Allies. Nenni was quickly released and the restrictions were later lifted. Far more important was the question of positive aid to Italian democracy, and the Executive Commissioner of AC believed the Allies had failed in not providing resources for a positive educational program. The main contribution of AC would have to lie in helping the government prepare a democratic machinery for the first local elections, and this in full measure it did. But whether its policy as regards Italian decision of the "institutional question" was altogether well advised is more difficult to judge. It long acquiesced in a government decree which, though the government tried to deny this,

[616]

aimed at decision by a constitutional assembly rather than a democratic referendum. Also, even after hostilities closed, AC continued to keep the question from being raised, although Italians failed to understand why. But in this question there was, fortunately, self-reversal both by the government and by the Allies. The government changed its statute to permit the referendum AC desired, and the Allies changed their policy to permit the earlier holding of the referendum which the Italians desired. Italians on 2-3 June 1946 voted for a republic by a majority that was somewhat narrow but still large enough to show how far new influences had acted as leavening on the traditionally conservative masses. More important for immediate purposes was the result of the simultaneous elections for the Constituent Assembly, in which the Christian Democrats won more seats than any other party, and the moderate parties together an aggregate greater than that of the co-operating Communists and Socialists.

If this precarious ascendancy of pro-Western forces was to be increased or even maintained the Allies had to recognize that at this particular stage democracy was probably less important to Italians than nationalism. In his initial statement, Prime Minister Parri had mentioned almost in the same breath Italy's still unrealized restoration as a great nation and the boundary questions soon to be determined. At the September 1945 conference of Foreign Ministers the Allies came to realize that the only possible chance of settling boundary questions on ethnic principles and not too greatly to Italy's dissatisfaction was to delay the settlement until the Soviet Union would agree to the broad peace conference wherein the weight of opinion might be on the side of moderation. At this juncture the Allies might have done well to have given the Italians temporary appeasement by the civil affairs agreement which superseded the obsolete armistice and which the Chief Commissioner had recommended in his June memorandum. British hesitation evidently delayed offering Italy a new relationship until the end of May 1946, by which time the Italian government, which once had clamored for such a change, preferred to see how it would fare at the approaching peace conference.

Restoration of AMG territory and further relaxation of controls would also satisfy some of the longings of Italian nationalism, but here too there were obstacles as well as inhibitions. If the Allies overrode Yugoslav objections to returning any territory as long as Italy claimed Venezia Giulia, it was not as easy to override inherent military and political difficulties. Successive transfers beginning in May did not effect the restoration of even all the undisputed areas until the end of  1945, when it seemed safe to assume that Bolzano would not be seriously disputed as Italian and could therefore be restored together with the rest of northern Italy. The relaxation of controls was also accelerated by the end of fighting in Italy but this too was in some cases delayed. The delay was principally in such matters as foreign trade and financial transactions, over which the Allies needed to retain supervision until the end of the war with Japan.

Throughout the last phase of occupation, aid to Italy had been less a matter of controls than of influence and advice; but the importance of this type of aid was something which Washington and London authorities, remote from the scene of action and with their patience already overstrained by the protraction of military responsibility, were not in a position fully to estimate. When, therefore, the lifting of controls had reached a certain point, the CCS raised the question of curtailing AC's organization and transferring most residual functions to AFHQ. Both AC and AFHQ disagreed but at the end of March

[617]

1946 the CCS directed the dismantling of all of AC but the Executive Branch and a few subcommisions concerned with military matters. At the end of January 1947 the CCS directed the abolition of AC, a move which could not have come about at a more unfortunately premature time.

Affairs in Italy had never been good but at just this moment the picture was darker than ever and portended danger not only for the Italians but also for the Allies. The bad economic situation, and perhaps even more the depressing prospects at the Paris Peace Conference, had influenced the November elections, which resulted in heavy gains by the extreme left and Fascist right at the expense of the pro-Ally parties. The Socialist leader Nenni in November warned of civil war as the alternative to leftist assumption of power. In January Italy received the final draft of the Peace Treaty and Nenni handed the U.S. Ambassador a note of bitter protest over how little had been wrung by Italy's final pleas. He now asked for separate accords with the Allies, in disregard of the Peace Conference's determination, and also of how difficult or impossible a step this would be for two such war-weary countries. Well-informed and fair-minded Italians appreciated the fact that had it not been for the United States the terms would have been far worse, and that to hold out longer would only have opened the door to Yugoslav unilateral action against a disarmed Italy. Nevertheless, there was a real danger that the good will which the Allies had built up for themselves in Italy over five years would now be substantially lost. In the case of both America and Great Britain, destiny seemed to have a way of calling twice. The United States, after engaging in second thoughts on international reconstruction, had another opportunity to retrieve the situation. The nation took advantage of this second chance. During his visit to the United States in January 1947, Prime Minister de Gasperi was given or promised substantial economic assistance for Italy. Later in the year Italy received its share in the Foreign Public Relief Program, and the various acts of waiver of financial claims and of positive aid culminated with the inclusion of Italy in the European Recovery Program. American assistance immeasurably strengthened the position of the moderate and pro-West Italian parties-so much so that in April De Gasperi, after commotion and even bloodshed in Italian politics, had the courage to form a cabinet from which, for the first time since Badoglio's government of technical experts, the Communists and Socialists were excluded. Hard times still lay ahead and it was not until the elections of April 1948, after the Allied withdrawal, that the victory of Italian parties friendly to the West became clearly manifest.

The final withdrawal took place on 14 December 1947, after three months in which AFHQ was no longer in existence and residual Allied functions were carried out by a Military Liquidating Agency with separate American and British components. On 13 December President Truman had issued a public statement affirming the continuing intention of the United States to concern itself in the preservation of Italy's freedom and independence. The day of withdrawal itself was marked by an exchange of friendly messages between Prime Minister de Gasperi and the President. The former expressed Italian gratitude for the past help of Allied troops; the latter, American gratification over the partnership established between the two countries in the defense of common ideals. This exchange of cordial national sentiments may seem largely perfunctory, but that it could occur at all is significant in light of the fact that most belligerent occupations had ended with a bitterness even greater than existed at the start. The exchange would not have been possible if,

[618]

during the occupation, benevolence had not on the whole outweighed narrow self-interest, and had not community of broad interests triumphed over conflicting interests.

One still later episode of the aftermath is also noteworthy, since it likewise broadens the historical perspective in which the conduct of Allied-Italian relations can be evaluated. In 1949 Italy became a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created to implement the treaty. By thus joining the community of free nations Italy repeated the same kind of act of faith as was her entering the Armistice of 1943 despite the deterrent threats of a totalitarian state. This eventuality also confirmed the faith and 'farsightedness of the Allies in having decided to treat Italy not as a conquered country but as a cobelligerent whose rehabilitation would be interdependent with their own long-term interest. The ensuing occupation, it must be admitted, had in some degree the recurrent disappointments which both the perverse circumstances of war and human fallibility had injected into all military occupations of the past. But, at least, the past had never seen an occupation whose immediate and ultimate success was greater.

 

1. AFTER THE FOREIGN ENEMY IS DEFEATED AN INTERNAL ENEMY EMERGES

AS A MINISTER OF STATE THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S LEADER HAS EMOLUMENTS
[Memo, Lipsius, Chief, Black Market Contl Div, Rgn IV, for Rgnl Cmsr, Rgn IV, 15 Aug 44, ACC files, 10400/153/79]

14. In my conversation with him [Palmiro Togliatti ] and his secretary, the question was raised by them concerning the propriety of sending for a Minister of State, instead of calling upon him. My reply to them was that he was being sent for as the leader of the Communist party, and not as a Minister of State.

15. An individual may choose to hold two positions, one of which entitles him to certain privileges and immunities, and the other of which does not. However, the privileges and immunities of the former are not attached to the latter, and it is my opinion that the leader of the Communist party is not entitled to any of the emoluments of office of a minister of state. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

[Memo, Fiske, Deputy Exec Cmsr, AC, for Rgn1 Cmsr Rgn IV, 24 Aug 44, ACC files, 10400/153/79]

2. The difficulties experienced by Lieut. Lipsius in this matter are fully appreciated. You should however remind him that Sig. Togliatti is first and foremost a Minister of State and as such entitled to the usual courtesies. Lieut. Lipsius should go to see Sig. Togliatti, not vice versa. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

THE MINISTER CLAIMS ITALIAN COMMUNISTS ARE PATRIOTIC AND HONEST-WITH EXCEPTIONS
[Notes of Conf Between Lipsius, Chief, Black Market Contl Div, and Signor Palmiro Togliatti, Minister Without Portfolio, 16 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/153/79]

♦ ♦ ♦ Lt. Lipsius . . . showed him the records of two cases in which "squadre annonaire" of the Communist party had confiscated some merchandise. Togliatti takes notes and then remarks that one of said cases had been handled by the "Movimento Communista Italiano" which is not a part of the Italian Communist Party. Lt. Lipsius wants to know what is the relationship among the different parties that in some way or other call themselves Communists and whether they have any doctrine, principle or program in common. Togliatti answers that the party of which he is the head is the only Communist party in Italy with nationalistic and patriotic tendencies. As to the rest, he adds, only a rather primitive distinction may be made, namely, the honest and the dishonest. The Catholic Communists may be classified "honest" whereas the "Movimento Communista Italiano" which originated at the time of the German occupation of

[619]

Italy falls in the class of the dishonest. The latter tried to infilter into the Italian Communist Party but it was readily ousted. The "Movimento Communista Italiano" is now having a declining life on the edge of Communism. Its policy being one of disintegration and disorder, it is being fought by the P.C.I. as well as the former is fighting the latter. 1

Togliatti says that, perhaps, not each member of his party is honest. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

IN THE SOUTH THE COMMUNISTS ARE BEGINNING TO BE PROVOCATIVE
[Min of Remarks of Lt Col F. H. McCleary, Rgnl Cmsr, Rgn II, at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/449]

♦ ♦ ♦ I. . . . The Communist Party has continued its ascendency to the point where it now is provocative. This is most marked in Potenza and Brindisi Provinces. Previous uneasiness has grown to fear among intelligent Italians that some violence will occur when the Allies withdraw.

 

IN ROME THE COMMUNISTS ARE DANGEROUS
[Note by Secy of SACMED's Political Comm., 20 Nov 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, PC(44)-136]

1. G-2 believe that the security situation in Rome is serious enough to warrant consideration of precautionary measures.

4. There are three active organizations which, although communist inspired, are much more extremist than even the Russians may desire. They constitute a potential danger. They are (1) Communist Young Group, (2) Movimento Communista d'Italia and (3) Movimento Partigiano. These groups vary in size but each is believed to be around 40000 or possibly more. They are well armed with weapons, ammunition and sabotage material secured either from the Allies prior to the fall of Rome, from the Anzio area or from German stocks. The members are well trained, very active and believe strongly in the theory of "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat." So far they have not advocated violence but are leaning that way.

5. Leftist propaganda is becoming more and more outspoken in its criticism of the Allies and the Bonomi Government. Conditions in Italy are contrasted to those in Bulgaria and Roumania, to Russia's benefit. Peasants are being urged openly to seize the land of large landowners. To some extent this is tacitly approved by the Government.

7. Civilian morale is spiralling downward at an increasing rate. This is due to the lack of essentials for the coming winter and the extremely high cost of goods on the Black Market. There is some decrease in pro-Allied sentiments. This is caused by communist propaganda, Mr. Eden's latest speech regarding Italian colonies, and the Allies' failure to fulfill PWB promises of adequate food. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

THE RADICAL CLNAI IS ASPIRING TOWARD THE DOMINATION OF ITALIAN POLITICAL LIFE
[Memo of Political Sec, AC, 12 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

4. The difficulties in regard to the formation of a new Government turned largely on the attempt of the Central Committee of National Liberation in Rome to impose a nominee of the Committee on the Lieutenant General, as Prime Minister, and, in general, to establish the Committee of National Liberation as the single dominant factor in Italian political life. With emissaries of the Committee of National Liberation in Rome at this period it was only natural that the latter's claims to recognition should figure in the demands put forward in the declarations and pronouncements of the Political Parties, particularly those of the extreme left.

5. When, therefore, the new Government was formed, one of their first acts was to issue a declaration in which, in welcoming the decision of the Central Committee of National Liberation to continue its collaboration in the war effort, the Government referred to the CLNAI as its representatives and stated that it had delegated to the CLNAI the task of directing the action of the patriots in the battle against the enemy. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

BONOMI FEARS IF THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER IS SOCIALIST THE SUCCEEDING GOVERNMENT WILL BE COMMUNIST
[Msg, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to SACMED, 23 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

1.... At meeting of CLNAI, twenty-first [May], agreement was reached on formation of Government.... Later in meeting serious disagreement developed over insistence of three Left Wing parties on the right of CLNAI to

[620]

dictate composition of Government. Liberal and Christian Democrats insisted that it must be done in consultation with leaders in the south and by constitutional means through the Lieutenant [of the Realm]. .. .

2. I met with Bonomi today. He protested illegal acts of CLNAI made under Inter Regnum Decrees prior to Allied entry into Milan. I am bringing these to attention of AMG, Fifth Army.

4. He [ Bonomi ] feels that if the next Prime Minister is a Socialist the next succeeding government will clearly be Communist.

 

ITALIAN LEADERS DECIDE TO FORM A MORE PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT
[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for All Concerned, 26 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

♦ ♦ ♦ At further meeting last night between the CLNAI, the Secretaries of Parties and members of Rome Government, now in North, full agreement was reached on:

1. Necessity of forming new government.

2. Necessity for all six parties to participate in new government.

3. Key positions in new government to be held by men who represent the progressive spirit shown by the people in their struggle for liberation. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

EXTREMISTS THREATEN TO SET UP A SEPARATE LEFT-WING GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH
[Msg, Hopkinson, Br Political Advisor, AC, to Exec Cmsr, AC, 8 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

At concluding meeting of Regional Committees of National Liberation of Northern Italy yesterday strong criticism was expressed by speakers of various parties of delay in formation of new government. There was tendency to lay blame on politicians of the South and Republican party speakers went so far as to say that if Rome could not make up its mind the CLN's in the North should consider the possibility of setting up a provisional government of Northern Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

[Msg, d'A Hopkinson to Hq AC, 9 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

... discussion on premiership seems to have reached deadlock with De Gasperi and Nenni each refusing to accept the other.
... if failure to find a personality acceptable to all parties should lead to break up of coalition and assumption of power by right wing parties with exclusion of communists and Socialists a very serious situation would arise in the North.

I doubt whether left-wing parties here would be willing to accept such a solution and it might even lead to formation of separate government in the north....

 

THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS FARTHER TO THE LEFT
[Hq AC, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

3. On 12 June, Signor Bonomi placed his resignation in the hands of the Lieutenant of the Realm and the Government crisis was officially opened. The CLNAI passed a resolution calling for action on a three-point program; namely, the designation of Signor Parri as the President of the Council, the representation in the new Government of all the political forces in the Committees of National Liberation, including such leaders as Signor Nenni, Togliatti and De Gasperi, and finally the appointment of five ministers without portfolio to be designated by Northern political parties. The Central CLN accepted the first point of this resolution the same day and on 17 June Signor Parri was received by the Lieutenant of the Realm and officially charged with formation of the new Government....

5. . . . As might be expected, the north has the largest representation, fourteen of the Ministers having been born North of Rome. However, it is the most representative Cabinet on geographical lines that new Italy has yet achieved. ... The new Government is farther to the Left than Signor Bonomi's last administration and Signor Parri himself is a man of avowed republican sympathies, although he does not share Socialist views on "Social Problems"-or so at least Signor Nenni has asserted. The powers given to Signor Nenni to take charge of the work of preparing for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and of the Office of Sanctions against Fascism are of considerable political significance at this time. On the other hand, the Right has also had its triumphs; it has succeeded in blocking the drive for a Socialist President which a month ago seemed sure of success. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

NATIONAL LIBERATION PARTIES ARE NOW IN THE SADDLE
[Radio Address of Prime Minister Parri, 23 Jun 45, Transmitted to Stone, 24 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

♦ ♦ ♦ This government . . . is born of the coalition of the parties who have led the movement of national liberation and who will have the right and the duty of guiding the country up to the time when it will have been able to

[621]

give itself free and regular representative organs. All the parties are represented in the government in just proportion; their leaders are at my side. Their presence, their responsibility is a guarantee of strength and stability for the government, the first guarantee of its efficiency, adequate for the gravity of the problems of the moment. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AT PARTING OF THE WAYS: PROPOSALS FOR MEETING COMMUNIST DANGER
[Memo on Future Policy Toward Italy from Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for the SAC, 23 Jun 45, 2  ACC files, 10000/136/299]

1. Italy is at the parting of the ways. Defeated in 1943, she has been fought over and occupied by Allies or Germans for two years: she has suffered civil war in the North where partisans have fought Fascists, and Republican troops have been in battle against the new Italian Army. She is split into eight conflicting political parties with membership of less than 10 percent of the population and no outstanding leader has come to the fore; she has had five Governments since September 1943; a million of her men have been in exile either as slave labor or as prisoners of war; more than half a million of her people have suffered dislocation of home; her financial position is precarious; her economy has been totally disrupted; she has no merchant fleet and few foreign markets; without coal and raw materials she faces unemployment amounting to several millions; the country is full of arms illegally held. Like other European countries devasted by the war, the ground in Italy is fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an anarchical movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph-possibly by force.

2. Communistic growth cannot be blocked by restrictive or repressive measures. Since the conditions which engender it are both material and morale, the only hope of restraining it in Italy is to ameliorate these conditions-to assist Italy economically, and to lift her morale by admitting her to a position of respectability in the family of nations.

3. It can be argued that the expiation of Italy's crime of 1940 must rightly be prolonged: indeed, her defeat and the course of battle since 1943 have tended to ensure that. Circumstances, if not the will of the United Nations, will see to it that she will not revert again to the artificial position of a great power which Mussolini's regime achieved. But already her people have shown, by their profession and acts of co-belligerency with the Allies, not only in the armed forces of the post-Armistice Italian Government, but among the Partisans in the North, that they are willing to abandon totalitarianism and work for the same freedoms as the Allies who liberated them. The great majority of Italians desire to see a democratic Italy. They will only permit Communism to take hold because of fear-since that party is the best organized and best armed in the country-or because of apathy arising from a generation of non-participation in democratic political life, the shame of defeat, and the results of privation. Their efforts to attain democracy may be ineffective compared with others; they may appear self centered, and, like many liberated peoples, show scant gratitude to their liberators. But unless they receive help and guidance from the democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, they will inevitably turn to the USSR and join the group of "police" states, united by Communism, which is extending westward from Russia.

4. It is in the material interests of the United States and Great Britain to prevent this. Nor can the historical and moral issues be disregarded. American and British influence, military, political, and economic, have been predominant in Italy for nearly two years. They have brought freedom from the common enemy; they have ensured freedom from hunger; they have not yet provided freedom from fear. Posterity would judge harshly if the endeavors of two great democratic states were to result in the institution of a second dictatorship in the first European country to be liberated from Fascism and Nazism. ♦ ♦ ♦

6. . . . Having "worked her passage," Italy must be allowed to emerge from defeat through co-belligerency to the position of an active partner, however lowly, in the maintenance of postwar security. If she is to serve as a bastion of democracy in Southern Europe, such a recovery is essential and must be encouraged.

[622]

7. The implementation of this policy would require certain positive steps, assurances, and conditions. These might be included in the agreement between the Allies and Italy which would formally terminate the state of hostilities and replace the Terms of Surrender as a prelude to her joining the United Nations now or in the very near future. The agreement might include, among others, the following provisions:
(a) Italy to regain control of her naval fleet for employment under any regional security scheme which might be evolved for the Mediterranean. . . .
(b) The Italian Army to be maintained at a reasonable strength (say 200,000 or 250,000 men)....
(c) The Italian Air Force to be maintained at a token strength, or at present strength....
(d) To enable her to fill her role as a "junior partner" in the maintenance of Mediterranean security, the Allies would agree to furnish a military mission to assist in the training and organization of the Italian land, sea, and air forces, similar to the prewar military and naval missions provided by the United States for certain South American republics....
(e) Similarly, an Allied Police Mission to assist the Italian Government in the reorganization and training of the Police Forces of Italy could be offered....
(f) The retention in Italy of an Allied Military Force of five Divisions (excluding Allied Forces in Venezia Giulia) until such time as revitalized Italian civil and military services were in a position to ensure democratic security in Italy....
(g) The establishment of an Allied economic organization (joint or separate) to assist Italy in correcting the basic defects of her economy, in the procurement of raw materials and the rehabilitation of her commerce and industry; and
(h) The provision of an annual quota of coal sufficient to enable Italian industry to function....
(i) The reassurance of credits in the U.S. and an increase in credits in the U.K. The latter might well take the form of financial assistance with regard to the import of coal.
(j) The replacement of the Allied Commission by a small Allied Mission to co-ordinate (d) to (h) above and to function as advisors to the Italian Government.
(k) Arrangements with respect to the Italian colonies to be considered with due regard to the interests of the inhabitants and to the assistance given by Italy as a co-belligerent and in no punitive sense.

 

SACMED ALSO ASKS FOR A DEFINITION OF ALLIED POLICY TOWARD ITALY
[Memo, McNarney, Actg SACMED, to CCS, 27 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/136/263]

1. I forward herewith 6 copies of a memorandum [dated 23 June 19451 written by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission on "Future Policy Toward Italy" [above].

2. The main purpose of this memorandum is to seek a more definite expression of Allied policy toward Italy. This is a purpose which I unreservedly support. In FAN 487 [Chapter XVII, Section 8] I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Government is to "relax control . . . thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility." While this definition of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principle behind our intentions. Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist Italy towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically," accepting the cost of doing this; or is it held that Allied interest in Italy is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?

3. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favor of the policy of active interest. While personally I favor the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other, would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions toward Italy.

 

LONG-TERM COMMUNIST AIMS STILL SEEM THREATENING
[ACofS, G-2, AFHQ, Rpt, Appreciation of the Situation in Italy, 26 Aug 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 6 (CCS Memo for Info 295) ]

3. c. The Communist Party.... It is highly organized at the centre and has direct contact with Russia. Its long term policy is presumably the creation of Italy as a communist state within the Russian sphere. To achieve this it is ready to wait a long time and meanwhile to co-operate with the governments in power. ♦ ♦ ♦

[623]

CHIEF COMMISSIONER FEELS HIMSELF LEFT IN THE DARK
[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for CofS, AFHQ, 10 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/69]

1. Before taking the drastic step of complete civilianization of the Allied Commission envisaged for the future . . . it would appear reasonable to ask for a declaration of Allied policy towards Italy.

2. With the exception of public declarations of broad principles by Allied statesmen we remain in ignorance of Allied policy. In the Chief Commissioner's memorandum of 23 June and in the Deputy SACMED'S covering letter of 27 July to that memorandum, definition of Allied policy in many of its aspects was recommended and requested. So far no reply to these papers has been received. 3  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

2. THE ALLIES TAKE STEPS TO MEET ITALY'S SECURITY NEEDS

SACMED SEES ALLIED TROOPS AS STILL NEEDED
[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to WD, 15 Jun 45, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 14625]

♦ ♦ ♦ Main task of Allied Occupational Forces in Italy after handover of metropolitan Italy to Italian Government will be maintenance of Allied Military Government, law and order and security of Italian frontiers. . . . General situation in these areas (other than Islands) is likely to be unsettled. In Venezia Giulia and adjacent territories Jugoslavs are likely to foment agitation and exploit unrest with view to eventual incorporation in Jugoslavia. To meet the commitment in northeast Italy, I estimate that minimum Occupational Land Forces required, at least until end of year and probably until conclusion of final peace settlement in Europe, will be one corps of 2 divisions. In addition, since extensive and widespread disorders in remainder of Italy would prejudice security, maintenance, and movement of Allied Sea, Land and Air Forces in Mediterranean Theater, provision must be made for adequate Allied Forces to be available at short notice in event of failure of Italian Forces to maintain control. Depending on circumstances obtaining in northeast Italy 4  at time, this commitment could be met in part from the Allied Corps referred to above. I consider, however, that to rely wholly on this Corps would be to accept undue risk, and that a general mobile reserve must be established (not necessarily in Italy) from which forces can be rapidly removed to threatened areas. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

SACMED TELLS CCS THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS MORE TROOPS TO MAINTAIN ITS AUTHORITY
[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 3 Aug 45, OPD Msg file, CM-IN 2640]

1. I have had under consideration the interim policy which, pending a final settlement by the peace treaty, should be adopted towards the Italian armed forces in the light of our intention to hand over to the Italian Government by 30 September responsibility for civil administration of all Italy, less Venezia Giulia and any other special areas which may be retained under AMG.

2. Internal situation in Italy.
 A. With a poor harvest and a general shortage of raw materials, especially coal, the economic situation in Italy is deteriorating and the position is not likely to improve. This will cause labor disturbances and internal unrest which is already beginning.
B. The authority of the Italian Government at present largely rests on the presence of Allied Troops which are being steadily reduced. If we are to avoid having to interfere in order to maintain law and order in Italy, the Italian Government must be given adequate forces whose efficiency must be increased as much as possible.

6. Requirements of Italian Government for Land Forces.
The Armed Forces which it is considered will be required by the Italian Government . . . can be summarized as:
A. An efficient and adequate police force deployed over the whole country.

[624]

B. Local Army reserves in each territorial region in order to back up the police force in quelling local disturbances.
C. A general Army reserve strategically located in order to undertake suppression of major uprisings.
D. Command administrative machinery. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AMG Is ALSO NEEDED AND TROOPS MUST SUPPORT IT
[Memo, Brig. Upjohn, Vice President, CA Sec, AC, for Exec Cmsr, AC, 7 Aug 45, ACC files, 10000/109/584]

1. As a result of my recent tour there was one matter on which I found complete unanimity from everyone I interviewed: RC's, Legal Officers, PS Officers, and so on. It will not surprise you to hear that it concerned the prospect of the maintenance of law and order as the Allies withdraw.

2. In every case the view was expressed that the present state of comparative law and order would give way to (at minimum) a series of serious disorders and riots with much bloodshed and (at maximum) to a complete communist armed revolution.

3. In some cases the view was expressed that such disorders would start soon after the termination of AMG, in others that they would not start until the number of Allied troops was substantially diminished. Many cited the recent diminution of crime to a deliberate plan to lull the Allies into a belief that the standard of law and order was increasing. Instances (which could not be proved) of suspected large scale communist plots for uprising, of secret collecting of big dumps of arms (some of them already raided) and so on were all cited to me.

4. This universal feeling is familiar to you and must be faced. It gives rise to the problem Ought AMG to be retained? I received the answer in nearly every case Yes but only if
(a) it is going to be retained for a long and advertised period, e.g. 6 months;
(b) Allied troops are retained in sufficient quantities to maintain AMG. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

NEARLY ALL AUTHORITIES THINK MORE AMERICAN TROOPS ARE NEEDED
[Memo, McCloy for CofS, WD, 20 Aug 45, ABC files, 381, Italy, Armistice-Surrender (5-9-43), JCS 1411-1, sec. 1-C]

♦ ♦ ♦ During my visit to Italy, I found some very strong opinions as to the need of our maintaining more troops than are presently contemplated for the occupying of Italy. The Ambassador and the people around him, General Hume-in fact, everybody, with the exception of General McNarney and Colonel Poletti, feel that to remove all American troops from Italy would encourage violent outbreaks before the new government is well established.

McNarney and Poletti took the view that the sooner we get out of Italy, probably the better off the Italians would be, as they would then be in a position where they would have to swim for themselves. Kirk's view was that until the present government got its roots down, it would be merely returning Italy to chaotic conditions to remove American troops. The argument was also made by some that if we withdraw, we would simply be selling out and abandoning the Italian peninsula to purely British policy.

I think there is something to be said for leaving two good American divisions there over the winter. On account of Venezia Giulia one division is presently contemplated. My inclination is to pull out all but the one division, although it may be risky to do so. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

ITALIAN ARMED FORCES ARE RETURNED TO ITALIAN CONTROL WITH RAISED CEILING
[Msg, CCS to SACMED, 29 Sep 45, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 71688, FAN-621]

1. The Italian Government will be authorized to retain armed forces which are adequate to maintain law and order in areas under its control.

2. Italian Forces which are not necessary to maintain law and order but which are essential to aid U.S. or U.K. Forces in the Theater will be returned to civilian status after they are no longer required by the U.S. or U.K. Forces.

3. Italian Armed Forces required to maintain law and order will be placed under Italian Government control about 30 September 1945 in accordance with your recommendation.

4. The authorized ceiling for the Italian Army will be 140,000. The Army includes local reserves, mobile reserves, Ministry of War, Territorial Region Headquarters, administration and training, and reinforcements. The authorized ceiling for the Carabinieri is 65,000. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AN ALLIED POLICE MISSION IS NEEDED BUT IS POLITICALLY UNWISE NOW
[Msg, Lt. Gen. William D. Morgan to CCS, 6 Oct 45, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 3001]

2. . . . Parri personally appears to agree to the desirability of such a mission. He officially states however

[625]

(A) That it would be inexpedient to invite a mission because the Communists would probably demand Russian participation.
(B) That if the Allies imposed a mission it would be contrary to present Allied policy and would be resented by the Italians.
(C) That, after elections when presumably the Communist would be an opposition party, the government might require a mission.
(D) That a mission might be agreed as part of a supplementary agreement to the peace treaty or even imposed as part of the treaty.

3. I still hold to the view that, unless the reorganization and training of the Carabinieri is placed under a qualified Allied Police mission, it will remain an inefficient and undependable force on which the government cannot depend in any crisis. I am hesitant however about insisting that a mission be accepted until it is clear that such action conforms to your policy.

 

THERE ARE STILL DANGERS AT THE FRENCH FRONTIER
[Msg, NAF-1098, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 13 Dec 45, ACC files, 10000/109/585]

Para 2. It is clear that unless we do restrict the employment of Italian troops in this zone pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments we risk provoking the French into precipitate action.

Para 4. I therefore propose at the time of handover to obtain an undertaking by the Italian Government not to station troops other than Carabinieri anywhere within 15 miles of the Franco-Italian border. This undertaking will be given no publicity. The Italian Prime Minister will be informed now that some such condition may be imposed. 5  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

THE CCS SUBSTANTIALLY AGREES TO SACMED's PROPOSALS ON OCCUPATION FORCES
[Msg, CCS to SACMED, 30 Dec 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 5346]

1. Subject to review from time to time of the actual size of the Forces, it is the present intention that an Allied Corps of one United States and one British division will remain in Venezia Giulia until that commitment is ended.

2. We cannot agree to set aside a reserve specifically for Italy alone but forces in paragraph 3 are temporarily available.

3. (A) 1 Armoured Regiment will continue to be provided from British resources.
(B) 6th British Armoured Division is remaining in your Theatre until required elsewhere.
(C) In event of emergency in Italy including Venezia Giulia, it may be possible, depending on current situation in Germany and Austria, to make available from United States resources in Western Europe reinforcements NOT exceeding 2 reinforced Infantry Regiments. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

THE CCS RAISES CEILING OF THE CARABINIERI
[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 22 Feb 46, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1040, NAF-1117]

♦ ♦ ♦ I recommend . . . that the ceiling of the interim Italian Army including Carabinieri approved by you in paragraph 4 FAN 621 [above] be increased by 10,000 to allow the ceiling of the Carabinieri to be raised to 75,000 in order to clear up requirements for which the present ceiling of the Caribinieri is not designated and to assist the Italian government. There will be no additional Allied commitment as clothing, equipment, and food for this increase are now an Italian responsibility.

 

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to SACMED, 16 Mar 46, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 80895]

Approval is given to your proposal to increase the ceiling of the Carabinieri in the interim Italian Army. The Italian Government should be informed by you that this increase is without prejudice to any decision which in the peace treaty may be taken subsequently.

[626]

3. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES AID AS VITAL TO POSTWAR AIMS

THE FIGHTING IS OVER BUT NOT THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
[Finance Subcom, AC, Final Rpt Prepared by Lt Col B. E. L. Simmons, Chief Financial Advisor, 16 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

14. . . . Military Government can only be military immediately behind the battle line, i.e., when there are no other considerations than to crush the enemy. In the later stages of occupying and administering a country, and then of advising its government, the problems of government cannot remain military; they inevitably embrace all the complexities of human organization, in their political, social and economic forms. In short, to develop policies, financial or otherwise, for military government is to develop a foreign policy toward a country or countries. It is the peculiar quality of military government that it establishes a close day-to-day relationship between occupier and occupied, a relationship that does not normally exist in international relations, and throws in high relief any failure to develop a closely-articulated policy. Are supplies to be furnished without supervision of distribution by the supplying country? Is reparations policy consistent with a program of economic and financial aid? Are foreign credits to be made available without insistence on internal control of inflation? Whether the answers to these questions are affirmative or negative, the conclusions may not be evaded that decisions cannot be ad hoc but require to be made against a background of long-run objectives....

 

THE ARMY'S SUPPLY PROGRAM WILL END
[Ltr, McCloy to Chairman of Liberated Areas Comm., 2 Jun 45, ASF, ID files, Civ Sup, DS-361]

(a) No funds will be included in War Department budget estimates for fiscal year 1946 for the provision of civilian supplies in this area. 6
(b) The economic policy for Italy established in the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister of September 26, 1944 can no longer be supported on a military basis....
(c) In the event agencies of this Government other than the War Department assume the responsibility for provision of supplies to Italy, there are sufficient supplies currently in the pipe line to permit the War Department to furnish to such agencies other than the War Department civilian supplies for Italy on the disease and unrest formula through August 1945 loadings.

 

AFHQ SAYS OUTSIDE ECONOMIC AID IS NEEDED MORE THAN EVER
[Msg, CM-IN 8791, AFHQ to WD, 9 Jun 45, CAD files, 400.38, Italy (2-20-43), sec. 151]

2. . . . Italy will need outside economic aid for some time to come and this aid may well be more important to orderly political and economic recovery after the close of the military period than in the early phases when the presence of troops itself is a stabilizing influence. If it is to continue to be United States policy to assist the recovery of Italy and to prevent the political and economic disturbance which would arise if aid was abruptly withdrawn, arrangements should be promptly made so that the continuity of the flow of minimum essential civil supplies will not be broken.

 

WAR DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES A LONG-TERM AMERICAN INTEREST IN ITALIAN STABILITY
[Statement of McCloy to Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 15 Jun 45, CAD files, 400.38, Italy (2-20-43), sec. 16]

... With the cessation of hostilities, the necessities of the military situation in Italy are no longer such as they were when the operations were in progress. This, however, does not mean that the War Department no longer has a vital interest in the political and economic conditions which prevail in Italy....

It is the period immediately following the tactical victory which may determine the pattern of the area for many years to come. Italy's strategic position in the Mediterranean area makes its stability one of the keys to peace in Europe as a whole. Today Italy is economically prostrate and politically feeble. This situation can be cured only with some material assistance from the United States. The War Department is advised that a plan will be promptly formulated by the executive arm of our government, in consultation with the Congress, which will cover our long term interest in Italy's economy. In the meantime, our government's interest is that Italy shall not be permitted to further submerge economically. ♦ ♦ ♦

As Italy has not been declared eligible for lend-lease, funds appropriated to the FEA can

[627]

be utilized only by their transfer to the War Department. The War Department supports the FEA in the request which it makes for funds for use in Italy and will undertake, to the extent that funds appropriated by the Congress for the purpose make it possible, to provide essential supplies to Italy to the amount of $100,000,000 until December 31, 1945.

 

PRESIDENT TRUMAN REINFORCES STATEMENTS ON AID TO ITALY AS IN U.S. INTEREST
[Ltr, Truman to the SW, 2 Jul 45, CAD files, 14, Italy (1-25-43) (1), sec. 9]

It is a matter of deep concern to me that the economic situation of Italy be not permitted to deteriorate further. Our policy is to assist in the recovery of Italy as the only assurance against a resurgence there of the forces we have fought in Europe, and progress towards recovery in Italy will require substantial assistance for the United States for many months to come.♦ ♦ ♦

 

AFHQ FEARS CRISIS WILL RESULT FROM LACK OF COAL AND IRON
[Memo, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Deputy Theater Comdr, MTOUSA, 9 Jul 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ papers]

4. a. Opinion is fairly unanimous that unless coal and raw materials are furnished to permit at least a partial resumption of industrial activity in the north the economic situation will deteriorate drastically during next winter. There is an employable industrial population of about 2 million, of which the concentration is in Milan and Turin. The bulk of these are at present held on plant payrolls under arrangements improvised by the companies and in certain cases with the Italian Government. Production in most plants is at a complete standstill and in others is only from 5 to 15% of capacity. Obviously these arrangements cannot last over a period of 30 to 90 days.
b. If all industrial activity is suspended and heavy unemployment results this fall and winter the political consequences are obvious. The temper of the workmen now is more conservative than has been expected; in fact, there appears to be a definite reaction against some of the excesses of the first few weeks. However this tendency can and probably will reverse itself if the basic problem of employment is not solved by the time the cold weather comes on.
d. The main answer to the problem is coal and raw materials, particularly cotton. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

SACMED EXPRESSES ALARM OVER DELAY IN CIVILIAN AGENCY PROCUREMENT
[Paraphrase of Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 6 Aug 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1582]

1. I am seriously concerned over the uncertainty as to the means whereby the flow of essential supplies to Italy will be maintained after the proposed ending of combined military responsibility.

2. Unless essential food, coal and petroleum products are delivered without interruption, an alarming situation which may involve serious internal disorder faces us. As the result of reports that procurement of these items is not now taking place a damaging loss of confidence on the part of the Italian Government, which cannot plan a sound programme of relief and rehabilitation, is in prospect.

4. Therefore, I ask urgently for assurance that these essential commodities will continue to be supplied without interruption, particularly as regards the part of the programme not already guaranteed financially by the United States, until the end of 1945; and that I be informed of the measures whereby the Allied Governments propose to meet the requirements of Italy during 1946. 7

 

RELIEVING NEWS-FEA AND THEN UNRRA WILL TAKE OVER

[Paraphrase of Msg (FAN-618), WD to Field Marshal Alexander, 17 Sep 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 8981]

2. Both Governments consider that UNRRA should assume responsibility for providing essential supplies for the Italian civilian population, and the UNRRA council at its session in London has approved a proposal to this effect. However, they have recognized that, if there is to be a continued flow of supplies to Italy, interim supply arrangements will be required to bridge the period between the end of military responsibility and UNRRA's effective assumption of responsibility. This period has, for planning pur-

[628]

poses, been assumed to cover loadings during the last 4 months of 1945, with the understanding that these interim arrangements will terminate at such earlier time as UNRRA's assumption of responsibility may permit.

3. To meet this problem, U.S. Government has included 100 million dollars in FEA Budget for its share of essential supplies needed by Italy, which should be loaded during the assumed interim period. FEA has prepared in consultation with Allied Commission through Combined Liberated Areas Committee Supply Sub-committee a supply program and is taking necessary measures, including procurement, to implement program.8  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

SACMED IS AGAIN WORRIED AS FEA PROGRAM ENDS
[Msg, Gen William Morgan to 14 Dec 45, OPD Msg CCS, files, CM-IN 4947]

1. The critical situation in Italy regarding basic civilian supplies makes it necessary that the matter be brought again to your attention even though in Par. 8 of FAN 618 you notified us that it might not be possible to provide relief supplies from civilian sources. However, Par. 9 left the door open for an appeal in an emergency.

2. With December loadings, existing flow of supplies ends, with no assurance of continuation. Should a break occur, I fear grave results which might necessitate the use of Allied military forces to maintain law and order. Every effort should be exerted to prevent development of a situation that would necessitate such action.

3. It is recommended that the appropriate authorities be informed immediately of the importance of uninterrupted flow of necessary supplies to Italy and that I be informed of your action.

 

THE SUPPLY PIPE LINE WILL CONTINUE
[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to Gen William Morgan, SACMED, 15 Jan 46, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 93035]

2. Necessity for continuing flow of essential supplies to Italy is known to appropriate civilian agencies.

3. Understand that State Department through War Shipping Administration expects to ship in January... FEA backlogs from December loadings....

4. Understand that ... an UNRRA loading program has been scheduled for January. 9  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AC MUST CONTINUE TO SPONSOR THE GOVERNMENT'S FOOD MEASURES
[Historical Rpt Submitted by Maj A. J. P. Parker for the Rationing Div to the Dir, Food and Agriculture Subcom, AC, 1 Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

♦ ♦ ♦ It is a marked fact that in the past few months while the Italian Government has been responsible for the administration, the High Commission for Food would not undertake any adjustments of ration scales without prior sponsorship of the Allied Commission. On the contrary, their proposals involving increases in scales were persistently followed up, although in view of deteriorated amassing, the additional requirements could only be met from external sources. That this policy, excellent though it may appear through Italian eyes, can only result in disappointment, is shown by the recent revelations of world staple shortages which may mean a considerable shortening of supplies and reduction of rations for Italy with consequent reactions of the people against the Government. The High Commission was continually warned on the prospect of smaller imports. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

4. WITH ALLIED ENCOURAGEMENT DEMOCRACY AND REPUBLICANISM ARE GIVEN THEIR CHANCE

LEFT-WING PARTIES ARE AVERSE TO A REFERENDUM ON THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
[Memo from Commodore Stone, Chief Cmsr, ACC, for SACMED, 17 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

2. The question has arisen again through publication in the New York "Times" recently of an interview with the Lieutenant General of the Realm in which the Lieutenant General expressed the view that a more accurate expression of popular will could be secured through the

[629]

medium of a referendum, rather than of a Constitutent Assembly. 10

3. When news of the publication in America was received in Rome, the Parties of the Left objected and proposed that a resolution be adopted by the Council of Ministers in which the Lieutenant General was severely criticized. The personal attack on the Lieutenant General was deleted and the following resolution adopted and issued as communiqué:

"The Government, having considered the declarations which appeared in a report of an audience granted by the Lieutenant General of the Realm to a journalist, reaffirms that the political Parties, from which the Government is emanated, are the expression of the will and of the aspirations of the Italian people fighting for its freedom and reaffirms the solemn pledge to decide about the institutional issue through a vote of a Constituent Assembly, as it has been established by a State law."

4. Since the communiqué appeared to be at variance with the assurances 1 had received from the President of the Council and the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, set forth in para 2 of my letter of 3 July-namely, that the question as to the means by which the Italian people might decide the institutional question would be left for future determination-I called on the President of the Council and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on November 9 for an explanation.

5. They were frank in setting forth the strong resistance of the Parties of the Left to permitting a determination by referendum as to whether Italy should be a constitutional monarchy or a republic, particularly as it is believed universal suffrage will be in effect at the time. They stated that the parties of the Left desire a republic and feel that they are more certain to attain their objective if the determination is made through the medium of a Constituent Assembly.

6. Notwithstanding the language of the communiqué, the President of the Council pointed out that the words in the communiqué "to decide about the institutional issue through the vote of a Constituent Assembly" were limited by the following words "as it has been established by a State law." The law in question, he argued, stated that the form of the government would be determined by the Constituent Assembly and not the type of Government. In other words, he continued, the law still does not preclude the possibility that the type of Government-monarchy or republic-could be determined by referendum and the precise form of monarchy or republic, that is to say the Constitution, would be worked out by the Constituent Assembly. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

ALLIED BAN ON THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION DOES NOT END WITH LIBERATION OF THE NORTH
[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, 11 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

♦ ♦ ♦ De Gasperi asked if the Allies were disposed to agree with Togliatti's contention that the Institutional question could be reopened as soon as the North had been liberated. I told him that the language of the December 10th commitment, which is identical with the language of the commitment of June 18th, was unequivocal and was not limited purely to the question of liberation, that the Government had committed itself to that language both in June and again in December, and that I did not see how the question was debatable. 11  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AC CONSIDERS A REFERENDUM THE ONLY DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for SACMED, 30 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

1. In discussing the question of the methods of determination of the future form of government of Italy, it is assumed that the primary consideration is the maintenance of the pledges of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain toward the Italian people of a free and untrammeled choice of the permanent form of their Government, and the guarantee that, insofar as possible, the will of the majority of the Italian people shall be carried out. . . .

2. Under present conditions in Italy, it would appear that the ultimate decision affecting the institutional question might be most justly brought about by means of a referendum rather than by entrusting the decision to the constituent assembly. Although it is of the opinion of the Legal Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission

[630]

that Decree Law 151 of June 24, 1944, precludes the Government from deciding this question by a referendum (ACC/4005/L of 6 Oct 1944), paragraph 4 of the same opinion points out that this Decree Law can be at any time abrogated by the enaction of a subsequent similar piece of legislation....

3.... In this connection, the President of the Council, Signor Bonomi, expressed to the Chief Commissioner subsequent to the Yalta Conference, the hope that the Allied Governments would require in the peace treaty or otherwise that the Italian institutional question be determined by referendum rather than by constituent assembly "in order to avoid the danger of having this question decided by less than a majority of the Italian people. .. ." It is hardly necessary to add that events and public statements over the past year have shown that if the institutional question were to be decided by the constituent assembly, strong political interests would undertake a concerted campaign to ensure the result desired by them, perhaps without sincere reference to the needs of the Italian people. . . . 12

 

THE GOVERNMENT PLANS FIRST LOCAL ELECTIONS BUT AC URGES MORE DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE
[Ltr, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Prime Minister Bonomi, 19 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/670]

Following the receipt of your letter of 27 February 1945, in which you gave me a general view of your Government's intention with respect to the holding of local elections, officers of the Local Government Sub-Commission conferred with officials of the Ministry of Interior in order to get a clarification and elaboration of your proposed plans. I cannot but feel that the voting methods intended to be used by the Italian Government based upon the 1915 law do not provide sufficient controls and guarantees to ensure the possibility of holding an independent, free and secret vote. . . .

Some of the principal defects in the existing system are:
(a) no formal nomination of candidates prior to the voting;
(b) no official ballot paper;
(c) no control of electioneering at the polling places.

Since the Allies are greatly interested in the rehabilitation of democratic institutions in your country, I feel that I must most earnestly recommend to you that the present election law be amended prior to the holdings of elections in territory under the control of the Italian Government. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AC SHOULD SEE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT WITH JUSTICE AND EQUITY
[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, 30 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

...  much can and must be done to educate the minds of the Italians with regard to the democratic way of life. We cannot check the march of events but it is not too late to rectify past mistakes.13  These elections will probably take place before the end of this year. It is essential that they should be carried out on democratic lines and in an atmosphere free from physical fear. The average Italian, if he thinks that the Communists will win the election and will use physical violence against those who have not voted for Communism, will, through fear and with the tradition of 2o years of Fascism behind him, vote for Communism against his own conscience. It is the duty of the Allies, and particularly of the Allied Commission, to ensure that the first elections in this country are carried out with freedom and equity. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AMG To ASSIST IN PREPARATION OF ELECTORAL LISTS
[Directive, Hq ACC to All Concerned, 13 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/620]

2. Although all the Italian legislation upon the preparation of the electoral lists has been given a formal implementation in Military Government Territory, its practical effect has hitherto

been confined to Italian Government Territory. With respect to provinces under Allied Military Government, the Italian legislation provided that the procedure for preparing the lists was to be commenced in any such province 10 days

[631]

after its return to the Italian Government; no provision was made for any steps to be taken during the period of Military Government. On the representation of this HQ, the Italian Government have altered this by the enactment of Article 5 of the Decree [DLL 201, 12 April 1945] . . . which provides for Allied Military Government to fix the date or dates for commencing preparation of the lists. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. Authority to fix a date or dates accordingly for the provinces under AMG will be exercised by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer at HQ AC. The RC's through the SCAO's will advise the CCAO as to the earliest date that can be set. The purpose of this directive is to give an indication of the considerations to be borne in mind in this connection.

4. The existence of electoral lists is a condition precedent to any sort of elections-national or local. The preparation of the lists is the first practical step in the return of Italy to the basis of democratic government, namely, the election of representative institutions, and it is thus an implementation of one of the fundamental policies of the Allies towards Italy.

5. The liberation of the whole of the country has brought the matter into even higher relief. Before that event, the lists could only be considered, for practical purposes, in connection with the holding of local elections in those parts of Italy that lay to the rear of our lines. Now, however, the holding of local elections throughout the whole of Italy more or less simultaneously is a possibility. The essential preliminary to local elections, the formation of the electoral lists, is already well under way in Southern and Central Italy; and the importance of not allowing the North to lag behind is obvious.

6. The preparation of the electoral lists and the necessary preliminaries thereto in Military Government Territory are, therefore, a matter of the highest priority and SCAO's and RC's will deal with the matter on that basis. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AMERICAN PRODDING ON EXPEDITING OF ELECTIONS
[Note, American Ambassador, 24 August 1945, Used as Basis of Conversation With Italian Prime Minister, 24 Jan 46, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

♦ ♦ ♦ As soon as honest balloting may be possible, the Government of the United States desires to see Italy commence the reconstruction of its government on an elective basis. With the view to holding national elections as soon as electoral machinery established for local elections is in operation throughout the country, it is felt that the Italian Government should consider immediately the holding of local elections, commune by commune, as quickly as preparations are completed. The United States Government advocates this course as the best guarantee of national democracy and as the most feasible in overcoming material difficulties precisely because the United States Government recognizes the serious responsibilities as well as privileges accruing to the Government of Italy in holding the first elections since the prefascist period. Such a course will provide already tested machinery for the national elections and would restore to the community, which is the foundation of the state, democratic responsibility. Although the Government of the United States is getting ready to conclude a treaty of peace with Italy, on the assumption that it is a democratic state, it is not possible up to the present time to point to a single commune which has a popularly elected organ of government, even in that territory early liberated and restored to Italian jurisdiction. Consequently it is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that at least communal elections will have been held throughout Italian metropolitan territory before the end of 1945. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

STATE DEPARTMENT PREFERS SOME PROCEDURAL DEFECTS TO FURTHER DELAY OF ELECTIONS
[Memo, Deputy U.S. Political Adviser for ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 10 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/141/735]

... the Department of State, while concurring in the objections and observations of the Allied Commission Local Government Sub-Commission regarding the Italian Government Law of 1915 feels also that the Sub-Commission should speedily conclude its negotiations with Italian officials to avoid any impression that the Allied Governments are responsible for additional delays in holding local elections. Therefore, while the Italian Law of 1915 may not be entirely satisfactory, the Department would prefer to overlook defects pointed out by the Sub-Commission rather than have the elections held up by disputes over minor points. The present law is not a permanent measure, but one which will be used only for the period prior to decisions on local government by a constituent assembly. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 10 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/109/622, vol. III]

2.... the Allied Commission have been careful to refrain from taking "minor points" in its dealings with the Italian Government on this subject. The objections raised to the Law of 1915

[632]

relate to questions which, in my opinion, are fundamental to any democratic electoral system.

5. The objection that insistence on these points is delaying the elections does not arise, since the Italian Government is not, in any case, ready to hold elections, or likely to be for some time, for the following reasons:
(a) Electoral Lists have not yet been completed, except in a small fraction of the total number of Communes....
(b) The Italian Government have not yet. decided what local bodies or officials are to be voted for by the electorate. 14  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

A REFERENDUM ON THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION AFTER ALL
[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 5 Mar 46, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 1142]

1. Copy of draft decree adopted March 1 by Council of Ministers to be submitted to Consulta on March 5 for consideration has been sent to me by Prime Minister. To be held simultaneously with elections for Constituent Assembly, a "referendum" (actually a plebiscite) to resolve the institutional question is provided for. 15

2. If a republic is favored by a majority of voters, the decree further provides that a temporary Chief of the State will be elected by the Constituent Assembly. When this assembly drafts and approves the new constitution a Chief of the State will be appointed in accordance therewith.

3. The present regime of the "Luogotenente" will continue, if the majority vote against the constitution of the republic, until such time as a new constitution is decided upon by the Constituent Assembly and the new Chief of State shall come into power.

 

POLITICS ON THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION WILL NO LONGER HAVE TO WAIT
[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 27 May 46, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 89394]

1.... The United States Government and His Majesty's government have . . . agreed that they shall take the initiative for the purpose of removing all basis for possible charges that the Allies have, by failing to terminate the truce, impeded the activities of the political parties and thus prejudiced the results of the referendum....

2. Therefore, you should at once inform the Italian Government that in consideration of the issuance of the decree laws of the Constituent Assembly and the referendum, and because of the imminence of the referendum and the elections, the Allied Governments consider that the commitment given to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, by successive Italian Governments in respect to the institutional truce are no longer binding. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

ITALY VOTES FOR A REPUBLIC
[Local Govt Subcom, Rpt for Jun 46, ACC files, 10000/109/617]

♦ ♦ ♦ On 2 and 3 June the Referendum on the institutional form of the State was held.

On 18 June the Supreme Court of Cassation declared the final results:

Republic

Total of valid votes

12,717,923 = 54.2%

Monarchy

Total of valid votes

10,719,284 = 45.7%
 

Republican majority

1,998639 = 8.5%

♦ ♦ ♦ A close technical study of the procedure was made by officers of the Sub-Commission in Rome, Naples and Milan. AC Liaison Officers likewise observed the elections in typical parts of their districts. Full analysis and studies of the figures have since been made by the Sub-Commission.

The reports submitted by the Liaison Officers and by officers of the Sub-Commission, and the analyses and studies above-mentioned show that, in general:
(a) public order was good;
(b) the numbers voting were remarkably high;
(c) the procedure prescribed by law was properly followed. 16  ♦ ♦ ♦

[633]

5. THE PROSPECT OF AN EARLY AND SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT RECEDES

A NEW ITALY WHICH EXPECTS A NEW DISPENSATION IN THE PEACE TREATY
[Radio Address, 23 Jun 45, of Prime Minister Parri as Transmitted to Chief Cmsr, AC, 24 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

♦ ♦ ♦ We have laboriously risen from the depth of the abyss, an abyss of defeat and shame. Under the Fascist Facade a new Italy has appeared; a poor, desperate Italy, but an Italy anxious for its liberty, wounded in its sense of honor. An Italy which has felt the duty and the right of shedding also its blood for its own redemption. We have purified ourselves, fellow citizens, with the blood of our best sons. We have placed a seal of blood on fascism, so that every bridge would be broken and any return to the past would be impossible.

We have risen in the estimation of the world, and above all in that of the three great liberating countries. But we are still far away from the position as a great nation, that our history, our importance, our number assign to us, on equal level and at the side of the other nations united in the democratic construction of the world.

We must deserve this place. It will not be given to us as a gift. We must gain it day by day with our work, hard and serious work, above all in this period in which the course of history is moving most rapidly and is nearing decisive hours for the destiny of Italy.

The boundaries themselves of our country are at stake. Soon the problems and the conditions of peace will be under discussion. The hour of the unification of the North [Venezia Giulia ] with the peninsula-let us wish-is not distant. The Allies are showing full understanding of our needs, and it is in your name, Italians, that I express to the three great leaders the solemn thanks of the Italian people. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

MEANWHILE ITALY WANTS CHANGE IN ITS ARMISTICE STATUS
[Msg, U.S. Ambassador Kirk to the Secy of State, 11 Jul 45, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 9]

♦ ♦ ♦ Parri [the Italian Prime Minister] wound up [a conversation with the U.S. Ambassador] by saying that it is essential to change Italy's armistice status, because at every turn he finds his hands tied by the present regime.

 

THE UNITED STATES DESIRES A PEACE TREATY WHICH WILL ENSURE ITALY'S STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE
[Ltr, Acting Secy of State Grew, to Stimson, 15 Jun 45, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 9]

The British Government has proposed an exchange of views regarding desired topics for a treaty of peace with Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦

The general policy of this government is to assist and encourage the conversion of Italy into a stable element among the nations of Europe. The United States repudiates the theory of economic and political spheres of influence. We do not wish Italy to be under the predominant influence of any single power but to be politically and economically independent. Like other powers of her rank, Italy should be encouraged to look primarily to the international security organization for her security in the future. For the immediate post war period, it is our aim to impose only such restrictions on Italy as are necessary to safeguard other countries from Italian aggression; but in order that Italy may have a genuine independence that country should not be so reduced in its defensive forces as to invite aggression....

 

THE TREATY SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE ITALY'S FRIENDLINESS TO THE WEST
[Ltr, SACMED to the Br CofS Comm. on the Peace Treaty With Italy, 1o Aug 45, OPD files, 336, sec. 6]

2. From a study of the political background given in the Post Hostilities Planning Staff report .. . it appears that the treaty is to have the following objects:
a. To establish Italy as a useful and prosperous state.
b. To encourage Italy to be friendly towards us and to be a member of any Western European system which may emerge. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

WAR DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THE VITAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE PEACE TREATY
[Paper, Alternative Military and Air Clauses for the Treaty of Peace With Italy, p. 2, Prepared by OPD, 21 Sep 45, OPD files, 336, Italy, sec. 2]

♦ ♦ ♦ The underlying principle of this [American] policy is to encourage and to assist

[634]

the development of Italy as a friendly democratic state. The policy together with the underlying principle is now taken as a guide for the Treaty with Italy.

The American objective respecting Italy is to strengthen the country economically and politically to withstand the threat of totalitarianism and unfavorable political realignment. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

FOREIGN MINISTERS AT LONDON CONFERENCE DISAGREE ON ITALIAN PEACE SETTLEMENT
[Statement of Secy of State Byrnes, 4 Mar 47, before U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Dept of State Bull, XVI, 486-87]

♦ ♦ ♦ At London the American delegation insisted that there should be a peace conference so that other states which had fought the war should be given the opportunity to make the peace. The Soviet representative opposed the proposal and the Conference adjourned in complete disagreement. 17  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

OFFICE OF SACMED IS RETAINED TO KEEP CONTROL OF ITALY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN HANDS
[Msg (FAN 631), CCS to SACMED, 5 Dec 45, CCAC files, 334, AFHQ (5-25-45)]

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that Allied Force Headquarters and the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, should both be retained for the present, the matter being reviewed again in April 1946. 18

 

AC URGES THAT THE OBSOLETE ARMISTICE BE REPLACED
[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for AFHQ, 8 Dec 45. ACC files, 10000/136/91 ]

1. In your F-55392 of 5 Dec 45 you instructed me to send my views as to abrogating or modifying the terms of the Armistice without prejudice to Allied military requirements or to any question which will fail to be decided in the eventual peace settlement.

2. If we follow the public utterances of the leaders of the United Nations the terms of FAN 487 [CCS directive relaxing controls in Chapter XVII, sec. 8] and (notwithstanding certain restrictive financial directives received subsequently) the policy underlying those statements and directions: if we study the long terms of the Armistice and your commentary recently made thereon, we can arrive at only one conclusion, namely, that the Armistice is out of date; most of the clauses have been superseded by events, the remainder have with few exceptions been modified in implementation and the instrument, designed for the surrender of an enemy in war, enjoyed immediate modification as a result of cobelligerency during war and now is practically inapplicable. If it were thought that Italy was ready for a Treaty then it must be admitted that she is ready for a new formal relationship, which, while perhaps less than that of a member of the United Nations is certainly more than that of a defeated nation.

3. Moreover, from the purely practical point of view, an examination of the existing Armistice Terms demonstrates that any attempt to modify or abrogate the articles of the document piecemeal would leave an instrument so tattered and unbalanced as to be quite unsuitable.

4. We recommend, therefore, that the Armistice Terms be abrogated altogether and be replaced by an Agreement of which a proposed draft is attached. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

ITALIANS ARE BITTER OVER LACK OF INDEPENDENT STATUS
[Pietro Nenni, Speech at Mtg of the Central Comm. of the Socialist Party, 7 Jan 46, 34 ACC files, 10000/136/229]

♦ ♦ ♦ we owe them [the Allies] gratitude for the little daily bread and the little coal we have, for petrol and for raw materials. But to them to we owe our uncertainty as to our fate and the lack of independent national status. ♦ ♦ ♦

[635]

ITALY IS OFFERED A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH MINIMUM CONTROLS
[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to SACMED, 29 May 46, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 3676]

1. Paragraph 3 of this message contains the text of an agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime, which was approved on 16 May 1946 by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France. The agreement is to be signed between the Italian Government and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

2. It is desired that you submit the text of the agreement immediately to the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Government and inform him that, if the agreement meets with the approval of the Italian Government, you have been authorized to proceed with its signature simultaneously with the conclusion of separate agreements between the United States and Italy regarding the maintenance of United States and British Governments which will be submitted to the Italian Government in a very few days. As soon as the agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime has been communicated to the Italian President of the Council, you should arrange for its publication in Italy.

3......
1. The additional conditions of Armistice of September 29, 1943, are hereby abrogated.

2. Relations between the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet and French Governments, acting in the interest of the United Nations, and Italy, shall be governed by the Armistice of September 3d, 1943, as modified by the present agreement.

3. The Allied Commission is hereby abolished. 19  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT NOW SEEMS INTERESTED ONLY IN THE PEACE TERMS
[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 31 Jul 46, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 6517]

Now advised by Prime Minister that owing to engrossment of Council of Ministers principally with consideration of Peace Treaty .. . it does not seem likely that comments of Government on the British and American agreements accompanying the proposed revised armistice can be transmitted before his departure on 28 July for Paris.

Comment of Chief Commissioner, with which I agree, is that the Government prefers not to take a position . . . until they see at forthcoming peace conference how Italy will fare.

 

6. RETURN OF AMG TERRITORY CONTINUES NOTWITHSTANDING OBSTACLES

WITH END OF HOSTILITIES MORE TERRITORY IS RETURNED DESPITE YUGOSLAV OBJECTION
[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 8 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 2603]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. From administrative, political and economic viewpoints it is now possible to return to Italian Government further territory. Most desirable that as many AMG officers as possible should be made available for North. A further advantage of transfer now is show of confidence in and support to Italian Government.

2. Allied Commission was therefore given authority to arrange transfer following territory on 10 May to Italian jurisdiction, subject obtaining approval Advisory Council for Italy: Provinces of Macerata, Ascoli Piceno, Perugia, Terni. Pesaro, Arezzo, Siena, Grosseto and Ancona less port of Ancona.

3. At Advisory Council Meeting 4 May .. . Yugoslav delegate personally objected to further return to Italian Government of territory as long as Italy objected to transfer of territory to Jugoslav Government....

4. The above-mentioned territory is purely Italian and its ultimate disposition could raise no question. Accordingly it is felt that restoration should take place in accordance with original plans even if consent . . . not obtained by 10 May. We propose to proceed in this manner unless instructions from you are to the contrary. 20  ♦ ♦ ♦

[636]

SOME THINK AVOWED ITALIAN UNREADINESS MUST BE CONSIDERED
[Ltr, Col C. H. A. French, Rgnl Cmsr, Umbria-Marche Rgn, for Exec Cmsr, AC, 15 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/583]

1. I write of a subject which, whenever territory is handed back to the Italian Government, is brought home very forcibly to the Regional and Provincial Commissioners whose territories are being returned.

2. I met this problem at Syracuse and Catania, at Foggia and Campobasso, when the Abruzzi Region was given back, and more forcibly than ever, just recently in the present handover.

3. I refer, of course, to the complaint by the Italians that we hand back too quickly. The reasons given are always the same.
(a) that they have been under a dictatorship for over 20 years and have not the ability at present to govern themselves.
(b) Freedom of speech has been denied them during this period of dictatorship and now that this freedom has been given back to them and they are not afraid of expressing their ideas, they continually quarrel amongst themselves.
(c) they require someone to whom they can turn in case of trouble.
(d) Watching our methods of administration for a few months has only confused them and is not long enough for them to obtain a well grounded experience. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

FURTHER RESTORATION INDICATES FAITH IN ITALY'S SELF-GOVERNING ABILITY
[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for Secy of Advisory Council for Italy, 8 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/583]

1. With the rapid evacuation to the North of Allied Troops from the remaining provinces of Toscana, the Supreme Allied Commander on my recommendation has come to the conclusion that restoration of certain additional provinces to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government in the immediate future is desirable. Not only does a further restoration of territory at the present time indicate a continuing faith on the part of the Allies in the ability of the Italian people to govern themselves, but enables a number of valuable specialist staff officers to be released for work in the North.

2. I have to inform you, therefore, that the Supreme Allied Commander proposes to restore to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, as of 0001 hours, Tuesday, 19 June 1945, the following provinces:
Firenze
Pisa
Pistoia
Livorno

The communes of Livorno, Pisa and Colle Salvetti will be excluded from this transfer owing to the great importance of the port of Livorno, the great destruction there and to the presence in these communes of extensive Allied Military supply dumps. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

REDEPLOYMENT NEEDS COMPEL RETENTION OF NAPLES BUT NOT OF ANCONA
[Msg, AFHQ to CCAC, MAT-845, 30 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/583]

♦ ♦ ♦ Allied Commission being instructed to advise Advisory Council For Italy in advance that no objection seen to hand-over Ancona Commune to Italian jurisdiction. Under present conditions, not believed practical to restore Naples Commune. During current heavy movement of troops and material through that port in connection with redeployment of Allied troops in this theater, change in jurisdiction is not desirable.

 

MORE TERRITORY IN THE NORTH IS RESTORED
[Proclamation 16F, SACMED, 4 Aug 45, ACC files, 10000/109/5831

♦ ♦ ♦ Allied Military Government established by me or my predecessor and all Proclamations and Orders heretofore issued by me or by him or under my or his authority in that portion of Italy comprising the Provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, Forli, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, Reggio, Emilia, Apuania and Lucca are hereby terminated as of 2359 hours on the 4th day of August 1945. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

ITALIAN TERRITORY SHOULD NO LONGER BE HELD MERELY AS A MILITARY CONVENIENCE
[Memo, Brig Gen Archelaus L. Hamblen, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for AFHQ Authorities, 26 Aug 45, MTO, HS files, 387.4-2, G-5, AFHQ]

I. Headquarters, Allied Commission in their Signal 4089 of 22 August (MC-IN 13741) recommend that the Communes of Livorno, Pisa, Colle Salvetti and Naples should be handed back from AMG Control to Italian Government administration at the same time as the rest of Northern Italy (less disputed territories). A recommendation to hand back AMG territory in the North

[637]

of Italy is now being considered by this Headquarters.

2. It will be remembered that AMG was retained in the Communes referred to in para I above although all surrounding areas have been handed back, in order that the military base installations and port facilities in Naples and Leghorn should be adequately safeguarded.

3. The following observations are made in regard to the handback of these Communes being reconsidered:
a. It is the policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (as laid down in FAN 536) to restore Italian Metropolitan territory to Italian administration under the supervision of the Allied Commission, with the exception of certain specified territories which do not include the Communes under reference.
b. It is considered that port operations in Naples and Leghorn will not in any way be prejudiced by the relinquishment of AMG control. Military installations can be safeguarded in exactly the same way as anywhere else in Italian Government territory.
c. The time has come when AMG can no longer be retained merely as a "convenience." Only for reasons of vital military necessity can AMG be retained in these areas. 21

 

REPEATED EFFORTS TO PRY THREE ISLANDS LOOSE FROM NAVAL AUTHORITIES
[Memo, Hamblen, ACofS, G-5 AFHQ, for CinC, Mediterranean, 12 Oct 45, MTO, HS files, 347.4-2 G-5 AFHQ]

2. The matter [of transferring to the Italian Government Pantelleria, Lampedusa, and Linosa] was first raised on 17 October 1944, while operations were still in progress. C-in-C Med [Mediterranean], then replied:

"It is highly undesirable from the Naval point of view that these islands should be released from Allied Military Government at this juncture. C-in-C Med, is in consequence unable to agree." ♦ ♦ ♦

3. The matter was raised again on 22 August 1945 when it was considered that all operational reasons for retaining the islands had ceased to be valid.
C-in-C Med. replied:
"C-in-C Med. is still unable to agree to the transfer of these islands to Italian jurisdiction."  ♦ ♦ ♦

4. . . . It is presumed that you are aware that only two Allied personnel are on duty in these areas at present and that the practical result of the transfer simply means that governmental agencies derive their authority from the Italian Government and not from SACMED: that the transfer has nothing to do with the future disposition of these areas; and that if necessary the same two individuals can be retained for liaison purposes. ♦ ♦ ♦

5. In view of these conditions it is considered that the CG MTOUSA is justified in requesting that you detail your objections so that he may inform the War Department. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

[Memo, CofS, CinC Mediterranean for ACofS, G-5 AFHQ, 30 Oct 45, MTO, HS files, 387.4-2, G-5, AFHQ]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, no longer objects to the transfer of control to the Italian Government. He is, however, of the opinion that steps should be taken to limit Italian activities on the islands to ones similar to those already authorized. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

FINALLY AN AUTHORIZATION TO RETURN THE REST OF ITALY-WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS
[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 8 Dec 45, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 87681]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. All areas in Italy, including the province of Bolzano and the Communes of Colle Salvetti, Livorno, Naples and Pisa, and the Fortress Islands of Lampedusa, Linosa, and Pantelleria, but excepting Udine Province and that portion of Venezia Giulia West of the Morgan Line, will be returned to Italian Administration as soon as possible and in any case NO longer than 21 days after receipt of this Directive....

2. Simultaneously, in respect of any territories which may be retained under AMG, all command functions of ALCOM over AMG will be performed by XIII Corps, reporting directly to AFHQ. Military personnel detached from duty with ALCOM will NOT be utilized as AFHQ Liaison to ALCOM.

3. At times of handover you should inform Italian Government and make public announcement to include statements that:
a. Udine is retained solely for military reasons and NOT because it is considered a disputed area.
b. Return of Bolzano is without prejudice to final disposal of Province under Peace Treaty at which Italian rights will receive full consideration.

[638]

4. As regards Lampedusa, Linosa, and Pantelleria, handback of these Provinces should be made at the same time, subject to your obtaining agreement of Italian Government to:
a. Their demilitarization.
b. Your retaining right of inspection to ensure that demilitarization is maintained. You should provide, if you think it necessary, for Allied Officers to be stationed there, as in other parts of Italy administered by Italian Government, to ensure that Allied Military interests are safeguarded. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AC OBTAINS AN ASSURANCE ON MINORITY RIGHTS IN BOLZANO
[Ltr, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Prime Minister de Gasperi, 22  8 Jan 46, ACC files, 10000/136/288]

♦ ♦ ♦ If the Italian Government could say quite simply, that it was not their intention to turn out of Bolzano any Sud Tiroler born there, whether he opted for Germany in 1939 or not, then, I believe that a very constructive step would have been taken towards a local peaceful settlement. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

[Ltr, De Gasperi to Chief Cmsr Stone, 25 Jan 46, ACC files, 10000/136/288]

♦ ♦ ♦ I am happy to confirm that the Italian Government, faithful to the traditions of democratic Italy, tending to respect the rights and claims of the minorities, has no intention whatever of expelling such German speaking citizens as remained there permanently even if they voted for German citizenship. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSES ITALIAN GRATITUDE FOR AMG'S WORK
[Ltr, Prime Minister de Gasperi to Stone, CCAC, 1 Jan 46, CAD files, 005.7 (3-16-43)(1), sec. 1]

Since the greatest part of the national territory is now being handed back to Italian Administration, it is a pleasure for me to tell you how deeply the 'Italian Government appreciates the work done by the Allied Military Government for over two years, through memorable events, against all kinds of difficulties and with unchanged feelings of sympathy towards our country.

Such feelings were always answered by those of the population, who considered the organizers of the Allied Military Government sincere collaborators of our reconstruction, while it welcomed the victorious soldiers of the United Nations as liberators.

I am happy to remind you that while the liberation war was raging, AMG had to cope with the worst difficulties: keep away the ghost of famine, bring relief to the refugees, prevent the spreading of epidemics, rehabilitate public services and private industry in devastated areas.

The way in which such difficulties were overcome with intelligence, energy and abundant means will remain a vivid and grateful memory with the Italians.

I beg you my dear Admiral to express to the Allied Military Government the gratitude of the Italian Government and the Italian Nation, and I trust that the friendly attitude inspired by the action of the United Nations will be maintained and confirmed.

 

7. RESIDUAL CONTROLS ARE FURTHER CURTAILED

WITH CONCLUSION OF HOSTILITIES ARMY AREAS BECOME MORE PERMISSIVE
[Paper, Political Activities in North Italy, Submitted by Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ to SACMED's Political Comm., 29 May 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, G-5:0001 ]

1. The arrest on 25 May of Nenni, the Socialist Party Leader, on the ground that he had addressed an unauthorized public meeting in the 5th Army area, has drawn attention to the desirability, now that hostilities are over, of ensuring that the same provisions concerning the holding of political meetings should be applicable in Army areas as those which apply in areas behind the Army boundaries under Regional AMG administration. 23

6. There is no evidence that the meeting which Nenni addressed was disorderly, or could reasonably have been expected to become so, or that it would interfere with Allied Military activities. It appears that the refusal to grant a permit for the meeting was due to an excess of zeal on the part of a local AMG officer with

[639]

in the Army area. It is felt, accordingly, that the instruction contemplated above would serve to clarify the position within Army areas and would prevent incidents occurring in the future. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

[AFHQ Instrs to 15th AGp, 7 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

♦ ♦ ♦ Consider that now hostilities have ceased, permits to hold political meetings should be granted in Army areas as matter of course provided such meetings are not likely to cause public disturbances or interfere with normal Allied military activities.♦ ♦ ♦

 

RELAXATION OF CONTROLS IS REAFFIRMED IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS
[Ltr, Prime Minister Parri to Chief Cmsr, AC, 22 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

On behalf of the Royal Italian Government I accept all obligations towards the Allies entered into by the former Italian Government since the conclusion of the Armistice signed on the 3d September, 1943. It is understood that the rights under the Armistice and surrender instrument with respect to control of the Italian Government will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs. 24

 

FISCAL CONTROLS LIFTED ONLY PARTIALLY AND CONDITIONALLY
[Ltr, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Parri, 18 Jul 45, 25  ACC files, 10000/107/470]

2. In order to implement further the declaration of 26 September, 1944, by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain regarding Italy, I am now directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to inform your Government that the intervention of the Allied Commission in Italian fiscal matters and other internal financial affairs will in future be confined to cases involving Allied military necessity. The Allied Commission will assist or advise your Government on financial matters in territory under your jurisdiction only when your Government specifically requests such advice or assistance, which will be given at a high level between the senior officers of this Commission and appropriate officials of your Government.

3. I am further directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to inform your Government that, subject to certain exceptions and conditions which are indicated below, it is no longer necessary to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission prior to the execution of Italian external financial transactions.

4. The exceptions to this general rule are as follows:
(a) the Italian Government is requested to consult with the Allied Commission before authorizing the use of Italian external assets for the purpose of paying claims arising prior to 8 September 1943. Thus all questions relating to the settlement of Italian clearing accounts should be discussed with this Commission before any action is taken.
(b) the Italian Government is requested to direct its exchange control and other appropriate authorities to consult with the Allied Commission before authorizing any external financial transactions undertaken by Italian insurance companies or involving the foreign branches or subsidiaries of such companies.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have stated that, as a condition of the relaxation of Allied control over Italian external financial transactions, the Italian Government is required to keep the Allied Commission fully informed as to the status of Italian external assets [and] of Italian external financial transactions. ♦ ♦ ♦

6. In conjunction with the relaxation of controls indicated in this letter, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed me to inform your Government that it will be expected to take the following steps:
(a) to establish and maintain an effective foreign exchange control agency.
(b) to adopt measures in support of the economic warfare objective of Allied Governments. 26  ♦ ♦ ♦

[640]

WITH THE CONTINUING WAR ONLY EXPORT CONTROLS CAN BE LIFTED
[Ltr, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Prime Minister Parri, 31 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/1945]

1. I wish to inform you that after 31 July 1945, the activities of this Allied Commission with respect to Italy's exports, will terminate. This decision refers equally to the territory which has already been returned to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and to the territory which is at present under Allied Military Government. This means that the Allied Commission will no longer act as a channel of communication for export orders or for matters referring to the procurement or implementation of such orders.

3. There are certain controls which it will be necessary for the Allied Commission to continue to retain, over Italy's export activities:
(a) In order that the Allied military and civilian supply program may not be impaired by conflicting export activities, the Allied Commission will not continue to screen all declarations of exportable surpluses, [but] will require monthly statistics of exports effected after 31 July 1945, and will have access to all other relevant data.
(b) The Allied Commission will continue to be responsible for insuring that those commodities which have been declared exportable by your Government and which fall under Category "A" ... 27  are reported to the appropriate Allied authorities and are subsequently exported to the country which such authorities shall specify. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

MANY MONTHS BEFORE ITALY CAN RESUME PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
[Commerce Subcom Rpt, for Nov 45, ACC files, 10000/ 109/842]

2. (a) Progress ... was made during the month by the Italian Government's recognition of the Proclaimed and Statutory lists. As soon as these "black lists" had been recognized the Italians were perfectly free (so far as the Allied Governments were concerned) to start private trading immediately.
(b) The delay in so doing has been due to the necessity for the Italian Government to complete the setting up of the machinery required for the smooth functioning of private trade under those controls which the Italian Government desire to establish. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

[Msg (FAN-634), CCS to SACMED, 8 Dec 45, ACC files, 10000/109/5851

5. You are completely relieved of Italian supply responsibility except for Venezia Giulia and Province of Udine. Supplies will be the concern of the Civilian Departments of the United States and United Kingdom Governments or the Italian Government programs. Pending further instruction, you should, as President of the Allied Commission, continue to advise and assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programs of supplies for the areas covered by its programs 28  and, when such programs have been established by the Italian Government, review and transmit them with appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee which will transmit them to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the United States and British Governments. You may also give assistance to the Italian Government in connection with the preparation of bids for transportation for the supplies when received in Italy. In addition, as Military Commander, you will have the right to communicate with the United States and United Kingdom Governments on supply matters affecting the security or redeployment of your troops. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

IT IS POLITICALLY INDISCREET TO ENFORCE ALL OUR RIGHTS
[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 5 Nov 46, ACC files, 10000/136/123]

1. Paragraph 3 of the so-called Macmillan Memorandum of 24 February 1945 requires the Italian Government to keep the Allied Commission generally informed of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments. Notwithstanding this obligation, difficulty has been experienced in securing full compliance. . . . This question was subsequently the subject of correspondence with Prime Ministers Bonomi and Parri and Foreign Minister De Gasperi in 1945 and culminated in a renewed and satisfactory pledge by Prime Minister Parri on 24 August 1945....

2. . . . recent news dispatches in the Italian press gave indication that the Italian Government had concluded a commercial treaty with

[641]

Poland without notification to the Allied Commission....

4. My recommendation is that . . . violation, inadvertent or deliberate, of paragraph 3 of the Macmillan Memorandum by the Italian Government cannot be condoned. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

[Ltr, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Chief Cmsr, AC, 12 Dec 46, ACC files, 10000/136/39]

The Supreme Allied Commander is cognizant of the violation of the "MacMillan Memorandum" but considers it inadvisable to approach the Italian Government on this subject, at this time. 29  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

8. HOW SOON CAN AC BE CLOSED DOWN OR CIVILIANIZED ?

FORECAST OF CLOSE-OUT TIME IS OPTIMISTIC DESPITE TROUBLED AREAS
[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for CAO, AFHQ, 15 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/256]

3. It is estimated that the winding up of the Regions will take approximately one month. Provincial Commissioners with their civil affairs and police staffs will be withdrawn to Regional Headquarters on September 1st. But the Allied Commission will have to continue until October 1st in nearly full operation and, if to be liquidated, will take until November 1st or even later to dissolve. This fits in pretty well with the life of AFHQ predicted by SACMED at four months. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AFHQ BELIEVES AC SHOULD BE RETAINED UNTIL THE PEACE TREATY
[Memo, Gen William Morgan, CofS, AFHQ, for Dir of CA, Br WO, 7 Sep 45, MTO, HS files, G5, AFHQ]

3. Although it should be possible to make considerable reductions after the handover of Northern Italy, it will still be necessary to retain the framework of the Allied Commission until such time as the Armistice Terms are superseded by the Peace Treaty. This will be required to perform the following main functions:
a. To co-ordinate Civil Supply matters until such time as this function is assumed by UNRRA or other agency.
b. To act as the agency through which SACMED can give advice to and maintain adequate liaison with the Italian Government.
c. To control AMG operations in residual AMG territories. The latter will for the most part consist of Venezia Giulia where Allied Commission control will be of a technical and not a policy nature. At the present moment this technical control cannot be undertaken by this headquarters [AFHQ] as the necessary machinery and staff do not exist....

4. I do not think it would be desirable or possible for the Allied Commission to be absorbed into Allied Force Headquarters. Presumably there will be no Allied Commission after the Peace Treaty. It is therefore not worthwhile taking such a large step for only a short period. Furthermore both the U.S. and British Commands in this theatre are about to be reorganized making it well nigh impossible to effect this absorption. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AGAIN A PROPOSAL TO DEMILITARIZE AC AND AGAIN THE ANSWER THAT CIVILIANS ARE NOT AVAILABLE
[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for Maj Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, CofS, AFHQ, 10 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/69] 30

3. . . . It has been, naturally, the objective of the War Departments in Washington and London to be relieved of military responsibility, but few steps have been taken by the Governments on either side of the Atlantic to assist in civilianization by producing either in quality or in quantity the officials necessary to fulfill even the residual functions of the Commission contained in various directives from the CCS. . . . Absenteeism persists in that FEA personnel cannot be relied upon to remain for more than sixty days, and since the recent changes in the constitution of FEA, there has been evidence of a very general desire on the part of such civilians to return to the U.S. rapidly. On the British side

[642]

practically no civilian personnel have been provided. It is generally accepted in London that it is impossible to secure their services. ♦ ♦ ♦

5. The result of the detachment of military personnel from the Commission would leave the Commission to function with 50 American and 13 British civilians. . . . The Allied Commission has many responsibilities-some residual, some laid down in CCS directives such as FAN 487 and subsequent telegrams, and some on which policy has been requested.
(a) Displaced Persons. Many thousands of such persons are in process of movement and will remain moving for many months to come. In August 180,000 Italians alone came through the Brenner Pass. Some 20 camps and 20 collection centers are in operation. Over 100 Officers are employed. UNRRA, the ultimate organization to handle these people, is quite unprepared to take over fully and will be unready for months to come. So far as displaced persons are concerned, the implementation of the directive would create chaos, suffering, and political repercussion.
(b) I.P.O.W. Many hundred thousands IPOW remain to be repatriated. Withdrawal of Allied Officers from this work would create the same conditions as those described in the preceding paragraph.
(c) Civil Supplies. UNRRA is not ready to take over. Present CCS directives place the responsibility in AC. The Commission is working on the principle that UNRRA must take over in time (probably 1 January) and a scheme of coordination to this effect is in operation. The removal of Allied military personnel before UNRRA takes over would undoubtedly lead to the total breakdown of civil supplies and their distribution.
(d) Coal. Civil requirements for Italy is a responsibility of the Allied Commission. This section is staffed by Allied officers. Their removal would involve a similar breakdown.
(e) Rehabilitation of Industry and the guidance of the Industrial Councils is in the hands of Allied Officers. If assistance to Italy in this respect is to remain, the present personnel must remain.
(f) War Material Disposal. Much remains to be done. Military personnel are employed.

6. Above are a few of the responsibilities which exist. Policy on others has been requested. Are we to assist Italy in the elections, in the field of Public Security, in her education towards a democratic way of life, in the preparation of a Bill of Rights for her people?

7. The Directive removes from Italy the service of Officers who for over two years have labored to assist Italy; who have gained a wealth of experience and knowledge in so doing both in the field of Italian economics and political administration. This surely cannot be considered sound policy. The quality of the civilians so far introduced, with a few exceptions, has generally been inferior, their experience necessarily smaller and their contacts fewer. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AFHQ DISAGREES WITH THE CCS ON DECREE OF CURTAILMENT POSSIBLE
[Paper of G-5 on Agenda for Conf at AFHQ, 6-7 Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/136/69]

2. On 29 November 1945, [OPD, CM-OUT 85940] the Combined Chiefs of Staff asked for the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on a draft directive on the reorganization of Allied Commission. This directive virtually reduced the Allied Commission to the status of a co-ordinating body of the Service Sub-Commissions, 31  with the residual function of acting as the Supreme Allied Commander's mouthpiece for enforcing any of his reserved rights under the Armistice Terms which he might find it necessary to invoke. The present functions of Allied Commission in regard to AMG in Venezia Giulia and Udine were to be transferred to HQ XIII Corps who would report directly to AFHQ.

3. The AFHQ view was that it was inexpedient at this stage to dispense with the services of the Chief Commissioner and his staff in connection with Civil Affairs and AMG matters, of which they had wide experience and for the handling of which a working organization was already in being Moreover there were certain Civil Affairs functions, e.g.; Advice on Local Government procedure in connection with the Italian elections and the review of AMG sentences, which the Allied Commission had already undertaken and which could not conveniently be transferred to any other body. Staff Sections to deal with those functions would therefore have to remain in the Allied Commission, even though the Chief Commissioner was relieved of his functions in connection with AMG.

These views were embodied in AFHQ signal ... of 12 December 1945 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff . . . which virtually recommended a continuation of the status quo, subject to a gradual reduction in the size of the Allied Commission as its various functions became re-

[643]

dundant or were transferred to other agencies, e.g.: the British and U.S. Embassies. 32  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

THE CCS DIRECTS AC TO REDUCE ITS FUNCTIONS
[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to Gen William Morgan, 18 Mar 46, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 81110, Fan-650]

1. After careful examination of your recommendations in MAT 965, it is not considered that paragraph 2 of FAN 634 which instructs that "All Command functions of ALCOM over AMG will be performed by 13th Corps, reporting directly to AFHQ" will be sufficiently implemented. This instruction applies to control and technical advice as well as to policy direction previously coming from subcommissions of ALCOM. 33

2. It is desired to reduce the functions of ALCOM more radically. This should be accomplished by elimination of subcommissions after their functions have been transferred to other agencies. All directives previously issued to these subcommissions will lapse.

3. Only absolutely minimum functions should be retained by ALCOM for a temporary period. These functions should be reduced by you as rapidly as practicable and the Combined Chiefs of Staff advised when, in your opinion, they serve no useful purpose and can be terminated.

4. It is understood that, in order to maintain liaison with the Italian Government, a small part of your G-5 Staff may have to be located in Rome. That staff will form part of AFHQ instead of ALCOM. Retention of subcommission structure in AFHQ is considered unnecessary in either Caserta or Rome. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

AC FUNCTIONS ARE CURTAILED BUT ARE STILL SUBSTANTIAL
[Memo, Hamblen, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Chief Cmsr, AC, 9 Apr 46, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

1. In FAN 650 [above] the Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed a more radical reduction of the functions of the Allied Commission....

5. The Allied Commission will be reorganized under the Chief Commissioner to consist of an Executive Branch and the three Service Sub-Commissions (Land, Naval and Air). No other Sub-Commission organization will be set up. Except for the Service Sub-Commissions all residual functions of the Commission will be covered in the Executive Branch.

6. The Commission is authorized to advise the Italian Government on Local Government matters until the Italian Government elections which are now scheduled for 2 June 1946. Liaison Groups of a minimum size will be maintained in the disputed area of Bolzano and on the Franco-Italian frontier. The Commission is authorized to give high level advice on economic and other problems, listed in paragraph 7 a, b and c below, and will continue temporarily to perform remaining export functions as directed by the C.C.S. No executive functions in economic matters will be carried out. The Commission will continue to perform the functions of the former Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission. Urgent steps will be taken to terminate the military phase of handling displaced persons and to complete the transfer of responsibility for their care to UNRRA, after which the residual functions of the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission will pass to AFHQ. The Commission will relinquish all command functions over military government territory, including not only policy direction but technical advice and control as well. 34

7. On the effective date of these instructions, G-5 AFHQ will in addition to its present responsibilities become responsible for all residual functions of the Allied Commission except:
a. Those pertaining to the enforcement of the Armistice Terms.
b. Those of advising the Italian Government as listed in paragraph 6 supra.
c. Such other functions as SACMED may from time to time direct. The functions for which responsibility will thus pass to AFHQ will include those now being performed, or in the past have been performed, by the Captured Enemy Materials, Food, Labour, Education, Legal, Agriculture, Industry, Utilities and Fuel, Foreign Trade, Commerce, Communications, Public Safety, Public Health, Public Relations, Transportation, Shipping, Fine Arts, and Finance Sub-Commissions and/or branches. In respect to AMG Territories, G-5 AFHQ will be responsible for all Civil Affairs including import programming on military account.

[644]

8. To perform the functions set forth in paragraph 7 supra, there will be set up in Rome a G-5 AFHQ Administrative Echelon. It will deal with the Italian Government on the ministerial and lower levels in matters not involving major policies. In major policies and in all matters pertaining to implementation of the Armistice Terms and pertaining to the residual functions of the Allied Commission, contact with the Italian Government will be made by the Commission....

 

FOR THIS HISTORIANS OWE THANKS
[Paraphrase of Msg, SACMED to CCS, 8 Apr 46, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 338 (NAF 11.28)]

1. . . . It is the considered opinion here, after detailed examination and long discussion, that the records of the Allied Commission should be treated differently from records of a purely military nature. . . . Rather than of strictly military interest they will be of permanent primary interest for historical research in Economic, Social, and Political fields as records of an initial effort in Allied Military Government.

3. It is recommended in view of the above:
A. That microfilm copies of the original documents be sent to the War Office and the War Department and that the original documents be placed in a central depository as properly arranged archives. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

9. THE PEACE TREATY AND SUBSEQUENT U.S.-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PROTESTS THE PROPOSED PEACE TREATY
[Msg, U.S. Embassy at Rome to Secy of State, 21 Jan 47, WDSCA files, 014, Italy, sec. 2]

Nenni . . . handed me note concerning final draft of Italian treaty which points out that none of requests for modification of original clauses of draft treaty presented by Italian Government in Paris have been heeded; that treaty shocks national conscience, particularly territorial clauses; and that finally under those circumstances Foreign Ministry must express most explicit reserve and ask that principle of revision of treaty on basis of bilateral accords with interested states under control and within framework of UNO be recognized. 35  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT IN THE TREATY OF PEACE
[Treaty of Peace Between Italy and the Allied and Associated Powers, 10 February 1947, Dept of State Publ 2743, European Series 21]

♦ ♦ ♦ Whereas Italy under the Fascist regime became a party to the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Japan, undertook a war of aggression and thereby provoked a state of war with all the Allied and Associated Powers and with other United Nations, and bears her share of responsibility for the war; and Whereas in consequence of the victories of the Allied forces, and with the assistance of the democratic elements of the Italian people, the Fascist regime in Italy was overthrown on July 25, 1943, and Italy, having surrendered unconditionally, signed terms of Armistice on September 3 and 29 of the same year; and Whereas after the said Armistice Italian armed forces, both of the Government and of the Resistance Movement, took an active part in the war against Germany, and Italy declared war on Germany as from October 13, 1943, and thereby became a co-belligerent against Germany; and Whereas the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy are desirous of concluding a treaty of peace which, in conformity with the principles of justice, will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the events hereinbefore recited and will form the basis of friendly relations between them, thereby enabling the Allied and Associated Powers to support Italy's application to become a member of the United Nations and also to adhere to any convention concluded under the auspices of the United Nations;

Have therefore agreed to declare the cessation of the state of war and for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty of Peace. 36  ♦ ♦ ♦

[645]

U.S. SEEMS TO HAVE DONE THE BEST IT COULD FOR ITALY AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE
[Statement of Secy of State Byrnes before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 4 Mar 47, Dept of State Bull, XVI, 487-89]

I might recall that the settlement involving Trieste was the most controversial aspect of our long negotiations. . . . The United States originally proposed that the area west of an ethnic line drawn after careful study by American experts should be the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia, leaving the Italian populations of Pola and Trieste joined to Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦

Yugoslavia supported by Soviet Russia urged the establishment of its frontier even to the west of Italy's pre-19i8 boundary. For its contribution to Allied victory Yugoslavia asked to be awarded the whole of Venezia Giulia. Its representatives claimed that the western littoral including the city of Trieste should be joined to its Slav hinterland in spite of the fact that this area was predominantly Italian.

Because of the mingling of the two nationalities throughout the Venezia Giulia area, numerous Italian elements of the population will now be placed under Yugoslav sovereignty. However, the new line does establish a certain balance between the two ethnic groups, and the establishment of the Free Territory does insure home rule to the people of the Trieste area under international guaranties. ♦ ♦ ♦

I am reconciled to the compromise for another reason-my fears as to what would have happened had our proposal been agreed to and Trieste given to Italy. Representatives of Yugoslavia had announced their determination to do everything in their power to take over Trieste. Nationals of Yugoslavia were daily moving into the city. After the treaty became effective and the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain returned home, it is probable there would be rioting in Trieste. Yugoslavia would declare it necessary to quell the rioting on its border and troops would be sent into Trieste. A disarmed Italy could not stop them.♦ ♦ ♦

While the United States did not oppose the requirement that Italy contribute to the rehabilitation of the countries she had invaded, we found difficulty in accepting reparation proposals which were put forward by the various claimant countries. Italy has few raw materials and has relied for her living primarily on the ability of her people to work, that is, by processing goods for export. ♦ ♦ ♦

After many months of discussion a formula was found for dealing with the Italian reparation problem which appeared to constitute a reasonable compromise between the conflicting viewpoints. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

U.S. WILL FURNISH ITALY RELIEF SUPPLIES
[Agreement Between United States and Italy, 3 July 1947, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 98]

♦ ♦ ♦ Article I. Furnishing of Supplies
 (a) the program of assistance to be furnished shall consist of such types and quantities of supplies, and procurement, storage, transportation and shipping services related thereto, as may be determined from time to time by the United States Government after consultation with the Italian Government in accordance with the Public Law 84, Both Congress, May 31, I947, and any Acts amendatory or supplementary thereto. Such supplies shall be confined to certain basic essentials of life, namely, food, medical supplies, processed and unprocessed material for clothing, fertilizer, pesticides, fuel, and seeds.
(b) Subject to the provisions of Article III, 37  the United States Government will make no request, and will have no claim, for payment for United States relief supplies and services furnished under this Agreement. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

THE U.S. RENOUNCES WAR CLAIMS AGAINST ITALY
[Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S.A. and Italy Regarding Settlement of Wartime Claims, 14 Aug 47, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 373]

9. The Government of the United States of America, recognizing the contribution of Italy towards the winning of the war by Italian action since October 13, 1943, and recognizing the conditions and terms of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and of various clauses of this financial agreement, agrees to renounce and waive claims of the Government of the United States of America or its agencies arising out of the following connections:
(a) Civilian supplies furnished, prior to the effective date of this Memorandum of Understanding, under the military relief program;
(b) Dollars transferred or to be transferred to Italy, equivalent to the net lira expenditures of the United States armed forces in Italy; and
(c) Supplies procured with funds appropriated for the purposes of the Lend-Lease Act

[646]

and transferred to Italy through the agency of the United States Department of War. 38  ♦ ♦ ♦

 

10. AT LONG LAST CLOSE-OUT

AC IS ABOLISHED AND ITS FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED TO AFHQ
[AFHQ Staff Memo 3, 31 Jan 47, ACC files, 10000/136/39)

1. Abolition of Allied Commission
 In conformity with the instructions contained in Combined Chiefs of Staff Signal FAN 711, 11 January 1947, the Allied Commission is abolished with effect from 2359 hours, 31 January 1947

2. Reorganization of Office of Chief Civil Affairs Officer
 a. In addition to the functions set forth in Staff Memorandum 48, AFHQ, 14 May 1944, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, is hereby designated as Chief Civil Affairs Officer. He will assume the duties of that office coincidently with the abolition of the Allied Commission. He is charged with responsibility for:
(1) Technical control and advice to all Allied Military Government Agencies, but not of the Italian Military Affairs Section, AFHQ. ... He will exercise operational command over such agencies outside of Zone A, Venezia-Giulia. Operational command over AMG agencies in Venezia-Giulia is vested in G.O.C.-in-C., CMF.
(2) The final review over all Military Government Court cases which in conformity with existing instructions are referred to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
(3) The Administration of Allied Civil Affairs agencies and camps for displaced persons, and for the repatriation of the inmates thereof.
(4) The programming of all AMG imports.
(5) The maintenance and disposition of files and records of the Allied Commission except those pertaining directly to the Armed Forces Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission. These latter records will be maintained and disposed of in accordance with instructions to be issued in due course.
(6) Liaison with the Italian Government in connection with the functions herein set forth or as directed by the Supreme Allied Commander.
(7) Such other matters pertaining to Civil Affairs and Military Government as may be directed by the Supreme Allied Commander from time to time. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

PROPOSAL FOR HANDLING RESIDUAL ALLIED FUNCTIONS AFTER ABOLITION OF AFHQ
[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 11 Feb 47, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 2265, NAF-1277]

1. After abolition of AFHQ, residual Allied functions will exist. By integrating the G-5 Sections on a co-operative basis, these allied duties can be performed as long as MTO and CMF are functioning.

2. By R plus go days all residual allied functions cannot be completed.39  After R plus go days the Historical Section AFHQ, the Allied Forces Record Administration (AFRA), the Allied Financial Agency (AFA), and the Allied Supply Accounting Agency (ASAA) must complete their tasks. A considerable volume of residual allied business in addition which, it is anticipated, cannot be decentralized to other National Agencies or Embassies, will have to be trans acted with the Italian Government for an unspecified period after R Day. Matters related to Civil Affairs will be the greater part of such business.

3. Upon disbandment of AFHQ it is proposed that, in order to ensure the early completion of these functions, a Military Liquidating Agency (MLA) be organized. . . . It is proposed that MLA be comprised of separate U.K. and U.S. military units. These will be integrated where necessary and will maintain close liaison under

[647]

coequal commanders who will report directly to War Office and War Department. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

PROBLEM OF UNREPATRIABLE DISPLACED PERSONS MUST NOW BE SOLVED
[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 7 Mar 47, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 1028]

1. One of our most difficult problems is the military responsibility for disposal, maintenance, and care of displaced persons, and it is causing General [Sir John] Harding and me increased concern. The time when it is imperative that disposal instructions be received has now arrived. It is my belief that failure to take some action well before R Day will cause embarrassment during the evacuation of Allied troops, may render ineffective the Allied policy of protecting displaced persons from forcible repatriation, and may make it difficult within the prescribed period to complete the evacuation.

2. Only four possibilities are apparent in view of the urgency for immediate action.
A. That the Allies terminate their responsibilities and withdraw forthwith all administrative and logistical support. . . . Under the provisions of Article 45 of the Italian Peace Treaty it appears most likely that demands for the surrender of major portion of the presently held displaced persons will be made upon the Italian Government immediately after R Day and, if the DPS are under their control, the Italian Government will be forced to accede to the demands. The Allied protection thus far provided will be rendered fruitless by such action.
B. That under agreement with the Italian Government, Allied Military Forces continue to maintain and hold DPS. Compliance with Article 73 of the Italian Peace Treaty would be made possible by such action.
C. That forthwith DPS be removed from Italy. That provisions for such action could be implemented fully in time to become effective is considered unlikely....
D. That all displaced persons held by the Allies be transferred to the supervision and care of the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR) with the least practicable delay. For some time the organization of the Displaced Persons Branch of G-5 AFHQ has been oriented in that direction. . . . This appears to afford the best solution from the viewpoint of this Headquarters. 40 ♦ ♦ ♦

 

A MILITARY LIQUIDATING AGENCY TO SUCCEED AFHQ WHEN PEACE TREATY TAKES EFFECT
[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 11 Feb 47, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 2265 (NAF 1277) ]

2. On "R" Day separate national elements will be established as in Paragraph 3, NAF 1277 [above] to take over residual Allied functions. These elements should be as small as possible and should be reduced progressively; every effort should be made to the end that for completion of residual Allied functions by "R" plus go days there will be only a minimum of personnel. ♦ ♦ ♦

 

PEACE IS IN FORCE
[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 15 Sep 47, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 86325]

♦ ♦ ♦ Having agreed to simultaneous deposit with the French Government of their respective ratifications of the treaty of peace with Italy, the Governments of France, USSR, UK, and U.S. have made said deposit on 15 September. As of that date the Treaty of Peace with Italy is in force.

 

U.S. TROOPS WITHDRAWN BUT INTERDEPENDENCE CONTINUES
[Statement by President Truman, 13 Dec 47, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 1221]

Although the United States is withdrawing its troops from Italy in fulfilment of its obligations under the treaty of peace, this country continues its interest in the preservation of a free and independent Italy. If, in the course of events, it becomes apparent that the freedom and independence of Italy upon which the peace settlement is based are being threatened directly or indirectly, the United States, as a signatory of the peace treaty and as a member of the United Nations, will be obliged to consider what measures would be appropriate for the maintenance of peace and security.

[648]

THE JOINT STRUGGLE IS THOUGHT TO HAVE ENGENDERED COMMUNITY OF IDEALS
[Msg, Prime Minister de Gasperi to President Truman on Day of Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Italy, 16 Dec 47, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 1269]

At the moment when all Allied troops have left our soil I wish to assure you that the Italians will forever retain the memory of their liberating action and the brotherhood of arms which united them afterwards with our regular and voluntary forces. Your troops fought in Italy for the cause of liberty and democracy. I shall be grateful to you if you will inform them that the common ideals for which they shed so much noble blood remain the supreme law of the Italian Republic.

 

[Msg, President Truman to Prime Minister de Gasperi, 14 Dec 47, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 1269]

I am grateful for your message on the occasion of the departure from Italy of Allied troops. I know that the Italian Government and people are dedicated to the preservation and protection of the freedoms which they have regained, and I am confident that I speak for the American people when I say that we are heartened by the knowledge that Italy stands with the other freedom loving nations of the world in the defense of liberty and democracy everywhere.

[649]

Go to:

Previous Chapter

Next Chapter

Endnotes  

Return to the Table of Contents

Search CMH Online
Last updated 18 February 2004