Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds (♦) are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter IX:

Italian Surrender and a Design for Maximum Returns With Minimum Responsibilities

Civil affairs planning for the mainland began under circumstances which could scarcely have suggested the broad scope and historic importance the Italy operation was destined to assume. The military campaign was to last from September 1943 until May 1945 and the occupation more than two years longer; the conduct of civil affairs was to require such major efforts as the development of Italy into a cobelligerent, the extension of enormous supply and economic aid, and the re-establishment of Italy, through reorientation in self-government and liberal institutions, as a democratic republic disposed toward partnership with the Western powers.

The last thing the U.S. Joint Chiefs expected or wanted in Italy was a major, prolonged entanglement. In their view, which had long been at odds with that of the British, the Italian operation was a diversion from the cross-Channel invasion which seemed the most direct and the quickest way of ending the war in Europe. The Americans accepted an infantry invasion of the mainland only because Allied resources were not ready for the great cross-Channel effort, and in the hope that this invasion might lead to the quick elimination of Italy from the war. But the operation was under no circumstances to use up resources required for Operation OVER LORD-that is, it was to be conducted within severe limitations on manpower. The CCS directive of 16 July envisaged definitely only an attack on the Naples area, and General Eisenhower proposed to push only as far as Rome. Because Allied strategists could not foresee the extent to which stubbornness rather than logic would lead Hitler to reinforce Italy, they did not expect the capture of the city to take long.

AFHQ civil affairs planners were not prophets but they were alert in deducing every contingency which might affect their major problem. Essentially, this problem arose from the fact that General Eisenhower had been given an absolute objective-elimination of Italy as a belligerent-along with very limited means. If Italy should surrender and the Germans should leave the Peninsula the Allies, as the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Operations Division (OPD) noted rather grimly, did not have enough trained personnel to administer all of Italy and at the same time supervise the return and demobilization of the Italian armed forces. If, on the other hand, the fighting should prove severe, prolonged, and devastating, they scarcely had even the military government personnel for administering Italy as far as Rome. If the documentation herein displays any one noteworthy thing, it is the ingenuity

[217]

of military leaders in their attempt to solve an almost insoluble problem, and in this case the solution seemed to lie in effecting the surrender of Italy under conditions which would still leave a co-operative central government. The only difficulty-here the planners faced a second limitation imposed upon them by the highest authority-was that the unconditional surrender formula, suddenly sprung upon Churchill by the President in their joint press conference at Casablanca, was inherently repugnant to such a solution. At the end of May General Eisenhower inquired of the War Department whether he could promise Italians an honorable peace in the event of a capitulation, only to be told that this was impossible inasmuch as the unconditional surrender principle had been approved by the President and concurred in by the Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, the Military Government Section (MGS) developed for Italy a plan not only for military government but also for military government in the combat zone capable of co-ordination with armistice control over a central government in the rear zone. Presenting these plans to the CCS on i9 July, General Eisenhower again sought some freedom of action-this time in more limited degree. In something of desperation he made one of the very few recommendations in his long military career which was destined to be explicitly and promptly turned down on the ground that it was beyond his purview. This recommendation was that he "should be free in the light of developments in the situation to judge whether important military advantages could be gained by dealing with military or civilian groups or with members of the Royal family, it being understood that no authority which maintains the character of the Fascist party .. . would be made use of." The military advantages included not only "reducing to the minimum the number of troops necessary for garrison purposes" but also the fact that "the number of trained personnel necessary for Military Government would likewise be reduced." The size of its military government component has been a problem for every army, and the general rule, in cases of a discrepancy between the scope of its task and its resources, has been for the army not to reduce its task but to strain its personnel for the conduct of civil affairs. If General Eisenhower here broke all precedent in behalf of military government-and also, indeed, in behalf of releasing garrison troops for combat-it can only be inferred that he was quite seriously concerned about the inadequacy of his manpower resources if he should be unable to entrust administration to a central Italian government. The outcome, however, was not such as to encourage other commanders to risk their standing with higher authority in behalf of a matter of civil affairs. In reply General Eisenhower was informed that in the view of the President his authority could not extend to discussing with Italians the formation of a political government-he could only discuss unconditional surrender. Undoubtedly this curb reflected a conviction that entrusting a soldier with even a tentative exercise of judgment in political matters contravenes correct principle. But, above anything else, the Italy operation revealed the difficulty of drawing a precise boundary line between the political and the military element without the risk of injury to both.

In considering the huge if not impossible task of military government that the Allied Commander in Chief (CinC) was now threatened with, one is inclined to philosophize about the peculiar difficulties of the soldier's civil affairs mission. This mission requires, in addition to all possible knowledge and skill, a patient resignation and adaptation to the most difficult strategic and political limitations. But success

[218]

often requires something else as well: some call it luck-some call it the help of Providence.

This is exactly what came to hand-on 26 July Mussolini fell from power, and the King appointed in his place Marshal Pietro Badoglio. This soldier had once led the Duce's armies, but disillusioned with Fascism, he was now ready to abolish its principal organizations and dismiss its principal leaders.

General Eisenhower at once saw a "vast but fleeting opportunity to gain all Allied aims"-aims which previously could have seemed in some degree conflicting. Indeed he saw an opportunity for realizing also an additional advantage-the conversion of an enemy into a cobelligerent. This would open the way for maximum returns with minimum responsibilities. General Eisenhower sought to obtain immediate CCS approval for effective propaganda and the prompt despatch by CCS of conditions to be presented to any Italian representative seeking an armistice. He quickly secured approval of the proposed propaganda, and AFHQ beamed to Italy a message congratulating the Italian people on having rid themselves of Mussolini and suggesting, even if rather vaguely, the advantage of immediate peace. But the document General Eisenhower needed in order to be able to announce conditions conducive to Italian capitulation was long delayed. On 30 July the CCS cabled to him only the military conditions of armistice-the so-called "short terms."

The "long terms," which included politico-economic conditions, were not ready until 27 September. This was about two months after the date on which General Eisenhower cabled about them and one cannot but wonder why the long delay. The unconditional surrender formula may well have had all the invigorating effects it was designed to have upon the will to fight, but, by the same token, it probably had a debilitating effect upon the will to prepare prompt political conditions of peace. The British were less doctrinaire than the Americans in their interpretation of the surrender formula and had presented their American associates with a long, detailed draft weeks before General Eisenhower's cable. The Americans could not accept the draft because it did not seem to make the unconditional surrender formula sufficiently explicit. On the day after Mussolini's downfall the President made the concession that the conditions "should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender." The effort to accelerate translating this into concrete terms was hampered by the difficulty of speedily taking into account the suggestions and amendments of a multitude of national and combined agencies. At any rate, when, on 18 August, an emissary of Badoglio met secretly in Lisbon with representatives of General Eisenhower to discuss peace, the only concrete conditions ready for him were the military terms, including a stipulation that other conditions mandatory for Italy would be transmitted later. By way of encouragement, he could only be told that, while military government in some degree would have to be imposed on Italy, he needed only to consider Sicily to realize that such government would be humane.

The Italians were compelled to ponder whether this was a sufficient encouragement at a time when the Germans were daily increasing their reinforcements in Italy and accelerating countermeasures should Italy try to make peace. Moreover, they were uncertain as to Allied military capabilities, which in fact rested upon a much smaller number of divisions than the Germans had in Italy. The Italians could well have felt themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea, but the lure of peace, with the hope even if not the assurance of honorable conditions, prevailed over the fear of German retaliation.

[219]

On 3 September the capitulation was secretly signed, and it was arranged that the Allied Commander in Chief and Badoglio should announce it simultaneously on 8 September, eve of the Fifth Army invasion. Yet so much was the situation a matter of touch-and-go that at the last minute Badoglio sent word that he felt both parties had been too hasty and that announcement must be further delayed. General Eisenhower replied that he would nonetheless announce the capitulation as scheduled. An hour and a half after General Eisenhower's announcement the Marshal finally decided, "in fear and trembling," that he had best follow suit.

On 3 September the British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina to the toe of the Italian boot and took Reggio Calabria. Six days later the Fifth Army sailed into the Bay of Salerno and soon established a long narrow beachhead. It was not until 17 September that the two armies formed a junction because, while the Eighth Army advanced rapidly, the Fifth Army was hit by a fierce German counterattack. For obvious reasons the civil affairs experience of the two armies differed. Both applied the lessons learned in Sicily, as in improving arrangements for loading and moving forward AMG personnel. But whereas the British advance was so rapid that there were not enough men for rear as well as combat areas, the Fifth Army had a large contingent that could do nothing for a time except try to live down the sobriquet of "Aged Military Gentlemen on tour," as the older of them had sometimes been called in Sicily. When the breakout took place, CAO's at first were occupied in obtaining Italian labor and in keeping roads clear of refugees. As the advance continued, their duties became broader until on 2 October, when Naples was taken, they faced for the first time the challenging task of governing and rehabilitating a great metropolis.

But the story of AMG achievements in Naples is less important at this point than an account of events in the little town of Brindisi, where Badoglio and the King had betaken themselves to govern in safety. Here too Allied officials came at the earliest opportunity, with the hope of establishing relations with them that would be as fruitful as the planners had presumed. On actual encounter there was some dismay. What could be called the Italian government consisted only of the Marshal, the King, and two service ministers. There were few clerks, no archives, not even a single typewriter. Certainly there could no longer be any thought of setting up at once a 4oo-man control commission; it would be sufficient to have at Brindisi a small Allied Military Mission. It was also decided that, rather than detract from the Government's prestige by declaring military government in "King's Italy" (as the four provinces under Badoglio were called), officers from this mission would render such assistance as was needed in supply and other matters, and at the same time exercise general supervision over an administrative machinery which Badoglio himself had already purged of notorious Fascists.

Very shortly, General Eisenhower decided to place the whole question of the status to be given the Badoglio government-"the chief question which faces us"-before the CCS. There was pathos at Brindisi, but there was also promise. This was the only true legal government of Italy (despite the one being set up for Mussolini to the north), and the King would still have a strong hold on the Italian people and armed forces. Badoglio, as reported, not only "said all the right things" but seemed sincere. Emphasizing these considerations, General Eisenhower raised the question of de facto recognition of Italy as a cobelligerent subject to certain conditions which would give Badoglio's government a broader and more liberal character. Then,

[220]

as though fearing he had perhaps failed to give enough emphasis to the most important consideration, General Eisenhower sent a second message pointing to the very heavy personnel commitment which would be entailed if Italy were to be ruled solely by military government. The Allied decision was to continue support of the Badoglio government subject to Badoglio's signature of the full armistice and to Italy's declaration of war against Germany. Despite Italian legal commitment not even the first of these conditions was gained easily since Badoglio declared that the severity of the terms was incompatible with the help which he said Italians were already giving the Allies. It was, in fact, decided to keep secret the armistice terms signed on 29 September, lest the government be imperiled. As for a declaration of war, Badoglio wished to wait until Rome was taken-avowedly from fear of German reprisals, but probably also from a desire to see Allied military capabilities demonstrated further. It was thus evident that armistice control over an astutely evasive government can often be more nominal than real. Repeated pressure had to be applied until, on 13 October, the King signed a declaration of war against Germany.

To complete the Allied design for Italy the Italian government still had to be developed sufficiently to enable it to administer additional territory. To this end the Allied Control Commission (ACC) was activated, and, because for the present the need at Brindisi was only for counterparts to the few existent ministries, the Allied personnel burden in this one respect was less than had been expected. Originally the belief was that territorial transfer could take place as soon as Badoglio-in pursuance of a decision taken after the more distinguished political talent had refused to serve under the King-had formed a caretaker government of technical experts. But ACC soon realized, as did Badoglio himself, that this was impossible. By the end of November lie believed he would be ready in a few weeks, but AFHQ itself was not ready because of legal issues being discussed with the CCS, and the year came to a close without the transfer having been effected.

Except for acquisition of nearly the entire Italian fleet, the Allies at this early stage had registered no impressive gains. But from the outset they had been realistic enough to put less emphasis upon actual gains than upon the minimizing of burdens. By this time, too, Allied officials had developed even more of the patience which is a prerequisite in the government of any foreign country during war. It was in fact far too early to evaluate the advantages accruing from armistice control since it had been established in only four provinces. Instead of being able to reduce military government personnel, AMG had had to increase it, but no great numbers of garrison troops had been required because copartner-ship had rendered the Italians friendly and co-operative. As for the future, two considerations already held out hopes of increased returns from the design that had been adopted for Italy. First, it was already beginning to be evident that the advance might have to continue beyond Rome to be militarily successful, and, with preparations for OVERLORD now being accelerated, armistice control with its prospective saving of personnel was more necessary than ever. Second, it had become apparent that while from a purely administrative standpoint military government was far more efficient than armistice control, in the very city of Naples where military government had performed so efficiently Italians were beginning to view it as repressive of their now awakening desire again to be self-governing and politically self-respecting. Armistice control was an instrument better adapted to the

[221]

achievement of that part of General Eisenhower's directive which imposed the goal of eventual restoration of Italy as a free nation. In the light of manpower shortage armistice control was a military necessity in any case, but in the light of their adapting it to this political goal the Allies could believe they were making a virtue of necessity.

1. THE THEATER HOPES FOR ARMISTICE CONTROL BUT PLANS FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT

THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER PRINCIPLE MUST GOVERN PLANNING
[Memo, Lt Col Ray E. Laux, CAD, for Chief, CAD, 31 May 43, CAD files, 334, Gen Council (3-8-43)]

In reply to a request from General Eisenhower for the War Department viewpoint as to whether Italy should be promised an honorable peace in the event of a capitulation, he was informed that no such promise will be made, and that the terms would be unconditional surrender. This directive was approved by the President and concurred in by Mr. Churchill.¹ ♦ ♦ ♦

BUT THE PLAN FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS MADE CAPABLE OF MODIFICATION
[Memo of MGS, AFHQ, on Preparations for Post-HUSKY Opns, 19 Jul 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec 2]

15. A scheme for military government, like all plans, should be capable of modification to meet the situation as it presents itself. This points to the need for recruiting personnel of high capacity and elastic mind. A change in circumstances might require a sudden shift in the type of control imposed upon the hostile nation.

In particular, the contingency should be borne in mind that the resistance of the Italian people may snap and some revolutionary change take place. We may be approached by some governmental authority suing for peace and giving promise of its ability to direct the political and economic life of Italy along acceptable lines. In such case it might be advantageous to come to terms with the new government and instead of imposing an AMGOT upon Italy to establish a Commission of Control to supervise the administration. From the personnel thus trained for AMGOT suitable officers would be available in connection with such a commission.

THE HUGE TASK DEMANDS A LARGE NUMBER OF HIGHLY QUALIFIED MG PERSONNEL
[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 19 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 14313]

♦ ♦ ♦ Gross [personnel] total is divided into following subdivisions as it is contemplated that Military Government will be organized for regions in order that the territory may be coped with as advance is made up the boot. There would be extension of AMGOT Sicily except number 6 and . . . number 7 which would require a new over-all organization. Region 1-Sicily 210. Region 2-Calabria, Lucania, Puglia 195. Region 3Campania 138. Region 4-Abruzzi, Lazio 200. Region 5-Umbria, Marches 135. Region 6-Sardinia 100. Region 7-Central Government 417. Total 1395. Figure 417, Region 7 should ultimately be reduced by 42 officers.² ♦ ♦ ♦

It is apparent to all concerned here that higher caliber staff than hitherto available will be required at head of both technical and administrative fields if a successful Military Government of so large an area is to be organized. It is suggested that Government Departments must be prepared to supply senior personnel and key men should be enlisted from industrial and commercial posts. It is felt that the experience such personnel would gain would be of high value either in the event of their transfer from AMGOT to other theaters, or of the establishment of commission of control over an Italian authority.♦ ♦ ♦

[222]

EISENHOWER PROPOSES NOT ONLY MILITARY GOVERNMENT BUT ALSO FREEDOM TO NEGOTIATE ARMISTICE CONTROL
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 19 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 13772)

1. The United States and British Governments prescribed two objectives for operation HUSKY which would also apply to post-HUSKY. (A) The military objective of eliminating Italy from the war, i.e., destroying and rendering ineffective the Italian land, sea and air forces wherever they may be; (B) The political objective of delivering the Italian people from the Fascist regime which led them into the war and of restoring Italy as a free nation.

2. My 5973 NAF 2502 establishes a post-HUSKY plan towards carrying out the military objective by occupying the Italian Peninsula up to and including Rome. In the course of this operation we shall be faced by two main possibilities. Either we shall have to fight all the way to Rome or at some point there may be an Italian surrender or collapse. No one can tell which of these will take place, but we consider that the first possibility must be plainly envisaged.

3. Our reason for this is that in our appreciation the Fascist Party backed by the Germans will do its utmost to keep Italy in the war. So far as we know the control of the party, supported by the presence of German forces and the Gestapo, has not yet been materially weakened. Therefore, if we achieve our plan for occupation of all Italy from Rome south, we should be prepared to find that there are still substantial Italian forces supported by Germans to the north, and that the Government has moved to a northern city. In these circumstances, the Italian administrative machinery from Rome south will have largely disintegrated.
I, therefore, recommend that as soon as possible plans should be contemplated here for the preparation of an Allied Military Government for occupied territory up to Rome inclusive and for Sardinia, and that these plans be developed so as to:
(A) Be capable of expansion from Sicily northward on a regional basis as our advance proceeds towards Rome;
(B) Allow for supervision over what may remain of the Central Italian administrative machine at Rome;
(C) Create a reserve of personnel against the need of advancing beyond Rome.

4. While these provisions should be made for the foregoing contingency, we should nevertheless be prepared for the other possibility, i.e., that at some point the Italian will to resist stops. In such an event, there are two possibilities:

(A) There will be no Italian Military or civilian group willing or able to assume the responsibility for administration under Allied control. Should this occur, we shall have to follow the same plan of establishing AMGOT as would have been the case if an Italian Government had continued resistance north of Rome.
(B) A central administrative authority or government will emerge or can be established which can, if it be properly handled, bring the important military advantage of reducing to the minimum the number of troops necessary for garrison purposes, thereby releasing the maximum number of fighting units for further combat purposes. The number of trained personnel necessary for Military Government could likewise be reduced.
I, therefore, recommend that I should be free in the light of developments in the situation to judge whether important military advantages could be gained by dealing with military or civilian groups or with members of the Royal family, it being understood that no authority which maintains the character of the Fascist Party or any succession thereto, or which includes outstanding Fascist leaders would be made use of. To meet this contingency, plans for the staffing of a commission of control over an Italian Government must also be worked out here so as to be available in case of need.

5. While in our view military considerations should remain predominant, nevertheless it may prove possible to advance the attainment of the second basic objective of restoring Italy as a free nation should the course outlined in 4 B become practicable. In addition, so long as a military government continues our responsibility for the well being of the Italian population under our control is immediate and direct. From the political point of view I assume that whereas only Great Britain and the United States are involved as long as we employ military government, should it be decided that relations could be established with some form of Italian central authority, the attitude and desires of other United Nations, notably the Soviet Union, may have to be considered.♦ ♦ ♦

THE THEATER COMMANDER MAY NOT DISCUSS WITH ITALIANS THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT
[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 25 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 11102]

The question of armistice terms and what arrangements are to he made in case the Italians request a general armistice is being discussed between Washington and London on the highest

[223]

level. It is the view of the British Government that your authority, without reference to both governments, should be limited to concluding local surrenders with any individual Italian commander. That request for a general, as opposed to a purely local termination of hostilities, even if the request came from the enemy commander in chief and did not involve any Italian Administration, concerns not only military but political and economic decisions as well, and should be referred to both governments, fighting meantime continuing even if only nominally. The President has expressed his view that you should not fix on general terms of surrender or armistice without the approval of both governments. The President seems to approve of your dealing with military or civilian groups in Italy even to the extent of discussions concerning unconditional surrender of Italy, but not in regard to establishing a government in occupied territory. He intends that the selection of Italians except minor officials for the civil government in Italy after its capitulation, must be made by the President and the Prime Minister after receipt of recommendations from you. ³ ♦ ♦ ♦

2. THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI AND THE SHIFT OF MILITARY THINKING TO ARMISTICE CONTROL

MUSSOLINI'S FALL AFFECTS THE PRESIDENT'S THINKING LESS THAN THE WAR DEPARTMENT'S
[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 26 Jul 43, G-3 files, ABC, 381, Italy, Armistice-Surrender (5-9-43) Sec I-A (CCS 258/1)]

My thought is that we should come as dose as possible to unconditional surrender followed by good treatment of the Italian people....

[Memo, Gen Thomas T. Handy, ACofS, OPD, for CofS, 27 Jul 43, G-3 files, ABC, 381, Italy, Armistice-Surrender (5-9-43) Sec I-A (CCS 258/1)]

4. It is considered militarily most desirable that the Italian State and a structure of government continue to exist under the supreme authority of the Allied Commander. The United Nations do not have available in the Mediterranean, nor can they make available in the near future, the large military government organization for completely administering all Italy, Italian economy, and the return and demobilization of Italian forces.♦ ♦ ♦

EISENHOWER IMMEDIATELY CONSIDERS USE OF NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
[Ltr, Eisenhower to Alexander, GOC, 15th AG, 26 Jul 43, ACC files, 10000/100/700]

♦ ♦ ♦ I personally have the conviction that if the central government actually surrenders itself it will, in its efforts to retain a unified country, attempt to surrender the whole national territory. In any event, once the central government has surrendered itself, I see many advantages to our use of existing civil machinery although, naturally, it will be necessary to replace at once all key individuals in whose co-operation we may not have complete confidence.♦ ♦ ♦

A MESSAGE TO THE ITALIAN PEOPLE TO AVERT ITALY'S BEING LEFT WITHOUT A RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 26 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 18839]

We regard it as of the utmost importance that full opportunity should be taken immediately of the dismissal of [Benito] Mussolini. If the King of Italy remains for more than a very short time as head of a country still at war with the Allies full odium in our two countries now concentrated on Duce will be transferred to the King. Situation might therefore arise where it will be impossible to arrange an honorable capitulation with the King and we may be left without any other responsible authority. It is therefore suggested that a message on the following lines should be immediately and constantly broadcast to the Italian people by this Headquarters... ⁴

[Msg, AFHQ to the Italian People, as Approved by CCS, 28 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 11150]

We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy on ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in war as the tool of Hitler and brought them to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the

[224]

Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves. The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor, who is still on Italian soil. You want peace. You can have peace immediately, and peace under the honourable conditions which our governments have already offered you. We are coming to you as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military forces in your country. If you do this we will rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war. As you have already seen in Sicily our occupation will be mild and beneficent. Your men will return to their normal life, and to their productive vocations and, provided all British and Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us and not taken away to Germany, the hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia and Sicily will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them. The ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored.

EISENHOWER ASKS FOR A DIRECTIVE IN CASE ITALY SEEKS AN ARMISTICE
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 27 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 19545]

In the event that the new Italian Government should in the immediate future request a Military Armistice, we must be prepared to announce at once the conditions under which such a general armistice would be granted by the Commander in Chief. It is important that the broad outline of the prescribed measures be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the understanding that further details would be amplified and carried out by the Allied Armistice Commission which would be set up in Italy to operate under my general supervision....⁵

PLANNERS OUTLINE THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMISTICE CONTROL
[Outline Plan for Control of Italy (MGS Paper No. 7), 21 Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/141/466]

2. An Armistice control authority operates in a different situation from a military government. The latter takes the place of a government which has been expelled, while the former operates upon a government which, after submission, has been kept in operation. The function of the Armistice control authority will be to maintain conditions favorable to the use of Italy as a base of operations, to enforce the conditions of the armistice, and to carry out such other policies as may be prescribed by higher authority. Whereas the powers belonging to a military government flow from general principles of international law, the activities of an Armistice control authority are restricted by the terms of the armistice. If, however, the Allied Nations reserve for themselves all the powers of an occupying power, they will have even under the armistice the same plenary authority they would have had if they had simply driven out the Italian Government. Still, in post-armistice conditions even more than during military government, it will be desirable to control the administration and economy of Italy by indirect methods, through the Italian Government, so long as adequate results are produced. Until further directives are given as to the organization and methods of the post-armistice control, the Armistice control authority will do all that may be necessary to safeguard the interests of the United Nations, but will refrain from any avoidable anticipation of questions of major policy.♦ ♦ ♦

EISENHOWER PRESENTS A PLAN FOR ARMISTICE CONTROL AS WELL AS MILITARY GOVERNMENT
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 3o Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 23780] ⁶

1. Developments since opening of operation HUSKY have indicated need for plans for
(A) Military Government and
(B) Armistice control, to be available for use either concurrently or alternatively in accordance with tactical and political situation.

2. My NAF 295 [CM-IN 13772, 19 Jul 43, sec. I above] gave outline plan for Military Government up to and including Rome in conformity with approved operational plans at that stage which did not take into account probability of an armistice.

3. . . . Situation is now different.

4. My staff is preparing to deal with an early armistice.

5. We have prepared a plan, having in mind the following factors:

A. Certainty that Italy will remain an active theater of operations and that continued German opposition may be expected as we press forward;
B. Desirability of producing a situation wherein

[225]

a national government responsive to Italian public opinion would be in conspicuous exercise of its authority;
C. The need, however, to take whatever action might be necessary to enforce the armistice and to maintain conditions and services essential to our military needs;
D. The supply responsibilities inevitably incident to the occupation;
E. The limiting factor of personnel, since it appears that any armistice control authority must rely at least at the outset chiefly on personnel requested in my NAF 296.

Part 2.

6. In the absence of any special directive I have given authority for planning to proceed on the following basis:

7. Outline Plan post-armistice situation would necessitate
(A) Allied military government organization to follow closely behind combat troops and organize and administer territory as occupied and
(B) an Armistice Control Authority (ACA) answerable to Commander in Chief to supervise the administration by the Italian Government of territory not subject to military government. This area would expand as Army advanced.

8. Armistice control authority would have military, naval, and air disarmament divisions to be staffed by service officers representing those forces in this Theater. It would also have sections corresponding generally to the Italian Government departments. These sections would supervise activities of the Italian Government
(A) to oversee the execution of the terms of the Armistice,
(B) to insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conformed to the requirements of an allied base of operations, especially transportation and communications, and
(C) to carry out any directives the Allied Government might give. The plan provides for a thinly spread control over local administration in the field. Experience in Sicily shows that with Fascist Party ousted public administration and economy are temporarily paralyzed: but situation on the mainland may not be the same. During initial period when dislocations are to be expected, regional authorities with expert staffs would be established to apply control when necessary. When conditions approached normal they would be eliminated. Thereafter Armistice control authority would conform to Italian system of direct control of provinces from centre of government.

3. ITALIAN SURRENDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO TYPES OF ALLIED CONTROL

THE THEATER HAS STILL NOT BEEN GIVEN THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE
[Min, 4th Mtg CCAC, 5 Aug 43, ABC files, 334, CCAC (8-9-43)]

5.... Mr. McCloy reviewed the fact that the President and the Prime Minister had settled the question of military terms of surrender for Italy by furnishing General Eisenhower with a military document with which he is authorized to accept an Italian Surrender.⁷

Mr. McCloy pointed out that the document did not contain a "saving" clause which would authorize him to act if desirable in effecting political conditions as well as military. He stated further that additional conditions should be drawn up, agreed to and made available to him as soon as possible.♦ ♦ ♦

A COMPLETED PLAN OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR THE IMMINENT INVASION
[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 19 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 14327]

Our plans with respect to Military Government in connection with planned future operations ... are as follows: We are organizing from personnel now in Sicily a unit to go with the BAYTOWN operation [British] and to take control of Region 2 as it is captured. A second team is being organized from personnel in the theater and those arriving from Washington and London to deal with region 3 in connection with operation AVALANCHE [American]. As these operations will be under the command of 15 Army Group, the allied military government for regions 2 and 3 respectively will be under the control of the present AMGOT organization. As soon as conditions will permit Sicily will be organized into region 1 and AMGOT Headquarters will move

[226]

to the mainland, probably in the vicinity of Naples. ⁸

BADOGLIO's EMISSARY CAN BE TOLD ONLY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT PLANS
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 21 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 16144]

♦ ♦ ♦ Their Emissary ⁹  referring to point 1o asked for explanations as to the question of retention of Sovereignty by the Italian Government.

He was informed that our representatives' instructions referred only to the terms of a military armistice and that he was not empowered to discuss questions relating to the future Government of Italy. A military government under the Allied Commander in Chief would unquestionably be necessary over parts of Italian territory.

He invited the attention of their Emissary to the fact that military government in Sicily had been established and was being exercised in a fair and humane manner.

A DIRECTIVE TO APPLY THE SICILY PATTERN FOR THE TIME BEING
[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 26 Aug 43, OPD files, 311.23, Security, sec. 1]

The jurisdiction of provisions contained in existing general directive for HUSKY is hereby extended for the time being to include that part of the Italian mainland which may be captured in the near future. . . .

Modification of existing general directive covering political, economic and financial matters will be furnished in near future.

You are authorized to designate the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, as Military Governor of such territory.¹⁰

The Combined Chiefs of Staff will transmit to you at an early date their directive wherein your relations with the Italian National Government will be established.

DECISION TO DEFER THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TERMS
[Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 29 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 12280]

Your NAF 342 ¹¹  has been seen by the President. He authorized you to proceed with military terms, obtain signature, and then transmit the comprehensive document to the Italian representatives.¹²  The Prime Minister has been informed of this authorization.

ITALIANS AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE ARMISTICE AND BROAD TERMS OF FUTURE ALLIED CONTROL
[Armistice Agreement, Known as Short Terms, Between General Eisenhower, CinC, Allied Forces, and Marshal [Pietro] Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, 3 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1] ¹³

Art. to. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.♦ ♦ ♦

Art. 12. Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Italy will be bound to comply will be transmitted at later date.♦ ♦ ♦

INVASION OF MAINLAND AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
[AMGOT Hq, Rpt for Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

(118) ... the AMGOT organization [See CM-IN 14327, above ] assigned to 8th Army for oper-

[227]

ation BAYTOWN was mounted at Taormina under Group Captain Benson, RAF, and Lt. Col. Harvey Gerry, AUS. Basic plans were developed by these officers in conjunction with AMGOT Headquarters, and a nominal table of organization was arrived at, personnel to fill which were supplied mainly from AMGOT Sicily. Motor transport was drawn mainly from 8th Army.

(119) The arrangements with 8th Army for loading and moving forward AMGOT personnel and vehicles were most satisfactory. Twelve officers were on the mainland on D Day, 25 officers with transport reached there on D+1 and eight additional officers with equipment on D+2. Region II Headquarters was established at Reggio immediately [3 September 1943, British Eighth Army invaded east coast of Calabria].

(123) The AMGOT personnel assigned to 8th Army continued with the advance of 8th Army through Calabria and Lucania. On 19 September headquarters were moved forward to Corigliano. The rapid advance made communications more than usually difficult. However, C.A.O.'s were established in each provincial capital and in large cities as they were occupied and an administration patterned after first phase administration in Sicily was established.

(124) During this period of the advance a considerable problem was presented by the demobilized and deserting soldiers of the Italian army who were clogging the roads and congesting the towns in large numbers heading for Calabria and Sicily. Some of them were armed and some had thrown away their arms. There were certain units still under their own officers fully armed. The feeding of these units was made the responsibility of 8th Army after AMGOT had indicated its inability to handle the problem. Notwithstanding the presence of the Italian forces in the area the usual proclamations were posted and steps taken to enforce the same.

(126) The advance through Calabria and into Lucania was so rapid that communication continued to be the most difficult problem.

(127) The political situation throughout Calabria and Lucania differed from that in Sicily in that the higher officials with active Fascist records had been removed by Badoglio. His reform, however, had not extended down to the Podesta and minor officials, many of whom AMGOT had to remove. The AMGOT officers continued to follow the policy of removing all former active Fascists in collaboration with F.S.P., 8th Army.

(128) With certain exceptions, such as Cosenza, war damage was not great throughout Calabria and Lucania and the services, such as water and sanitation, were in satisfactory condition through the territory. In the provinces of Catanzaro and Cosenza there was a fair amount of grain and the food situation was therefore not serious at the time of occupation. Investigation of stocks amassed from this year's harvest was undertaken to determine the long range requirements.

(129) While the advance up the Calabrian peninsula was in progress AMGOT officers were attached to the units which occupied Taranto on 11 and 12 September. . . .¹⁴

(130) . . . personnel for Region III [Campania-landing of U.S. Fifth Army] was selected and assembled in North Africa shortly prior to embarkation. The personnel was made up in part of experienced officers drawn from Sicily. The majority, however, consisted of officers arrived from the U.S. and U.K., some of whom had had a short period of training at the training center of Tizi Ouzou, and some of whom had just arrived in the theater. Many of the officers were graduates of the School of Military Government at Charlottesville. The full establishment of equipment was drawn in North Africa and was able to move at the time of embarkation.

(131) Both the 5th Army and the U.S. Navy were co-operative in loading and moving forward AMGOT personnel. The first wave [5th Army] was landed on the beaches of Paestum and Salerno in part on D Day (September 9) and the balance in the following few days. Practically the entire staff of Region III was landed by D+ 12, on the assumption that the army advance might be rapid and the officers needed. As the tactical situation developed, however, the personnel was not required but they were most gainfully employed, prior to the fall of Naples, and were disposed about the cities and towns of the occupied area, thus receiving valuable experience. The delay also served to give further time for the perfecting of organization and laying of plans for the occupation of Naples.♦ ♦ ♦

[228]

THE PATTERN OF ALLIED-ITALIAN RELATIONS IS IMMEDIATELY ADAPTED TO CO-OPERATION WITH BADOGLIO
[Directive. Cofs, AFHQ, to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM [Allied Military Mission], 12 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1]¹⁵

1. The Italian Government, to whom an Armistice had been granted, is now established in the Brindisi area.
The Commander in Chief has decided that a Military Mission shall be dispatched to the Italian Government.
You are appointed Head of the Military Mission and will assume your duties forthwith.

2. Object

The task of the Mission is to transmit the military instructions of the Commander in Chief to the Italian Government, collect and transmit intelligence, and- arrange for such co-ordinated action as the Italian armed forces and people can be induced to take against the Germans.
In fulfilling this task you, and all members of your mission, will bear constantly in mind the extreme importance of inculcating in the Italian Government, armed forces and people, the will to resist and hamper in every way the German forces in Italy and the Italian possessions.

The British Resident Minister in North Africa (Right Hon. Macmillan) and the U.S. Minister (Mr. Murphy) or their representatives, will be associated with your Mission, in order to make the necessary diplomatic contacts with the Italian Government. They will, however, report to you, and all instructions from the Allied Commander in Chief, on political as well as military questions, will be transmitted to them through you.♦ ♦ ♦

[Min, Post-Husky Plng Comm. Mtg No. 7, 15 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/141/467]

I. b. Colonel Maxwell [Deputy Chief, MGS] stressed that following on the recent capitulation of Italy by the Badoglio government, events had occurred which had resulted in only a comparatively small and essentially military Italian mission being available to meet Allied representatives and that although there had already been substantial gains from the capitulation in the shape of the surrender of parts of the Italian fleet, it was not considered necessary at the moment for more than a Military Staff Mission to meet Italian representatives. This being so, the time had not yet come to send Advanced Hq Allied Armistice Control into the field and that in its place the Military Staff Mission under Lieutenant General Mason MacFarlane had been charged with the duty of co-ordinating with the Italian representatives on all staff matters and would in addition be used as an ad hoc body to deal with all other points which might arise. In this connection it was emphasized that the intention of having Armistice Control Commission remained, but that the question of sending forward an advanced part of it had been deferred and would be brought forward again as opportunity offered.♦ ♦ ♦

MILITARY GOVERNMENT NOT PROCLAIMED IN "KING'S ITALY"
[Ltr, Gen Julius C. Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Hilldring, 28 Sep 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 1]

♦ ♦ ♦ General Rennell and I made a visit to Brindisi last week and with General [Mason-] MacFarlane worked out an ad interim arrangement with Marshal Badoglio under the terns of which we agreed not to proclaim Military Government in the four southern provinces of Apulia. In the circumstances it seemed inadvisable to give public notice of our control of sovereignty right under the nose of the little King and the old Marshal. Instead of establishing Military Government we agreed to allow the Marshal to govern these four provinces with AMG officers established in prefectures and other appropriate places as liaison officers but with the distinct understanding that they were to exercise substantial influence on local administration. Badoglio was perfectly agreeable to this as he and all concerned were abundantly aware that any reluctance on the part of the Italians to do things we require in getting on with the campaign might quickly result in the establishment of complete military control. You will note that we did not include the province of Foggia for obvious reasons [Foggia provided bases for the air forces].

As there was not sufficient Italian lire in an area to meet requirements and as our supply of AM lire was not enough to make up the difference it was necessary to declare BMA sterling notes and yellow seal dollars as legal tender.

[229]

This was accomplished by a proclamation made by Badoglio in the King's name and establishing at the same time a rate of zoo lire to the dollar and 400 to the pound as obtains in Sicily. There was a good bit of argument on this point, it being contended that a more "favorable" rate should be applied for political and psychological reasons in "unoccupied territories. ♦ ♦ ♦

ARMISTICE CONTROL To BE SET UP IN SARDINIA
[Directive, MGS, AFHQ, to Regnl Allied Cmsr for Sardinia, 28 Sep 43, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

♦ ♦ ♦ At the outset your control over Sardinia will be of a provisional character, pending the coming into operation of the Allied Commission. On the one hand you will not be conducting an Allied Military Government such as has been set up in Sicily, and on the other hand you will not be a mere military mission to offer to Sardinian authorities suggestions and advice which they will be free to disregard. You will be the agent of the Allied Commander in Chief, who has "the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war." [see above, Art. 10 of Armistice]. Subject to directions which from time to time you will receive from Allied Force Headquarters, you will speak as his representative to the representative in Sardinia of the Italian Government, which is bound "to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require." [Art. 10, above.] Accordingly you will instruct and guide the Italian authorities in Sardinia as may seem proper for the attainment of the purposes of the Allied Governments. You are not yourself to assume the government of Sardinia, but act upon and through the Italian administration there. You will not issue proclamations such as were posted in Sicily, nor countersign the decrees of the Italian authorities. It is their function to administer the territory, and yours to direct them as the interests of the Allied Nations may require. You will not allow yourself to be drawn into any discussion as to whether the Italian High Commissioner or other authorities are legally competent to do what is required of them. That is an internal question. The Italian Government must do as it is instructed, and any refusal or deliberate failure will be promptly reported to this Headquarters, which will take such steps as seem appropriate. ♦ ♦ ♦

CORSICA COMES UNDER FRENCH
[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 8 Oct 43, AFHQ Msg files, CMOUT 2356]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Corsican operation was carried out almost exclusively by the French and the French National Committee early established etat de siege in the island and appointed the Prefect [Charles] Luizet who was sent from Algiers.

Arrangements are being made with the French that our relations with respect to Corsica be the same as those obtaining in Algeria and that the two Ministers deal with political and economic questions in the same manner as for Algeria.¹⁶

4. EISENHOWER RECOMMENDS STRENGTHENING THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO COBELLIGERENCY

A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT EVEN TYPEWRITERS
[Capt Ellery W. Stone, USNR, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, Address at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

3. . . . When we arrived at Brindisi in September of last year there was virtually no Italian Government and no administrative machine. There was the Italian Prime Minister, Marshal Badoglio, with two service ministers but without any other colleagues or any of the officials, archives, or even typewriters that are the apparatus by which administrations can be carried on. It is no secret that all our original communications from the Italian Government of Brindisi came in the form of letters written by the hand of the Prime Minister himself.♦ ♦ ♦

[230]

YET IT SEEMS A MILITARY NECESSITY TO DEVELOP BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, i8 Sep 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 13972]

The military mission which I dispatched to Brindisi 13 September has been in daily contact with the Badoglio administration. The British and American ministers who accompanied [Mason-] MacFarlane to Brindisi have now returned and the following analysis of the situation made during the course of our preliminary investigation on the spot may be of assistance to both governments in determining our future Italian policy. It seems to me that certain decisions are urgently necessary.

Marshal Badoglio asserts that Italy is now in a de facto state of war with Germany. The Brindisi administration, however, is free to exercise its authority, with allied consent, over only five provinces of Italy with a population of about two millions and including about three army divisions, and insignificant air force and a certain amount of naval personnel. . . . The bulk of the country is now under German control. All of Badoglio's civilian ministries remained in Rome. The Brindisi party consists of the King, Crown Prince Umberto, Badoglio, and a group of generals and admirals including Joint Chief of Staff Ambrosio and the Army Chief of Staff [Mario] Roatta. Marshal Badoglio and his associates claim that the civilian ministers left in Rome are not disloyal but are merely separated from the head of the government by force majeure. It should be noted that the King and Badoglio left Rome by automobile in great haste at 5:00 a.m. 9 September, proceeding to the Port of Pescara on the Adriatic and thence by Italian cruiser to Brindisi. We believe, however, that there was dispute among the Italians regarding the wisdom of departure from Rome and the present position may be a straddle to protect better Italian interests.

The importance of the Badoglio administration is its unchallenged claim to legality. Its only contestant is the newly established "Republican Fascist Government" said to be established in Northern Italy, maintaining certain "commissioners" in Rome under German auspices. While Mussolini's name is associated with the latter by German radio, our Brindisi contacts doubt that he has authorized the use of his name in that connection, believing that the party is headed by gangsters of the type of Farinacci, Scorza and the like.

We have little doubt of the sincerity of the Badoglio administration to co-operate with the Allies. From the military point of view it thus far offers only a few divisions in territory free from the Germans. With the armed forces Badoglio undoubtedly enjoys a definite prestige. While there is a pronounced atmosphere of sympathy for the Allies, it is also coupled with a spirit of defeatism.

The chief question which faces us and has a most important bearing on our military operations in Italy is the status to be given the Badoglio Administration and Italy as a whole. This vital point of policy will govern all executive action whether in the military, political or propaganda sphere.

Badoglio has made repeated references to the spirit of the messages from the President and the Prime Minister. He points out to us that his administration is conscientiously and loyally carrying out the terms of the Armistice and has surrendered the Italian fleet. The Italian people and the armed forces naturally regard an armistice as connoting a cessation of hostilities. His administration, however, stands for war against the Germans. How will the Italian people and the army, Badoglio asks, understand that this is their duty unless a status of at least co-belligerency can be given to Italy. Most of the problems which face us in Italy, directly affecting our military operations, depend upon the reply which our government will make. We have given general instructions covering support to be given to Italian units or individuals who resist or oppose the Germans, and covering the employment of Italian naval vessels. . . . All this, however, necessary as it is to our success, is inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice, and as it will shortly become necessary for me to confer directly with Marshal Badoglio, I should be able to reassure him on a number of matters which will have a profound effect on our military relations with Italy during the period of active hostilities. For example, are the Italians to be disarmed and disbanded in accordance with the Armistice, or used to actively assist our forces? . . . Our present plan of Allied Military Government depends upon the policy we select. Will we adopt a policy of indirect control of government to replace Allied Military Government, at least in certain areas? My instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on several of these matters are clear, and are in accordance with military necessity and my own ideas, but they are not at all consistent with provisions of the long term Armistice conditions to which I am instructed to obtain signature.

This raises the critical question of what action should be taken at this point regarding the signature of the complete armistice terms. We found

[231]

that Marshal Badoglio does not clearly understand the necessity of signing these terms. In his mind the imposition of such terms is undoubtedly inconsistent with active Italian co-operation in the war effort against Germany.
It is obviously impracticable to adopt an effective propaganda line to the people of Italy until the government structure and the Italian status are clarified.
We feel that our governments might wish to consider some form of de facto recognition of the Badoglio administration as a co-belligerent or military associate subject to certain conditions:

A. A strengthening of the national character of the administration by infusion of representatives of political parties-a form of national coalition government;
B. A decree restoring the former constitution and promising free elections after the war for a constitutional assembly;
C. Possible eventual abdication of the King in favor of either his son or grandson (this requires careful study as it might prove more popular abroad than with the Italian people);
D. Whatever military requirements we might decide upon;
E. Acceptance of the Allied organization in the nature of an armistice commission, but possibly with a different title from which the Italian administration would accept guidance and ultimate instructions. Allied Military Government would gradually disappear and its personnel be integrated where necessary in the new organization, while we might agree to suspend the application of certain rights under the armistice and regard the reformed and liberated Italy as a co-belligerent.

. . . I realize that the' line of action which I have suggested here will provoke political repercussions and may arouse considerable opposition and criticism. Accordingly I recommend that the burden be placed upon us, on the ground of military necessity, which I am convinced should be the governing factor. ¹⁷

EISENHOWER WARNS OF THE HEAVY COMMITMENT IF THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT IS NOT USED
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 2o Sep 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 14715]

.. My views are summarized as follows. In our future relations with Italy there are only two courses:

1. To accept and strengthen the legal government of Italy under the King and Badoglio; to regard this government and the Italian people as co-belligerents but with their military activity subject to my direction under terms of armistice, and I, of course, making such military, political and administrative conditions as I find necessary from time to time. Included in these would be the imposition by directive of such clauses of the long terms as may be necessary from the supply, shipping, economic and other points of view under the authority of Article 12 of the short terms.

2. To sweep this government aside, set up an Allied Military Government of occupied Italy, and accept the very heavy commitments involved.

Of these two courses, on military grounds, I strongly recommend the first. Since as co-belligerent it would necessarily declare war on Germany and on the Fascist Republican Government of Italy, for all elements desiring to fight against Fascism in Italy it will be the natural rallying point.

IN CASE OF ARMISTICE CONTROL TRANSFER OF TERRITORY WILL HAVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES
[Memo, Chanler, CLO, AMGOT, for Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, 22 Sep 43, CAD files, HUSKY Plan]

♦ ♦ ♦ Colonel Maxwell . . . states that owing to the turn of events which have actually taken place, it has now become desirable for political reasons nominally to turn over as much as possible of recaptured Italian territory to the Italian Government immediately, even though we are not yet ready to give up the powers of an occupying force in the degree usually contemplated at this phase. In other words, the proposal is to give the appearance of withdrawal as an occupying power without necessarily giving up its powers.♦ ♦ ♦

[232]

5. THE POLICY OF "PAYMENT BY RESULTS" AND THE LONG-TERM ARMISTICE

BOTH GOVERNMENTS DECIDE To SUPPORT BADOGLIO IF ITALY DECLARES WAR ON GERMANY
[Msg, Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 23 Sep 43, Diary of the Office CinC, vol. VII., pp. 818-20]

In reply to your NAF 409 and 410 [CM-IN 13972, 18 Sep and CM-IN 14715, 20 Sep, sec. 4 above] the following directive has been agreed upon by the Prime Minister and myself I. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions [see below, "Civil Affairs Provisions of the Long-Term Armistice" ] .

2. On the basis of military necessity you are impowered to make recommendations from time to time to lighten the provisions of the military armistice in order to enable the Italians within the limit of their capacities to wage war against Germany.

3. On condition that it declare War on Germany the present Government of Italy will be permitted, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 hereunder, to carry on as the Government of Italy and as such be treated as a co-belligerent in the War against Germany, such relationship to be based on the clear understanding that it is not in any way to prejudice the untrammeled right of the people of Italy to decide on the form of Government they will eventually have and that no final form of the Government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters.

5. You will encourage in all practicable ways the vigorous use under your direction of the Italian Armed Forces against Germany.♦ ♦ ♦

CHURCHILL SUMS UP THE POLICY IN A PHRASE
[Msg, Macmillan, Br Resident Minister, to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM, 23 Sep 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 13454]

♦ ♦ ♦ The P.M. has sent agreed policy of war cabinet which in effect approves our proposals. It agrees to co-belligerency, requires signature of Long Terms, and offers return of liberated areas to Italian Government in return for broad-based coalition government, and acceptance of authority of Control Commission.

P.M. sums up policy as "payment by results." ♦ ♦ ♦

THE FUTURE Is FORESHADOWED: SOVIET UNION OPPOSES LIGHTENING THE TERMS
[Transl of Communication from Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov to American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 21 Sep 43, quoted in Msg, U.S. Embassy in Moscow to Secy of State, 26 Sep 43, G-3 files, Exec No. 2, Item 2]

♦ ♦ ♦ No reason is seen by the Soviet Government for the proposal in point two of the message that instructions be given in respect of any lightening of the military armistice terms for Italy, especially since the message does not make clear what lightening of the terms is being contemplated. It is obvious that the Allies must be interested in Italy strictly complying under the control of the Allies with the detailed terms of the armistice which they have agreed upon and ratified. In addition, it is necessary to keep in mind that only with the agreement of the Allied Governments can a change in the provisions ratified by these Governments take place.♦ ♦ ♦

BADOGLIO IS APPRISED OF THE LONG TERMS AND THE EXPECTATION OF ITALIAN DECLARATION OF WAR
[Memo, Murphy, U.S. Minister, AFHQ, 27 Sep 43, Lt Gen. Walter Bedell Smith's Papers, The Capitulation of Italy.]

Macmillan and I accompanied General Smith and General [Mason-] MacFarlane on a visit to Marshal Badoglio at 5:00 p.m. today. By agreement with and under direction of the CinC, General [Mason-] MacFarlane presented to Marshal Badoglio two copies of the long armistice terms. He recalled to the Marshal that the military armistice referred, in Article 12, to the political, economic and financial conditions which will be imposed and said that the signature of the present long terms, which included all three conditions, was the principal item on the agenda of the Malta meeting scheduled for 29 September.♦ ♦ ♦

We emphasized the importance of a declaration of war if our public opinions were to sup

[233]

port the considerable concessions from the strict armistice terms which it was proposed to make, such as the modification of the Allied Military Government, the return to the Badoglio administration of Sicily, and the decision to support the King and his Government. Both of these points were understood by the Marshal.

Badoglio seemed to be content with the status of a co-belligerent, if that could be obtained. He did not emphasize unduly a desire to be regarded strictly as an ally.

A suggestion was made by General Smith that, for propaganda purposes and for the purpose of inciting the Italians to the maximum war effort, the Italian Government might blur the edges of co-belligerency in speaking to their own people of the promised land of alliance, but that the technical, legal status must remain that of cobelligerency. He mentioned that there was no indignity in this because that was the technical relationship between the United States and Great Britain and France and Italy during the last war. He also pointed out that, for example, today the United States had no military alliance with Great Britain or the Soviet Union.

Here again Badoglio said that he would discuss the matter with the King and be prepared tomorrow morning to give us an answer. Our strong impression was that there was no need to make any concession on this point. We have the distinct feeling that the status of co-belligerency will be acceptable to the Italians.♦ ♦ ♦

CIVIL AFFAIRS PROVISIONS OF THE LONG-TERM ARMISTICE
[Additional Conditions of the Armistice With Italy,¹⁸  Long Terms Instrument Signed by Eisenhower and Badoglio, 29 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/136/91]

18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian territory. The territories or areas concerned will from time to time be notified by the United Nations and all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will be thereupon withdrawn from such territories or areas in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Commander in Chief. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of Article 4 above.¹⁹  The Italian Supreme Command will guarantee immediate use and access to the Allies of all airfields and Naval ports in Italy under their control.

19. In the territories or areas referred to in Article 18 all Naval, Military and Air installations, power stations, oil refineries, public utility services, all ports and harbors, all transport and all inter-communication installations, facilities and equipment and such other installations or facilities and all such stocks as may be required by the United Nations will be made available in good condition by the competent Italian authorities with the personnel required for working them. The Italian Government will make available such other local resources or services as the United Nations may require.

20. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument the United Nations will exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout the territories or areas referred to in Article 18, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue of proclamations, orders or regulations. Personnel of the Italian administrative, judicial and public services will carry out their functions under the control of the Allied Commander in Chief unless otherwise directed.

21. In addition to the rights in respect of occupied Italian territories described in Articles 18 to 20,

A. Members of the Land, Sea or Air Forces and officials of the United Nations will have the right of passage in or over nonoccupied Italian territory and will be afforded all the necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions.
B. The Italian authorities will make available on nonoccupied Italian territory all transport facilities required by the United Nations including free transit for their war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions issued by the Allied Commander in Chief regarding the use and control of airfields, ports, shipping, inland transport systems and vehicles, intercommunication systems, power stations and public utility services, oil refineries, stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as United Nations may specify, together with connected repair and construction facilities.

22. The Italian Government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations.

23. The Italian Government will make available such Italian currency as the United Nations require. The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during

[234]

military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations. The Italian Government will take such measures as may be required by the United Nations for the control of banks and business in Italian territory, for the control of foreign exchange and foreign commercial and financial transactions and for the regulation of trade and production and will comply with any instructions issued by the United Nations regarding these and similar matters.

24. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with or dealings with or for the benefit of countries at war with any of the United Nations or territories occupied by such countries or any other foreign country except under authorization of the Allied Commander in Chief or designated officials.

29. Benito Mussolini, his Chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.

30. All Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fascist Militia (MVSN), the Secret Police (OVRA), all Fascist youth organizations will insofar as this is not already accomplished be disbanded in accordance with the directions of the Allied Commander in Chief. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the United Nations may give for abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist ideology and teaching.

31. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinions will insofar as this is not already accomplished be rescinded, and persons detained on such grounds will, as directed by the United Nations, be released and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the Allied Commander in Chief may give for repeal of Fascist legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting there rom.

32. A. Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified by the United Nations and any nationals of the United Nations, including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or otherwise under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory, will not be removed and will forthwith be handed over to representatives of the United Nations or otherwise dealt with as the United Nations may direct. Any removal during the period between the presentation and the signature of the present instrument will be regarded as a breach of its terms.
B. Persons of whatever nationality who have been placed under restriction, detention or sentence (including sentences in absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations will be released under the direction of the United Nations and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected.
C. The Italian Government will take such steps as the United Nations may direct to safeguard the persons of foreign nationals and property of foreign nationals and property of foreign states and nationals.

33. A. The Italian Government will comply with such directions as the United Nations may prescribe regarding restitution, deliveries, services or payments by way of reparation and payment of the costs of occupation during the period of the present instrument.
B. The Italian Government will give to the Allied Commander in Chief such information as may be prescribed regarding the assets, whether inside or outside Italian territory, of the Italian state, the Bank of Italy, any Italian state or semi state institutions or Fascist organizations or residents in Italian territory and will not dispose or allow the disposal, outside Italian territory, of any such assets except with the permission of the United Nations.

34. The Italian Government will carry out during the period of the present instrument such measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization as may be prescribed by the Allied Commander in Chief.

35. The Italian Government will supply all information and provide all documents required by the United Nations. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, records, plans or any other documents or information.

36. The Italian Government will take and enforce such legislative and other measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the Allied Commander in Chief for the same purpose.

37. There will be appointed a Control Commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander in Chief.

42. The Italian Government will send a delegation to the Headquarters of the Control Com

[235]

mission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the Control Commission to the competent Italian authorities.♦ ♦ ♦

THE LETTER OF THE LAW WILL NOT BE INSISTED UPON OR CONSIDERED UNCHANGEABLE
[Ltr, Eisenhower to Badoglio, 29 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/136/91]

The terms of the armistice to which we have just appended our signatures are supplementary to the short military armistice signed by your representative and mine on 3 September 1943. They are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into execution. We also recognize that it is not at this time in the power of the Italian Government to carry out certain of the terms. Failure to do so because of existing conditions will not be regarded as a breach of good faith on the part of Italy. However, this document represents the requirements with which the Italian Government can be expected to comply when in a position to do so.

It is understood that the terms both of this document and of the short military armistice of 3 September may be modified from time to time if military necessity or the extent of co-operation by the Italian Government indicates this as desirable.

A GOVERNMENT MAY BE OVERTHROWN BY A MERE MATTER OF SEMANTICS
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Sep 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 21055]

Yesterday at Malta I met Badoglio where we signed the long term document with the Amended Preamble. There is no question in the minds of any of us that Badoglio hates Fascism and the Germans intensely but he made only one objection. He stated in the most sincere and emphatic way that if the title of the document "Instrument of Surrender of Italy" or the clause "the Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender unconditionally" become public knowledge in Italy that he and his government would be overwhelmed by a storm of reproach and that he would be forced to resign as of no further use to the King or to the United Nations.

... He pointed out the growing intensity of the German-Fascist propaganda directed against his still insecure government and the effect of reemphasizing at this time a complete Italian surrender after all his efforts towards co-operation. Nevertheless he signed the document, upon my assurance that I would present to my two governments his earnest plea for modification of the items quoted above and my solemn promise that I would recommend in the strongest possible way, even if his request is not granted, the title and paragraph in question should be kept confidential so long as they constitute a danger to the Badoglio government.

My Chief commanders and advisers agree with me that Badoglio's apprehensions are well founded. . . . We all feel that our governments have much to gain and will have lost nothing by granting Badoglio's request. The terms of the document signed and the Armistice of 3 September give us full control and amount to complete capitulation by Italy. . . . Any further deterioration of Italian military morale or the possible scuttling of Italian naval units which might result from a revulsion of feeling would be a serious blow to us. I, therefore, strongly recommend that the title of the long term document be changed to read "Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy," that the last sentence of the preamble be changed to read "And have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian government and that the statement of unconditional surrender in paragraph I be omitted.²⁰ ♦ ♦ ♦

AFTERTHOUGHTS ON THE ITALIAN ARMISTICE
[Memo, Samuel Reber, Vice President, Political Sec, AC, and Harold Caccia, enclosed in Ltr to Dunn, Dir, OEA [Office of European Affairs], Dept of State, 31 Mar 44, CAD files, 387.4 (7-6-43) (1)]

Experience with the Italian Armistice has shown that, apart from the obvious drawback of the two over-lapping Armistice arrangements, there are certain difficulties which should be avoided if possible in the preparation of any future Armistice.

The most important of these arose because the Italian Armistice was prepared so long in advance that it bore little relation to the conditions of the Italian capitulation and Allied requirements thereafter. . . . The existence of these

[236]

difficulties brings out that in the drafting of Armistice terms there seem to be two methods of approach:

1. To go into great detail in the Armistice terms themselves and try and cover under each heading all points which are likely to arise. This method has two drawbacks
a. It will produce a document of enormous length, and
b. Since the lengthy document must be prepared long in advance, the conditions which it is to meet will probably have altered substantially. Consequently some of its clauses may no longer be applicable. Some may not exactly cover the requirements of the Allies and would have to be interpreted to do so; finally other questions will arise for which no precise provision has been made.
In the Italian case it was necessary subsequently to include the right to requisition and extra territoriality in the documents of transfer. ²¹

2. To retain under each heading in the Armistice terms general powers susceptible of wide construction so that the terms can always be interpreted in the sense desired by the Allies at the time without appearing to be doing an injury to the defeated enemy. This has not always proved easy in the case of the Italian terms. In this connection it should be pointed out that in the Italian terms, the expression frequently arises that "the Italian Government will comply, etc." This is not satisfactory as the defeated Government may frequently be unable to comply, even with the best will in the world, and powers for the Allies to do things themselves even in unoccupied territory should always be reserved as under Article 10 of the Short Terms.

At the same time these general clauses should be made very clear and not, for instance, like clauses 23 or 28 of the Italian Armistice regarding financial terms and treatment of other enemy personnel and property.

This second method should result in a document of reasonable dimensions which must, however, be of such a nature that it can be made generally known as well to enemy officials and public as to all Allied authorities responsible for its execution. The secret nature of the Italian terms has proven a handicap.

Further, the document should be accompanied by an administrative directive to the commission or body concerned with the execution of the Armistice stating what policy there should be adopted in regard to the clause. Periodic meetings of the various Allied groups which may be charged with administration of territory and the execution of the Armistice with the responsible officials of the enemy Government should be arranged to insure even application of the terms and coordination of activity whether the Allies are acting jointly or in regions. Records of these meetings should be kept.

In order to avoid the necessity of subsequently imposing harsher conditions of application for any other reasons than intransigence on the part of the enemy, this directive should insist upon a severe interpretation of the terms in the initial stages. The directive can later be revised from time to time and the burden progressively lightened if the terms are executed in a reasonable manner.♦ ♦ ♦

6. PREREQUISITES OF TERRITORIAL TRANSFER AND A CONTROL COMMISSION DO NOT MATERIALIZE

ARMISTICE CONTROL AND RETURN OF TERRITORY TO FOLLOW ITALY'S DECLARATION OF WAR
[Ltr, Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Hilldring, 28 Sep 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 1]

... We expect that before you receive this letter announcement will have been made of the granting to the Italian Government of a status of co-belligerency. This is in conformity with a directive we have received and will call for the immediate formation of the Allied Commission.♦ ♦ ♦

As soon as we have given the accolade to the Badoglio government as the legitimate government of Italy we shall want to turn back to the Italian sovereignty those portions of Calabria which military operations will permit us to hand over and Sicily to Italian sovereignty. We shall probably suggest to Badoglio that he appoint a high commissioner or other civil officials as the head of a temporary government in Sicily with instructions to form an administrative council of five or ten local notables. This will be the top civil authority in the Island with which our people would deal. We cannot expect very much in the way of effective administration from the Italians until the government is re-established in Rome and perhaps not too much even then. The crowd

[237]

in Brindisi is rather pathetic and does not show evidence of any great capacity to run the show. Moreover Italy is in a sad state of demoralization and what with the destruction caused by our own operations and German demolition, together with the departure of the Fascist Party which has made the thing tick for twenty years, we shall find a dilapidated and creaking machine. This means that although nominally we shall turn over provinces as they are cleared and the fighting front moves to the north, we shall probably have to give a substantial amount of direct assistance for some time to come. As long as there is fighting in Italy we must see to it that those services essential to the operation are kept going and that there is not disorder in the rear areas. Perhaps the Italians will be able to see to some of that but I am not very sanguine about it. [See below, Chapter XI, Section I.]

I personally believe that we can make some political capital out of the transfer of occupied territories to Italian jurisdiction by telling the world that we install Military Government only where it is necessary for military operation and that as soon as conditions permit, we shall hand the territory to appropriate civil authorities. It might even be useful propaganda-wise to have a public interment of AMGOT as AMGOT is, I believe, destined to become a comparatively small unit to operate immediately in the rear of tactical forces and moving north as the line moves north. Areas cleared and settled would in the circumstances be turned over to the Italians subject to the control we would exercise through the Allied Commission. ♦ ♦ ♦

MARSHAL BADOGLIO IS HESITANT ABOUT THE QUESTION OF AN EARLY DECLARATION OF WAR
[Notes, Murphy, U.S. Minister, on the Conference Aboard H.M.S. Nelson in Valetta Harbor, Malta Conf, 29 Sep 43, Smith Papers, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 658-59]

Marshal Badoglio opened the conversation with a statement on several points which he said he had in mind:

(1) His desire to see the formation of a government on a broad, liberal basis.

(2) A declaration of war by the Italian Government against Germany on the return of the government to Rome.

(3) In the interval, he emphasized, the Italians are in a de facto state of war and fighting against the Germans in Corsica, Dalmatia, etc.

(4) He stated that as soon as it would be possible to move Italian troops from Sardinia, he would be able to put eight Italian divisions at the disposal of the Allies.

(5) He expressed the fear that Italian prisoners taken by the Germans might be liable to treatment as franc tireurs and, as such, to summary execution.

General Eisenhower stated that in his opinion the effort which the Italians are at present making is ample proof of their intention to co-operate, but that in view of (5) above, it would appear necessary that Marshal Badoglio's government, which, after all, is the only legal Italian Government, declare war immediately.

Marshal Badoglio replied that he had already considered that point of view, but that the power of the government at the moment extended over only a small part of Italy which rendered a declaration of war in these circumstances extremely difficult.

General Eisenhower, however, pointed out that to the contrary the other exiled governments, occupying not an inch of their national territory have declared war against Germany. He expressed a desire to have the Badoglio administration undertake the administration of Sicily and other liberated areas, but it is not clear to him how such an arrangement can be made unless a declaration of war is undertaken.

Marshal Badoglio promised to refer this question to the King who, he said, in any event must decide. Under Italian law only the King can declare war, Badoglio therefore stated that he would reserve his answer until he could consult with the King.

General Eisenhower stated that everything Marshal Badoglio does to wage war actively against Germany will raise his government by that much in the esteem of the United Nations. He pointed out that for three long years Italy has been an enemy of the United Nations and there has been built up a mass psychology which is not as willing to accept the Italians as soldiers on the field :night be. Therefore, General Eisenhower stated, it is Marshal Badoglio's duty today to do so just as quickly as possible. He inquired if Marshal Badoglio would so advise the King.

Marshal Badoglio replied that he understood General Eisenhower's point of view and would present it exactly to the King as stated because his point of view corresponds to that of General Eisenhower. [See ch. XV, sec. I, on liberalization of government.] ♦ ♦ ♦

TRANSFER OF TERRITORY IS DEFERRED
[Memo, Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, for CofS, AFHQ, 4 Oct 43, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

We are pursuing our plans with respect to the government of Italy on the following assumptions:

[238]

1. Before being installed in Rome the Badoglio Government will not be in a position to (a) declare war on Germany, ²²  or (b) complete the formation of a liberal government representing all shades of political opinion, or (c) effectively to administer any substantial portion of Italian territory.

2. That as soon as the Italian Government complies with (a) and (b) above, we shall publicly accord it a status of co-belligerency and turn over all territory which operational requirements will permit to Italian administration. 3. That for the purpose of eliminating Fascism and driving the Germans out of Italy we shall support the Badoglio Government as the actual government of Italy, meantime requiring that it be broadened and liberalized in accordance with democratic principles.

On these assumptions we propose to proceed as follows:

1. To continue the military mission at Brindisi until the King and Badoglio move to Rome. [Major] General [Kenyon A.] Joyce will be added on arrival and, as may be necessary, a few technical members such as financial, legal officers, etc.

2. To continue military government over all territory now occupied or to be occupied until the Italian Government is installed in Rome.... This military government would be divided into two parts. (a) An advance unit which would continue with the 15th Army Group, establish military government and continue direct control as long as the military situation may require. (b) The balance of our existing military government would be made directly responsible to AFHQ. This unit would govern all of the settled provinces until such time as they can be turned over to the Italians for administration. This Allied Military Government would be merged with the Allied Commission which would be constituted and put in operation when the Italian Government is installed in Rome. The commission would then begin to function to enforce the armistice and give instructions and guidance to the Italian administration in accordance with our present directive. The Commission would thus absorb all of Allied Military Government except the mobile unit with the 15th Army Group which would continue to report through 15th Army Group for tactical and administrative reasons to AFHQ [see Chapter X]. ♦ ♦ ♦

CLOSE SUPERVISION OF BADOGLIO'S ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES
[Memo, Rowell, MGS, for Chief, MGS, 30 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/92]

♦ ♦ ♦ 26. Allied control of the four Apulian provinces under the jurisdiction of the Badoglio Government is exercised by liaison officers drawn from AMG and attached to the Allied Military Mission. The organization contains thirteen officers and six EM/OR's. The Chief Liaison Officer is Lt. Col. Nelson Monfort whose headquarters is situated at Brindisi.

27. During my visit to the Allied Military Mission, Col. Monfort made it possible for me to see his organization at work. In his company, I visited Taranto, Lecce and Bari, and talked with the AMGLO [Allied Military Government Liaison Organization] officers there. In Brindisi, I saw a great deal of Col. Mayne, Col. Monfort's deputy and head of the Brindisi team. The information presented below is combined from what these officers told me and what I saw for myself.

28. AMGLO officers and men are distributed in groups among the four provincial capitals and the Headquarters. The strength of each group corresponds to the importance of the capital and the amount of work to be done there.

30. The principal matters handled by AMGLO Headquarters are high level liaison and trade and supplies. Messages and requests from AMGOT [also from 15th Army Group] to the Italian Army and Government pass through Col. Monfort's office and are taken up with the proper officials....

31. With regard to supplies, the four provinces are treated as a territorial unit. . . . The Italian authorities come to Col. Monfort for these supplies. It is his task to verify the documents which have been submitted and to take appropriate action.

32. In handling matters which extend to the four provinces, Col. Monfort deals with the Italian officials at the highest level: Generals Alibertu, [Leopoldo] Piccardi or Innocenti. If the business involves orders to the provincial prefects or other provincial authorities, they are issued by Innocenti and the AMGLO provincial officers on the spot report anything unsatisfactory in their local execution.

33. The AMGLO provincial officer deals with the local affairs of his province. He serves as liaison officer between the civilian population and the armed forces. For example, complaints against members of the armed forces who are

[239]

alleged to have committed offenses against civilians are taken to the local AMGLO officer who refers them in turn to the proper military authority. He is in direct touch with the provincial officials of his province and keeps an eye on their behaviour....

34. AMGLO does not post proclamations or ordinances. This is done either by the appropriate Italian officials or the area commanders. The latter occurs when the matter in question affects both Allied military forces and civilians; for example, hours when wine and spirits may be sold in restaurants and bars. In such an ordinance, printed in Italian and English, it is stated that the ordinance is issued in co-ordination with the Prefect. AMGLO is the co-ordinating agency.

AMGLO exercises political functions in accordance with the general Allied policy that active Fascists shall be removed from positions of authority or influence. Col. Monfort has had at least two prefects removed from office and suitable officials put in their place. His procedure has been to collect all pertinent information from Field Security and his own officers and to present it with his recommendation to Innocenti. There has not been an instance in which his recommendation has not been carried out promptly and without objection. AMGLO officers in the provinces keep an eye on the podesta and other communal officials as well as on those of the provincial level.♦ ♦ ♦

7. THE BURDENS OF CONTROL BECOME GREATER RATHER THAN LESS

NOT ENOUGH PERSONNEL
[Msg, Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Chief, CAD, 30 Sep 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 20825]

Existing authorized allotment of enlisted personnel . . . is inadequate and requires upward revision. ♦ ♦ ♦

(B). The thinning out process, moving personnel from rear areas to forward areas, cannot proceed as rapidly as originally anticipated due to inability of Italian Government to resume effective control under present and prospective conditions, considering probable heavy damage and dislocation of transportation and communications consequent upon heavy fighting.♦ ♦ ♦
(D). Sicily experience indicates greater need for enlisted personnel than first estimated.♦ ♦ ♦

[Rpt, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, 10 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/61, par. 6]

♦ ♦ ♦ The staff which was initially detailed to accompany 8th Army under Group Captain Benson, had . . . to fulfill the dual function of acting as Civil Affairs Officers in the immediate rear of the fighting formations of 8th Army and at the same time to provide an administration in the rearward areas. The staff, which was not complete at the time the operation was launched, has consequently been scarce throughout the period with a result that in spite of some reinforcements sent from Sicily, the number of officers available to maintain administration in the rearward Provinces occupied, and largely evacuated by the 8th Army, has never constituted more than a skeleton force.♦ ♦ ♦

DEVASTATION COMPLICATES OCCUPATION OF NAPLES
[Msg. AFHQ to CCAC, 2 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 1441]

McSherry has just returned from Naples [occupied I October] and reports as follows on conditions there. Head of local public health service reported there was no cholera or typhus and that prevalency of other diseases was normal. Medical supplies reported short. Number of doctors apparently adequate. Food situation serious. Reported that Germans took all stocks of food. Water situation acute. Viaduct and some of the reservoirs blown up but 15 days supply of water on rationed basis available for present population. Known breaks in viaduct can be repaired in 15 days. Considerable portion of main aqueduct is in German territory. Its condition unknown. Electrical system blown up. Main telephone exchange blown but two smaller exchanges intact. Gas works destroyed necessitating importation of coal for bakery and household use as well as for military purposes. Sewer system reported to be OK. All transportation including electric trolley busses were taken by Germans. All industrial plants, warehouses and hotels reported destroyed. It was estimated 600,000 persons remained in city. Population appeared greatly relieved upon entry of Allied troops. Reception emotional.

[240]

Cursory survey of housing would indicate this will be no serious problem. Railroad yards badly damaged. Officials appointed during Badoglio regime were present. All officials sincerely expressed desire to co-operate in any way possible. Main entrance to port reported blocked but harbormaster reported south entrance open. Harbormaster stated that port could be opened very shortly.

DIFFICULTIES FROM NEAPOLITANS' EXPECTATION OF BEING TREATED AS ALLIES
[Chanler, Chief, Legal Die, AMGOT, Rpt to Dir, CAD, 21 Dec 43, ABC, 014, HORRIFIED Govt, sec. 2 (CCAC Memo for Info No. 13), pp. 15-16]

32. . . . The population had been wildly enthusiastic in welcoming all Allied soldiers entering the town. General McSherry and Colonel [Edgar E.] Hume, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer with the 5th Army, had entered Naples in advance of the troops and moved into the "Municipio" or city hall. The next morning, additional AMG officers having arrived bringing proclamations and flags, a rather difficult question presented itself. On looking out the window of the "Municipio," where the AMG officers had spent the night, it was noticed that a large Italian flag was flying from one of the only two flagpoles on the building. (The whole city was bedecked with Italian and some Allied flags). There was a large crowd standing in front of the "Municipio," who broke into loud cheers when Colonel Hume stepped out on the balcony. He had just given instructions to raise the British and American flags. When he saw this situation, it became immediately apparent that the good will of the population would be rudely destroyed if the Italian flag was first hauled down and then replaced by the American and British flags. After a hasty consultation, no directives having been yet received except a semi-official rumor that the Italians had been granted a status of co-belligerency, it was decided that the only practical solution, in the absence of a third flagpole, was to drape all three flags from the balcony in front of the building. This met with great applause. Unfortunately, several weeks later it was decided by higher headquarters that Italian flags should not be permitted to fly from any official building in Occupied Territory-no doubt a correct decision but not a happy one so far as the particular flag on the Naples " Municipio" was concerned.

33. Similarly, when Proclamations Numbers I, 2 and 3 were posted on the morning after the occupation of Naples, the enthusiasm of the crowds which read the proclamations visibly dampened. They seemed rather hostile in tone to the population which had suddenly swung around in the volatile manner characteristic of Neapolitans, at the time of occupation, to the belief that they were and always had been our greatest friends. Subsequently, Proclamation Number I was considerably toned down to make it appear a little less belligerent.♦ ♦ ♦

AMG IS ENTERING A CRITICAL STATE
[Msg, Mal Gen J. F. M. Whiteley, DCofS, AFHQ, to McCloy, 6 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3705]

♦ ♦ ♦ We are entering a critical state for AMG involving the administration of occupied territory pending the assumption of authority by the Italian government, followed later by the conversion of the bulk of it into the Allied Commission and the transfer of settled territory to the Italian government.♦ ♦ ♦

CAO's DEAL WITH MOB VIOLENCE IN REMOTE LOCALITIES
[Rennell, CCAO 15th AGp, Rpt, so Oct 43 [hereafter cited as Rennell Rpt, 10 Oct 43], ACC files, 10000/100/61, par. 18]

I8.. . . Since my officers have no escorts and since it will not always be possible to occupy, physically, inhabited centres removed from the axis of advance, I see no methods of stopping ... acts of violence. In some cases my officers have themselves and by themselves quieted mobs, as yet without much risk to themselves but I cannot be certain that in future cases if they enter inhabited towns where violence is taking place without escort, that they will necessarily escape danger to themselves. Nevertheless, if they do not enter towns in the remote places there is a risk of such localities being turned over to crude mob rule with all that that implies. As it is, in most of the major places which have been occupied, there has been evidence of looting by the civilian population.

ENTHUSIASM OVER LIBERATION BUT NOT OVER THE PROSPECT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
[Rennell Rpt, 10 Oct 43, par. 20]

20. . . . The enthusiasm with which Allied troops have been received . . . must not be construed as indicating a desire to be governed by an Allied Military Government which, as I have before stated and desire here to re-state, cannot in my view conduct a direct administration in Italy

[241]

or do more than direct an incompetent Italian bureaucracy to govern a dispirited and apathetic people.

SOME ITALIAN LOCAL OFFICIALS ARE CRITICAL
[Transl of Ltr, Prefect of Foggia to Badoglio, 19 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1097)

♦ ♦ ♦ the situation is daily worsening for two principal causes:

a) Overbearing attitude of the numerous allied troops who, as I already said, take over houses, farmhouses, and country houses, ousting tenants and peasants, forbidding them to enter their property even to get their implements.
For this reason many areas will not be farmed. The very few vehicles saved from German destruction are "requisitioned," that is robbed, because nobody indemnifies for them; they are taking over the AGIP oil tanks and also requisitioning the empty barrels, thus rendering impossible an emergency depot.
b) Intrusion in every branch of civil life by numerous officers of civil affairs who, assigned in almost all villages, are taking complete charge, ousting or changing the village Mayor, arresting persons, and letting prisoners free, issuing orders not to pay taxes, taking without consideration provisions out of civil food stores ("ammassi"), publishing price and labour tariffs different, of course, for each town, even appointing themselves (as at Serracapriola) Town Governor, shutting up City Houses (as at Castelluccio dei Sauri), quartering troops in them and forbidding the Mayor and employees to enter, thus arresting the civil life of the town, issuing orders to work at enormous prices, hiring workmen whose wages they order to be paid by the Town Administration or by Civil Engineer Department without taking notice of their financial possibilities; are now setting their eyes on the arms deposited by the citizens and they may seize them if our Military Authority does not quickly take the arms over.

They are mostly youngsters (some of them are 23-24 years old) who have no single direction of action, not co-ordinated, who act at random without knowing all our difficult corporative system which cannot be abruptly abolished.

This "civil service" which wants to do everything is raising so great a hitch in the life of the region which is more tied up now than during the period of German pillage raids.

We had thought the effort would be to help us: they didn't give us anything. We want nothing tough; we only wish to be let free to pursue our errands: we'll go on, as we can, in our misery.²³ ♦ ♦ ♦

[Memo, Benson, AMG Hq, Eighth Army, for AMG Hq, 15th AGp, 30 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1097]

1. The letter written by the Prefect at Foggia to Marshal Badoglio dated i9 October 1943, a copy of which was handed to me on my recent visit to Bari, calls for some detailed comment in view of paragraph (b) which lays at the door of AMGOT various actions with which, in fact, they were in no way connected.

2. It will be as well to take the points raised by the Prefect in detail before commenting in general on the tone of the letter and the merits and demerits of the whole Foggia position as set forth in his letter.

3. Para (a) There is no need for me to comment on the paragraph, which is not levied at AMGOT, excepting to point out that there is an element of truth in the words "for this reason many areas will not be farmed." If agricultural settlement buildings are requisitioned and the inhabitants moved, the land they cultivated must suffer.

As regards AGIP I am informed that the allegation at any rate insofar as Foggia town is concerned is not the case.

4. Para (b) (i) "Intrusion in every branch of civil life . . . are taking complete charge."

This is broadly speaking true and is the work the Allied Military Government must do, though the "taking charge" is done through the local Podestas, etc. and not direct.

(ii) "Changing the village Mayor"
I know of one case where this was done by AMGOT for very good reasons. The new Podesta appointed by AMGOT has proved in every way successful, but the Prefect sent instructions superseding him by another Italian who was not acceptable to AMGOT. This has since been rectified and the AMGOT appointed Mayor remains. I know of no other cases in which AMGOT have removed Podesta at any rate without consulting the Prefect.

[242]

(iii) "Arresting persons."
No prisoners have been let free by AMGOT excepting after a fair trial, or investigation in the case of political prisoners. Gaols have frequently been found when AMGOT officials entered with the doors wide open and this has caused considerable trouble as AMGOT has had to endeavour to find and collect the prisoners so that each case could be examined.

(v) "Issuing order not to pay taxes."
The only tax which AMGOT officials have forbidden to be paid is the "Sindicati contribution" which it was decided by higher authority should be abolished. It is understood that the Prefect wishes to reinstate this as being the only method of collecting money for relief. He has been refused permission.

(vi) "Taking without consideration provisions out of civil food stores."
This had never been done by AMGOT who require all civil stocks of feed to feed civilians. The Prefect may be referring to certain surplus stocks of grain amounting in all to about 100 tons, which were sent to Naples. This, of course, was and still is a necessity to help the population of that city.

(vii) "Publishing prices and labour tariffs, etc."
No price tariffs have as yet been published by AMGOT. They are in print at the moment of writing and will be applicable to the whole of Foggia Province and other provinces as captured within the axis of Eighth Army. Labour prices have been published and are the same as those originally approved of and drawn up by the army in Sicily.

(viii) "Appointing themselves Town Governors.
I regret I am unable to answer this allegation as I do not know what is meant. Serracapriola is the headquarters of V Corps and has an AMGOT liaison officer attached to the Corps and the usual two AMGOT officers looking after the town and the district. Perhaps the Prefect is referring to the Town Major.

(ix) "Shutting up city houses, quartering troops in them, thus arresting the civil life of the town."
As an accusation against AMGOT this is merely stupied. The opposite is invariably the case, and it is AMGOT that has to fight to retain the necessary accommodation for provincial and communal administration. Examples are Foggia, where the available buildings were requisitioned by the N.A.A.F. [Navy, Army, Air Forces] and even today there is no proper accommodation from which to carry on the Provincial Government.

(x) "Issuing orders for work at enormous prices."
The only "works" which AMGOT have ordered are the clearing of debris in the streets and works in connection with road maintenance. Authorized labour rates have been paid, which are probably admittedly too high. They are not governed by AMGOT.

(xi) "Hiring workmen whose wages .. . financial possibilities."
Certain works have been put in hand for operational needs, such as road repairs (mentioned in (x) above). Payment for this is made through the Province, but provision for payment is made by AMGOT. Foggia has had 16,000,000 of AMGOT funds, which are used to pay for outgoings which cannot strictly be called a provincial expenditure. The statement as made by the Prefect is quite false.

(xii) "Setting their eyes on the arms deposited . . . does not quickly take the arms over."
Arms are collected under the proclamation and are safeguarded and tabulated. They will be returned in due course when security allows. Instances have occurred of arms being requisitioned, chiefly revolvers belonging to Carabinieri, but never by AMGOT. ♦ ♦ ♦

THE PROSPECTS OF RELIEF ARE DARK FOR THE CAO's
[Ltr, Capt J. G. Seguin, CAO, to Lt Col Julius W. Holmes, SCAO, Chieti Province, 12 Dec 43, ACC files, 10507/115/ 23]

Can't get a lamp of any kind for love or money. Am in darkness from 5:00 P.M. till next morning. It is a real draw back as I cannot do my paper work.

Can you find or steal one for me?♦ ♦ ♦

IN THE FORWARD AREAS AMG Is EXPECTED TO SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS
[Maj G. L. Wilcox, Dir, Public Safety, AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1093]

♦ ♦ ♦ Officials of AMG are welcomed. The people are inclined to rely too much on AMG and do not make enough effort to help themselves. They are inclined to expect to be given food and clothing and shelter and to have all their problems solved for them. ♦ ♦ ♦

[243]

AT LEAST WE ARE NOT UNPOPULAR
[Rpt of Rgn II, ACC for Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

♦ ♦ ♦ AMG is criticized, but almost invariably in good nature. Its failings are never attributed to lack of good will or intentions. They are explained by our ignorance of the complicated mentality of the southern Italian and by our readiness to believe that most people speak the truth, whereas few do. ♦ ♦ ♦

8. AN ENEMY IS MADE A COBELLIGERENT

NEW PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO DECLARE WAR
[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 5 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3, CM-OUT 1863]

♦ ♦ ♦ The President and the Prime Minister are in agreement that the King of Italy declare war on Germany as soon as possible.
There appears to be no necessity for waiting until Rome is occupied by the Allies.
You will, therefore, put pressure upon the Italian Government for an early Declaration of War against Germany without waiting for further successes by the Allied Forces.
Immediately following such declaration a joint announcement of Italy's co-belligerency will be made by the U.S., the U.K., and the Soviet.

[Msg, Eisenhower to Brig Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, Actg Chief, AMM, 5 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Marshal has shown every willingness to co-operate effectively but failure to declare war is militating against the position of the Italian Government and the recognition we can accord it. I am well aware that His Majesty and his family, the Marshal and other members of the Government are personally exerting themselves to the utmost to inspire resistance to the Germans, but in the matter of formal declaration of war they must act decisively and without further delay. The world will understand decisive action but further .temporizing will be interpreted as a desire on the part of the Italian Government to evade definite responsibility. I repeat that you should present this matter to the proper authorities in the most emphatic way as I consider it of vital importance at this stage of relations between Italy and the United Nations.

[Memo, Gen Taylor for Badoglio, 7 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

The following is a resume of the views of the British and American Government relative to the need for an immediate declaration of war on Germany by the Italian Government.

An immediate declaration of war is essential at this stage of relations between Italy and the United Nations. It is the considered opinion of General Eisenhower and the governments which he represents that now is the time to take this decisive step...

The Allied leaders respect the reluctance of His Majesty, the King, to declare war for constitutional reasons. The present situation, however, is in no wise comparable to that when Mussolini led an unwilling nation into war. Now it is the nation which has declared and looks to the government for formal sanction. The thousands of gallant Italians engaged in acts of war at this moment are entitled to the rights and protection of belligerency in their relations both to the Allies and to Germany. If a constitutional validation is necessary, it can follow the formation of a broad national government in Rome, but, in the meantime, the United Nations await a declaration of war as the inevitable response of Italy to the German acts of aggression.♦ ♦ ♦

STILL MORE PRESSURE IS NECESSARY
[Memo, Gen Taylor to Badoglio, 11 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

It has now been five days since I had the honor to submit to your Excellency the expression of the views of the Allied Governments on the urgency of an Italian Declaration of War. Throughout this period the eyes of the United Nations have remained, fixed upon your Government, awaiting an expression of your intentions. Meanwhile, I understand that the Mediterranean Commission is assembling tomorrow to consider far-reaching matters of policy affecting the entire Mediterranean area with the status of Italy still in doubt. Unless the Italian Government takes decisive action at once, the Commission will convene in an atmosphere inimical to Italian interests. ²⁴ ♦ ♦ ♦

[244]

FINALLY AN ITALIAN DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY
[Proclamation of Marshal Badoglio to the Italian People, 13 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

... There will be no peace in Italy as long as a single German treads our soil.
We must march forward together with our friends of America, Britain and Russia and of the other United Nations.
In the Balkans, in Jugoslavia, in Albania, in Greece and elsewhere, the Italian troops who have been witnesses of German acts of aggression and of cruelty might fight to the end against the common enemy.
The government which I lead will soon be completed by bringing in representatives of every political party. Thus a truly democratic government will be formed and I reaffirm the promise that once the war is over the Italian people will be free to hold elections and choose the government which they desire.
Italians: I inform you that His Majesty the King has charged me this day the 13th of October to announce the Declaration of War on Germany.

ALLIES RECOGNIZE ITALY AS COBELLIGERENT
[Joint Statement by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., 13 Oct. 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept the active co-operation of the Italian nation and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since 8 September and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and the American, British and Soviet Governments will continue to work with the Italian Government on that basis. The three Governments acknowledge the Italian Government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have.

The relationship of co-belligerency between the Governments of Italy and the 'United Nations Governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to the United Nations' cause.

THE STATESMEN NOW CONTEMPLATE MILITARY GOVERNMENT ONLY IN COMBAT ZONE
[Jt Note by Hull and Eden, Policy and Administration in Connection with the Military Operations in Italy, 23 Oct 43, CofS files, 337, Conf, 1943 (142)]

The most recent developments have been the Italian declaration of war against Germany, and the acceptance by the Allies of Italy as a co-belligerent with, among other conditions, the understanding that the Italian Government should be reorganized upon a broader and more liberal basis by the inclusion of representatives of anti-Fascist political groups.

As a result of these developments it is now contemplated that Military Government will be restricted in the future to the combat zone and that elsewhere supervision and control of the Italian administration will be carried out through the agency of a Control Commission under, so long as the military situation requires, the presidency of the Commander in Chief. ²⁵  ♦ ♦ ♦

9. RISE AND FALL OF HOPES FOR EARLY RETURNS

COBELLIGERENCY REVIVES THE PLAN FOR EARLY ARMISTICE CONTROL AND TRANSFER OF TERRITORY
[Min of Mtg of Allied Officials at Home of the Br Resident Minister, 13 Oct 43, MTO, HS files, AFHQ Papers]

General Holmes outlined the present situation as to the Allied Commission for the post-armistice control of the Italian Government. It had been planned to establish the Allied Commission soon after the Malta Conference between General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio. That plan had had to be temporarily abandoned: in its composition the Government remained too weak to be entrusted with authority, and in consequence a decision was made to continue military govern-

[245]

ment over all occupied Italian territory until Rome was reached. . . . See his memo to the Chief of Staff, 4 October.

The situation had now altered. The Italian Government had declared war, it was being treated as a co-belligerent, the occupation of Rome seemed more remote, and in consequence steps must be taken at once to develop the Italian Government. It was therefore planned (1) to send a party of high-level personnel from Tizi Ouzou to AMG Headquarters, Palermo, to merge with that body and help prepare for its transformation into the Allied Commission; (2) to send a smaller party to the seat of the Italian Government to take up the work of the Allied Commission. A skeleton Allied Commission would thus be constituted at Brindisi, and would from time to time be strengthened.♦ ♦ ♦

The position, vis-à-vis the Italian Government, would then be that we were prepared, in principle, to transfer territory to Italian administration. But this could not be accomplished at once, and we would begin with Sicily. An Italian high commissioner for Sicily would then be appointed to meet with representatives of AMG and AC to arrange for the transfer of authority.

Mr. Macmillan stressed the need for putting the Allied Commission into operation without further delay. He added that the four provinces adjacent to Brindisi, which were now actually under Italian administration, should then be brought into conformity with the system of control under the Allied Commission. First regularize the situation in the four provinces, then place Sicily under Italian administration, then go to other areas.♦ ♦ ♦

IT IS DECIDED TO SEND AN ADVANCE ACC GROUP TO BRINDISI
[Memo, Gen. Taylor, Actg Chief, AMM, for Badoglio, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91)

I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency the following personal message to you from General Eisenhower:

I observe with great satisfaction that the Italian Government has declared war on Germany. By maintaining a vigorous resistance to the German forces, the Italian Nation, through its armed forces and its civilian population, may hasten the redemption of Italy.

I take this occasion to inform you that the Allied Commission is being constituted and that an advance group of officers will shortly arrive at Brindisi prepared to discuss the most pressing problems with the Italian Government....

NOT EVEN HOTEL ROOMS FOR THEM
[Msg, Gen Taylor to AFHQ, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/36]

.. . I transmit herewith Marshal Badoglio's reaction to a very general discussion of the arrival of the Allied Commission to Brindisi. . . . He wishes me to point out that his government consists only of himself and the ministers of Navy, Air and Industry. These ministers are comparatively without staff and do not have access to the official archives. Marshal consequently feels that the arrival of a large group of economic and administrative officers on the Allied side will be unwarranted until the government is solidly installed in Rome. He adds that the housing arrangements in Brindisi as he knows it cannot possibly accommodate more than a few other officers unless they are willing to live in tents or on boats in the harbor. I repeat my previous recommendation that only one or two officers be sent here for the present to survey the situation.

ONLY A FEW OPPOSITE NUMBERS SHOULD BE SENT
[Msg, AMM to AFHQ, 20 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/75]

... Apart from military officials there are very few officials in Badoglio Government to handle administrative and economic matters. . . . In view of these considerations and General Taylor's message that Badoglio does not feel adequately equipped to administer territory now under Allied Military Government seems advisable to limit advance party of officers having opposite numbers in present Italian government. This means head Civilian Supply and Finance Sub-commissions. Other officers can be added as Italian Government grows. .. .²⁶

BUT BADOGLIO Is EXPECTED To BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR TERRITORIAL TRANSFER IMMEDIATELY
[Memo, Gen Taylor to Badoglio, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

. .. It is important that we start examining forthwith problems connected with the gradual transfer of territory now under Allied Military Government to the administration of the Italian Government subject to guidance and instruction from the Commission. It is apparent that any measures of this sort require detailed consideration, and that it is a prerequisite that the Italian Government put itself in a position satisfactorily to discharge the responsibilities involved....

[246]

BADOGLIO WANTS NO MORE TERRITORY UNTIL HE CAN HANDLE IT
[Msg, Gen Taylor to AFHQ, 20 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/26]

... I wish to state clearly Badoglio's position regarding the return of liberated territory to his government. He has told me more than once that he does not desire a complete transfer until his government is capable of handling it. He thinks that this will not be the case until he gets to Rome where he can form a government, have access to the archives and have necessary means of communication at his disposal. As this necessarily entails considerable delay he asks now that some public expression of our intentions be made to strengthen his internal position. If the Allied governments do not wish to make such a declaration, would there be any objection to Badoglio himself saying publicly what the Allies have undertaken to do when the Italian government is qualified both administratively and politically to assume the responsibility?

PERSONNEL DIFFICULTIES INCREASE BECAUSE ITALIAN AID HAS NOT MATERIALIZED
[Brig Gen Edgar E. Hume, SCAO AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/154/204]

♦ ♦ ♦ The rapid expansion of the Fifth Army from two small corps to far more than twice that size has doubled the requirements of CAO's for work with divisions in the field and difficulties have been experienced in obtaining sufficient officers suitable for this type of work....

(2) The replacements received during month were without experience and the number of experienced GAO's is now small in proportion to the number of corps and divisions. ♦ ♦ ♦

[247]

Endnotes  

Return to the Table of Contents

	Return to CMH Online
	Last updated 18 February 2004