Notice: Our website is currently undergoing a migration, and some content may have been moved to a new location, be actively migrated, or be temporarily inaccessible. We appreciate your patience as we continue to add content gradually over time.

From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe, and The Gulf War

Cookie Disclaimer - CMH Online does not use persistent cookies (persistent tokens that pass information back and forth from the client machine to the server). CMH Online may use session cookies (tokens that remain active only until you close your browser) in order to make the site easier to use. CMH Online DOES NOT keep a database of information obtained from these cookies. You can choose not to accept these cookies and still use the site, but it may take you longer to fill out the same information repeatedly and clicking on the banners may not take you to the correct link. Refer to the help information in your browser software for instructions on how to disable cookies.

External Links Disclaimer - The appearance of hyperlinks to external sites does not constitute endorsement by the Department of the Army of the linked web site or the information, products or services contained therein. For other than authorized activities such as military exchanges and Morale, Welfare and Recreation sites, the Department of the U.S. Army does not exercise any editorial control over the information you may find at these locations. Such links are provided consistent with the stated purpose of this web site.

Migration Notice - The Center for Military History has recently completed the initial migration process to a new content management system (CMS). Please note that not all content has been migrated over yet, but it will be gradually transferred over time. If you are unable to find specific content, feel free to send us an inquiry, and our team would be happy to assist you in locating the information you need.

Inquiries - For inquiries related to organizational history, military programs, or research at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), please email CMH Answers at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.answers@army.mil. Due to high correspondence volume, response times may vary. Before reaching out, review the Army Records Master List, FAQs, and Online Bookshelves. On-site research appointments require one week’s notice. For more information, please visit the CMH website at https://history.army.mil/About-CMH/Inquiries-and-Visitor-Policy/.

Special Publications CMH Pub 70-56-1, Paper 1998, 2002; 377 pages, illustrations, tables, maps, appendixes, index

Stephen P. Gehring

Special Publications
CMH Pub 70-56-1, Paper
1998, 2002; 377 pages, illustrations, tables, maps, appendixes, index

GPO S/N: 008-029-00336-8

From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait describes how the United States Army, Europe, under the command of General Crosbie E. Saint, supported the coalition's armed response to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. With the changed threat environment of the post-Cold War period as a backdrop, Stephen P. Gehring credits effective planning and preparations in the late 1980s for USAREUR's successful transition in 1990 from a basically static heavy force focused on the defense of Europe to a smaller mobile heavy force capable of deploying rapidly for contingency operations anywhere in the European Command's area of responsibility. This initiative, according to Gehring, had irrevocably launched USAREUR on a new phase in its history. He examines in depth how USAREUR planned, assembled, prepared, and deployed its personnel, equipment, and war reserves to the Persian Gulf to stop and reverse Iraqi aggression, providing the decisive armored units and firepower that proved so critical to the success of coalition operations in Southwest Asia. He also covers contingency and logistical planning, the programs to support the residual community in Europe, and the subsequent redeployment and force reduction. His study of the versatility, deployability, and lethality of USAREUR forces underscores the value of a trained and ready Army, and those now involved in planning and executing Army Transformation will learn much from this remarkable story.

* View this publication online.