93D DIVISION
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
IN THE
WORLD WAR
PREPARED BY THE
AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1944
Foreword
THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION was created by Congress in 1923 for the purpose of commemorating the services of American forces in Europe during the World War. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commission has erected suitable memorials in Europe and improved and beautified the eight American cemeteries there. It has also published a book entitled "American Armies and Battlefields in Europe" which gives a concise account of the vital part played by American forces in the World War and detailed information regarding the memorials and cemeteries.
In order that the actions of American troops might be accurately set forth, detailed studies were made of the operations of each division which had front-line battle service. In certain cases studies of sector service were also prepared. It is felt that the results of this research should now be made available to the public. Therefore, these studies are being published in a series of twenty-eight booklets, each booklet devoted to the operations of one division.
In these booklets only the active service of the divisions is reared in detail. The accounts, however, are comprehensive enough to be of general interest and establish a great body of fact concerning the operations. For the military student, they provide an excellent background for tactical studies and present an extensive list of sources upon which further study can be based.
AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION
s/John J. Pershing, Chairman
PREFACE
IN READING the booklets of this series it should be borne in mind that they are based on historical studies which were prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission primarily for the purpose of determining the front line of each American division for each day of its active operations. Consequently, they were essentially front-line infantry studies. The operations of other arms, movements of reserves and other phases of the operations were covered only in sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of the infantry action.
The preparation of these studies was begun soon after the Commission was created, and every precaution was taken to insure that the research would be conducted with the utmost accuracy and thoroughness. A number of officers from the Regular Army as well as from the Marine Corps were selected and detailed to the Commission from time to time to carry on the work. All records of the War Department pertaining to the subject were exhaustively examined, as were the French, British and German documents which had been collected by the Army War College. From these sources, the daily front lines of each division were determined and plotted on large-scale maps, and brief accounts of the operations were prepared. The maps and accounts of operations were then referred to officers of the divisions concerned for comment and additional information. They were normally sent to officers of all ranks down to and including company commanders. In cases of doubtful or controversial points, the reference was carried further. The replies received were carefully studied, evaluated and used to correct and amplify the original studies. In this way, the Commission was able to secure and preserve valuable data which otherwise would have been lost.
In these booklets, it has not been the purpose to go far beyond the scope of the original studies. However, casualty and strength tables have been added and enough other material
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has been included to present connected histories of the division from their organization until the conclusion of their service it Europe, and to portray their actions in proper relationship to the operations of the corps and armies with which they served.
In order to indicate to the reader the areas in which the divisions served, a general map of France and Belgium has been included in each booklet. This map shows the principal cities and the battle lines of July 17 and November 11. In addition it shows, by special symbol, certain localities of particular interest to the division concerned.
All dates are 1918 unless otherwise indicated and are inclusive for example, October 9-11 includes the three days, October 9, 10 and 11. Dates in the headings of chapters dealing with operations, and in the titles of accompanying maps, are in general the dates between which one or more infantry regiments of the division have been awarded battle honors by the War Department. In certain cases infantry regiments, as well as other elements of the division, have been awarded battle honors for dates other than those indicated. The dates on the battle line of the maps include the period during which the division held command. The lines are as of midnight unless otherwise indicated; for example, October 9 indicates the line held at midnight, October 9.
The operation maps are reproductions of maps commonly used by American forces during the World War. In a great number of cases it was necessary to use parts of two or more sheets of the wartime maps to make one operation map, which accounts for the different treatments of topographical detail often found on the same operation map. Names which appear on the maps in the abbreviated form are spelled in full in the text. A table of abbreviations with the French equivalent and English translation appears in the front of each booklet. Names of certain topographical features which are well known, and are frequently referred to, appear in the text in the Anglicized form for example, Argonne Forest rather than Forêt d'Argonne, Marne River rather than Marne Rivière.
The casualty figures are based on the official casualty records of The Adjutant General. Tables of casualties have been prepared, however, only for the periods of active operations. The
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purpose is to show the casualties which occurred under the division command during specific actions. Therefore, casualties of elements which were detached during the actions are not included, while casualties of elements of other divisions which were attached have been included. It will be noted that, in the majority of cases, the dates in the casualty tables cover longer periods than those in the chapter headings or on the maps. This was found necessary in order to include all casualties incident to entering or leaving the line.
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CONTENTS
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iii
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x
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Organization of the Division—Authorized Strength—Map of France and Belgium—Arrival in Europe—Early Service— Champagne-Marne Defensive; Afrique, Aire, Calvaire, St. Mihiel and Verdun Sectors.
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1
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Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive (368th, 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments), September 26-October 8—Subsequent Service, including Anould and Thur Sectors, October 9, 1918-February 1919—Casualties.
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7
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Oise-Aisne Offensive (370th Infantry), September 15-November 11—Subsequent Service, November 12, 1918-February 1919—Casualties.
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25
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Table of Organization, Infantry Division, November 11, 1918—Strength of 93d Division—General Table of Casualties—Sources.
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35
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INDEX [omitted]
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41
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OPERATION MAPS [omitted]
Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive, 368th, 369th and 372d Infantry Regiments, September 26-October 8.
Oise-Aisne Offensive (370th Infantry), September 15-November 11 (Maps 1 and 2).
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Pocket
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ix
Organization, and Service from
Arrival in the A. E. F. until September 25
THE 93D DIVISION (Provisional) was organized at Camp Stuart, Virginia, in December 1917 from colored National Guard units from the States of New York. Illinois, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Tennessee, the District of Columbia and from colored selective service men from South Carolina. [1]1
The principal units of the division were:
185th Infantry Brigade
369th Infantry Regiment
370th Infantry Regiment
186th Infantry Brigade
371st Infantry Regiment
372d Infantry Regiment [1]
(No field artillery brigade, divisional troops or trains were organized)
The details of organization of the American infantry division were changed from time to time during the World War. Under the tables of organization which were in use in the American Expeditionary Forces on November 11, 1918, and which, in general, were in force during 1918, the maximum authorized strength of the division was 991 officers and 27,114 men. Its principal armament was 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm guns, 12 6-inch trench mortars, 260 machine guns and 16,193 rifles. Further details concerning the composition of the American infantry division appear in the table on page 35. The divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces seldom attained the maximum authorized strength shown above. The actual strength of the 93d Division on certain dates is shown in the
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1. The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to the sources on which the statements in the paragraphs are based. All sources are listed in the appendix: (p. 37).
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table on page 36. The approximate strength of the division for other dates may be obtained by applying to these figures the battle losses which appear in the casualty tables following the accounts of battle operations. [2]
The first unit sailed from Hoboken on December 12, 1917, followed during February, March and April, 1918, by the remainder of the division from Hoboken and Newport News. The various units landed at Brest and St. Nazaire, France. [1]
Owing to the need for replacements in French units, the four infantry regiments of the 93d Division were sent to the French. It was contemplated that this arrangement would be temporary, and that they would be regrouped as an American division, but later developments made it impracticable for this to be done. The regiments remained with French divisions until the close of hostilities, being reorganized according to the French tables of organization. The division staff was assigned to other duties. [1, 97]
The 369th Infantry was the first of the regiments to arrive in France. It landed at Brest in December 1917 and was sent to Camp Coëtquidan for duty with the Services of Supply. On March 12 it moved to Givry-en-Argonne, 15 kilometers south of Ste. Menehould, where it was attached to the French 16th Division for training. [1]
From April 8 to July 4 this regiment, affiliated with the same French division, participated in the occupation of the Afrique Sector, just west of the Argonne Forest north of Ste. Menehould. On April 29 it assumed command of the front line from Ville-sur-Tourbe to the west bank of the Aisne River which it held until the night of July 3-4. Upon being relieved in the front line, the regiment withdrew to intermediate and second-line positions. [1, 129]
From July 15 to 18 the 369th Infantry participated in the Champagne-Marne Defensive, which was the Allied and American action against the German offensive to widen the Marne salient by attacking on both sides of Reims. On July 15, after assisting in stopping a German attack against the French 6th Division, the regiment moved to the support of the French 161st Division north of Minaucourt, 5 kilometers southwest
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of Ville-sur-Tourbe. On July 18 it took part in the counterattack which retook the front-line trenches of this division. [1]
On July 21-22 one battalion entered the front line in the Beauséjour subsector (Calvaire Sector), 1 kilometer south of Butte du Mesnil. From July 23 to August 19 the regiment occupied the Calvaire subsector (Calvaire Sector), 1 kilometer north of Calvaire. Subsequently it moved to St. Ouën, where it trained until September 7. On September 9 it became an organic part of the French 161st Division, and from September 11 to 15 occupied the Beauséjour subsector. On September 14-16 the regiment was relieved and moved to the Somme-Bionne area, 15 kilometers west of Ste. Menehould, preparatory to participating in the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive with the French Fourth Army. [1, 129]
The 370th Infantry, upon its arrival in France, proceeded to Grandvillars, in the Vosges region near Belfort, where it was attached to the French 73d Division for training. On May 19 it was transferred to the French 133d Division, and on June 1 joined the French 10th Division, which was occupying a sector near the Swiss border. On June 12 the regiment commenced to move to Lignières (Meuse), where on June 17 it joined the French 34th Division which was holding the St. Mihiel Sector at the tip of the St. Mihiel salient. On June 22 the regiment took over the subsector southwest of the town of St. Mihiel. The relief of the regiment in this subsector began on July 1, and on July 5 it moved to the vicinity of Auzéville, 20 kilometers southwest of Verdun, where it joined the French 36th Division. From July 7 to August 18 it participated in the occupation of the Aire Sector, on the Meuse-Argonne front, 10 kilometers north of Auzéville. After being relieved in the Aire Sector the regiment trained in the Bar-le-Duc area until September 1 when it moved to the vicinity of La Ferté-Milon, 65 kilometers northeast of Paris. Here, on September 4, it was assigned to the French 59th Division preparatory to participating in the Oise-Aisne Offensive with the French Tenth Army. [1]
The 371st Infantry, upon its arrival in France, proceeded to Rembercourt-aux-Pots, 26 kilometers west of St. Mihiel, where it trained with the French XIII Corps until June 6. It
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was then designated as an organic part of the French 157th Division, and placed at the disposal of the French 68th Division which was holding the Verdun Sector on the Meuse-Argonne front from west of Forges to Bois d'Avocourt. On July 11 the regiment moved to a support position in this sector. The 371st Infantry passed to the control of the French 157th Division which relieved the French 68th Division July 16. The regiment continued to participate in the occupation of the Verdun Sector with the French 157th Division, occupying a number of positions until September 14. Upon being relieved, the regiment moved with the division to the Somme-Bionne area preparatory to participating in the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive with the French Fourth Army. [1, 112]
The 372d Infantry, upon its arrival in France, proceeded to Condé-en-Barrois, 5 kilometers south of Rembercourt-aux-Pots, where it trained with the French XIII Corps until May 26. It then joined the French 63d Division which was holding the Aire Sector on the Meuse-Argonne front from the Aire River to Le Four de Paris. On June 4 the regiment moved into the front line and on the 7th assumed command of the Argonne-Ouest subsector. On June 21 it was assigned to the French 35th Division. The 372d Infantry assumed command of the Vauquois subsector, east of the Aire River, on July 1. On the following day it became an organic part of the French 157th Division. The French 157th Division was relieved in the front line on July 14 and, on July 16, relieved the French 68th Division in the Verdun Sector. The 372d Infantry participated in the occupation of the Verdun Sector with the French 157th Division until September 14. Upon being relieved, the regiment moved with the division to Hans, near Somme-Bionne, preparatory to participating in the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive with the French Fourth Army. [1, 112]
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Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive, and Subsequent Service
MEUSE-ARGONNE (CHAMPAGNE) OFFENSIVE (369TH, 371ST AND 372D INFANTRY REGIMENTS)
SEPTEMBER 26—OCTOBER 8
SUBSEQUENT SERVICE, OCTOBER 9, 1918—FEBRUARY 1919
FROM THE TIME that the American Commander-in-Chief arrived in France, he bent every effort toward organizing an American army under American command at the earliest possible moment. To accomplish this would normally consume considerable time because it would first be necessary to transport a large number of troops to Europe, provide for their supply and complete their training. The organization of this army was further deferred by the critical situation created by the German offensives launched in the spring and early summer of 1918. These offensives so depleted the Allied reserves that the Allies faced almost certain defeat unless they received immediate support. In this crisis the American Commander-in-Chief postponed for the time being the concentration of American divisions for the formation of an American army, and made all American combatant forces available for service with the British and French armies. With this assistance, the Allies were able not only to stop the German offensives before they gained a decisive victory but, on July 18, to launch a successful counteroffensive against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July 24, while this offensive was still in progress, a strategic offensive plan was agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief which included a mission for an American army. The immediate purpose of
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this plan was to reduce the salients which interfered with railroad communications which were essential to further offensive operations. One of these was the St. Mihiel salient. [3, 128]
The American First Army was organized on August 10, and on August 30 assumed command of the front from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, to Watronville, 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun. From September 12 to 16 it conducted the St. Mihiel Offensive which resulted in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. [3].
With the reduction of the St. Mihiel and other salients the immediate purpose of the strategic offensive plan of July 24 had been accomplished, and it became possible to undertake the great converging offensives which had been agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief early in September. These offensives included an American attack to be launched on September 26 between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, supported on the left by the French Fourth Army between the Argonne and the Suippes River; a renewal on September 27 of the British-French attack between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers; and a combined Allied attack east of Ypres on September 28. Between these principal offensives, secondary operations were to be undertaken. [3, 125, 126, 127]
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army and the French Fourth Army was to be directed against the principal German lateral line of supply, the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières railroad, which, at Sedan, lay 53 kilometers from the front. The severing of this artery would render the German positions to the west and northwest of Sedan untenable. The importance of this line of communications made it certain that the Germans on this front would resist to the last extremity. [3]
East of the Argonne Forest, the American First Army was to make an initial advance of 16 kilometers and penetrate the hostile third position on its front. This position, known to the Germans as the Kriemhild Stellung, formed a part of their great defensive system, popularly called the Hindenburg Line, which ran from the vicinity of Metz to the North Sea. On the
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Meuse-Argonne front, the Hindenburg Line extended from Bois de Forêt, crossed the heights of Cunel and Romagne, and included the high ground north of Grandpré. From this point the Hindenburg Line continued across the front of the French Fourth Army just north of the Aisne River. West of the Argonne Forest, the French Fourth Army was to advance at the same time toward the line, Grandpré—Vouziers— Machault—Bétheniville. This combined action of the two armies would force the evacuation of the Argonne Forest by flanking it on the east and west, and insure their junction at Grandpré. The American First Army and the right of the French Fourth Army were then to advance to the line, Stenay—le Chesne—Attigny, which would outflank the Hindenburg Line in front of the French Fourth Army. This operation would clear the way for both armies to drive to the north, cut the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières railroad and drive the enemy beyond the Meuse. [3, 4, 5, 128]
P
The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the service of the 93d Division in the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.
During the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the 369th Infantry was assigned to the French 161st Division, and the 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments to the French 157th Division, both of the French Fourth Army.
The offensive began on the morning of September 26, on which date the 369th Infantry advanced into a gap in the front line and took Ripont. A further gain of about 1 kilometer was made on the 27th.
On the 28th the French 157th Division entered the line between the French 161st and 2d Moroccan Divisions, placed elements of the 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments in the line, and occupied Bussy Ferme and positions to the southwest. The operation was
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continued on the 28th and Séchault, Ardeuil and Montfauxelles were captured.
Stubborn resistance was encountered by the French 161st Division on September 30, but the 369th Infantry advanced to a position about 1 kilometer northeast of Séchault, from which it was withdrawn to a reserve position during the night of September 30-October 1.
The 371st Infantry advanced about 2 kilometers on the 30th, and was relieved by the 372d Infantry during the early morning of October 1. The latter regiment continued the attack on the 2d, and advanced its line to a position south of Monthois, where it remained until the relief of the French 157th Division on October 7.
In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive, the French 161st Division, to which the 368th Infantry was assigned, and the French 157th Division, to which the 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments were assigned, were concentrated west of Ste. Menehould in the area of the French Fourth Army. [1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]
These two divisions, together with the French 2d Moroccan Division, composed the French IX Corps. This corps was to attack as the second corps from the right, with the French XXXVIII Corps to its right and the French II Corps to its left. Prior to September 26 the front line within the zone of action of the IX Corps extended southwest from Bois de la Faux to the vicinity of Redoute de la Truie. The mission of the IX Corps was to aid by all possible means the advance toward Grandpré of the XXXVIII Corps to its right, by pushing its own advance toward Brécy, on the Aisne River 3 kilometers northeast of Challerange. It was to cover the left of the XXXVIII Corps, and furnish artillery support. [4, 5, 12]
The IX Corps was to attack with the 161st Division and 2d Moroccan Division in line from right to left, and the 157th Division in reserve. The first phase of the operation contemplated a piercing of the German main line of resistance and an advance to the line, Cernay-en-Dormois—Séchault—Trières Ferme. Following the break-through, the IX Corps was to
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carry out its exploitation to the line, Challerange—Monthois, which was to be reached on the first day of the attack. [5, 13]
The zone of action assigned the List Division was as follows:
Right boundary: Bois en 1 lune (excl.)—Maisons de Champagne Ferme (incl.)—Mont Macherin (excl.)—Calvaire in Bouconville (excl.).
Left boundary: Bois Barrant (incl.)—Bois Allongé (incl.)—Bois de la Hachette (incl.)—Ripont (excl.)—Bussy Ferme (excl ). [7, 14]
The formation for the attack of the 161st Division was to be as follows:
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French 163d Infantry
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French 363d Infantry
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3d Battalion, 369th Infantry, in support
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2d Battalion, 369th Infantry, in support
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Division Reserve
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1st Battalion, 369th Infantry
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To the right of the 161st Division was the French 74th Division, XXXVIII Corps; to the left, the 2d Moroccan Division, IX Corps. [12, 15, 16, 17]
During the night of September 24-25 the support battalions of the 369th Infantry had been moved forward to positions in rear of the French front-line troops. The reserve battalion moved to a position about 4 kilometers south of Bois de Beauséjour. The 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments were held in reserve of the French 157th Division near Somme-Bionne, about 14 kilometers south of Ripont. [7, 9, 10]
Sept. 26
The French attacked behind a rolling barrage at 5:25 a. m., September 26, following an intense artillery preparation which had continued throughout the night. Meeting with no resistance in the enemy first position, the attack of the 161st Division moved forward to the second position, where determined resistance was encountered. During the advance a gap opened between the 163d Infantry and the 2d Moroccan Division. The 3d Battalion, 369th Infantry, following in rear of the French 163d Infantry, pushed forward and to the left on its own initiative and closed this gap. [7, 17]
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During the remainder of the day the 3d Battalion, 369th Infantry, advanced abreast of the French 163d Infantry to its right and the 2d Moroccan Division to its left and captured the town of Ripont. The battalion crossed La Dormoise Rivière about 8 a. m. and the French 163d Infantry reached the Rouvroy—Ripont road about the same time. Here the advance was held up by enemy fire from the north. On the extreme right, the French 363d Infantry was also held up in the general vicinity of the Rouvroy—Ripont road. At noon the division ordered a continuation of the attack, after a heavy artillery preparation, to the unimproved road extending northwest through crossroads 188, about 600 meters north of Fontaine-en-Dormois. When this line was reached, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 369th Infantry, were to attack and hold Tranchée de Bellevue and the slopes descending from Bellevue signal station to the northeast. The attack was to be launched behind a rolling barrage as soon as the two battalions of the 369th Infantry were ready. Attacks were made at 3:30 p. m. and 5 p. m. but the designated line could not be reached. The French 363d Infantry, the French 163d Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 369th Infantry, from right to left, held a line for the night on the slopes north of La Dormoise Rivière from the vicinity of Tranchée de Brun west and south to positions along the Rouvroy—Ripont road. [7, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]
During the evening the IX Corps ordered a continuation of the operation on September 27 without change in the disposition of its divisions. An advance was ordered to a line, Mont Cuvelet—Tranchée de Bellevue, by two successive stages. The exploitation was to commence as soon as this line was gained. The 161st Division forwarded these instructions to its organizations at midnight, September 26, announcing that the attack would commence at 5:15 a. m., September 27, after a half-hour artillery preparation. The attack was to be made on a 3-battalion front by the French 363d Infantry, the 369th Infantry and the French 163d Infantry, from right to left. This order mentioned the possibility of the insertion of the French 157th Division between the 161st Division and the 2d Moroccan Division on September 27, in which case the 157th Division
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would take over the zone of action of the French 163d Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 369th Infantry, was assigned to the assault echelon, the 2d Battalion to the support and the 1st Battalion to division reserve. [22]
During the night the French 157th Division, to which the 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments were assigned, was moved forward to the vicinity of Butte du Mesnil. [9, 10]
Sept. 27
The attack of September 27 did not begin on time because of the slow transmission of orders and the subsequent delay in moving the 3d Battalion, 369th Infantry, to its line of departure. At 9:15 a. m. the 161st Division ordered the French 163d Infantry to attack to the left of the zone of action assigned to the 369th infantry. The general advance of the two front-line French regiments commenced between 10 and 10:30 a. m. At 10:30 a. m. the 161st Division ordered the French 163d Infantry, assisted by the left of the French 363d Infantry, to attack to the north and advance to the southern edge of Parc, the wooded area about 1 kilometer north of Ripont. While this attack was in progress, the 369th Infantry was to move forward in column of battalions, and upon reaching the objective was to be placed in line between the two French regiments. [7, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26]
At 12:30 p. m. the 161st Division announced that the flank divisions were abreast and that this situation made it impossible for the enemy to offer serious resistance along the plateaus to the north of Fontaine-en-Dormois and the plateau of Bellevue signal station. A vigorous advance was accordingly ordered to be pushed forward without pause behind rolling barrages. By 2:25 p. m. a line was reached along the crest of the hill north of Fontaine-en-Dormois and crossroads 188. The positions held for the night by the 369th Infantry were somewhat in rear of this position, being along the Fontaine-en-Dormois—Gratreuil road, and in the town of Fontaine-en-Dormois. [16, 21, 23, 25, 27]
At 5:20 p. m. the 161st Division issued orders announcing the continuation of the pursuit in the direction, Mont Cuvelet—Croix Renard. The 74th Division remained to the right, while the French 157th Division was to be to the left. The same dis-
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position of regiments abreast, each in column of battalions, was continued. Division cavalry was ordered before daybreak, September 28, to precede the infantry between Séchault and Bouconville. It was also announced that, contrary to previous belief, the enemy was holding Bellevue signal station. An infantry attack, supported by an artillery concentration on the signal station, was ordered for 6:30 p. m. The attack was not made. [28, 29]
During the night of September 27-28 the 2d Battalion, 369th Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion in the front line. [7]
At 4 p. m. the French 157th Division was ordered to move the 371st Infantry, followed by a battalion of the French 333d Infantry, in the direction, Ripont—Bussy Ferme, disposing its battalions in depth so as to occupy the position between the 161st Division and the 2d Moroccan Division. The boundary between the 161st and 157th Divisions was prescribed as a southwest-northeast line through the crossroads about 500 meters south of Le Pied. Commencing at 12:30 p. m., September 27, the 371st Infantry had marched from Butte du Mesnil to the crests between Maisons de Champagne Ferme and Butte du Mesnil. At 5:25 p. m. it continued its advance from this line in accordance with further orders of the division. The march was in progress at midnight, and before dawn, September 28, the 371st Infantry had reached positions astride the Ripont—Gratreuil road, its leading elements at the Fontaine-en-Dormois—Gratreuil road. The order of battalions was 1st, 3d and 2d, from front to rear. [9, 30, 31]
In accordance with orders of the division, the 372d Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, moved during the day to Ravin d'Hébuterne, and at midnight September 27, continued to Ripont, arriving about 2:30 a. m., September 28. [10]
Sept. 28
At 1:30 a. m., September 28, the 161st Division issued field orders incorporating instructions of the IX Corps issued on September 27. It was announced that if the plateau of Bellevue signal station was not taken during the night of September 27-28 by the French 163d and the American 369th Infantry Regiments under the orders already issued, the attack would be renewed at 7 a. m., September 28, after an artillery prepara-
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tion. New axes of advance were provided, that of the 368th Infantry including Lager Mont Cuvelet and Grange et Puits. [30]
About 3:30 a. m. the 368th Infantry received orders to attack in a half hour. These orders had to be translated and distributed. The 2d Battalion moved with difficulty to the line of departure, abreast of the flanking French regiments. The 3d Battalion was in close support. The barrage commenced at 4:30 a. m., and the infantry attacked about that time. Enemy machine-gun fire from the ridge of Bellevue signal station made advance difficult. By 8:30 a. m., with the 74th Division abreast to the right, the right of the division reached a northwest-southeast line on the ridge, extending south of the crossroads near Bellevue signal station. The left and center could not pass the crossroads about 500 meters south of Le Pied. About 9 a. m. the 369th Infantry repulsed a counterattack. Counterattacks were also repulsed during the morning by the adjoining French regiments. At 2 p. m. the division directed that the crest of Bellevue signal station would be captured by a series of attacks progressing from the west to the east. By 4 p. m. advance elements held a line along the southern slopes of Mont Cuvelet and on the crest along the road south of Tranchée de Bellevue. This line could not be held, however, and the 369th Infantry organized its line for the night on the southern slopes of the plateau, in liaison with the French to both flanks. [7, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35]
At 6:30 p. m. the 161st Division ordered the operation continued during the night of September 28-29. The French 163d Infantry, on the left, was to attack straight east against Bellevue signal station and establish itself facing north with its right on the road passing the station. On the right, the French 363d Infantry was to patrol to Mont Cuvelet. If that position was held by the enemy, the patrols were to return. If it was not held, the regiment was to occupy it. In the center, the 369th Infantry was to pass between the two French regiments when the regiment to the left had accomplished its mission of establishing a line near Bellevue signal station, and was to organize on the spur extending to the northeast from the
16
station. The orders relative to actions of the 369th Infantry were later canceled, but the French regiments attacked during the night, and by dawn, September 29, had established a line abreast of the station. [35, 36, 37]
At midnight, September 28, the 161st Division published orders stating that the first mission of the division was the complete possession of Bellevue signal station, the spur to the northeast and Mont Cuvelet. When this line was firmly held, the three front-line regiments were to re-form for a march in the general direction of Les Rosiers Ferme. The 369th Infantry was to lead the march and take Séchault, then advance to the farm. French cavalry was to assist the advance. The right boundary assigned by the Fourth Army as the right boundary of the IX Corps, and consequently that of the 161st Division, was a line, Calvaire (in Bouconville)—Bois de la Malmaison, both exclusive. The left boundary was a line, Bellevue signal station—les Petits Rosiers (incl.). [38, 39, 40]
In the zone of action of the 157th Division, the 371st Infantry attacked at 6:45 a. m. on a 500-meter front, with the 1st Battalion leading, followed in column by the 3d and 2d Battalions, from positions astride the Ripont—Gratreuil road, at its junction with the Fontaine-en-Dormois—Gratreuil road. The axis of advance was a line, Ripont—Bussy Ferme—les Petits Rosiers. The attack commenced after a passage of lines through the right battalion of the 2d Moroccan Division. Enemy machine-gun fire rendered the advance slow, and it was discovered that a gap existed between the right of the 371st Infantry and the left of the 161st Division. [9, 41]
At 8:40 a. m. the 157th Division ordered the 372d Infantry to advance from the vicinity of Ripont with two battalions to fill this gap. It was to advance generally on the axis of the 371st Infantry, and remain to the right of that regiment, covering a 500-meter front with one battalion. The support battalion was to advance by bounds, remaining about 1 kilometer in rear of the assault battalion, and was not to be engaged without authority of the division. [41, 42]
The 3d Battalion, 372d Infantry, supported by the 1st Battalion, advanced at once, and secured contact with the enemy
17
about 11:30 a. m. By the combined attack of the 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments, the western slope of the ridge about 500 meters south of Le Pied was taken during the afternoon. By dark, advanced troops had reached the heights south of Bussy Ferme. On the right, the 372d Infantry reached the slopes of Le Pied. Two companies on the right continued the advance, but lost direction and became separated from the remainder of the battalion. Portions of these companies reached positions at the road junction west of Séchault and spent the night there, without liaison with the remainder of the battalion. On the left, the 371st Infantry reached a position on the reverse slope of the saddle about 400 meters to the south of Le Pied, and organized a line for the night, in contact with troops of the 2d Moroccan Division to the left. After dark, the 3d Battalion, 371st Infantry, was put in to the left of the 1st Battalion. Bussy Ferme was occupied during the night. [9, 10, 21]
Sept. 29
On September 29 the French 363d Infantry, on the right of the zone of action of the 161st Division, took Mont Cuvelet, and spent the morning in cleaning up the line, Mont Cuvelet—Bellevue signal station, and the ridge to the northeast. During the morning the 1st Battalion, 369th Infantry, was ordered to pass through the 2d Battalion and take Séchault. The passage of lines was effected shortly after noon, and the 1st Battalion attacked about 2:45 p. m. from the heights south of Séchault. The town was taken in the afternoon, and a line consolidated north and east of it. During the advance, portions of Company K, 372d Infantry, which had spent the night west of the town, were encountered. The 2d Battalion assisted the 1st Battalion in holding this line during the evening. During the night both battalions withdrew from the town to its southern edge to permit the barrage for September 30 to be laid north of the town. The French regiments to the flanks reached positions abreast of the 369th Infantry during the day. [7, 21, 43]
The 157th Division had issued orders at 2 a. m. for its attack of September 29. The mission of the division was given as that of covering the right of the 2d Moroccan Division, while
18
advancing in the general direction of Monthois, and taking the successive enemy works on the plain east of Marvaux. The division was ordered to attack at 10 a. m. in three columns, from right to left, the 372d Infantry, the 371st Infantry and the French 333d Infantry, with each regiment in column of battalions. The advance was to be made in advance-guard formation and troops were instructed to maintain close liaison to both flanks. At 6:45 a. m. the 157th Division issued additional orders for the attack, prescribing intervals of 500 meters between assault regiments. Troops were to be on the line of departure, an east and west line through Bussy Ferme, at 9:30 a. m., and were to attack due north. The 372d Infantry, on the right, was to march on an axis, Moulin d'Avègres—slopes west of Challerange. The 371st Infantry was to march on an axis, Moulin Moya—slopes east of Monthois. The French 333d Infantry was to march on an axis straight north to Monthois. [40, 44]
Upon receipt of the orders of the division, the 372d Infantry ordered the 1st Battalion to replace the 3d Battalion in the assault echelon. The 3d Battalion was placed in support, and directed to maintain liaison during the advance with the 161st Division to the right and the 371st Infantry to the left. By 6:30 a. m. the 1st Battalion had relieved the 3d Battalion at Bussy Ferme, and established liaison to both flanks. The assault commenced at 10 a. m. The 1st Battalion, 372d Infantry, on the right, advanced to the right of the assigned axis toward Séchault. By 11:20 a. m., when its left was at Moulin Moya, it was discovered that the 161st Division to the right had not yet moved forward. About 1 p. m. patrols of the right company entered Séchault, but were driven back by enemy machine-gun fire. In the late afternoon, after the 369th Infantry had established its line north and east of the town, troops of the 372d Infantry mopped up portions of it. During the evening the 372d Infantry was withdrawn from the line for reorganization south of Bussy Ferme, and the 157th Division placed a battalion of the French 333d Infantry on the line, Séchault—Moulin Moya, prior to the hour of attack of September 30. Owing to heavy losses in officers and men, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 372d
19
Infantry, were reorganized into a provisional battalion during the night. [9, 10, 21, 45, 46, 47]
The 371st Infantry received the orders for the attack about 9:15 a. m. and transmitted verbal orders to the 3d Battalion to attack at l0 a. m. These orders were not received by the 3d Battalion before 10 a. m., but observing the French 333d Infantry attacking to its left, the battalion advanced with them. At the beginning of the action, Company K, on the left of the battalion, seeing the French 333d Infantry held up by enemy machine guns, attacked and drove them back, thus enabling the French to advance. The company succeeded in reaching positions about 750 meters northwest of Ardeuil, where by nightfall it had formed on the line with the French troops. It rejoined its battalion during the morning of September 30. The remainder of the battalion continued north, capturing the towns of Ardeuil and Montfauxelles, and established a line for the night in the railroad yards north of Montfauxelles, in contact with the French 333d Infantry to its left. Liaison was not secured before midnight with the battalion of the French 333d Infantry which had been ordered into the gap along the line, Séchault—Moulin Maya. The 2d Battalion, 371st Infantry, moved to Montfauxelles and formed a right-flank guard with one company. The 1st Battalion, 371st Infantry, took a position just south of the Séchault—Ardeuil road, and extended the right-flank protection of the 2d Battalion to the right rear. [9, 21, 48]
During the night the 2d Battalion, 372d Infantry, was moved to the ravine southwest of Bellevue signal station. [48]
No changes in dispositions or orders were made by the 157th Division for the advance on September 30. [9, 48, 49]
The 161st Division announced in orders issued on the 28th that the mission of the IX Corps for the following day was to push energetically in the general direction of Vouziers, about 9 kilometers north of Monthois, in order to prevent the enemy from establishing himself upon his chosen line of resistance. The 161st Division was assigned the mission of taking Challerange and the heights to the north. The 157th Division, to its left, was to take Monthois and Saviguy-sur-Aisne, about
20
5 kilometers north of Monthois. It was announced that since Challerange was strongly organized, it was not to be attacked frontally until after artillery preparation and partial encirclement. The forward movement of the 161st Division was to help the XXXVIII Corps to the right by flanking from the west the wooded heights in the zone of action of that corps. The 161st Division was to advance with the French 163d Infantry, on the left, leading. This regiment was to move on Les Petits Rosiers and the slopes west of Challerange, and was directed to maintain contact with the 157th Division to its left. In the center, the 369th Infantry was to be echeloned to the right rear of the French 163d Infantry; it was to march on Les Rosiers Ferme and reach Les Sugnons Ruisseau, north of the road running northeast from Ardeuil. On the right, the French 363d Infantry was to be echeloned to the right rear of the 369th Infantry, and was ordered to reach a general line, crossroads west of Bois de la Malmaison—les Sugnons Ruisseau, maintaining liaison with the French 74th Division to the right. The attack was to take place at 7 a. m., September 30, following an artillery preparation which was to commence at dawn. French division cavalry was to aid the advance. [7, 50]
Sept. 30
The division attacked as ordered on September 30. By 8:30 a. m. the French 163d Infantry, on the left, was held up near Les Petits Rosiers by fire from the east and southeast. The 369th Infantry, with its 1st Battalion leading and its 2d in close support, in the center, and the French 363d Infantry on the right, received fire from the right rear, but advanced to the northeast, abreast. By 3 p. m. the advance had reached the line, southwest corner of Bois de la Malmaison—les Petits Rosiers, with all three regiments abreast. Further advance on the left was stopped by the flooded condition of the Avègres Rivière, which could not be flanked from the west without entering the zone of the 157th Division. During the night of September 30-October 1, the 369th Infantry was relieved by the French 363d Infantry, and was moved to the vicinity of Bellevue signal station where it remained in reserve until the division was withdrawn from the line during the night of October 6-7. [7, 21, 51, 52, 53]
21
In the zone of action of the 157th Division, the advance continued about 7 a. m., with the 3d Battalion, 371st Infantry leading, supported by the 2d Battalion. A battalion of to French 333d Infantry attacked to each flank of the 371st Infantry. By 9:30 a. m., Trières Ferme was reached, and by 11 a. m. an east and west line was held immediately north of this farm, where the line was halted for the day. Because of the inability of the 161st Division to pass the flooded areas of the Avègres Rivière, the 2d Battalion, in support, and the 1st Battalion, in reserve, were disposed to cover the right flank. An attack at 3 p. m. with artillery support netted no material gains. [9, 21, 54]
Pending further attack on Monthois, which depended upon the success of the 2d Moroccan Division to the left, the 157th Division ordered the 371st Infantry to be relieved by the 2d Battalion, 372d Infantry, during the night of September 30-October 1. The 371st Infantry was ordered reorganized in the vicinity of Ardeuil. [54, 55, 56, 57]
Oct. 1
At 5 a. m., October 1, the 2d Battalion, 372d Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion, 371st Infantry, in the front line north and west of Trières Ferme. The 371st Infantry withdrew and remained in division reserve until the relief of the division on October 6-7. [9, 10]
At 7 a. m. the division issued orders warning its troops to be ready to attack Monthois when the 2d Moroccan Division to the left was ready to attack. Reconnaissances of the immediate front and in the direction of Challerange were ordered. Shortly after midnight, September 30, the consolidated 1st and 3d Battalions, 372d Infantry, had moved to support positions 3 kilometers north of Séchault on the Séchault—Monthois road. Preparations for resumption of the attack on Monthois continued. The battalions of the French 333d Infantry held their positions to both Banks of the 372d Infantry. [10, 58, 59]
In its orders for October 2 the 157th Division gave as its mission the taking of Monthois and Challerange in three phases, to commence after the 120th Division, which had relieved the 2d Moroccan Division to the left, had captured the heights of Croix des Soudans and the heights to the northeast. These
22
were the last enemy positions south of the Aisne. The advance was to be made upon rocket signals from the 120th Division, at which time the rolling barrage of the 157th Division was to commence. The 120th Division was to attack at 11 a. m., October 2. [60, 61]
Oct. 2
At midnight, October 1, the 157th Division issued further orders, providing that the three attacking battalions would occupy a zone of action from vertical grid line 281.5 west to vertical grid line 280. [62]
During the morning the 120th Division advanced, but could not entirely accomplish its mission of clearing the ridges north of Croix des Soudans, with the result that the rocket signal to the 157th Division was not given. The IX Corps, however, believing that the ridges had been taken, ordered the 157th division to attack. The assault battalion of the 372d Infantry, flanked by two French battalions, attacked at 1:50 p. m. behind a rolling barrage. Heavy enemy fire rendered advance difficult, but the 2d Battalion, 372d Infantry, reached a position about 800 meters south of Monthois, with battalions of the French 333d Infantry to each flank. To the left, the 120th Division took only a part of the plateau southwest of Monthois. [10, 61]
Oct. 3
At 3 a. m., October 3, the 157th Division issued its orders for the day's operation. At this time it was announced that the 161st Division, to the right, had captured Challerange, while the 120th Division, to the left, had not yet taken the slopes southwest of Monthois. The 157th Division was ordered to hold positions gained until the 120th Division reached and held the vicinity of Croix de Saingly. The 120th Division was to commence its assault at 6:45 a. m. The 372d Infantry issued field orders at 5:45 a. m. giving the details of the division order, and assigning specific missions to be carried out when and if the 157th Division should attack. [63, 64]
The 120th Division attacked as ordered, but did not gain its assigned objectives, and the 157th Division did not launch its attack on Monthois. The 372d Infantry made no changes in its dispositions, but continued to hold its front line. [65]
Oct. 4
The front of the IX Corps and of the corps to its right and left was now opposed to an enemy main line of resistance
23
south of the Aisne. To the immediate left of the 157th Division the 120th Division, II Corps, attacked on October 4, but could make no gains. The right of the XXXVIII Corps was held up in the vicinity of Binarville, about 16 kilometers southeast of Monthois. The left of the American First Army was also temporarily unable to advance. [6, 66, 67]
In the zone of action of the 157th Division, the attack which had been planned to follow the capture of Croix de Saingly by the 120th Division was not made, as the latter division failed to accomplish its mission. [66]
Oct. 5
The attack contemplated against Monthois was again postponed on October 5; the same orders relative to its accomplishment by the 372d Infantry that had previously been in force continued for the day. [68, 69]
Oct. 6-7
Early in the morning, following an artillery preparation, the enemy launched a counterattack against the front of the 157th Division and the 2d Battalion, 372d Infantry. This attack was repulsed. No changes in line occurred during the day. [69, 70]
Oct. 6-7
No changes in line were made on October 6. The French 157th Division issued orders relative to its relief by the French 125th Division during the night of October 6-7, command to pass to the incoming division at 5 a. m. on October 7. The 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments were ordered upon relief to take station north and south of Ruisseau de Marson, in the vicinity of Beauséjour Ferme. The relief took place as ordered. [10, 71, 72]
Oct. 8, 1918-Feb. 1919
After the French 161st Division was relieved in the front line, the 369th Infantry moved with it to Vitry-le-François, 45 kilometers southwest of Ste. Menehould, where the division passed to corps reserve. On October 8 rehabilitation in this area began. The 371st Infantry and the 372d Infantry, French 157th Division, assembled near Beauséjour Ferme. [1, 7, 9, 73]
On October 14 the 369th Infantry moved with the French 161st Division to Belfort, where from October 17 to November 11 it participated in the occupation of the Thur Sector, northeast of the city. It advanced with its division into Germany, as part of the French Army of Occupation, on November 17. The 369th Infantry was relieved from the French army on
24
December 12 and on the 17th returned to the vicinity of Belfort. On December 31 it moved to the American Embarkation Center, Le Mans. It sailed from Brest, France, February 2, 1919, and arrived in New York on the 12th. [1, 129]
On October 11 the 371st Infantry and the 372d Infantry had moved with the French 157th Division by way of Ste. Menehould to the vicinity of Corcieux, 60 kilometers north of Belfort. From October 13 to November 11 these regiments participated in the occupation of the Anould Sector, northeast of Corcieux. On December 20, when the French 157th Division was disbanded, they reverted to American command. In January 1919 they moved to the American Embarkation Center, Le Mans. The 371st Infantry and the 372d Infantry sailed from Brest on February 3, 1919, and arrived in Hoboken February 11. [1]
CASUALTIES, MEUSE-ARGONNE (CHAMPAGNE) OFFENSIVE
|
|
Sept 16-25
|
Sept. 26-27
|
Sept. 28-Oct. 1
|
Oct. 2-11
|
Total
|
|
369th Inf
|
W
|
8
|
148
|
480
|
43
|
679
|
|
DW
|
1
|
4
|
31
|
1
|
37
|
|
K
|
3
|
70
|
52
|
10
|
135
|
|
371st Inf
|
W
|
4
|
16
|
753
|
123
|
896
|
|
DW
|
--
|
1
|
23
|
7
|
31
|
|
K
|
--
|
1
|
106
|
1
|
108
|
|
372d Inf
|
W
|
4
|
17
|
320
|
168
|
509
|
|
DW
|
--
|
--
|
7
|
16
|
23
|
|
K
|
--
|
8
|
54
|
22
|
84
|
|
TOTAL
|
20
|
265
|
1,826
|
391
|
2,502
|
W=Wounds not mortal: DW=Died of wounds; K=Killed in action.
25
Oise-Aisne Offensive and Subsequent Service
OISE-AISNE OFFENSIVE (370TH INFANTRY) SEPTEMBER
15—NOVEMBER 11
SUBSEQUENT SERVICE, NOVEMBER 12, 1918—FEBRUARY 1919
WHILE THE 369TH, 371ST AND 372D INFANTRY REGIMENTS were serving in the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive with the French Fourth Army, the 370th Infantry was participating in the Oise-Aisne Offensive with the French Tenth Army. This offensive, which had been launched on August 18, was to continue as a secondary operation to be undertaken between the great converging offensives. [1, 6, 128]
As a result of the success of the British-French attack between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers, the Germans had made a general withdrawal between the Vesle and Scarpe Rivers during the period September 3-7. [6]
The French were in contact with the new German position astride the Ailette River on September 8. On September 14 the French Tenth Army attacked the line, Vailly-sur-Aisne—Fort de la Malmaison—Chavignon, with the object of forcing the evacuation of the line of the Aisne River. The attack met with only slight success, and the troops were ordered to organize for defense, and be prepared to follow up any German withdrawal. [6]
P
The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the service of the 93d Division in the Oise-Aisne Offensive. This
26
synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.
The 370th Infantry, after serving in quiet sectors for training, was assigned to the French 59th Division, French Tenth Army, with which it participated in the Oise-Aisne Offensive. The division entered the line on September 17, as a part of the French XXX Corps and on September 22-23 placed the 370th Infantry in line between Vauxaillon and Canal de l'Oise à l'Aisne. The regiment participated in the attacks of September 28-30, following the German evacuation of the positions south of the canal. On October 6 the division was assigned to the French XVI Corps. Again following a German withdrawal, the regiment advanced on the morning of October 12 and entered Bois de Mortier. It then passed to division reserve. The French 59th Division was relieved from the front line on October 13 and passed to the reserve of the French Tenth Army.
The French Tenth Army was relieved by the French Third Army on October 27 and the 59th Division was assigned to the French XVIII Corps for the relief of the French 127th Division in line northeast of Laon. (See Map No. 2.) The relief was completed on October 30.
Early in November, as a result of the Allied attacks on the Western Front, the Germans were forced to withdraw to their previously prepared Antwerp—Meuse line. Opposite the 59th Division the movement commenced during the night of November 4-5. The 59th Division took up the pursuit on November 5 which continued until the Armistice. In this pursuit the 370th Infantry had no separate front-line command, but its battalions were attached to French regiments and at various times took part in the operations as front-line troops.
The 1st Battalion, 370th Infantry, was in the front line near St. Pierremont on November 5 and east of Nampcelles-la-Cour on November 6. On November 8 the 3d Battalion reached Lagny les Aubenton, while the 2d Battalion participated in the fighting east of Beaume. On November 9 the 3d Battalion occupied Pont d'Any, and on November 11 was at Le Gue d'Hossus when the Armistice became effective.
27
Sept. 15-24
On September 14 the 370th Infantry, as part of the French 59th Division, left the vicinity of La Ferté-Milon and moved toward the front of the French Tenth Army. On the following day it moved into the Vauxaillon area. During the night of September 16-17 the French 59th Division, French XXX Corps, relieved the French 66th Division east of Vauxaillon, and the next night extended north to Canal de l'Oise à l'Aisne, relieving the French 17th Division. Taking over the missions of the divisions it had relieved, the 59th Division endeavored to capture the woods east of Moisy Ferme and Mont des Singes and advance in a northeasterly direction to Canal de l'Oise à l'Aisne. Very stiff fighting resulted in practically no change in the lines, and on September 20 the division issued orders to organize for defense. [74, 75, 76, 77, 78]
Companies F, G, I and L, 370th Infantry, were attached to front-line regiments, and while not originally in the assault echelon, participated in the fighting near Moisy Ferme and Mont des Singes. The remainder of the regiment was held in division reserve in the vicinity of Antioche Ferme. [21, 78]
During the night of September 22-23 the 1st Battalion, 370th Infantry, relieved French troops in the front line along the road between Champ Vailly and Ecluse. The 2d Battalion was placed in support in the vicinity of Les Tueries, about 1,700 meters west of Vauxaillon, and the 3d Battalion in reserve near Tincelle Ferme, about 1,400 meters southwest of Antioche Ferme. The 370th Infantry took command of the left subsector of the French 59th Division on September 24. [21, 79, 80]
The right boundary of the subsector was a line, Champ Vailly—point 300 meters west of the crossing of the road from Pinon to Brancourt and Canal de l'Oise à l'Aisne. The left boundary followed the canal from the bend west of Courson to Ecluse. The French 325th Infantry, French 59th Division, was to the right and the French 31st Division, French XVI Corps, to the left. [80, 81, 82]
Sept. 25-28
There was local fighting in the right of the zone of action of the 59th Division during the period from September 25 to 27. The 370th Infantry engaged in minor actions to clear the enemy
28
from the triangle formed by the road, the canal and the railroad. [80, 83]
The Army Group of the German Crown Prince approved the withdrawal of the German Seventh Army to Canal de l'Oise à l'Aisne and Bois de Mortier during the night of September 27-28. This was made necessary because of the reinforcements needed in the Champagne and Meuse-Argonne areas where the American First Army and the French Fourth Army had launched their general attacks on September 26, and to avoid the losses entailed in holding the Laffaux salient, about 4 kilometers southwest of Pinon. [84]
Information of the German withdrawal was obtained by the French about 1 a. m., September 28, and all front-line battalions were at once ordered to attack at daybreak in order to gain contact with the enemy. [85]
The advance began about 8 a. m., and Hill 158, southwest of Pinon, was occupied by noon. Resistance from Mont des Singes, Ferme de la Rivière and Bois de Mortier held up the center and the left. [85]
The 370th Infantry received the attack order while in the midst of the relief of its front-line battalion by the 2d Battalion. The relief was completed, however, and the attack launched at daybreak. The right of the 370th Infantry was unable to advance, but the left succeeded in occupying the woods west of Ferme de la Rivière by noon. A position was held facing east toward the farm, and north along the canal. [21, 80, 86, 87]
Army, corps and division issued orders for the pursuit to be made in a northeasterly direction and assigned boundaries accordingly. The French 59th Division, with three regiments in line, was to make a turning movement, pivoting on the 370th Infantry. The first objective was the line, Pinon—Ouvrage Pierre—Ouvrage Jacques—the canal from the bend east of Ferme de la Rivière to Ecluse. The second objective was the line, Lizy—Anizy-le-Château—Bois de Mortier. The 370th Infantry was charged with protecting the left flank of the division from attacks coming from the wooded area northwest of Anizy-le-Château. [88, 89, 90, 91]
29
During the remainder of the day, Pinon, Ouvrage Pierre, Ouvrage Jacques and Mont des Singes were taken. [85]
At 5:20 p. m. the French 59th Division issued orders for a continuation of the attack during the night. The south bank of the canal was to be reached not later than daybreak, September 29. This accomplished, the north bank was to be reconnoitered and the attack pushed to the objectives already set. The line of the canal was divided into three regimental sectors, that of the 370th Infantry extending from the Pinon—Brancourt road crossing to Ecluse. [92]
Sept. 29-Oct. 11
The Germans resisted stubbornly on the 29th. Although the fighting was continuous throughout the day, only small gains were made. Patrols of the 370th Infantry which crossed the canal and entered Bois de Mortier were driven back by machine-gun fire. [80, 87]
The attack was continued without change in mission on September 30. The French captured the line of bastions in Forêt de Pinon and the sawmill (Scierie) west of the Anizy railroad station. [21, 93]
In the 370th Infantry, the 3d Battalion moved into a position along the railroad northeast of Vauxaillon, relieving the 2d Battalion, except Company F, which remained along the canal and in the woods west of Ferme de la Rivière. The 3d Battalion, plus Company F, attacked at 3 p. m., captured the farm and established a position along the canal from the Pinon—Brancourt road bridge to the divisional boundary. [21, 80, 94, 95]
On October 1 the French captured the Anizy railroad station, on October 2 the sugar factory (Sucrerie) south of Anizy and on October 3 conducted mopping-up operations south of the canal. While these attacks were in progress, the 370th Infantry was engaged in mopping up south of the canal. [80, 96]
On October 3, in compliance with instructions from higher authority, the French 59th Division organized its sector for defense and made preparations to cross the canal and capture Anizy-le Château. [96]
The period October 4-11 was marked by active patrolling and by preparations to cross the canal and the Ailette River.
30
Attempts to bridge the canal were unsuccessful, although many indications of an impending German withdrawal were observed. [98]
The 3d Battalion, 370th Infantry, reconnoitered the western part of Bois de Mortier on October 4. Company C relieved Company F along the canal west of Ferme de la Rivière during the night of October 7-8. The 1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion in the front line during the night of October 8-9. [99, 100, 101]
On October 6 the French XVI Corps took command of the French 59th Division, while the French XVIII Corps took command of the French 36th Division. [102]
Continued attacks by the French and Americans in the Champagne and between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest caused the Army Group of the German Crown Prince to execute a general withdrawal along its front between October 10 and 13. Opposite the 59th Division, the Germans moved back to a position near Cessières, about 2 kilometers northeast of Suzy, during the night of October 11-12. [103, 104]
Upon taking command of the 59th Division, the French XVI Corps prescribed new boundaries for the zone of advance to the north in case of a German withdrawal. The plans of the 59th Division for a resumption of the attack provided for an advance to the vicinity of Laon in three phases. The first, which involved crossing the canal and the Ailette River and freeing Bois de Mortier, was to be accomplished by a general advance of all three regiments. The 370th Infantry was to pass to the support as soon as Bois de Mortier was captured, while the two French regiments continued the movement. [105, 106]
Bois de Mortier was to be attacked from the south by the 370th Infantry and from the west by the French 31st Division. [106]
Oct. 12
German artillery activity decreased during the night of October 11-12 and at 3 a. m., October 12, ceased altogether. Patrols continued to meet resistance and the first attempts to cross the canal were unsuccessful. At 6:30 a. m. the bridges south of Anizy and on the Pinon—Brancourt road were captured and the crossing commenced. [107]
31
During the morning the right regiment established a position along the road between Ancien Moulin Barthel and the cemetery of Anizy-le Château. The center regiment advanced west of Anizy-le Château and occupied Tranchée des Deboires. [107]
The 1st Battalion, 370th Infantry, aided by the advance of the French 31st Division to its left, crossed the canal and river and advanced about 500 meters into Bois de Mortier, without opposition. This completed the first phase of the pursuit by the 58th Division, and the 370th Infantry passed to support. The regiment continued in reserve or support during the rest of the operation. [2l, 80, 107, 108]
The two French regiments continued the advance, and by night had reached a line north of Lizy and Wissignicourt. [109]
Oct. 13-Nov. 4
Late in the afternoon of October 13 the French 31st Division passed through the French 59th Division near Cessières and the 59th Division became a part of the reserve of the French Tenth Army. [109]
From October 13 to 27 the 370th Infantry remained in the vicinity of Cessières, where it was reorganized and employed in road construction. During the night of October 27-28, the regiment moved toward the front northeast of Laon. (See Map No. 2.) The 1st and 2d Battalions went into support positions near Grandlup-et Fay, and the 3d Battalion to positions in reserve near Chambry. On October 27 the French Third Army took over the front of the French Tenth Army and assigned the 59th Division to the French XVIII Corps for the relief of the French 127th Division in line northeast of Laon. [80, 110, 111]
The relief of the 127th Division was completed as ordered and command of the sector passed to the 59th Division at 10 a. m., October 30. The mission of the division was to join in the attacks designed to capture the line of La Serre Rivière and to be ready to pursue vigorously any German withdrawal. [113, 114]
The 59th Division organized its sector with the two French regiments abreast, the 325th Infantry on the right and the 232d Infantry on the left. The 370th Infantry was divided, battal-
32
ions being assigned both to the support and reserve echelons. [115]
In case of a German withdrawal, the front-line battalions were directed to pursue at once. By utilizing the support battalions for a passage of lines, the line of the Serre was to be gained and organized for defense. [116]
In the meantime the great converging offensives of the Allied and American armies had continued. By the end of October the American First Army and the French Fourth Army had accomplished the first part of the plan for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive and were in a position to turn the hostile positions north of the Aisne, cut the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières railroad and drive the enemy beyond the Meuse. The British-French attack between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers and the combined Allied attack east of Ypres had reached the line, Oise River—Sambre River—Escaut River. These offensives forced the Germans to withdraw to the Antwerp—Meuse line of defense. [3, 6, 104]
Nov. 5-6
Opposite the French 59th Division the German withdrawal to the Antwerp—Meuse line commenced during the night of November 4-5. The movement was discovered early in the morning of November 5 and the pursuit was promptly begun. [117]
The German resistance consisted of isolated delaying actions fought with machine guns and artillery. Against this form of defense the 59th Division followed the roads, moving forward in advance-guard formation. The advancing troops did not fully occupy the divisional zone. During halts protection was furnished by march outposts. [117]
The advance met slight resistance and progress was rapid. By nightfall the division held the south bank of the Serre. In the course of the day the 1st Battalion, 370th Infantry, which was attached to the right French regiment, entered the line and held a position for the night on the hills overlooking St. Pierremont. [21, 117]
The division continued the pursuit on November 6 with the railroad through Jeantes la Ville as the day's objective. Machine-gun resistance was encountered throughout the day.
33
The division established a line along La Brune Riviere for the night. [118]
Nov. 7-11
The 1st Battalion, 370th Infantry, advanced through Bois du Val St. Pierre, where Company C captured a German battery. The battalion spent the night in the front line on the right of the division, east of Nampcelles-la-Cour. [21, 118]
The advance was continued at 6 a. m., November 7, with the line, plateau of La Hayette Ferme—Bas Val-la Caure, as the objective. Strong resistance was encountered along the line of the Aubenton—Hirson railroad. The position held by the division at night was south and north of Hurtebise and east of Beaume. The 1st Battalion, 370th Infantry, halted for the night at Monplaisir, but was not in the front line. [21, 119, 120]
The advance was resumed on November 8 with the Maubert-Fontaine—Hirson railroad as its objective. The 3d Battalion, 370th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion in the right regiment, while the 2d Battalion entered the line along the railroad east of Beaume, in the left regiment. [121]
The Germans resisted stubbornly and little progress was made. The French held a line facing Aubenton. A detachment from the 3d Battalion, 370th Infantry, occupied Logny les Aubenton after dark. The remainder of the battalion was near Hurtebise, charged with protecting the right flank of the division. [21, 121]
The attack was ordered resumed on November 9 with objectives unchanged, but before the hour of attack it was learned that the Germans had evacuated their positions. The pursuit was renewed and at 3 p. m. the division reached its objective, the Maubert-Fontaine—Hirson railroad. The front of the right regiment was at Pont d'Any, which was held by the 3d Battalion, 370th Infantry. The head of the left regiment was at Goncelin. [21, 122]
On November 10 the 59th Division was assigned to the French XVI Corps and ordered to continue the pursuit to the line, Taillette—le Cul des Sarts. Still moving in advance-guard formation, the division reached a line along the eastern and northern edges of Bois des Hingues. The 3d Battalion,
34
370th Infantry, was north of Eteignieres, but not in the front line. [21, 123]
The advance was continued on the morning of November 11 with objectives unchanged. Encountering only slight resistance, the 59th Division held the Rocroi—Régniowez road at 11 a. m., when the Armistice became effective. The 3d Battalion, 370th Infantry, halted at Le Gue d'Hossus. The division cavalry occupied Taillette with outposts in La Verte Place. [2l, 124]
Nov. 12, 1918-Feb. 1919
Following the Armistice the 370th Infantry was concentrated in the vicinity of Aubenton, moving from there to the area north of Laon. On December 10 the regiment moved by stages to the area north of Reims, where it was relieved from duty with the French 59th Division on December 13 and moved to Soissons. On December 23 the regiment moved to the American Embarkation Center, Le Mans, for return to the United States. It sailed from Brest on February 2, 1919, and arrived in New York on February 9. [1]
CASUALTIES, OISE-AISNE OFFENSIVE
|
|
Sept. 15-27
|
Sept. 28-Oct. 3
|
Oct. 4-14
|
Oct. 15-31
|
Nov. 1-11
|
Total
|
|
370th Inf
|
W
|
189
|
218
|
53
|
24
|
76
|
560
|
|
DW
|
3
|
3
|
--
|
--
|
9
|
15
|
|
K
|
17
|
|
4
|
3
|
41
|
90
|
|
TOTAL
|
209
|
246
|
57
|
27
|
126
|
665
|
W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action; DS=detached service.
35
Appendix
INFANTRY DIVISION (COMBAT)
ORGANIZATION IN EFFECT NOVEMBER 11, 1918
|
Units
|
Number of units
|
Strength
|
|
Division Headquarters
|
1
|
304
|
|
Infantry Brigades
|
2
|
--
|
|
…Brigade Headquarters1
|
1
|
25
|
|
(2)
|
(50)
|
|
…Infantry Regiment1
|
2
|
--
|
|
(4)
|
--
|
|
…..Regimental Headquarters2
|
1
|
6
|
|
(4)
|
(24)
|
|
…..Headquarters Company2
|
1
|
343
|
|
(4)
|
(1,372)
|
|
…..Machine-Gun Company2
|
1
|
178
|
|
(4)
|
(712)
|
|
…..Supply Company2
|
1
|
162
|
|
(4)
|
(648)
|
|
…..Infantry Battalions2
|
3
|
--
|
|
(12)
|
--
|
|
……..Battalion Headquarters3
|
1
|
3
|
|
(12)
|
(36)
|
|
……..Rifle Companies3
|
4
|
3,072
|
|
(48)
|
(12,288)
|
|
…Machine-Gun Battalions1
|
1
|
759
|
|
(2)
|
(1,518)
|
|
…Medical Department and Chaplains1
|
--
|
127
|
|
(254)
|
|
…Ordnance Department1
|
--
|
20
|
|
(40)
|
|
…Veterinary Field Units1
|
1
|
4
|
|
(2)
|
(8)
|
|
Field Artillery Brigade
|
1
|
--
|
|
…Brigade Headquarters
|
1
|
79
|
|
…Regiments, 75-mm Gun
|
2
|
3,036
|
|
…Regiments, 155-mm Howitzer
|
1
|
1,616
|
|
…Trench-Mortar Battery
|
1
|
177
|
|
…Medical Department and Chaplains
|
--
|
96
|
|
…Ordnance Department
|
--
|
49
|
|
…Veterinary Field Units
|
4
|
16
|
|
Machine-Gun Battalion
|
1
|
--
|
|
…Battalion Headquarters
|
1
|
30
|
|
…Machine-Gun Companies
|
2
|
356
|
|
…Medical Department
|
--
|
7
|
|
…Ordnance Department
|
--
|
2
|
|
Engineer Regiment
|
1
|
1,712
|
|
…Medical Department and Chaplains
|
--
|
31
|
|
…Ordnance Department
|
--
|
6
|
|
Field Signal Battalion
|
1
|
488
|
|
Trains
|
--
|
3,150
|
|
Total
|
28,105
|
1. Upper figures indicate number per brigade. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.
2. Upper figures indicate number per regiment. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.
3. Upper figures indicate number per battalion. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.
36
STRENGTH OF 932D DIVISION1
|
Units
|
Aug. 31
|
Sept. 30
|
Oct. 31
|
Nov. 30
|
|
369th Inf
|
2,781
|
2,328
|
2,529
|
2,528
|
|
370th Inf
|
3,179
|
2,951
|
2,762
|
2,906
|
|
371st Inf
|
2,819
|
2,246
|
2,230
|
2,652
|
|
372d Inf
|
2,708
|
2,826
|
2,486
|
2,659
|
1. Present with the units of the division; does not include absentees.
GENERAL TABLE OF CASUALTIES
|
|
Total
|
|
Meuse-Argonne Offensive (Champagne) (369th, 371st, 372d Infantry Regiments)
|
2,502
|
|
Oise-Aisne Offensive (370th Infantry Regiment)
|
665
|
37
Sources
The following is a list of the sources on which the statements made in the preceding narrative are based. The numbers refer to the corresponding numbers in brackets at the ends of paragraphs.
|
1
|
Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces-Divisions. Prepared in the Historical Section, Army War College.
|
|
2
|
Table of Organization, G. H. Q., A. E. F., Dec. 1.
|
|
3
|
Report of the First Army, A. E. F.
|
|
4
|
Plan d'Action No. 8.850/3, French Fourth Army, Sept. 15.
|
|
5
|
Instructions No. 9121/3, French Fourth Army, Sept. 19.
|
|
6
|
Rapport du Maréchal Commandant-en-Chef des Armées Françaises du Nord et du Nordest sur les Opérations en 1918.
|
|
7
|
Report of Operations, 368th Infantry, Jan. 7, 1919.
|
|
8
|
Ordre Général No. 74, French 161st Division, July 15.
|
|
9
|
Report of Operations, 371st Infantry, Jan. 24, 1919.
|
|
10
|
Report of Operations, 372d Infantry, Jan. 19, 1919.
|
|
11
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Sept. 14.
|
|
12
|
Ordre Préparatoire No. 3, French 161st Division, Sept. 21.
|
|
13
|
Additif No. 9155/3, French Fourth Army, Sept. 20.
|
|
14
|
Ordre Général d'Opérations No. 85, French 161st Division, Sept. 23.
|
|
15
|
Sketch 1/50,000, Pièce Annexe No. 175, French 161st Division, Sept. 25.
|
|
16
|
Sketch, 1/20,000, Pièce Annexe No. 189, French 161st Division, Sept. 27.
|
|
17
|
Historique, Pièce Annexe No. 179, French 161st Division, Sept. 26-Oct. 6.
|
|
18
|
Ordre Particulier No. 135, French 161st Division, Sept. 26.
|
|
19
|
Ordre Général No. 86, French 161st Division, Sept. 26.
|
|
20
|
Journal of Operations, French 161st Division, Sept. 26.
|
|
21
|
Special Correspondence, American Battle Monuments Commission. This pertains to information in the files of the Commission which was obtained in the manner indicated in the preface.
|
|
22
|
Ordre No. 180, French IX Corps, Sept. 26.
|
|
23
|
Journal of Operations, French 161st Division, Sept. 27.
|
|
24
|
Historique, French 161st Division, Sept. 26-Oct. 6.
|
|
25
|
Compte Rendu, French 161st Division, Sept. 27.
|
|
26
|
Ordre Général No. 87, French 161st Division, Sept. 27.
|
|
27
|
Ordre Général No. 88, French 161st Division, Sept. 27.
|
|
28
|
Ordre Général No. 89, French 161st Division, Sept. 27.
|
|
29
|
Telephone Message No. 6765/3, French 161st Division, 5 p. m., Sept. 27.
|
|
30
|
Ordre Général No. 91, French 161st Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
31
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Sept. 27.
|
|
32
|
Compte Rendu, French 161st Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
33
|
Journal of Operations, French 161st Division, Sept. 28.
|
38
|
34
|
Sketch, Journal of Operations, Pièces Annexes No. 197 and 198, French 161st Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
35
|
Ordre No 6774/3, French 161st Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
36
|
Journal of Operations, French 161st Division, Sept. 29.
|
|
37
|
Annexe to Ordre No. 6777/3, French 161st Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
38
|
Ordre Général No. 92, French 161st Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
39
|
Ordre No. 9485/3, French Fourth Army, Sept. 28.
|
|
40
|
Ordre d'Opérations No. 6, French 157th Division, Sept. 29.
|
|
41
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
42
|
Ordre au 372d Infanterie, French 157th Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
43
|
Compte Rendu, French 161st Division, Sept. 29.
|
|
44
|
Ordres Complémentaires, French 157th Division, Sept. 29.
|
|
45
|
Field Message, 372d Infantry to 1st Battalion, 372d Infantry, no hour, Sept. 29.
|
|
46
|
Field Messages, 1st Battalion, 372d Infantry, to 372d Infantry, 6:30 a. m. and 8:30 a. m., Sept. 29.
|
|
47
|
Field Message, 3d Battalion, 372d Infantry, to 372d Infantry, 9:30 a. m., Sept. 29.
|
|
48
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Sept. 29.
|
|
49
|
Ordre No. 9.510/3, French Fourth Army, Sept. 29.
|
|
50
|
Order Général d'Opérations No. 93, French 161st Division, Sept. 30.
|
|
51
|
Journal of Operations, French 161st Division, Sept. 30.
|
|
52
|
Compte Rendu, French 161st Division, Sept. 30.
|
|
53
|
Sketch, 1/20,000, accompanying Compte Rendu, French 161st Division. Sept. 30.
|
|
54
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Sept. 30.
|
|
55
|
Ordre d'Opérations No. 8, French 157th Division, Sept. 30.
|
|
56
|
Ordre, French 157th Division, Sept. 30.
|
|
57
|
Ordre Complémentaire, French 157th Division, Sept. 30.
|
|
58
|
Ordre, French 157th Division, Oct. 1.
|
|
59
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Oct. 1.
|
|
60
|
Ordre Général d'Opérations No. 9, French 157th Division, Oct. 1.
|
|
61
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Oct. 2.
|
|
62
|
Ordre Complémentaire, French 157th Division, Oct. 2.
|
|
63
|
Ordre d'Opérations, French 157th Division, Oct. 3.
|
|
64
|
Field Orders No. 9, 372d Infantry, Oct. 3.
|
|
65
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Oct. 3.
|
|
66
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Oct. 4.
|
|
67
|
Map, 1/80,000, French Fourth Army, to accompany Instruction No. 9121/3, Sept. 19.
|
|
68
|
Orders, 372d Infantry, Oct. 5.
|
|
69
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Oct. 5.
|
|
70
|
Field Message, 2d Battalion, 372d Infantry, to 372d Infantry, 8:15 a. m., Oct. 5.
|
|
71
|
Journal of Operations, French 157th Division, Oct. 6.
|
39
|
72
|
Ordre Général No. 13, French 157th Division, Oct. 6.
|
|
73
|
War Diary, 372d Infantry, Oct. 7-8.
|
|
74
|
Special Order No. 499, French Tenth Army, Sept. 4.
|
|
75
|
General Operations Orders No. 540, French Tenth Army, Sept. 12.
|
|
76
|
Operations Order No. 10, French 59th Division, Sept. 16.
|
|
77
|
Operations Order No. 12, French 59th Division, Sept. 17.
|
|
78
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Sept. 16-20.
|
|
79
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Sept. 23-24.
|
|
80
|
Report of Operations, 370th Infantry, Jan. 2, 1919.
|
|
81
|
General Order No. 1858/3, French 59th Division, Sept. 17.
|
|
82
|
Journal of Operations, French XXX Corps, Sept. 23.
|
|
83
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Sept. 25-27.
|
|
84
|
War Diary, German Army Group, Crown Prince, Sept. 28.
|
|
85
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
86
|
Journal of Operations, French XXX Corps, Sept. 28.
|
|
87
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Sept. 29.
|
|
88
|
General Operations Order No. 616, French Tenth Army, Sept. 28.
|
|
89
|
Operations Orders Nos. 188 and 194, French XXX Corps, Sept. 28.
|
|
90
|
Operations Orders Nos. 1920/3 and 1923/3, French 59th Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
91
|
Operations Order No. 14, French 59th Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
92
|
Operations Order No. 15, French 59th Division, Sept. 28.
|
|
93
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Sept. 30.
|
|
94
|
Journal of Operations, French XXX Corps, Sept. 30.
|
|
95
|
Memorandum, 370th Infantry, Oct. 5.
|
|
96
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Oct. 1-3.
|
|
97
|
"My Experiences in the World War," Pershing.
|
|
98
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Oct. 4-11.
|
|
99
|
Report of Reconnaissance, 370th Infantry, Oct. 4.
|
|
100
|
Memorandum, 370th Infantry, Oct. 7.
|
|
101
|
Daily Operations Report, French 59th Division, Oct. 9.
|
|
102
|
Journal of Operations, French XXX Corps, Oct. 6.
|
|
103
|
War Diary, German Army Group, Crown Prince, Oct. 12.
|
|
104
|
"My Own Story," Ludendorff.
|
|
105
|
Memorandum No. 2819/3, French XVI Corps, Oct. 6.
|
|
106
|
Plan de Démarrage, No. 1975/3, French 59th Division, Oct. 9.
|
|
107
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Oct. 12.
|
|
108
|
Field Orders No. 17, 370th Infantry, Oct. 11.
|
|
109
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Oct. 12-14
|
|
110
|
Telegram No. 4640/M, French G. H. Q. to French Tenth Army, Oct. 27.
|
|
111
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Oct. 27.
|
|
112
|
Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, Ministère de la Guerre, Paris.
|
|
113
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Oct. 30.
|
|
114
|
General Operations Order No. 673, French Third Army, Oct. 27.
|
|
115
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Nov. 2.
|
40
|
116
|
Order No. 475/S, French 59th Division, Oct. 31.
|
|
117
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Nov. 5.
|
|
118
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Nov. 6.
|
|
119
|
Order, French 59th Division, Nov. 6.
|
|
120
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Nov. 7.
|
|
121
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Nov. 8.
|
|
122
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Nov. 9.
|
|
123
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Nov. 10.
|
|
124
|
Journal of Operations, French 59th Division, Nov. 11.
|
|
125
|
Directive, Allied Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 3.
|
|
126
|
Letter, Allied Commander-in-Chief to American Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 23.
|
|
127
|
Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches.
|
|
128
|
Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Sept. 1, 1919.
|
|
129
|
General Order No. 32, War Department, Aug. 30, 1923.
|
|
|
|
|
Last updated 3 October 2003
|