VNI - 221
Small Unit Combat After-Action Interview Report
4th Engineer Battalion
NOTE
: The original of this document is contained
in the Vietnam Interview Collection (VNI) of the Historical Resources Branch,
US Army Center of Military History. When created the report carried a CONFIDENTIAL
security classification but has since been declassified. Other than removing
those markings and ignoring the original pagination, the following document
faithfully reproduces the original report, including spelling and punctuation.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH ENGINEER BATTALION
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262
AVDDH-EN 18 March 1969
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report
Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDDH-GC
APO San Francisco 96262
1. TYPE OF OPERATION: SEARCH AND CLEAR operations in assigned AO by
the 4th Infantry Battalion (Provisional) and OPCON units.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 11-13 March 1969.
3. LOCATION: Assigned circular AO extending seven (7) kilometers from
base camp with one AO extension reaching into southern portion of Yellow
sector of TAOR boundary.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 4th Engineer Battalion (Command
Element)
5. PRINCIPLE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED:
a. LTC Elvin R. Heiberg, III, Battalion Commander
b. Capt. Thomas K. Booth, Company A Commander
c. Capt. David J. Carney, Company C Commander
d. Capt. William C. Hawkins, Artillery LNO
e. Lt. Rodney D. Millar, Company B Commander
6. TASK FORCE: 4th Infantry Battalion (Provisional) augmented
by OPCON TOE units as follows:
a. 4th Infantry Battalion (Provisional) consisting of headquarters
element and three (3) line companies (Provisional).
b. One (1) platoon, tanks, Company E, 4th Engineer Battalion.
c. One (1) platoon, trucks, Company E, 4th Engineer Battalion.
d. E Battery, 4/42nd Artillery (105mm towed, Camp Enari - DS).
7. SUPPORTING FORCES: Artillery general support included E Battery,
5/16th Artillery (155mm S.P.) and base camp mortar battery (81mm
and 4.2").
8. INTELLIGENCE:
a. Discussion with Division G-2 and Military Intelligence revealed that
Provisional Battalion AO had been unusually quiet in the three (3) or four
(4) days preceeding operation. All the major villages in the AO had Civil
Affairs representatives located in them. One item of particular interest
in this AO was that in the past, the enemey has placed caches where a cut
bank is located four (4) to fifteen (15) feet high. About eight (8) to
ten (10) feet back from the top of this bank, the ground will be dug out
and covered with bamboo, dirt and camouflage material. A bamboo sign shaped
like a "Y" and from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) inches in length
will be found one hundred (100) meters from the location.
b. The operation revealed a number of items of intelligence value:
(1) 131130 - A NVA medical complex consisting of five (5) thatched hooches
(ZA 217202) was destroyed using thermite grenades. One was believed to
be a doctor's office, a second a messhall, and a third a sleeping quarters.
One hut was constructed in such a manner that it caught water from the
trees and through a network of bamboo shoots, accumulated it in containers.
The last hut had several shelves, which were probably used for storage
of medical supplies.
(2) 131130 - At the same location as above, an NVA newspaper was found
dated 6 March 1968. A weathered note was with the paper stating how badly
the NVA and VC were defeating the Americans and South Vietnamese. A broken
syringe was discovered in the same area.
(3) 131145 - As the search continued along the hill mass from the medical
complex, six (6) sleeping positions, one (1) 8' x 20' thatched building,
and five (5) small "lean-to" type structures on short stilts
were found. The structures were burned.
9. MISSION: 4th Infantry Battalion (Provisional) conducts
search and clear operations within AO.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The battalion moved by convoy along three
(3) routes into assigned AO. All three (3) companies conducted search and
clear operations in specified zones of operations.
11. EXECUTION: At 110710 March 1969, the convoy departed Camp Enari.
Company A proceeded by bridge truck to AR 835390 and departed from the
LD at 0845 hours. Company B moved by truck to vicinity AR 769402 and crossed
the LD at 0850 hours. Company C proceeded along 19W to ZA 228356 and crossed
the LD at 0855 hours. The Battalion CP was operational on Dragon Mountain
at 0830 hours. All companies reported negative SITREP's throughout the
day and night. Night ambushes and LP's were in place the vicinity of all
company night locations by 1800 hours. Just prior to noon on 12 March 1969,
Company B was ordered to proceed to operate in a new AO in the southern
portion of the Yellow sector of the TAOR boundary. Company C was positioned
in order to provide a reinforcing capability if required. All significant
activity during the operation was in this Yellow Sector AO. All active
operations ceased at 1400 hours 13 March 1969 and the last elements closed
into Camp Enari at 1700 hours.
12. RESULTS: All significant results are reflected in the paragraph
8, INTELLIGENCE. No contact was made with the enemy during the operations.
- ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:
a. Resupply of water and rations was satisfactory. The 450 gallon water
trailer was inoperative after the morning of the second day, however, the
logistics effort was still effective using smaller water containers and
there were good main supply routes within ready access of the companies
throughout the operation.
b. Three (3) scout dogs were employed. All company commanders felt the
dogs worked well and the handlers were enthusiastic in the conduct of their
mission.
c. No medical facilities were moved to the forward CP location. The
company medics combined with rapid and effective extraction of injured
personnel by helicopter indicated that forward medical facilities were
not necessary for operation in an AO this close to base camp.
d. Transportation was responsive and adequate.
e. Radio communications were excellent.
f. Artillery expended - A total of six (6) smoke and ten (10 high explosive
rounds were expended on five (5) defensive target missions.
g. Intelligence feedback was satisfactory although minimal.
h. The tank platoon (two [2] M-48 tanks) derived valuable training from
it's employment with an infantry platoon on the objective in Yellow Sector.
- SPECIAL TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT: None
15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:
a. This was a good exercise, although no significant activities occurred
beyond the hospital/"way station" complex just south of the TAOR.
For operations within the TAOR, having the battalion CP on Dragon Mountain
proved most satisfactory, reducing security requirements while insuring
adequate radio communications.
b. The shortage of personnel on the operation requires division attention
for correction (See Recommendations 16a, below). As a battalion commander
"speaking" to a brigade headquarters, I have little leverage.
When I receive the answer, "We simply cannot furnish the required
number of troops (weapons, radios)," I have no way of enforcing compliance.
Significantly, 1st and 3rd Brigade were woefully
short, whereas 2nd Brigade produced.
16. RECOMMENDATIONS:
a. A division conducted inspection is most necessary of the units, preferably
the late afternoon before the operation to permit corrections. Whereas
there will be a last minute fallout of personnel affecting the participating
strength, the 20% shortage of personnel in two of the brigade companies
is unacceptable. The shortage was bearable for this operation, but it could
have been detrimental if the Provisional Battalion were committed outside
the TAOR.
b. The "call-up" of the Provisional Battalion on the order
of once a month for the past three (3) months has significantly improved
the effectiveness and timely response of the battalion. A continuation
of this policy is advisable to enable personnel with "Provisional"
experience to pass this on to new officers and non-commissioned officers
with no break in the continuity of the units' effectiveness.
E. R. HEIBERG III
LTC CE
Commanding
Copy Furn:
ADC-B (THRU: C of S)
CO, ICC