DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY
US ARMY CENTER
OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
UNITED STATES
ARMY IN VIETNAM
Oral History Interview
VNIT 101
End-of-Tour Interview
CPT Joseph W. Kinzer
Advisory Team 163
Liaison Officer, 3d Airborne Brigade, Airborne Division
Interview Conducted 11 June 1968 at Airborne
Division Advisory Detachment, Airborne Division Headquarters, Tan Son Nhut
Air Base, Republic of Vietnam
Interviewer: MAJ Charles C. Pritchett,
20th Military History Detachment
UNITED STATES
ARMY IN VIETNAM
Oral History Interview
VNIT 101
MAJ PRITCHETT: This is MAJ Charles
C. Pritchett, Commanding Officer, 20th Military History Detachment, Headquarters,
United States Army, Vietnam [USARV]. This morning, 11 June [1968], we are
located at the Airborne Division Headquarters (ARVN [Army of the Republic
of Vietnam]), Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. And we
are interviewing CPT Joseph W. Kinzer, an infantry officer, serial number
0*******, who is one of the division liaison officers. Prior to becoming
a liaison officer, CPT Kinzer was a battalion senior advisor within the
Airborne Division. He has been in country approximately a year and is scheduled
to rotate within the next ten to fifteen days back to CONUS [Continental
United States], or Stateside, assignment.
When did you come in [the Army]? 19 ...
?
CPT KINZER: 1959.
MAJ PRITCHETT: 1959. What have been
some of your major assignments, or your major assignments since that time?
CPT KINZER: Well, I ... the first
five and a half years I was an enlisted man. I was with the 3d Infantry
Division in Germany, the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, [Georgia],
and the "Old Guard"1 [at Fort Myer] in Arlington,
[Virginia], for two years. I went to OCS [Officer's Candidate School] in
[19]64, was commissioned in September [19]64, went to jump school and was
assigned to the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, [North Carolina].
I spent 30 months with the 82d Airborne Division, went to the MATA2
course at Fort Bragg; was then assigned to MACV [Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam] as an advisor. Upon arrival in country I was assigned to the Vietnamese
Airborne Advisory Detachment.
MAJ PRITCHETT: When did you arrive
in country?
CPT KINZER: On the 29th of June,
1967.
MAJ PRITCHETT: What have been your
assignments in country?
CPT KINZER: Well, for the first
four months I was the senior battalion advisor with the 7th Vietnamese
Airborne Battalion. After that I was assigned to the ... [what was] then
the 3d Airborne Task Force as liaison officer. And in ... I've had that
job ever since, up to date.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Where did you go
to college?
CPT KINZER: I didn't, I went to
OCS. I just completed high school. I do not have a degree.
MAJ PRITCHETT: And what's your age
now?
CPT KINZER: I'm 28 years old.
[INTERRUPTION]
MAJ PRITCHETT: ... like to ask you
a few questions in regards to your tenure as the senior advisor to the
battalion. How is (or was) the battalion advisory team organized?
CPT KINZER: The authorized battalion
TOE [Table of Organization and Equipment] was three personnel per team:
a captain, first lieutenant, and an E-7 [sergeant first class]. I was the
senior advisor. 1LT Arvin [was] my assistant battalion advisor. MSG Larson
was my weapons advisor.
MAJ PRITCHETT: How did you employ
these people, or utilize them on a day-to-day basis?
CPT KINZER: In an operational environment
the battalion worked in ... normally in two elements. It is organized with
four rifle companies. Consequently the battalion commander would maneuver
his unit in two-company sized units. The battalion executive officer with
one and the battalion commander with the other. The ... I (as the senior
advisor) would be with the battalion commander and I employed the assistant
battalion advisor with the executive officer, maneuvering with two companies.
The weapons advisor would normally be with the lead company, generally
in ... with the command group of the lead company that was under the control
of the battalion commander. He worked directly with me most of the time.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, what were your
specific duties as the senior advisor to the battalion?
CPT KINZER: This is everybody's
question, really: just what are the duties of an advisor. In my experience
with the battalion and with this division over the past year, I've found
that the Vietnamese Airborne Division being what it is, having the leadership
and the caliber of personnel, and the training they have is ... advice,
tactical advice, you give very little. Because they are good tacticians
and they employ their units properly. They are sound tacticians across
the board. I found myself and my advisors acting 75% of the time as a go-between
or liaison between the Vietnamese unit that we were with and US and Free
World forces' combat and combat service support units. To give an example,
helicopter gunships, US tactical air strikes, US artillery (US Marine Corps
most of the time up in the north), resupply and [medical] evacuation missions.
And I was head coordinator, more or less, for the battalion commander in
the employment of these Free World forces.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, how ... when
you were out on an operation, how was a decision reached to employ, say,
light fire teams3 and also air strikes, and would you give me
a talk-through on just how the decision would come about, and how the strikes
would actually be called in?
CPT KINZER: Right. When the battalion
initially made contact, of course, the battalion commander would develop
the situation, move forward, and make an estimate of what he was up against.
Based upon his and my estimate and mine, we would reach an agreement (a
mutual agreement) on what we ... or what he ... . Or he would tell me what
he felt should be employed. And, of course, I'd make my own decision on
this as to the effect of what he wanted to employ, whether it be gunships
or artillery. And rarely ever (if ever) did we have any disagreement on
what to employ. And he would just merely request to me that "get me
a set of gunships" or "I'd like US artillery reinforcing fires
on this" or "I'd like naval gunfire fired on this." And
I would in turn forward my request to the brigade senior advisor, who would
in turn contact the US supporting unit. And the supporting fires (the naval
gunfire or the gunships) would immediately be brought on station.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, did you have
an assigned FAC, or a naval gun (ANGLICO) team, or artillery FO?4
CPT KINZER: During the operations
along the lower ... along the coastline, we did have an ANGLICO team attached
to us. And this was if we decided to employ naval gunfire, which we did
on many occasions, it would just be a word from me to the OIC [Officer
in Charge] of the gunfire team to fire such-and-such a coordinate. As far
as FACs are concerned, we were unique in comparison to any other ARVN unit
in that we had our own organic US FAC team assigned. And these FACs were
constantly with us on all operations and acted as our eyes and ears on
many an occasion, as a radio relay. And of course they did a real fine
job bringing in tactical air strikes against the enemy.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Was this a Vietnamese
FAC or a US type?
CPT KINZER: No. This was US Air
Force types. And they had generally three to four aircraft and eight to
ten FACs all the time. And where each brigade (or task force, as it was
then called) was then assigned so many FACs [and] so many aircraft, depending
upon the duration and location of an operation. They stayed with us throughout
the operation.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, you mentioned
the fact that you coordinated a lot with US units. How were you as an advisor
and the battalion that you were working with accepted by the US units?
CPT KINZER: To put it in plain English,
with open arms. I feel, in my experience working with US units, that most
all US units that I've worked with are eager to work with ARVN, to find
out what ARVN's capable of doing, to find out how they work, and to really
work on the US-ARVN relationship as far as combined operations are concerned.
And my duties during this particular time would be more or less a ... I
would be a spokesman or coordinator for the battalion commander to the
US commander. I would present his scheme of maneuver, his plan of fire
support, to the US commander, and do ... coordinate any fire support or
anything like this that we were depending upon the US for. And this worked
extremely well in all cases.
[INTERRUPTION]
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, it's ... to
my understanding ... that the ARVN units are not under the command of an
American unit, would you describe just how these operations, when they're
out in the field side-by-side (the US and ARVN units, that is, or airborne)
who controls ... or how is the operation ... overall operation controlled?
CPT KINZER: It has been my experience
in working with US units ... alongside of them. The ARVN commander commands
the ARVN units and the US commander commands US units. As far as the operation
itself is concerned, the coordination between the two commanders is such
[that] its not, in fact, anybody controlling ARVN but ARVN and US but US.
What I mean to say here is the commander still maintains chain of command
and his reports go to his headquarters, be it ARVN or US. The cooperation
and the coordination between the two units is such that the operation runs
very fluidly and it is well-coordinated.
And this is where the advisor plays the
major role. And this is where I felt that the advisor really either did
the job or he didn't do the job, because of the complexity of the US organization.
We found that on many occasions, [we found it] hard for the Vietnamese
to grasp the concept of how the US were operating. And with the magnitude:
their resources and their capability to move, and shoot and communicate.
And we found that without the US advisor working with ARVN, that the commander
(Vietnamese--type) would have had little or no concept of what the US was
capable of doing.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Do you recall any
specific examples you'd like to relate at this time?
CPT KINZER: Well, I think I ...
a shining example of this was Operation PEGASUS/Lam Son 207 (which was
the Vietnamese name for the operation). This involved a combined operation
with the 1st US Air Cavalry Division,5 the 26th US Marine Regiment,
and the 3d Airborne Brigade of the ARVN Airborne Division. The mission
was to relieve the pressure around the Khe Sanh combat base in I Corps.
We were being supported by the 1st US Air Cavalry Division during the operation,
and it was very complex as far as we were concerned because, as far as
the advisors were concerned, because we had never been exposed to the complete
resources of an air mobile division before ... to date, rather.
And we found that working with the cav
is something like you've never experienced before. I mean, they have (like
I said before) ... have the ability to move rapidly and on short notice
anyplace in this country. And the Vietnamese were very receptive to this.
I feel they did a remarkable job. And the mission entailed moving the 1,800-man
brigade from along the coast by Quang Tri to the Laotian border around
Khe Sanh combat base. And with the cooperation and the coordination between
the ARVN commander and the 1st Brigade of the air cavalry division, this
operation was effected with little or no trouble.
The operation itself went off extremely
well. And many of the US commanders and the US aviation support units that
were actually moving our troops commented personally to me and the senior
advisor on the flexibility of the airborne troops, their know-how, and
their willingness, and their ability to respond to different situations.
MAJ PRITCHETT: When was the operation
conducted?
CPT KINZER: The operation kicked
off with the 3d Airborne Brigade on the 7th day of April and terminated
on 14th day of April, 1968.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Would you give a
brief run-down on how the ARVN airborne battalion is equipped?
CPT KINZER: The ARVN airborne battalion
... most weapons and the equipment in the ARVN airborne battalion are typical
of a US battalion with two exceptions. The airborne battalion (ARVN-type)
has 60mm mortars and the 57[mm] recoilless rifles whereas the US battalion
has four-deuce [4.2-inch] mortars, 81mm mortars, and the 90mm recoilless
rifle. This was the only difference in equipment. The ARVN airborne battalions
are completely outfitted with the [5.56mm] M-16 rifle, the [40mm] M-79
grenade launcher, and the [7.62mm] M-60 machine gun at this time. And this
makes our working with the US units that much more fluid in that it doesn't
create a real supply problem. Ammunition is 99% compatible, and this definitely
helps make the situation move a little bit faster.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, you mentioned
supply problems. What specific problems have you encountered as a battalion
advisor?
CPT KINZER: During the time I was
with the battalion, I ... we didn't really experience any problems as far
as resupply was concerned. Probably because of the nature of the operation.
We were operating along the coastal region, around Hue and Quang Tri in
the I Corps Tactical Zone. And normally we had a line of communications
by road, and on certain occasions where we did have to resupply by air,
it was coordinated and conducted by VNAF (the Vietnamese Air Force), using
their helicopters.
As liaison officer to the 3d Brigade, we
found that working with the US units, we depended upon them entirely for
our support. And it took a little adjusting (to say the least) to learn
the new SOPs6 that especially the 1st Cav used, and learn their
system for doing things.
The real problem we had was trying to get
our counterpart to make a sound estimate of his resupply needs far enough
in advance for the US and ourselves to react to the requirement. The requirement
for positioning the ammunition and/or rations, and allocating [a] sufficient
number of aircraft to move the same supplies. This was one of our biggest
problems, was to ... getting, like I say, getting our counterpart to see
far enough ahead and make an estimate of what his requirement would be
at such-and-such a time, and go ahead and submit that requirement to us
so we would have enough reaction time to ... to, like I say, position the
supplies and get them rigged for airlift, and get them in there. This problem
only existed for a short while (probably two days). And once they saw the
need to get this information most expeditiously, they would forward the
request directly to us, give us enough reaction time, thereby allowing
the resupply to proceed with no problem.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, as a battalion
advisor, would you discuss the unit's maintenance program that existed
in the battalion, and any actions that you might have taken to better it?
CPT KINZER: This was one of the
points of interest when I initially joined the battalion. The battalion
was in a semi-reserve status or in a 'stand down.' They had just recently
returned from an operation in I Corps. And one of my first questions to
the battalion commander was what kind of program he had organized for maintenance.
And he just spread the whole thing before me, what each company would do,
and how it would be accomplished, how the weapons would be cleaned and
inspected. And it came off just like he said it would.
MAJ PRITCHETT: I've heard it said
before by some people that the ARVN soldier takes very good care of his
own personal gear, but has a tendency somewhat, sometimes, to maybe let
crew-served type of equipment (crew-served weapons, vehicles, and radios)
kind of go their merry way until they completely will not function. What's
been your experience in this line?
CPT KINZER: In the 7th Battalion
I feel that a member of a crew-served weapons team realizes that that weapon
is going to provide as much if nor more support for the unit as a whole
than the individual rifle carried by a soldier and consequently he takes
real good care of it.
It's been my experience, as far as the
vehicles are concerned ... . I can speak from a personal example here:
my vehicle, when I got here, was in real bad shape because it had been
run and not taken care of by the advisor before me, and I took it back
to the motor pool (or had it towed back). And within two weeks they had
put a new engine in, had four new tires on it, and really had it in top-notch
running condition. Every time we went to the field, I'd leave my jeep with
the motor pool and it was just in immaculate shape when I got it back.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, we discussed
logistical or resupply problems or areas while on operations. You mentioned
being in a 'stand down.' How has the ARVN supply channel functioned during
these periods of time?
CPT KINZER: I saw no problem at
all as far as the everyday logistics problems were concerned, or the everyday
logistics activities (you might say). As far as field equipment, immediately
upon returning from an operation in this 'stand-down' status, maybe two
or three days, it was SOP in the battalion that all TA-50 (this is field
gear: boots, fatigues, web gear, so on and so forth) would be inspected
by the individual units. And this would be consolidated at battalion-level
immediately [for] direct exchange through the division G-4 channels and
the troop had good equipment, serviceable equipment, when he went back
to the field.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, during your
period as the senior advisor to the battalion, did you find that the airborne
soldier was adequately fed?
CPT KINZER: Yes, I did. In my experience
with the battalion, I never ate (well, I say I never ate) any GI chow.
Ninety-nine times out of a hundred, I would eat with my counterpart; eat
exactly what he was eating, which was sufficient and in certain cases was
more than I could eat. The average soldier, I feel, (and I made it a point
to get around and look at their messing operations--they have a different
concept than we do, they don't eat US C-Rations per se, they cook in their
own little rice pot), but everyone I saw had sufficient rice, I felt, and
vegetables and so on, and basic needs that they needed to function.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, you mentioned
eating with your counterpart. Who provided the equipment and supplies for
the advisors?
CPT KINZER: This was ... in my battalion
(I'm speaking strictly for the unit that I was serving with) I had my battalion
commander, or my counterpart, prior to going ... prior to moving out on
any operation, with whom I would eat, who would be responsible for procuring
my food. And his statement to me was "when you go to the field with
me, don't worry about a thing. I'll feed you, I'll take care of you."
And I can certainly say he did this.
MAJ PRITCHETT: I'd like to get into
another area now. And this is the area of training. What type of training
program did the battalion have when not actively engaged or participating
in any given operation?
CPT KINZER: Well, I joined the battalion
during this 'stand-down' period. It lasted for about two weeks, altogether.
Again, this was one of my questions to the counterpart, what their schedule
of activities would be during this particular period. And during this time
we had received over 150 replacements right out of basic training who had
not been school trained in the functioning and operation and firing of
the M-16 rifle. My recommendation to him was that we get them to the ...
get them into a classroom for some classroom-type instruction on the basics
of this weapon and after that get them to a rifle range. This was accomplished
within four days after I made the recommendation which was really ... impressed
me. And some of the instruction put out by the young first and second lieutenants
in the battalion was just Fort Benning-style, I'd say. They did a real
fine job of this and everybody was zeroed and qualified with the weapon
prior to moving out on the next operation.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, do you consider
the training program with this type weapon to have been successful?
CPT KINZER: I certainly do. I think
the results speak for themselves.
MAJ PRITCHETT: There's been quite
a bit of controversy over the M-16 rifle. What difficulties have you noticed
that have been experienced with the airborne trooper?
CPT KINZER: Well, speaking from
an experience standpoint, my company that I commanded in the 82d was equipped
with M-16 rifles and we had little or no problem with them Stateside. But
of course this was completely different environment. But my personal feelings
on the M-16 are [that] it's just like your car you have back home. It has
certain little idiosyncrasies, things that you have to watch out for. And
it does require a lot more cleaning and care than the M-14 and the M-1
rifle. And I think this is a point that needs to be brought home to every
soldier--that you have to clean that weapon and take care of it, just like
you eat a meal every day. I mean, it's just got to be a constant thing.
It can't be left to hang in the breeze for two or three days at a time
and then certainly ... suddenly realize that you have to clean your weapon.
And I think that the Vietnamese airborne trooper is well-aware of this,
because everybody carries a brush and cleaning rod, oil, and patches. And
they are constantly maintaining their equipment on a daily basis.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, how often did
the battalion participate in airborne ... excuse me, I mean airborne jumps?
And how often did the advisors participate in these activities?
CPT KINZER: The battalion I was
assigned to was never committed to an operational parachute assault while
I was there. However, in order to maintain their airborne proficiency,
they are required to make a jump once every 90 days. And this is depending
on the tactical situation, which of course influences it quite a bit. I,
as an advisor, jump with the battalion. Administratively on one occasion
here in the Saigon area. Since being assigned to the division I have made
fourteen jumps with the jump school during the times when the battalion
was not actively committed. But they try as time permits to maintain their
proficiency and keep everybody qualified as far as parachuting is concerned.
MAJ PRITCHETT: I know about qualifications.
What are the qualifications for the advisor to receive the Vietnamese jump
wings7?
CPT KINZER: The qualifications as
they stand right now are, of course, be a qualified US parachutist and
complete six jumps with their jump school here at Saigon.
[INTERRUPTION]
MAJ PRITCHETT: Joe, we've been talking
about your duties as an advisor to a battalion. I'd like to ask you what
were your duties were here at division?
CPT KINZER: Well, since I left the
battalion (as I said) before I was working with the 3d Brigade as their
liaison officer. And these duties entailed much more than any US liaison
officer I've ever met in that the brigade advisory detachment (section,
rather) that they have right now consists of a five-man team: a major,
master sergeant, and an E-5 (sergeant) as the brigade advisory section;
and then we have the captain and a radio operator that were working as
the liaison section. And in working as a liaison officer, I felt--found
myself rather--doing much the same job as the brigade S-3 would do in coordination,
planning.
To give you an example of this, during
the Operation [PEGASUS] I just described with the 1st Air Cavalry Division,
the brigade was located at Quang Tri in a reserve status and I as liaison
was brought forward to the 1st Air Cavalry Division C[ommand] P[ost] to
make liaison, to effect coordination, and get everything going for this
operation that was impending around the Khe Sanh combat base. And this
is an experience I will never forget. I walked in the brigade TOC [Tactical
Operations Center] ... [correction], division TOC and was introduced to
MG [John] Tolson's ... was introduced to MG Tolson's primary staff: the
Chief of Staff; the [G]-1, -2, -3, -4, -5; the [Division] Engineer, and
the [Division] Signal Officer.
And I found myself kind of on the spot
because the operation was going to kick off in two days' time and I found
myself (more or less) making decisions for the brigade commander in how
many aircraft I wanted, what time I wanted to commence the combat assault,
where I wanted to establish my fire base, where I wanted to put my artillery,
how much concertina wire I wanted, when I wanted the bulldozer to move
in to dig the TOC slot and the gun positions, and what my resupply requirements
would be, what my ASR [authorized supply rate] was for my 105[mm] howitzers.
And it was just a little overwhelming and more than I could handle at the
time. Thank God that the 1st Brigade had the requirement of lifting us
from Quang Tri into the area. This was a big help to me. Their S-3 and
S-3 Air and myself worked two nights until midnight planning this move.
And as I said before, this is a little
bit more than is expected of a liaison officer. I was ... I felt that liaison
was a misnomer in this case. It should have been operations officer, because
that's certainly what I was doing. What I was doing up there was coordinating
all this stuff. And as it worked out in the long run, not any reflection
on myself, but what I had requested from the 1st Cav was pretty much along
the same lines as the battalion ... [correction], brigade commander wanted.
It worked out pretty well. We had our problems, but things did kind of
work themselves out after we got into the operation and the brigade commander
finally got a handle on what was going on got everything ironed out. It
went rather smoothly after that.
[INTERRUPTION]
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, Joe, do you
have anything else to add to what you just ... the remarks you made about
[the] liaison officer?
CPT KINZER: I think that there's
a definite need to take another look at the advisory set-up, which has
been done. And certainly if the operations are to continue in conjunction
with US units similar to the Cav, or any other division for that matter,
that the brigade advisory section should certainly be augmented in order
to cope with operations requirements, the intelligence requirements, and
logistics requirements that are ever-present in working with a US unit.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, what specifically
should be added to the team?
CPT KINZER: I think the brigade
advisory section should have a staff advisor because in the operation that
we have participated in, I found the senior advisor for the brigade working
with the staff more than he does the commander. And only rarely ever did
he ever have an opportunity to sit down and really talk out the situation
with the commander because of the other requirements that were so pressing
on him at the time. And one operations sergeant and a radio operator are
certainly not enough. I would recommend that the brigade have a staff advisor,
an operations officer, and at least two operations NCOs [non-commissioned
officers] and two radio operators at the brigade level. And they certainly
need something in the way of logistics. And I think
they
need to get the liaison officer out of the operations business and into
the liaison business, where he can effectively conduct liaison as it's
... as it should be conducted between adjacent units, next higher headquarters,
and subordinate units. And I think that under the new proposed TD [Table
of Distribution], this will be effected and I think it will make for a
lot smoother operation.
[INTERRUPTION]
MAJ PRITCHETT: Going back to the
battalion team, what should be added there, if anything?
CPT KINZER: I think that under the
present set-up, they have augmented the team by one NCO, and I feel that
this is certainly sufficient. They now have a four-man team: two officers
and two enlisted men. And I feel certain that this is sufficient.
MAJ PRITCHETT: What sort of position
was the other man that has been added?
[INTERRUPTION]
CPT KINZER: I don't think the addition
of the one man will change the [INTERRUPTION] I don't think the
addition of the other NCO will change the basic concept in the way the
advisory team works at battalion level. I think that in the Airborne Division
they will continue to keep the advisors out with the companies rather than
keeping them all at battalion headquarters, which is SOP in some of the
other ARVN divisions.
We feel, here in the Airborne Division,
that in order to make a good estimate of the situation, and make a valid
recommendation to the battalion commander on the employment of US and Free
World Forces' support, we feel that we need a man up there who is on the
scene and who can see what the situation is. It would be like, if we didn't
have ... operate like this, it would be like a battalion commander running
four companies with no company commanders or no one to give him an estimate
of the situation as it existed on the front. And it certainly is not the
job of a battalion commander to always move to the front to make an estimate
of the situation. He is ... makes his decision based on what his company
commanders tell him. And we feel if we don't have someone with that company
commander to make an estimate of the advisory side of the operation, why
we cannot give him valid advice on the employment of US support.
MAJ PRITCHETT: I'd like to maybe
go back in the area of logistics and talk a minute about medical evacuation.
What problems incurred on medical evacuation? How was this handled? And
what role did the advisor play?
CPT KINZER: As far as the battalion
was concerned, on the several operations that we ran in I Corps, we did
suffer light to moderate casualties on occasion. From the medical standpoint,
I think the Vietnamese medical personnel that were working with the battalion
certainly did a magnificent job, from all I could see. Regardless of what
the situation ... how intense the fire was, the medics were always on the
scene administering first aid and evacuating their personnel to a secure
area where they could be further evacuated to medical facilities. As far
as the advisor's role in this respect, we were primarily interested in:
Number One, how many casualties they had; [and Number Two], the nature
of [the] wounds. And, again, here we planned for and coordinated the medical
evacuation. Our primary role was in marking the landing zone [LZ], insuring
it was secure, and bringing the helicopter in, [and] assisting with the
loading the personnel on the chopper and getting them evacuated most expeditiously.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, next, Joe,
I'd like to ask you what have been the major problems that you encountered
as an advisor during your time here?
CPT KINZER: I think one of the biggest
problems that I've had as an advisor, both in the battalion and in the
brigade operations, is to get your counterpart (or the Vietnamese commander)
to plan ahead. I feel that they are good commanders, they exercise a lot
of good leadership, but on many, many occasions I've found some commanders
who did not have the foresight to see beyond today.
MAJ PRITCHETT: When you mention
leadership, what has the advisor done to improve leadership within the
units?
CPT KINZER: Hmm. Let me think about
that. In this regard, I feel that the advisors here in the Airborne Division
have, in order to develop better leadership, have ... have shown their
Vietnamese counterparts (now this is across the board) where certain leaders
in the division have been deficient, in a very tactful way, and have given
the division staff, the division commander, and the battalion commanders
guidance in how to rectify the situation. And the Vietnamese, you certainly
have to realize ... well, they 'play favorites' and fail to 'call a spade
a spade' in some cases. And they ... they're a little bit 'political minded'
and they are--some commanders, I'm not speaking for all of them--are a
little bit reluctant to step on somebody's toes because they feel it might
hurt them in the long run. But this is not normally the case. Like I say,
only on occasion. And they have taken (especially the division commander)
has taken some real stern measures against people who do not toe the mark
and who do not command effectively. And this was, in many, many cases,
based on the advice of the advisors.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, I'd like to
ask you, what do you consider to have been the highlight of your tour or/and
your major accomplishments as an advisor?
CPT KINZER: It goes without saying
as far as I'm concerned the highlight of my tour was the operation in Khe
Sanh with the 1st Air Cavalry Division. It was an experience for me in
not having worked with a US unit since 1967, and only in a Stateside environment.
This was certainly the highlight of my tour over here. I think I learned
more in the week or so that we worked with the Cav than I had in the previous
six months--in their concept of doing things and just how fast they were
able to react to any situation. And I feel the major accomplishment along
this line was the fact that I was the 'go-between' between the US air cavalry
division and the Vietnamese airborne division. And I feel a certain sense
of accomplishment here in being able to expose a portion of ARVN to the
resources, the ability, and the concept that the US division is using over
here. And I feel that this has certainly been the highlight of my tour
with the division.
MAJ PRITCHETT: I'd like to ask you
one question. As a battalion advisor, would you describe how many times
... or how many times you moved back and forth across the length and breadth
of the country?
CPT KINZER: As a battalion advisor
... I went to the battalion on the 1st of July and left the 1st of November
in [19]67. And those four months were spent in the I Corps area. However,
because of the mission of the Airborne Division, it's got to be able to
move anyplace in the country on short notice. And I can say I've seen that
country from stem to stern, from the Cam Lao Peninsula to the DMZ [Demilitarized
Zone]: Dak To, Kontum, all around Saigon during the Tet Offensive, the
DMZ in September of [19]67, and IV Corps in March of [19]68. So I certainly
have been exposed to all the terrain features here in Vietnam.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well next I'd like
to ask you, Joe, if you would discuss in detail some operation where significant
contact or results was obtained, and describe [it] in detail, and include
what role the advisors played?
CPT KINZER: I guess the operation
for this is what ARVN called Lam Son 121. It was a search-and-destroy operation
conducted by the 7th and 9th Airborne Battalions just southeast of Hue-Phu
Bai in September 1967. The mission called for the 7th Battalion to move
overland and clear a series of objectives generally in a southeasterly
direction from Phu Bai airfield. The 9th Battalion was to make a landing
by sea, coming down paralleling the South China Sea along the coast and
move inland to link up with us. With a series of objectives to clear. Attached
to the 7th Battalion was a platoon of APCs [armored personnel carriers]
from the 7th Cav[alry] Regiment there in Hue.
MAJ PRITCHETT: That an ARVN unit
or US unit?
CPT KINZER: No, this is an ARVN
unit. And we had one artillery battery (ARVN) in support--this was our
airborne artillery battery--and we had one Regional Force [RF] company
attached to the battalion.
As we approached the initial objective,
we were taken under some sniper fire. The APCs quickly returned the fire
with their .50-calibers [M-2 machine guns]. The firing diminished and we
continued to move.
As we approached the first objective in
our series of objectives, we were taken under intense mortar and rocket
fire from a well-entrenched enemy. During the first twenty minutes of the
battle that ensued (this was approximately 1230 in the afternoon), the
Regional Force company on the left flank of the battalion suffered six
killed and six wounded in the first twenty minutes. And under the heavy
contact, they fell back, thus exposing the left flank of the battalion.
And I felt this was one of my most tense
moments with the unit, in that the battalion commander didn't know at the
time that this RF company had actually gave way on the left flank and he
didn't know his flank had been exposed. I got the word from my advisor
who was moving with the left flank element and as it developed, he and
his counterpart (the battalion exec) plus two radio operators were the
entire left flank of the battalion. And the VC [Viet Cong] had moved out
of their positions and were trying to turn the flank.
And my recommendation to the battalion
commander, right away, was to move the APCs from the right over and fill
the gap on the left. And this was done immediately. He didn't hesitate
a bit. He knew after he had gotten a handle on the situation and I had
told him, he knew what had happened. And he did maneuver the APCs over;
however, the terrain didn't lend itself to rapid deployment of armor in
that particular area.
[END OF SIDE ONE]
The terrain could be characterized by a
mosaic of rice paddies, with three- and four-foot-high dikes, trench systems,
paths built up out of the dikes. And it really was difficult for the APCs
to move. But once they got in there and built up a good volume of fire,
why the mortar fire wasn't so intense after a while.
And during this time he was maneuvering
his units, I was calling the FAC who was orbiting overhead to get a handle
on what was out in front of us there. And he had spotted several groups
of VC--sixteen to eighteen in a group. And immediately I requested tac[tical]
air strikes. He forwarded an immediate request to Da Nang. We had air on
station in about fifteen minutes.
And the battle lasted from about 1230 that
afternoon until about 1830 that evening. And as far as my role in the fight,
[it] was primarily coordinating the US air strikes with the FAC. Marking
friendly locations through my two advisors [that] I had up front with them.
And controlling helicopter gunships that we have. We put in about six sets
of gunships. And, of course, after we got the left flank plugged up there
and got things moving, I moved one advisor back to establish a landing
zone.
And as a result of the action we killed
52 [VC], captured 25 weapons, and we had twelve friendly killed and about
40 wounded.
MAJ PRITCHETT: You say you cleared
landing zones. For what [purpose]?
CPT KINZER: To effect medical evacuation.
MAJ PRITCHETT: What type/size enemy
unit was in there?
CPT KINZER: We felt that it was
at least a reinforced company because of the fact that they were firing
recoilless rifles (and these are normally found at company level under
the VC organization) and also we were getting some 82mm mortars (excuse
me) ... some 82[mm] mortars intermittently, and we felt that there was
at least a reinforced company in there, if not more, because 82s are normally
employed at battalion level.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Was this a VC unit
or NVA [North Vietnamese Army]?
CPT KINZER: It was the 804th VC
Battalion, elements of it. What we later found out to be two companies
of the 804th VC Main Force Battalion.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Can you think of
any other specific advice you might have given your counterpart during
the battle there?
CPT KINZER: One time, I guess it
was around 1500 after we effected the first evacuation, he had his troops
on line and he and I walked the line and was checking everything out. He
was building up a real good volume of fire. And I asked him when he was
going to conduct ... when he was going to assault the positions. And I
don't know if he was completely ignoring me or didn't know when he was
going to do it, but I certainly felt this would have been the time because
all the troops looked like (to me) they were just anxious to get up over
those trenches there and really get in there and mix it up. And he spent
about the next 45 minutes jockeying his APCs around again and ... finally,
as the battle progressed, we started getting some 60[mm] mortar rounds.
And these were coming in real close--I mean they were popping all around
the 'PCs and everything. He had his command group and myself on top of
one of these 'PCs. And my advice to him was to move as fast as possible,
because if he didn't that these mortars were just going to pick us to pieces.
And as a result, he got the 'PCs moving and his troops did move out and
sweep the objective. We finally cleared it about 1830 that night.
MAJ PRITCHETT: What was the weather
like?
CPT KINZER: The weather was great.
Visibility was good; ceiling is about 30,000 feet, visibility is just unlimited--ten
miles plus, I'd say. We really had good weather. And one of the helicopter
gunship pilots made a comment that he hadn't been on a turkey shoot like
this in about two months. So we really got them on the run there and they
did a good job for us.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Can you think of
anything else to add to this particular operation?
CPT KINZER: Well, other than the
fact that my assistant was wounded (he caught a mortar fragment in the
arm). He stayed with us that night and the next morning during the resupply
(which was conducted by the VNAF) we evac'ed him back to the hospital where
he spent seven days. And he came back after seven days and went on to work
with us.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Joe, do you have
anything else to add to this interview?
CPT KINZER: No. I don't think so,
sir. I've said about all I've got to say about it. I hope you don't get
a misconception by what I've said. I don't want to paint ... I didn't want
to really paint a real rosy picture, as it has not been a bed of roses.
It's ... we've had our ups and downs on occasion. And I think, as I've
mentioned before, that the Vietnamese like to play favorites now and then.
I think the only thing a man needs to be
an advisor over here is an open mind, good common sense, and respect for
his counterpart. He's got to realize his situation, the fact that he's
been at this a long time, he doesn't have a lot to look forward to. As
far as comparing him to an American commander, a year over here or two
years and then it's back to the States again. Not dodging rockets all the
time. For the Vietnamese commander it's more of the same day after day
and year after year. And sometimes you have to bend a little bit to see
his point of view. But there are times when you have to stick by your guns
regardless of how difficult he wants to be; you've got to make him see
it your way. Because if he's ever going to get anyplace, some things you've
just got to make an adjustment to.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, do you wish
to place any restrictions upon the use of this information, now, that you've
given me? It will be used for historical purposes only, but do you have
any other restrictions that you'd like to place upon it?
CPT KINZER: No, sir. I don't think
I have mentioned anything that was classified in the interview. Certainly
not operations that we've run. They've certainly got enough publicity in
the papers and I don't think there should be any restrictions place on
it.
MAJ PRITCHETT: Well, I'd like to
express my appreciation for the time you've given this morning. And I wish
you much success in your future assignment.
CPT KINZER: Thank you much, sir.
It's been a pleasure.
[END OF INTERVIEW]
Endnotes
1. 1st Battalion, 3d Infantry.
2. Course to prepare individuals
to serve as advisors in Vietnam.
3. In normal situations in
Vietnam, a light fire team consisted of one observation helicopter and
one helicopter gunship.
4. Air Force Forward Air
Controller, Marine Corps Air-Naval-Ground Liaison Company, or artillery
Forward Observer.
5. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
6. Standing Operating Procedures.
7. Parachutist skill qualification
badge.