92D DIVISION

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

IN THE

WORLD WAR

 

PREPARED BY THE

 

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

PRINTING OFFICE

1944

 

 

Foreword  

 

THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION was created by Congress in 1923 for the purpose of commemorating the services of American forces in Europe during the World War. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commission has erected suitable memorials in Europe and improved and beautified the eight American cemeteries there. It has also published a book entitled "American Armies and Battlefields in Europe" which gives a concise account of the vital part played by American forces in the World War and detailed information regarding the memorials and cemeteries.

In order that the actions of American troops might be accurately set forth, detailed studies were made of the operations of each division which had front-line battle service. In certain cases studies of sector service were also prepared. It is felt that the results of this research should now be made available to the public. Therefore, these studies are being published in a series of twenty-eight booklets, each booklet devoted to the operations of one division.

In these booklets only the active service of the divisions is covered in detail. The accounts, however, are comprehensive enough to be of general interest and establish a great body of fact concerning the operations. For the military student, they provide an excellent background for tactical studies and present an extensive list of sources upon which further study can be based.

 

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

s/John J. Pershing, Chairman

 

 

PREFACE

IN READING the booklets of this series it should be borne in mind that they are based on historical studies which were prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission primarily for the purpose of determining the front line of each American division for each day of its active operations. Consequently, they were essentially front-line infantry studies. The operations of other arms, movements of reserves and other phases of the operations were covered only in sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of the infantry action.

The preparation of these studies was begun soon after the Commission was created, and every precaution was taken to insure that the research would be conducted with the utmost accuracy and thoroughness. A number of officers from the Regular Army as well as from the Marine Corps were selected and detailed to the Commission from time to time to carry on the work. All records of the War Department pertaining to the subject were exhaustively examined, as were the French, British and German documents which had been collected by the Army War College. From these sources, the daily front lines of each division were determined and plotted on large-scale maps, and brief accounts of the operations were prepared. The maps and accounts of operations were then referred to officers of the divisions concerned for comment and additional information. They were normally sent to officers of all ranks down to and including company commanders. In cases of doubtful or controversial points, the reference was carried further. The replies received were carefully studied, evaluated and used to correct and amplify the original studies. In this way, the Commission was able to secure and preserve valuable data which otherwise would have been lost.

In these booklets, it has not been the purpose to go far beyond the scope of the original studies. However, casualty and strength tables have been added and enough other material

 

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has been included to present connected histories of the division from their organization until the conclusion of their service it Europe, and to portray their actions in proper relationship to the operations of the corps and armies with which they served.

In order to indicate to the reader the areas in which the divisions served, a general map of France and Belgium has been included in each booklet. This map shows the principal cities and the battle lines of July 17 and November 11. In addition it shows, by special symbol, certain localities of particular interest to the division concerned.

All dates are 1918 unless otherwise indicated and are inclusive for example, October 9-11 includes the three days, October 9, 10 and 11. Dates in the headings of chapters dealing with operations, and in the titles of accompanying maps, are in general the dates between which one or more infantry regiments of the division have been awarded battle honors by the War Department. In certain cases infantry regiments, as well as other elements of the division, have been awarded battle honors for dates other than those indicated. The dates on the battle line of the maps include the period during which the division held command. The lines are as of midnight unless otherwise indicated; for example, October 9 indicates the line held at midnight, October 9.

The operation maps are reproductions of maps commonly used by American forces during the World War. In a great number of cases it was necessary to use parts of two or more sheets of the wartime maps to make one operation map, which accounts for the different treatments of topographical detail often found on the same operation map. Names which appear on the maps in the abbreviated form are spelled in full in the text. A table of abbreviations with the French equivalent and English translation appears in the front of each booklet. Names of certain topographical features which are well known, and are frequently referred to, appear in the text in the Anglicized form for example, Argonne Forest rather than Forêt d'Argonne, Marne River rather than Marne Rivière.

The casualty figures are based on the official casualty records of The Adjutant General. Tables of casualties have been prepared, however, only for the periods of active operations. The

 

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purpose is to show the casualties which occurred under the division command during specific actions. Therefore, casualties of elements which were detached during the actions are not included, while casualties of elements of other divisions which were attached have been included. It will be noted that, in the majority of cases, the dates in the casualty tables cover longer periods than those in the chapter headings or on the maps. This was found necessary in order to include all casualties incident to entering or leaving the line.

 

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•  ABBREVIATIONS

A. E. F.—American Expeditionary Forces
Ancn. (Ancien)—ancient
B. (Bois)—wood
Cx. (Croix)—cross
excl.—exclusive
Fme. (Ferme)—farm
Gde. (Grande)—large
G. H. Q.—General Headquarters
incl.—inclusive
Min. (Moulin)—mill
Mons. (Maisons)—houses
Mt. (Mont)—mount
Ouv. (Ouvrage)—works
Rau. (Ruisseau)—brook
Redt. (Redoute)—redoubt
Riv. (Rivière)—river
Rues. (Ruines)—ruins
Sal. (Signal)—signal station
Scie. (Scierie)—sawmill
Sucie. (Sucrerie)—sugar mill.
Tr. (Tranchée)—trench

 

 

CONTENTS

 

FOREWORD		iii
PREFACE		v
ABBREVIATIONS		x
ORGANIZATION, AND SERVICE FROM ARRIVAL IN THE A. E. F. UNTIL SEPTEMBER 25		1
	Organization of the Division—Authorized Strength—Map of France and Belgium—Arrival in Europe—Early Service—St. Dié Sector.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE		6
	Meuse-Argonne Offensive, September 26-October 5—Casualties.
MARBACHE SECTOR AND WOËVRE PLAIN OPERATION AND SUBSEQUENT SERVICE		26
	Marbache Sector and Woëvre Plain Operation, October 8-November 11—Subsequent Service, November 12, 1918-March 1919—Casualties.
APPENDIX		35
	Table of Organization, Infantry Division, November 11, 1918— Strength of 92d Division—General Table of Casualties—Sources.
INDEX		41
OPERATION MAPS		[Omitted]
	Meuse-Argonne Offensive, September 26-October 5. Marbache Sector and Woëvre Plain Operation, October 8-November 11.

 

 

1

 Organization, and Service from
Arrival in the A. E. F. until September 25

 

THE 92D DIVISION, National Army, was organized in November 1917, from colored selective service men from the United States at large. The various units were assembled and received their preliminary training at Camps Funston, Kansas; Grant, Illinois; Upton, New York; Dix, New Jersey; Meade, Maryland; Dodge, Iowa; and Sherman, Ohio. The division was brought to full strength in May 1918. [1]¹

The principal units of the division were:

183d Infantry Brigade
365th Infantry Regiment
366th Infantry Regiment
350th Machine-Gun Battalion

184th Infantry Brigade
367th Infantry Regiment
368th Infantry Regiment
351st Machine-Gun Battalion 

167th Field Artillery Brigade
349th Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns)
350th Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns)
351st Field Artillery Regiment (155-mm howitzers)
317th Trench-Mortar Battery

Divisional Troops
348th Machine-Gun Battalion
317th Engineer Regiment
325th Field Signal Battalion
Headquarters Troop
Trains [1]

The details of organization of the American infantry division were changed from time to time during the World War. Under

 

¹ The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to the sources on which the statements in the paragraphs are based. All sources are listed in the appendix (p. 37).

 

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the tables of organization which were in use in the American Expeditionary Forces on November 11, 1918, and which, in general, were in force during 1918, the maximum authorized strength of the division was 991 officers and 27,114 men. Its principal armament was 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm guns, 12 6-inch trench mortars, 260 machine guns and 16,193 rifles. Further details concerning the composition of the American infantry division appear in the table on page 35. The divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces seldom attained the maximum authorized strength shown above. The actual strength of the 92d Division on certain dates is shown in the table one page 36. The approximate strength of the division for other dates may be obtained by applying to these figures the battle losses which appear in the casualty tables following the accounts of battle operations. [2]

In May the greater part of the division, less artillery, was concentrated at Camp Upton, New York, prior to embarkation. Sailings from Hoboken began on June 7. The various elements landed at Brest and St. Nazaire, the last troops arriving in France on July 12. [1]

Following its arrival in France, the 92d Division, less artillery, proceeded to the 11th (Bourbonne-les-Bains) Training Area. The artillery brigade upon its arrival proceeded to Montmorillon for training. On August 12 the division, less artillery, moved to the vicinity of Bruyères, in the Vosges Mountains, in the area of the French Seventh Army. On the 13th the artillery moved to La Courtine for further training. [1]

From August 23 to 30 the division, less artillery, affiliated with the French 87th Division, and under control of the French XXXIII Corps, participated in the occupation of the St. Dié Sector. This sector, which was about 25 kilometers wide, lay in the Vosges north of St. Dié, and controlled the southerners exit of the Saales Pass. At the end of this period the 92d Division assumed command of the sector and held it until September 20, when it was relieved by the French 20th Division, with which the American 81st Division was affiliated. The next day the division commenced a move to the region north

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of Triaucourt, about 30 kilometers southwest of Verdun, and was assigned to the American I Corps. [1]

On September 24 the division, less the 368th Infantry and artillery, proceeded to the Argonne Forest northwest of Clermont-en-Argonne, where it was in reserve of the I Corps. The 368th Infantry moved to an area north of Sainte Menehould in the adjoining area of the French XXXVIII Corps. [1]

 

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 26—OCTOBER 5

FROM THE TIME that the American Commander-in-Chief arrived in France, he bent every effort toward organizing an American army under American command at the earliest possible moment. To accomplish this would normally consume considerable time because it would first be necessary to transport a large number of troops to Europe, provide for their supply and complete their training. The organization of this army was further deferred by the critical situation created by the German offensives launched in the spring and early summer of 1918. These offensives so depleted the Allied reserves that the Allies faced almost certain defeat unless they received immediate support. In this crisis the American Commander-in-Chief postponed for the time being the concentration of American divisions for the formation of an American army, and made all American combatant forces available for service with the British and French armies. With this assistance, the Allies were able not only to stop the German offensives before they gained a decisive victory but, on July 18, to launch a successful counteroffensive against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July 24, while this offensive was still in progress, a strategic offensive plan was agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief which included a mission for an American army. The immediate purpose of this plan was to reduce the salients which interfered with railroad communications which were essential to further offensive operations. One of these was the St. Mihiel salient. [3, 5]

The American First Army was organized on August 10, and on August 30 assumed command of the front from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, to Watronville, 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun. From September 11 to 16 it conducted

 

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the St. Mihiel Offensive which resulted in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. [5]

With the reduction of the St. Mihiel and other salients the immediate purpose of the strategic offensive plan of July 24 had been accomplished, and it became possible to undertake the great converging offensives which had bean agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief early in September. These offensives included an American attack to be launched on September 26 between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, supported on the left by the French Fourth Army between the Argonne and the Suippes River; a renewal on September 27 of the British-French attack between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers; and a combined Allied attack east of Ypres on September 28. Between these principal offensives, secondary operations were to be undertaken. [5, 6, 7, 107]

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army was to be directed against the principal German lateral line of supply, the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières railroad, which, at Sedan, lay 53 kilometers from the front. The severing of this artery would render the German positions to the west and northwest of Sedan untenable. [5]

Protecting this vital supply line, the Germans had, during the previous four years, constructed a strong system of field fortifications. On the Meuse-Argonne front, there were four distinct defensive positions. The first lay close behind the front line. The second included Montfaucon and traversed the Argonne south of Apremont. The third, which was known to the Germans as the Kriemhild Stellung, formed a part of their great defensive system, popularly called the Hindenburg Line which ran from the vicinity of Metz to the North Sea. This position extended from Bois de Forêt, across the heights of Cunel and Romagne, to include the high ground north of Grandpré. The fourth position included the heights of Barricourt, and extended westward to Buzancy and Thénorgues. The first three positions had been thoroughly organized, and numerous intermediate positions constructed between them.

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These defenses, together with the natural military strength of the terrain, presented a formidable obstacle to an attacking army. The importance of the communications protected by this front made it certain that the Germans would resist here to the last extremity. [5]

The plan of the First Army contemplated an initial advance of 16 kilometers and a penetration of the hostile third position. This penetration would force the enemy to evacuate the Argonne Forest, and insure the junction of the First Army with the French Fourth Army at Grandpré. A further advance of 16 kilometers was then to be made to the line, Stenay—le Chesne. Such an advance would outflank the enemy's position along the Aisne River, in front of the French Fourth Army, and clear the way for an advance on Mézières or Sedan. These operations were to be supplemented by an attack to clear the heights east of the Meuse River as far as Bois de la Grande Montagne. [5]

In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne Offense, the front of the First Army was extended from Watronville to the west edge of the Argonne Forest on September 22. The attack was to be launched at 5:30 a. m., September 26, with the III, V and I Corps in line from right to left. West of the Argonne Forest, the French Fourth Army was to attack in conjunction with the American forces. Elements of the First Army east of the Meuse were not to attack during the opening days of the offensive. [5] 

P

The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the service of the 92d Division in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

Thc 92d Division, less the 368th Infantry and the 167th Field Artillery Brigade, was in reserve of the I Corps on September 26. The 368th Infantry was an element of the Franco-American liaison group known as Groupement Durand which operated between the American First Army and the French Fourth Army. The regiment attacked on the right of Groupement Durand on the morning

 

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of the 26th on a 1-battalion front from La Harazée to Vienne-le-Château. Thc regiment advanced about 1 kilometer, but in the evening all except scattered platoons and its left company withdrew. Thc left company maintained positions for the night in Tranchée des Baleines.

On the morning of September 27 the regiment, with two battalions in line, reached and held scattered positions in Tranchée de la Tringle, Tranchée Tirpitz and the upper reaches of Vallée Moreau. In another attack late in the afternoon positions were reached east and west of the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road; in and near Tranchée Tirpitz and in Vallée Moreau.

On September 28 one company gained and occupied a line in the ravine north of Tranchée Tirpitz. Troops on the left occupied positions in Vallée Moreau.

Thc regiment took no offensive action on September 29. The left battalion was relieved by French troops. The right battalion was relieved by the former reserve battalion which took up positions in Tranchée Tirpitz.

On September 30 the regiment had moved forward to Tranchée du Dromadaire by noon, and in the late afternoon joined the French in an assault on Binarville. The town was captured and a line for the night held about 300 meters to the south. There were detachments northeast of the town and one company in line with the French.

The 368th Infantry was withdrawn from the front line on the morning of October 1. The 92d Division, less artillery, engineers, and the 183d Infantry Brigade, had been placed at the disposal of the French XXXVIII Corps on the 29th, and remained in reserve of that corps from October 1 to 4.

The plan for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive contemplated that the First Army would advance rapidly east of the Argonne Forest, and that the main attack of the French Fourth Army would be made west of the Aisne River. By this enveloping action, the enemy was to be forced to evacuate his strong positions in the Argonne Forest. Liaison between the two armies was to be maintained by a Franco-American group which was to

 

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operate between the Argonne Forest and the Aisne River. [8, 12]

The 92d Division was designated as reserve of the I Corps. It was still without its artillery brigade, but had attached to it the 62d Field Artillery Brigade, 37th Division. The engineer regiment, three battalions of infantry, two companies of the 351st Machine-Gun Battalion, and the 368th Infantry had been detached for other missions. The 368th Infantry, by arrangement with the French Fourth Army, was to form a part of the Franco-American liaison group which was to maintain contact between the 77th Division, I Corps, the left element of the First Army, and the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, French XXXVIII Corps, the right element of the French Fourth Army. [8, 9, l0, 11, 12]

This liaison group, organized as a provisional brigade, was known both as Groupement Durand and Groupement Rive Droite, and was to operate as the right element of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division. It was to attack in the following formation:

Fr 11th Cuirassiers		Amer 368th Infantry
2d Battalion	3d Battalion	2d Battalion
1st Battalion		3d Battalion
		1st Battalion (Div Res)

The boundaries assigned for the attack were as follows:

Left boundary, American First Army: La Harazée (incl.)—Binarville (excl.)—Lançon (excl.)—Grand Ham (incl.).

Left boundary, American 77th Division (as ordered by that division): La Harazée (incl.)—road junction 800 meters northwest of Moulin de l'Homme Mort—Etang de Poligny.

Right boundary, American 368th Infantry (as ordered by Groupement Durand): La Harazée (excl.)—crossroads about 700 meters north of point 213—Binarville—Lançon.

Left boundary, American 368th Infantry (as ordered by Groupement Durand): east edge of Bois Long—Bois Carré—Boyau de la Cote 176 (incl.)—point 500 meters west of Binarville.

 

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The right boundary of Groupement Durand and the 368th Infantry did not coincide precisely with the left boundary of the 77th Division. A gradually widening gap existed between the two boundaries, and at Binarville was about 800 meters wide. [8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]

The French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division was to advance astride the Aisne River, making its main effort with those elements west of the river. Groupement Durand, operating east of the river, was to protect the right of the troops making the main effort, and maintain liaison with the 77th Division in the Argonne Forest. As the attack progressed, it was expected that the French 11th Cuirassiers would be pinched out by the convergent advances to both flanks. [12, 15, 17]

On September 24 Groupement Durand issued orders directing one battalion of the 368th Infantry to relieve the 1st Battalion, 11th Cuirassiers, during the night of September 24-25 in the Biesme subsector, from point 213 west to a point about 300 meters west of the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road. The support and reserve battalions were to remain south of La Biesme Rivière. At 9 p. m. on the 24th the 368th Infantry commenced its forward movement, and on the following morning completed the relief. [13, 18]

On September 25 the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division announced that the assault troops of Groupement Durand would be in position on the night of September 25-26. Special efforts were to be made not to attract the attention of the enemy in gaining the line of departure, which ran northwest from point 213 to a point about 300 meters southeast of Bois Beaurain. An artillery preparation was to commence six hours before the hour of attack. The troops west of the Aisne were to keep in advance of Groupement Durand. At H-hour Groupement Durand was to advance to a line extending generally east and west through Servon and occupy the first line of hostile trenches, whereupon units were to be reorganized, reconnaissance to the front was to be made and positions were to be held against hostile counterattack, particularly from the Argonne Forest. Upon command of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Divi-

 

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sion, the elements west of the Aisne were to make a further thrust to the north. [19]

The mission assigned the 368th Infantry was to keep the enemy under surveillance and maintain contact, assure liaison to both flanks and, in case of enemy withdrawal, to pursue in conjunction with the 11th Cuirassiers. To accomplish the latter portion of this mission, the assault battalion was to form a line of resistance as far forward as possible, feeling out the enemy with patrols and advance as opportunity offered. Mixed liaison detachments were to be provided to both flanks. Finally, if the 368th Infantry was to be ready to send an advance guard toward Binarville. The regimental reserve battalion, from a position to be taken up north of the Biesme, was to be prepared to meet counterattacks from the northeast, but was not to be engaged in the attack of the regiment without authority of Groupement Durand. On the 25th this battalion was to make reconnaissances of the roads in the direction of Binarville, and to the northeast. The battalion in division reserve was to be engaged only upon orders of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division. On September 25 it was to reconnoiter routes of advance to Vienne-le-Château and vicinity. [14, 20]

In orders issued by the 368th Infantry the 3d Battalion was directed to secure and maintain liaison with support elements of the 77th Division. The hour for the attack was announced as 5:30 a. m. September 26. [21]

Sept. 26

The 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, attacked about 5:25 a. m., supported by the regimental machine-gun company. The artillery at the disposition of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division was insufficient to provide efficient preparation in the zone of action of the regiment, and did little or no damage to the heavily wired enemy positions in its front. Furthermore, no heavy wirecutters were supplied by the French division in time to be of use for the attack, and as a consequence the troops were forced to advance through the existing trenches or paths. This made lateral communication extremely difficult. [13, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 ]

The action of the leading battalion soon developed into separate movements by three groups, only one of which was con-

 

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trolled by the battalion commander. These groups, which became separated soon after leaving the line of departure, consisted of Companies E and H, on the right, Company F, in the center, and Company G, on the left. [24, 25]

Companies E and H crossed Tranchée de Suede in the morning and reached the vicinity of Tranchée de Courlande. In the advance, isolated hostile machine guns were silenced. There was no liaison to either flank, and patrolling to the front disclosed no enemy. The advance was resumed about 1:15 p. m. and followed the narrow-gauge railroad which generally paralleled Boyau de Turquie. After passing Tranchée Tirpitz, enemy rear-guard machine guns were again encountered and a halt was made for reconnaissance and reorganization. By dark liaison had not been secured to either flank, and these two companies withdrew during the evening, taking positions in rear of the line of the 3d Battalion. [23, 24, 25, 26]

Company F reached the first line of enemy trenches without opposition, but soon split into two groups of two platoons each. The right group advanced to Tranchée de Finlande via Boyau de Stuttgart, where it was temporarily held up, about 11 a. m., by enemy machine guns. In the afternoon portions of this group reached Tranchée Tirpitz, advancing up Boyau de Stuttgart, but, receiving artillery fire in this position, withdrew about 5:30 p. m. to the ravine in rear of Tranchée de Damas. Receiving more artillery fire here, a further withdrawal was made to the south of Tranchée du Goeben, where this group spent the night. The left group advanced to the ravine south of Tranchée de Finlande, but received artillery fire and withdrew south of Tranchée de Breslau, where it spent the night. A liaison detachment of Company K was with this group. Both of these groups of Company F were out of touch with all other units. [24, 25, 27, 28]

On the left, Company G spent the day working forward through the wire and trenches, and reached Tranchée des Baleines about dusk. A position was held here with Company M in support. Liaison was maintained to the left with support elements of the French 11th Cuirassiers, but not with the front

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line of that regiment, which had reached the vicinity of Tranchée de l'Euphrate. [24, 25, 29, 30]

The 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry, in regimental reserve, crossed the Biesme during the night of September 25-26 and, in compliance with an order of Groupement Durand, moved about 1 p. m. to the line of trenches about 350 meters in rear of the former French front line. Detachments of Company K operated as liaison groups to both flanks of the regiment during the day, one group remaining with Company F. The line of the 3d Battalion, extending west from a point 600 meters north of La Harazée to point 188, was the only organized front line of the 368th Infantry at midnight, September 26, with the exception of that portion of the line held by Company G on the left. It was through this line of the 3d Battalion that elements of the 2d Battalion withdrew during the evening. The scattered groups of Companies E, F and H ahead of the line of the 3d Battalion were not in liaison with this line or with one another. [13, 24, 31]

The liaison detachments of the 3d Battalion and portions of Company E had maintained contact to both flanks during the early part of the day, but by 2:30 p. m. contact with the front-line troops of the 77th Division had been lost. Later in the day contact was also lost with the French to the left. In the late afternoon a platoon of Company M was detached from its company and sent to Ravin de l'Artillerie. It failed to gain contact with the left of the regiment's front line, and did not return to its company during the remainder of the operation. Late in the day liaison was reestablished with patrols sent out by the 77th Division. [13, 24, 31, 32]

By dark the French l1th Cuirassiers, operating in open country, had taken Servon, and had strong outposts beyond the town. The right of their line was in the vicinity of Tranchée de l'Euphrate. [30]

The French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division ordered a continuation of the attack on the 27th on both sides of the Aisne. Groupement Durand was directed to reconnoiter the enemy points of resistance at daybreak, and push forward during the

 

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day to the line, Tranchée de la Palette—Tranchée de Charlevaux, north of the Binarville—Autry road. [33]

27 Sept.

At 3:45 a. m., September 27, the 368th Infantry received orders from Groupement Durand, directing an advance in accordance with the division orders toward a line, Tranchée du Dromadaire—Tranchée Clotilde. A group of 75-mm guns was placed at the disposal of the 368th Infantry. Orders of the 368th Infantry to attack at 5:15 a. m. with two battalions in line, the 2d and 3d from right to left, were transmitted to battalion commanders. The 1st Battalion remained in division reserve. [13, 34]

The 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, ordered the attack, but as the companies were in some confusion, the morning was spent in assembling the battalion. However, early in the morning Company G, from its positions in Tranchée des Baleines, moved forward until stopped by hostile machine guns at Tranchée de l'Euphrate. Contact with the French lath Cuirassiers was established about 9 a. m. Company G was moved under cover of the ravine to Tranchée de Finlande. [13, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35]

On the right, Company H was assembled in Tranchée de Suede, with Company E in support. During the afternoon this company, supported by Company E, advanced from Tranchée de Suede, and placed two platoons in Tranchée de la Tringle, with the remainder in support in Tranchée de Courlande. The right of the front line was in Tranchée de la Tringle, generally east of Boyau von Mudra, with no liaison to either flank. Company E attempted to locate the 77th Division to the right, but failed. [13, 36]

About 4:30 p. m. Companies G and F commenced an advance from Tranchée de Finlande, in the course of which the two companies became separated. Company G, on the right, reached Tranchée Tirpitz in the vicinity of Boyau de Kehl, where it remained during the night with no liaison to either flank. Company F advanced past Tranchée Tirpitz, reaching and reconnoitering the ravine to the north. Patrols working northeast from this point encountered machine-gun resistance.

 

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About 10 p. m. Company F withdrew from its advance position to a less exposed position just north of Tranchée Tirpitz, where it was at midnight, with no liaison to either flank. During the late afternoon and evening a detachment of regimental headquarters personnel advanced up the ravine southwest of the cemetery (in square 43), capturing prisoners. [13, 27, 29]

In the 3d Battalion, Company M, supported by Company I, attacked about 9 a. m., and advanced to the northwest over Hill 176. In this movement, Company M got behind Company G in the advance on Tranchée de l'Euphrate, and it remained south of that trench when Company G was withdrawn about noon for its afternoon attack from Tranchée de Finlande. After the withdrawal of Company G, Company M moved to the right so that its right rested on the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road. It moved forward and occupied Tranchée de l'Euphrate against slight resistance. Company L was held in battalion reserve behind Company I during the morning. Company K was again assembled in preparation for an attack in the afternoon. [13, 24, 31, 36]

During the afternoon the 3d Battalion was formed in the left of the regimental zone of action, and attacked about 5:30 p. m. with Companies K, I and M, from right to left, in line. Companies I and M guided on the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road, with Company M to the left of the road in contact with the French l1th Cuirassiers. About 7 p. m. the advance was halted, at which time Companies I and K took positions for the night extending from the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road about 400 meters to the east on a line, Depot—Tranchée Tirpitz. Company M, to the west of the road, advanced about 350 meters farther along the road, and took position west of it, holding a line for the night in Vallée Moreau. It extended to the west about 500 meters with an outpost to the northeast. Liaison was not maintained with the remainder of the battalion, nor was there front-line liaison with the French 11th Cuirassiers, whose right was about 600 meters east of Cote 172. [24, 31, 361

At 3 p. m. the French XXXVIII Corps ordered its troops not to advance by means of formal attacks, but to infiltrate by numerous small columns so as to get behind the hostile rear

 

17

guards. Groups of artillery were ordered to support what were termed "the advance-guard regiments advancing to the Aisne." [37]

During the day the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, was moved north to the Biesme in the vicinity of Vienne-le-Château. [38]

28 Sept.

For the attack of the 28th, the Machine-Gun Company, 368th Infantry, was divided between the 2d and 3d Battalions. Two companies of the 351st Machine-Gun Battalion, 92d Division, were attached to the 368th Infantry, which in turn attached them to the assault battalions. [24, 39, 40]

At 2:15 a. m. Groupement Durand issued orders, in accordance with instructions from the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, directing the 368th Infantry to attack in the direction of Binarville, astride the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road. The 368th Infantry was to be reinforced by a squadron of the French 10th Dragoons, which by this order was assigned a mission of preceding that regiment in the direction of Binarville and maintaining liaison with the right of the French 11th Cuirassiers. This squadron, with attached machine guns, had the specific mission of informing the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division as to the situation in the region of Binarville. The hour of attack was to be determined by the 368th Infantry. A group of 75-mm guns and one of 155-mm guns was to be at the disposal of that regiment. The 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, in division reserve, was ordered to move to Tranchée de Breslau, near the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road, prepared to repulse counterattacks from the east and northeast. This battalion was further ordered to determine the exact dispositions of the front-line battalions and establish liaison by patrols with the left of the 77th Division. [13, 41, 42]

On the right, the 2d Battalion was somewhat disorganized, and no coordinated attack was made during the morning. Company F. the most advanced unit, moved south from its positions just north of Tranchée Tirpitz about 5 a. m. It reorganized small scattered detachments which had been lost from the company in the advance of September 27. By 11 a. m. this company was in Tranchée de Finlande. During the morning Company H moved from Tranchée de Damas toward

 

18

Tranchée Tirpitz, paralleling Boyau de Fribourg. Company E was reorganized and placed on the right in Tranchée de Finlande. Company G, also assembled in Tranchée de Finlande, was in support. [23, 25, 26, 27, 28]

In two urgent field messages of 11:25 a. m. and 12:30 p. m., the 368th Infantry ordered the 2d Battalion to advance and take Tranchée du Dromadaire, to protect the right of the 3d Battalion, which at this time was approaching the line, Tranchée du Dromadaire—Tranchée Clotilde. The advance was taken up about 12:30 p. m. with Companies E, F and H in the assault echelon, and Company G in support. On the right, Company E advanced north along the narrow-gauge railroad paralleling Boyau de Turquie, keeping the railroad to its left, and about 4 p. m. reached positions just north of Tranchée Tirpitz. Enemy machine-gun and grenade fire held up the advance here, and about 5:30 p. m. the company withdrew to trenches in the ravine south of Tranchée de Finlande. In the center, Company F reached a position on the ridge 500 meters south of the cemetery by 5:30 p. m. Resistance was encountered and some disorganization resulted. A withdrawal was made to trenches south of the ridge, where positions were held for the night. On the left, Company H reached the trenches north of Tranchée Tirpitz. An attempt was made to attack west down Vallée Moreau toward the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road, but enemy machine guns stopped the movement. About 6 p. m. this company withdrew to Tranchée de Damas. [13, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28]

Company F was the only company of the 2d Battalion retaining an advance position for the night, and this company had no liaison to either flank. The three rear companies organized a line of resistance in the ravine south of Tranchée de Finlande. [25]

On the left, the 3d Battalion attacked about 7:30 a. m., with Companies K, I and M in line from right to left. Little opposition was encountered while crossing Vallée Moreau, and the whole line reached a position just south of the line, Tranchée du Dromadaire—Tranchée Clotilde. Here the advance was stopped, and about 2:30 p. m., when the hostile fire increased in

 

19

intensity, the three companies, less a detachment of Company M, withdrew south of the stream in Vallée Moreau for reorganization. Company L, from reserve in the trenches south of Depot, attacked eastward to relieve pressure on the 2d Battalion, but meeting resistance in the vicinity of Boyau de Stuttgart, withdrew in disorder and was again placed in reserve. Another advance on Binarville was made about 5:30 p. m. Companies K, I and M, astride the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road, again advanced to the stream in Vallée Moreau. Companies K and I on the right did not succeed in crossing the valley, but portions of Company M reached positions on the southern slopes of ridge 182. Through a misunderstanding of orders, parts of two companies began an unauthorized movement to the rear. This was checked south of Vallée Moreau, and the three companies finally held a line for the night astride the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road about 300 meters north of Depot. There was no liaison with Company F to the right, or to the left with the French who were holding along the same general line in the vicinity of Cote 172. The detachment of Company M, which had remained about 200 meters south of Tranchée Clotilde after the earlier withdrawal, retained its positions for the night, but was not part of the front line. [13, 24, 31, 36]

The 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, which up to this time had been in reserve of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, moved to Tranchée de Breslau during the day. At 3:30 p. m., Groupement Durand assigned it to the 368th Infantry to reinforce the attack on Binarville. The town was ordered taken by the 368th Infantry on this date. A battalion of the French 8th Cuirassiers was assigned to Groupement Durand, and was ordered to take Binarville if the 368th Infantry did not succeed in doing so. A detachment of the French 9th Cuirassiers was placed at the disposal of the 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, to act with that organization in the same manner as the squadron of the French 10th Dragoons assigned to the regiment. [13, 38, 43]

Late in the afternoon, when word was received that the 3d Battalion's advance was stopped, the 1st Battalion was formed

 

20

along the Binarville—Vienne-le-Château road for the purpose of relieving the 3d Battalion. This relief was completed the following day. [24, 38]

The orders of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division for a resumption of the attack on September 29 reaffirmed the original mission of the two groups operating on both sides of the Aisne. The group on the right was to make the main effort in the direction of the Binarville—la Mare aux Boeufs road, with the 368th Infantry and the French 9th Cuirassiers; from right to left. The Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road was assigned as the boundary between the French 9th Cuirassiers and the French 11th Cuirassiers. The assault battalion of the French 9th Cuirassiers was to pass through the left of the 368th Infantry and attack at dawn, while the 368th Infantry was directed to attack on a 1-battalion front to the right. [44]

Sept. 29

At 12:55 a. m., September 29, Groupement Durand ordered the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, to move from reserve and take position in Tranchée Tirpitz between Boyau de Kehl and Boyau de Fribourg. It was to maintain liaison with the 77th Division to the right, and the assault battalion of the French 9th Cuirassiers to the left. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 368th Infantry, were to be withdrawn from the front line. The detachment of the French 10th Dragoons, attached to the 368th Infantry for the movements of September 28, was ordered to assure liaison between the French l1th Cuirassiers, which regiment was to stay in position on the left, and the incoming assault battalion of the French 9th Cuirassiers. The Boyeu de Fribourg was assigned by this order as the boundary between the French 9th Cuirassiers and the 368th Infantry. [45]

No offensive action took place in the zone of the 368th Infantry during the morning of September 29. The 1st Battalion sent forward strong patrols to locate the positions of the advanced troops preparatory to the contemplated relief during the afternoon. At daylight Company F withdrew from its positions of the night of September 28-29 to Tranchée de Finlande. At 11 a. m. the 1st Battalion moved forward to effect the relief of the 2d Battalion in Tranchée Tirpitz. This relief was com-

21 

pleted about 3:30 p. m. The 2d Battalion went into reserve in the former French front line. [13, 24, 25, 38]

The relief of the 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry, was not accomplished by the 1st Battalion, French 9th Cuirassiers, by daylight, as ordered, but was completed at 4:30 p. m. The 3d Battalion went into support in Tranchée de Breslau and Tranchée de Magdebourg. [24, 31, 36]

At 12:35 p. m. the American I Corps notified the 92d Division that the division, less artillery, engineers, and the 183d Infantry Brigade, was to be attached to the French XXXVIII Corps. The French corps issued orders at 5 p. m. announcing this attachment, and assigning a zone of assembly south of the Biesme. Upon its relief by the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, the 368th Infantry was ordered assembled in the rear area under its own brigade and division command. After the regiment had rejoined the 184th Infantry Brigade, the 92d Division was to reconnoiter in the area between the right of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division and the American 77th Division, with a view to the ultimate engagement of the brigade in the direction of Binarville. [10, 46]

During the day the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division issued orders in preparation for another attack on Binarville. This order announced that the enemy occupied Tranchée du Dromadaire with numerous machine guns and impeded not only the advance of Groupement Durand on Binarville, but also the advance of the American 77th Division past Dépôt de Machines. The division artillery was ordered to place a preparatory fire upon the enemy defenses. At an hour to be announced later, the French 9th Cuirassiers, in conjunction with the French 11th Cuirassiers and the American 77th Division, was to attack Tranchée du Dromadaire, and hold it, so as to provide a base for attack on Binarville on September 30. [47]

This attack took place as ordered, at 6 p. m., and the fist Battalion, French 9th Cuirassiers, took the portion of Tranchée du Dromadaire to its front, while the French 11th Cuirassiers advanced to and held Tranchée Clotilde. The 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, to the right of the French 9th Cuirassiers, did not participate in this attack. With the exception of the taking

 

22

of a small portion of Tranchée du Dromadaire, no gain was made by the left flank unit of the 77th Division. [13, 30, 48, 49]

At midnight, September 29, the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division announced the success of the attack of 6 p. m., and stated that the enemy was preparing to counterattack. The mission of advancing to the north by the division was unchanged. Its right was ordered to continue on Binarville, flanking any resistance on the heights north of Vallée Moreau. Groupement Durand was specifically ordered to attack Binarville, with two objectives, the first the line of enemy works south of Binarville between Moulin de l'Homme Mort and Le Moinerie Ferme, and the second, Binarville. Two battalions of the French 9th Cuirassiers were designated for the attack. The French 11th Cuirassiers, to the left, was to support the attack. Artillery preparatory fire was to commence at noon, September 30. [50]

Sept. 30

On the 30th the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division ordered the two rear battalions of the 368th Infantry to areas of assembly south of the Biesme, and directed the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion from the line and its assembly in the same area. The French 9th Cuirassiers was ordered to assume the liaison mission of the 368th Infantry with the American 77th Division. [51]

The 92d Division ordered the assembly of its troops, designating an assembly area for the 184th Infantry Brigade, and announcing establishment of division headquarters at Sainte Menehould, about 10 kilometers south of La Harazée. The 368th Infantry was to march to the assembly area when relieved in the front line by the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division. [46, 52]

About 8 a. m. the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, sent strong reconnaissance patrols from Tranchée Tirpitz toward that portion of Tranchée du Dromadaire to its front, without encountering the enemy. About 11 a. m., Companies A, B and C advanced to Tranchée du Dromadaire, and Company D, in support, was moved to Tranchée Tirpitz. In the morning Groupement Durand issued orders announcing that the French 9th Cuirassiers was to attack at noon in the direction of Binarville,

 

23

and directing that the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, continue to occupy Tranchée Tirpitz and secure liaison with the 77th Division. [24, 30, 38, 53, 54]

This latter order did not reach the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, until late in the evening. In the absence of instructions and in the belief that its orders for the attack had miscarried, and also observing the commencement of the attack of the French 9th Cuirassiers, the battalion began the advance on Binarville at 2 p. m. Companies A, B and C, from right to left, were in the front line, and Company D in support. Binarville was entered about 4 p. m., and the battalion reorganized in the town. [24, 38, 53]

In the attack of 2 p. m. the assault elements of the French 8th Cuirassiers, in conjunction with the French 11th Cuirassiers to their left, advanced to the west of Binarville. They were stopped generally along the main road leading north from the town, in the vicinity of point 3258. Company A, 368th Infantry, accompanied these troops and formed in line with the French. Companies B and C, with French support troops, received heavy shelling in the town, and moved to positions in the enemy works about 300 meters to the south. An outpost of about 100 men was left in shell craters northeast of the town to the east of Caniveau Téléphone. Companies B and C established contact with the 77th Division, which advanced its front to an east and west line immediately south of Moulin de l'Homme Mort during the late afternoon. Company D remained in reserve about 1 kilometer south of Binarville. [30, 38, 53]

At 4 p. m. the 184th Infantry Brigade notified the 368th Infantry that the regiment had reverted to brigade control and that further orders would come through its headquarters. The 368th Infantry was ordered to hold the position it then occupied. The 367th Infantry was to take a position on a 1-battalion front to fill the gap existing between the right of the 368th Infantry and the 77th Division. The 367th Infantry was to move forward to take over the line during the night of September 30-October 1. [38, 55]

24

At 8:30 p. m. the 184th Infantry Brigade notified the 368th Infantry that the French XXXVIII Corps considered it inadvisable to move more American troops into the front line, as it was expected that within 24 hours the front would be so narrowed that French troops could cover it. Pending further orders, the 368th Infantry was ordered to hold the positions it then occupied. [13]

The order from the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division for the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, to withdraw was not received by the battalion until about 10 p. m. [38]

Oct. 1-5

About 4 a. m., October 1, Companies C, B and D, 368th Infantry, commenced to withdraw from the front lines held during the night of September 30-October 1, and moved to Tranchée de Damas. Company A withdrew from its position in the French front line north of Binarville about 7 a. m. and rejoined its battalion. [24, 38]

During the day the 184th Infantry Brigade reconnoitered positions of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, preparatory to relieving that organization. At 5 p. m. the French XXXVIII Corps ordered the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division to be withdrawn to army reserve, and its place in the front line taken by a group under the command of the 92d Division. Further details of this proposed relief of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division were issued by the French XXXVIII Corps at 10:30 p. m. However, before the relief could be accomplished, the French Fourth Army countermanded the relief orders. The 92d Division remained in reserve of the French XXXVIII Corps until October 4, when it was returned to the American I Corps. It was placed in reserve of that corps, and on the following day was assigned to the American IV Corps and began to move to the vicinity of Nancy. [10, 13, 30, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60]

 

25

CASUALTIES, MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

92d Division		Sept. 24-25	Sept. 26-Oct. 7	Total
365th Inf	W		8	8
	DW
	K
366th Inf	W		18	18
	DW		1	1
	K		1	1
367th Inf	W		2	2
	DW
	K
368th Inf	W	4	222	226
	DW		16	16
	K		42	42
349th MG Bn	W
	DW
	K
350th MG Bn	W		2	2
	DW
	K
351st MG Bn	W		3	3
	DW
	K
Others	W
	DW		1	1
	K		1	1
TOTAL		4	318	322
Attached Units
134th FA (37th Div) (Sept. 24-Oct. 7)	W
	DW
	K
135th FA (37th Div) (Sept. 24-Oct. 7)	W
	DW
	K
136th FA (37th Div) (Sept. 24-Oct. 7)	W
	DW		1	1
	K
TOTAL			1	1
AGGREGATE TOTAL		4	319	323

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action.

 

26

 Marbache Sector and Woevre Plain Operation and Subsequent Services

MARBACHE SECTOR AND WOËVRE PLAIN OPERATION,

 

OCTOBER 8—NOVEMBER 11

 SUBSEQUENT SERVICE, NOVEMBER 12, 1918—MARCH 1919

WHEN IT WAS DECIDED that the First Army would undertake the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, it became necessary to limit the St. Mihiel Offensive to the elimination of the salient itself. Therefore, at the conclusion of the St. Mihiel operation, the First Army established a defensive position along the general line, Pont-à-Mousson—Vandières—Jaulny—Woël—Haudiomont, while it concentrated the bulk of its forces west of the Meuse River and launched the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This position was immediately in front of the Hindenburg Line, which, on this portion of the front, was known to the Germans as the Michel Stellung. The outposts of the Michel Stellung extended along the general line, Prény—Bois de Grand Fontaine—Rembercourt—Dampvitoux—Jonville—Harville—Etain. Since the close of the St. Mihiel Offensive on September 16, the activities of the troops on this front had been limited to the defense of their sectors and conducting demonstrations in support of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. [5, 8]

The following paragraph, in italic, is a synopsis of the service of the 92d Division in the Marbache Sector and Woëvre Plain Operation. This synopsis is designed to make the principal

 

27

facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

The 92d Division assumed command of the Marbache Sector on October 9, relieving the Frcneh 69th Division as the right division of the American First Army. Its mission was to hold the line east of the Moselle River and harass the enemy. On October 12 it passed to the control of the American Second Army. The west sector limit of the division was extended west of the Moselle River on October 26. During its occupation of the Marbache Sector, the division patrolled actively and made plans for its action in case of an enemy withdrawal. On November 10 it attacked, capturing Bois de Cheminot, the southern edge of Bois de la Voivrotte and Bois Fréhaut. No advance was made west of the Moselle. On November 11 the division completed the occupation of Bois de la Voivrotte prior to 11 a. m., the hour the Armistice became effective.

Oct. 8-31

On October 8, the 92d Division, which had arrived two days previously from the reserve of the I Corps in the Argonne Forest, was assembling northwest of Nancy preparatory to relieving the French 68th Division. The latter held the line of the Marbache Sector which extended from La Renaissance inclusive, through Port-sur-Seille, Morville-sur-Seille and Lesménils to the east bank of the Moselle, just north of Pont-à-Mousson. The 92d Division completed the relief and assumed command of the sector at 11 p. m., October 9. By this relief it became the right division of the IV Corps, on the right of the First Army. The French 165th Division, French XXXII Corps, French Eighth Army, was to the right and the American 7th Division, then engaged in the relief of the 90th Division, to the left. The division artillery remained in training at La Courtine until October 20. The 62d Field Artillery Brigade, 37th Division, was attached to the 92d Division. [1, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67]

The mission of the 92d Division was to hold the line of the First Army east of the Moselle. It was to harass the enemy by frequent patrols, thus insuring control of the immediate foreground in the divisional sector. It was to hold itself in readiness

 

28 

for offensive action. The 183d Infantry Brigade occupied the front line with the 366th and 365th Infantry Regiments in line from right to left. The 184th Infantry Brigade was in division reserve. [63, 64]

On October 12 the front of the First Army was divided. That portion of the line from Port-sur-Seille to Fresnes-en-Woëvre, 18 kilometers southeast of Verdun, was placed under the command of the newly organized Second Army. The mission of the Second Army was to occupy and defend its zone, cooperate with the French Eighth Army to the east in defending the fortified areas of Frouard and Nancy, and to make preparations for eventual offensive action. Its line was approximately 45 kilometers long and was held by the American IV and French II Colonial Corps from right to left. The IV Corps had the 92d, 7th and 37th Divisions in line, from right to left. [5, 72, 73, 9l]

On October 23 the VI Corps assumed command of the 92d Division. On October 24 the 62d Field Artillery Brigade, less the 136th Field Artillery, was relieved. The 136th Field Artillery Regiment continued in support of the 92d Division until October 30. [68, 69, 70, 71]

The west limit of the VI Corps was extended on October 26 and the 92d Division was ordered to relieve elements of the 7th Division immediately west of the Moselle River by 8 a. m. Command passed at that hour to the 92d Division and the west boundary of the division became a line, Villers sous-Prény, exclusive—east edge of Bois des Rappes. The 367th Infantry, under direct command of the division, occupied the new position with directions to pay particular attention to flank liaison. The 368th Infantry, under the command of the 184th Infantry Brigade, moved to the positions vacated by the 367th Infantry, near Jaillon, 18 kilometers south of Pont-à-Mousson. in reserve. [71, 74, 75]

During the period October 9-31 patrolling was engaged in on the division's front. The 328th Field Artillery Regiment, 85th Division, was attached on October 31, and remained with the 92d Division until after the Armistice. [1, 76]

By the end of October, the First Army had accomplished the first part of its plan for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive and was

 

29

ready to undertake the second operation, i. e., cut the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières railroad, and drive the enemy beyond the Meuse. It was planned that an attack to accomplish this would be launched on November 1. [5]

Nov. 1-9

On November 1 the Second Army issued field orders covering its action in case the Germans withdrew on its front. The Nov. VI Corps issued its field orders on the same day. In case the enemy withdrew, it was anticipated that he would pivot on the Fortress of Metz, holding the outer defenses along the general line, Verny—Ancy-sur-Moselle—Amanvillers, all about 12 kilometers from the center of the city. Pivoting on its right, the Second Army was to follow closely and maintain contact with the French Eighth Army, to its right, and with the First Army. On the left of the Second Army, the French II Colonial Corps was to develop any weakness in the German defenses, and hold the bulk of its troops in readiness to push the enemy's withdrawal upon receipt of orders. It was to advance in the direction of Conflans-en-Jarnisy in close liaison with the right corps of the First Army, which would move on Etaín. In the center, the IV Corps, pivoting on the left of the VI Corps, was to advance its left in liaison with the French II Colonial Corps. The VI Corps was to hold its lines, send out strong detachments to keep contact with the enemy and maintain liaison with the French Eighth Army. To insure cohesion in the forward movement, use was to be made of formed units from support and reserve. Special attention was to be given to the prompt assembly of troops deployed in sectors. [77, 78]

The 92d Division issued its orders on November 4 covering its actions in case of an enemy withdrawal. These orders embodied the provisions of the field orders of the corps and army, and directed that troops deployed in the outpost zone and the zone of resistance were to be ready to assemble promptly and move forward. The division planned that two battalions of infantry would lead the advance, and that a detachment of two companies would maintain contact with the French to the right. West of the Moselle two companies were directed to maintain combat liaison with the 7th Division. [79]

In the meantime, the attack of the First Army, which had

 

30 

been launched on November 1, had been highly successful. By November 5, it had broken through the enemy's defenses and artillery positions west of the Meuse and was pursuing rapidly toward Sedan. Elements of the First Army had also forced a crossing of the river and established a bridgehead at Dun-sur-Meuse. [5]

The French XVII Corps relieved the French II Colonial Corps as the left element of the Second Army on November 6. [91]

In view of reports that the enemy was making preparations to withdraw, the Second Army issued field orders on November 6 which directed that the situation would be developed on D-day by a reconnaissance in force. A limited portion of the Hindenburg Line was to be seized and, should any weakness on the part of the enemy be developed, the movement was to be exploited to the fullest extent. The principal mission was assigned to the IV Corps. It was to employ two brigades of infantry, one from each division, to attack in the direction of Waville and gain the general line, northeastern edge of Bois de Grand Fontaine—north end of spur east of Rembercourt—northern edge of Bois de la Perrière—Grande Fontaine. Part of the artillery of the VI and French XVII Corps was to support the movement upon the request of the IV Corps. In addition, the corps to the flanks were to fire artillery demonstrations and conduct raids on their respective fronts. [80]

In the VI Corps it was planned, in addition to artillery fire, to support the reconnaissance in force by advancing the outpost line of the 92d Division east of the Moselle. The 183d Infantry Brigade was to seize Bois de Cheminot, Bois de la Voivrotte and Bois Fréhaut. These objectives having been gained, they were to be held and organized for defense. West of the Moselle, the 367th Infantry was to act in conjunction with the 7th Division. [81, 94, 95, 96]

At 5:45 p. m., November 9, the Second Army issued field orders designating November 11 as D-day for the reconnaissances in force covered by its orders of the 6th. At 6:30 p. m., having received reports that the enemy was withdrawing, it issued field orders directing that the follow-up operation covered by its orders of the fist, be initiated at once. [82]

31

By November 9 the enemy was in full retreat along the entire front of the Allied offensives. On this day the Allied Commander-in-Chief issued instructions to the Commanders-in-Chief to push their attacks vigorously. These instructions were transmitted by the American Commander-in-Chief to the First and Second Armies. Those for the Second Army were contained in a telegram received at 8:55 p. m. which directed that the enemy be pushed with all energy and decisive results obtained. Verbal orders were given to all corps commanders between 9 p. m. and 11 p. m., which were confirmed by field orders issued at 1:30 a. m., November 10. The result of these orders was to commit the Second Army to a general offensive instead of an attack of limited objectives.² [5, 97]

The attack was to be launched at 7 a. m. November 10. On the left, the French XVII Corps was to advance northeast in Nov. 10 the direction of Conflans. In the center, the IV Corps was to move on Vionville. The VI Corps was to push forward on both banks of the Moselle toward Corny, about 8 kilometers north of Vittonville. [83]

Preceded by telephone instructions, field orders of the 92d Division and 183d Infantry Brigade were issued at 3 a. m. and 7:50 a. m. respectively. These orders were based upon the instructions for the attack in support of the reconnaissance in force which had been issued on November 8. East of the river, the 183d Infantry Brigade was to advance with two battalions in the assault echelon to the line, Bois de Cheminot—Bois de la Voivrotte—Bois Fréhaut. Upon gaining this objective, the troops were to be reorganized and the advance continued to the second objective, the line, Longeville-les-Cheminot—Bouxieres-sous-Froidmont—Champey. Liaison was to be maintained with the French 165th Division to the right. West of the river, the 367th Infantry, with two companies in front line, was to advance in close liaison with the 7th Division to its left. [84, 98, 99]

On the right of the 183d Infantry Brigade, one platoon of

 

———

2. All of the service of the Second Army has been officially classified by the War Department as sector service. However, the offensive action of November 10-11 is often referred to as the Woëvre Plain Operation.

 

32

Company H, 366th Infantry, advanced and occupied Bois de Cheminot. Two platoons of Company F moved into Bois de la Voivrotte about 8 a. m., but were forced to retire about one hour later to the southern edge of the wood. They again advanced to the northern edge of the wood about 12:30 p. m. where they remained until about 4:30 p. m., when they were once more compelled to retire to the southern edge. [22, 85, 86]

The 365th Infantry advanced its 2d Battalion to the northern edge of Bois Fréhaut, and established a detached post on the Moselle. The gap between Bois Fréhaut and this detached post was controlled by machine guns sited on Mousson hill and on the west bank of the river. [24]

At 1:05 p. m. the 183d Infantry Brigade ordered the advance to the second objective resumed at 5 p. m. The 366th Infantry was directed to move its 2d Battalion on Bouxieres from the southeast, and provide suitable protection for the right flank of the battalion. The 1st Battalion, 365th Infantry, was ordered into Bois Fréhaut to attack through the positions of the 2d Battalion, 365th Infantry. At 3:55 p. m. the division revoked the orders for this attack, and at 4:10 p. m. the 183d Infantry Brigade ordered the consolidation of the positions gained. [87, 88, 99]

The mission of the 367th Infantry was one of protecting the flank of any advance made by the 7th Division. The 7th Division attacked at 7 a. m. against the ridge west of Prény, but because of heavy enemy fire withdrew during the morning. The 367th Infantry did not move forward. It patrolled the valley of Ruisseau Moulon during the day, denying it to the enemy, although the valley was never occupied as an outpost while the regiment was in the Marbache Sector. [24, 79, 89, 90, 104]

At 2:50 p. m. the Second Army issued field orders directing that the attack would be continued. The VI Corps ordered the 92d Division to seize the heights east of Champey and continue its advance astride the Moselle, maintaining liaison with the French XXXII Corps by detachments along La Seille Rivière. Elements west of the Moselle were to advance in liaison with the IV Corps. [92, 93]

 

33

During the evening the 92d Division directed the resumption of the attack on November 11. The 183d Infantry Brigade was directed to secure the line, Bouxieres—Champey, and exploit the enemy withdrawal by strong combat patrols operating to the north. The 367th Infantry was ordered to conform to the movements of the 7th Division. [100]

Pursuant to instructions from the division, the brigade directed the operation to begin at 5 a. m., November 11. [101]

Nov. 11

About 3 a. m., November 11, the 2d Battalion, 366th Infantry, reoccupied the northern edge of Bois de la Voivrotte. Two companies then advanced against Bouxieres, the remainder of the battalion providing flank protection to their right. The companies attacking Bouxieres reached the southern edge of the town but, being threatened by enemy machine-gun groups working around their flank, had retired to the northern edge of Bois de la Volvrotte by 9:30 a. m. In a later attempt to take Bouxieres they were again forced back to the wood. When hostilities were suspended at 11 a. m. the line rested in Bois de Cheminot and Bois de la Voivrotte. [24, 86, 99, 102]

The 365th Infantry made no advance from its lines in the northern edge of Bois Fréhaut. [24]

West of the Moselle, the 367th Infantry made no advance, as the right of the 7th Division did not attack. [103, 104, 105]

Nov. 12, 1918-Mar. 1919

On November 14 the division was relieved east of the Moselle River by the French 39th Division and assembled west of the river in the vicinity of Pont-à-Mousson. On December 15 it moved to the Mayenne area, American Embarkation Center, Le Mans, thence on January 30, 1919, to Brest for return to the United States. The leading elements sailed from Brest on February 1. The last elements arrived in New York on March 6. [1, 106]

34

CASUALTIES, MARBACHE SECTOR AND WOËVRE PLAIN OPERATION 

92d Division		Oct. 8-Nov. 8	Nov. 9-11	Total
365th Inf	W	362	221	583
	DW	9	4	13
	K	14	16	30
366th Inf	W	21	186	207
	DW	1	10	11
	K	3	16	19
367th Inf	W	20		20
	DW	1		1
	K
368th Inf	W	8	1	9
	DW
	K
349th FA (DS Oct. 8-19)	W	8	1	9
	DW
	K
350th FA (DS Oct. 8-19)	W		5	5
	DW
	K
351st FA (DS Oct. 8-19)	W	4	2	6
	DW
	K
349th MG Bn	W	3	1	4
	DW
	K
350th MG Bn	W	4	30	34
	DW
	K	1	1	2
351st MG Bn	W		1	1
	DW
	K
Others	W	3	3	6
	DW
	K
TOTAL		462	498	960
Attached Units
134th FA (37th Div) (Oct. 8-30)	W	1		1
	DW
	K
135th FA (37th Div) (Oct. 8-30)	W	6		6
	DW
	K
136th FA (37th Div) (Oct. 8-30)	W	4		4
	DW
	K
328th FA (85th Div) (Oct. 31-Nov. 11)	W
	DW
	K
TOTAL		11		11
AGGREGATE TOTAL		473	498	971

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action; DS=detached service.

 

35

INFANTRY DIVISION (COMBAT)

ORGANIZATION IN EFFECT NOVEMBER 11, 1918

 

Units	Number of units	Strength
Division Headquarters	1	304
Infantry Brigades	2	--
…Brigade Headquarters1	1	25
	(2)	(50)
…Infantry Regiment1	2	--
	(4)	--
…..Regimental Headquarters2	1	6
	(4)	(24)
…..Headquarters Company2	1	343
	(4)	(1,372)
…..Machine-Gun Company2	1	178
	(4)	(712)
…..Supply Company2	1	162
	(4)	(648)
…..Infantry Battalions2	3	--
	(12)	--
……..Battalion Headquarters3	1	3
	(12)	(36)
……..Rifle Companies3	4	3,072
	(48)	(12,288)
…Machine-Gun Battalions1	1	759
	(2)	(1,518)
…Medical Department and Chaplains1	--	127
		(254)
…Ordnance Department1	--	20
		(40)
…Veterinary Field Units1	1	4
	(2)	(8)
Field Artillery Brigade	1	--
…Brigade Headquarters	1	79
…Regiments, 75-mm Gun	2	3,036
…Regiments, 155-mm Howitzer	1	1,616
…Trench-Mortar Battery	1	177
…Medical Department and Chaplains	--	96
…Ordnance Department	--	49
…Veterinary Field Units	4	16
Machine-Gun Battalion	1	--
…Battalion Headquarters	1	30
…Machine-Gun Companies	2	356
…Medical Department	--	7
…Ordnance Department	--	2
Engineer Regiment	1	1,712
…Medical Department and Chaplains	--	31
…Ordnance Department	--	6
Field Signal Battalion	1	488
Trains	--	3,150
Total		28,105

 

1. Upper figures indicate number per brigade. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

2. Upper figures indicate number per regiment. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

3. Upper figures indicate number per battalion. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

 

36

 STRENGTH OF 92D DIVISION¹

Units	Aug. 31	Sept. 30	Oct. 31	Nov. 30
365th Inf	3,479	3,701	3,181	3,108
366th Inf	3,592	3,535	3,364	3,209
367th Inf	3,574	3,593	3,160	3,254
368th Inf	3,614	3,376	2,292	3,209
349th MG Bn	359	362	324	338
350th MG Bn	708	716	660	655
351st MG Bn	712	718	666	696
…..Total Inf and MG2	16,083	16,053	14,393	14,519
349th FA	1,333	1,502	1,418	1,421
350th FA	1,357	1,504	1,410	1,499
351st FA	1,573	1,708	1,687	1,721
…..Total FA3	4,468	4,938	4,742	4,849
317th Engrs	1,216	1,507	1,290	1,510
Others	3,258	3,513	3,929	3,963
TOTAL	25,025	26,011	24,354	24,841

 

1. Present with the units of the division; does not include absentees.

2. Includes both infantry brigade headquarters.

3. Includes field artillery brigade headquarters and the 317th Trench Mortar Battery.

 

GENERAL TABLE OF CASUALTIES 

	92d Division	Attached units	Total
Meuse-Argonne Offensive	322	1	323
Marbache Sector and Woëvre Plain Operation	960	11	971

37

Sources

 The following is a list of the sources on which the statements made in the preceding narrative are based. The numbers refer to the corresponding numbers in brackets at the ends of paragraphs.

1	Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces-Divisions. Prepared in the Historical Section, Army War College.
2	Table of Organization, G. H. Q., A. E. F., Dec. 1.
3	Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Sept. 1, 1919.
4	"My Experiences in the World War", Pershing.
5	Report of the First Army, A. E. F.
6	Directive, Allied Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 3.
7	Letter, Allied Commander-in-Chief to American Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 23.
8	Field Orders No. 20, First Army, Sept. 20.
9	Letter, I Corps to French XXXVIII Corps, Sept. 23.
10	Report of Operations, 92d Division, Nov. 18.
11	War Diary, 62d Field Artillery Brigade, Sept. 26-Oct. 5.
12	Plan d'Engagement No. 1420, French Ist D. C. P., Sept. 20.
13	Report of Operations, 368th Infantry, Nov. 15.
14	Ordre No. 10, Groupement Durand, Sept. 25.
15	Field Orders No. 43, 77th Division, Sept. 24.
16	Plan d'Engagement 11° Cuirassiers à Pied No. 1/5, Sept. 23.
17	Ordre Particulier No. 34/O. P., 1429/3, French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 23.
18	Withdrawal Order, Groupement Durand, Sept. 24.
19	Ordre d'Attaque No. 1439/3, French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 25.
20	Note de Service, Groupement Durand, Sept. 25.
21	Operations Orders Nos. 37 and 38, 368th Infantry, Sept. 25.
22	Report of Operations, 2d Battalion, 366th Infantry, Nov. 17.
23	Report of Operations, Company H. 368th Infantry, Sept. 26-30.
24	Special Correspondence, American Battle Monuments Commission. This pertains to information in the files of the Commission which was ob tained in the manner indicated in the preface.
25	Report of Operations, 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, Sept. 26-30.
26	Report of Operations, Company E, 368th Infantry, Sept. 26-30.
27	Report of Operations, Company F, 368th Infantry, Sept. 26-30.
28	Field Message, 368th Infantry to Groupement Durand, 8 p. m., Sept. 26.
29	Report of Operations, Company G, 368th Infantry, Sept. 26-30.
30	Dossier, Offensive Operations, French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 26-Oct. 10.
31	Report of Operations, 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry, Sept. 25-30.
32	Report of Battles, Skirmishes, etc., during the war, 308th Infantry, Feb. 3, 1919.

38

33	Ordre No. 1451/3/0. P., French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 26.
34	Ordre No. 27, French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 27.
35	Kriegstagebuch, German 76th Reserve Division, Sept. 27.
36	Reports of Operations, Companies I, K, L and M, 368th Infantry, Sept. 25-30.
37	Note No. 2459/3, French XXVIII Corps, Sept. 27.
38	Report of Operations, 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, Oct. 17.
39	Report of Operations, Machine-Gun Company, 368th Infantry, Sept. 25-Oct. 1.
40	Memorandum, 184th Infantry Brigade, 7:35 p. m., Sept. 27.
41	Ordre No. 39, Groupement Rive Droite, Sept. 28.
42	Ordre No. 4/O. P., French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 27.
43	Ordre No. 48 Groupement Rive Droite, Sept. 28.
44	Ordre Général No. 5/O. P., 1456/3, French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 28.
45	Ordre No. 55, Groupement Rive Droite, Sept. 29.
46	Ordre Particulier No. 2486/3, French XXXVIII Corps, Sept. 29.
47	Ordre Particulier No. 6/O. P., 1456/3, French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 29.
48	Reports of Operations, French 4th, 9th and 11th Cuirassiers, Sept. 26-Oct. 10.
49	Report of Operations, 308th Infantry, Sept. 26-Oct. 16.
50	Ordre Général d'Opérations No. 7/O. P., French 1st D. C. P., midnight Sept. 29.
51	Note 64/3, French 1st D. C. P., Sept. 30.
52	Field Orders No. 13, 92d Division, Sept. 30.
53	Reports of Operations, Companies A, B, C and D, 368th Infantry, Sept. 26-30.
54	Ordre No. 63, Groupement Durand, Sept. 30.
55	G-3 Memorandum, 184th Infantry Brigade, Sept. 30.
56	Ordre Particulier No. 2507/3, French XXXVIII Corps, Oct. 1.
57	Ordre Général d'Opérations No. 193, French XXXVIII Corps, Oct. 1.
58	Journal de Marche et d'Opérations, French XXXVIII Corps, July 11-Nov. 3.
59	Ordre Général d'Opérations No. 195, French XXXVIII Corps, Oct. 3.
60	Field Orders No. 14, 92d Division, Oct. 4.
61	War Diary, 92d Division, Oct 8-10.
62	Field Orders No. 38, IV Corps, Oct. 6.
63	Field Orders No. 17, 92d Division, Oct. 7.
64	Field Orders No. 17, 183d Infantry Brigade, Oct. 8.
65	Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, Ministère de Guerre, Paris, 1924.
66	Daily Operations Report No. 8, 7th Division, Oct. 10.
67	War Diary, 62d Field Artillery Brigade, Oct. 6-23.
68	Field Orders No. 1, Second Army, Oct. 11.
69	War Diary, 62d Field Artillery Brigade, Oct. 24-30.
70	Field Orders No. 5, Second Army, Oct. 21.

39

71	Field Orders No. 6, Second Army, Oct. 24.
72	Field Orders No. 4, Second Army, Oct. 16.
73	Daily Operations Reports, Second Army, Oct. 12-Nov. 11.
74	Field Orders No. 20, 92d Division, Oct. 24.
75	Daily Operations Report No. 17, 92d Division, Oct. 26.
76	Daily Operations Reports Nos. 1-22, 92d Division, Oct. 10-31.
77	Field Orders No. 13, Second Army, Nov. 1.
78	Field Orders No. 2, VI Corps, Nov. 1.
79	Field Orders No. 22, 92d Division, Nov. 4.
80	Field Orders No. 14, Second Army, Nov. 6.
81	Operations Order No. 7, 183d Infantry Brigade, Nov. 8.
82	Field Orders Nos. 17 and 18, Second Army, Nov. 9.
83	Field Orders No. 19, Second Army, Nov. 10.
84	Field Orders No. 24, 92d Division, Nov. 10.
85	Report of Operations, 366th Infantry, Nov. 11.
86	Report of Operations, 183d Infantry Brigade, Nov. 11.
87	Field Orders No. 20, 183d Infantry Brigade, Nov. 10.
88	Operations Memorandum No. 29, 183d Infantry Brigade, Nov. 10.
89	Daily Operations Report No. 39, 7th Division, Nov. 10.
90	Daily Operations Report, 367th Infantry, Nov. 10.
91	Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces–General Headquarters, Armies, Army Corps, Services of Supply and Separate Forces. Prepared in the Historical Section, Army War College.
92	Field Orders No. 21, Second Army, Nov. 10.
93	Field Orders No. 5, VI Corps, Nov. 10.
94	Field Orders No. 3, VI Corps, Nov. 6.
95	Letter, 92d Division to 183d Infantry Brigade, Nov. 8, Subject: Contemplated Activities required by Field Orders No. 3, VI Corps.
96	Letter, 92d Division to VI Corps, Nov. 8, Subject: Action under Field Orders No. 3, VI Corps.
97	Special Report of Operations, Second Army, Nov. 10-11, Dec. 29.
98	Field Orders No. 19, 183d Infantry Brigade, Nov. 10.
99	Report of Operations, 183d Infantry Brigade, Nov. 19.
100	Field Orders No. 25, 92d Division, Nov. 10.
101	Field Orders No. 21, 183d Infantry Brigade, Nov. l0.
102	Field Orders No. 26, 92d Division, Nov. 11.
103	Daily Operations Report, 367th Infantry, Nov. 11.
104	Daily Operations Report No. 40, 7th Division, Nov. 11.
105	Daily Operations Report, 92d Division, Nov. 11.
106	War Diary, 92d Division, Nov. 14.
107	Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches.

 

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