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Cover, Army Ground Forces Study No. 1

The Army Ground Forces

 

ORIGINS OF THE ARMY GROUND FORCES:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY, 1940-1942

Study No. 1


By

Lt. Col Kent Roberts Greenfield
and
Dr. Robert R. Palmer

 

Historical Section     •     Army Ground Forces

1946

 
HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

 
       
 

314.7 (1 Sept 1946) GNHIS

   1 September 1945
       
SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces    
TO:  All Interested Agencies    
       
1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

 

 

      

1 Incl:
   Historical Study

 /S/
J.L. TARR
Colonel, AGD
Acting Ground Adj General
            

PREFATORY NOTE

Study No. 1, Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, U.S.A. 1940-1942, is not a definitive history of GHQ. The objective of its authors was comprehensive, but it was restricted by their mission as members of the Historical Section, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, and by the inevitable conditions of the wartime historical project. Broadly stated, their objective was to explore the antecedents of the Army Ground Forces in the history of GHQ. 

Such an exploration was obviously necessary, since the evolution of the Army Ground Forces was dominated by the views of Gen. Lesley J. McNair, who directed the staff of GHQ, and since GHQ, from July 1940 until 9 March 1942, supervised the training of ground units for combat, a task which became the primary mission of the Army Ground Forces. As the study progressed it was seen that an understanding of the history of the Army Ground Forces would benefit by an account of the origin of agencies and policies later inherited by the Army Ground Forces and also by an account of the reorganization of the War Department in which that command itself originated, since no previous study of this was available.

A limitation dictated by the need for economy of effort was to confine research almost entirely to the records of GHQ. This decision seemed justified since the object was to set forth the point of view of GHQ as the predecessor of the Army Ground Forces. Other records were explored when necessary to complete or supplement those of GHQ.

It will be found that certain subjects, such, for examples, as the activities of GHQ as a planning and operational agency, and the reorganization of the War Department itself, are treated more fully, perhaps, than the restricted scope of the study required. In such cases the wealth of information found in the records of GHQ inspired the hope that incidental contributions might be made to an understanding of larger questions. At the same time it was believed that a better understanding of the mission, authority, and policies of the Army Ground Forces would result.

Helpful, in some cases invaluable, information or criticism in preparing the present study was obtained from Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony, Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte,  Maj. Gen. Clyde L. Hyssong, Maj. Gen. Frank A. Keating, Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolting, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, Brig. Gen. John M. Lentz, Brig. Gen. Paul McD. Robinett, Brig. Gen. William G. Walker, Brig. Gen. John S. Winn, Jr. Brig. Gen. Riley F. Ennis, Col. John W. Wurts, Lt. Col. George Seleno, and Maj. Kenneth W. Hechler.

The system of references and abbreviations used in the footnotes is explained in Appendix II.  

  

 

  

 

Kent Roberts Greenfield
Lt. Col., Infantry
Chief, Hist. Sect.

 

Contents

Chapter
..
Page
1.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY

 1
       Organization of the Military Establishment in 1940 1
     GHQ in the Mobilization of 1940-1942 3
     Separation of the Field Armies from the Corps Areas 4
     Training Tasks for GHQ 5
     The GHQ Staff 6
     GHQ as a Training Division of the General Staff 7
     Expansion of the Functions and Authority of GHQ, 3 July 1941 8
     Planning Activities 12
     Command Problems 13
     Expansion and Reorganization of the GHQ Staff 14
2.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRAINING UNDER GHQ

 16
       Authority of GHQ over Training 16
     State of Training in August 1940 16
     Preparation for the Citizen Army 17
     General Proficiency vs. Specialism in the New Army 20
     Large-Unit Training and Testing 21
     GHQ-Directed Army Maneuvers, 1941 23
     Morale 25
     Leadership--The Officer Problem 26
     Reemphasis on Essentials 27
     War: the Readiness of Old Divisions and the Creation of New Ones 27
     Summary of Training Principles under GHQ 29
3.

GHQ AND THE ARMORED FORCE

 31
       Establishment of the Armored Force 31
     Relation of GHQ to the Armored Force 32
     Training Directives and Maneuvers 32
     Organizational Problems: The Directive of 3 April 1941 34
     Status of the Armored Force: 3 April 1941 to 9 March 1942 37
     Conclusions 40
4.

GHQ AND TANK DESTROYER ELEMENTS

 41
       The Tank Menace, 1940 41
     Views of GHQ on Antitank Measures 41
     Delay in Preparing Antitank Measures 42
     Creation of Planning Branch, G-3, WDGS 44
     Creation of the Provisional Antitank Battalions 44
     Sources of Encouragement: the Antitank Conference of July 1941 44
     Testing of Antitank Weapons in GHQ-Directed Maneuvers 45
     Progressive Acceptance of Principles Favored at GHQ 45
     The Tank Destroyer Center and the Tank Destroyer Battalions 46
5.

THE RELATION OF GHQ TO AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING

48
       Development of Amphibious Training, 1940-1941 48
     The Role of GHQ 48
     The Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet 49
     Training on the Pacific Coast 50
     An Army Amphibious Training Center Projected 51
6.

THE ROLE OF GHQ IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRBORNE TRAINING

 53
       Origins of Airborne Elements 53
     The Transport Shortage and its Effects on Organization and Training 53
     Airborne Elements in the GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, 1941 54
     Projects for Further Airborne Development 54
7.

GHQ AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR SUPPORT TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

 56
       Responsibilities of GHQ for Air and Air-Ground Training 56
     Basic Problems in Combined Air-Ground Training 57
     Observation Aviation 57
     The Problem of Air-Support Tests, 1940-41 58
     Execution of Air Support Tests, Spring 1941 59
     The Air Support Commands and the 1941 Maneuvers 60
     Aviation in the 1941 Maneuvers 61
     Disagreements over Air-Ground Command Relations 62
     FM 31-35 "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces." 63
8.

GHQ AND THE DEFENSE COMMANDS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

 65
       The Role of GHQ in Planning the Defense of the United States 65
     The Principle of Territorial Command Unity and the Air Problem 66
     Creation of the Four Defense Commands 66
     Coordination of Antiaircraft Weapons and Pursuit Aviation 70
     Reluctance of Air to Accept Command over Ground Forces 71
9.

AN EXAMPLE OF GHQ AT WORK: 15-30 SEPTEMBER 1941

 73
10.

FAILURE OF GHQ TO DEVELOP ACCORDING TO THE PLANS OF 1921

 75
       The Outlook of GHQ on Its Mission 75
     Limited Powers of GHQ as a Planning and Operational Headquarters 76
     Problems of Incomplete Tactical Control 78
     The Air Problem 82
     Measures Taken to Improve the Position of GHQ 82
11.

PLANS FOR REFORMING THE ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

 83
       Reform of GHQ vs. Reorganization of the War Department 83
     The Point of View at GHQ on Reorganization 83
     Basic Problems Encountered in the Attempt to Strengthen GHQ (August-November      1941) 84
     The Decision to Reorganize the War Department 85
     Development of the Reorganization Plan (November 1941-March 1942) 86
     Summary 87
 
-

APPENDIX I: General Staff, GHQ 1941-42

90
...

APPENDIX I: Special Staff, GHQ 1941-42

91
     
...

NOTES

  
       Chapter I 93
     Chapter II 99
     Chapter III 104
     Chapter IV 107
     Chapter V 110
     Chapter VI 112
      Chapter VII 114
     Chapter VIII 118
     Chapter IX 120
     Chapter X 121
     Chapter XI 125
     
 
Charts
  
1.
 Organization of the War Department 9
2.
 Operation of GHQ--Relation of GHQ to War Department, Etc. 11
3.
 Map: Creation of Four Defense Commands 67
4.
 Peace Organization of Field Forces 69
5.
 Command Chart, Dec 1, 1941 77
     

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