Origins of the Army Ground Forces General Headquarters

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Cover, Army Ground Forces Study No. 1

The Army Ground Forces

ORIGINS OF THE ARMY GROUND FORCES:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY, 1940-1942

Study No. 1

By

Lt. Col Kent Roberts Greenfield
and
Dr. Robert R. Palmer

Historical Section • Army Ground Forces

1946

	HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

314.7 (1 Sept 1946) GNHIS			1 September 1945

SUBJECT:	Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces
TO:	All Interested Agencies

1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties. 2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory. 3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands. 4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department. BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

1 Incl: Historical Study		/S/ J.L. TARR Colonel, AGD Acting Ground Adj General

PREFATORY NOTE

Study No. 1, Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, U.S.A. 1940-1942, is not a definitive history of GHQ. The objective of its authors was comprehensive, but it was restricted by their mission as members of the Historical Section, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, and by the inevitable conditions of the wartime historical project. Broadly stated, their objective was to explore the antecedents of the Army Ground Forces in the history of GHQ.

Such an exploration was obviously necessary, since the evolution of the Army Ground Forces was dominated by the views of Gen. Lesley J. McNair, who directed the staff of GHQ, and since GHQ, from July 1940 until 9 March 1942, supervised the training of ground units for combat, a task which became theprimary missionof the Army Ground Forces. As the study progressed it was seen that an understanding of the history of the Army Ground Forces would benefit by an account of the origin of agencies and policies later inherited by the Army Ground Forces and also by an account of the reorganization of the War Department in which that command itself originated, sinceno previous study of this was available.

A limitation dictated by the need for economy of effort was to confine research almost entirely to the records of GHQ. This decision seemed justified since the object was to set forth the point of view of GHQ as the predecessor of the Army Ground Forces. Other records were explored when necessary to complete or supplement those of GHQ.

It will be found that certain subjects, such, for examples, as the activities of GHQ as a planning and operational agency, and the reorganization of the War Department itself, are treated more fully, perhaps, than the restricted scope of the study required. In such cases the wealth of information found in the records of GHQ inspired the hope that incidental contributions might be made to an understanding of larger questions. At the same time it was believed that a better understanding of the mission, authority, and policies of the Army Ground Forces would result.

Helpful, in some cases invaluable, information or criticism in preparing the present study was obtained from Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony, Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Maj. Gen. Clyde L. Hyssong,Maj. Gen. Frank A. Keating, Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolting, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, Brig. Gen. John M. Lentz, Brig. Gen. Paul McD. Robinett, Brig. Gen. William G. Walker, Brig. Gen. John S. Winn, Jr. Brig.Gen. Riley F. Ennis, Col. John W. Wurts, Lt. Col. George Seleno, and Maj. Kenneth W. Hechler.

The system of references and abbreviations used in the footnotes is explained in Appendix II.

KentRoberts Greenfield
Lt. Col., Infantry
Chief, Hist. Sect.

Contents

Chapter	..	Page
1.	GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY	1
	Organization of the Military Establishment in 1940	1
	GHQ in the Mobilization of 1940-1942	3
	Separation of the Field Armies from the Corps Areas	4
	Training Tasks for GHQ	5
	The GHQ Staff	6
	GHQ as a Training Division of the General Staff	7
	Expansion of the Functions and Authority of GHQ, 3 July 1941	8
	Planning Activities	12
	Command Problems	13
	Expansion and Reorganization of the GHQ Staff	14
2.	THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRAINING UNDER GHQ	16
	Authority of GHQ over Training	16
	State of Training in August 1940	16
	Preparation for the Citizen Army	17
	General Proficiency vs. Specialism in the New Army	20
	Large-Unit Training and Testing	21
	GHQ-Directed Army Maneuvers, 1941	23
	Morale	25
	Leadership--The Officer Problem	26
	Reemphasis on Essentials	27
	War: the Readiness of Old Divisions and the Creation of New Ones	27
	Summary of Training Principles under GHQ	29
3.	GHQ AND THE ARMORED FORCE	31
	Establishment of the Armored Force	31
	Relation of GHQ to the Armored Force	32
	Training Directives and Maneuvers	32
	Organizational Problems: The Directive of 3 April 1941	34
	Status of the Armored Force: 3 April 1941 to 9 March 1942	37
	Conclusions	40
4.	GHQ AND TANK DESTROYER ELEMENTS	41
	The Tank Menace, 1940	41
	Views of GHQ on Antitank Measures	41
	Delay in Preparing Antitank Measures	42
	Creation of Planning Branch, G-3, WDGS	44
	Creation of the Provisional Antitank Battalions	44
	Sources of Encouragement: the Antitank Conference of July 1941	44
	Testing of Antitank Weapons in GHQ-Directed Maneuvers	45
	Progressive Acceptance of Principles Favored at GHQ	45
	The Tank Destroyer Center and the Tank Destroyer Battalions	46
5.	THE RELATION OF GHQ TO AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING	48
	Development of Amphibious Training, 1940-1941	48
	The Role of GHQ	48
	The Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet	49
	Training on the Pacific Coast	50
	An Army Amphibious Training Center Projected	51
6.	THE ROLE OF GHQ IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRBORNE TRAINING	53
	Origins of Airborne Elements	53
	The Transport Shortage and its Effects on Organization and Training	53
	Airborne Elements in the GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, 1941	54
	Projects for Further Airborne Development	54
7.	GHQ AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR SUPPORT TRAINING AND DOCTRINE	56
	Responsibilities of GHQ for Air and Air-Ground Training	56
	Basic Problems in Combined Air-Ground Training	57
	Observation Aviation	57
	The Problem of Air-Support Tests, 1940-41	58
	Execution of Air Support Tests, Spring 1941	59
	The Air Support Commands and the 1941 Maneuvers	60
	Aviation in the 1941 Maneuvers	61
	Disagreements over Air-Ground Command Relations	62
	FM 31-35 "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces."	63
8.	GHQ AND THE DEFENSE COMMANDS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES	65
	The Role of GHQ in Planning the Defense of the United States	65
	The Principle of Territorial Command Unity and the Air Problem	66
	Creation of the Four Defense Commands	66
	Coordination of Antiaircraft Weapons and Pursuit Aviation	70
	Reluctance of Air to Accept Command over Ground Forces	71
9.	AN EXAMPLE OF GHQ AT WORK: 15-30 SEPTEMBER 1941	73
10.	FAILURE OF GHQ TO DEVELOP ACCORDING TO THE PLANS OF 1921	75
	The Outlook of GHQ on Its Mission	75
	Limited Powers of GHQ as a Planning and Operational Headquarters	76
	Problems of Incomplete Tactical Control	78
	The Air Problem	82
	Measures Taken to Improve the Position of GHQ	82
11.	PLANS FOR REFORMING THE ORGANIZATION FOR WAR	83
	Reform of GHQ vs. Reorganization of the War Department	83
	The Point of View at GHQ on Reorganization	83
	Basic Problems Encountered in the Attempt to Strengthen GHQ (August-November 1941)	84
	The Decision to Reorganize the War Department	85
	Development of the Reorganization Plan (November 1941-March 1942)	86
	Summary	87

-	APPENDIX I: General Staff, GHQ 1941-42	90
...	APPENDIX I: Special Staff, GHQ 1941-42	91

...	NOTES
	Chapter I	93
	Chapter II	99
	Chapter III	104
	Chapter IV	107
	Chapter V	110
	Chapter VI	112
	Chapter VII	114
	Chapter VIII	118
	Chapter IX	120
	Chapter X	121
	Chapter XI	125

	Charts
1.	Organization of the War Department	9
2.	Operation of GHQ--Relation of GHQ to War Department, Etc.	11
3.	Map: Creation of Four Defense Commands	67
4.	Peace Organization of Field Forces	69
5.	Command Chart, Dec 1, 1941	77

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